The German magazine KATAPULT, known for its visual journalism and social research, published an infographic in issue No. 39 (October–December 2025) that shocked the civilized world.

What KATAPULT Magazine No. 39 Showed

On the map is Ukraine, with the territories occupied by Russia highlighted in red: Crimea, the south of the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions, and most of Donbas.

The caption under the map is short but terrifying: 114,500 square kilometers.

The headline sounds simple, almost mundane — “Wie viel Land Russland in der Ukraine besetzt hat” — “How much land Russia has occupied in Ukraine”.
And below is a question that strikes any normal person:

“Wie viel das in deinem Land wäre?” — “How would this look in your country?”

Below the map of Ukraine, the editorial team placed fifteen mini-maps: Germany, France, Italy, Poland, Spain, Turkey, USA, Belarus, Finland, Portugal, Greece, Belgium, Czech Republic, Sweden, and Russia.

On each of them, the same area — 114,500 km² — is shaded in red, so everyone can see: if Russia took as much as in Ukraine, what would disappear on their own map.

This visualization turns dry numbers into a personal feeling — into a real, physical awareness of loss.

Scale: Comparison with Israel

To truly understand the scale, one just needs to look at the numbers.
The area of Israel in “internationally recognized borders” is 20,770 square kilometers.

If you add the Golan Heights and East Jerusalem — territories that Israel considers its own, (but more than 150 countries and the UN do not recognize their annexation, and recognition has been fully or partially expressed only by the USA, several Latin American countries, and some states in Africa and Oceania), — the total area will be about 22,000 square kilometers.

Add the controlled areas in Judea and Samaria — Zone C, about 60% of these lands, — and the area increases to 26,000.
And if you include all of Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip, it will be about 28,000 square kilometers.

Now the comparison.

The Russian occupation covers 114,500 square kilometers.
This is more than five times the size of all of Israel in “internationally recognized borders”,
and about four times larger than modern Israel along with Judea, Samaria, and Gaza.

Even if we recall the historical maximum of 1967–1982, when Israel controlled Sinai, the Golan, Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, —
the entire territory was about 88,000 square kilometers.

And even then, Israel was smaller than the currently occupied part of Ukraine — by almost thirty thousand square kilometers.

If you transfer a “spot” of 114,500 km² onto the map of the Middle East, it would cover all of Israel, all of Judea and Samaria, Gaza, and Sinai —
and there would still be room for Lebanon + Cyprus, or one and a half Qatar, or an entire Kuwait.

What Exactly KATAPULT Magazine No. 39 Printed

The KATAPULT editorial team did not limit itself to the map of Ukraine.
The issue’s pages feature maps of fifteen countries — from Germany to the USA —
and on each of them, the same red spot of 114,500 km² is marked.

The editorial wrote:

“Diese Karten zeigen, wie groß die von Russland besetzten Gebiete der Ukraine sind – im Vergleich zu anderen Ländern.”
(“These maps show how large the territory occupied by Russia in Ukraine is – compared to other countries.”)

These data show that if such a scale of occupation were transferred to any European country, it would lose a third or half of its territory.
And small states, like Belgium and the Czech Republic, would disappear from the map entirely.

KATAPULT makes the reader literally feel the scale of the catastrophe.
What looks like a red spot on the map is, in reality, cities, schools, streets, and millions of lives.

When a Map Stops Being Just Geography

On behalf of the editorial team of NAnews, we can say only one thing:
this map is not just a piece of journalism, but a visual scream.
In these lands, people are tortured, killed, raped.
Books are burned there, language is erased, children are stolen and prepared to one day take up arms against their country.

Every square kilometer on the KATAPULT map is a home that no longer exists,
and a family that will never return.

The publication of the German magazine is not about numbers, but about the conscience of the world.
About the fact that before our eyes, there is an attempt to rewrite the world,
and that Ukraine, defending itself, defends the very idea that
the borders of nations are not drawn with blood.

Ukraine must regain all its land — all of Donbas and all of Crimea.
Not partially. Not “by agreement”.
Completely. Because a world where territory can be stolen with impunity ceases to be a world.

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Understanding modern Russia through ceremonial formulas, state slogans, and pseudo-historical manifestos has long been impossible. The structure of this system is much more accurately revealed elsewhere: in the language of the zone, in the cult of power, in the hierarchy of ‘pahan — six’, in the romanticization of the bandit as a hero, and in the habit of turning violence into a norm. This idea is thoroughly examined in the podcast (Ukr.) “TYURYAGA.RU: Brigade, Brother, Word of a Guy and Other Hits of RU Culture” by the authors of Center for MordoRU Research, where prison culture is shown not as a byproduct, but as one of the basic codes of Russian public life.

The key bond of Russian culture today… PRISON! And this is not only because many Muscovites have served time or are planning to do so in the future. But consider that the current Russian elite not only does not disdain criminal chanson as a national style of music, but also pours crazy money into criminalized cinema — from films like “Brother” or “Boomer” to series — the classic “Brigade” and the more modern “Word”.

What caused such an infusion of the Russian people with prison culture and what consequences it has today — are discussed by Deputy Director of the CPI Alina Alexeeva and cultural sociologist Bogdan-Oleg Gorobchuk.

For the Israeli audience, this conversation is especially important.

In Israel, they understand too well what happens to a society where power begins to be passed off as truth, and aggression as character. When a regime grows next to the democratic world, feeding on criminal aesthetics, humiliation of the weak, and the cult of a harsh hierarchy, it is no longer a question of foreign pop culture. It is a question of security, political thinking, and how violence becomes an export commodity.

Why prison has become not a metaphor, but a model

In the discussed video, a harsh but accurate formula is voiced: the real deep Russia is most conveniently read through criminal psychology.

Not through officialdom, not through school textbooks, and not through the decorations of ‘great culture’, but through prison logic, where the world is divided not into citizens, but into castes, where dignity is replaced by status, and freedom is substituted by submission.

The essence of this model is extremely simple and therefore so tenacious. Either you are a ‘pahan’, or you are a ‘six’. The system does not like a third position. It poorly tolerates an autonomous person who does not want to either dominate or submit. That is why it so needs a constant ritual of inclusion in the pack: through fear, through violence, through symbolic or literal blood, through coercion to participate. The podcast separately analyzes the logic of teenage initiation, where the right to be ‘one of us’ must be earned through humiliation, fighting, and rejection of one’s own individuality.

This is especially noticeable in the example of the discussion of the series ‘Word of a Guy’. It is shown not just as a nostalgic product about the end of the USSR or about tough neighborhoods. In the video, it is interpreted as a screen textbook of Soviet-post-Soviet street and prison hierarchy, where a teenager is forced to ‘sew’ to a group so as not to remain an outsider, and belonging to the collective is almost formalized as initiation into a closed male order.

And here an important key point emerges. The problem is not in one series and not even in one genre. The problem is that this logic in Russia does not look archaic. The podcast authors directly say: this is not a museum exhibit and not a critic’s invention, but a living culture that continues to reproduce in school, in music, in everyday language, in male rituals, in politics, and in mass imagination.

From the yard to the state

An important part of the conversation is devoted to how street and prison hierarchy rises up the levels of society.

First, it’s the yard, school, teenage group. Then — the criminal world of the 90s. Then — the new elite, which stops being ashamed of criminal taste and begins to consider it a sign of strength and status. And then the main thing happens: the state does not destroy this culture, but negotiates with it, absorbs it, and turns it into its own tool.

The podcast emphasizes that the end of the 80s and the 90s gave this environment a huge chance. The collapse of old institutions, the fall of the authority of power structures, the struggle for capital, and the redistribution of property brought criminal mechanisms out of the shadows into the center of public life. Later, the authorities learned not so much to defeat this world as to balance with it and use its code as part of a new normality.

That is why in the Russian system, prison is not just a place of detention. It is a way of unifying society. It is a model that teaches: at the top, there should be one, the rest are distributed by ranks; humanity hinders management; humiliation is an acceptable method; fear is a useful resource. In the discussed video, this idea is voiced as one of the central theses.

Why this is important to understand in Israel

For Israel, where the issue of social stability is always linked to security, this topic is not theoretical.

The Russian-speaking environment in the country has faced the import of post-Soviet cultural codes for decades — from television nostalgia to the language of rough male ‘truth’. And if you do not timely distinguish where everyday habit ends and the normalization of violence begins, you can miss the moment when bandit aesthetics start to seem like a ‘strong style’, rather than a symptom of moral degradation.

Israeli society is built on the opposite idea: strength is needed to protect life, not to deify the predator. That is why it is important for the reader here to see the difference between military responsibility and criminal romanticism. Between the army as an institution of civil defense and a gang as a machine of domination. Between a defender and a ‘cool guy’. These are different worlds, even if from the outside someone wants to reduce them to one word — strength.

How cinema, music, and series trained the viewer

One of the strongest lines of the podcast is the analysis of not only ideology but also media.

Because no toxic system holds on fear alone. It needs an attractive shell. It needs evil to look stylish, and humiliation to seem natural.

The video authors recall how in the 90s and later Russian series and films about bandits became part of the general media space and in Ukraine too. ‘Brigade’, ‘Brother’, ‘Bandit Petersburg’, and other stories sold the viewer not just a plot about criminals. They sold an emotional package: brotherhood, oath, loyalty to the pack, the right of the strong, the charisma of a person without brakes. And for teenagers, this often worked as a ready-made role model.

The podcast separately mentions that after watching such stories, boys would come to school and literally start playing Sasha Bely. This is a crucial detail. Mass culture here did not reflect reality but taught it. It offered a ready-made mask of masculinity, in which crime looked almost like initiation, and an oath to the gang — as a high moral act.

Especially indicative is the analysis of the film ‘Brother’. In the discussion, it is called not a neutral classic, but a film that laid a time bomb. The reason is clear: the central character acts as a bearer of unconditional right to violence, and the story itself teaches the viewer not to empathize with the law, but to admire the person who shoots first and then justifies himself with talk of truth. When such aesthetics live in the mass consciousness for decades, they begin to form the political instinct of an entire country.

Chanson as the music of the national subconscious

Equally important is the musical part of this cultural code.

The video thoroughly discusses that for the new Russian elite of the 90s and subsequent years, chanson and criminalized aesthetics became not a shameful periphery, but an organic part of status. This was listened to, ordered in restaurants, marked ‘coolness’ with it, and demonstrated belonging to the right male world through it.

Another thesis sounds even harsher: this culture did not remain in the past. The podcast gives examples of modern tracks and trends where the chanson code, criminal language, and bandit image are again packaged in a fashionable form — through pop, TikTok aesthetics, ‘gangster’ recitative, and visual quotes from the old criminal world.

That is, the system does not just keep an archive. It constantly updates the showcase.

It is here in the middle of the conversation that it becomes especially clear why NANovosti — News of Israel | Nikk.Agency raises such topics for the Russian-speaking audience in Israel. It is not about a film review and not about someone else’s nostalgia. It is about cultural vaccination: the more accurately society recognizes the mechanisms of romanticizing violence, the harder it is to sell the old prison code under the guise of ‘tradition’, ‘tough character’, or ‘real male truth’.

School as an early conveyor

One of the most disturbing topics in the transcription is the school environment. It is directly stated that in the Russian model, children come to school and are divided into castes: ‘guys’ and ‘not guys’.

This is not just slang. This is the language of early sorting of people by the principle of strength and suitability to the pack.

The comparative emphasis is also important. Podcast participants note that in Ukraine, similar models were once also felt as inertia of the 90s and as a result of Russian cultural influence, but after the Revolution of Dignity and against the backdrop of war, the social structure began to change: children became closer not to bandit brotherhood, but to the image of a defender, a soldier, a fighter who answers not to a pahan, but to the country.

This is a fundamental fork. Where growing up is built around a criminal caste, a person learns to humiliate and submit. Where growing up is associated with responsibility and a civic role, he learns to protect and withstand blows without turning into a predator. The difference is colossal.

From the romance of the zone to war and politics

The heaviest part of this conversation begins where prison culture ceases to be a topic of series and music and moves into direct politics. The podcast insists: the romanticization of the zone in Russia is closely intertwined with the romanticization of war. The logic is almost literal — if crime, power, and domination have long been perceived as a normal path to status, then external aggression is easily presented as a continuation of the same male ritual.

The video directly draws a link between the recruitment of prisoners, Prigozhin’s practice, and the transformation of a former convict into an acceptable, and sometimes even heroized, participant in the war.

The formula sounds extremely grim: killed, served time, went to war, killed again, got out — and became part of the norm. The podcast authors emphasize that in Ukraine there is no such conveyor as a cultural model, whereas in Russia it literally comes ‘out of every hole’.

This explains a lot for Israel as well. When a country faces not just an opponent, but a society where violence is embedded in the mass myth of dignity, any negotiation illusions require additional sobriety. Because in front of you is not only the state apparatus but also a long-standing school of emotional habituation to cruelty.

Why ‘strength in truth’ turns into a license to kill

The podcast very accurately exposes one of the main substituted concepts of Russian mass culture: the famous formula about truth and strength has long been detached from ethics and has become a convenient verbal cover for arbitrariness. First, a person kills, and then begins to philosophize about truth. First, destroys, and then declares it justice.

Such a mechanism looks spectacular in cinema, but in real politics, it turns into justification for any aggression.

Hence the particular toxicity of such cultural products. They do not just make the bandit ‘understandable’. They teach the viewer an important psychological move: first to sympathize with the abuser, then to adopt his lexicon, and then to consider his moral justifications convincing. This is the deep work of propaganda, where the path to political violence is paved not only by news but also by soundtracks, series, replicas, memes, and archetypes.

Why the Russian model is dangerous for neighbors

Russia has long been unable to export attractive modernity. But it is good at exporting nerve, fear, rudeness, and infected cultural forms. This applies not only to politics but also to media. Where the Russian cultural code long remained the norm, it eroded the very notion of masculinity, solidarity, and success.

Instead of dignity came status.

Instead of freedom — belonging to the pack. Instead of law — the personal ‘truth’ of the strong.

For countries that are nearby, including Israel as a state with a large Russian-speaking community and a keen sense of historical threat, this is an important lesson. Criminal romanticism cannot be treated as a harmless style. Very often it is a training ground for future political barbarism.

What to oppose to this matrix

The answer to this cultural model is not in censorship hysteria and not in panic before every series.

The answer is in clear moral distinction.

Things need to be called by their names: bandit pathos does not make a person strong, prison aesthetics do not make culture deep, and violence, even beautifully filmed, does not become valor.

This is intuitively understandable to the Israeli reader. Here the price of error is too high, the feeling of real threat is too close, and it is too well known how easily the cult of power without morality turns into a cult of destruction. That is why the conversation about ‘Brother’, ‘Brigade’, chanson, and ‘Word of a Guy’ is not a conversation about someone else’s past. It is a conversation about how to recognize moral infection before it begins to pass itself off as the norm.

This is the main conclusion that follows from the podcast. Prison in the Russian case is not only an institution of punishment. It is a cultural factory, the language of power, a way of socialization, a source of pop heroes, and a political textbook for the masses. And as long as this factory operates, Russia will again and again produce not a citizen, but a pack member; not a free person, but a bearer of rank instinct; not a culture of life, but a culture of domination and death.

…
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Ukraine is transitioning the fight against stolen grain to a new format. After scandals with ships transporting agricultural products from temporarily occupied territories, Kyiv no longer wants to act manually — from one port to another, from one request to another, from one diplomatic scandal to the next.

On April 30, 2026, Volodymyr Zelensky announced that Ukraine is building a system to counter the Russian ‘shadow grain fleet.’ According to him, these are ships used to transport grain stolen from temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine. Kyiv wants to work in this direction just as it does with the Russian shadow oil fleet: through sanctions, evidence, pressure on intermediaries, insurance companies, shipowners, captains, ports, and buyer states.

Israel in this story remains just one of the latest episodes. The main thing now is broader: Ukraine shows that it will pursue not only Russian ships but the entire international chain that helps Moscow sell stolen grain as a regular commodity.

What exactly did Zelensky announce

On the evening of April 30, Zelensky reported that Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha informed him about contacts with partners and the synchronization of sanctions. Separately, the President of Ukraine highlighted work on the Russian ‘shadow grain fleet’ — ships that, according to Kyiv, transport grain taken from occupied territories.

This is an important formulation. Ukraine no longer speaks only about a specific batch of grain or a single ship. Kyiv is building a permanent mechanism that should preemptively identify the route, cargo, shipowner, flag, insurer, destination port, and companies involved in the deal.

Essentially, Ukraine wants to make trading in stolen grain toxic. So that every participant in the chain understands: if they accept such cargo, insure such a ship, process documents, or unload a batch, they may face sanctions, investigation, and an international scandal.

Why is this compared to the shadow oil fleet

The Russian shadow oil fleet has already become a separate sanction problem for the West. Moscow uses ships with opaque ownership, flag changes, complex routes, transshipments, and intermediaries to bypass restrictions and continue earning from exports.

Now Ukraine wants to apply a similar logic to grain. Only here it is not about oil, but about products that, according to Kyiv, were taken from captured territories: from ports, elevators, and agricultural areas under Russian control.

On November 25, 2025, Ukraine imposed sanctions against 56 sea vessels that, according to Kyiv, illegally entered Ukrainian ports temporarily occupied by Russia and exported food. The official statement from the President of Ukraine directly mentioned the closed ports of Sevastopol and Feodosia, as well as thousands of tons of Ukrainian wheat, sunflower, and other agricultural products.

How Ukraine plans to pressure other countries

The main tool is not military, but legal, diplomatic, and sanction-based. Ukraine cannot physically stop ships in foreign ports, but it can make their reception a problem for the receiving country.

The first way is official requests. Kyiv can send documents to states requesting to detain the ship, arrest the cargo, seize ship documentation, take grain samples, and interrogate the crew. This approach was applied in the case of PANORMITIS: Ukraine asked to check the origin of the cargo and not allow it to pass as a regular commercial batch.

The second way is sanction synchronization with partners. Ukraine seeks to ensure that its sanction lists do not remain only an internal Ukrainian document but transition to a mode of international pressure: the EU, USA, UK, Switzerland, and other partners can impose restrictions against ships, owners, captains, traders, and intermediary companies.

The third way is public market warning. After the situation with PANORMITIS, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha stated that this is a signal for ships, captains, operators, insurers, and governments: do not buy stolen Ukrainian grain and do not become part of the crime.

Who will be targeted first

Ukraine will pressure not only buyer countries. Most likely, the main targets will be those who make the scheme possible.

These are shipowners and operators who provide ships. These are captains who enter closed ports or participate in dubious transshipments. These are companies that process documents and sell the cargo further. These are insurers, without whom large maritime trade becomes risky. These are ports that accept cargo even when the origin of the grain raises questions.

A separate area is flag states. If a ship sails not under the Russian flag, Ukraine can appeal to the country of registration and demand a response: inspections, license revocations, registry exclusions, or at least an official investigation. Ukrainian sanction materials have already indicated that some ships sailed under flags of countries other than Russia, and Kyiv intends to work with such states separately.

Which countries are already featured in the routes

According to Ukrainian reports and international media, the problem is not limited to one direction. Materials on the Russian grain fleet mentioned deliveries to various countries in the Middle East and the Mediterranean. Publicly mentioned were Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, and Israel, as well as other markets where products may end up after re-registration or mixing of batches.

Reuters reported that from January to April 2026 alone, 25 ships of the Russian grain fleet made about 50 voyages from occupied Ukrainian ports to third countries, exporting more than 850 thousand tons of grain. This is no longer isolated smuggling but stable maritime logistics.

For Ukraine, this is fundamental. If such routes are not broken, Russia gains two benefits: it profits from stolen products and makes the occupation economically beneficial for itself.

Why this becomes an international problem

Stolen grain is difficult to trace after mixing. A trader can claim that the batch is Russian. A carrier can refer to documents. An importer can say they are not obliged to check the political history of each cargo. A port can assert that it only works with formal papers.

This is precisely what the scheme relies on. The more intermediaries between the occupied territory and the final buyer, the easier it is to blur the origin of the goods.

NANews — News of Israel | Nikk.Agency in this context is important to consider not as a story about one port or one country, but as part of a larger question: can Ukraine turn evidence of stolen grain into an international mechanism of accountability.

What can the EU do

The European Union has already indicated that it is ready to consider sanctions against individuals and companies in third countries if they help Russia bypass restrictions or finance the war. In the context of the grain scandal, European representatives spoke about their readiness to apply measures against those involved in such schemes.

This is a key point. If the threat of sanctions becomes real, the problem will go beyond Ukrainian statements. Then a buyer in any country will consider not only the price of grain but also the risk of losing access to the European market, banking operations, insurance, and international contracts.

For business, this is often stronger than moral arguments. It’s one thing to argue with Kyiv. It’s another to end up on the EU or US sanctions list.

Why ports and insurers become a weak point of the scheme

Maritime trade depends on trust. A ship must be insured, documents must be accepted, a port must allow entry, cargo must be paid for, a bank must process the payment. If even a few elements of the chain start to refuse, the scheme becomes more expensive and risky.

That’s why Ukraine will work not only with governments but also with the market. A captain must understand that his name may end up on a sanctions list. An insurance company must understand that servicing such a voyage may lead to an investigation. A port must understand that unloading a dubious batch may become a political scandal.

This will not instantly stop the entire scheme. But it changes the cost of risk.

What the new strategy of Kyiv means

Ukraine is effectively opening a new front — not military, but economic-legal. The goal is not to let Russia calmly turn occupation into export, and stolen grain into a normal international commodity.

To achieve this, Kyiv will collect data on ships, publish lists, impose sanctions, seek synchronization with partners, warn buyer countries, pressure ports, and work through the prosecutor’s office. Individual cases, like PANORMITIS, become not an end in themselves but a test of the system: can a ship be stopped before unloading, can an importer be forced to refuse a batch, can fear be created for the next participants in the route.

The main meaning of Zelensky’s statement is that Ukraine no longer wants to chase each ship at the last minute. Kyiv is trying to build a network in which the Russian grain fleet will find it increasingly difficult to hide behind flags, intermediaries, paper documents, and the indifference of buyer countries.

And if such a system works, then for Russia, stolen grain will cease to be easy prey. It will become a cargo with a political, legal, and sanction trail.

…
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In Haifa, the laureates of the city’s title “Honorary Citizen of Haifa” were announced — in Hebrew, this is יקירי העיר חיפה. Among the 12 new laureates for 2025 was an immigrant from Ukraine: Mira Gross (מירה גרוס), a native of Chernivtsi.

The award ceremony took place on January 8, 2026, at the Krieger Center — מרכז קריגר. The official list of laureates was published there as well. In the municipality’s materials, next to Mira Gross’s name, her public position is indicated: «יו”ר מועצת בני ברית חיפה» — chairperson of the council of B’nai B’rith Haifa (בני ברית חיפה), with an explanation of her leadership in volunteer initiatives in the fields of health, women’s support, work with teenagers with special needs, and projects related to the joint life of different communities in the city.

Mira Gross’s story is an example of a “quiet” contribution that rarely becomes the hero of loud headlines. But it is precisely such biographies of the city that are usually noted: they contain decades of work, responsibility, human resilience, and a habit of seeing things through to completion.

What the title “Ikarim of Haifa” (יקירי העיר חיפה) means

The award “יקירי העיר חיפה” is not a popularity contest or a formal “checkmark” for one successful project. The municipality emphasizes: the title is awarded once a year and, as a rule, to no more than 12 people. The rules specify an age criterion: candidates are considered if they are 70+, as well as the importance of long-term residence in the city and that the “center of life” of the person is in Haifa. The commission, as noted, takes into account the demographic picture of the city when possible.

Simply put, it is always a story about a long distance. To be noticed at such a level, you need to be useful for years — in a hospital, in a school, in public structures, in city projects, in places where help does not look “media-friendly,” but without it, everything falls apart.

Chernivtsi → Israel: the beginning of Mira Gross’s biography (מירה גרוס)

In the official biography published by the municipality, it is stated that Mira Gross was born in 1948 in Chernivtsi (Ukraine). The names of her parents are also listed: Zalman and Sarah Berkovich.

It is separately emphasized that the family had the status of «מסורבת עלייה» — “refuseniks”: repatriation was not a simple procedure, and permission to leave had to be obtained. In 1972, she repatriated to Israel with her husband and three-month-old daughter. This detail is important not “for sentimentality,” but for understanding reality: her move to a new country did not begin with a “period of adaptation in peace,” but immediately with responsibility and domestic tension.

The same biography states that her husband is Leon Gross (ליאון גרוס), a football player for Dynamo Kyiv. For the Haifa audience, this is not an empty reference: Leon Gross was associated with Israeli football after repatriation, so the surname is recognizable in the city not only in the medical field.

Education and professional base: not “just a nurse”

Official data from the municipality adds details that are usually lost in a short retelling.

Mira Gross is listed as having a bachelor’s degree in biology and nursing. Later, she continued her studies and professional development — this is an important element of her career because nursing in Israel at the managerial level has long ceased to be just a “craft” and requires administrative and systemic competencies.

In this biography, there is no sense of “careerism for the sake of career.” Rather, it is a habit of learning and expanding competencies to be responsible for people and processes in the hospital without self-deception.

“Lin” (מרכז רפואי לין): 43 years of medicine and responsibility for the care system

Professionally, Mira Gross is a nurse. The official biography states that approximately six months after repatriation, she began working in the healthcare system. Later, she specialized in diabetes, and over time reached a managerial position at the medical center “Lin” in Haifa — מרכז רפואי לין (this is a Clalit structure, כללית).

Sources mention two close formulations: אחות ראשית (chief nurse) and מנהלת הסיעוד (director/manager of the nursing service). To sound precise and “without hesitation” in Russian, it is more accurate to write: head of the nursing service at the “Lin” medical center.

This is not a “desk job.” It is responsibility for care standards, training, and quality of nursing staff work, process organization, resource distribution, and communication between departments. Usually, at this level, a person becomes the one who keeps the clinic “in shape” every day — without unnecessary noise.

Mira Gross retired in 2016. If counted by public chronology (work shortly after 1972–1973 and until 2016), the figure “43+ years” seems justified. The Israeli publication Haipo in an article about her retirement states it directly: 43 years of work in the nursing and management system. The farewell evening is also described there, attended by about 120 colleagues according to the publication.

In a separate note by Haipo about the appointment of her successor, another important detail is added: Mira Gross was the head of the nursing service at “Lin” for about two decades. This is not just “worked for a long time,” but “managed the system for a long time,” which is a key point for the hospital.

Work beyond the hospital: education, public health, and systemic projects

The official biography of the municipality emphasizes: her activities were not limited to the walls of “Lin.”

Among the directions mentioned are projects on health education, as well as participation at the level of interaction with healthcare structures. The biography also features a Ministry of Health project related to promoting a healthy lifestyle, mentioning the format of lectures and meetings for different audiences — from children to the elderly.

These details are important for one reason: they show that her career developed towards public health and a systemic approach — when you think not only about the current patient but also about how to make people less sick and better understand what is happening to them.

After retirement: B’nai B’rith Haifa (בני ברית חיפה) as a continuation of “city work”

If the story ended in 2016, it would already be a strong biography.

But it continues — and it is here that the second layer appears, which the municipality directly associates with the awarding of the title “יקירי העיר חיפה”.

After retiring, Mira Gross continued her public activities in B’nai B’rith Haifa (בני ברית חיפה). In the official list of laureates, next to her name, the position is indicated: יו”ר מועצת בני ברית חיפה — chairperson of the organization’s council.

The municipality formulates the directions of her work quite clearly: volunteer projects in the field of health, support for women, assistance to teenagers with special needs, initiatives related to inter-community dialogue and “joint life” in the city.

A separate congratulation from the B’nai B’rith organization after the ceremony (dated January 9, 2026) adds specifics: she is credited with helping to open new divisions, supporting women, working with teenagers, with “lone soldiers,” and with immigrants, as well as promoting quality of life and health in the community.

It is important to emphasize this in simple language: it is not about “symbolic participation,” but about work that requires time, connection with people, organizational skills, and the ability to constantly engage.

In local publications related to B’nai B’rith, practical projects are also mentioned — for example, initiatives to help children from low-income families (such as providing school backpacks). They are useful as a fact: they show the scale of “earthly” work that does not require a camera.

Why Haifa noted such a biography

When the municipality describes the meaning of the “ikarim of the city” award, a clear criterion is mentioned: these are people who have left a mark on the life of Haifa.

Mira Gross’s story fits this criterion almost “textbook-like,” but without textbook pathos:

• aliyah from Chernivtsi, the difficult path of a “refusenik” family;
• decades of medicine in Haifa;
• leadership role in the nursing service at “Lin”;
• continuation of public work after retirement, in structures that really help people;
• combination of professional experience and volunteer practice.

This looks like normal city logic: Haifa recognizes those who have been doing work for years on which others depend. And does so without the need to turn a person into a “poster.”

Why this is important for the “Jews from Ukraine” section

Chernivtsi is a city with a strong Jewish history, and for many Israelis of Ukrainian origin, this geography is not abstract but personal.

Mira Gross’s story is not about loud statements, scandals, or “big politics.” It is about how Jews from Ukraine integrated into Israel through systemic professions and public responsibility: hospitals, education, volunteer networks, support for those in need.

And perhaps this is one of the most accurate ways to talk about “contribution”: not with slogans, but with biographies that show how many years a person has held the city in their hands.

NAnews — News of Israel | Nikk.Agency. – in our section “Jews from Ukraine“.

…
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The cargo ship Panormitis will not be unloaded in Haifa

The scandal surrounding the grain, which Ukraine considers to have been exported from territories occupied by Russia, has reached an important resolution for Israel. The ship Panormitis, which was near Haifa and awaiting the opportunity to unload, will not receive permission to dock for unloading the disputed cargo.

This is not just a port story and not an ordinary commercial dispute between a supplier and a buyer. It is about a cargo that Kyiv associates with a systematic scheme of exporting Ukrainian grain from territories under Russian occupation. Ukraine has officially asked Israel not only to refuse the ship but also to conduct investigative actions: arrest the ship and cargo, seize documents, take grain samples, and interrogate the crew.

On the morning of April 30, 2026, it became known that the Israeli side would not allow the unloading of Panormitis in the port of Haifa. According to Israeli media, importer Zenziper refused to accept the batch of wheat and stated that the Russian supplier would have to find another place for unloading.

For Israel, this decision removes the most acute risk: the disputed cargo will not enter the country’s market through Haifa.

But the legal part of the story is not yet closed.

What Ukraine demanded

Ukraine’s Prosecutor General Ruslan Kravchenko reported that Panormitis was heading to the Israeli port of Haifa with grain, which, according to the Ukrainian version, was partially obtained through transshipment from another ship. Kyiv asked Israel to confiscate the ship and cargo, conduct a search, seize ship and cargo documentation, take grain samples, and interrogate the crew members.

This moment makes the situation particularly sensitive. If the ship simply leaves Haifa, Israel will formally avoid unloading but will not answer the main question: will there be an investigation into the evidence provided by Ukraine.

The Ukrainian side claims that this is not about a single episode but a broader scheme. Reuters reported that Kyiv claimed hundreds of thousands of tons of grain were exported from occupied territories in the first months of 2026 through dozens of voyages. The management of Panormitis, for its part, denied the Ukrainian origin of the cargo and claimed that the grain was Russian.

Why this became a diplomatic conflict

Initially, Israeli authorities tried to act cautiously: without loud decisions, without a sharp conflict with Russia, and without immediate public acknowledgment of Ukrainian claims. Israel’s Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar confirmed that Kyiv’s official request was received and is being considered by the relevant authorities.

However, the situation quickly went beyond bureaucratic correspondence.

Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky warned that sanctions could be imposed against those involved in such supplies—not only Ukrainian but also with the participation of European partners. AP reported that Kyiv had already linked the story to possible sanctions consequences and accused Israel of insufficient response to previous signals about the grain.

For the Israeli audience, the question here is not only “whose grain.” The question is broader: can Israel allow goods to pass through its ports, the origin of which Ukraine associates with Russian occupation and war financing.

In the middle of this story, it is clear why NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency examines such topics specifically in the Israeli context: this is not a distant Ukrainian-Russian dispute, but a question of Israel’s reputation, relations with Kyiv, pressure from the EU, and the moral cost of trading with Russian structures.

Haifa found itself at the center of someone else’s war

The port of Haifa in this story became not just a point on the map. It turned into a symbol of how Russia’s war against Ukraine reaches Israel through logistics, grain, business contracts, insurance documents, and importers’ decisions.

Earlier, the Ukrainian side had already reported another ship—Abinsk, which, according to Kyiv, managed to unload in Haifa despite warnings. This part of the conflict increased Ukraine’s irritation and made Panormitis a test for Israeli authorities.

Now the result is different: the cargo is not being unloaded.

This is important.

But if the ship leaves without a search, seizure of documents, and inspection of grain samples, Israel will effectively choose the minimal reaction: not accepting the cargo but not turning the story into a direct legal confrontation with the Russian supplier.

What the refusal to dock means for Israel

The decision not to allow the unloading of Panormitis can be considered a tactical victory for Ukraine and public pressure. Kyiv has shown that it can translate the issue of stolen grain from the level of publications and diplomatic statements into a practical plane: if there is suspicion of cargo from occupied territories, the port should not become a convenient point of sale.

For Israel, this decision reduces the risk of a sanctions scandal.

But it does not eliminate the more complex question: who exactly checked previous deliveries, which companies participated in the chain, which government bodies issued permits, and how such cargoes could reach the Israeli market at all.

Here, it cannot all be reduced to “private business.” Grain import is not a market purchase. It involves documents, customs, sanitary checks, permits, logistics, port infrastructure, and commercial connections. Therefore, Ukrainian claims inevitably affect not only the importing company but also the state control system.

The main outcome is still intermediate

At the moment, the main thing is known: Panormitis will not unload the disputed wheat in Haifa. The Russian supplier will have to find another port.

But two questions remain open.

First, will Israel conduct a full investigation, as Ukraine requests.

Second, will this case become the beginning of a systematic review of grain supplies related to Russia and occupied Ukrainian territories, or will it all be limited to one refusal to unload after a public scandal.

For Israel, this is not a minor episode of foreign trade. It is a test of the ability to stop in time when a commercial contract starts to smell not like wheat, but like war.

…
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On April 29, 2026, the story with the Russian ship PANORMITIS near Haifa shifted from a diplomatic conflict to Israeli domestic politics. The first noticeable reaction was the position of Knesset member Merav Michaeli from the party “Democrats“, who is part of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee.

She stated that she sent an urgent demand to the Prime Minister to stop the unloading of the Russian ship PANORMITIS at the port of Haifa. According to an investigation by Avi Scharf in Haaretz, it concerns grain that Russia might have exported from the occupied territories of Ukraine. The Ukrainian side also says that the issue is not limited to one ship: Kyiv considers such deliveries as part of a broader scheme of exporting Ukrainian grain through Russian channels.

Why Michaeli’s statement became a political signal

Merav Michaeli framed the claim not as a technical issue of the port, customs, or documents. She called what is happening not only a moral problem but also a strategic mistake for Israel.

Her statement said:

“I sent an urgent demand to the Prime Minister to stop the unloading of the Russian ship PANORMITIS at the port of Haifa, which, according to Avi Scharf’s investigation in Haaretz, is transporting grain stolen by Russia from territories it occupied in Ukraine. I also demanded explanations from him regarding reports that dozens of similar ships have been importing stolen Ukrainian grain into Israel throughout the current government’s term.

This is about moral decline and strategic recklessness: Israel is becoming a transit corridor allowing Russia to bypass sanctions, at the very time when it is arming our worst enemies, primarily Iran. This is a direct continuation of the government’s irresponsible course, which time and again prefers dubious ties with Putin over the outstretched hand of President Zelensky, causing colossal damage to Israel’s reputation in the democratic world, firmly standing on Ukraine’s side.

The citizens of Israel deserve an answer: why does the government choose Putin — and who profits from this at the expense of our national security?

Party “Democrats”.

This is an important moment specifically for the Israeli audience. The discussion is no longer just about where the wheat came from and who processed the documents. The question is broader: can Israel in 2026 afford to appear as a country through which goods related to the Russian occupation of Ukrainian territories pass, when Russia itself maintains ties with Iran — Israel’s main strategic enemy.

Formula of the claim: grain, sanctions, Iran

Michaeli’s statement contains three levels of accusation.

The first is moral. If the grain is indeed exported from the occupied territories of Ukraine, its acceptance in Israel becomes a problem not only for business but also for the state.

The second is diplomatic. Ukraine has already publicly warned Israel about possible consequences, including sanctions against those involved in such trade or benefiting from it. Kyiv also states that it has conveyed information and protests to Israel through diplomatic channels.

The third is strategic. Russia is not a neutral player for Israel. Moscow maintains ties with Iran, and Iran arms and directs forces that have threatened Israel for years through regional proxies. That is why in Israeli politics, the topic of stolen Ukrainian grain begins to sound like a national security issue, not just a trade dispute.

Haifa found itself at the center of an international conflict

According to international media reports, the ship PANORMITIS was near Haifa amid Ukrainian demands to prevent unloading. Earlier, the Ukrainian side had already protested due to another ship, which, according to their claims, delivered grain of dubious origin to Israel.

For Israel, this is especially sensitive because the port of Haifa is not an abstract point on the map. It is one of the symbols of Israel’s economy, logistics, and the country’s connection to the outside world. If it becomes associated with a channel for bypassing sanctions or legalizing stolen Ukrainian grain, the blow will be not only to specific importers.

It will be to the reputation of the state.

What exactly does Michaeli demand

Michaeli demands two things: to stop the unloading of PANORMITIS and to get explanations regarding reports of dozens of similar ships that allegedly could have been importing stolen Ukrainian grain into Israel during the current government’s tenure.

The meaning of her statement is simple: Israeli citizens should know who made the decisions, who gave the permissions, who checked the origin of the cargo, and who profited from this trade.

This is where the topic goes beyond the usual formula “it’s private business.” Importing grain into the country does not happen in a vacuum. There are port procedures, customs, documents, permits, origin checks, sanitary and commercial mechanisms. Therefore, if the scheme indeed existed, questions should be not only to companies but also to state structures.

In the middle of this story, it is especially clear why NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency considers the scandal not as a separate episode, but as a test of Israel’s ability to distinguish short-term gain from long-term damage. When it comes to Ukraine, Russia, Iran, and Israel’s reputation in the democratic world, silence becomes a political position.

Why this is dangerous for Israel

Ukraine is already preparing sanction steps against those who, according to its version, are involved in the trade of stolen grain. In Europe, they may also closely watch participants in such chains if assistance in bypassing restrictions related to Russia’s war against Ukraine is proven.

This creates several risks for Israel at once.

Reputational risk

Israel constantly demands that the world understand its threats, its pain, and its right to security. But this position becomes weaker if the country appears to turn a blind eye to stolen resources of another warring democracy.

Ukraine is currently fighting against Russian aggression. Israel is fighting against terrorist and Iranian threats. These two realities are not the same, but they have a common point: both countries know what it means to live under the pressure of an enemy that does not respect borders, civilians, and international law.

Sanction risk

If specific Israeli companies, intermediaries, shipping agents, or cargo recipients are found to be connected with the supply of stolen Ukrainian grain, they may fall under Ukrainian or European measures. For business, this means blockages, financial checks, problems with partners, and a reputational toxic trail.

For the state, it is even more dangerous. Israel cannot afford a situation where its ports are perceived as a convenient zone for dubious Russian supplies.

Strategic risk

The harshest part of Michaeli’s statement is the question about the government’s choice. According to her, the current course repeatedly prefers dubious ties with Putin over the outstretched hand of President Zelensky.

This phrase sounds sharp, but it hits the nerve of the Israeli discussion. If Russia simultaneously receives economic opportunities, maintains political channels with Israel, and deepens cooperation with Israel’s enemies, the question arises: where is the red line?

For Israelis, this is no longer an internal Ukrainian issue. It is a question of whether Israel is paying with its reputation and security for someone else’s benefit.

What the authorities must now explain

Israeli authorities may say that actions require legal evidence, documents, and formal procedures. But after Michaeli’s statement, the pressure on the government will increase.

The public needs answers to several direct questions: did Israeli agencies know about the origin of the grain; who allowed the unloading of previous shipments; which companies participated in the chain; why did Ukrainian warnings not lead to an immediate halt of controversial supplies; who exactly profited from the import.

And most importantly — why should Israel risk relations with Ukraine and the democratic world for schemes where the ultimate beneficiary might be the Russian military economy.

The scandal around PANORMITIS has already become more than the story of one ship. It is a test for Israeli politics: can Jerusalem act not only after international noise but also before the reputational damage becomes irreversible.

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Dmitry Dubov. April 29, 2029. In this issue, we analyze why Israel once again finds itself in the role of catching up in the technology war.
FPV drones are already changing combat tactics in Lebanon and undermining the usual advantages of the army.
Why do cheap and mass solutions turn out to be more effective than expensive systems?
How Ukraine’s experience became a new methodology of modern warfare — and why was it ignored?

What’s wrong with relying on electronic warfare and why do fiber-optic drones break the entire concept of suppression?
Where is the IDF losing pace and what does a ‘smart army’ mean in the new reality?
Why does Hezbollah adapt faster and how does this affect the course of the conflict?
What changes in tactics are already happening — and are they enough?

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The Israeli Foreign Ministry reminded that on November 10, 1975, the USSR achieved the adoption of Resolution 3379, declaring Zionism a “form of racism”. Today, Russia, relying on Iran and its allies, repeats the same rhetoric under the guise of “fighting Nazism” in Ukraine.

50 Years Later: A Reminder from Israeli Diplomacy

On November 10, 2025, the Israeli Foreign Ministry published a message:

“Today marks the 50th anniversary of the adoption of the disgraceful UN Resolution No. 3379 (XXX). On the night of November 10-11, 1975, the UN General Assembly adopted the resolution by 72 votes in favor, 35 against, and 32 abstentions, declaring Zionism a form of racism.

The Soviet Union, with the support of Arab states, finally achieved its goal.”

For Israel, it was not just a diplomatic blow — it was a moment when the false Soviet myth received the UN’s seal.

In his speech, Israeli representative Chaim Herzog publicly tore up the text of the resolution, declaring that “persecutions will only strengthen Zionism.”

How Moscow Fabricated the Narrative

The Israeli Foreign Ministry directly reminded how Moscow laid the foundation of anti-Zionism:

“The first significant attempts to link Zionism with racism, and particularly with fascism (which in the USSR became synonymous with Nazism), on the international stage were made by Moscow in 1964. At that time, in response to a proposal to include condemnation of anti-Semitism in a resolution on racial discrimination, Soviet representatives unofficially threatened that they would be ‘forced’ to bring their amendment condemning Nazism, fascism, and Zionism to general discussion.”

Later, in 1965, the USSR fulfilled its threat and introduced an amendment to the UN equating anti-Semitism and Zionism:

“The Soviet Union, fulfilling its previous year’s threat, introduced the following amendment: ‘UN member states condemn anti-Semitism, Zionism, Nazism, as well as any manifestations of colonial policy and ideology, national and racial hatred, and pledge to do everything possible for their speedy elimination.’”

“Subsequent attempts to bring the condemnation of anti-Semitism to the UN General Assembly always encountered counter-attempts from the USSR to condemn Zionism,” the Israeli Foreign Ministry statement said.

From Ideological Campaign to Diplomatic Blackmail

The break in relations with Israel lifted all restrictions on comparing Zionism with racism, and the USSR embarked on large-scale propaganda.

“Over 8 years (1967–1975), more than 120 books and brochures were published, aimed at ‘revealing’ the racist nature of Zionism. Not only Marx but also Hitler and Goebbels were called as witnesses,” notes the Israeli Foreign Ministry.

In December 1973, with Moscow’s support, an amendment appeared in the UN condemning “Israeli Zionist imperialism,” and in 1975, the Third Committee of the UN supported an anti-Zionist resolution prepared by Arab countries.

“As a result, personal and state terror from Arab states, fueled by Moscow, bore fruit: on October 17, 1975, the Third Committee adopted resolution A/C.3/L.2519 condemning Zionism,” the Foreign Ministry publication states.

After the adoption of Resolution 3379, the USSR perceived it as international legitimization of its anti-Zionist line.
In Soviet propaganda of the 1970s-80s, a huge number of publications appeared where:

• “Zionism” was presented as an ideology of Jewish world domination, closely linked with US imperialism;
• Israel was depicted as a “racist military outpost” of the West in the Middle East;
• the term “Zionism” was used as a veiled form of anti-Semitism.

Propaganda was conducted through all channels — from films to academic works of the Academy of Sciences. In special publications, like the journal “Asia and Africa Today”, Israel was systematically equated with apartheid and colonialism.

For the USSR, it was not a fight against Israel but a tool for controlling the Middle East and Africa.
Under the slogan of “anti-racism,” the Soviet Union built political alliances and sold weapons to dozens of Arab regimes.

1991: Repeal Without Repentance

Only on December 16, 1991, Resolution 46/86 repealed the assertion of “Zionism as a form of racism.”
But in Russia, anti-Zionist rhetoric survived the USSR.
In the newspapers of the 90s, they still wrote about the “Zionist lobby,” and in the UN, Moscow played the role of a “balancing factor,” using the old Soviet lexicon.

Nevertheless, at the level of rhetoric, nothing changed:

• Russian newspapers of the 1990s (especially of a patriotic and nationalist nature) continued to use the phrase “Zionist lobby”;
• in textbooks and media, the term “Zionism” was often presented as something “aggressive” and “anti-Arab”;
• some former Soviet diplomats and journalists continued to claim that “the repeal of the resolution was a mistake under US pressure.”

After 2022: “Zionism = Nazism” — A New Turn in Kremlin Rhetoric

With the start of Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine, Moscow returned to the Soviet method of ideological inversion: accusing others of what it does itself.
Now the role of “global evil” in Kremlin narratives is shared by two targets — Ukraine and Israel.

The formula has changed, but the essence remains the same:

• Israel is accused of “double standards” and “supporting neo-Nazis in Kyiv”;
• the word “Zionism” is once again used in the rhetoric of Russia’s allies — Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas, and other terrorists — as a synonym for aggression;
• federal TV channels and propagandists broadcast claims like: “Israel copies Nazi methods”, substituting historical meanings and distorting the memory of the Holocaust.

In reality, the Kremlin itself is building around itself a axis of anti-Zionism and anti-Ukrainianism, where old Soviet narratives and new geopolitical alliances have merged.
Russia uses the UN and diplomatic platforms of the “Global South” to once again instill the myth: Israel is the “oppressor,” Ukraine is the “puppet,” the West is the “source of evil.”

This scheme works as an ideological weapon:
in the Arab world, it legitimizes an alliance with Iran and Hamas,
inside the country — justifies repression and anti-Western mobilization,
and in relation to Ukraine — creates a pseudo-historical justification for aggression.

Fifty years ago, on November 10, 1975, the UN General Assembly adopted the disgraceful Resolution No. 3379, declaring Zionism a form of racism. This lie, spread by the USSR and its allies, dealt a heavy blow to Jews worldwide and Israeli diplomacy. But the truth prevailed — in 1991, the resolution was repealed.

Today we must remember: anti-Zionism is anti-Semitism.

This phrase today sounds like a warning: when lies become diplomacy, the path to aggression begins.
Exactly what Russia is doing in relation to Ukraine — accusing it of “Nazism” and “Russophobia” to justify occupation, destruction, and killings.
Thus, Moscow repeats the model of the USSR of the 1970s, when anti-Zionism was used as a shield for anti-Semitism, and now anti-Ukrainianism has become a cover for war crimes.

“New Slogans” of Old Ideology

Modern Russian anti-Zionist formulas almost literally repeat Soviet ones, but the mask has changed.
Then they spoke of “colonialism,” today — of “globalism.”
Then they fought against “Israeli imperialism,” now — against “Western neo-Nazism.”

The same method, the same addressee — the Arab world, African countries, and now also the “Global South.”
Russia tries to implant its agenda in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and African media, portraying Israel and Ukraine as part of a “Western conspiracy.”

Conclusion: Lies Do Not Die If Not Exposed

The USSR began by imposing the idea of “Zionism = racism” on the world.
Modern Russia, in alliance with Iran and anti-Israeli forces, continues to exploit the same narrative — only under new slogans:
now it is “fighting neo-Nazism,” “denazification,” and “protection of traditional values.”

Formally, Resolution 3379 no longer exists, but its spirit lives on — in the propaganda plots of Russian media, in the speeches of diplomats, and in the strategic alliance with Iran, which openly calls for the destruction of Israel.
What was once called “anti-Zionism” today returns as a policy of total denial of the right to exist — both for Israel and Ukraine.

Israel will always oppose attempts to once again defame Zionism and rewrite history. We remember and will not allow the past to be repeated.

That is why the Israeli reminder of the disgrace of 1975 is not just history.
It is a warning to both Kyiv and Jerusalem:
lies, not condemned in time, return in a new form,
and once again serve as justification for aggression.

Formally, Resolution 3379 no longer exists, but its spirit lives on in Moscow’s statements and in the Kremlin’s alliances with the same circle of states that were “warmed up by Moscow” half a century ago.

…
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Confidence in victory is disappearing in the Russian military camp

In the Russian propaganda and pro-military space, the tone is noticeably changing. Previously, they confidently spoke of “victory,” “demilitarization” of Ukraine, and the imminent defeat of Kyiv, but now completely different words are being heard: stalemate, lagging, fatigue, drones, losses, and even “catastrophe.”

The reason for the new discussion was the publication by NZZ, retold by Ukrainian media on April 28, 2026. It states that Russian propagandists and pro-military commentators increasingly acknowledge the gap between the Kremlin’s declared goals and the real military situation. The German-language review Perlentaucher on April 28 also notes that in the war against Ukraine, the Russian propaganda environment already sees a contradiction between military goals and military reality.

For the Israeli audience, this is important not only as a Ukrainian-Russian topic. Israel itself lives in the logic of war, drones, missiles, propaganda, and pressure on society. Therefore, Russian nervousness around Ukrainian technologies clearly shows how modern warfare changes the balance even against a large army.

Why the date is important

The symbolic moment is indeed strong: Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine has already lasted longer than the Soviet-German war of 1941–1945. For Russian propaganda, which constantly relies on the cult of the “Great Patriotic War,” this is a painful comparison.

The Kremlin promised a quick operation. In reality, Ukraine was not destroyed as a state, the Ukrainian army did not disappear, and Ukraine’s defense industry, on the contrary, became one of the key problems for Russia.

The original material correctly notes: today in the Russian environment, there is less talk of triumph and more attempts to explain why the declared goals have not been achieved.

Drones, long-range strikes, and fear inside Russia

The main reason for this nervousness is Ukrainian drones and long-range strike capabilities. For years, Russia built the image of a country that cannot be reached. Now this image is cracking.

On March 17, 2026, Reuters reported, citing TASS, that the Secretary of the Russian Security Council, Sergey Shoigu, acknowledged: the pace of development of Ukrainian drone systems and their methods of application are such that no region of Russia can feel safe anymore. He also spoke about the increase in sabotage attacks against Russia in 2025.

This is no longer a Ukrainian assessment. These are the words of a person from the top of the Russian security system.

For the Kremlin, it is especially unpleasant that the problem has become not only military but also psychological. Previously, Russian missiles flew over Ukrainian cities, and Russians watched the war as a television picture, but now the war is physically approaching Russian territory, industrial facilities, refineries, pipelines, military factories, and cities far from the border.

Yekaterinburg as a new signal

On April 25, 2026, Reuters reported a Ukrainian drone hitting a multi-story building in Yekaterinburg, the fourth-largest city in Russia. According to local authorities, there were no fatalities, several people received minor injuries, and one woman was hospitalized. Reuters separately noted that Yekaterinburg is located about 1900 kilometers from Kyiv and is in a region with defense sector enterprises.

Even if Ukraine does not always publicly comment on such episodes, the very fact of strikes at such depth changes the perception of the war.

The Russian viewer is used to the picture where the danger is “there,” in Ukraine. Now propaganda is forced to explain why Russian air defense does not guarantee safety, why drones are flying further, and why the huge army cannot secure its own territory.

“We have legendary weapons, they have modern ones”

The original text provides a telling phrase by Vladimir Solovyov: “We have legendary weapons, they have modern ones.” Even if it is presented in the propaganda broadcast as an emotional outburst, the meaning is unpleasant for Moscow.

For decades, Russia sold the image of a military superpower. But the war against Ukraine showed that legends do not shoot down drones, do not protect the Black Sea Fleet, and do not compensate for technological lag.

Ukrainian drones, sea drones, long-range developments, and flexible military engineering have gradually changed the battlefield. That is why Russian pro-military bloggers are already discussing not only “heroism” but also real technological lag.

Economy, fleet, and the search for the guilty: what scares the Kremlin camp

Military problems are compounded by economic ones. War requires money, people, equipment, production, repair, logistics, and constant pressure on the domestic labor market.

On March 31, 2026, Business Insider reported that Russian billionaire Oleg Deripaska proposed considering a 12-hour workday and a six-day workweek as a way to get through economic transformation. He linked this to the new reality of restrictions and the need to “work more” in a crisis.

For the average Russian, this does not sound like victorious mobilization, but as an acknowledgment: war and sanctions require an increasingly harsh regime within the country.

The Black Sea Fleet as a blow to the imperial myth

A separate pain for Russia is the sea. Ukraine practically does not have a classic large fleet but managed to seriously change the situation in the Black Sea. Russian ships were destroyed, damaged, or forced to hide in ports and move further away from Ukrainian strikes.

For a country that builds its military pride on parades, naval traditions, and imperial symbolism, this is especially humiliating.

It is important not to exaggerate: Russia remains a dangerous opponent, has large resources, and continues to strike Ukraine. But the very need to justify the fleet, air defense, drones, and losses shows that the previous image of invincibility is shattered.

Why this is important for Israel

Israel should closely watch the Ukrainian experience. Not because the wars are the same, but because technologies, drones, long-range strikes, and information warfare have already become a common reality for different fronts—from Ukraine to the Middle East.

In this context, NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency sees the main lesson: a small or medium-sized country can change the strategic balance if it quickly learns, develops its own technologies, strikes at the enemy’s logistics, and does not allow propaganda to replace reality.

For Israel, this is not theory. Iran, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and other forces also rely on missiles, drones, attrition, and psychological pressure. Ukraine shows that the response can be not only a classic army but also technological flexibility, mass production, intelligence, range, and constant adaptation.

Propaganda seeks the guilty because the victorious picture is no longer there

When the war does not go according to plan, propaganda begins to look for traitors. The original material mentions that former “people’s governor of the DPR” Pavel Gubarev spoke about a possible huge number of Russian military casualties, after which Solovyov called him a traitor and demanded his arrest.

This is typical logic of an authoritarian system: as long as everything is fine, they talk about national unity; when problems begin, they look for the guilty inside.

But behind this cry lies the main fact. Russia’s war against Ukraine has become much longer, more expensive, and more dangerous for the Kremlin than promised to society. Ukraine not only withstood but also created threats that the Russian system is forced to acknowledge even through its own propaganda.

Russia can still fight for a long time. It retains resources, people, missiles, aviation, defense factories, and the readiness to throw new forces to the front. But talks of a “quick victory” have been replaced by talks of drones, lagging, mobilization, economic tension, and “catastrophe.”

And this in itself is an indicator.

For Ukraine, this is not a reason to relax. For Israel, it is a reason to carefully study the experience of modern warfare. And for the world, it is a reminder: an empire may look huge, but its weak points become visible precisely when the victim stops being afraid and starts responding technologically, systematically, and far-reachingly.

…
“Not About the War”: The book of Jewish defender of Ukraine Maksym Shvartsman was presented in Chernivtsi on the 3rd anniversary of his death at the front - July 21, 2026 - Новости Израиля

Did Azerbaijan stop Israel’s vote on recognizing the Armenian genocide? - July 20, 2026 - Новости Израиля

June 2026 was the hardest for Ukrainian civilians since April 2022 — UN data - July 20, 2026 - Новости Израиля

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NAnews – News of Israel: Supporting Cultural Initiatives

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“Not About the War”: The book of Jewish defender of Ukraine Maksym Shvartsman was presented in Chernivtsi on the 3rd anniversary of his death at the front - July 21, 2026 - Новости Израиля

Did Azerbaijan stop Israel’s vote on recognizing the Armenian genocide? - July 20, 2026 - Новости Израиля

June 2026 was the hardest for Ukrainian civilians since April 2022 — UN data - July 20, 2026 - Новости Израиля

An event occurred in Brussels that is difficult to simply call a church ceremony. In the Cathedral of St. Michael and St. Gudula, one of the main churches of the Belgian capital, ancient stained glass windows associated with the anti-Semitic libel of 1370 were dismantled.

For the Jewish history of Europe, this is not an interior detail, but a painful symbol.

Hundreds of people attended the ceremony, including representatives of the Christian clergy, the Chief Rabbi of Brussels and Belgium, Rabbi Avraham Gigi, as well as leaders of the Jewish community. Instead of the stained glass windows, a memorial plaque was installed in local languages and Hebrew with an official acknowledgment of historical injustice and apologies for the suffering caused to the Jewish people. The ceremony in the Brussels cathedral took place on April 26, 2026, according to media reports.

What happened in Brussels and why it matters

The Cathedral of St. Michael and St. Gudula is not an ordinary church. It is one of the central Catholic churches in Brussels, associated with the state and religious history of Belgium. Therefore, the decision to publicly remove images that for decades reminded of a medieval anti-Semitic accusation has not only museum but also political and moral significance.

The essence of the matter goes back to 1370.

At that time, Jews were accused of stealing consecrated hosts and their ‘desecration.’ According to church legend, the hosts were allegedly damaged, after which they began to ‘bleed.’ Such stories in medieval Europe often became a pretext for mass hatred, torture, executions, pogroms, and expulsions.

In Brussels, this legend became known as the ‘Miracle of the Holy Sacrament’ or the ‘Brussels Sacramental Miracle.’ But behind the beautiful religious formula lay a tragedy: Jews were accused without real evidence, part of the community was destroyed, the rest were expelled, and their property confiscated.

Why this is not just an old dispute about stained glass

The ancient stained glass windows were not neutral art. They visually reinforced a false narrative in which Jews were portrayed as enemies of the Christian shrine.

This is exactly how medieval propaganda worked: not only through sermons but also through images, legends, processions, relics, and church holidays. For the illiterate population, stained glass was often stronger than text. It did not explain—it instilled.

Therefore, the dismantling of such images is not an attempt to ‘erase history.’ On the contrary, it is an attempt to finally call history by its name.

The history of the issue: how the libel became part of the city’s memory

After the events of 1370, the story of the ‘bleeding hosts’ became part of Brussels’ religious memory. The hosts were revered as a shrine, and the plot itself was maintained for centuries by church tradition and artistic images.

Later, especially in modern times, such legends were used not only against Jews but also in Catholic-Protestant disputes. The image of the ‘miracle’ was supposed to confirm the special significance of the Eucharist and strengthen the Catholic version of faith.

But for the Jewish community, this cult meant something else: a memory of lies, blood, and exile.

After World War II and the Holocaust, the Catholic Church’s attitude towards such plots began to change. The Second Vatican Council and the declaration Nostra aetate played an important role, changing the official tone of the Catholic Church towards Jews. In 1968, the Archdiocese of Mechelen-Brussels renounced the previous recognition of the cult associated with this ‘miracle,’ and in 1977, an explanatory plaque appeared in the cathedral, distancing itself from the accusations of 1370.

But, as it turned out, one explanation was not enough.

The stained glass windows continued to exist as a visual trace of the old libel. And only now, about 650 years later, a stronger symbolic step was taken: the image was removed, and in its place appeared a memorial plaque with a direct acknowledgment of the harm done to the Jewish people.

What is the libel of ‘desecrating the host’

It is important not to confuse terms here. The classic ‘blood libel’ is the accusation of Jews in the murder of Christians, most often children, allegedly for ritual purposes. And the accusation of ‘desecrating the host’ is another form of anti-Semitic myth: Jews were accused of stealing or damaging consecrated bread.

But the essence of these plots is the same.

They turned Jews into a demonized enemy, created a religious justification for violence, and allowed authorities or mobs to rob, expel, and kill. Therefore, in a broad sense, the Brussels story of 1370 belongs to the same European tradition of anti-Semitic libels that for centuries poisoned relations between the Christian majority and Jewish communities.

Why this is important for Israel and the Jewish world today

For Israel, such news does not sound like distant European archaeology. It is part of a long history in which lies about Jews first became a picture, then a legend, then a ‘well-known fact,’ and after that—a pretext for violence.

That is why the acknowledgment of the mistake after 650 years is significant.

It does not bring back the dead. It does not cancel the expulsion. It does not erase the fear that has been passed down in the Jewish memory of Europe for centuries.

But it shows that historical lies can be called lies even after centuries. For the Jewish audience in Israel, this is especially sensitive because modern anti-Semitism often works in the same way: first a caricature, then an accusation, then a justification for aggression.

In this sense, the story of Brussels is not only about the Middle Ages. It is a warning about how dangerous it is when a religious, political, or media system preserves a false image of the Jew as the culprit of others’ troubles for decades.

NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency considers such stories not as museum news but as part of a larger theme: how Europe, Israel, and the Jewish people today work with memory, historical responsibility, and a new wave of anti-Semitism.

Why ‘better late than never’ sounds bitter here

The phrase ‘better late than never’ fits this event but sounds almost painfully in it.

Because it has not been ten years or one generation. About six and a half centuries have passed. During this time, Europe has experienced the expulsion of Jews, ghettos, church bans, pogroms, racial theories, the Holocaust, and a new surge of anti-Semitism already in the digital age.

Therefore, the dismantling of the stained glass windows in Brussels is not just an act of goodwill. It is an acknowledgment that symbols have power. Even old ones. Even beautiful ones. Even if they are accustomed to being called ‘historical heritage.’

Historical heritage does not cease to be a heritage of hatred if it is built on lies.

What this ceremony changes

From a practical point of view, one ceremony will not solve the problem of anti-Semitism in Europe. It will not stop radical movements, will not instantly change school programs, and will not remove new versions of old libels from the internet.

But it sets an important standard.

If a false accusation has been displayed in the cathedral for centuries as part of religious memory, today it must be publicly dismantled, explained, and acknowledged. Not hidden in an archive. Not left with a vague signature. Not justified by the words ‘it was the time.’

For Israel and Jewish communities, this is fundamental: the memory of the past must be not decorative but honest. Especially where once religious authority helped turn lies into violence.

The Brussels cathedral took a step that should have been taken long ago.

That is why this story is important not only for Belgium. It is important for all of Europe, for Israel, and for every society that wants to understand: anti-Semitism does not start with bonfires. It starts with a lie that no one stops for too long.

…
“Not About the War”: The book of Jewish defender of Ukraine Maksym Shvartsman was presented in Chernivtsi on the 3rd anniversary of his death at the front - July 21, 2026 - Новости Израиля

Did Azerbaijan stop Israel’s vote on recognizing the Armenian genocide? - July 20, 2026 - Новости Израиля

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He was the vice-president of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (UHVR, chairman Roman Shukhevych), deputy Stepan Bandera in the OUN and at the same time he is a “Righteous Among the Nations”.

Fedor Vovk (in emigration – Ivan Vovchuk), together with his wife Yelizaveta Shkandel, saved many Jews in Nazi-occupied Nikopol, says in The Jerusalem Post Boris Lozhkin, President of the Jewish Confederation of Ukraine.

Vovk’s case among Ukrainian nationalists is not unique. Many members of the OUN during the Holocaust risked their lives to shelter Jews and forged documents, turning them into Ukrainians.

On July 12, 1998, Yad Vashem awarded Fedor Vovk and his wife Yelizaveta Shkandel the honorary title of “Righteous Among the Nations”. https://www.yadvashem.org/yv/pdf-drupal/ukraine.pdf (Vovk, Feodor & Shkandel, Yelizaveta, p. 39)

The detailed life story of Ivan Vovchuk, one of the leaders of the OUN and a Righteous, can soon be read in the book Oleg Protsenko “National Tribune. Life and Ideas of Ivan Vovchuk”. With the support of the Vovk Foundation, it is now being prepared for publication by the “Fronesis” publishing house. Many facts presented in the book will be published for the first time.

The nationalist-Righteous should be known by as many people as possible, not only in Ukraine but also abroad. This will help destroy the myth of Ukrainians as anti-Semites and further strengthen relations between Ukrainians and Jews.

“The leaders of Ukrainian nationalists embody the democratic and indomitable spirit of the Ukrainian people, who are fighting for their freedom today.”

“More than two years after Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine, Ukrainians are still fighting bravely.

Two years later, Russian President Putin is still spreading unfounded propaganda that my country, a country with a Jewish president and a thriving Jewish community, is a ‘Nazi state’.

There is no deeper symbol to counter this false portrayal than the recent completion of the Torah Scroll of Solidarity between Ukraine and Israel, with letters written by their presidents Volodymyr Zelensky and Isaac Herzog. This scroll will become a motivating force for the Ukrainian and Jewish communities to unite, become closer than ever, to confront the old Soviet script and ensure the victory of freedom. But more needs to be done.

Putin has repeatedly promoted the absurdly false narrative that Ukraine needs to be “denazified,” claiming that Ukraine is a Nazi state led by Ukrainian nationalists aligned along neo-Nazi lines, thus justifying his unrestrained and unfounded war.

These claims are not new.

For decades, Russian authorities, formerly Soviet, have called the Ukrainian nationalist movement Nazi in an attempt to discredit Ukrainians who want to live in a free and democratic Ukraine.

They focused their efforts on the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, a political party founded in 1929 dedicated to creating an independent Ukrainian state. The OUN played a key role in the creation of the Ukrainian state and continues to play an increasingly important role in Ukrainian society today.

During World War II, there were instances of Ukrainian nationalists collaborating in crimes against Jews.

But these acts were rare and absolutely not official policy or a reflection of the OUN’s position.

Much of today’s “reporting” on the party’s alleged crimes during the Holocaust comes from KGB propaganda aimed at discrediting Ukrainian nationalists.

In fact, there were many instances where leaders of Ukrainian nationalists risked their lives to save Jews from the Nazis in Ukraine. And now, as Putin’s Russian propaganda spreads worldwide with the support of supporters like Tucker Carlson, it is most important for the Ukrainian and Jewish communities to unite to highlight their own stories and counter Russian myths about Ukrainians and Ukrainian nationalists.

Read us on the channels Israel News Nikk.Agency Новини Ізраїлю in — Telegram, — Facebook, — Google News

The story of Ivan Vovchuk should be brought to public attention

The stories of these people should be brought to public attention. They embody the democratic and unwavering spirit of the Ukrainian people, who are fighting for their freedom today. And they emphasize the need to strengthen Ukrainian-Jewish relations and not allow Putin to resolve them.

One such Ukrainian was Ivan Vovchuk.

Vovchuk, a native of Nikopol and a leader of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, used his position to save Jewish families, including Sarah Bakst and her children, from Nazi terror.

His actions and those of his brave wife, Yelizaveta Shkandel, are poignant reminders of the shared history and mutual support between the Ukrainian and Jewish communities, refuting the vile narrative propagated by the Kremlin.

“Vovk” was recognized by Yad Vashem, Israel’s official memorial to the victims of the Holocaust, as a Righteous Among the Nations for his heroism.

His story is a beacon of humanity and courage, standing against the senseless Russian propaganda seeking to portray Ukraine as an anti-Semitic, Nazi state.

The current Russian propaganda campaign is not only historically inaccurate but also deeply offensive. It is an insult to the memory of the Holocaust victims and the courage of people like Vovk, who stood against real anti-Semitism and Nazism. And it is an insult to the modern Jewish community in Ukraine.

Unfortunately, this narrative has resonated with only a small part of American and European society.

“That’s why I am working with the Vovk Foundation on a new book that will detail the story of Ivan Vovchuk to debunk the fabricated lies spread by Putin and his opponents in the Western world.”

This book, using a range of unpublished primary sources and documents, will counter Putin’s condemnations of Ukrainians and Ukrainian nationalists like Ivan Vovchuk and bring the Ukrainian and Jewish communities closer together as the Russian war machine deliberately tries to create a chasm between them.

“The importance of uniting the Ukrainian and Jewish communities in the fight against aggression cannot be overstated. This alliance is a testament to our shared pursuit of justice and mutual respect. Our unity is a powerful force against the disinformation and hatred spread by our opponents.”

The struggle we are waging today is not only Ukraine’s struggle; it is a battle for the very soul of Europe and the principles of freedom and humanity that are essential for the entire world. Just as Vovk and others like him rose to the challenge of their time, we too must stand firm against the distortion of history and the malevolent intentions of Russian aggression.

“The international community, especially the West, must continue to support Ukraine, ensuring that the sacrifices made are recognized and that aspirations for a peaceful and just future are realized.”

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“Not About the War”: The book of Jewish defender of Ukraine Maksym Shvartsman was presented in Chernivtsi on the 3rd anniversary of his death at the front - July 21, 2026 - Новости Израиля

Did Azerbaijan stop Israel’s vote on recognizing the Armenian genocide? - July 20, 2026 - Новости Израиля

June 2026 was the hardest for Ukrainian civilians since April 2022 — UN data - July 20, 2026 - Новости Израиля

“Ah, what you sent
Last week,
We have long since eaten
And eagerly await,
When you will send again
To our dinner
A dozen
New and sweet … “

To the port of Haifa, according to data (April 25, 2026) from researcher Katerina Yaresko, another grain ship is approaching, the origin of which may be linked to the occupied territories of Ukraine. It concerns PANORMITIS, IMO: 9445021.

The declared cargo is 6201.56 tons of wheat and 19043.73 tons of barley.

For Israel, this story is important not only as a trade episode. It concerns Russia’s war against Ukraine, the possible plundering of resources in the occupied territories, and how international logistics can become a tool for concealing the origin of goods.

What is known about the ship PANORMITIS

According to published data, PANORMITIS was at anchor in the port of Kavkaz in Russian territorial waters and did not violate Ukraine’s state border itself.

The key question is different: who exactly delivered the grain to it and where was this cargo exported from.

There are indirect signs that the entire cargo of PANORMITIS could be linked to Kerch and Berdyansk. However, the author of the investigation carefully emphasizes: it is not yet possible to assert this for the entire volume of the cargo.

What has been proven about one carrier

According to Katerina Yaresko, evidence was gathered regarding the ship LEONID PESTRIKOV, IMO: 9922122.

It is claimed that it delivered 6087.68 tons of barley and 954.56 tons of wheat from Berdyansk, after which on April 18, it transferred the grain to PANORMITIS.

Loading in Berdyansk, according to this data, took place from April 7 to April 15, 2026.

The documents for the cargo of LEONID PESTRIKOV were processed in the Russian port of Temryuk, where the ship arrived already loaded from Berdyansk. This scheme, according to the author, is used because there is no customs point in Berdyansk, and it also helps Russian occupation structures to conceal the origin of the grain.

Why this could be a war crime

The exporter is named as the company “Petrokhleb-Kuban”. According to the researcher, this company regularly participates in the export of grain from the occupied territories.

The essence of the problem is not only in the route of one ship. If the grain is indeed exported from the occupied territories of Ukraine, it is about the plundering of resources, and this is considered a war crime.

Another important point: it does not matter whether it concerns the entire cargo or only the proven part. The very fact of exporting grain from the occupied territory should be recorded and investigated.

In Russian documents, as Yaresko points out, disinformation schemes are systematically used: the loading port is changed, the origin of the goods is concealed, and real routes are masked through Russian ports.

Why Israel finds itself at the center of the issue

For the Israeli audience, this story is particularly sensitive. The ship is heading specifically to Haifa, one of the country’s key seaports.

NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency considers such cases not as a distant Ukrainian plot, but as a matter of Israeli responsibility, international law, and Israel’s relations with Ukraine against the backdrop of the ongoing war.

Ukraine is conducting a criminal investigation into the facts of grain export from the occupied territories. For the investigation, international legal assistance from the country where such a ship arrives is important. This is an opportunity to obtain documents, check the cargo, record evidence, and understand the real supply chain.

After ABINSK, the problem looks systemic

In the previous case, related to the ship ABINSK, IMO: 9303869, Israel, according to Yaresko, refused Ukraine international legal assistance.

Now a second consecutive voyage with similar signs appears.

This no longer looks like a single episode, but like a systemic problem: grain, the origin of which is linked to the occupied territories of Ukraine, may be regularly imported into Israel.

What will happen next

The main question now is how Israel will react this time.

If the ship indeed arrives in Haifa, the Ukrainian side may have a chance to request assistance, documents, and verification of the cargo’s origin again. For Israel, this is a test not only of port procedures but also of political position: is the country ready to participate in recording possible crimes related to the Russian occupation of Ukrainian territories.

The story of PANORMITIS shows that the war is not only on the front. It continues in ports, invoices, customs documents, transshipment schemes, and routes where the origin of goods is sometimes better hidden than the cargo itself.

…
“Not About the War”: The book of Jewish defender of Ukraine Maksym Shvartsman was presented in Chernivtsi on the 3rd anniversary of his death at the front - July 21, 2026 - Новости Израиля

Did Azerbaijan stop Israel’s vote on recognizing the Armenian genocide? - July 20, 2026 - Новости Израиля

June 2026 was the hardest for Ukrainian civilians since April 2022 — UN data - July 20, 2026 - Новости Израиля

On April 24, 2026, a new political scandal erupted around the Venice Biennale: the international jury of the 61st contemporary art exhibition announced that it would not consider Russia and Israel among the contenders for the main awards — the ‘Golden Lion’ and the ‘Silver Lion.’ However, the national pavilions of both countries remain in the exhibition program, which is scheduled to open on May 9, 2026.

Formally, the jury’s decision is explained by a reference to the International Criminal Court and accusations related to the leaders of these states.

In practice, however, it is about a much broader story: a major art venue has once again found itself at the center of a debate about war, responsibility, boycott, freedom of art, and the boundaries of political pressure.

For the Israeli audience, this topic is especially sensitive. Israel, in this case, has been placed in the same category as Russia — a country waging a full-scale war against Ukraine and using culture as part of its foreign policy presence.

Such proximity in itself raises questions: where is the line between a legal formula, a political gesture, and a moral substitution?

What the Venice Biennale decided

The jury of the Venice Biennale stated that it would refrain from considering countries whose leaders, according to international reports, are involved in cases at the International Criminal Court. As a result, Russia and Israel are effectively removed from the competition for key awards.

Importantly: this does not mean the exclusion of pavilions from the exhibition.

Russia and Israel will be able to present their projects, and viewers will be able to see them, but the jury will not consider these works as potential laureates of the main prizes. Thus, the biennale chose an intermediate model: not to prohibit participation, but to limit symbolic recognition.

Why this looks like a compromise

The biennale organizers emphasize that the international jury acts autonomously and independently determines the laureates. The exhibition’s press service separately noted that the organization does not interfere in the jury’s decisions and simultaneously does not assume the right to prohibit the participation of national pavilions of recognized states.

This is where the main conflict arises.

On one hand, the biennale tries to maintain its status as an open international platform. On the other — the jury effectively introduces a politico-ethical filter that influences the final hierarchy of the exhibition. The pavilions remain, but full participation in the race for prestigious awards is no longer possible.

For art, this is not a technical detail. The ‘Golden Lion’ of the Venice Biennale is not just an award, but a sign of global recognition. Exclusion from the awards does not close the pavilion’s doors but changes the country’s status within the event.

Russia, Israel, and the different nature of accusations

In the Ukrainian and European context, the main focus is now primarily on the Russian pavilion. After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Moscow’s participation in major cultural events has been perceived not as ‘ordinary culture,’ but as a matter of political normalization of a regime responsible for war, city destruction, strikes on civilian infrastructure, and the destruction of Ukrainian cultural heritage.

Russia did not participate in the 2024 exhibition, and its return in 2026 caused a sharp reaction from the European Union, Ukraine, the Baltic countries, Finland, and a large number of cultural figures. Associated Press reports that the EU has already announced a reduction of a 2 million euro grant for the Venice Biennale due to the return of the Russian pavilion.

With Israel, the situation is different but no less politicized. The jury’s decision is related to international criticism of Israel’s actions in Gaza and the ICC warrant against Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. However, for Israeli society, this framing of the issue is perceived as especially painful: Israel is waging a war following the Hamas attack on October 7, 2023, and the threat from Iran, Hezbollah, and other proxy groups remains part of the country’s real security.

Why the comparison of Israel and Russia causes irritation

For many in Israel and the Jewish diaspora, the very linkage of ‘Russia and Israel’ in one decision seems problematic. Russia is an aggressor in the war against Ukraine. Israel, no matter how intense the international dispute around its actions in Gaza, views its war as a fight against terrorist infrastructure following the largest attack on Jews since the Holocaust.

This does not negate debates about rights, humanitarian consequences, and the responsibility of political leadership.

But the mechanical unification of the two countries in one formula creates a sense of moral equivalence, which in itself becomes a political statement. That is why the jury’s decision will be discussed not only in cultural circles but also in diplomatic, Jewish, Ukrainian, and Israeli contexts.

In this sense, Nikk.Agency — Israel News | Nikk.Agency draws attention to a key detail: the biennale does not just evaluate art but effectively participates in a global debate about whom international institutions consider an acceptable interlocutor, who is a problematic participant, and who is a symbol of an unacceptable return to normalcy.

International reaction: pressure on the biennale intensifies

The European Union hit funding

The most serious practical step so far is related specifically to Russia. The European Commission sharply condemned the decision to allow the Russian pavilion and announced a reduction of a 2 million euro grant, calculated over a three-year period. According to AP, the biennale has 30 days to justify its position on Russia’s participation.

This is an important signal: the dispute has gone beyond cultural discussion.

Whereas previously it was about letters, statements, and public pressure, now the issue has moved into the realm of money, contracts, and institutional responsibility. The European Union is effectively saying: if the venue gives a stage to Russian state presence, it cannot expect the previous level of European support.

Latvia, Finland, Ukraine, and artist protests

Latvia announced a boycott of the biennale’s opening on May 9, Finland is limiting its participation format while maintaining the Russian pavilion, and the heads of the ministries of culture and foreign affairs of 22 countries opposed Russia’s return to the exhibition. European and Ukrainian representatives associate this not with censorship, but with the impossibility of pretending that the Russian state remains an ordinary cultural participant after the war against Ukraine.

Ukraine also appealed to Italy not to issue visas to Russian participants associated with the pavilion. According to Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha, Kyiv has already imposed sanctions on individuals involved in organizing Russia’s participation and expects corresponding decisions from the host country.

Separate pressure comes from artists. More than 70 participants appealed to the biennale leadership with a protest against the participation of Israel, Russia, and the USA. This shows that within the artistic community there is no unified line: some demand exclusions and boycotts, others believe that art should remain a space for dialogue even in the most difficult periods.

How organizers and Italy respond

The Venice Biennale insists that it has not violated the rules and does not have the authority to prohibit the participation of a country recognized by the Italian Republic. Organizers also point out that the Russian pavilion in the Giardini gardens historically belongs to Russia, and for participation, Moscow had to notify the foundation of its intention to open the exhibition.

In Italy, the reaction is also mixed.

Italy’s Minister of Culture Alessandro Giuli reportedly distanced himself from visiting the Central Pavilion and chose a trip to Lviv — a symbolic gesture towards Ukraine. At the same time, Deputy Prime Minister Matteo Salvini criticized Brussels’ pressure, and Veneto region President Alberto Stefani called the EU’s actions unacceptable, arguing that art should create a space for cultural dialogue.

Russia, as usual, presented the situation as an attack by the West on culture. Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova called the possible funding cut a ‘step back’ and accused the West of ‘anti-culture.’ For Moscow, this is a convenient framework: instead of talking about the war against Ukraine — a conversation about allegedly oppressed culture.

But this is precisely part of the problem. The Russian state has been using cultural platforms as soft power for years, and then demands to separate art from politics at the moment when politics becomes inconvenient.

What this means for Israel

For Israel, the Venice Biennale jury’s decision is an unpleasant signal. It shows that international cultural institutions are increasingly moving from universal artistic criteria to political restrictions, and these restrictions can be applied in very broad and controversial contexts.

The Israeli pavilion remains at the exhibition. This is important.

But exclusion from the competition for awards means that even with formal presence, the country faces a symbolic boycott. This model may be repeated at other international venues: not a complete ban, not direct exclusion, but a lowering of status through decisions by juries, curators, funds, and partners.

For Ukraine, the main issue is to prevent the normalization of Russian presence. For Israel — not to allow the war against terrorist organizations to be automatically translated into the same moral category as Russia’s aggressive war against Ukraine.

It is at this crossroads that the current Venice Biennale finds itself.

Formally, it is an exhibition of contemporary art. In essence — a mirror of international politics in 2026, where pavilions, awards, grants, and boycotts have become the language of diplomacy.

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“Not About the War”: The book of Jewish defender of Ukraine Maksym Shvartsman was presented in Chernivtsi on the 3rd anniversary of his death at the front - July 21, 2026 - Новости Израиля

Did Azerbaijan stop Israel’s vote on recognizing the Armenian genocide? - July 20, 2026 - Новости Израиля

June 2026 was the hardest for Ukrainian civilians since April 2022 — UN data - July 20, 2026 - Новости Израиля

He was born in Lviv, became an Israeli citizen, coached children at “Maccabi Be’er Sheva,” served in the IDF, and then returned to Ukraine — and to a war that was not of his choosing. He voluntarily joined the “Right Sector”, helped train recruits, later signed a contract with the UAF and commanded a platoon in the International Legion of Territorial Defense. He died near Bakhmut — as a man who lived between two countries and remained loyal to both. The story of Dmytro Fialka is not just about heroism, but about choice and duty that is stronger than fear.

Lviv. Birth and Roots

Dmytro Bohdanovych Fialka was born on June 21, 1983, in Lviv. It was the city where everything began for him: football, first friends, the smell of the yard, and cold morning training sessions at the school stadium. He grew up in a family that valued hard work and knew the price of responsibility. And, as acquaintances later recalled, he was focused from childhood — never fussed, acted calmly and precisely.

When he was about fifteen, the family moved to Israel. Repatriation, a change of language, a different climate and culture — all of this was a challenge. But it was there, in Israel, that Fialka learned to overcome himself.

Israel. Service and Formation

After moving to Israel, Dmytro graduated from school and obtained citizenship. He served a three-year term in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), in the “Nahal” brigades, and participated in combat operations against the “Hezbollah” group during the Second Lebanon War.

This chapter of his life became foundational. There, in the dusty valleys and hot positions, he understood what discipline was, what trust meant, and the responsibility for others. He later often told friends: “The army made me a man. I don’t regret a single day.”

The service ended, but the habit of acting, not talking, remained. And then football reappeared in his life.

Coach at “Maccabi Be’er Sheva”

From 2008 to 2013, Dmytro Fialka worked as a coach for the youth teams of the “Maccabi Be’er Sheva” club. In the official records of the Israel Football Association (IFA), he is listed as דימה פיאלקה (Dima Fialka).

He coached teenagers, led them to tournaments, and helped them find confidence on the field. One of his trainees was Or Dadia, who later became a player for the “Hapoel Be’er Sheva” club. In an interview, he said:

“Dima was my first coach. He could explain without shouting. After he left for Ukraine, we still corresponded. He was interested in how I was playing. I will never forget this.”

For Fialka, football was not just a job. It was a language he spoke with children. He demanded from them the same as he demanded from himself — precision, respect, and honesty.

Return to Lviv and New Life

In 2015, Dmytro returned to Ukraine. The reason was simple and human — a sick grandmother. He settled again in Lviv, where he started. He met Eva, got married, and became the father of two children — a daughter and a son.

In Lviv, he continued his coaching work: first at the “Dynamo Lviv” club, then at the DYUSSH FC “Lviv”, where he worked with teenagers. Before the war, he coached the youth team of Dynamo Lviv, as confirmed by publications in Israeli and Ukrainian media.

Colleagues recalled that Dmytro always came first and left last. During training, he repeated:

“If you want to be listened to — be an example.”

He lived modestly but with dignity. He loved children, his family, and football. And, as Israeli journalists later wrote about him, “he lived between two flags, but never betrayed either.”

War. Volunteer and Commander

When Russia launched a full-scale invasion in February 2022, Dmytro did not wait for a summons.

He volunteered for the Ukrainian Volunteer Corps “Right Sector”, where he helped select and train recruits. Later, he signed a contract with the Armed Forces of Ukraine and became a platoon commander in the International Legion of Territorial Defense of the UAF — a unit that included both Ukrainians and foreigners, among them veterans from Israel, Poland, the USA, and Canada.

His call sign was “Ship”.

He did not like to talk much about the war. In one of the messages to friends, he wrote:

“There are no strangers here. Everyone is your own if they are nearby.”

Fighters recalled that he knew how to maintain order, never lost composure, and never left his subordinates.

Death near Bakhmut

On September 1, 2022, Dmytro Fialka died near Bakhmut while performing a combat mission. According to official Ukrainian and Israeli media reports, he received a gunshot wound to the head.

Dmytro’s body remained in territory controlled by Russian forces. For six weeks, his family and volunteers fought for his return. On October 11, 2022, his remains were returned to Ukraine as part of a body exchange between Ukraine and Russia.

This news was covered by major Israeli and Ukrainian media. Times of Israel reported that “the body of the former Israeli soccer coach was returned to Ukraine after exchange negotiations.” Ynet clarified that this exchange was the result of significant diplomatic and humanitarian efforts.

Israeli Family and Burial Decision

In Israel, in Be’er Sheva, where Dmytro’s mother and younger brother lived, the news of his death caused deep shock. Relatives began a fundraising campaign — about 15,000 shekels to transport the body for burial in Israel.

But Dmytro’s family in Lviv decided otherwise. His wife Eva insisted that he should remain where he lived and for what he died — in Ukraine. This dilemma was painful for both sides, but the decision was made calmly, with respect. Israeli relatives returned the collected funds to donors, calling it “a tribute of memory and love without borders.”

There was no conflict in this story. There was only pain, shared between two countries.

Funeral in Lviv

On October 21, 2022, Dmytro Fialka was buried in the Jewish section of Yaniv Cemetery in Lviv. The ceremony was attended by representatives of the Jewish community, Israeli diplomats, volunteers, and his former students.

Two flags — Ukrainian and Israeli — stood side by side. Not as a symbol of division, but as a sign that one person can be a home for two nations at once.

Radio Liberty wrote that words about his courage and modesty were spoken at the funeral. He was not a politician, did not strive to be a hero. He simply did what he considered right.

Memory and Recognition

After Dmytro’s death, his name appeared in the memorial lists of the International Legion of the UAF. In Israel and Ukraine, dozens of publications were written about him — from sports portals to major publications.

The Israel Football Federation confirmed his status as a former coach of the “Maccabi Be’er Sheva” club. On social media, Israeli players and coaches posted photos with the caption “Dima Fialka – forever coach.” In Lviv, he is remembered as a teacher who could speak to children so that they listened not out of fear, but out of respect.

A Man Between Flags

Dmytro Fialka lived a life that cannot be measured in kilometers. He was born in Ukraine, grew up in Israel, returned to Ukraine, and died defending it.

Israeli media wrote about him warmly. Israel Hayom called him “a soldier of two homelands,” Ynet — “a coach remembered by everyone who learned from him to be strong.” Ukrainian sources — “a man who understood that freedom knows no borders.”

He did not leave behind loud speeches — only an example. And this example is worth more than any awards.

Moral and Conclusion

The story of Dmytro Fialka is not about death. It is about the choice a person makes when they cannot do otherwise. About the fact that true belonging to a country is not a passport, but an action.

He was a Jew, a Ukrainian, an Israeli. He was a father, a husband, a coach, a soldier. And he became a person who proved: loyalty is not geography, but an inner truth.

When we see two flags side by side — Israeli and Ukrainian — we should remember that sometimes one person can connect them more strongly than dozens of diplomatic agreements. Such a person lived. His name was Dmytro Fialka.

Moral: Memory That Unites Two Nations

There are dozens, hundreds of such destinies. People whose lives passed between Israel and Ukraine, between two homelands, between two worlds that seemed distant until pain brought them closer.

These are stories of Israelis of Ukrainian origin, IDF veterans, volunteers, doctors, IT specialists, and ordinary citizens who stood alongside Ukrainians during the war. And each of them, like Dmytro Fialka, carries a part of a common code — human and honest.

When society remembers such people, it becomes stronger. Memory is not just an archive. It is a mirror of conscience. It reminds us that the true connection between countries is born not in offices, but in the actions of those who do not seek profit, who simply do what they consider right.

Dmytro Fialka showed that patriotism can be dual, but loyalty is one. He lived at the intersection of cultures, spoke two languages, prayed in different words, but in his heart had one principle: life is worth living with honor.

Society — both Ukrainian and Israeli — is obliged to remember such people. They become a bridge between nations that too often share pain. And it is thanks to such stories that we see that heroism is not about war, but about humanity.

Main Sources:

• Ynet — גופת מאמן הכדורגל הישראלי שנהרג בקרבות הוחזרה לאוקראינה
• Times of Israel — Body of former Israeli soccer coach killed in Ukraine returned in prisoner swap
• Israel Hayom — הישראלי שנהרג באוקראינה הובא למנוחות בלבוב
• Bhol — גופת ישראלי שנהרג באוקראינה הוחזרה לישראל במסגרת חילופי גופות
• KAN News — אזרח ישראלי נהרג בלחימה באוקראינה
• Walla News — גופת האזרח הישראלי שנהרג באוקראינה הוחזרה לישראל
• Radio Liberty — Dmytro Fialka, killed near Bakhmut
• Ukrinform — A Ukrainian who served in Israel died
• ZAXID.NET — Dmytro Fialka, who died at the front, was buried in Lviv
• Wikipedia (ukr.) — Fialka Dmytro Bohdanovych
• Israel Football Association (IFA) — registry of coaches of the Maccabi Be’er Sheva club

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“Not About the War”: The book of Jewish defender of Ukraine Maksym Shvartsman was presented in Chernivtsi on the 3rd anniversary of his death at the front - July 21, 2026 - Новости Израиля

Did Azerbaijan stop Israel’s vote on recognizing the Armenian genocide? - July 20, 2026 - Новости Израиля

June 2026 was the hardest for Ukrainian civilians since April 2022 — UN data - July 20, 2026 - Новости Израиля

Every autumn, the city of Uman in the Cherkasy region of Ukraine becomes a place of pilgrimage for thousands of Jews from all over the world who come to celebrate Rosh Hashanah, the Jewish New Year.

This event symbolizes not only a religious tradition, but also a deep historical connection between the Jewish people and the Ukrainian land. Many Jews, inspired by this tradition, settled in Uman, creating an entire microdistrict and gradually assimilating into the Ukrainian cultural environment, which emphasizes the long history of coexistence between Jews and Ukrainians.

Israeli philologist and cultural scientist, professor Wolf Moskovich, told in detail about significant Ukrainian-Jewish cultural ties, which are reflected even in surnames, many of which are of Ukrainian origin. For example, the surnames Ivankiv And Vannikov come from the name of the village of Ivanki, located near Uman, and Zavadivker – from the village of Zavadivka. Surname Macedonian originates from the village of Makedoni, located near Kanev.

Of particular interest are surnames with a clear Ukrainian flavor, such as The Bully Tail, Coward Head, Storcheus And Psuybumaga. Although they resemble the style characteristic of the Zaporizhian Sich Cossacks, Professor Moskovich emphasizes that Jewish surnames began to form steadily only at the beginning of the 19th century, when the Sich had already ceased to exist. Nevertheless, this fact testifies to the complex interweaving of Ukrainian and Jewish cultures, which together formed unique social and cultural structures.

Historical ties between Jews and Ukrainians are also confirmed by numerous toponymic Jewish surnames that originate from the names of settlements in Ukraine and Belarus. These surnames were formed similarly to the surnames of the Ukrainian, Belarusian and Polish gentry. In some cases, they even coincide with the gentry surnames of these peoples. The list of such surnames includes Lebedinsky, Mirgorodsky, Zhitomir, Belotserkovsky, Rakitnyansky, Potocki, Odessa, Chernobyl, Zhvanetsky, Koretsky, Brodsky and others. These surnames not only indicate a geographical connection, but also reflect the long history of coexistence of Jews on the territory of Ukraine.

In the 20th century, especially during the Soviet period, Jews had the opportunity to change their surnames, which was sometimes done to adapt to the local culture or for political reasons. Thus, Yiddish surnames could be calqued into Ukrainian analogues, for example: Bilan (from Weissman), Fisherman (from Fisher), Chervonenko (from Rothman), Chernenko (from Shvartsman) Such adaptation demonstrates the desire of Jews to integrate into Ukrainian society while preserving their roots.

A particularly interesting example of the Ukrainization of Jewish surnames is Pinchuk And Polischukwhich probably originated from surnames Pinsky And PoleskiyThis process testifies to the mutual influence and adaptation of cultures that lived side by side for many centuries.

The coexistence of Jews and Ukrainians has a long and sometimes complex history. Both nations have experienced periods of conflict and cooperation, but their shared cultural heritage continues to play a significant role in modern times. Jews began settling en masse in Ukraine in the Middle Ages, when the country was part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and then the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Their contribution to the economic and cultural development of the regions was significant. Over time, Jewish communities in Ukraine became increasingly influential, and many Jews participated in the social and cultural life of the country.

This coexistence is especially relevant in our time, when the world is on the threshold of change, and preserving cultural ties and the memory of centuries-old cooperation between peoples is becoming even more important.

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“Not About the War”: The book of Jewish defender of Ukraine Maksym Shvartsman was presented in Chernivtsi on the 3rd anniversary of his death at the front - July 21, 2026 - Новости Израиля

Did Azerbaijan stop Israel’s vote on recognizing the Armenian genocide? - July 20, 2026 - Новости Израиля

June 2026 was the hardest for Ukrainian civilians since April 2022 — UN data - July 20, 2026 - Новости Израиля

The column by British author Jake Wallis Simons, published in The Telegraph on April 18, 2026, under the headline The West is losing its moral compass, is built around a harsh thesis: The West is increasingly unable to defend free societies when faced with more ruthless, more consistent, and less restrained opponents. The author links three cases—Ukraine, Israel, and Iran—into one line and argues that it is not a set of separate crises, but a systemic political weakness of democracies.

For the Israeli audience, this text is important not only as British journalism. It directly addresses a question that resonates particularly sharply in Israel after October 7: why do Western capitals often appear morally loud but strategically indecisive where the cost of error is measured in the lives of citizens, border security, and the survival of allies.

Ukraine, Israel, and Iran as one political test

Simons presents Ukraine as an example of a dangerous Western illusion: the country gave up the world’s third-largest nuclear arsenal after signing the Budapest Memorandum in 1994, receiving political security assurances from the US, UK, and Russia. Later, this very construct became one of the symbols of how international guarantees might not work in the face of direct aggression. The story of Bucha only reinforced this conclusion, turning the issue of deterrence failure into a question about the cost of trust in external promises.

In this logic, Israel occupies a special place. After the Hamas attack on October 7, 2023, the debate was not only about the military response but also about the willingness of Western elites to consistently support the right of a democratic state to self-defense in the face of terrorist warfare. For many in Israel, this is where the main gap between beautiful declarations of values and real political will became apparent.

In Simons’ view, Iran is the third element of the same picture. It is about a regime that combines internal repression, the export of instability, and pressure on the neighboring region. At the same time, there were various assessments of the scale of the January 2026 repressions in Iran: human rights activists reported mass killings of protesters, and several investigations and publications suggested that the death toll could have exceeded 30,000 in two days, although these figures remain disputed and require cautious wording. Human Rights Watch spoke of mounting evidence of mass executions, and major international media pointed to the extremely severe scale of violence.

Why the author brings these three stories together

The logic of the column is that Ukraine, Israel, and Iran show the same problem from three sides. Ukraine demonstrates that the West poorly prevents aggression. Israel shows that the West often begins to morally waver when a democratic country responds to a terrorist attack. Iran reminds us that Western rhetoric about human rights too often does not translate into real pressure on regimes that kill their own citizens.

This is where the topic becomes especially sensitive for Israel. Because from the Israeli perspective, the question is no longer abstract. If the democratic world cannot respond equally clearly to the Russian war against Ukraine, Islamist terror against Israel, and repression within Iran, then the problem is not a lack of information but a crisis of strategic clarity.

Where exactly, according to Simons, the West fails

The essence of Simons’ argument is not reduced to emotions.

He writes about moral disorientation, where part of the Western establishment continues to think in terms of procedures, compromises, and reputational risks even when faced with forces openly betting on violence, intimidation, and the destruction of the very rules. This is why, in his opinion, democracies lose not only in reaction speed but also in the ability to call things by their names.

For Ukraine, this meant too slow a realization of the scale of the Russian threat. For Israel, attempts to impose symmetry where one side commits a terrorist attack on the civilian population and the other defends its own existence. For Iran, chronic lagging of real international reaction behind the regime’s level of brutality.

In the middle of this conversation, it is especially appropriate to remind that NAnews — News of Israel | Nikk.Agency has repeatedly recorded the same pattern: in the modern world, not only borders but also the very mechanisms of moral distinction become vulnerable when democracies begin to be ashamed of their own righteousness faster than dictatorships of their own cruelty.

What this means for Israel

For the Israeli reader, the main takeaway from such a text is not to mechanically accept the British column as a final diagnosis, but to see the overall scheme. Israel has long lived in a reality where the issue of security cannot be separated from the issue of international legitimacy. And if Western democracies lose the ability to defend allies without endless reservations, it becomes a threat not only to Kyiv or Iranian dissidents but also to Israel’s own strategic position.

Moreover, Iran in this triangle is not just another example of authoritarianism.

It is a state that for decades has been forming an anti-Israeli regional network, supporting proxy structures, and simultaneously suppressing its own society. Therefore, the “Ukraine — Israel — Iran” link does not seem artificial to the Israeli audience. On the contrary, it shows how different crises converge at one point: the question of whether the West can defend freedom not at conferences, but in confrontation with force.

The book behind this column and the broader meaning of the debate

Simons’ column echoes his book Never Again: How the West Betrayed the Jews and Itself, which was published in 2025–2026 in various formats and develops the same line: the crisis of the West is not only a story about Jews, Israel, or specific wars, but a story about how liberal societies lose the instinct for self-preservation.

One can argue with the author’s individual emphases, his sharpness, and how much he generalizes different international stories. But ignoring the main nerve of this text is already difficult. Ukraine reminded us that promises do not always protect. Israel showed that even after a monstrous blow, allies can quickly move from sympathy to hesitation. Iran proved that authoritarian regimes are willing to go further than many Western politicians are ready to admit.

Therefore, the question posed by this column sounds extremely concrete for Israel: if democracies truly want to survive as democracies, they will have to relearn not only to talk about values but also to defend them with force, consistently and without self-disarming naivety.

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“Not About the War”: The book of Jewish defender of Ukraine Maksym Shvartsman was presented in Chernivtsi on the 3rd anniversary of his death at the front - July 21, 2026 - Новости Израиля

Did Azerbaijan stop Israel’s vote on recognizing the Armenian genocide? - July 20, 2026 - Новости Израиля

June 2026 was the hardest for Ukrainian civilians since April 2022 — UN data - July 20, 2026 - Новости Израиля

The numbers behind the war against the future. Not just schools, but a system of pressure. New data shows the scale of the problem that Ukraine has been warning about for years. In the 2025–2026 academic year, there are 1980 “Russian” schools operating in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine, working according to Russian standards, and more than 582 thousand Ukrainian children are studying in them. This is not about isolated cases or a local system failure, but about a massive and deliberate restructuring of the educational space under Russia’s control.

But the most frightening thing in this story is not the statistics themselves, but what lies behind them. Through schools, the occupying power builds a mechanism of pressure in which children are gradually changed in terms of language environment, educational content, historical memory, and the very sense of belonging to Ukraine. In March 2026, in the analytical report of the Center “Almenda”, this is directly described as a policy of destroying the identity of children in the occupied territories.

For the Israeli reader, there are too many familiar signals here to consider this topic distant. When the blow is struck at children, at memory, at language, and at the upbringing of the next generation, it is no longer just a humanitarian crisis. It is an attempt to steal the future of a nation.

How exactly Ukrainian children are broken

Militarization instead of childhood

One of the key parts of this system is militarization. Children and teenagers in the occupied territories are drawn into structures like the “First Movement” and “Yunarmiya”, where instead of normal development, creativity, and free choice, they are imposed with a cult of loyalty, submission, and war. Ukrainian and international sources describing the report’s findings indicate that Russian authorities are accelerating the militarization of education, introducing ideological subjects, and embedding elements of state propaganda into school life.

This looks especially cynical because everything is presented under the guise of “upbringing”, “patriotism”, and “care for youth”. In reality, the child is gradually accustomed to the idea that their future should be connected not with Ukraine, but with the state that came to their land with war. And here it becomes clear: this is not about education as such, but about preparing a loyal generation for a foreign system.

Fear as an everyday norm

An equally important element is fear. In the occupied territories, school becomes not a place of choice, but a place of coercion. Parents find themselves under pressure, and teenagers are deprived of the opportunity to openly speak about their pro-Ukrainian position. Even maintaining an internal connection with their country becomes a risk there. This is also mentioned in the materials accompanying the “Almenda” report and in the stories of children who are later managed to be taken out of occupation.

Thus, an environment is built where silence becomes a way to survive. A child learns not to think freely, but to hide their feelings, beliefs, and memory in time. And this is already a blow not only to children’s rights but also to the very possibility of society to reclaim these children without severe consequences for their psyche.

That is why the topic of Ukrainian children in the occupied territories should not fall out of the international agenda. NAnovosti — Israel News | Nikk.Agency in such a conversation sounds not like a formality, but as part of a common effort not to let the world turn away from what is happening right now.

Why Save Ukraine is so important here

Who they are and what they do

Save Ukraine is a Ukrainian humanitarian organization founded in 2014. On its official website, it explains its mission as saving children, supporting families, and forming a strong generation capable of restoring the country’s future. After the start of the full-scale war, the organization became one of the most prominent structures engaged in evacuating civilians, returning Ukrainian children from occupation and from Russia, as well as their further rehabilitation.

In the context of this topic, Save Ukraine is important not as an abstract charity fund, but as an organization that deals with the most severe consequences of occupation in practice. It conducts rescue missions, helps return children home, accompanies families, provides temporary safety, and then helps children go through the path of recovery after experiencing pressure, isolation, ideological processing, and fear. On the Save Ukraine website, it is separately emphasized that it is about children who faced separation from families, militarization, persecution, and other forms of violence.

Save Ukraine:
https://www.saveukraineua.org/

That is why mentioning Save Ukraine in this topic carries special weight. This is not a story “about sympathy”, not a beautiful logo, and not a set of the right words. This is a structure that really pulls children out of the trap where they were tried to be deprived of home, memory, and a normal childhood.

Why this is a question of Ukraine’s future

On the organization’s website, messages about new rescue operations are regularly published.

At the end of March and the beginning of April 2026, Save Ukraine reported on new groups of children and teenagers who were managed to be taken out of occupation and deportation. This shows that the problem has not remained in the past and has not been reduced to isolated cases — it continues, and the fight for each child is literally happening now.

Therefore, the issue of returning Ukrainian children cannot be perceived only as a humanitarian mission. It is a question of whether Ukraine will be able to maintain a connection with the next generation, which the enemy is trying to rewrite for itself. Every child who manages to break out of this system is not just a saved fate. It is also a blow to the very logic of occupation, which is built on the calculation that over time children will forget who they are, where they are from, and to which country they belong.

And that is why this needs to be spoken about loudly. Not only in Kyiv. Not only in the human rights community. Not only in reports.

This should be known in Israel, in Jewish communities, in international institutions, in the media, and in political circles. Because here the war is not only for territories. Here the war is for memory, for identity, and for the future of an entire generation of Ukrainian children.

…
“Not About the War”: The book of Jewish defender of Ukraine Maksym Shvartsman was presented in Chernivtsi on the 3rd anniversary of his death at the front - July 21, 2026 - Новости Израиля

Did Azerbaijan stop Israel’s vote on recognizing the Armenian genocide? - July 20, 2026 - Новости Израиля

June 2026 was the hardest for Ukrainian civilians since April 2022 — UN data - July 20, 2026 - Новости Израиля

In Uzhgorod, a step was taken that recently seemed almost impossible: the foundation was laid for the restoration of the wooden synagogue from the village of Velyki Komyaty in Transcarpathia at the Transcarpathian Museum of Folk Architecture and Life. This is a rare monument of Jewish heritage that was dismantled, transported to the regional center, and is now planned to be recreated in the open-air museum. According to Ukrainian and specialized Jewish sources, this object is indeed one of the very few surviving wooden synagogues in Eastern Europe, and after restoration, it should become part of the museum’s exhibition and simultaneously a space for cultural and religious life.

This was reported by the Transcarpathian Regional Council.

For the Israeli audience, this news is important not only as a local history plot from Transcarpathia.

It directly concerns the theme of preserving Jewish memory in Eastern Europe — the very memory that has been disappearing for decades along with communities, buildings, cemeteries, and local stories. Against the backdrop of war, destruction, and general instability, the very idea of not just preserving the remnants of a building but transporting it, saving it, and returning it to public space looks like a rare example of Jewish heritage in Ukraine not only surviving but literally getting a second life.

Why the history of this synagogue goes far beyond Transcarpathia

The ceremony itself took place on April 15, 2026, on the territory of the Uzhgorod open-air museum. According to Suspilne, a stone and a commemorative certificate were laid in the foundation at that time, and the museum director Vasyl Kotsan clarified that the building had already been dismantled and transported to Uzhgorod. The restoration was divided into three stages: first dismantling and transportation, then the foundation and construction, and after that — the arrangement of the building itself and the space around it. The work is planned to be completed in September–October 2026.

The project was initially not a local initiative of one museum. It is based on the cooperation of the museum, local authorities, Jewish structures, and the Hungarian side.

Jewish Heritage Europe wrote back in the fall of 2025 that the relocation of the synagogue was the result of a memorandum of cooperation between several participants, including the Consulate General of Hungary in Uzhgorod, the museum, representatives of the Transcarpathian administration, and the Jewish community. Already in April 2026, Ukrainian regional sources confirmed that the project had moved from the stage of agreements to the practical phase of construction.

This is especially important because it is not about reconstruction “from scratch” based on designers’ fantasies.

Specialists previously performed architectural measurements, drawings, and descriptions of the object. The Center for Jewish Art at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem records the existence of this wooden synagogue in Velyki Komyaty, publishes its photos and drawings, and also classifies it among the wooden synagogues of Transcarpathia. Thus, the restorers have a scientific basis that allows them not just to build a stylization but to try to restore the historical appearance of the monument as accurately as possible.

What makes it truly unique

In Ukrainian publications, the object is often called the only such synagogue in Europe. Here, the accuracy of formulations is important. It is more reliable to say this: it is one of the last surviving wooden synagogues in Eastern Europe and an exceptionally rare example of Jewish wooden sacred architecture that has survived to this day. This cautious but convincing assessment is given by specialized sources studying the Jewish heritage of the region.

For the reader in Israel, this nuance is not technical but fundamental. When the media writes “the only one in Europe” without verification, it sounds impressive but may raise doubts among those familiar with the history of wooden synagogues in Poland, Lithuania, Ukraine, and Belarus. In this case, the value of the object does not need exaggeration. Even the formulations “rarest,” “one of the few surviving,” and “without analogs in its regional type” are more than sufficient to understand the scale of the event.

The complex fate of the building and the memory of Jewish life that was almost erased

According to Jewish Heritage Europe, the synagogue was first studied in the 1980s, and after the death of Hungarian researcher Aniko Gazda, architects from Lviv continued the work.

At that time, measurements and descriptions of the building were made. The size of the building is 13.83 by 7.92 meters. From the outside, it looks almost like a rural house, but the arched windows and some interior details reveal its true purpose. In recent decades, the building was either empty or used as a utility room or warehouse.

It is worth noting separately that there is a discrepancy in the sources regarding the dating. In news publications, it is sometimes attributed to the mid-19th century, but the Center for Jewish Art’s database indicates the first half of the 20th century, and Jewish Heritage Europe — the late 19th or early 20th century. For a quality text, it is more correct not to present one controversial date as final but to honestly indicate that researchers differ in more precise dating but agree on the main point: this is a historical object of exceptional rarity that has long been under threat of loss.

Suspilne also provides another important detail that returns this story to a human dimension.

According to a project participant, more than 400 Jews from the village of Velyki Komyaty were deported to Auschwitz during the Holocaust. Therefore, the restoration of the synagogue is not only about working with wood, beams, and foundation. It is an attempt to restore the visibility of the Jewish life that was once a full-fledged part of the local world and was then almost completely destroyed.

In this place, it is especially appropriate to say why such stories are important for Israel as well. Jewish statehood has long become not only a political but also a civilizational response to the disappearance of communities that lived in Europe for centuries. When a synagogue doomed to final destruction is restored in Ukraine, it works not only as a museum project. It is a return of voice to those places where Jewish presence was attempted to be erased by war, Nazism, Soviet neglect, and time. And it is precisely such stories that NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency should notice and explain to the Israeli reader not as an exotic from Transcarpathia but as part of a large Jewish historical map.

Who is involved in the restoration and how much it costs

According to Suspilne, the first stage — dismantling and transportation — cost about 903 thousand hryvnias. The second stage, related to the formation of the foundation and construction, is estimated at 3.5 million hryvnias. The museum director also clarified that for full restoration, about 40% of the structure will have to be made from new material, as some of the original elements did not withstand time.

This is also an important point for understanding the scale of the project. It is not about cosmetic repairs. Specialists are essentially reassembling the monument, trying to preserve as many authentic elements as possible, but at the same time preventing the object from collapsing after the ceremonial opening. Such an approach usually causes disputes among restorers, but in cases where the monument has stood without proper care for decades, a compromise between authenticity and physical survival becomes inevitable. This project is precisely at such a point.

How the foundation was laid, who participated, and what was said

The ceremonial ceremony took place on April 15 on the territory of the Transcarpathian Museum of Folk Architecture and Life in Uzhgorod. On this day, a stone was laid in the foundation of the future restored synagogue from the village of Velyki Komyaty, along with a commemorative certificate. The event itself became not just a technical start of work but a public symbol of the beginning of the rescue of a rare monument of Jewish heritage in Transcarpathia.

The ceremony was attended by representatives of regional authorities, international partners, diplomats, Jewish organizations, and representatives of the local community.

Among the participants were the chairman of the Transcarpathian Regional Council Roman Saray, Deputy Head of the OVA Yuriy Guzynets, Consul General of Hungary in Uzhgorod József Bocskai, President of the Jewish Confederation of Ukraine Rabbi Meir Stambler, Chairman of the Presidium of the Public Foundation of Hungarian Jewish Heritage MAZSÖK György Szabó, as well as ambassadors of Transcarpathia Alex Rovt and Gennady Gutman. Representatives of the Jewish community of the region were also present at the ceremony.

A separate role in the event was played by museum workers and specialists involved in the restoration project itself.

Museum director Vasyl Kotsan explained that the building had already been dismantled and transported to Uzhgorod, and the restoration would take place in three stages. According to him, the first stage — dismantling and transportation — cost almost a million hryvnias, and at the second stage, which includes the formation of the foundation and construction, the parties were just moving to sign a new agreement. He clarified that the cost of the second stage is 3.5 million hryvnias, and among the signatories will be the Consulate General of Hungary in Uzhgorod, Jewish associations, charitable foundations, the museum itself, the Transcarpathian Regional Council, and the regional state administration.

Roman Saray in his speech emphasized not only the architectural but also the historical value of the object. He stressed that the wooden synagogue from Velyki Komyaty is not just an old building but a living witness to the centuries-old history of the region and a symbol of the multicultural Transcarpathia that the region is proud of.

According to him, not so long ago, this mid-19th-century monument was under threat of complete disappearance, but thanks to the joint efforts of regional authorities, international partners, the MAZSÖK foundation, the Consulate General of Hungary, restorers, and museum specialists, it was possible to start a large-scale project to save it.

In his words, there was also a practical emphasis on the future of the object. Saray stated that after the completion of the work, the synagogue will become not only an adornment of the museum’s exhibition but also an important point on the tourist map of the region. In addition, he separately thanked everyone who participated in the preparation of the complex project: specialists who carefully marked each detail during dismantling, scientists working on restoring lost interior fragments, as well as patrons and ambassadors of Transcarpathia, in particular Alex Rovt and Gennady Gutman.

The speech of Rabbi from Hungary Baruch Oberlander was also significant.

He emphasized that the restoration of this synagogue is important not only for the Jewish community but also for all of Transcarpathia. In his words, there was a direct connection between the fate of the building and the fate of the people: he reminded that more than 400 Jews from the village of Velyki Komyaty were sent to Auschwitz. Therefore, the current work, in his assessment, is important also because it restores the memory of the Jewish life that once flourished here. He separately noted the significance of the efforts of Uzhgorod Rabbi Menachem Mendel Wilhelm, calling this work very important.

Thus, the opening ceremony of the construction phase was structured not only as the official start of the project but also as an act of historical memory. It combined several meanings at once: the rescue of a rare monument, international cooperation, the return of Jewish history of Transcarpathia to the public space, and an attempt to show that it is not about museum formality but about restoring an important fragment of the lost world.

What Uzhgorod will get and why it can become a point of attraction for Europe and Israel

After the completion of the work, the synagogue should become not just another museum house in the open-air museum.

According to Jewish Heritage Europe and Ukrainian sources, it is planned to be used not only as an exhibit but also as a space for the cultural and spiritual life of the Jewish community. This sharply increases the value of the project: the object will not exist as a dead backdrop for excursions but will have a chance to perform at least part of its historical function again.

For tourism, this is also a strong story. Uzhgorod and Transcarpathia have long been perceived as a territory of intersection of Ukrainian, Hungarian, Jewish, Slovak, Rusyn, and Central European cultures. If the project is completed qualitatively, the restored synagogue may become one of the most notable points of Jewish heritage in the region — and not only for Ukrainian tourists but also for researchers, pilgrims, descendants of Transcarpathian Jews, as well as Israelis interested in memory routes in Eastern Europe.

Against the backdrop of constant news about the destruction of monuments, war, and loss, this story stands out precisely because it is about salvation.

Not about a declaration, not about a memorial plaque, and not about a beautiful statement for social networks, but about a real attempt to pull from oblivion one of the last material traces of Jewish Transcarpathia. And in this sense, the news from Uzhgorod is indeed more than a regional event. It is a reminder that Jewish memory in Europe can not only disappear but also return — if there are people ready to fight for it.

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“The Sataniv Jewish cemetery operated for almost 500 years. The ancient core of the cemetery is the burial of the 15th, 17th, 18th, and early 19th centuries. It numbers about one thousand tombstones. This period marks the flourishing of the carving art of the Jewish people.”

In the Horodok district of the Khmelnytsky region of Ukraine, ancient cemeteries are being studied. This is done within the framework of the “Graves of Ancestors” project in cooperation with the public organization “Ukraine Incognita.” Fourteen Ukrainian, Polish, and Jewish cemeteries have already been studied. The Jewish ones are the best preserved.

What the texts, ornaments, embossed images, and inscriptions on the matzevot tell about was explained by the head of the department of culture, religions, and tourism of the Horodok City Council, Oleh Fedorov, in a report by “Suspilne”.

This is the old part of the Sataniv Jewish cemetery. Burials here date back to the 16th – early 19th century.

“This is one of the most beautiful tombstones of the Sataniv necropolis. It is not the oldest, it is from 1800. Here lies Sarah, the daughter of Rabbi Meir from Lviv,” said researcher and local historian Dmytro Polyukhovych.

Researcher and local historian, member of the public organization “Incognita Ukraine” Dmytro Polyukhovych says the tombstones are decorated in the Baroque style and have a number of symbols.

“It is said here that the girl buried here is righteous in her deeds, modest. This is a very romantic epitaph: ‘for this beauty, which will decay in the ground, I weep.’ Here we see symbols of maiden purity: does — a symbol of maiden purity and beauty, resting — a symbol of innocence and purity, lions — a symbol of the Jewish people. And this is actually a portal.

On another tombstone ceiling, matzevot, three hares are depicted. They have become symbols of the three world religions.

“The image of three hares first appears in China, in a Buddhist cave monastery and dates back to the 4th century AD. In Europe, it became a symbol of Christianity: three hares, each separately and all together — one whole. Such an image is found in many Christian medieval churches of the 10th-11th centuries in Western Europe. And from there it already reaches the Jews,” said the researcher and local historian.

And this is a woman’s grave from 1799. Wolves with prey are depicted on the tombstone — a symbol of premature death. This monument is the most saturated with symbols of death, said Dmytro Polyukhovych.

“This is a symbol of premature death. Next, we see a candlestick, a five-branched one, which is characteristic of women’s tombstones. It indicated that the woman was righteous and has a five-branched candlestick. However, instead of the central candle, there is an eagle, the fifth. The candle holders themselves are very interesting here. We see snakes, in whose mouths candles are inserted.”

According to Dmytro Polyukhovych, The Sataniv necropolis is one of the oldest Jewish necropolises in Ukraine.

“The Sataniv cemetery operated for almost 500 years. The ancient core of the cemetery is the burial of the 15th, 17th, 18th, and early 19th centuries. It numbers about one thousand tombstones. This period marks the flourishing of the carving art of the Jewish people.”

The head of the department of culture, religions, and tourism of the Horodok City Council, Oleh Fedorov, said that the cemetery research was conducted by their department within the framework of the “Graves of Ancestors” project in cooperation with the public organization “Ukraine Incognita.” In total, fourteen cemeteries have already been studied.

“The Jewish cemeteries of the 17th-18th century are best preserved here because they were usually in such inaccessible public places, on high hills, so they are better preserved. This is truly a museum of stone carving,” said Oleh Fedorov.

According to Oleh Fedorov, The Sataniv Jewish necropolis deserves the status of a national monument.

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