Month: June 2026

International Jewish Book Day is celebrated annually on December 29 (International Jewish Book Day). This holiday symbolizes the rich literature and cultural heritage of the Jewish people, reflecting their influence on world culture.

However, behind the celebration lie deep historical ties that unite Israel, Ukraine and the Jewish community.

One of the brightest pages of this story is ancient example of Jewish literature — “Kiev letter” — unique document of the 10th century, written in Hebrewwhich emphasizes the Jewish presence at that time in the lands of Kievan Rus.

The document is written in Hebrew and contains the first mention of Kyiv in the form Qiyyōb (Heb. קייב).

History of International Jewish Book Day

The origins of this holiday remain unclear. It is believed that it was first celebrated in 1981, when the Jewish National and University Library in Jerusalem (today the National Library of Israel) initiated an event dedicated to the promotion of Jewish literature.

The purpose of the holiday is to recall that the book has always been a central element of Jewish culture, an important tool for the transmission of knowledge, spirituality and values.

Holiday traditions

Today, International Jewish Book Day is accompanied by the following events:

1. Book fairs: We offer works by both classical Jewish authors and contemporary writers whose work is devoted to Jewish themes.
2. Literary evenings: Writers share their work, discuss trending topics, and interact with readers.
3. Lectures and seminars: Participants will learn about the history of Jewish literature, its influence on world culture, and its importance for preserving Jewish identity.
4. Children’s programs: Special attention is given to children to instill a love of reading from a very young age.

The holiday has become a symbol of the unity of Jewish communities and a reminder of the contribution of literature to the development of national identity.

“Kiev Letter”: the first written mention of Kyiv

The Kyiv leaf is a unique document of the 10th century, written in Hebrew.

The letter was discovered among the collection of Hebrew manuscripts of the Cairo Geniza in the Ben Ezra Synagogue by University of Chicago professor Norman Golb in 1962. Later, Harvard University professor Emelyan Pritsak joined the study of the monument.

The authors reported the results of their research at several scientific conferences and in 1982 the document was published in their joint monograph, with Golb providing the translation and Pritsak the interpretation. In the USSR, the existence of the letter was known, but not advertised. The letter was first published translated from English into Russian in 1997.

Manuscript TS (glass) 12.122. kept in the Cambridge University Library. It is a piece of parchment 22.5 cm long and 14.4 cm wide. The sheet is damaged in two places and has seven vertical folds. The text is written on the front side, the back side is blank. Ink is brown (faded black). The text occupies 30 lines.

According to the discoverers, this letter is the oldest authentic document written on the territory of Kievan Rus and can date back to the 10th century.

It was created by the Jewish community of Kyiv, which was under the influence of the Khazar Khaganate. The letter is the most important evidence about the life of the Jewish community in Ancient Rus’.

Contents of the “Kyiv Letter”

The document is a letter in which the community appeals to Jews in other cities with a request to help raise money for the ransom of Jacob ben Hanukkah, a member of the community who found himself in debt slavery. The letter describes the tragic story of Yakov, who vouched for his brother, who took money from the “infidels.” After the death of his brother, his debt was transferred to the guarantor, which led to Yakov’s imprisonment.

Interesting facts:

• The letter contains 30 lines of text written in brown ink.
• The document mentions Kyiv under the name Qiyyōb (קייב).
• The last word is written in Turkic runes, which is probably the only surviving written evidence of the Khazar language.

The meaning of the “Kyiv letter”

The “Kiev Letter” is not only a valuable historical evidence, but also a unique source for the study of Jewish and Khazar cultures. The document illustrates the legal and social norms of the time, showing how the system of surety and debt slavery worked.

Jewish literature in Ukraine: general context

Ukraine occupies an important place in the history of Jewish literature. Many prominent Jewish writers, such as Sholem Aleichem, Yitzchok Ben-Zvi and others, drew inspiration from the life of Jewish communities located in Kyiv, Odessa and other cities.

An important stage was the era of the Khazar Kaganate, when Judaism became widespread and Kyiv became an important center of Jewish life. The Kiev Letter serves as evidence of the deep historical roots of Jews in the territory of modern Ukraine.

Why is this important today?

For Israel and Ukraine, literature and history create a powerful cultural bridge. Modern literary projects, translations and publications help to recall common pages of history, such as the “Kiev Letter”, and deepen mutual understanding between peoples.

Jewish Book: Implications for the Community

The Jewish book has always been more than just text. It acted as a repository of spirituality, culture and knowledge. Today, International Jewish Book Day helps highlight the importance of written heritage, both ancient and modern.

On the website NAnews – Israel News we often talk about events related to Jewish culture and its historical roots. The Kiev Letter, being the oldest written evidence about Kyiv, shows how literature helps preserve the identity and culture of the people.

Conclusion

International Jewish Book Day is not only a holiday, but also an opportunity to reflect on the importance of literature and its influence on the history of peoples. The Kiev Leaf as part of the Jewish and Ukrainian heritage is a vivid example of how a common history can unite.

Ukraine and Israel are connected by deep historical ties. From the Kyiv Letter to modern Jewish literature, these connections remain strong.

Read more about the unique history of the Jews of Ukraine on the website NAnews – Israel News! Learn how ancient documents and modern books become part of a common culture.

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On June 30, 2026, the Ukrainian publication TSN published an article by Oleksandr Marushchak about a discovery that sounds almost absurd for wartime Kyiv.

In the Dnipro district of the capital, near the residential complex “Park Lakes,” researchers of underground Kyiv discovered an abandoned radiation shelter designed for approximately 700 people.

This is not a new object and not a temporary basement.

According to TSN, it is a substantial Soviet bomb shelter of the former “Agromash” plant, which once dealt with the repair of agricultural machinery. The plant’s premises were long demolished, the area was given over to residential development, high-rises appeared around, and the shelter itself was considered lost.

But it turned out that it had not disappeared.

It remained underground all these years — next to houses, next to people, next to an area where, during the Russian war, residents lack proper shelter.

Kyiv, Dnipro district: what exactly was found near the “Park Lakes” residential complex

The story of the discovery was told to TSN by the researcher of underground Kyiv, Kyrylo Stepanyets.

According to him, the shelter was noticed after the ground subsided. This is an important detail: the object was found not because it was timely checked by municipal services, not because a city inventory revealed a forgotten bunker, but practically by accident — when the earth reminded that there was something beneath it.

Stepanyets told TSN that back in 2010 he saw the entrance to this bomb shelter. At that time, the memory of the industrial area still remained in this place. Later, the premises of the “Agromash” plant were demolished, the area began to be developed for housing, and the shelter was considered lost.

“I thought it was buried, but it turned out it wasn’t. It was completely preserved underground,” TSN conveys his words.

Inside, according to the publication, elements of a full-fledged protective structure have been preserved: airtight doors, gas masks, exhausts, air purification filters. So it’s not about a random basement, but a real radiation shelter built in case of a major war.

And here begins the main nerve of this story.

In the fifth year of the full-scale war against Ukraine, when Kyiv regularly experiences air raids, missile and drone attacks, a shelter for 700 people lay under residential buildings.

Not destroyed.

Not dismantled.

Not disappeared.

Just forgotten, buried under debris, and officially needed by no one.

The bunker exists, there are many people, but no shelter: the paradox of the fifth year of war

According to Kyrylo Stepanyets, as cited by TSN, there is no decent shelter on the territory of the residential complex, although a powerful Soviet bunker is preserved underground nearby. The researcher directly called this “the paradox of the fifth year of the full-scale war.”

And this is indeed not just a beautiful phrase.

Ukraine lives in a state of daily threat. Kyiv is one of the main targets of Russian attacks. For the residents of the capital, an air raid alarm has long ceased to be something exceptional. People descend into the subway, seek basements, take shelter in parking lots, corridors, underground passages.

And here, next to the high-rises, there could be a place designed for hundreds of people.

Stepanyets claims that the premises could be cosmetically repaired, and then it could now save the residents of the area. He also told TSN that the Dnipro District State Administration previously refused to repair the bomb shelter, citing a lack of funds and interest in the object.

If this information is officially confirmed, the story will cease to be just an unusual find.

This is already a matter of responsibility.

Who knew about this object?

Who decided it was no longer needed?

Who allowed the area to be developed without resolving the fate of the shelter?

Why in a city that has lived under the constant threat of Russian strikes since 2022 do such objects only surface after the ground subsides?

Former factories of Kyiv: how many such shelters might still be under new buildings

A separately important part of the TSN material is Stepanyets’ words that such shelters might not be an isolated case.

In Soviet times, bomb shelters for nuclear war were built at many enterprises in Kyiv. Then a different era began: factories closed, industrial zones were sold, buildings were demolished, and the land was transferred to residential development.

And with these processes, part of the protective infrastructure simply fell out of sight.

On the site of former factories, residential complexes, shops, offices, parking lots appeared. But underground, old shelters could remain — somewhere destroyed, somewhere flooded, somewhere buried, and somewhere, like near “Park Lakes,” almost completely preserved.

TSN also provides another example: in the “Galaxy” residential complex, after the dismantling of the dairy plant premises and the construction of high-rises, the bomb shelter was preserved, repaired, and is now used as a reliable shelter.

This comparison is especially important.

In one place, the old shelter was preserved and returned to the people.

In another, an object for 700 people ended up under debris.

So the problem is not only in the legacy of Soviet infrastructure. The problem lies in the decisions made after that: what to preserve, what to write off, what to check, and what to simply forget.

Reaction of the KMDA: now looking for the balance holder

After TSN’s appeal, the situation was responded to by the Department of Municipal Security of the KMDA in Kyiv.

They reported that specialists are already investigating the situation with the found bomb shelter of the former plant. In particular, they are determining who had the underground premises on balance and who should have been responsible for its functioning. Also, after this, they will decide what to do with the object next.

But this very reaction sounds like a separate diagnosis.

In the capital of a warring country, a shelter for 700 people was found, and the authorities are now figuring out who it belonged to and who should have been responsible for it.

For peacetime, this would be a bureaucratic story.

For Kyiv in 2026, it is a matter of security.

Because a shelter during wartime exists not when it was once built, and not when it is listed in old documents. It exists only when a person can enter it during an alarm.

Why this story is important for Israel

For the Israeli audience, this news from Kyiv should be understandable without long explanations.

In Israel, the topic of shelters is part of life. Mamad in an apartment, public shelters, instructions from the Home Front Command, readiness of municipalities, availability of protected spaces — all these are not abstract norms, but a practical survival system.

That is why the story of the Kyiv bunker near the “Park Lakes” residential complex is important for readers of NAnews — Israel News.

It shows that civil protection is not only concrete, doors, and filters.

It is accounting.

It is responsibility.

It is verification.

It is understanding who is responsible for what.

It is a political and municipal decision not to wait for a tragedy to then look for the guilty.

Ukraine today is going through an experience that Israelis largely understand: peaceful cities become targets, civilian areas come under attack, and security begins not only with the army and air defense but also with the nearest shelter.

If there is a bunker for 700 people under the house, but no one knows about it, it is not protection.

It is an illusion of protection.

What should happen now

The story of the found shelter in the Dnipro district of Kyiv should not end with one TSN article and a few social media posts.

The first thing to do is to officially check the technical condition of the object.

Second, establish the balance holder and legal status of the premises.

Third, understand if the shelter can be quickly brought to a state suitable for people.

Fourth, conduct a separate inspection of former industrial areas of Kyiv, where similar structures might have been preserved after the demolition of factories.

Fifth, publicly explain to the residents of the area whether they can rely on this shelter, when and under what conditions.

Because in such a story, the main question is not how impressive the found bunker looks.

The main question is how many people it could have protected if it had been remembered earlier.

In the fifth year of the full-scale war, a forgotten shelter for 700 people in Kyiv is no longer just an “incredible find.”

It is a test of how the city treats the lives of its residents.

And it is a lesson not only for Ukraine.

It is a lesson for any country living under the threat of strikes on peaceful cities.

…
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Chief Rabbi of Ukraine Moshe Asman published a statement and video with Dmitry Korchinsky on June 29, 2026, following the events surrounding the action on June 21 in Kyiv and the reaction of the Embassy of Israel in Ukraine.

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Original author: Israeli journalist Shimon Briman. At NAnews / Israel News we carefully retell the main points and recommend reading the full material from the author.

From the author on September 12, 2025:

“How an Israeli🇮🇱 commando from ‘Fauda’ fights for Ukraine🇺🇦, performing feats of such magnitude that a Hollywood action movie could be made. I doubted until I received a letter from SBU officers describing his merits.

One of Eyal’s most fantastic yet real achievements is the destruction of 49 Russian combat helicopters worth a billion dollars in one day. One of my most important and fascinating materials in recent years.”

BRIEFLY: what the story is about

• An Israeli veteran, referred to in Ukraine as “like from ‘Fauda’”, fights on the side of Ukraine.
• Lived in Kherson for many years; since 2022 — underground, intelligence, frontline work.
• Main point: the real bridge Israel—Ukraine is built by people and their decisions, not just agencies.
• We provide a summary for readers in Israel and direct them to Shimon Briman’s originals.

Who he is

At the center of the article is Eyal Israeli, a 52-year-old Israeli who lived in Kherson for many years and has special training; after 02/24/2022 he stayed in the city, joined the territorial defense, and then under the auspices of the SBU formed a small reconnaissance and sabotage group in occupied Kherson.

The described episodes include collecting and transmitting coordinates of Russian forces, adjusting strikes, countering collaborators, helping military families and hospitals, and on the day of Kherson’s liberation, the first Ukrainian flag was raised on his refrigerator truck.

The hero then acts in conjunction with the Ukrainian Marine Corps intelligence and the SBU, engages in launching and repairing reconnaissance drones; after the Kakhovka HPP explosion, he helps evacuate people by boat under fire.

The text emphasizes his open Israeli identity (IDF/FAUDA patches, Israeli flag, Hebrew), as well as mentions of bureaucratic difficulties (denials of assistance as “non-citizen”, attempts to obtain citizenship) and received threats after publications.

And yes — the article separately describes an episode with the airfield near Chornobaivka in early March 2022: the hero filmed enemy equipment from the roof of a high-rise building, transmitted the coordinates to the Ukrainian side, after which the object was fired upon.

“Fauda”, but without takes

In the series, there is a second take and soundtrack. On the ground — there is not.
The camera does not wait for convenience. And sometimes the best tactic is not to go outside at all.

Why this matters to Israelis

To see not a “distant” war, but people who act according to values familiar to us. Responsibility, restraint, helping one’s neighbor — this is immediately recognizable.

What the diaspora feels

Some help humanitarianly, some with words and connections, some with deeds.
And many see in him not a legend, but an example.

Where the media’s place is

We keep the focus on the Israel—Ukraine connection without myth-making. Facts, context, respect for safety and details.

Bureaucracy and reality

Queues and formalities do not disappear even for those who have done much.
It’s unpleasant, but that’s how wartime is structured. The work continues — without fanfare.

What this story teaches

Not to wait for applause. To keep the rhythm. To remember why it all started — for life and dignity.

Read the original by Shimon Briman (three languages)

We deliberately do not retell verbatim. Go to the author — there are live details and the voice of the primary source.

Ukrainian (LB.ua):
https://lb.ua/society/2025/09/12/695803_supergeroy_z_faudi_viyni_proti.html

Russian (NEWSru.co.il):
https://www.newsru.co.il/press/12sep2025/eyal_briman.html

English (The Jerusalem Post):
https://www.jpost.com/international/internationalrussia-ukraine-war/article-867213

NAnews Conclusion

This is not a plot about a series. It’s about school, discipline, and the choice of one Israeli who became part of Ukraine’s defense.

The bridge Israel—Ukraine is built by such people, not just protocols.

For NAnews — Israel News this is an important sign: solidarity has a face, a voice, and concrete actions. We recommend reading Shimon Briman’s originals in full — there you can hear that very “live timbre” that is best seen with your own eyes.

…
“Not About the War”: The book of Jewish defender of Ukraine Maksym Shvartsman was presented in Chernivtsi on the 3rd anniversary of his death at the front - July 21, 2026 - Новости Израиля

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“Bright memory to Maksym Bulygin.
We remember. We respect. We will not forget.
Baruch Dayan HaEmet – Blessed is the True Judge“, – from the Federation of Jewish Communities of Ukraine.

On January 20, 2026, in Zhytomyr, a commemorative event was held dedicated to the unveiling of a memorial plaque for Maksym Bulygin — a graduate of the private lyceum “Or Avner!, who died on June 10, 2024, defending Ukraine. The ceremony was attended by parents, relatives, students, teachers, and representatives of the city’s Jewish community.

Maksym Bulygin was a serviceman of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, a volunteer who decided to defend the country from the first months of the full-scale war. The memorial plaque, installed on the walls of the lyceum where he studied, became a sign of respect and gratitude from the community and the educational institution, as well as a reminder of the price Ukraine pays for freedom and independence.

Memorial ceremony at the school where he studied

The unveiling of the memorial plaque took place in a restrained and focused atmosphere. For the Or Avner lyceum, this event holds special significance: Maksym was not an abstract hero but a student of this school, a graduate who was well remembered here.

During the event, words were spoken about his life path, character, choices, and courage. Those present honored Maksym’s memory with a minute of silence. For the school’s students, the ceremony became an important moment of realizing that the war is not a distant news story but a reality that affects their environment, their city, and their school.

Official position of the community

The event was also reported by representatives of the Jewish community of Ukraine. In the published message it says:

Federation of Jewish Communities of Ukraine:

«🕯 Honoring the memory of the Hero — Maksym Bulygin.

On January 20, a solemn event was held at the private lyceum “Or Avner” in the city of Zhytomyr, dedicated to the unveiling of a memorial plaque for Maksym Bulygin — a graduate of the lyceum who died on June 10, 2024, defending Ukraine.

The event was attended by parents, students, teachers, and guests. Those present honored the memory of the Hero, recalled his life path, courage, self-sacrifice, and the road he traveled for the freedom of his country. This day became a reminder of the price of freedom and of those who gave the most valuable thing for it — their lives.

Bright memory to Maksym Bulygin.

We remember. We honor. We will not forget.

Baruch Dayan HaEmet — Blessed is the True Judge».

Biography and personal history

Maksym Bulygin was born and raised in Zhytomyr. He had Ukrainian citizenship, and by nationality, he was a Ukrainian Jew — this information is indicated in the Ukrainian Wikipedia and is confirmed by his biography and participation in the life of the city’s Jewish community.

He was the only child in the family. He attended a Jewish kindergarten, later, after graduating from the Chabad lyceum “Or Avner” (where his grandmother worked as a teacher for 25 years), he entered Vocational School No. 18, where he obtained the profession of “Cook-Baker”.

He was a diligent student, sang in the choir, found a long-term hobby — chess (backgammon). From childhood, he was an active member of the Jewish community of Zhytomyr. From 2019 to 2021, he served in the Ukrainian army, serving as a rifleman. After demobilization, he worked at “Nova Poshta”, first as a loader, later becoming a scanner.

On February 24, 2022, at the beginning of the full-scale invasion, Maks received a summons and immediately stood up to defend his native Ukraine. He fought in various formations. Shortly before his death, he was in the ranks of the 117th Separate Mechanized Brigade. He served for 2.5 years in the east — Bakhmut, Avdiivka, Zaitseve, and beyond. He almost died several times.

In 2024, Maksym was transferred to another battalion, offered to become a UAV operator, he mastered this specialty, and when he went on his first combat mission, he did not return. UAV operator Maksym-Wolf Bulygin heroically died on June 10, 2024, during a combat mission to defend Ukraine from Russian aggressors in the village of Robotyne, Zaporizhzhia region, when the occupiers dropped explosives on his position.

A year before his death, Maksym found a beloved, they set a wedding date for the end of June, the defender agreed on leave, but two weeks before the desired day, he died.

“Grandma’s boy”

Behind the official formulations and biographical references lies the personal side of Maksym’s life, which his relatives talk about. Maksym’s grandmother, Tatyana Lipinska, recalls:

“He called himself ‘grandma’s boy’.”

This simple phrase sharply contrasts with the image of a soldier and emphasizes the human dimension of his fate. For the family, Maksym was not only a serviceman and hero but also a grandson, a close person, with a warm attachment to his relatives.

Service and death

On June 10, 2024, Maksym Bulygin died while performing a combat mission in the Zaporizhzhia direction. His death was a heavy blow to his family, friends, and community.

On June 25, 2024, after a traditional Jewish farewell ceremony near the synagogue in Zhytomyr, conducted by Rabbi Shlomo Wilhelm, Maksym Bulygin was buried at the Smolyansky City Military Cemetery.

For personal courage shown in the defense of the state sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, selfless fulfillment of military duty, he was awarded – by Decree of the President of Ukraine dated November 27, 2024, No. 787, the Order of “For Courage” III degree (posthumously).

On June 20, the Chief Rabbi of Kyiv and Ukraine Moshe Asman wrote about Maksym Bulygin’s death on his Facebook page. By the same Presidential Decree No. 787, and the same award, (posthumously) was given to the son of Rabbi Moshe Asman — Samborsky Matityahu.

The significance of the event for the community and the city

The unveiling of the memorial plaque in Zhytomyr is significant not only as a local event. It is part of a broader process of preserving the memory of the fallen defenders of Ukraine — regardless of their origin, religion, or nationality.

Maksym Bulygin’s story refutes propagandist myths about the alleged “detachment” of national minorities from the defense of Ukraine. The country’s Jewish community has been involved in the defense from the first days of the war — on the front lines, in volunteering, in humanitarian aid.

Memory as responsibility

At the Or Avner lyceum, they emphasize that the memorial plaque is not only a sign of mourning but also an element of educational work. It will remind students of the real fates of the school’s graduates, the price of decisions, and that freedom does not exist by itself.

Maksym’s story is the story of a person who made a choice and remained true to it until the end. For his school, city, and community, this choice became part of the collective memory.

“We remember everyone who holds the sky above us”

“We remember everyone who holds the sky above us” — this formula, voiced during the ceremony, became the unofficial conclusion of the event. The memorial plaque on the walls of the lyceum is a reminder of a specific life, a specific fate, and a specific loss.

Maksym Bulygin will forever remain in the memory of his family, teachers, classmates, and the Zhytomyr community. His name is inscribed not only on the school walls but also in the modern history of Ukraine — a history that is being written here and now, at the cost of human lives. It is precisely such stories, behind which stand real people and real losses, NANews — News of Israel | Nikk.Agency consider important to preserve and tell, so that the memory of the fallen defenders does not turn into a dry line of the chronicle.

…
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A new formula is emerging in US-Israel relations, which until recently seemed almost impossible for the right-wing Israeli camp: even under Donald Trump, Israel is no longer guaranteed to remain an ‘exception’ in American foreign policy.

This is the conclusion drawn from a Politico article published on June 27, 2026, under the headline “Israel’s Vance problem is bigger than JD Vance.” The authors of the article — Felicia Schwartz, Alex Gangitano, and Dasha Burns — cite numerous sources, including American and Israeli officials, as well as people familiar with the relations between the two governments. The key point of the article: Israel’s problem is not only with US Vice President JD Vance, but with a deeper change in Washington’s logic.

According to Politico, Israel expected that the America First doctrine in Trump’s second presidential term would have a special exception for Israel. But now, as sources say, Washington is increasingly operating on a different principle: if Israel’s interests and the interests of the US administration diverge, the American side is not obliged to automatically choose the Israeli line.

For Israel, this is a painful signal. In Jerusalem, it was customary to believe that under Trump, relations with the US would be not just close, but almost unconditional. However, recent weeks have shown: support may remain, but its political cost and conditions are changing.

What exactly did Politico write

According to Politico, there is a growing understanding in Israeli political circles that Israel’s status as a US ally is no longer placed above other foreign policy tasks of Washington. One Israeli political adviser explained it this way: Israel expected that it could remain an exception to everything America does in foreign policy for four years, but such logic could not continue indefinitely.

The meaning of this phrase is more important than the quote itself. It’s not about breaking the alliance or the US ‘abandoning’ Israel. It’s about something else: Israel can no longer be sure that any clash of interests will be resolved in its favor.

That is why the Politico article sounds alarming for Benjamin Netanyahu’s government. If earlier many in Israel hoped that Trump would provide full support before future political developments, now, according to sources, such automatism is not yet present. One interlocutor familiar with the relations between the two governments said directly: Netanyahu expected full support from Trump before the elections, but so far this has not happened.

For the Israeli audience, this is an especially important moment. НАновости — Новости Израиля has repeatedly noted that Israel-US relations cannot be assessed only by public statements of friendship. Sometimes real politics is seen not in compliments, but in where Washington begins to set boundaries.

Why Vance became a symbol of the new approach

The figure of JD Vance found itself at the center of the crisis after his statement on June 18, 2026. At a White House briefing, he sharply warned Israeli critics of the US-Iran agreement. According to Axios, Vance said that Donald Trump is the only head of state in the world who currently treats Israel with sympathy, and that the Israeli cabinet should not attack the only strong ally Israel still has.

Le Monde also separately analyzed this speech and called it a stern warning to Israel. The French publication emphasized that Vance’s words came against the backdrop of criticism from Israeli right-wing politicians towards the American line on Iran.

At first glance, this could be seen as Vance’s personal harshness. But Politico offers another angle: Vance is not a deviation from the course, but its manifestation. He says out loud what part of the Trump administration already considers political reality.

According to information close to the vice president’s team, Vance’s rhetoric reflects a change in public sentiment in the US, including among young Republicans. This is fundamental: if earlier the pro-Israel position within the Republican Party was considered almost mandatory, now among part of the right-wing electorate the question is increasingly being asked — why should the interests of another country determine American policy?

It is here that the slogan America First begins to work not only against Ukraine, Europe, or international organizations, but also against traditional expectations of Israel.

The Iran deal as a point of contention

The main background of the current crisis is the American line on Iran. On June 17, 2026, the US and Iran reached a preliminary agreement, around which tension immediately arose between Washington and Jerusalem. Reuters writes that the Trump administration tried to defend this agreement, while in Israel it caused alarm and criticism.

For Netanyahu, Iran is not an ordinary diplomatic topic. His political biography has been built for decades around warnings about the nuclear threat, pressure on Washington, and attempts to persuade American presidents to act tougher. Therefore, any US deal with Iran is perceived in Israel not only as a foreign policy step but also as a test of Netanyahu’s influence on the American system.

Reuters on June 24, 2026, wrote that the new US-Iran deal could become a political blow to Netanyahu. According to analysts and diplomats, he risks being not the architect of the American line, but its hostage: Washington is playing its own game, and Israel is forced to react.

Against this background, Vance’s statements take on an even harsher meaning. He is not just asking Israeli ministers to be more careful with their words. He is effectively saying: if Israel interferes with the American deal, Washington may reconsider the level of support.

This does not mean an immediate cessation of military aid. But it does mean the emergence of a new lever of pressure.

Why this is important for Israel

For Israel, the alliance with the US is not a diplomatic luxury, but part of the national security system. American military aid, political protection in international institutions, arms supplies, diplomatic cover, and influence on regional players have been critically important elements of Israeli strategy for decades.

But the new American logic sounds different: support for Israel remains as long as it does not interfere with major US interests.

In this sense, Politico captures not just a conflict between Vance and Israeli ministers. The publication describes a deeper shift: Israel is facing the fact that its alliance with the US is becoming less emotional, less ideological, and more transactional.

That is, Washington can say: we support you, but not at any cost. We are your ally, but not your automatic tool. We take into account Israel’s security, but we are not obliged to subordinate all American policy in the Middle East to it.

For Netanyahu’s government, this is especially dangerous because its internal legitimacy largely rests on the image of a leader who knows how to talk to American power better than anyone else. If this image weakens, the problem becomes not only diplomatic but also political.

Within the Republican Party, attitudes towards Israel are changing

One of the most important elements of this story is the change in the American right-wing audience. Support for Israel in the US has been strong for decades among both Democrats and Republicans, although its forms differed. But in recent years, both parties have been experiencing internal splits.

Among Democrats, criticism of Israel has intensified on the left flank. Among Republicans, the influence of a camp that does not want new wars, new commitments, and new foreign policy expenses is growing. For this group, Israel remains an ally, but not necessarily an ally for whom the US should take any risk.

Reuters on June 26, 2026, separately wrote about the difference in tones between Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio. Vance spoke more harshly about how Israel’s actions could undermine US peace efforts, while Rubio emphasized Israel’s right to self-defense more strongly. The White House officially denied any split and claimed that the entire administration was acting within Trump’s line.

For Israel, this means that even within the Trump administration, there is no single simple intonation. There is support for Israel, but there is also irritation. There is a traditional Republican pro-Israel reflex, but there is also a new policy of restraint.

Netanyahu found himself in a difficult trap

Netanyahu needs Trump. But Trump does not necessarily need Netanyahu to the same extent.

This is the new asymmetry. The Israeli prime minister is interested in demonstrating full support from the White House, especially if political turbulence lies ahead within Israel. Trump, on the other hand, is interested in presenting himself as a president who ends wars, makes deals, and forces allies to take American conditions into account.

If Netanyahu criticizes the Iran deal too sharply, he risks irritating the White House. If he remains silent, he risks receiving criticism from the right within Israel. If he continues military actions that Washington considers harmful to its diplomacy, he may face even more open pressure.

That is why the phrase from the Politico source that ‘the worst is yet to come’ sounds not like emotional dramatization, but like a political forecast.

What this means for the Israeli audience

For readers in Israel, this story is important not only as another episode in the Trump-Netanyahu relationship. It shows that Israel is entering a period where familiar guarantees are becoming less obvious.

The US remains Israel’s main ally. This has not changed in one week and has not disappeared after one statement by Vance. But the quality of this connection is changing. Support will increasingly depend on how much Israel’s actions align with the American plan for the region.

If the US wants a deal with Iran, it will be harder for Israel to torpedo it.
If the US wants stabilization in Lebanon, it will be harder for Israel to explain continued strikes solely with internal security logic.
If Trump wants to show American voters that he is not dragging the country into new wars, Israeli expectations may become a political burden for him.

НАновости — Новости Израиля believes that the main question now is: can Israel maintain a strategic alliance with the US if Washington stops perceiving Israeli interests as an automatic extension of American ones?

The answer is not yet clear.

But it is already evident that the era of simple formulas is ending. The phrase ‘Trump will support Israel’ no longer explains the whole picture. It needs to be added: he will support — if it does not contradict his deal, his electorate, his understanding of America First, and his desire to show that he is in control of the situation.

Conclusion

The Politico article is important not because it reports a personal conflict between Vance and Israel. Its significance is deeper: it captures the moment when in American politics, Israel ceases to be an unconditional exception.

For Netanyahu, this is a diplomatic risk.
For the Israeli right-wing camp, it is an ideological blow.
For Washington, it is an attempt to regain control over the Middle East agenda.
For Israel, it is a reminder that even the closest ally can at some point say: first US interests, then everything else.

This is the new reality described by Politico: Israel’s problem with Vance is not just a problem with Vance. It is a problem with America, which increasingly demands that allies adapt to it, not the other way around.

…
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In the center of Tel Aviv, an evening is being prepared that will become not just a restaurant event for many guests, but a meeting with the atmosphere of a Ukrainian home, music, and celebration.

On July 3, 2026, the restaurant SHO? — Ukrainian Traditional Food celebrates 3 years of operation.

The celebration will take place at Karlibach 3, Tel Aviv.

Doors open at 19:00.

The evening program includes Diadele and Friends, DJ Samso, live music, a disco, and a festive atmosphere of Ukrainian cuisine in Israel.

Three years of taste, meetings, and Ukrainian atmosphere in Tel Aviv

For the SHO? restaurant, these three years have become more than just a period of operation.

These were years of meetings, conversations at the table, first dates, large gatherings, family dinners, warm evenings, and moments that you want to remember with a smile.

In their festive address, the restaurant team writes that these three years are primarily about the guests.

About the people who came, returned, brought friends, celebrated important dates, and gradually became part of the history of this place.

SHO? has grown as a space where Ukrainian cuisine in Tel Aviv has become not only about dishes but also about the feeling of closeness, familiar taste, and lively communication.

What will happen on July 3

The festive evening will begin on July 3 at 19:00.

Guests can expect:

Diadele and Friends — the musical part of the evening and festive performance.

DJ Samso — disco and mood after live music.

Ukrainian cuisine — the atmosphere of the SHO? restaurant, the dishes that people return for, and an evening at a large common table.

Celebration of the 3rd anniversary — meeting guests, friends of the restaurant, and everyone who wants to spend the evening in a Ukrainian atmosphere in the center of Tel Aviv.

The poster for the evening is marked as “святкуємо 3 роки разом” — “celebrating 3 years together”.

And this well conveys the idea of the event: not a formal date, but a celebration of people who over the years have become part of one big story.

A Ukrainian place in Israel to return to

In Israel, Ukrainian restaurants and cultural spaces have long become something more than just points on the gastronomic map.

For some, it is an opportunity to try familiar dishes.

For others, it is to maintain a connection with the language, music, memories, and people.

For others, it is to discover Ukrainian cuisine through the lively atmosphere of Tel Aviv.

SHO? has become exactly such a place in three years: a restaurant where people come not only to eat but also to meet, talk, celebrate, hear music, and feel among their own.

The restaurant team thanks the guests for these years and emphasizes: the best is yet to come.

Information for guests

Event: 3rd anniversary of SHO? — Ukrainian Traditional Food

Date: July 3

Time: doors open at 19:00

Place: SHO? — Ukrainian Traditional Food

Address: Karlibach 3, Tel Aviv, Israel

Program: Diadele and Friends, DJ Samso, live music, disco

Reservations and details – https://www.facebook.com/shotelaviv

The festive evening at SHO? is an opportunity to celebrate 3 years of Ukrainian taste, music, and meetings in Tel Aviv.

NANews — News of Israel follows events that unite people, culture, and the life of the Ukrainian community in Israel.

…
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In Israel, many people have the same practical problem: the main bank or credit card is literally linked to everything.

It is used to pay for advertising on Facebook, Instagram, and Google, subscriptions to work services, hosting, domains, online stores, apps, trips, delivery, international platforms, and dozens of small regular payments.

As long as everything works, it’s convenient. But as soon as the advertising account charges more than expected, a subscription is automatically renewed, a foreign service rejects a payment, or the card needs to be reissued, it becomes clear: keeping all payments on one main card is not always wise.

Against this backdrop, more and more users are looking towards separate virtual cards. One of the services actively discussed in this topic is RedotPay.

It is often called a crypto card, but for the average user, cryptocurrency is not the only important thing.

RedotPay can be interesting as a separate payment tool: for online payments, advertising accounts, international services, mobile wallets, limits, as well as working with USDT, USDC, BTC, ETH, and other supported digital assets.

Officially, RedotPay describes itself as a payment app and stablecoin-based card that connects digital assets with everyday payments, and the service’s help center states that to get a card, you need to download the app, register, pass identity verification, add crypto assets via on-chain deposit or buy crypto, and then apply for a virtual or physical card.

What is RedotPay in simple terms

RedotPay is not an ordinary bank card from an Israeli bank. It is a separate payment service with a virtual and, depending on conditions, physical card.

It can be considered in several scenarios.

1. First scenario — RedotPay as a virtual card for online payments: advertising, subscriptions, stores, international services, work tools.
2. Second scenario — RedotPay as a card for payment via phone, it is added to Google Wallet or Apple Wallet.
3. Third scenario — RedotPay as a crypto wallet and payment app, where the user can work with supported digital assets, top up the balance, transfer funds, buy crypto assets, and use them for payments.

In official descriptions, RedotPay mentions virtual and physical cards, payment with BTC, ETH, USDT, USDC, and other assets, mobile payments, the ability to pay online and in stores, as well as using the card with a large number of merchants worldwide.

But an important point: RedotPay should not be perceived as a “card without rules.” It is a financial payment tool with its limits, fees, identity verification, top-up rules, country restrictions, and possible questions about the origin of funds.

Why a separate virtual card is needed

The main benefit of a separate virtual card is control.

When the main bank card is linked to all sites and services, the user effectively opens access to their main payment tool to dozens of different platforms. This is not always dangerous, but often inconvenient.

For example, a small business owner launches advertising on Facebook and Google.

At the same time, he pays for domains, hosting, CRM, newsletters, design services, AI tools, Canva, Adobe, subscriptions, marketplaces, and apps. After a few months, it becomes difficult to understand where the business expenses are, where the personal payments are, where the advertising is, and where the automatic renewal of an old subscription is.

A separate virtual card RedotPay allows you to separate payments. One card can be used only for advertising. Another — for subscriptions. A third — for travel or online purchases. Even if something goes wrong, the main bank card will not be linked to every service in a row.

For users in Israel, this is especially relevant because many work with international platforms, pay for services abroad, run advertising accounts in different languages, and use services that do not always work perfectly with local cards.

Payment for advertising on Facebook, Instagram, and Google

One of the main pains of business is advertising payments.

Facebook Ads, Instagram Ads, and Google Ads charge money regularly. Sometimes the charge occurs after accumulating a certain amount, sometimes on a schedule, sometimes after changing limits in the advertising account. If the main card is linked to advertising, the advertising budget mixes with personal and other business expenses.

A separate RedotPay card can help bring order. It can be used only for advertising, topped up with the necessary amount, and control spending on the project.

RedotPay in the help center separately mentions that after activating the card, information is synchronized with platforms like PayPal, Google Pay, and Facebook, but this does not mean that every payment in every advertising account will always go through without rejections. Advertising platforms, banks, payment networks, and the service itself may have their own payment verification rules.

Therefore, the correct approach is this: first test small amounts, check how the card goes through in the desired advertising account, and only then use it for regular budgets.

Limits on one payment and per day

Another strong point of a separate card is the ability to limit expenses.

If the service allows setting a limit on a one-time payment and a daily limit, it is convenient for advertising, subscriptions, online purchases, and team expenses. The user can pre-limit the amount the card can spend at one time or per day.

This is important when the card is linked to an advertising account. For example, if you want to spend no more than a certain amount on an ad test, the limit helps reduce the risk of unexpected charges.

This is also useful for subscriptions. An old service will not be able to charge more than allowed by the limit. And if the card is used only for a specific project, expenses are easier to control.

In the help center RedotPay there are separate materials on card limits and fees, as well as a section on card usage, where among the questions is the setting of transaction limits. Before active use, you need to check the current limits in your account because conditions may differ by card type, country, verification level, and service rules.

Google Wallet and Apple Wallet: card in the phone

Many users no longer need plastic. They pay by phone: in stores, cafes, transport, apps, and services.

Therefore, an important question: can a virtual card be added to a mobile wallet?

RedotPay has separate instructions for linking a virtual card to Google Pay, as well as a help center section on digital wallets, where there are materials on Google Pay and Apple Pay. On the RedotPay website, there is also a separate page about RedotPay Card on Apple Pay.

For the reader, this means a simple thing: if the function is available for their card, country, device, and account, the virtual card can become a regular payment tool in the phone. For Israel – available.

But here you cannot promise too much. Before use, you need to check whether adding the card is supported specifically for you: in Israel (it can), on your device, with your account, with your card version, and in your mobile wallet.

If the card is added to Google Wallet or Apple Wallet, it is convenient for regular purchases. If not, it can still be considered as a card for online payments, advertising, subscriptions, and international services.

Crypto wallet inside RedotPay: not just a card

RedotPay is interesting not only as a virtual card. Inside the service, there is the logic of a wallet and working with digital assets.

The official app download page RedotPay lists among the possibilities Personal: Card, Send to bank & e-wallet, Send to RedotPay user, Multi-Currency Wallet, Credit, Earn, Swap, and P2P Marketplace. This shows that the service covers not one scenario, but several: card, wallet, transfers, exchange, and working with different payment functions.

For the user, this can be convenient if they already work with USDT or other assets. For example, they can top up the balance, use the supported asset to pay with the card, transfer funds within available functions, or buy crypto assets through the app.

But the more functions, the more responsibility. You need to understand fees, networks, limits, transfer rules, withdrawal conditions, and identity verification requirements.

USDT, USDC, BTC, ETH, and other assets

RedotPay in app descriptions indicates support for payments with BTC, ETH, USDT, USDC, and other assets. But the current list is always better to check inside the app because supported assets, networks, and conditions may change.

For most users, the most understandable scenario is USDT or USDC because these are stablecoins. But even here there is a risk of error: USDT can exist in different networks, and it needs to be transferred only to the correct address in the correct network.

Crypto top-up: where mistakes are most often made

In the RedotPay help center, a standard way to top up with cryptocurrency is described: open the app, go to Home > Deposit, select the currency, for example, USDT, and then choose the appropriate network for the selected currency.

The most dangerous mistake is thinking that “USDT is USDT everywhere.”

For the user, this can end in a problem. If you choose the wrong network or send the wrong asset, the deposit may not arrive. Therefore, before transferring a large amount, it is better to make a test transfer of a small amount and make sure that the address, network, and asset are chosen correctly.

This is especially important for people who have only used a regular bank card before and are not used to crypto wallets. In a bank, you can sometimes cancel or dispute a transaction. In crypto transfers, a network or address error can be much more complicated.

Top-up with a regular bank or credit card

For users from Israel, an important question sounds like this: can RedotPay be topped up not only by transferring cryptocurrency from an external wallet but through a regular bank or credit card?

In the RedotPay help center, it is stated that the user can buy supported cryptocurrencies in the app using a credit/debit card, as well as other available payment methods.

But for the Israeli user, this needs to be checked practically.

One card may pass and another may not. The bank may decline the transaction. The payment provider may charge a fee. There may be purchase limits, country restrictions, KYC requirements, or additional checks.

Therefore, the correct wording is this: RedotPay indicates the possibility of purchasing supported crypto assets with a credit/debit card, but before use, you need to check whether your specific Israeli bank or credit card passes, what fees apply, and whether there are any restrictions from the bank or service.

Transfers between wallets and users

Another scenario is transfers.

If the service allows sending funds to other RedotPay users, working with a multi-currency wallet, transfers to bank & e-wallet, or other functions, this can be convenient for those who often make international payments or separate business and personal funds.

But here again, it is important not to promise too much. Each function may have separate conditions: country, currency, fee, speed, limit, KYC, availability for a specific user.

Therefore, in the article, it is better to write not “everything is possible,” but “the app declares different functions for the card, wallet, transfers, and fund management; before using a specific operation, you need to check its availability and conditions.”

This approach is safer and more honest.

How RedotPay differs from a regular bank card

A regular bank card is linked to a bank account. RedotPay is a separate payment service.

There are advantages in this.

You can avoid linking the main bank card to all sites.

You can use a separate card for advertising.

You can separate business expenses from personal ones.

You can set limits.

You can use a virtual card for subscriptions and international services.

You can add the card to a mobile wallet if the function is available.

You can work with supported digital assets.

But there are also limitations.

It is not a bank in the usual sense.

There are service rules.

There are fees.

There is KYC.

There are limits.

There is a risk of payment rejections.

There is a risk of errors in crypto transfers.

There are tax and banking issues if significant amounts and digital assets are involved.

That is why RedotPay is better considered not as a replacement for an Israeli bank, but as an additional payment tool for specific tasks.

Who RedotPay can be useful for

RedotPay can be of interest to entrepreneurs, marketers, website owners, freelancers, digital specialists, and anyone who regularly pays for international services.

For example, if you launch advertising on Facebook, Instagram, or Google, a separate card helps separate the advertising budget from personal expenses.

If you pay for hosting, domains, SEO services, AI tools, CRM, newsletters, design platforms, and subscriptions, a virtual card helps avoid linking the main bank card to everything.

If you travel frequently or shop in foreign online stores, a separate card can be a convenient backup payment tool.

If you already have USDT, USDC, or other supported assets, RedotPay can be interesting as a link between digital assets and everyday payments.

If it is important for you to pay by phone, you should check the support of Google Wallet and Apple Wallet for your card and country.

Who should not rush

RedotPay should not be used on emotions.

Do not rush if you do not understand the difference between a bank, a card, a crypto wallet, an exchange, and a payment service.

Do not rush if you do not know what a transfer network is.

Do not rush if you think that USDT in any network can be sent to any USDT address.

Do not rush if you are looking for an “anonymous card,” “bank bypass,” or “payments without questions.”

Do not deposit large amounts until you have checked the fees, limits, support, withdrawal rules, and card operation on small payments.

And especially do not use such services for dubious operations. Any normal payment service operates with rules, checks, and restrictions.

What to check before registration

Before registering with RedotPay, a user from Israel should go through a small checklist.

Is the service available for your country and your document.

What documents are needed for identity verification.

What fees are there for issuing and using the card.

What limits are there for one payment and per day.

Can you set the necessary limits manually.

Can the card be added to Google Wallet.

Can the card be added to Apple Wallet.

Does the card work with Facebook Ads, Instagram Ads, and Google Ads.

Is the card suitable for your subscriptions and online services.

Can you buy supported crypto assets with your bank or credit card.

What fees does the payment provider charge when purchasing with a card.

What crypto assets are supported.

What networks are available for USDT or other assets.

Can funds be transferred to other users.

Can the balance be withdrawn.

How does support work.

What to do in case of a disputed charge.

What to do if the deposit did not arrive.

What are the terms of the referral program.

This is not bureaucracy, but normal financial hygiene. The sooner the user checks these questions, the fewer surprises there will be later.

RedotPay referral program: how to speak honestly

RedotPay has a referral program. A user can invite another person via a link or code and receive a reward if the invitee fulfills the service conditions.

For media, it is important to present this transparently. There is no need to disguise the referral link as a “neutral recommendation.” The reader should understand that the author or editorial team may receive a reward.

A normal formulation looks like this:

You can register and independently study the terms of RedotPay via the link:

https://url.hk/i/en/0h7rn

The material contains a referral link. If you register through it and fulfill the conditions of RedotPay, the author or editorial team may receive a reward. This is not financial, investment, tax, or legal advice.

Main risks to remember

The first risk is fees. The card, purchasing crypto assets, exchange, withdrawal, payments, or service may have different fees. They need to be checked before the operation, not after.

The second risk is limits. If a payment does not go through, the reason may not be the store, but the card limit, service limit, account settings, or payment network rules.

The third risk is KYC. RedotPay requires identity verification to obtain a card, and this is a normal part of the operation of such services. In the help center, obtaining a card is directly linked to identity verification.

The fourth risk is errors in crypto transfers. The wrong network, wrong asset, or wrong address can create a serious problem.

The fifth risk is payment rejections. Not every service is obliged to accept a specific card. Advertising accounts, subscriptions, stores, and payment systems may have their own rules.

The sixth risk is questions from the bank or tax specialist. If it concerns digital assets and significant amounts, it is important to keep a history of operations, purchase confirmations, transfers, statements, and documents about the origin of funds.

How to start more safely

The most sensible way is not to start with a large amount.

First, you need to download the app, study the terms, register, and check which functions are available specifically to you.

Then you can issue a virtual card, look at fees, limits, and security settings.

After that, it is worth making a small test payment: for example, in an online service or where you actually plan to use the card.

If you want to use the card for advertising, first test it on a small advertising budget.

If you want to top up with cryptocurrency, first make a test transfer of a small amount.

If you want to buy crypto with a regular bank or credit card, first check if your Israeli card goes through and what the final fee is.

If you want to pay by phone, check adding it to Google Wallet or Apple Wallet.

This approach does not guarantee the absence of problems, but it significantly reduces the risk of unpleasant surprises.

Frequently asked questions

Is RedotPay a bank card?

No, it is not a regular bank card from an Israeli bank. It is a separate payment service with a virtual and, depending on the conditions, a physical card.

Can RedotPay be used in Israel?

Before registration, you need to check the availability of the service, KYC, and functions specifically for users from Israel. Conditions may depend on the country, document, account, and internal service rules.

Can you pay for advertising on Facebook, Instagram, and Google?

The card can be considered for advertising payments, but each advertising account needs to be tested separately. Payment may depend on the platform’s rules, card, limits, and verification.

Can you set a limit for one payment and per day?

RedotPay has reference materials on limits and card usage. Before use, you need to check what limits are available specifically in your account and whether they can be adjusted to your tasks.

Can the card be added to Google Wallet or Apple Wallet?

RedotPay has instructions for Google Pay and Apple Pay, but availability needs to be checked for your country, device, account, and specific card.

Can you pay in regular stores?

If the card is added to a mobile wallet and supported by a specific terminal, it can be used for contactless payment. But before that, you need to check the availability of the function and test the payment.

What crypto assets does RedotPay support?

The official app descriptions list BTC, ETH, USDT, USDC, and other assets. It is better to check the current list in the app.

Can RedotPay be topped up via USDT?

The RedotPay help center describes topping up via Deposit with a currency choice, such as USDT, and the corresponding network. The main thing is to choose the right network and not send a large amount without testing.

Can RedotPay be topped up with a regular bank or credit card?

RedotPay states that supported cryptocurrencies can be purchased in the app using a credit/debit card and other available payment methods. But a user from Israel needs to check if their specific card goes through, what fees apply, and if there are any bank restrictions.

Is this financial advice?

No. Such material should be an informational overview. The decision to register, top up, purchase digital assets, or use the card is made by the user independently.

Conclusion

RedotPay may be of interest to users in Israel not only as a crypto service but also as a separate virtual card for online payments, advertising, subscriptions, international services, and phone payments.

Its practical value lies in separating expenses and control. The main bank card does not need to be linked to all sites. A separate payment tool can be used for advertising. Limits can be set for subscriptions. A separate card can be kept for online purchases. A wallet, top-up, and supported payment functions can be used for digital assets.

But RedotPay should not be perceived as a “simple card without questions.” It is a service with KYC, fees, limits, rules, supported countries, networks, payment conditions, and possible risks.

Before registration, it is worth calmly checking the conditions, testing a small amount, understanding the limits, understanding the top-up rules, ensuring the availability of Google Wallet or Apple Wallet, and not storing large amounts without understanding all the conditions.

You can register and independently study the terms of RedotPay via the link:

https://url.hk/i/en/0h7rn

The material contains a referral link. If you register through it and fulfill the conditions of RedotPay, the author or editorial team may receive a reward. This is not financial, investment, tax, or legal advice.

…
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“Wait, doesn’t all the land in Israel belong to the state? How then is it transferred to someone?”

This is the most common and absolutely logical question.
And the short answer to it is — no, not all the land in Israel belongs to the state.

…

Let’s say right away, in Israel, a petition/open appeal by Israeli citizens to the government is gaining momentum, demanding “to stop the transfer of the Alexander Courtyard to Russia and related IPPO structures“, because they believe that such a transfer “threatens Israel’s security” and poses “risks associated with external influence and the political interests of Moscow and related organizations”.

“Protect Israel from the Russian threat: stop the transfer of the Alexander Courtyard to Hamas supporters“
“Protect Israel from the Russian threat: stop the transfer of the Alexander Courtyard to Hamas supporters”

here it is (Hebrew) – https://www.atzuma.co.il/threatfromrussia

…

Let’s return to land ownership.

Where did this myth come from

In Israel, indeed:

• most of the land is under state management;
• there is the Israel Land Authority;
• land is often not sold, but leased long-term.

Because of this, there is a feeling that

“everything state-owned means the state decides everything.”

But this is not quite so.

What actually belongs to the state and what does not

In Israel, there are three different types of land:

1. State land
   Yes — belongs to the state.
   This is simple.
2. Private land of citizens and organizations
   Yes — it exists.
   With documents, registers, and property rights.
3. Historical and foreign private property
   This is where the whole story with courtyards, churches, and old objects begins.

Many such plots:

• were purchased even before 1948,
• during the Ottoman Empire, British Mandate,
• by private societies, churches, foundations.

And Israel did not automatically nullify these rights.

Why didn’t Israel say: “Everything is ours, period”

When Israel was being re-established, it consciously did not go down the path of confiscating all private property.

The reasons are simple and harsh:

• it wanted to be a state of law, not a revolutionary regime;
• it inherited the British legal system, not destroyed it;
• mass confiscation would mean:
  • endless courts,
  • international isolation,
  • destruction of its own legitimacy.

Simply put:

Israel could have taken it — but decided not to become one who takes by force.

Then what does “transfer” mean in such disputes

When it is said that an object is “transferred”, it does not mean that:

• Israel is giving away “its land”,
• or making a gift to someone.

In fact, Israel:

• is not the owner of such objects,
• acts as an arbiter,
• decides whom to recognize as the legal owner between disputing parties.

Can Israel take it for itself?

Theoretically — yes:

• if the object is recognized as ownerless,
• if no party proves the right,
• or for exceptional reasons of public interest.

“Public interest” — these are rare cases when the state can intervene in private property for the sake of security, vital infrastructure, or protection of unique heritage, for example, for road, railway, or metro construction, creating a security zone, or preserving a historical object.

But this is a extreme scenario, which Israel almost does not resort to, because it:

• creates a dangerous precedent,
• hits international reputation,
• undermines the very logic of a state of law.

The shortest explanation

Land under the sovereignty of Israel — yes.
But ownership — not always state-owned.
Therefore, Israel does not “give away its own”, but decides, whose it is by law (Israeli and international).

Let’s start.

What is the Alexander Courtyard today — in fact

The Alexander Courtyard, here it is on Google map, is a historical-archaeological, cult, and museum complex in the Old City of Jerusalem, located approximately 40–50 meters from the Church of the Holy Sepulchre (1–2 minutes walk). It is not a hotel or commercial lodging: accommodation for tourists or pilgrims is not provided.

Area and location.
The complex occupies a plot of about 1,300–1,500 m², which is a significant size for the dense development of the Old City. Nearby are key shrines and locations:

• Church of the Holy Sepulchre — 40–50 m;
• route Via Dolorosa — directly adjacent (the Judgment Gate Threshold is part of it);
• district Muristan — about 100 m;
• Jaffa Gate — approximately 250–300 m.

What exactly is on the territory of the courtyard:

• House Church of St. Alexander Nevsky — a small Orthodox church of the late 19th century; services are held periodically, there is no permanent monastic community.
• Judgment Gate Threshold — an authentic archaeological object of the Roman era (1st century AD), a fragment of an ancient pavement and threshold; according to Christian tradition, associated with the path of Jesus Christ to the trial of Pontius Pilate and included in the Via Dolorosa route.
• Archaeological site — elements of ancient city walls and buildings of Jerusalem, discovered during 19th-century excavations and preserved.
• Small museum and exhibition rooms, dedicated to the history of the complex and findings.
• Inner courtyard and historical buildings, forming a closed architectural ensemble within the Old City.

What is happening there now:

• the courtyard is open to visitors as a cultural-historical object;
• tours and archaeological site inspections are conducted;
• there is a museum exhibition;
• the cult function of the church is maintained;
• work is being done on the maintenance, protection, and conservation of monuments.

What is fundamentally absent there:

• there is no hotel or hostel;
• there is no commercial tourist service;
• there is no diplomatic or state institution.

Who manages the object:

Management and daily activities are carried out by the Orthodox Palestine Society (OPS) — a non-governmental public association operating in Jerusalem within the Israeli legal framework. Administrators, guides, and caretakers work on-site; restorers and monument protection specialists are involved as needed. The State of Israel does not directly manage the courtyard but oversees it within the framework of heritage protection and security legislation.

It is the combination of significant area, archaeological value, and extreme proximity to the Church of the Holy Sepulchre that makes the Alexander Courtyard an object of special attention and explains why the dispute around it goes far beyond a usual property issue.

Let’s continue.

In November 2025, a new round of hearings on the transfer of the Alexander Courtyard took place in the Jerusalem District Court — from the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society (IPPO) — to whom — Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society (IPPO).

No, this is not a typo.

Why “IPPO ≠ IPPO”, if OPS was in between

(in the international-legal sense, considering the role of OPS)

In practice, it is about not two, but three different entities, which creates the main confusion. Two of them bear the same name — the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society, and the third — Orthodox Palestine Society (OPS) — occupied an intermediate position during the legal gap period.

Imperial IPPO (1882–1917)

The pre-revolutionary “Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society” (IPPO) was a private public association, founded in 1882 and operating within the legal framework of the Russian Empire.

Principally important legal clarification:
the imperial IPPO did not belong to the state of the Russian Empire and was not the property of the royal family or the House of Romanov.

• the society was not a state body;
• was not part of the structure of ministries or departments;
• its property was not state property;
• it was not in the personal property of the emperor or members of the dynasty.

Imperial patronage was expressed exclusively in:

• approval of the charter,
• moral and political support,

but not in ownership rights.

All land plots and buildings in “Palestine”, including the Jerusalem courtyards, belonged to the society itself as an independent legal entity, not to the state and not to the royal family.

The term “Palestine” is used here exclusively in a historical-legal sense, as it appeared in Ottoman, European, and mandate documents of the late 19th — early 20th century, and has no relation to modern political realities or issues of Israeli sovereignty. For clarity, this name will be used strictly in the form and meaning in which it is recorded in official acts of the corresponding period.

After 1917, the Russian Empire and the imperial legal order ceased to exist. As a result, the imperial IPPO lost its legal personality and ceased to exist as a legal entity. There was no formal act of liquidation, but in the international-legal sense, the society ceased to exist.

Important for the IPPO case

Already in 1918, Soviet Russia, and then the USSR, officially renounced succession in relation to the Russian Empire, which was recorded by the decree of the Council of People’s Commissars on the annulment of state debts and the rupture of imperial legal and contractual obligations. This renunciation meant not only the non-recognition of imperial state debts but also the absence of succession for private imperial societies, including the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society. Accordingly, the property of the IPPO abroad was not considered inherited by the USSR and was not under the protection or management of the Soviet state, which cemented the international-legal gap in the fate of the society and its property.

OPS as a period of factual continuation

In the legal vacuum that arose after 1917, the activities and management of the property of the former IPPO in the Holy Land effectively passed to the Orthodox Palestine Society (OPS)— a Jerusalem Orthodox organization formed in the emigrant community from the Russian Empire in the 1920s. People, local structure, archives, and actual management of the courtyards moved to OPS.

Orthodox Palestine Society (OPS) — is a non-governmental public association operating in Jerusalem and associated with the historical tradition of the pre-revolutionary Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society, but legally independent and not representing any state. It operates within the Israeli legal framework and manages historical objects, including the Alexander Courtyard. In this article, OPS is mentioned only as one of the parties to the property dispute, without delving into its history.

At the same time, OPS was not and was not recognized as the legal successor of the imperial IPPO. It did not receive the property by an act of inheritance or transfer and acted in the international-legal logic as a factual holder and custodian, not as a legal owner.

Russian IPPO (since the 1990s)

The modern Russian “Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society” (IPPO) was created in the 1990s and registered under Russian Federation law. In a legal sense, this is a new legal entity, not identical to the pre-revolutionary society.

The Russian IPPO declares itself the successor of the imperial IPPO, relying on historical continuity, mission, traditions, and the restoration of the name. However, from the point of view of international and Israeli law, the coincidence of the name and appeal to historical identity does not create automatic succession.

International-legal conclusion

In international-legal logic, automatic succession is possible only if there is continuity of the same legal entity or an internationally recognized act of transfer of rights. In the case of the IPPO, such conditions did not exist. An additional factor cementing the gap is the existence of OPS as an independent factual holder of property in the period between 1917 and the 1990s.

Final formula

The Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society was a private public association and did not belong to either the state of the Russian Empire or the royal family; its property was not state property. In the international-legal sense, the modern Russian IPPO is not an automatic successor of the pre-revolutionary IPPO, as there is no continuity of the legal entity and there was no internationally recognized act of transfer of rights.

What is the legal collision

In December 2019, Israeli media reported on the registration of the Alexander Courtyard for Russia in the Israeli real estate register. It was this entry that created the impression that the object had already been transferred. However, the registration was carried out administratively, without completing legal proceedings and without resolving objections from the Orthodox Palestine Society (OPS).

OPS, led by Nikolai Vorontsov-Hofman, filed a protest, after which the Jerusalem District Court imposed a temporary ban on the transfer of the object to the Russian IPPO, effectively freezing the situation.

Administrative decision of 2020

In 2020, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu signed an administrative document categorizing the Alexander Courtyard as a “place of Christian worship”.

This decision was not an act of property transfer and did not replace legal proceedings, but it placed the object in a special legal regime, where questions of its status could be considered at the government level, not exclusively within the framework of ordinary civil litigation. Thus, the executive branch received an additional tool for resolving the dispute outside the classic judicial path.

Current legal status

The Jerusalem District Court ruled to maintain the status quo until a political-administrative decision is made.

According to the court’s decision, the courtyard temporarily remains under the management of the OPS (Orthodox Palestine Society) — that is, the structure that carries out the actual ownership and management of the object at the moment — until a special interdepartmental commission of the Israeli government makes a final decision on the ownership issue.

The court did not recognize any of the parties as the final owner, emphasizing the limited jurisdiction in this situation.

Positions of the parties

• The Russian side claims that Israel should fulfill previous political commitments and complete the transfer process in favor of the Russian IPPO, which is considered by it as a historical successor.
• OPS (Orthodox Palestine Society) insists that the courtyard is its historical property, which Russia or Russian structures never directly owned, and disputes the very idea of transfer.
• The Israeli government takes an intermediate position, trying to balance between external political pressure, internal legal risks, and international criticism, avoiding a unilateral decision without the conclusion of a specialized commission.

What’s next

The court directly indicated that the final decision is within the competence of the governmental interdepartmental commission, not the court and not the prime minister individually.

Until such a decision is made, the situation remains legally suspended. At the same time, continued pressure from the Russian side is expected, especially given the current geopolitical context, while the Israeli government continues to postpone the final decision, striving to minimize legal and political consequences.

By the way –

there is material about the modern Russian IPPO from the Israeli publication “Details”

“The Alexander Courtyard is wanted to be transferred to a structure, accusing Israel of the “October 7 massacre” and promoting more than 170 exhibitions about the “genocide of Palestinians”

And here is the video Sergey Auslender – Nikita Aronov on this issue:

Ancient Hebrew period (10th century BC — 70 AD)

Land was regulated by the norms of ancient Hebrew law (din Torah), as well as city and royal administration. The plot was outside the sacred zone of the Temple Mount, so the temple property regime (קדשי המקדש) did not apply to it. Ownership was secular and could be private, communal, or administrative within the framework of ancient Hebrew property law.

Specific owners are not known by name, as cadastral fixation of property in the modern sense did not exist. After the destruction of Jerusalem in 70 AD and the liquidation of the city structure, the former ancient Hebrew property titles effectively lost legal force.

Roman period (70 AD — 4th century AD)

After the destruction of Jerusalem in 70 AD, the territory came under the direct control of the Roman Empire and was regulated by the norms of Roman law (ius Romanum). Land was considered either state property (ager publicus) or private property (dominium privatum), transferred to Roman citizens or municipal structures of the city.

Specific owners of the plot are not recorded in surviving sources. Property rights of the previous population were terminated as a result of war and deportations, and subsequent ownership was determined by decisions of the Roman administration and city management (municipium).

Byzantine and early Christian period (326–637 AD)

In 326–335 AD, at the initiative of Empress Helena, mother of Emperor Constantine the Great, and by direct order of the imperial authority, the territory in the area of the future Church of the Holy Sepulchre was withdrawn from the usual city circulation. This decision was part of the state policy of Christianizing Jerusalem after the legalization of Christianity. Land, previously part of secular urban development, was transferred to the status of sacred property (res sacrae) according to the norms of Byzantine and Roman imperial law (ius Romanum, ius Byzantinum).

The legal holder of rights to the plot became the Jerusalem Church (ecclesia Hierosolymitana), that is, the local Christian institution under the management of the Bishop of Jerusalem, operating under imperial patronage (imperial patronage). The transfer was not formalized by a purchase-sale agreement, as the mechanism of imperial withdrawal and sacralization of land, characteristic of the 4th century, was applied. Private individuals were not owners, and the alienation of the plot was taken out of the civil circulation.

The formation of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre and the adjacent territory secured a stable Christian status for this area, which was maintained throughout the Byzantine period. Documentary confirmation of this is provided by contemporaneous sources of the 4th century, primarily the testimonies of Eusebius of Caesarea (Vita Constantini), as well as subsequent Byzantine church management practices. By the time of the Arab conquest of Jerusalem in 637 AD, the plot was recognized as church property, under institutional, not private ownership.

Early Islamic period (from 637 AD — 10th century)

After the capture of Jerusalem in 637 AD by the troops of Caliph Umar ibn al-Khattab, the city came under the rule of the Rashidun, and then the Umayyad and Abbasid caliphates. Upon the change of sovereignty, Christian shrines and church possessions were not confiscated. The rights of the Jerusalem Church to the plot in the area of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre were preserved within the framework of Islamic law.

The legal basis was the granting of Christians the status of dhimmi (ahl al-dhimma), which guaranteed the protection of the person, cult, and property upon payment of a poll tax (jizya). Church property was recognized as legal and inviolable, and the land continued to be owned by the Christian institution as a religious collective. The caliphate did not convert such plots into waqf and did not include them in the state land fund (bayt al-mal).

Thus, in the early Islamic period, there was no redistribution of property, but a confirmation of the previously established Byzantine church title. By the 10th century, the plot remained part of the Christian confessional zone around the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, with continuous institutional ownership and without a break in legal status.

Medieval period: Crusaders, Ayyubids, Mamluks (11th–15th centuries)

In 1099, Jerusalem was captured by the Crusaders, and the city came under the control of the Latin Kingdom. Christian property in the area of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre was redistributed within the Christian world: management and ownership of plots passed to Latin church institutions under canon law (ius canonicum). At the same time, the category of church sacred property was preserved, and the land was not turned into secular private property.

After the return of Jerusalem under the control of the Ayyubids in 1187 and the subsequent establishment of Mamluk control, there was a rollback of Latin dominance. Muslim authorities restored the principle of protecting Christian shrines and property within Islamic law. Church plots around the Church of the Holy Sepulchre were preserved for Eastern Christian communities, including Greeks and Copts, as recognized religious corporations. Property was considered collective confessional ownership and was not included in the state land fund.

By the end of the Mamluk period, the plot on which the Alexander Courtyard later arose was part of a stable Christian property mass in the Old City. The legal status was determined not by a specific purchase-sale agreement, but by continuous recognition of religious property with the change of political regimes.

Ottoman period (1517 — mid-19th century)

After the conquest of Jerusalem by the Ottoman Empire in 1517, the city was included in the Ottoman administrative-legal system. Christian communities were recognized by the state as religious corporations within the millet system, which gave them the right to collective ownership of real estate and independent management of internal affairs. The property of Christian denominations, including land plots in the area of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, was regulated by the norms of Ottoman law, combining sharia and imperial legislation (kanun).

At the early stage of Ottoman rule, the rights of religious communities were primarily fixed in fiscal-land registers (defter). These documents reflected the recognition of a specific community’s ownership of a plot and its responsibility to the state, but did not represent an individual title deed in the modern sense. It was about state confirmation of existing confessional ownership, not the creation of new property rights.

With the development of the Ottoman land system and the implementation of reforms in the 18th–19th centuries, religious possessions in Jerusalem were more formally registered in the tapu land certificate system. It was the tapu senedi that became the first type of document that can be considered a full-fledged title deed, recognized by the state and allowing for the alienation of property.

Within this registration, part of the Christian plots around the Church of the Holy Sepulchre was secured for the Coptic Orthodox community of Jerusalem as an independent legal entity.

It is important to emphasize that the Ottoman authorities did not “transfer” the land to the Copts. Their right was based on continuous confessional ownership, which the state recognized and formalized through registration. The Ottoman administration considered the Coptic community as a legitimate owner, capable of disposing of real estate, including its sale, subject to the established procedure and obtaining permission from the authorities.

By the mid-19th century, the Coptic community had a formalized and state-recognized title of ownership, confirmed by tapu documents. It was the emergence of this formalized Ottoman title deed that became the first case of documentary securing of property rights to the plot in a legal sense and created the legal possibility of its lawful sale to the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission in 1859–1860.

Purchase of the plot by the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission (1859–1860)

In 1859–1860, the land plot in the area of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, previously registered for the Coptic Orthodox community of Jerusalem, was alienated in favor of the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission in Jerusalem. The transaction was formalized as a private purchase-sale between two religious corporations and was carried out within the framework of the existing Ottoman law. The seller was the Coptic church institution, possessing a formalized title of ownership, confirmed by the tapu system, and the buyer was the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission, acting through its head, Archimandrite Antonin (Kapustin).

The legal basis of the transaction was a purchase-sale agreement concluded under the norms of sharia and kanun with the mandatory administrative permission of the Ottoman authorities for the alienation of real estate to a foreign religious entity. Such a procedure was standard for Jerusalem in the mid-19th century and applied to all foreign Christian missions. The Ottoman administration considered the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission not as a state body of the Russian Empire, but as a church institution, which excluded the qualification of the transaction as interstate.

The financing of the purchase was carried out at the expense of donations and church funds, but the source of the money did not affect the legal status of the property. In Ottoman documents and registers, the owner of the plot was recorded as the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission in Jerusalem, not the Russian Empire, not the imperial family, and not the treasury. No acts transferring the plot to the state property of Russia were formalized.

The conclusion of the transaction in 1859–1860 created a new initial title of ownership, recognized by the Ottoman state and valid in subsequent periods. From this moment, the plot was in the private church ownership of the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission, which became the legal basis for the subsequent construction and formation of the Alexander Courtyard, but did not generate any rights for the Russian Empire as a state.

Development of the plot and formation of the Alexander Courtyard (1860s — 1890s)

After the completion of the purchase-sale in 1859–1860, the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission in Jerusalem began the development of the plot as the legal owner under Ottoman law. The use of the land was carried out based on the formalized tapu title and was not accompanied by any acts of alienation or change in the legal status of ownership. The Ottoman authorities considered construction and archaeological work as permissible disposal of private church property (mulk).

In the 1860s–1870s, the plot was cleared and adapted for religious and pilgrimage purposes. In the 1880s–1890s, an architectural complex was formed here, which received the name Alexander Courtyard. This name had a memorial character and did not reflect the form of ownership or state affiliation of the object. The right of the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission to the plot continued to be preserved without changes and did not require re-registration.

Transfer of management of the Alexander Courtyard to the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society (late 19th century)

By the end of the 19th century, the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission in Jerusalem decided to transfer the economic and pilgrimage management of the Alexander Courtyard to the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society. The basis for this was the statutory goals of the IPPO, aimed at organizing pilgrimages, maintaining Russian institutions in Palestine, and exploiting religious real estate. The transfer was carried out in the form of an internal order between affiliated church-public structures and was not formalized as a civil-law transaction of alienation.

From a legal point of view, it was about delegating management and use functions (administratio), not about transferring ownership rights (dominium). The Russian Ecclesiastical Mission retained the title of owner, based on the Ottoman tapu, while the IPPO acted as the managing organization, carrying out actual possession, maintenance, and exploitation of the object. No purchase-sale, donation, or other title deed in favor of the IPPO was formalized, and the change of owner was not registered in either Ottoman or subsequent registers.

The transfer of management did not require separate permission from the Ottoman authorities, as it did not affect the title of ownership and was considered an internal order of the owner within his powers. In legal terms, the IPPO acted as a lawful possessor (lawful possessor), having gained access to the object based on the owner’s consent.

It was this status that later became key for assessing the continuity of possession after 1917, but it did not itself turn the IPPO into an owner at this stage.

1917–1922: cessation of the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission, renunciation of succession, and creation of a legal vacuum

After the revolutionary events of 1917, the pre-revolutionary church-state order of the Russian Empire was destroyed. The Holy Synod, through which the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission in Jerusalem operated, was abolished, centralized management and financing of the mission ceased, and the Soviet government refused to recognize pre-revolutionary church institutions as holders of property rights abroad. As a result, the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission lost its legal personality and ability to act as an active owner of real estate.

The cessation of the mission’s activities was not accompanied by an act of liquidation, confiscation, or transfer of property. The Alexander Courtyard was not transferred to either the state or another church structure. In 1918–1922, Soviet Russia officially renounced succession for foreign private and church property of the Russian Empire, which excluded the emergence of a title for the RSFSR or the USSR. Thus, the title of ownership, formalized in the 19th century for the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission, was “orphaned”: it was not annulled but lost its active holder.

The Moscow Patriarchate, restored in new conditions, did not become the successor of the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission in a property sense. It arose as a new church structure within the Soviet legal framework and did not receive automatic international recognition as the heir to pre-revolutionary foreign assets. Neither the Soviet state nor foreign authorities formalized acts of succession linking the patriarchate with the mission’s rights to real estate in Jerusalem.

In these conditions, the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society, which even before 1917 carried out lawful management and use of the Alexander Courtyard based on the owner’s consent, continued actual possession of the object. This possession was qualified as lawful and continuous (lawful possession), as the IPPO did not enter arbitrarily, did not displace another owner, and acted within the framework of previously obtained powers. The absence of a successor for the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission and the refusal of the USSR to make claims created a legal vacuum in which the IPPO remained the only subject exercising possession, forming the basis for subsequent recognition of the title based on the principle of continuity of possession (continuity of possession).

British Mandate period (1917–1948): administrative practice and recognition of the IPPO

During the British Mandate in Palestine (1917–1948), the new authorities adopted the principle of preserving existing property rights and titles formed before the change of sovereignty. Regarding the Alexander Courtyard, the British administration did not carry out expropriation, sequestration, or nationalization and did not declare the object ownerless (bona vacantia). The absence of an active owner, which arose after the cessation of the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission, was not filled by transferring the property to the mandate state.

The practice of management and administrative interaction was built directly with the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society. All official correspondence, permits, and orders for the operation and maintenance of the courtyard were addressed to the IPPO as the responsible owner and manager. British authorities did not require the IPPO to present an act of transfer of ownership and did not initiate re-registration of the title, which meant tacit recognition of the established possession through the administrative behavior of the authority (recognition by conduct).

Legally, this period became key for consolidating the status of the IPPO. Continuous and lawful possession (lawful possession) in the absence of a competing owner and in the absence of state actions to expropriate the property led to the crystallization of the title. The British Mandate did not create new property rights but confirmed the existing situation based on continuity of possession (continuity of possession), which was later accepted by subsequent sovereign authorities.

Jordanian period (1948–1967): preservation of the status quo of ownership and applicable law

After 1948, East Jerusalem came under Jordanian control, which applied the principle of preserving the existing property order (status quo), used in international practice during the change of sovereignty. The applicable law included the norms of Ottoman land law (Ottoman Land Code 1858), which continued to operate in East Jerusalem, as well as the provisions of mandate law, inherited from the British administration. These sources were considered as a continuing legal order and did not require automatic re-registration of ownership.

Regarding the Alexander Courtyard, Jordanian authorities did not carry out confiscation, sequestration, or recognition of the property as ownerless (bona vacantia). The absence of such actions meant the preservation of the previous title. Administrative interaction was carried out with the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society as the factual owner and manager, without requiring an act of transfer of ownership. In these conditions, the principle of lawful and continuous possession (lawful possession, continuity of possession) was applied, where the right is not created anew but preserved in the absence of competing claims.

Former Russian state property in West Jerusalem after 1948

After the declaration of independence of the State of Israel in 1948 and the establishment of its control over the western part of Jerusalem, Israel came under its jurisdiction a number of objects that previously belonged to the Russian Empire as a state. The issue of their fate was not resolved automatically but under active external political pressure from the Soviet Union.

The USSR became one of the first states to recognize Israel and used this recognition as a tool of political pressure. Soviet diplomacy directly insisted on the transfer of former imperial state real estate to the USSR as the successor of the Russian Empire. For the young Israeli state, which was in international isolation and dependent on external support, this factor was decisive.

As a result, in 1949–1951, Israel recognized the USSR’s rights to objects that before 1917 were state property of the Russian Empire and were located within western Jerusalem. Such objects included the complex of the Russian Compound (Migraash ha-Rusim), buildings of the former Russian hospital, as well as administrative and representative buildings, constructed and registered to the state treasury. These objects did not belong to church property and were not owned by public or religious organizations.

Legal formalization was carried out by administrative decisions of the Israeli government and subsequent registration in property bodies. The basis was Israel’s recognition of the USSR as the state successor of the Russian Empire exclusively in terms of state property, as well as diplomatic agreements between the parties. A separate special law was not adopted; the legal effect was achieved through a combination of executive acts and international obligations.

This mechanism did not extend to objects that before 1917 belonged to the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission, monasteries, or public structures, as they were not state property and did not fall under the principle of state succession.

“Orange Deal”. Redemption by the State of Israel of former Soviet real estate in West Jerusalem (1964)

In 1964, the State of Israel redeemed from the Soviet Union a significant part of the real estate in West Jerusalem, previously recognized for the USSR as state property of the Russian Empire. The deal was formalized within the framework of an interstate agreement and received the unofficial name “orange deal”.

The subject of the redemption was exclusively objects that had the status of state (treasury) property before 1917 and were located on territory under Israeli control. These included the main buildings of the Russian Compound (Migraash ha-Rusim), administrative and economic buildings, as well as buildings of the former Russian hospital and accompanying infrastructure. After the completion of the deal, the USSR’s ownership of these objects was terminated, and they passed into the full ownership of the State of Israel.

The decision to redeem was due to several reasons. The formal ownership of the USSR of large objects in the center of Jerusalem was considered by Israel as a problem of sovereignty and internal security. Legally, Israel could not nationalize foreign state property without serious international consequences, so redemption was chosen as a legal way of final settlement. In addition, the USSR was interested in converting unused foreign real estate into economic compensation, and Israel — in gaining full control over the territory for the placement of state, judicial, and municipal institutions.

The 1964 deal did not extend to objects located in East Jerusalem, did not concern church and public property, and was not related to objects that before 1917 belonged to the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission, monasteries, or the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society. The Alexander Courtyard was not included in this process.

1967: extension of the Israeli land registration system and fixation of IPPO ownership

After the Six-Day War of 1967 and the establishment of Israeli control over East Jerusalem, Israel extended its civil and property law to this territory. For the first time for the Old City, a unified national system of real estate registration was applied — the Israeli land registry Tabu (Lishkat rishum mekarkein).

Before this, other forms of land accounting existed in Jerusalem: Ottoman tapu records, as well as mandate and Jordanian practices of preserving these records. However, none of them represented a modern state cadastre with mandatory fixation of the current owner. The Israeli Tabu, unlike previous systems, fixes property rights as a legal fact recognized by the state.

When including objects of East Jerusalem in Tabu, Israel did not carry out nationalization, did not create new titles, and did not change owners. The principle of preserving previously existing property rights (status quo / continuity of title) was applied: if an object had a legal owner and was not alienated, its right was preserved and subject to fixation in the register.

The Alexander Courtyard was entered into the Israeli real estate register (Tabu) with the indication of Orthodox Palestine Society (OPS) as the owner of the plot. The basis was Ottoman purchase-sale documents, the lawful entry of the pre-revolutionary Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society into possession, continuous actual management of the object by the local structure after 1917, and the absence of any act of alienation in favor of the state(?). The object was not registered for the State of Israel and was not considered state property.

Thus, after 1967, the property rights to the Alexander Courtyard were first formally fixed in a modern state register precisely for OPS. It was not about the emergence of a new right, but about the state fixation of an already existing historical title, which in Israeli law is a full confirmation of private property.

1967–1990: absence of disputes and the beginning of Russian claims

From the moment of the inclusion of East Jerusalem in the legal field of the State of Israel in 1967 until the early 1990s, the issue of the ownership of the Alexander Courtyard was not raised or disputed.

During this period, the Soviet Union did not make property claims to the Alexander Courtyard, which corresponded to its previously declared renunciation of succession for foreign private and church property of the Russian Empire.

1991–1996: first practical steps of Russia

In 1991–1992, after the collapse of the USSR, Russian diplomatic missions in Israel began raising the issue of the status of certain objects of so-called “Russian real estate”, including the Alexander Courtyard, within the framework of working contacts with Israeli departments. These actions were informal and consultative in nature and were not accompanied by the filing of lawsuits, official statements of ownership rights, or attempts to change the entry in the real estate register.

In 1993–1996, the Russian side sent administrative requests to Israeli bodies asking to clarify the legal status of the object and the possibility of its re-registration. In response, Israeli registering bodies pointed to the presence of a valid entry in Tabu, as well as the absence of title documents necessary for changing the register. Formal procedures for reviewing the entry were not initiated.

During this period, no legal proceedings were conducted, no transfer decisions were made, and no changes in the real estate register occurred. All actions were limited to correspondence and consultations at the interdepartmental level.

Late 1990s — early 2000s: transition to formalized demands

In the late 1990s — early 2000s, the Russian Federation moved from consultations to formalized appeals to Israeli bodies demanding a review of the status of the Alexander Courtyard.

During this period, the Russian side began officially declaring that the object is “Russian property” and insisting on its re-registration in the state registers of Israel.

Israeli registering bodies refused to change the entry in Tabu, citing:

• the absence of proper title documents;
• the absence of a continuous and recognized chain of title;
• the presence of a valid registration for another entity.

No legal decisions were made during this period, and the entry in the real estate register remained unchanged.

2019–2022: administrative decisions and their review

In 2019, an administrative process related to changing the status of the Alexander Courtyard was initiated in Israel. The consideration of the issue took place not in a judicial order, but at the level of executive power and registration bodies.

In December 2019, within this process, an attempt was made to administratively formalize the rights of the Russian Federation to the object. These actions were of a political-administrative nature and took place against the backdrop of negotiations between Israel and Russia on the case of Israeli citizen Naama Issachar, convicted in the Russian Federation.

It is important to emphasize that it was not about judicial recognition of ownership rights. Registration actions were carried out administratively, without considering the issue of a continuous chain of title and without canceling the previously existing entry in the real estate register, which created a legal collision.

In 2020, a separate administrative decision was simultaneously made to categorize the Alexander Courtyard as a “place of Christian worship”, which transferred the object to a special legal regime, but was not an act of property transfer and did not replace legal proceedings.

In 2022, Israeli bodies canceled the administrative decisions of 2019–2020 related to changing the status of the object. The cancellation was carried out administratively, based on the results of an internal review of the legality of registration actions, without issuing a court decision on the merits of the ownership dispute.

During the review, it was established that the changes in the status of the Alexander Courtyard were made:

• without proper legal basis;
• without a court decision;
• without confirmation of a continuous and recognized chain of title.

After the cancellation of administrative decisions, the entry in the real estate register was returned to the state that existed before 2019.

2022 — present: status quo and awaiting decision

Currently, the legal status of the Alexander Courtyard remains uncertain. The object continues to be in a status quo mode until a final decision is made by the authorized bodies of the State of Israel. The process is not complete: further steps depend on the conclusions of the governmental interdepartmental commission and possible new legal actions.

Ultimately, the key decision remains with the government of Israel, not the court. The courts only fixed the status quo and directly indicated that the final answer should be developed by the interdepartmental commission and then approved by the executive branch. Thus, the issue goes far beyond a private property dispute and becomes a test of the ability of the Government of Israel to withstand external pressure without destroying the internal logic of a state of law.

Whether Benjamin Netanyahu will ultimately be able to protect the interests of the State of Israel — standing firm against the persistent demands of Putin — or whether the country will confirm its commitment to historical-legal facts, law, and democratic procedures, will be an indicator of which principle will be decisive: “political expediency” or “rule of law”.

This choice and its consequences continue to be closely monitored by NAnews — News of Israel | Nikk.Agency.

Public reaction: petition on risks to Israel’s security

Amid the ongoing dispute over the Alexander Courtyard, a public initiative emerged in Israel in the form of a petition posted on the Atzuma platform under the name Threat from Russia. The authors of the appeal urge the Israeli government to stop any forms of transferring the Alexander Courtyard to structures associated with the Russian Federation, considering such a step as a potential risk to national security.

“להגן על ישראל מהאיום הרוסי: לעצור את העברת חצר אלכסנדר לתומכי חמאס”
“Protect Israel from the Russian threat: stop the transfer of the Alexander Courtyard to Hamas supporters”

here it is (Hebrew) – https://www.atzuma.co.il/threatfromrussia

The text of the petition emphasizes that it is not just about a property or historical dispute. According to the initiators, the possible transfer of the object could lead to “institutional consolidation of Russian presence in a sensitive area of Jerusalem”, which is seen as a factor of political and symbolic influence, going beyond religious use.

A separate emphasis is placed on the risk of using religious and public structures as a “tool of external influence”, including promoting “political narratives and informal contacts that do not coincide with Israel’s interests”. The authors of the petition point out that similar “influence mechanisms” have already been used by Russia in other countries under the guise of cultural and religious institutions.

The appeal also emphasizes the geopolitical context: “active interaction of Russia with states and structures hostile to Israel, including Iran and related forces”. In this light, the transfer of the object in Jerusalem is perceived as a “potential channel of external pressure”, not as a neutral legal act.

Finally, the authors consider dangerous the very “precedent of a political decision bypassing a full legal procedure”, as it, in their opinion, “undermines trust in state institutions and creates vulnerability for future external pressure on Israeli decisions”.

At the same time, the petition is not a legal document and has no binding force. It reflects the position of part of Israeli society and serves as a form of public pressure on the executive branch, complementing the legal and political context around the Alexander Courtyard.

…
“Not About the War”: The book of Jewish defender of Ukraine Maksym Shvartsman was presented in Chernivtsi on the 3rd anniversary of his death at the front - July 21, 2026 - Новости Израиля

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Venezuela is experiencing one of the most severe natural disasters in recent decades.

On the evening of June 24, 2026, the north of the country was shaken by two powerful earthquakes with magnitudes of 7.2 and 7.5. They occurred less than a minute apart, approximately 160 kilometers west of Caracas, according to the US Geological Survey, as reported by Reuters. The first official figures already look grim: at least 164 dead and nearly 1,000 injured, but rescuers warn that the data may change after clearing the debris and restoring communication with the affected areas.

Caracas, the coastal state of La Guaira, and settlements in the Caribbean coastal area were the hardest hit. It is there that the most intensive search and rescue operations are currently underway. Authorities are calling La Guaira a disaster zone: dozens of buildings have collapsed, infrastructure is damaged, and communication, power supply, and transportation links are disrupted.

For Israel, this news is important not only as an international tragedy. The country is home to people from Latin America, including the Venezuelan Jewish community, and the disaster once again reminds us that a strong earthquake can turn an urban area into a mass disaster zone in minutes.

What happened in Venezuela

The first powerful tremor occurred on the evening of June 24. A few dozen seconds later, a second, even stronger one followed. This sequence intensified the destruction: buildings already damaged by the first strike might not withstand the second.

According to Reuters, the earthquakes were felt in the capital and at a great distance from the epicenter. In Caracas, people ran out of homes, hospitals, shopping centers, and office buildings. In some areas, power and communication outages began, and schools and some institutions were closed.

Particularly severe reports are coming from La Guaira — a coastal region near Caracas, where the country’s main international airport is located. AP reports that buildings in the area were damaged, people were evacuated, and patients from one hospital were placed outside after the damage.

In photos and videos published by international agencies, you can see destroyed facades, debris, rescuers with stretchers, people spending the night in open areas, and patients being carried out of damaged buildings.

Why the death toll might rise

The official figure — 164 dead — is still preliminary. In such disasters, the initial data almost never reflect the full scale of the tragedy. The main reason is that people may remain under the rubble, and some areas may be inaccessible to rescuers due to destroyed roads, communication outages, and lack of equipment.

Reuters reports that, according to a site associated with opposition representatives, more than 10,000 people were unaccounted for shortly after the earthquakes. This does not mean that they all died or are under the rubble, but it shows the scale of chaos and the difficulty in establishing contact with families.

The US Geological Survey’s PAGER impact assessment system warned of the risk of a much more severe scenario. Such models are not an official death toll count, but they take into account the magnitude, depth of the earthquake, population density, building types, and the likelihood of secondary destruction. According to estimates cited by Reuters, the death toll could exceed 10,000 if the worst-case scenario in densely populated areas is confirmed.

La Guaira has become one of the main disaster zones

Acting President of Venezuela Delcy Rodriguez stated that La Guaira has become a ‘real tragedy’ and a disaster zone. According to her, dozens of buildings have collapsed there, and rescuers are conducting intensive operations to find survivors under concrete and metal in time.

This region is particularly vulnerable: it is located between mountains and the sea, near Caracas, with dense urban development, transport hubs, and an airport. If roads, bridges, or access to destroyed buildings are damaged, the rescue operation immediately becomes much more difficult.

The situation is further complicated by possible secondary consequences. Experts point to the risk of landslides and soil liquefaction — a phenomenon where water-saturated soil loses strength after strong tremors and begins to behave almost like a liquid. This is especially dangerous for coastal areas, buildings on weak foundations, and slopes.

Airport, hospitals, and communication

According to international agencies, the main airport near Caracas was damaged and closed. This is critically important because rescuers, humanitarian aid, medicines, and equipment usually arrive through the airport.

Hospitals are operating in overload mode. In Caracas, medical staff increased shifts to receive the injured. Some facilities were damaged, and some patients were taken outside due to the risk of aftershocks and destruction.

Communication problems also hinder assessing the real number of victims. After major earthquakes, people often cannot reach relatives, mobile networks are overloaded, electricity goes out, and messages from certain areas arrive with significant delays.

International reaction and assistance

The US has expressed readiness to help Venezuela. According to Reuters, Washington expressed readiness to provide support, and American representatives reported contacts with Venezuelan authorities. Other countries in the region also offered or expressed readiness to provide assistance.

For Venezuela, international aid can be crucial. The country has been in a severe economic and political crisis for many years, and medical and utility infrastructure in many areas operates with limited resources. Even under normal conditions, hospitals, communication, and the transport system are under strain; after the earthquake, this strain becomes critical.

NAnews — Israel News notes: in such disasters, the first 24 hours often determine how many people can be saved. Rescuers need heavy equipment, search dogs, mobile hospitals, generators, water, medicines, and safe routes to the destroyed areas.

Was there a tsunami threat

After the tremors, warnings of a possible tsunami threat briefly sounded, but they were later lifted. This does not eliminate the danger for coastal areas: even without a tsunami, the earthquake can damage port infrastructure, roads along the coast, buildings on slopes, and communications.

Why Venezuela is vulnerable to such earthquakes

Venezuela is located in a zone of complex tectonic plate interaction. The north of the country is near the boundary of the Caribbean and South American plates, so strong earthquakes are possible here. The country’s history already includes destructive seismic events, including the 1812 catastrophe, when, according to historical estimates, tens of thousands of people died.

But magnitude is not the only factor. The final tragedy depends on the depth of the tremor, the distance to cities, the quality of construction, the time of day, the readiness of rescue services, and the condition of hospitals and roads.

If a strong earthquake occurs near dense urban development, and buildings are not designed for such loads, the destruction can be enormous even at a lower magnitude. In Venezuela, this risk is exacerbated by old housing stock, economic crisis, and limited capabilities for rapid large-scale mobilization.

What is known now

At the moment, several key facts are confirmed.

Two strong earthquakes with magnitudes of 7.2 and 7.5 occurred on the evening of June 24, 2026.

At least 164 people died, and nearly 1,000 were injured.

The most severe destruction is recorded in the Caracas area, La Guaira, and the Caribbean coast.

People may remain under the rubble.

The main airport and part of the hospital infrastructure were damaged.

Rescue operations continue, and the number of victims may change.

For readers in Israel, this tragedy is another reminder of the importance of earthquake preparedness. Israel is also located in a seismically active region, near the Syrian-African Rift. Therefore, issues of building reinforcement, hospital readiness, backup communication, civil defense, and personal home supplies are not abstract theory but part of real security.

NAnews — Israel News will continue to monitor the situation in Venezuela and updates from international agencies.

What is important to remember

Venezuela experienced not one tremor, but a double blow, which sharply increased the destruction.

The official death toll is still preliminary.

The main hope now is for rescue operations in the first hours and days after the disaster.

The most severe consequences may be in areas where communication is disrupted and rescuers have not yet reached all the debris.

For Israel, this is also an occasion to talk again about seismic preparedness, because earthquakes do not warn in advance.

…
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The Historical and Toponymic Commission of the Odessa City Council unanimously supported the initiative to establish a monument-bust in the city to the outstanding Odessan, writer, poet, and one of the leaders of the Zionist movement Vladimir (Ze’ev) Jabotinsky, without whom it is impossible to imagine the political history of the future State of Israel.

The discussion is currently about supporting the idea itself: the final location has not yet been approved, and the final decision must be made by the city council deputies, reported Odessa media on May 15, 2026.

For Odessa, this is not just a question of urban sculpture. For Israel, it’s not just news from Ukraine. Jabotinsky was born in Odessa, formed in its multilingual and Jewish intellectual environment, and then became a figure whose legacy is directly connected with the history of Zionism, Jewish self-defense, and the future statehood of Israel.

Initiative from Odessa and Jerusalem

The proposal to install a bust of Vladimir Jabotinsky was submitted to the city hall by the World Club of Odessans and the Menachem Begin Institute in Jerusalem. This very connection shows that it is about a memory that has long gone beyond the boundaries of one city.

Odessa gave Jabotinsky language, character, urban optics, and literary memory. Israel received from his ideas one of the important lines of political Zionism, which influenced decades of Jewish history.

The initiators proposed placing the monument near the Odessa Opera House — in Palais-Royal or on Lanzheronovskaya Street. The argument was not accidental: it was in this area that the editorial office of the “Odessa Leaflet” was once located, where Jabotinsky worked. Moreover, his novel “The Five” begins at the Opera building — one of the main symbols of old Odessa.

However, it was the location that became the main subject of debate.

Why Palais-Royal raised questions

At the meeting of the historical and toponymic commission, some participants considered the proposed locations “unsuccessful.” Palais-Royal and the space near the Opera House are the historical core of the city, associated with the protected architectural environment of Odessa.

Despite the absolute support for the idea of creating the monument, the question of its exact location remains open. Members of the historical and toponymic commission voted to recommend alternative locations for the bust together with the Department of Architecture and Urban Planning.

The main argument of the opponents of such a location was not about Jabotinsky himself, but about preserving the historical appearance of the center. A new monument in this area may raise questions about the visual balance of the space, especially considering the status of Odessa’s historical center and the requirements for protecting the urban environment.

“We must approach this issue in a balanced way, considering Odessa’s status as a UNESCO World Heritage Site,” emphasized the relevant department.

Since the historical and toponymic commission is an advisory body, its decision is of a recommendatory nature. The final decision on the location and permission for the construction of the monument must be made by the deputies at a session of the Odessa City Council.

As a result, the commission supported the idea of the monument but recommended looking for other possible locations together with relevant city structures. That is, the political and cultural “yes” has already been voiced, but the architectural point on the map has not yet been set.

Why Jabotinsky is important for Odessa, Ukraine, and Israel

Vladimir, or Ze’ev, Jabotinsky was born in Odessa in 1880. He was a writer, journalist, translator, publicist, political thinker, and one of the leaders of the Zionist movement. His name is associated with Revisionist Zionism, the idea of Jewish self-defense, and the creation of the Jewish Legion within the British Army.

For Israel, Jabotinsky is not a museum figure. His legacy continues to be part of the country’s political memory, especially in the right-wing Zionist camp. The Menachem Begin Institute in Jerusalem, as a participant in the initiative, makes this bridge between Odessa and Israel particularly noticeable.

NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency considers this story in this context: Odessa is returning to the public space not just a famous compatriot, but a person whose ideas became part of the road to Jewish statehood.

For the Ukrainian context, this initiative is also important. Against the backdrop of Russia’s war against Ukraine, Odessa continues to rethink its urban space, deciding which names should be visible in the city center and which symbols of the past require reconsideration. The monument to Jabotinsky in this sense can become part of a broader work with memory — not imperial, but urban, Jewish, Ukrainian, and European.

Odessa in Jabotinsky’s biography

Jabotinsky always remained connected with Odessa, even when his life took place far beyond its borders. His novel “The Five” became one of the most famous literary texts about old Odessa, its Jewish environment, family memory, and the disappearing world of the early 20th century.

Therefore, the debate about the monument’s location does not cancel the main thing: the city has effectively recognized the need to return Jabotinsky to its visible historical space.

This is especially symbolic for Odessa, where Jewish history was not an external addition to the city’s image, but one of its foundations. Odessa’s Jews created newspapers, schools, theaters, literary circles, trade networks, political movements, and charitable structures. Jabotinsky grew up in this complex urban environment — multilingual, argumentative, ambitious, and very Odessan.

Memory has already been attempted to be preserved — and it has been destroyed

In Odessa, this is not the first attempt to perpetuate the memory of Jabotinsky. A commemorative bas-relief was installed on the house on Yevreyskaya Street, where he lived, back in 1997. Later it was damaged and then stolen by vandals. Currently, the city maintains a mural depicting Jabotinsky on Bazarnaya, 33 — in the house where he was born and raised.

This detail gives the new initiative additional meaning.

The monument to Jabotinsky is not only a question of bronze, pedestal, and city commission. It is a question of protecting memory. Especially in a region where Jewish heritage often exists between respect, oblivion, political disputes, and direct vandalism.

What will happen next

After the decision of the historical and toponymic commission, city structures need to select a suitable place for the monument. Then the issue must go through further procedures and be submitted for consideration by the deputies of the Odessa City Council.

It is not yet possible to say that the bust has already been installed or that the point near the Opera House has been finally approved. It is more accurate to formulate it this way: the commission supported the initiative to install a monument to Vladimir Jabotinsky in Odessa, but the location is still being agreed upon.

For Israel, this story is important already now.

It shows that Ukraine, despite the war, continues to work with historical memory not only through renaming streets and dismantling imperial symbols but also through the return of names associated with Jewish history, Zionism, and the future of Israel.

In the case of Jabotinsky, this is especially true. He was a son of Odessa and at the same time one of those people whose ideas became part of the great Jewish path to statehood.

Therefore, the future monument in Odessa is not just a bust of a famous native of the city. It is a sign that between Ukraine, Israel, and the Jewish people, there is a memory that cannot be reduced to diplomatic statements. It stands in biographies, books, streets, houses, stolen bas-reliefs, and new decisions of city commissions.

…
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A new nervous term has appeared in Russian diplomacy — more precisely, an old term that is now beginning to crumble before our eyes. We are talking about the so-called “spirit of Anchorage” — a formula that Moscow has been trying to use for almost a year to explain that after the meeting between Donald Trump and Putin in Alaska, a special understanding on Ukraine arose between the US and Russia.

Now Russia itself is effectively admitting: this construct did not work.

In recent days, several high-ranking Russian officials have stated that the United States allegedly did not fulfill the “understandings” or “agreements” reached at the Anchorage meeting. Moscow is increasingly talking about disappointment with the American line, although the US has not publicly confirmed the existence of such commitments.

What Moscow called the “spirit of Anchorage”

Formally, the expression sounded almost diplomatic. In reality, it served a completely different purpose.

Under the “spirit of Anchorage,” the Kremlin understood its notion that Trump was allegedly ready to accept a key Russian demand: Ukraine should give up all of Donbas, including territories that Russia does not control, and in return, Moscow would temporarily halt advances on other fronts. This is how Reuters describes the Russian interpretation of the outcomes of the meeting in Alaska.

What is more important is that this was not an officially announced deal. There was no published document. There was no confirmation from Washington that the US agreed to recognize Russia’s right to Donbas or force Ukraine to retreat from its own territory.

But for the Kremlin, this was enough to build a propaganda framework.

Moscow presented the situation as if peace was almost agreed upon, but Ukraine, Europe, the “party of war,” and everyone not ready to accept Russian terms were in the way. It was a convenient way of exerting pressure: if there is a “spirit of Anchorage,” then Kyiv supposedly only needs to agree with what larger players have already decided for it.

In reality, such logic has nothing to do with sustainable peace. It is the logic of coercion.

Why Russian statements have become sharper right now

First, Putin’s aide Yuri Ushakov stated that one side allegedly remains committed to the “understandings” of Anchorage, while the other failed to fulfill its part. Later, he added that Russia no longer expects these agreements to be fulfilled but is waiting for “victory” and the realization of its own goals.

Then Sergey Lavrov went further and essentially began to present the meeting in Alaska as a possible American maneuver that allowed time for Ukraine’s rearmament. His deputy Sergey Ryabkov also spoke about the US moving away from “basic understandings,” although he emphasized that contacts with Washington would continue.

This is an important change in tone.

Previously, the Kremlin more often blamed Ukraine: Kyiv allegedly does not want peace, Zelensky allegedly hinders agreements, Europe allegedly pushes for war. Now some of the irritation is shifting to the US. Moscow seems to admit: the expected American pressure on Ukraine did not occur in the form the Kremlin had hoped for.

For Russian propaganda, this is an unpleasant moment. For almost a year, it explained to the domestic audience that Trump understands Russia better than European leaders and that Washington could become an instrument for formalizing the war on Russian terms. But if the US does not fulfill what Moscow considered “understandings,” then the entire construct loses its meaning.

The main failure of the Kremlin is not diplomatic but psychological

Russia hoped that it could be perceived as a party that simply wants to “fix the reality on the ground.” But the reality here is different: Moscow demands not only recognition of already occupied territories but also the transfer of what it could not fully capture.

This is not a compromise. It is an attempt to gain through negotiations what could not be obtained by military force.

Therefore, complaints about the collapse of the “spirit of Anchorage” do not look like regret over a failed peace but as irritation over a failed capitulation of Ukraine.

This is where the key question arises for the Israeli audience. NAnews — Israel News views such events not only as another diplomatic dispute around Ukraine but as an indicator of how authoritarian regimes use the language of negotiations. They talk about “peace,” but under this word, they often mean the consolidation of capture, punishment of the victim, and reward for the aggressor.

Why this is important for Israel

At first glance, the dispute over the “spirit of Anchorage” may seem distant from Israel. But it is not.

Israel knows well that security, border, and mediation formulas are never abstract. When one side attacks, captures, kills, and then demands to recognize the result of forceful pressure as the basis for “peace,” it is not about diplomacy but about the legalization of violence.

The Ukrainian case is important for Israel also because it shows how Russia works with international mediators. Moscow tries to create the impression that great powers can agree among themselves, and the country against which the war is waged should only accept the outcome. This is a dangerous principle for any state that lives in a complex regional environment and depends on international support, alliances, and the right to self-defense.

If tomorrow such logic becomes the norm, any aggressor will be able to say: “We are ready for peace if we are left with everything we have captured and a little more.” After that, the victim will be accused not of defending itself but of “hindering the agreement.”

For Israel, this is a particularly sensitive topic. The country constantly faces attempts by external players to simplify reality, pressure security, and substitute the issue of protection with the issue of political convenience. Therefore, the Ukrainian situation is not only a Ukrainian story. It is an example of how the international system is tested for its ability to distinguish negotiations from blackmail.

What the new rhetoric of Moscow means

The current statements by Ushakov, Lavrov, and Ryabkov show that the Kremlin is experiencing not just a diplomatic pause. It has faced the fact that its expectations from Washington have not been realized.

Reuters separately notes: in Moscow, they wanted the US to act as a mediator that would help end the war on terms favorable to Russia. Analyst of the International Crisis Group Oleg Ignatov believes that behind the offended rhetoric lies deep disappointment of the Kremlin.

This disappointment is further intensified because the American focus has shifted. According to Reuters, the attention of key American mediators, including Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, is now also linked to negotiations on Iran, and the Kremlin expects the resumption of contacts when they become available.

For Moscow, this is painful. It wanted to be the main issue on the global agenda around which Washington would build a separate deal. Instead, Russia sees that its demands do not automatically become US policy.

Ukraine remains a subject, not an object of the deal

The most important thing in this story is not that Russia is offended by the US. The main thing is that Ukraine has not disappeared from the equation.

Moscow is used to talking about the war as if everything is decided by Washington and the Kremlin. But Ukraine continues to resist, Europe strengthens support, and the international discussion does not boil down to the Russian ultimatum on Donbas. According to Reuters, Ukraine consistently states that it will not give up its territory.

This is what breaks the Russian scenario.

If the “spirit of Anchorage” really meant pressure on Kyiv for territorial capitulation, then the Kremlin would be talking about diplomatic success today. But it talks about a breakdown, US retreat, and the need to achieve “victory.” This means that behind the beautiful formula was not a real peace architecture, but the expectation that Ukraine would be forced to accept Russian terms.

NAnews — Israel News will continue to follow this line because it shows not only the state of Russian-American contacts but also a broader principle: can borders be imposed by force in the 21st century, and then demand that the world call it a compromise.

The failure of the “spirit of Anchorage” is not just another episode of diplomatic bickering. It is an acknowledgment that the Russian strategy of pressure through imaginary agreements has collided with reality.

The Kremlin tried to present the meeting between Trump and Putin as the beginning of a big bargain, where Ukraine was supposed to pay with territory for a temporary ceasefire. But the US did not confirm such commitments, Ukraine did not agree to give up its land, and Europe did not disappear from the process.

Now Moscow is changing its tone: yesterday Anchorage was presented as a diplomatic foundation, today — as an alleged American trick. Such a change in rhetoric speaks of weakness of position, not strength.

For Ukraine, this means that the struggle is not only on the front but also around the right to be the subject of its own destiny. For Israel, it is a reminder that any “peace plan” should be evaluated not by beautiful words but by what it offers the victim of aggression: security or capitulation.

And if Russia today complains that the “spirit of Anchorage” is dead, then the question sounds differently: was there ever a spirit of peace there — or just an attempt to formalize someone else’s territory as a subject of a deal?

…
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On June 25, 2026, in Tel Aviv, a chamber Ukrainian evening “Maiden Joys. Kupala” will take place, dedicated to one of the most beautiful and symbolic holidays of Ukrainian tradition — Ivan Kupala.

The event will take place at 20:00 at the Ukrainian Cultural Center at the address: Yermiyahu Street, 22, Tel Aviv.

For the Ukrainian community in Israel, this is not just a calendar meeting. It is an evening of remembrance of roots, living culture, women’s communication, music, aromas, summer mysticism, and that warm connection with Ukraine, which is especially important to maintain far from home.

Kupala in Israel: Ukrainian tradition in the heart of Tel Aviv

The Ivan Kupala holiday in Ukrainian culture has always been associated with nature, water, fire, herbs, wreaths, wishes, and belief in the special power of a summer night.

According to folk beliefs, it was on Kupala night that people searched for the fern flower, wove wreaths, made wishes, and listened to the signs of nature. These images have long become part of Ukrainian cultural memory — not museum-like, but living, domestic, passed down through stories, songs, gestures, and rituals.

In Tel Aviv, the organizers offer to touch this tradition in a soft and cozy format. The evening is designed for a small number of participants, so the atmosphere promises to be not massive, but almost family-like — with communication, details, attention to mood, and the personal presence of each guest.

What will be in the evening program

The program includes mystical stories and tales about Kupala traditions, wreath weaving, music, warm communication, light snacks, and sparkling wine.

A separate part of the evening will be dedicated to aromatic oils. Larisa Garkalyuk will conduct an excursion into the world of aromas and talk about the properties of oils that help restore inner harmony, fill with energy, and feel a connection with nature.

Two thematic photo zones will be prepared for guests. Professional photos will be taken by Boris Podelko, so participants will have not only impressions but also beautiful photographs as a keepsake.

Why such evenings are important for Ukrainians in Israel

After 2022, Ukrainian culture for many has become not only part of personal biography but also a way to maintain a connection with home, language, tradition, and community. In Israel, where a noticeable Ukrainian community lives, such events work on several levels: they help meet, talk, feel support, and show that Ukrainian culture continues to resonate even far from Ukraine.

For the Israeli audience, this is also an important signal. Ukrainian holidays, theatrical projects, cultural evenings, and public initiatives in Tel Aviv create a visible space of Ukrainian presence in Israel — not only news or political, but also human.

In this context, NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency follows such initiatives as part of the big story of Ukrainian-Israeli ties: through culture, language, communication, memory, and support for people who are building their lives in Israel today but maintain a connection with Ukraine.

Format, address, and registration

The evening “Maiden Joys. Kupala” will take place on June 25 at 20:00.

Venue: Ukrainian Cultural Center, Yermiyahu Street, 22, Tel Aviv.

The number of places is limited — only 20 participants. This format makes the event more personal and chamber-like: here, not only the program and photo zones are important, but also the very feeling of a circle where you can calmly talk, remember Ukrainian traditions, and spend a summer evening in a warm atmosphere.

Kupala night as memory, beauty, and meeting

“Maiden Joys. Kupala” is not an event about folklore for the sake of folklore. Rather, it is an attempt to transfer the Ukrainian summer ritual into the modern urban context of Tel Aviv: without a stage and officialdom, through wreaths, aromas, photographs, stories, and live communication.

For Ukrainian women in Israel, such an evening can become an opportunity to return for a few hours to familiar symbols of childhood, family stories, and the Ukrainian calendar.

And for the Ukrainian cultural space in Israel itself, it is another sign: tradition continues to live when it is not just remembered, but people are gathered around it.

…
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In Israel, from June 18–21, 2026, an unusual story at the intersection of politics, war, television, and conspiracy theories gained widespread attention. At the center was Uri Geller — an Israeli illusionist and mentalist, known for many years for his claims of supernatural abilities, telepathy, and work with intelligence agencies.

This time, Geller linked the behavior of US President Donald Trump with Iran and claimed that the sharp changes in the American leader’s position could be the result of exposure to “low-frequency electromagnetic waves.”

The main thing here is accuracy. This is not an official statement from the Israeli government and not confirmed information from intelligence services. This is Uri Geller’s public version, voiced in the Israeli media space and then published by Channel 14 as a broadcast story.

What happened on June 18, 2026

On June 18, 2026, Israeli TV host Sharon Gal posted a video on Instagram with a caption in Hebrew: “אורי גלר במסר חד לנשיא טראמפ” — “Uri Geller with a sharp message to President Trump.” In this video, Geller addressed Trump and discussed his position on Iran.

The context was a sharp debate in Israel around the American line on Iran. In June 2026, the international press discussed US-Iran negotiations, a memorandum of understanding, and the controversy over how Washington tries to present the agreement: as a strategic victory for the US or as a concession to Tehran. The Soufan Center wrote on June 15, 2026, that the US and Iran are competing to shape the public perception of the agreement, with sanctions, assets, and the Strait of Hormuz remaining key issues.

For Israel, this was not abstract diplomacy. Any rapprochement between Washington and Tehran is directly perceived through the lens of security, the Iranian nuclear program, missile threats, Hezbollah, and Israel’s future freedom of action.

What was written on June 19, 2026

On June 19, 2026, the Israeli site “בחדרי חרדים” published an article with the headline: “נשמע הזוי לגמרי” — “Sounds completely insane.” The author of the article, Hani Levin, noted the publication time: 19.06.26.

The article stated that Uri Geller, in an interview with Sharon Gal on חדשות 24, offered a conspiratorial explanation for Trump’s behavior. According to Geller, the change in the US president’s position was not accidental and could be related to ELF — Extremely Low Frequency technology, meaning the impact of extremely low frequencies.

Geller claimed that with such technology, it is possible to “bombard the brains of leaders with low frequencies.” He also stated that he knows about this because, in the past, according to him, the American intelligence agency CIA asked him to perform various tasks. Host Sharon Gal reacted skeptically and said it “sounds completely insane.”

In the same retelling, it was noted that Geller suggested Trump might have been subjected to such exposure during visits to China or in Washington. After Sharon Gal’s question about whether the situation could be “reversed” with another signal, Geller stated that he is personally trying to act in this direction.

What Channel 14 published on June 21, 2026

On June 21, 2026, Channel 14 / C14 posted an article under the headline: “אורי גלר טוען: זה מה שקרה לנשיא — ‘הוא לא טראמפ האמיתי’”, which can be translated as: “Uri Geller claims: this is what happened to the president — ‘he is not the real Trump’.” The publication date on the C14 page is indicated as 21.06.26.

The C14 publication directly stated that Geller, on the program “ישראל הבוקר” with Tal Meir, put forward an “unusual theory” about changes in Donald Trump’s positions. According to Geller, hostile elements are using technology based on very low-frequency electromagnetic waves, which allegedly can influence the functioning of the human brain, behavior, and decision-making.

Channel 14 also cited Geller’s claim about the E-1000 technology. He stated that countries like Russia, North Korea, and Iran possess it. According to him, Trump could have been affected by such “emissions” during foreign visits or even through weapons operating from embassies.

Separately, Geller recalled a story from the past where he allegedly helped the US convince Russian representative Yulia Vorontsova to sign a nuclear disarmament agreement using a combination of telepathy and ELF weapons. This was also retold in the C14 material.

Why this story became notable

This story is important not because Geller’s version is proven. There is no evidence in the published materials that Iran is affecting Trump’s brain with low-frequency weapons.

It is important for another reason.

By June 18–21, 2026, part of the Israeli right-wing media space was clearly looking for an explanation as to why Trump, whom many in Israel considered the toughest ally on the Iran issue, began acting not as his supporters expected. When the behavior of the American president no longer fits into the usual political picture, not only analysis and criticism emerge, but also versions on the verge of fantasy.

That is why Sharon Gal’s phrase “sounds completely insane” became almost key in this story. The host did not present Geller’s words as a proven fact. He directly expressed doubt. But the very fact of such a conversation appearing in the Israeli broadcast shows the level of nervousness around American policy on Iran.

What is important for the Israeli audience to understand

For Israel, the main question is not whether “waves against Trump’s brain” exist. The main question is different: how reliable American policy remains if White House decisions on Iran can change quickly, sharply, and without a clear explanation for allies.

In June 2026, the American line on Iran was discussed against the backdrop of reports of a possible memorandum, sanctions, the Strait of Hormuz, and Washington’s attempt to present the diplomatic process as control over the Iranian threat. Meanwhile, in the Israeli discussion itself, the feeling was growing that US agreements with Iran might not align with Israel’s security interests.

NAnews — Israel News draws attention to this part of the story: behind the loud and strange wording about “electromagnetic weapons” lies real political anxiety. Israeli society is trying to understand whether it can continue to fully rely on the personal promises of the American president if his position on Iran can change within a few days.

Conclusion

The fact is: June 18, 2026, a video with Uri Geller and a message to Trump appeared with Sharon Gal; June 19, 2026, the site “בחדרי חרדים” retold this as an unusual and conspiratorial version; June 21, 2026, Channel 14 published material about Geller’s statement on the program “ישראל הבוקר.”

The claim that Iran is affecting Trump with low-frequency electromagnetic weapons remains precisely Uri Geller’s claim. There is no confirmation of this.

But the story itself became a symptom of a more serious issue: in Israel, there is growing concern that US policy on Iran may be determined not only by Israel’s security interests but also by the internal logic of the American administration, negotiations with Tehran, and Donald Trump’s personal style.

And when real politics becomes too unpredictable, versions that would have seemed like a joke yesterday begin to appear in the broadcast. Today they are already becoming part of the news agenda.

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17-year-old Briton Alexander Browder has become the youngest person to be added to Russia’s sanctions list. At first glance, this is almost a grotesque story: the Kremlin, the Russian Foreign Ministry, sanctions — and a schoolboy from the UK who is banned from entering Russia.

But in reality, this is not a joke.

It is Moscow’s nervous reaction to an investigation that hit one of the most sensitive points of the Russian military economy: how sanctioned regimes transfer money, buy technology, and continue to trade when regular banks are closed to them.

For Israel, this story is important not only because of Russia. In Browder’s report, alongside Russia, Iran and North Korea are named — states that use a similar logic of circumventing sanctions through cryptocurrency, stablecoins, exchangers, and shadow payment routes. This is where the main question begins: if Russia has learned to conduct large sums outside Western banking control, how does this model help Iran?

Alexander Browder: the schoolboy who touched the cryptocurrency nerve of the Kremlin

What he investigated

On March 3, 2026, Alexander Browder published a report for the Henry Jackson Society think tank. The study was dedicated to how cryptocurrencies are used for money laundering, circumventing sanctions, and financing regimes under international pressure.

According to the Henry Jackson Society, the research database analyzed 164 cases of cryptocurrency money laundering over the past 20 years, with the total scale of identified illegal operations estimated at approximately $350 billion. The report names Russia, Iran, and North Korea among the key risk states.

Browder’s main storyline is not ‘bitcoin’ as a trendy topic, but a new financial reality. Sanctioned regimes no longer depend solely on offshore accounts, cash, intermediary banks, and fictitious contracts. Now they have digital assets, stablecoins, crypto exchanges, wallets, and chains of exchangers through which money can be moved faster than regulators can react.

A special place in this story is occupied by A7A5 — a ruble stablecoin linked to the A7 network. According to materials presented by Browder to the British Parliament, A7A5 was launched in January 2025 and was described as a tool created to circumvent sanctions; among the associated figures and structures mentioned were sanctioned Ilan Shor and Russian Promsvyazbank.

Why Moscow reacted this way

On June 3, 2026, the story moved from the expert environment to international news: Russia added Alexander Browder to the sanctions list. The Russian Foreign Ministry accused him and several other Britons of ‘slanderous fabrications’ and ‘false information.’ 17-year-old Browder called the sanctions a ‘badge of honor’ and stated that his work hit Moscow’s ‘Achilles’ heel.’

DW also paid attention to this story on social media: a publication stated that British schoolboy Alexander Browder uncovered schemes for laundering Russian money through cryptocurrency and subsequently fell out of favor with the Kremlin.

There is another important layer here. Alexander is the son of Bill Browder, founder of Hermitage Capital and one of Putin’s most famous critics. It was Bill Browder who became one of the initiators of the ‘Magnitsky Act’ after the death of lawyer Sergei Magnitsky in a Russian prison in 2009.

But Alexander’s story is no longer a continuation of the old plot about offshore accounts and tax fraud. It is a new generation of investigations. Instead of paper schemes — blockchain. Instead of bank transfers — stablecoins. Instead of one account in Switzerland — dozens of wallets, exchanges, exchangers, and companies in different countries.

A7A5 scheme: how Russia turns sanctions into a technical task

How the circumvention principle worked

The purpose of A7A5 was not just to create another cryptocurrency. The purpose was to provide Russian participants in settlements with a digital tool tied to the ruble, which can be used where a regular bank payment becomes too dangerous or impossible.

The conditional scheme looks like this:

1. A Russian entity receives rubles.
2. Rubles are introduced into the system linked to A7.
3. They are used to purchase the ruble stablecoin A7A5.
4. A7A5 is transferred through crypto wallets, exchanges, and exchangers.
5. Then the token can be exchanged for USDT, yuan, dirhams, or another settlement currency.
6. After that, an intermediary in a third country pays for goods, equipment, logistics, or services.

In the regular banking system, sanctions control looks for a simple link: who pays, to whom, and for what. In the cryptocurrency scheme, this link is broken into several parts. Tokens, wallets, exchanges, exchangers, shell companies, and intermediary countries appear.

That is why such a scheme is dangerous. It does not legally cancel sanctions but makes their application much more complicated.

On May 26, 2026, the UK imposed sanctions against 18 individuals and legal entities associated with the A7 network. The official statement from the British government said that A7 was a Kremlin-supported system for circumventing Western sanctions, financing military purchases, and processing funds from oil sales for the Russian military economy. London also indicated that the network claimed transfers of more than $90 billion a year.

This figure is important for the Israeli reader. It is not about a school report or a theoretical crypto scheme. It is about a financial pipeline through which amounts comparable to large military budgets could pass.

What exactly could be paid for with this

Through such channels, not only abstract ‘services’ can be paid for. In sanction schemes, specific categories are usually important: electronics, equipment, dual-use components, logistics, oil, intermediary services, industrial materials, and goods that directly or indirectly support the military economy.

For Russia, this could mean purchases for the war against Ukraine.

For Iran — access to technologies, drone components, missile programs, logistics, and financing channels for structures associated with the IRGC.

At this point, Alexander Browder’s story ceases to be personal. It becomes a story about how Russia turns the sanctions regime into an engineering task: if a bank is closed, a bypass payment route is created; if the dollar is dangerous, a stablecoin is used; if a direct supplier fears sanctions, an intermediary in a third country appears.

Where Iran fits in and why it is a threat to Israel

Russia helps Iran not by transfer, but by model

The most accurate formulation is this: Russia helps Iran circumvent sanctions not necessarily with one direct payment through A7A5, but by creating and scaling a model that Iran can use in its interests.

This model consists of five elements.

1. The first element is cryptocurrency instead of a bank.
2. The second is a stablecoin instead of a regular currency transfer.
3. The third is exchanges and exchangers instead of a transparent banking route.
4. The fourth is third countries instead of direct contact Russia–Iran or Iran–supplier.
5. The fifth is national payment systems instead of Western infrastructure.

Iran already has its own part of this system. On June 2, 2026, the US Treasury imposed sanctions against Iran’s largest crypto exchange Nobitex and three other Iranian crypto platforms. According to the US, Nobitex processed more than 50% of all incoming digital assets of Iran in 2025 and helped the Iranian regime, including structures associated with the IRGC, circumvent sanctions through digital assets.

Here is where the key link for Israel appears.

A7A5 — the Russian door to crypto-sanction circumvention. Nobitex — the Iranian door. USDT and intermediaries — the corridor between them.

Russia has A7/A7A5 — an example of a large network for circumventing sanctions through cryptocurrency and stablecoins.

Iran has Nobitex — its own crypto infrastructure, which the US associates with circumventing sanctions and structures close to the IRGC.

The connection between Nobitex and A7A5 does not necessarily look like a direct transfer from one platform to another. In open data, something else is more important: they work as two sides of one sanction model. The Russian A7A5 turns rubles into cryptocurrency liquidity and then, according to analysts, is mainly exchanged for USDT. The Iranian Nobitex, according to the US Treasury, was a key platform for the Iranian regime’s access to digital assets and stablecoins. Therefore, the bridge between the Russian and Iranian schemes becomes not A7A5 itself and not Nobitex itself, but the common layer of stablecoins — primarily USDT, through which sanctioned structures can transfer value, hide the source of money, and pay for goods or services through intermediaries.

For the Israeli audience, this is crucial. If Russia creates a ruble crypto channel, and Iran uses its own crypto exchange infrastructure to access stablecoins, then together they form not a one-time scheme, but a parallel financial environment. Such an environment helps Tehran circumvent sanctions, maintain access to money, and pay for what directly affects Israel’s security: technologies, logistics, drone components, missile programs, and structures associated with the IRGC.

Mir and Shetab: the second half of the scheme

Cryptocurrency is only one level. The second level is the integration of national payment systems.

Russia promotes Mir, Iran — Shetab. In November 2024, the first phase of their integration was launched: Iranian cardholders gained the ability to withdraw rubles from Russian ATMs. The next stages should expand opportunities for Russian cards in Iran and Iranian cards in Russia.

In Tehran on June 17, 2026, the agency IRNA reported that the third stage of the integration of the Iranian banking system ‘Shetab’ and the Russian payment system ‘Mir’ should be completed within the next two months. According to the Iranian state agency, this was stated by the head of the Central Bank of Iran.

For the average reader, this may sound like a tourist news: cards, ATMs, payments. For Israel, the meaning is different. Russia and Iran are building a payment bridge that reduces their dependence on Western banks. The less Iran depends on the Western financial system, the harder it is to pressure it with sanctions.

And that means Tehran has more opportunities to finance what directly concerns Israel: the IRGC, missile programs, drone developments, regional proxy networks, and logistics chains.

In the middle of this story, it is important to see not only the numbers but also the consequences. NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency considers Browder’s investigation, the A7A5 network, sanctions against Nobitex, and the Mir–Shetab link as parts of one picture: Russia and Iran are creating financial bypass routes that can amplify threats to Israel, Ukraine, and the entire region.

Why this needs to be explained to the Israeli audience

Israel often looks at Iran through a military lens: missiles, drones, Hezbollah, the IRGC, the nuclear program. But behind each such threat is a financial system. Someone pays for components. Someone transfers money to intermediaries. Someone closes logistics. Someone makes a payment for a product that looks civilian in documents but can actually enter a military chain.

Russia helps Iran precisely in this area — in the area of survival under sanctions. It shows how to connect cryptocurrency, stablecoins, payment systems, third countries, and trade intermediaries into one working scheme.

For Russia, this is a way to finance the war.

For Iran — a way to maintain access to money, technologies, and external markets.

For Israel — a warning: sanctions against Iran may remain on paper, but their effectiveness will decrease if Moscow and Tehran build alternative financial routes.

Alexander Browder’s story makes this mechanism visible. The 17-year-old schoolboy ended up on Russia’s sanctions list not because he politically threatened the Kremlin. He touched on a much more practical topic: money. And in the Russian-Iranian link, money is not just economics. It is drones, missiles, oil, logistics, proxy networks, and wars that continue even when official banks are already closed.

The conclusion for Israel is simple and unpleasant: Russia helps Iran circumvent sanctions by turning circumvention into a system. Not into one loophole, not into one secret transfer, but into an entire financial architecture — with cryptocurrency, stablecoins, exchangers, national cards, third countries, and intermediaries. That is why the story of the British schoolboy against the Kremlin is important not only to London or Kyiv but also to Jerusalem.

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Occupied Crimea has once again become the center of events. Over several days — from the night of June 20 to June 22, 2026 — a series of strikes hit Russian military facilities, logistics, energy, port infrastructure, and air defense systems across the peninsula.

For Israel, this topic does not seem distant. Crimea is not only Ukrainian territory seized by Russia in 2014 but also one of the key nodes of the war, through which Moscow has tried for years to maintain the southern direction, supply the army, and demonstrate that the peninsula is supposedly “protected.” Now this picture is cracking.

Amid the strikes, power outages, water problems, fuel sales restrictions, transportation disruptions, and queues for departure began in Crimea. The occupation administration tries to talk about “temporary difficulties,” but it itself introduces measures that resemble a state of anxious anticipation.

Strikes on Crimea June 20–22: What Happened

On the night of June 20, a series of explosions thundered in Crimea. After this, a major fire broke out at the Tavricheskaya TPP in the Simferopol area. According to reports from open sources, the strikes occurred at intervals of about 10–15 minutes, and one of the likely targets could have been a fuel tank.

Residents of several areas quickly felt the consequences. Alushta, Perevalnoye, and part of the settlements in the Simferopol district were left without electricity.

The next night, June 21, became even more difficult for the Russian control system over the peninsula. Explosions were recorded in Bakhchisarai, Kerch, Nizhnegorsky district, in the villages of Oktyabrskoye and Krasnogvardeyskoye, as well as in the Krasnoperekopsky district. Local residents reported the operation of Russian air defense, including missile launches near Zui in the Belogorsky district and in the area of the Tavricheskaya thermal power plant.

But the main blow in terms of meaning was not just on individual objects. The entire scheme on which the Russian presence in Crimea is based was under pressure: ports, crossings, fuel, electricity, military logistics, and connection with mainland Russia.

Kerch and the strike on both sides of the “Crimean Bridge”

One of the key points was Kerch. It is this area that Russian troops use for the transfer of goods, fuel, and support of the southern front. After the attack, reports of damage to port infrastructure appeared.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky confirmed strikes on Russian military logistics, oil industry facilities, and air defense systems. According to him, Ukrainian forces operated at a distance of about 300 kilometers from the front line.

It is especially important that the strikes hit objects on both sides of the “Crimean Bridge.” It was about maritime logistics used for transporting oil to the Krasnodar region, an oil depot in Kerch, as well as military facilities. There were reports of strikes on four radar stations of the S-400 complexes and two “Pantsir” complexes.

After the attack, data also appeared about a fire on three car ferries. Among the mentioned objects is the ferry “Panagia” at the Kerch crossing in the Temryuk district of the Krasnodar region and an oil terminal in the village of Chushka.

For the Israeli audience, it is important to understand one thing here: these are not just “another explosions.” This is pressure on the supply system. When the army loses stable logistics, it becomes more difficult to hold the defense, move equipment, deliver fuel, ammunition, and food.

Crimea enters a regime of restrictions: light, water, fuel, and exit

After the strikes on June 21, serious power outages began in Crimea. Areas in Sevastopol, Greater Yalta, Krasnoperekopsk, Alushta, Armyansk, and Dzhankoy were left without light.

The occupation administration was forced to introduce shutdown schedules. Formally, this was explained by network damage, overloads, and emergency shutdowns. In fact, the peninsula faced the fact that the infrastructure serving the Russian military machine became vulnerable.

Problems quickly spread to the communal sphere. Due to the de-energization of pumping stations, water supply disruptions began. The so-called “Water of Crimea” department acknowledged that part of the pumping stations was left without power, and consumers in several areas faced shutdowns.

Another blow to ordinary life — fuel.

The occupation “authority” announced the actual cessation of free gasoline sales at gas stations. Fuel began to be issued primarily to state services and structures that ensure the operation of the occupation administration. The Gauleiter of Crimea, Sergey Aksyonov, publicly urged residents to “remain calm,” but did not properly explain the reasons for the fuel crisis.

It is at such moments that the propaganda picture of “stable Crimea” collapses the fastest. When there is no light, water is supplied intermittently, gasoline disappears, and transport begins to operate on a reduced schedule, people no longer need television statements. They see reality themselves.

In this context, NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency views the situation in Crimea not as a separate episode of the war, but as part of a broader picture: Ukraine consistently strikes not at symbols, but at Russia’s ability to hold occupied territories through military logistics, fear, and infrastructural control.

Queues for exit and closed crossing

Amid the attacks on June 21, hundreds of cars tried to leave Crimea. There were reports of more than 710 cars in line. People complained about long waits and difficulties with leaving the peninsula.

The situation was exacerbated by the temporary closure of the Kerch crossing. It was through it that part of the supplies of products, fuel, and military cargo went. In addition to car ferries, a railway ferry with fuel tanks also operated through the crossing, which was also under threat.

The authorities of the Krasnodar region announced a temporary ban on transportation through the Kerch crossing and offered drivers an alternative land route through Rostov-on-Don, Taganrog, Mariupol, Melitopol, and Simferopol. For civilians, this means additional hours on the road and risks. For the army — a longer, vulnerable, and overloaded supply shoulder.

Actual “commandant” logic

After the strikes, the occupation administration introduced a set of restrictions that in reality resembles an emergency management regime.

Public transport was transferred to a reduced schedule — from 05:30 to 21:00. Fuel sales were limited. Ferry service was practically stopped, leaving only passenger boats. Shopping centers, supermarkets, and hypermarkets received reduced working hours — from 07:00 to 20:00. Evening street lighting was decided not to be turned on.

This does not look like ordinary “resource saving.” It looks like an attempt to maintain manageability in a situation where strikes on infrastructure begin to affect not only the military sphere but also the psychological state of the peninsula.

Panic among the occupiers and the question: what will happen next

The most indicative part of what is happening is reports that Russian military personnel have begun to evacuate families from Crimea.

Journalist TSN Yulia Kirienko, citing data from local residents, wrote that the military is already evacuating their relatives, and representatives of the occupation environment, who have cooperated with Russia since 2014, are looking at apartments in the Krasnodar region.

Such details are important. Panic is often first felt not by official talking heads, but by those who live inside the system: security forces, officials, military families, people associated with the occupation administration. If they start looking for backup options, it means that trust in the “eternal Russian Crimea” has weakened.

On the night of June 22, the explosions continued. It was restless in Feodosia, where after one of the explosions part of the city was left without electricity. In Armyansk, a fire broke out in the area of the railway station. Later, reports appeared that satellites recorded a powerful fire at the building of the FSB border service of Russia. Local residents also spoke of detonation, possibly of ammunition.

Crimea as a “suitcase without a handle” for Russia

Commander of the UAV Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Robert Brovdi, known as “Madyar,” believes that Russia will continue to hold on to Crimea as a strategic and ideological trophy. But from a military point of view, the peninsula is already losing its former role as a bridgehead because logistics and infrastructure are systematically affected.

The formula “suitcase without a handle” sounds especially accurate here. Abandoning Crimea is politically dangerous for Putin. Holding it is becoming more expensive, more difficult, and more painful.

Advisor to the Minister of Defense of Ukraine Sergey Sternenko stated on June 21 that the occupiers in Crimea face serious problems. And the head of the Council of Reservists of the Ground Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Ivan Timochko suggested that in the event of critical problems with logistics and supply, Russian troops may begin unauthorized withdrawal.

This does not mean that the liberation of Crimea will happen tomorrow. War rarely develops in a straight line. But recent events show: the Russian system on the peninsula no longer looks inviolable.

For Israel, where the cost of logistics, air defense, fuel, ports, and rear stability is well understood, this story should be read without illusions. When the army’s supply routes start burning, when air defense loses stations, when fuel is issued only to selected services, and military families are evacuated in advance, this is no longer just informational noise.

It is a sign that the occupation is becoming expensive, nerve-wracking, and increasingly unmanageable.

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On June 21, 2026, Ukrainian publicist and political commentator Vitaly Portnikov published a text that for the Israeli audience sounds not like a commentary on foreign politics, but as a direct warning.

His main idea is simple but painful: a state that builds its security on relations with one leader, even if that leader seems the most convenient ally, sooner or later finds itself in a dangerous dependency.

At the center of the text are Donald Trump, Israel, Ukraine, the politics of Benjamin Netanyahu, and the broader question: should alliances be based on values or on benefits?

Portnikov writes that during the 2024 US presidential campaign and the first year of Trump’s new presidency, he often had to argue with American and Israeli acquaintances. They convinced him that criticism of Trump was only related to Ukraine — with the new American president’s reluctance to continue the previous line of assistance to Kyiv.

But Portnikov himself explains it differently. For him, the problem is not only in Ukraine. The problem is that politics built not on values but on personal calculations can change at any moment. Today such a leader seems beneficial to Israel. Tomorrow he may decide that it is more advantageous to negotiate with those who were considered enemies just yesterday.

For Israel, the question of relations with the US has always been strategic. America remains the main ally, a source of diplomatic support, military cooperation, and political cover on the international stage.

But Portnikov draws attention not to the alliance with the US itself, but to something else: it is not friendship with America that is dangerous, but turning this friendship into a personal bet on one politician.

In his logic, Israel should not reduce its security system to relations with one US president. Especially if it concerns a leader who acts primarily out of personal interests, political gain, and a desire to prove his strength.

This is where the text becomes important for the Israeli internal discussion.

When Israeli politicians say that Trump is the best president for Israel, it may sound convenient at the moment. But if the entire strategy is built on the expectation that one person in the White House will always do exactly what is expected in Jerusalem, that is no longer a strategy. It’s a gamble.

Portnikov directly compares this approach to gambling in a casino. Betting all the money on one number can bring a win, but it can also leave you with nothing.

Portnikov draws a parallel with Ukraine.

According to him, Ukraine, after the change in American policy, was forced to learn to survive without the previous level of US support. This became possible not by itself, but because Kyiv, after the Russian attack, began to build a complex system of alliances.

Ukraine could have acted differently: put everything on Washington and find itself at a loss when American policy changed. But Ukrainian diplomacy and defense system gradually sought other supports — European alliances, domestic production, new technological solutions, military cooperation with various partners.

For Israel, this example is important not because the situation of the two countries is the same. It is different.

Ukraine is at war with Russia in Europe. Israel lives in a different regional reality, surrounded by different threats and has a different history of alliances. But there is a common lesson: a state should not allow its security to depend on the mood of one external center of power.

A particularly strong part of Portnikov’s text concerns the history of Israel itself.

He reminds that the Jewish state has always been able to create situational alliances, move from one agreement to another, and act independently when an ally became unreliable.

This is indeed an important thought.

Israel was not created as a dependent territory. It emerged as a nation-state capable of defending itself, making decisions, and not waiting for someone abroad to allow it to survive.

Therefore, when Israeli politics begins to look as if the fate of the country depends on the decision of one US president, it contradicts the very idea of Israeli independence.

Portnikov formulates this harshly: those Jews who want their future to be decided by the US president live in the US. Those who want to live in a nation-state live in Israel — and should not depend on the whims of the White House.

For the Israeli reader, this is not just a political phrase. It is a question of Zionism, national dignity, and strategic maturity.

Portnikov offers several conclusions.

The first is to stop living with the illusion that Trump will necessarily “remember” Israel, strike Iran, meet the expectations of Netanyahu, Smotrich, or any other Israeli political force.

Yes, circumstances may arise where the US will again enter into a tough conflict with Iran. But even in such a case, according to Portnikov’s logic, Trump will primarily pursue his own interests, and only then consider Israel’s interests.

The second conclusion is that Israel needs to regain the ability to act independently. Not in the sense of breaking with the US. Not in the sense of rejecting the alliance with America. But in the sense of understanding that an ally should not replace its own strategy.

The third conclusion is that Israel needs to strengthen partnerships again, based not only on benefits but also on values.

This is perhaps the most difficult part of the text.

Portnikov says that without the reputation of a democratic state in the Middle East, it will be harder for Israel to build new alliances. A state that wants the world to recognize its right to exist must itself maintain moral and political clarity. Not because it sounds better in diplomatic statements, but because reputation becomes part of security.

For Israel, 2026 is a time of tough decisions.

After the war, regional pressure, internal disputes, and growing dependence on external support, Israeli society increasingly asks the question: who can we rely on?

The answer “only on the US” sounds familiar, but is no longer sufficient. The answer “only on Trump” can be dangerous.

The US remains Israel’s main ally. This does not change. But even the most important ally should not become the only support. Israel needs additional diplomatic bridges, a broader system of partnerships, work with Europe, regional contacts, technological and defense independence, as well as a more precise understanding of the Ukrainian experience.

Ukraine has shown that a country under threat cannot afford the luxury of waiting for one savior. Israel cannot either.

Portnikov’s text essentially poses a question to Israel that goes far beyond the attitude towards Donald Trump.

It is a question of what Israel’s security strategy will be in the coming years.

Will it be built on personal connections, political sympathies, and the hope that “our man” in Washington will solve everything?

Or will Israel return to a more mature model: a strong army, independent decisions, an alliance with the US, but not dependence on one president; partnership with democratic countries, but without illusions; regional policy, but without abandoning its own principles.

Portnikov does not write a text against the Israel-US alliance. On the contrary, his logic is different: a true alliance should not turn into political dependence.

Because dependence is not security. It is expectation.

And a state that lives under constant threat cannot afford to just wait.

For Israel, the main lesson of this text sounds like this: The US is important, but Israel cannot be the project of one American president. The country needs a system of alliances, its own strategy, and a return to a policy where values are not a weakness, but become part of strength.

…
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March 13, 2026, at the Havana Music Club in Tel Aviv, the long-awaited concert of the Ukrainian rock band “BEZ OBMEZHEN” – as part of the world tour “Strong Hearts”!

Big Goal: The “Strong Hearts” tour is charitable. The main goal is to raise funds for vehicles and drones for the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
Your Contribution: Every ticket purchased is not just an entry to the hall, but real help for Ukrainian defenders.

Come feel the atmosphere of unity and sincere Ukrainian music. We are waiting for you!

March 13, 2026
Friday, 20:00
Tel Aviv Havana Music Club, Yigal Alon St. 126.

It will be a powerful performance by one of Ukraine’s most popular and charismatic bands, bringing live sound and sincere emotions to Israel. The band, known for its candid and strong music, will delight its fans in Israel with new hit compositions.

The band’s concert is not just music, it’s a whole story of freedom, strength of spirit, and resilience, which they embody in their work.

The band’s history and their contribution to Ukrainian culture

“BEZ OBMEZHEN” has long won the love of audiences around the world. Since its founding, the band has gathered thousands of fans in different countries, and their tracks have gained millions of listens online. Winners of numerous prestigious music awards such as M1 Music Awards, “Golden Firebird”, YUNA, the band has long established itself as a symbol of independent and honest Ukrainian culture.

Since the beginning of the full-scale war in Ukraine, the band not only continued its creative activity but also actively supported its country. More than 300 concerts during the war, in which they raised over 102 million hryvnias to support the Armed Forces of Ukraine. These performances became not only an expression of their music but also incredible support for the Ukrainian military and people. Each show is not just a performance but a true act of solidarity and courage.

Concert program

The concert will start at 20:00, and doors will open for spectators at 19:00. Venue — Havana Music Club, Tel Aviv, Yigal Alon St. 126.

Ticket prices:
An entrance ticket to the event can be purchased in advance, and the ticket price will depend on the location. Don’t miss the chance to be part of a historic event — a concert of a Ukrainian rock band in Israel!

Quotes and achievements of the band

The band “BEZ OBMEZHEN” has become a symbol of the Ukrainian music scene over the years of its career. They not only gather huge audiences but also participate in the most important cultural and social projects.

For those who can’t wait for the concert, the band already has several popular hits that can be listened to online.

YouTube channel: BEZ OBMEZHEN.

What to expect from the concert

The concert of “BEZ OBMEZHEN” in Tel Aviv promises to be a real musical event of the year. The audience will not only enjoy new hits but also a true rock atmosphere filled with the energy of freedom and struggle. Live sound, powerful emotions, and a unique atmosphere will make this evening unforgettable.

“These concerts are the energy of freedom, a symbol of resilience that we bring to the world through music,” noted the organizers’ representatives.

This concert is important not only for music fans but for everyone who values freedom, independence, and supports Ukraine in its struggle.

The concert of “BEZ OBMEZHEN” in Tel Aviv is not just a musical event, it’s an opportunity to feel the spirit of Ukraine, its strength, and courage, which this legendary band carries. They continue to inspire people around the world, and their music is a living testament to the resilience of the Ukrainian people.

On the NAnews website we always follow events that unite Israel and Ukraine, and this concert is one of the bright examples of such rapprochement between the two nations. Join us and support this great musical act.

Where to buy tickets and concert information

• Date: March 13, 2026
• Time: 20:00 (doors open — 19:00)
• Venue: Havana Music Club, Yigal Alon St. 126, Tel Aviv
• Ticket price: varies depending on the location
• YouTube channel: BEZ OBMEZHEN

Tickets are already available via the link.

…
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After the G7 summit, which took place in French Évian-les-Bains from June 15-17, 2026, the topic of Ukraine once again went beyond the usual formula of “support Kyiv as long as it takes.” Now, a different logic is becoming increasingly clear: if Moscow is not ready for real negotiations, it will be pushed towards them through the cost of war.

This does not mean that diplomacy disappears.

On the contrary, diplomacy is being talked about more and more often. But after more than four years of full-scale war, it becomes obvious: Putin will not stop on his own unless he feels that continuing aggression is destroying not only Ukrainian cities but also the very economic foundation of the Russian military machine.

In the official statement of the G7 leaders, there is talk of supporting Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as the intention to enhance the supply of air defense systems, additional complexes, interceptors, and long-range capabilities. There is also a recorded readiness to increase pressure on the Russian military economy, including sanctions against the oil and gas sector.

For Israel, this is not a distant European topic. It is a question of how the democratic world responds to regimes that test the boundaries of what is permissible: Russia in Ukraine, Iran in the Middle East, their partners and dependent regimes in the gray zones between war, blackmail, and trading in fear.

What the G7 really showed

The G7 summit was not an instant turning point, but it showed an important shift in language and priorities.

It’s no longer just about Ukraine standing firm. It’s about Ukraine being able to change the balance of the war. For this, Kyiv needs three things: sky protection, long-range capabilities, and pressure on the sources of Russian military income.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky spoke on the sidelines of the G7 about sanctions and how allies discussed further pressure on Russia. According to Reuters, G7 leaders confirmed their support for Ukraine and agreed to increase pressure on the Russian military economy, including through the oil and gas sector.

This is where the key line of the new stage passes. Until now, Western policy often looked like a reaction to another Russian strike: Moscow hits — Ukraine asks for air defense, missiles, shells, help for energy. Now the logic is gradually turning in the other direction: not only to defend against the consequences but also to hit Russia’s ability to continue the war.

This does not eliminate the risk. Russia is likely to respond with terror against the Ukrainian rear: energy, water, heat, logistics, civilian objects. But that is precisely why strengthening Ukrainian air defense/missile defense becomes not a technical detail but a strategic condition for the entire new phase of the war.

Why air defense for Ukraine is not a defensive detail but a strategic factor

The Israeli audience understands well that air defense is not just a matter of military technology.

When a country lives under the threat of missiles, drones, and ballistics, sky protection means the ability to preserve the economy, cities, hospitals, power plants, transport, and normal civilian life. Israel knows this from its own experience.

For Ukraine, air defense has the same significance, only in an even larger-scale war. If Kyiv receives long-range capabilities but does not receive sufficient protection from retaliatory strikes, Russia will try to break the rear: in winter — energy, in summer — logistics, in any season — civilian infrastructure.

Therefore, the G7 formula is important precisely in conjunction: more air defense, more interceptors, more long-range capabilities. One without the other does not create a sustainable strategy. Together, it turns into an attempt to impose a new cost of war on Moscow.

Why the focus is on the war economy

One of the key scenarios increasingly discussed in expert and political circles is pressure on the economic base of Russian aggression.

Refineries, oil and gas revenues, logistics, military factories, export schemes, and supply chains are not just the economy. They are the fuel of war. From this money, Russia pays the military, produces missiles, purchases components, supports the repressive apparatus, and finances strikes on Ukraine.

That is why sanctions against the oil and gas sector and strikes on objects related to the Russian military economy become part of one picture. The West presses from the outside, Ukraine works on military and industrial infrastructure, and Russian elites begin to understand: the war may cease to be a manageable way to retain power and turn into a threat to their own assets, incomes, and future.

Here it is important not to cross the line between fact and forecast. It cannot be stated that at the G7 a public decision was made to “finish off” the Russian economy. But it can be said otherwise: the official formulations of the G7 and statements after the summit show that pressure on the Russian military economy is becoming a central element of the allies’ policy towards Ukraine.

For NAnews — News of Israel, the Ukrainian aspect is not the only important one here. The question is broader: if an aggressive regime sees that the war is becoming increasingly costly, its behavior changes. If it sees fatigue, fear, and endless delays, it continues to test the world for weakness.

Long-range capabilities change not only the front but also negotiations

Long-range capabilities are not just weapons on the battlefield.

They are a tool that changes the political mathematics of war. As long as Russia can launch missiles with impunity, produce drones, process oil, finance the army, and hide key nodes deep in the rear, it feels space to continue aggression.

When this space narrows, the conversation about negotiations becomes different.

Moscow is used to negotiating as a continuation of blackmail: first capture, destroy, kill, and then offer to “fix reality.” The new logic should be the opposite: first make the continuation of the war too expensive, and only then open a window for a real conversation.

The Trump factor: deal or pressure

A separate topic is Donald Trump’s position.

His political style is often described as a combination of pressure and offering a deal. First, a tough situation is created. Then the other side is offered a beneficial exit. If the exit is rejected, the pressure increases.

Regarding Russia, the problem is that Moscow has long demonstrated an unwillingness to make a real compromise. Putin not only did not stop. He continued the strikes, continued the demands on Ukraine, continued the attempt to force the West to recognize Russian seizures as a new norm.

That is why after the G7, not only the text of the statement is important, but also the change in the atmosphere around the American position. Reuters wrote that at the summit, Trump became noticeably closer to the allies’ position on Ukraine, and European leaders saw in his approach a “real change” compared to previous skepticism.

This does not mean that Washington will automatically switch to the toughest line. But it means that the new aid package to Ukraine and the unlocking of additional support tools have a political chance. Not only as help to Kyiv but as a way to return the US to the role of the main player at the table of future settlement.

If America wants to be among the winners, it cannot allow Europe and Ukraine to independently form a new security architecture and then come to the ready table as an observer.

The EU poses the question more harshly

Europe after the G7 looks more consistent than before.

The European logic is simple: Russia should not receive a reward for aggression. Ukraine must stand firm. Pressure on Moscow must grow. And those who want to participate in the post-war world must help shape victory, not wait for a convenient moment.

Therefore, the question to the US becomes harsher: Washington can be the leader of the process, can be a partner of the process, or can find itself as a country that hesitated too long.

For Trump, this is especially sensitive. He does not like to lose and does not like to look like someone who came late. Therefore, strengthening Ukraine can become for him not only a foreign policy decision but also a matter of personal political logic: to be where victory is being formed.

Why this is important for Israel

Israel should look at the G7 not as a European ceremony but as an indicator of Western behavior in an era of great threats.

Ukraine is at war with Russia. Israel lives under the threat of Iran and its proxies. But between these stories, there is a common line: aggressive regimes closely watch how the democratic world reacts to force, blackmail, and terror.

If Russia can destroy Ukraine for years, and the world only expresses concern, this is read not only in Moscow. It is read in Tehran, Damascus, Pyongyang, and other capitals where the weakness of the West is perceived as an invitation to the next step.

If Russia faces systemic pressure, strengthening of the Ukrainian army, sanctions on the military economy, and political unity of allies, it creates a different signal: aggression becomes too expensive.

For Israel, the Ukrainian experience is especially important because of the air defense topic. Ukraine needs protection from Russian missiles and drones. Israel needs protection from Iranian missiles, drones, and proxy structures. Both countries understand: the sky is not an abstract zone. It is the life of people.

NAnews — News of Israel has repeatedly written that security today cannot be divided into “European” and “Middle Eastern.” The Russian war against Ukraine, the Iranian threat to Israel, energy blackmail, and attacks on civilian infrastructure are different manifestations of one era where authoritarian regimes test how far they will be allowed to go.

Belarus, Armenia, and the weak links of the Russian orbit

Another important question is how strong the Russian sphere of influence remains.

Belarus, Armenia, and other countries that have long been in Moscow’s orbit are becoming part of a broader struggle for the post-Russian space. Russia weakens not only when it loses tanks near Pokrovsk or missiles over Kyiv. It weakens when its allies begin to seek a way out of dependence.

Regarding Belarus, one must speak cautiously. Scenarios of pressure on Alexander Lukashenko’s regime can indeed be considered in the logic of weakening the Russian military infrastructure around Ukraine. But it cannot be stated without confirmation that specific strikes or operations have already been agreed upon.

It is more correct to pose the question differently: if Moscow uses Belarus as a military, political, and logistical resource, then pressure on this resource becomes part of a big strategy. Not necessarily through direct war. Sometimes it is enough to show Lukashenko that the price of full attachment to Russia becomes higher than the price of distance.

Armenia in this sense shows another example. After disappointment in Russian support, Yerevan began to seek broader external ties. This does not mean an immediate break with Moscow, but it shows a trend: the Russian imperial system is held not by the love of allies but by fear and dependence. When fear decreases, dependence begins to crack.

The theory of the “cornered rat” and the real cost of escalation

Opponents of strong pressure on the Russian Federation often use the image of a “cornered rat”: if you press too hard, Putin will strike back even more terribly.

This argument cannot be completely ignored. Russia indeed remains dangerous. It has missiles, drones, a huge repressive apparatus, a nuclear arsenal, and a willingness to kill civilians.

But it is important to recognize another thing: Moscow has already used almost all the main tools of escalation, except for the most extreme ones.

Russia has already hit energy. Already destroyed cities. Already conducted massive missile attacks. Already blackmailed with nuclear weapons. Already conducted mobilization. Already turned the war into a tool of internal dictatorship.

What remains?

Mass mobilization in the style of “Arise, vast country” is an extremely difficult task for Putin’s Russia. The Soviet Union moved towards a strict command-administrative system for decades. Putin has neither the time, nor the Bolshevik party, nor a real mobilization ideology capable of raising the whole country without risk.

The nuclear scenario is even more dangerous for Moscow itself. China, whose opinion the Kremlin cannot completely ignore, strongly opposes it. For Beijing, nuclear escalation in Europe would mean a blow to global trade, markets, stability, and its own interests.

Therefore, the real Russian response is likely to be familiar: terror against the Ukrainian population, strikes on energy, water, heat, transport, an attempt to break the rear and sow fatigue. That is why the West, if it really wants to pressure the Russian Federation, must simultaneously strengthen the Ukrainian sky.

The main challenge for Ukraine after victory

But the most important part of this story begins not in Moscow, but in Kyiv.

Ukraine can defeat Russia on the battlefield and lose part of the future within itself if, after a huge sacrifice, it remains in the logic of decorative politics, corruption, imitation of reforms, quarrels with allies, and internal self-destruction.

Ukraine’s strategic task is not just to receive a medal for heroism and a bag of gold for effort. The task is to sit at the table of the post-war world as a country that not only stood firm but also became stronger: militarily, engineering-wise, technologically, European, institutionally.

This means that Ukraine must be not only a symbol of resistance. It must become a producer of security.

A country that has an army, industry, air defense, long-range capabilities, strong universities, functioning courts, effective bureaucracy, trust of allies, and a political culture capable of not destroying its own achievements for the sake of a short internal fight.

The main obstacle here is not only Russian missiles. The main obstacle is the internal decorative-parasitic layer that knows how to say the right words but does not know how to build a state. Ukraine of engineers, military, entrepreneurs, volunteers, doctors, teachers, and European culture must defeat not only Moscow but also its own habit of tolerating imitation.

It is not enough to win with Europe — you need to become Europe

After the G7, it became clear: Ukraine has a chance not just to survive but to move into a new political category.

If the West really strengthens air defense, long-range capabilities, sanctions, and pressure on the Russian economy, the war may enter a phase where Moscow, for the first time in a long time, will not only advance but also lose strategic initiative.

But military victory is only the first part of the task.

It is not enough for Ukraine to win with Europe. It needs to become Europe. To be, not to seem.

This means building a state that allies trust. An economy that produces strength. An army that not only defends the country but also becomes part of a new security system. A policy that understands the price of partnership. And a society that after the war will not allow replacing real European transformation with a beautiful facade.

Russia must be brought to sanity. But Ukraine after this must prove an equally difficult thing: that it fought not only for survival but for the right to be one of those who write the rules of the new world.

…
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In Tel Aviv-Yafo, the Ukrainian Cultural Center operates — a platform where Ukrainian culture in Israel exists not “on holidays,” but in the regular city rhythm.

This is a place for exhibitions, meetings, lectures, and community events, where not only Ukrainians come, but also Israelis who find it important to understand neighbors and partners not through headlines, but through people and meanings.

What is this center and why is it needed in Israel

The center is associated with the Embassy of Ukraine in the State of Israel and operates as a cultural point of presence for Ukraine in the city.

To put it simply: it’s a space where you can see, hear, and “touch” Ukraine through culture — without unnecessary ideology and without the officialdom that often repels.

The Ukrainian Cultural Center in Tel Aviv started on October 13, 2021 — in reports about the opening, this was called the beginning of work in test mode.

Separately, on the page of the Embassy of Ukraine in the State of Israel, it is noted that the center has been operating “since October 2021” and that it was previously in Bat Yam.

Where is it located

The address used in announcements and reference information:

22 Yirmeyahu Street, Tel Aviv, Israel.

How to get there – https://maps.app.goo.gl/YdLnoL4dH34XU7cP6

For the Israeli audience, it’s convenient to explain it like this: it’s a regular city address, not “somewhere in the suburbs,” and you can get there just like to any venue in Tel Aviv — the main thing is to check the time of the specific event.

What events are held there

Based on the experience of similar platforms and how their announcements are structured, the set of formats usually looks like this:

Exhibitions and project presentations.

Public talks and lectures — from history and culture to contemporary topics.

Community evenings: intimate meetings, readings, music, conversational formats.

Sometimes practical classes appear — for families, teenagers, new immigrants, volunteer groups.

What makes this convenient for an Israeli: you can come “for one evening” and leave with an understanding of the context, which then significantly changes the perception of news and conversations on social networks.

Why this is important for Israel

Israel lives in a reality where cultural diplomacy is not an abstraction, but a part of everyday security, social resilience, and relations with neighbors and allies.

That is why NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency regularly pays attention to such platforms: sometimes one calm cultural conversation gives more than dozens of emotional discussions “in the comments.”

In the Israeli environment, this is also a way to maintain bridges between communities — without pressure, without slogans, but with real contacts and human normalcy.

If you want to propose your event or partnership

The most effective way is not a “post to nowhere,” but a short letter: who you are, what you want to do, for which audience, in what language, what format, and how many people you expect.

Organizers usually critically need to understand two things: whether it will be safe and understandable for the local audience, and whether the cultural platform is turning into a political rally.

What you can do right now

If you are Israeli and just want to understand — start with one event and see if it’s “yours” or not.

If you are from the Ukrainian community — use the center as a place where you can not only miss home but also gather around real activities: art, language, support, and communication.

And if you are media or a city activist — such points help explain the complex regional agenda in normal human language, without overheating and without cheap labels.

How to contact if you want to come or clarify details

Provided contact details:

Phone: 054-352-4326

Email: zoryan.kis@mfa.gov.ua

Follow announcements about events held at the “Ukrainian Cultural Center”:

https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61561521344927

Here is an important nuance: such centers often live by the logic “from event to event,” so it’s better to clarify the language of the event, the format of entry, and the need for registration, even if you think “well, it’s just an exhibition.”

…
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