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October 15 — Haifa, October 21 — Netanya, October 23 — Bat Yam. Felix Shinder returns to Israel with “Lemonchiki”, “7:40”, klezmer, Utyosov, and that very Odessa intonation. But behind the cheerful poster, there is another story: after 2022, his concerts in Europe became charitable, and part of the income from one of the previous Israeli tours was directed to children of Ukrainian refugees.

Author — Anton Pshydynskyi

On September 9, 2026, Israeli producer Svetlana Berdetskaya announced new Israeli concerts of Felix Shinder. And here, as is customary in Odessa, everything seems clear, but there are details.

Tickets are already available on SHOWMAN.

In the initial poster, Haifa was scheduled for October 17. However, the current SHOWMAN ticketing system now says otherwise: October 15, 2026, Thursday, 19:00. So we looked not only at the announcement but also where they are already asking for shekels for tickets. As of September 10, three concerts are officially listed: Haifa, Netanya, and Bat Yam.

It turns out to be a real little Israeli route of Odessa.

October 15 — Haifa, Matnas Adar, Beitenu Hall, Yerushalayim St., 29, starts at 19:00, ticket — 166 shekels.

October 21 — Netanya, Arik Einstein Auditorium, Bnei Berman St., 6, starts at 19:00; program “L’chaim, friends!”, duration one and a half hours, tickets cost 161–181 shekels.

And October 23 — Bat Yam, Lagra Bar, Atzrifim St., 3, 19:00, ticket — 166 shekels.

And if someone now asks, what do these three cities and the whole article have to do with it — well, Felix Shinder is coming to Israel not just to sing a couple of songs about Odessa-mama. He has his own old scores with this country. In a good way.

Odessa does not come with a suitcase — it comes with an accordion

Organizers call Shinder “the voice of modern Odessa.” The wording is promotional, but in this case, there is something to latch onto. His program is indeed assembled like an old Odessa courtyard, where no one particularly asked what language we would sing in today.

There will be “Lemonchiki”, “7:40”, “Chaim”, “Jewish Wedding”, songs by Leonid Utyosov. Next to them — “Hava Nagila”, “A Yidishe Mame”, “Hevenu Shalom Aleichem” and Shinder’s own songs. Klezmer meets modern folk, and on top of all this, a blues harmonica periodically appears — an instrument that the musician himself carries through a significant part of his creative biography.

In Netanya, organizers separately promise improvisation and conversation with the audience. And this is already very Shinder-like: his concert is traditionally arranged so that the viewer risks finding themselves not in a chair, but almost a participant in what is happening. Once his band was advertised with the phrase that there should always be “live fish” at concerts. What exactly was meant — explaining to a real Odessan is somehow awkward.

But Shinder himself takes Odessa folklore noticeably more seriously than it might seem after the first ten minutes of fun. He spent years collecting old songs, searching for recordings, dealing with Yiddish, and trying to separate living urban culture from the stage parody of Odessa.

And here the current concerts unexpectedly intersect with what NAnovosti has been writing about for more than a year. In April 2025, we talked about “Odessa Days in Israel” — a project that simultaneously connected Ukrainian Odessa and Tel Aviv through music, literature, and a shared Jewish history. Shinder does roughly the same thing in his own way: only instead of round tables, he has an accordion, klezmer, and a hall that starts singing along after a while.

Shinder also sang in Ukrainian. On “Voice of the Country,” he performed the folk song “Oh, There on the Hill,” and before the project, according to his own words, he practically did not perform such a repertoire. Svyatoslav Vakarchuk suggested moving away from the usual festive sound, and the song was made with a Balkan intonation.

Peresyp, Cheryomushki, Israel — and back to Odessa

Felix Shinder was born on August 29, 1986, in Odessa. He himself said that he was born in Peresyp, grew up in Cheryomushki, and the family geography included Troitskaya near Marazlievskaya. That is, the set for the future singer of Odessa folklore was quite convincing even before he managed to choose a repertoire.

In 2000, when Felix was 14 years old, the family moved to Israel and settled in Netanya. Here he studied Hebrew at the Akiva Ulpan, then attended a regular school. Two years later, the family returned to Odessa. That is why the current concert on October 21 in Netanya is not quite the usual “first time in the city on tour.” For Shinder, this is a place from his own teenage biography.

And then there was a very non-academic school of life: odd jobs, hitchhiking, Deribasovskaya, music, the street, the harmonica, and a gradual understanding of what exactly he wants to pull from Odessa’s past onto the modern stage.

In one of the interviews, Shinder formulated his longing for old Odessa remarkably briefly: “the sea is the same, the gobies are the same, the cats are the same, but the people are not”. He spoke of a city from which a significant part of that mix of Jews, Greeks, French, Italians, and other communities that created old Odessa had disappeared.

And here begins not a concert anecdote.

On his father’s side, Shinder has Jewish roots. On his mother’s side, as the musician himself said, Jewish, Polish, French, Latvian, and Ukrainian lines mixed. He also recalled the family experience of Soviet anti-Semitism: his mother changed her Jewish surname to enter a music school. Therefore, restoring the Jewish musical tradition does not look like an attempt to add a few recognizable melodies to the show for an Israeli audience. It’s part of the family history.

When in October 2025, Jewish Culture Days were held in Odessa itself, NAnovosti wrote about songs in Yiddish, Hebrew, and Ukrainian, about “Migdal,” Chabad, the Jewish museum, and Israeli authors from Odessa. There was a fairly accurate thought: Jews could leave Odessa, but there are almost no former Odessans. Shinder’s story fits into this formula effortlessly.

“Voice of the Country”: when Odessa went all over Ukraine

The wide Ukrainian public got to know Felix Shinder in 2015 thanks to the fifth season of “Voice of the Country.” At the blind auditions, he performed “When the Night Lanterns Sway,” Potap and Svyatoslav Vakarchuk argued over him, and Shinder himself chose Vakarchuk’s team and reached the final stage of the project.

It was that rare case when the television format did not level the artist with the others. On the contrary, the whole country suddenly saw a person who brought Odessa urban folklore, a specific manner of speaking, and musical material that was hard to confuse with anyone else to the big stage.

The next step was the project “Money Forward”. The musicians called their style Odessa Gangsta Folk — klezmer, urban folklore, Odessa songs, a bit of musical hooliganism. In 2016, the album “Gold of Ancient Odessans / Music Of Ancient Odessites” was released.

It included “Gefilte Fish,” “Chaim,” “Moldavanka,” “Jewish Wedding,” “Lemonchiki,” “Lanterns,” and other things that Shinder did not try to put behind museum glass. The meaning was the opposite: to bring them out, give them a modern arrangement, and make them live again.

Then Odessa music traveled quite far from Moldavanka. In Shinder’s touring history — the USA, Latin America, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Israel; festivals Sommerfestival der Kulturen in Stuttgart, FolkHerbst, International Klezmer Festival Fürth, Atlas Weekend, Jazz Koktebel.

NAnovosti recently talked about a similar project in internal logic UkraYiddish, where Ukrainian songs are translated into Yiddish, and Jewish ones into Ukrainian. This is already another generation and different music, but the mechanism is familiar: Ukrainian and Jewish cultures here do not exist on opposite sides of the museum corridor but continue to talk to each other. In Odessa, such a conversation has been going on for a long time, just sometimes with an accordion.

NAnovosti — Israel News | Nikk.Agency

After February 24, cheerful songs did not disappear. Just next to them appeared war

On February 24, 2022, Felix Shinder was outside Ukraine. Later he settled in France. And here his concert biography changed: Odessa music continued to sound, only more and more often next to the word “concert” appeared another — charitable.

Latvian public media LSM, telling about Shinder in February 2026, noted that since 2022 he has been living in France and actively touring Europe with charitable concerts. Among the cities where he performed are Vilnius, Tallinn, Warsaw, and Krakow.

The most specific episode was restored from the documents of the Paris Théâtre de la Ville. On November 27, 2022, a large Journée Odessa — “Odessa Day” was held there. In the morning, Shinder accompanied the reading of Ukrainian poetry by Ilya Kaminsky and Kateryna Babkina in French, Ukrainian, and English on the harmonica. In the evening, after the discussion “What is the future of Ukraine?” he, together with accordionist Ivan Netepenko and violinist Yevgeny Falin, played Odessa folk with klezmer intonations.

And most importantly — Théâtre de la Ville directly stated that all proceeds from Journée Odessa were transferred to the charity organization With Hope for the Future, which helped children of Ukraine. Here, no beautiful words are needed: the mechanism is clear — the audience buys tickets for a Ukrainian cultural event, the income goes to children, Shinder takes the stage as one of the participants in this program.

In Israel, his concerts have already helped Ukrainian children

For the Israeli reader, there is an even closer episode.

During one of Felix Shinder’s previous tours in Israel, organizers directly stated in the poster that part of the proceeds from the concerts would be transferred to children of Ukrainian refugees in Israel. And it was not about some late interpretation by journalists — this wording was preserved directly on Israeli ticket pages.

And this is an important part of the current story. Because Shinder’s connection with the Ukrainian community in Israel was not only musical.

For a person who himself lived as a teenager in Netanya, then returned home to Odessa, and after the Russian invasion again found himself outside Ukraine, the story of Ukrainian refugees in Israel clearly did not look like something alien and distant.

Today, this is especially felt against the backdrop of what is happening with Jewish Odessa itself. In June 2026, NAnovosti talked about international support for the city’s Jewish community after a Russian strike that affected the “Or Avner Chabad” complex and the “Mishpacha Ukraine” children’s home. 124 children managed to go down to the shelter. Therefore, the current cheerful concert route of Shinder exists alongside a completely different reality of his native city.

Odessa humor generally works poorly if you forget why this city needed it so many times.

And before the war, charity was not a new profession for Shinder

It would be convenient to write that after February 24, the artist suddenly discovered charity. Only this is not true.

On April 5, 2016, Shinder participated in the Odessa Opera House in the concert “Unforgettable Kvitka,” dedicated to the memory of Ukrainian singer Kvitka Cisyk. Together with him, Oksana Bilozir, Yevgeny Nischuk, Oksana Mukha, Vitaliy Kozlovsky, and other performers took the stage. The project had a charitable component and was associated with helping cancer patients and purchasing medical equipment.

His band participated in other charitable and environmental initiatives. Shinder appeared at public events in Odessa, including World Cleanup Day, and generally gave the impression of a person who is not satisfied with just telling others how they should live correctly.

At the same time, it is important not to confuse two different stories. Shinder’s former band later continued to work under the name Kommuna Lux, already with another vocalist. After the Russian invasion, Kommuna Lux indeed actively collected aid for Ukraine, including for the military, bought equipment and vehicles. But this is the activity of Felix’s former colleagues, not a reason to write that Shinder personally did all this. At NAnovosti, such things are better separated, even when you really want to make the hero even more heroic.

And now — “L’chaim, friends!”

And after all this biography, the name of the Netanya concert begins to sound a little different.

“L’chaim, friends!”

Of course, it can be simply translated: “To life.” But here too much coincided.

A person was born in Odessa, lived as a teenager in Israel, returned home, appeared on the Ukrainian “Voice,” collected old Jewish-Odessa music anew, then again found himself in emigration due to the war. Played charitable concerts for Ukraine. In Israel, part of the proceeds from his performances was given to children of Ukrainian refugees. And now he is coming here again with songs of the city that Russia continues to hit with missiles and drones.

At the same time, no one expects an hour and a half of mourning on stage. Quite the opposite.

There will be “Lemonchiki.” There will be “Seven Forty.” There will be Utyosov. Klezmer. Harmonica. “A Yidishe Mame.” “Hava Nagila.” There will be an audience that will surely start singing somewhere before the artist.

Because Odessa has always been peculiar about this: when life becomes completely unfunny, it somehow stubbornly continues to laugh.

And Shinder knows this intonation.

Where and when

October 15, 2026, Haifa — Matnas Adar, Beitenu Hall, Yerushalayim St., 29. Start — 19:00. Ticket — 166 ₪.

October 21, 2026, Netanya — Arik Einstein Auditorium, Bnei Berman St., 6. “L’chaim, friends!” Start — 19:00, duration — 1 hour 30 minutes. Tickets — 161–181 ₪.

October 23, 2026, Bat Yam — Lagra Bar, Atzrifim St., 3. Start — 19:00. Ticket — 166 ₪.

Tickets are already available on SHOWMAN.

And then everything is simple. As they said in Shinder’s old posters — hold your pocket. This time they will put a little Odessa in it.

…
Felix Shinder in Israel in 2026: “Lemonchiki”, klezmer, three concerts and Odessa, which you can’t take with you – it travels itself – October 15 – Haifa, October 21 – Netanya, October 23 – Bat Yam - September 10, 2026 - Новости Израиля

Jews from Ukraine: The History of the “Jewish Kuren” in the Ukrainian Galician Army of 1919 - September 9, 2026 - Новости Израиля

Crown, ‘Pirates’, and 38 Lists: Which Parties and Lists Are Running in the 2026 Elections in Israel - September 9, 2026 - Новости Израиля

The Jewish Detachment left a significant mark in history as a symbol of bravery and solidarity between two peoples.

In honor of the commander Solomon Laynberg, a street in Lviv was named after him.

In 2013, it was proposed to establish a monument to the “Jewish Detachment” in Ternopil, but the project was suspended due to the war in Donbas.

The Jewish Detachment (official name – “Shock Detachment of the 1st Corps of the Galician Army”) within the Ukrainian Galician Army (UGA) became an important element in the struggle for Ukraine’s independence in 1919. This unit became a bright example of cooperation between two peoples — the Ukrainian and the Jewish, striving for freedom and independence during the war, and we are telling its story in our regular section Jews from Ukraine.

Political Situation and Jewish Involvement

At the beginning of the 20th century, Jews made up about a quarter of the population of Lviv, and most of them were actively involved in social and political life. Lviv had many Jewish lawyers, doctors, and students. Despite relative safety in Galicia, Jews still suffered from Polish discrimination, which forced them to cooperate with Ukrainians in the struggle for independence.

With the formation of UNR and ZUNR, Jews faced the necessity of deciding whether to support Ukraine’s fight for independence. Despite the cultural autonomy offered by these states, many Jews chose neutrality.

UNR (Ukrainian People’s Republic), formed in 1917, sought Ukraine’s independence but faced numerous challenges — Bolsheviks, Whites, and Polish forces.

Meanwhile, ZUNR (Western Ukrainian People’s Republic), formed in 1918 in Galicia, sought to preserve Ukrainian identity and independence but was quickly absorbed by Polish forces. Both of these states not only recognized cultural autonomy for Jewish communities but also gave them the opportunity to participate in state affairs.

The Union of UNR and ZUNR

Union, or the unification of UNR and ZUNR, took place on January 22, 1919, and became a symbol of the desire for unity of Ukrainian lands. This act was an important step toward the creation of a unified independent Ukrainian state. However, in practice, the union turned out to be complicated. ZUNR ultimately remained under Polish control, and Ukrainian authorities of UNR faced numerous internal problems, which prevented the Union from leading to a long-term consolidation. In 1920, Polish forces finally established control over Galicia, and ZUNR was integrated into the Polish state. Nevertheless, Union remained an important symbol of unity for the Ukrainian people and continued to influence Ukraine’s national ideology in the years to come.

Union was not instantaneous. After November 9, 1918, UNRada formed the Temporary State Secretariat headed by K. Levitsky, and the “Temporary Basic Constitution” on the state independence of Ukrainian lands from the former Austro-Hungarian Empire, declaring ZUNR on the territory of Eastern Galicia, Northern Bukovina, and Transcarpathia. On November 13, the new coat of arms — a golden lion on a blue background — and the flag — blue and yellow — were approved.

At the same time, against the backdrop of military actions and Polish aggression, on November 11, the ZUNR forces were forced to leave Przemysl, which became a base for Polish forces’ attack on Lviv. A few days later, in mid-November, Romanian troops captured Northern Bukovina, and on November 22, Polish forces took Lviv.

By December 1, the ZUNR delegation signed a preliminary agreement on union with UNR. On January 22, 1919, at Sofiyskaya Square in Kyiv, the act of reunion of UNR and ZUNR took place. However, in reality, the union was postponed until the convening of the Constituent Assembly (which never occurred).

The Fate of UNR After the Union

After Union in 1919, UNR continued the struggle for independence but faced serious internal and external challenges. The Ukrainian army actively fought the Bolsheviks and tried to hold its territories against Polish aggression. Poland, strengthening its control in Galicia, captured the territory of ZUNR, and in 1920, it completed its victory on this front.

In April 1918, after the German occupation, Pavlo Skoropadsky became the Hetman of the Ukrainian People’s Republic and declared the creation of Ukrainian State — an authoritarian monarchist state. His rule was supported by Germany but faced resistance from Ukrainian socialists and nationalists who opposed dependence on foreign powers. After the German capitulation in November 1918, Skoropadsky was overthrown, and power passed to the Directory.

Directory was formed in November 1918 in response to the overthrow of Skoropadsky. It was a collective executive body composed of five leaders, including Volodymyr Vynnychenko, Symon Petliura, and other political figures.

Directory represented a more democratic and radical form of government, aimed at mass support among peasants and workers.

The main goal of the Directory was to create an independent Ukrainian state, without dependence on foreign powers such as Germany.

Directory faced several problems: internal disagreements among its leaders, an unstable political situation, and threats from Poland, Bolsheviks, and other external enemies.

However, it resisted both internal and external threats, despite military defeats.

Directory actively fought against Bolsheviks and Whites, trying to restore Ukraine’s independence.

However, in 1920, the Bolsheviks won, and Ukraine (UNR) became part of Soviet Russia.

Creation of the “Jewish Detachment”

“The Jewish Detachment”, officially known as “Shock Detachment of the 1st Corps of the Galician Army”, was formed in June 1919 during the Chortkiv Offensive (operation). It became an independent operational military unit of the 1st Corps of the Ukrainian Galician Army and played an important role in defending Ukrainian territories from Polish and Bolshevik troops.

The creation of the detachment was supported by the Jewish National Council of Ternopil, which authorized Solomon Laynberg to approach Colonel Osip Mykytka, commander of the 1st Corps of the UGA, with a proposal to form a Jewish military unit. Laynberg suggested gathering several hundred Jews from Ternopil to create a fighting unit that would become part of the Galician army.

Colonel Mykytka agreed to this proposal, and an order to form the detachment was signed. Among the commanders of the unit, in addition to Jews, were also senior Ukrainian officers. Thus, the Jewish Detachment became a symbol of the union between two peoples — Ukrainians and Jews, who fought for Ukraine’s independence.

Formation and Training

The detachment was formed in the village of Ostapye, located in the Pidvolochysk district of Ternopil region. Intensive training of soldiers began here. The unit consisted of about 1200 fighters, including riflemen, officers, as well as sappers, telephone operators, and cavalry. A feature of the detachment was the large number of intellectuals and experienced soldiers among the fighters, which allowed for the formation of a combat-ready and disciplined unit.

It is also worth noting the engineering skills of the commander — Solomon Laynberg, who, using his knowledge, created a radio station for effective communication between army units, which significantly improved coordination in combat conditions.

Furthermore, the detachment was provided with all the necessary equipment — uniforms, weapons, ammunition, forage, and food — from the 1st Corps of the UGA, which indicates its importance in the context of military operations.

Combat Path of the Detachment

On July 14, 1919, the detachment participated in battles with Polish troops at places such as Maxymivka, Romanove Selo, and Zherebky, covering the retreat of Ukrainian troops across the Zbruch River. In the following days, the detachment actively participated in battles against the Bolsheviks. It captured Mikhaylpole, defended Proskuriv (now Khmelnytsky), Vinnytsia, Fastiv, and Berdiansk.

Despite heavy losses, the detachment continued its participation in military operations, taking part in the Kiev offensive in August 1919.

Reasons for Disbandment

“The Jewish Detachment” was disbanded at the end of 1919 for the following reasons:

1. Epidemic and Losses: The epidemic of typhus and shigellosis killed about 60% of the detachment’s personnel, weakening the unit.
2. Lack of Resources: After several military operations, there was a shortage of weapons, ammunition, and food, which made it impossible to continue fighting.
3. Military Reorganization: Due to changes in the strategy of the UGA, the detachment was integrated into other parts of the army.

Why Jews Joined the Ukrainian Army

Jews who joined the “Jewish Detachment” saw their role in defending Ukrainian independence for several reasons:

1. The Idea of National Liberation: Despite striving to create a Jewish state in Palestine, many Jews saw supporting Ukraine as a chance to ensure the security of Jewish communities.
2. Solidarity with Ukrainians: In Galicia, there was a close connection between the Jewish and Ukrainian people, which strengthened their alliance in the fight for independence.
3. Response to Pogroms: In response to the pogroms in Lviv in 1918, when Polish forces carried out mass reprisals against Jews, many Jews decided to join the ranks of the Ukrainian army to defend their land.

Legacy and Memory

“The Jewish Detachment” left a significant mark in history as a symbol of bravery and solidarity between two peoples. In honor of its commander Solomon Laynberg, a street was named in Lviv. In 2013, a proposal was made to install a monument to the “Jewish Detachment” in Ternopil, but the project was suspended due to the war in Donbas.

Officially, the Jewish unit ceased to exist. On November 17, the UGA and the Armed Forces of the South of Russia signed a separate peace treaty. The Ukrainian army came under the command of Anton Denikin. The “Whites” were notorious for their extreme anti-Semitism. Some Jewish fighters refused to fight. Nearly a hundred soldiers broke through to Odessa, where, together with members of the local Jewish fighting group, they seized a ship and sailed to Palestine, where they continued to fight for a Jewish state.

Some stayed in Soviet Ukraine, while others returned to Galicia, which by then was under Polish control.

What happened to Solomon Laynberg afterwards is unknown. According to one version, he returned to Ternopil and was killed by the Poles the following year. According to another, he stayed in Soviet Ukraine, became a member of the Communist Party, served in the Red Army, and soon moved to Moscow. He was arrested twice. In 1938, he was executed in Leningrad.

The phenomenon of “The Jewish Detachment” can be compared to the Jewish Legion, which fought in the British army against the Turks in Palestine, with the difference that the Jewish fighters of the detachment fought not for their own country but for the independence of Ukraine.

NAnews and the “Jews from Ukraine” series

The article about “The Jewish Detachment” in the Ukrainian Galician Army highlights the important role of Jews in the fight for Ukraine’s independence. It is an example of solidarity and joint struggle between Ukrainians and Jews against external threats, where Jews actively participated in the creation of the Ukrainian state.

In the series “Jews from Ukraine“, we uncover the contribution of the Jewish community to Ukraine’s history, emphasizing their important role in the national struggle. NAnews – Israel News continues to cover these events, preserving the memory of solidarity and mutual understanding between the two peoples.

…
Felix Shinder in Israel in 2026: “Lemonchiki”, klezmer, three concerts and Odessa, which you can’t take with you – it travels itself – October 15 – Haifa, October 21 – Netanya, October 23 – Bat Yam - September 10, 2026 - Новости Израиля

Jews from Ukraine: The History of the “Jewish Kuren” in the Ukrainian Galician Army of 1919 - September 9, 2026 - Новости Израиля

Crown, ‘Pirates’, and 38 Lists: Which Parties and Lists Are Running in the 2026 Elections in Israel - September 9, 2026 - Новости Израиля

38 lists have been submitted for the 26th Knesset elections — from Likud, Eisenkot, and the Bennett-Lapid alliance to the Pirates, Paradise, and the candidate in a crown. But the main question is not about the exotic: several small parties are near the 3.25% threshold, and their results could change the composition of the next Israeli government.

Author: Lev Varshavsky

On September 8, 2026, the submission of lists for the 26th Knesset elections in Israel was completed. The Central Election Commission received 38 applications. Voting is scheduled for October 27, 2026, but it is too early to definitively speak of 38 participants: the CEC must verify the candidates, names, and letter designations of the lists. Final approval is expected on September 27.

The number 38 is not a record for Israel. In 2022, 40 lists were submitted, and in one of the 2019 elections — 47. Israel’s proportional system allows relatively small political projects to reach a national level, but to obtain mandates, it is necessary to overcome the 3.25% threshold.

If a party does not pass the threshold, its votes are not ‘transferred’ to the winners but are excluded from the calculation of the distribution of 120 mandates. In 2022, MERETZ received 150,793 votes, about 3.16%, and was left without seats in the Knesset. Therefore, a few tenths of a percent can change not only the fate of one party but also the balance of an entire political camp.

All 38 lists and who leads them

1. ביחד — ‘Together’. The list is headed by Naftali Bennett, with Yair Lapid as the second number. It is one of the largest new alliances of the campaign and one of the main competitors of Likud and Gadi Eisenkot’s party.

2. ישר! עם איזנקוט — ‘Straight! with Eisenkot’. Led by former IDF Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot. In recent polls, his project is among the campaign leaders and claims the first place in terms of mandates.

3. שרשר — לאהבה ואחדות העם — ‘Sharshar — for love and unity of the people’. Leader — Eitan Shvili, known as Sharshar. He came to submit documents in a blue robe and crown, and named the woman in the second position as his ‘queen’. Among the declared themes are helping people with post-traumatic syndrome and veterans.

4. השותפות לכולם — ‘Partnership for All’. The list is headed by Talal al-Krinawi from Rahat. It is one of several small Arab projects participating in the elections separately from RAAM and the Joint List.

5. הפיראטים צפים לטוב — ‘Pirates sail for the better’. The leadership of the list includes Ohad Shem-Tov and Noam Kozar. Israeli ‘Pirates’ are not participating in the elections for the first time, and in 2026, additional attention was drawn to them by behavioral economics professor Dan Ariely.

6. עמך ישראל — ‘Your People, Israel’. Leader — former IDF Brigadier General Ofer Winter. Yosef Haddad became the second number. Winter positions the project as a right-wing party and stated that he sees himself only in a right-wing government.

7. ישראל תחילה — ‘Israel First’. Led by Sharren Haskel. The project also joined a political structure associated with the ‘Ale Yarok’ movement.

8. גן עדן — ‘Paradise’. Leader — Yeshua Ben-David. He calls himself a candidate for Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, speaks of a state partially based on Halacha, promises debt and mortgage forgiveness, and declares a desire to become a priest in the Temple.

9. קול הנשים — ‘Voice of Women’. The list is headed by Dr. Mazal Shaul. The project is built around separate women’s political representation.

10. ביחד נצליח — ‘Together We Will Succeed’. The list is headed by entrepreneur Avi Shaked. It is an Arab-Jewish project, one of the creators of which was social activist Drar Americh from Tamra.

11. ישראל ביתנו — ‘Our Home Israel’. The leader remains Avigdor Lieberman. The party is once again running as an independent force and occupies a stable place in the opposition camp.

12. משפט צדק — ‘Fair Trial’. The list is headed by Dr. Larisa Amir-Trembovler. It is one of the small projects focusing on judicial and socio-political agendas.

13. שמע — ‘Listen’. Led by Naftali Goldman. The party is among the small religiously oriented lists of the current campaign.

14. עוצמה יהודית — ‘Jewish Power’. Leader — Itamar Ben-Gvir. In these elections, the party is running separately, despite attempts to consolidate the right-wing camp around other religious-national projects.

15. סדר חדש — ‘New Order’. The list is headed by lawyer Avital Ofek. He has already participated in previous election campaigns with ideas of political and state reform.

16. המילואימניקים והכלכלית — ‘Reservists and Economic Party’. The project is led by Yoaz Hendel and economist Yaron Zelekha. Former deputy Einat Wilf is the third number. In some polls, the union overcomes the threshold and receives four mandates.

17. הדמוקרטים — ‘Democrats’. Leader — Yair Golan. The party occupies the left and center-left segment and is one of the notable parliamentary forces of the opposition.

18. רע״ם — ‘United Arab List’. The list is headed by Mansour Abbas. The party is once again running independently and competes for the Arab voter with the Joint List and smaller Arab projects.

19. ש״ס — ‘Shas’. Leader — Aryeh Deri. It is one of the two largest Haredi parties in Israel and a traditional participant in coalition formation.

20. הציבור החרדי — ‘Haredi Public’. The list is headed by Moti Leitner. It is one of several small Haredi projects that have emerged alongside Shas and ‘Yahadut HaTorah’.

21. אני ואתה — מפלגת העם הישראלית — ‘You and I — Israeli People’s Party’. Led by lawyer and doctor Alon Giladi. The very name emphasizes the attempt to present the project as an alternative to traditional party structures.

22. ברית עולם לגאולת ישראל — ‘Eternal Alliance for the Redemption of Israel’. Leader — Ofer Lifshitz. The party’s name combines the ideas of eternal alliance and religious redemption of Israel.

23. תיקון שיטת הבחירות והממשל — ‘Reform of the Electoral System and Governance’. Moshe Salomovich is the first number. The political program is practically spelled out in the name: the main focus is on changing the rules of governance and elections.

24. הגוש התנ״כי — ‘Biblical Bloc’. Led by Dennis Lipkin. It is a separate religious-political project that is not part of Smotrich’s bloc or major Haredi parties.

25. בטח — ביטחון חברתי — ‘Social Security’. Leader — Semen Grafman. The party focuses on the social and economic security of citizens.

26. אורות השחר — ‘Light of Dawn’. The list is headed by Benayahu Har-Shemesh. The project positions itself as a separate right-wing social force.

27. ביטחון אישי — ‘Personal Security’. The first number is Michael Topchiashvili. The very name shows the project’s main focus — internal security and protection of citizens.

28. צבע שחור — מגן עולם התורה — ‘Black Color — Defender of the Torah World’. Led by Rabbi Eliyahu Boymrind. This is another small Haredi religious list in the current elections.

29. הליכוד — ‘Likud’. Leader — Benjamin Netanyahu. The party remains the main center of the current right-wing camp and one of the main contenders for forming the next government.

30. כחול לבן — ‘Blue and White’. The list is headed by Benny Gantz. The main problem for him now is the electoral threshold: some of the latest polls give the party a result noticeably below the required 3.25%.

31. הציונות הדתית וזהות — ‘Religious Zionism and Zehut’. The first number is Bezalel Smotrich, the second is Moshe Feiglin. The union is largely technical: the task is to reduce the risk of losing right-wing votes due to one of the parties not passing.

32. תנועת אח״י — ‘AHI Movement’. The list is headed by Rabbi Yuval Elimelech. It is another independent religious project among the numerous small lists of the campaign.

33. צומת — בית ישראל — ‘Junction — House of Israel’. The project unites Moshe Green and former deputy Gadi Yevarkan. It tries to occupy a separate niche in the right-wing and socially conservative field.

34. תקומה — ‘Revival’. Leader — Elkana Federman. On October 7, 2023, he was responsible for the security of the Nova festival, was injured, and participated in rescuing people. He enters politics with the idea of strengthening the representation of the generation of reservists and war participants.

35. הרשימה המשותפת — ‘Joint List’. HADASH, TAAL, and BALAD are once again performing together. The first number is Yousef Jabareen, the second is Ahmad Tibi, the third is Sami Abu Shehadeh.

36. הקהל — ‘Assembly’. Led by Rabbi Shlomo Elboim. It is a general Haredi list participating separately from the main ultra-Orthodox parties.

37. יהדות התורה — ‘Judaism of the Torah’. The first number is Yaakov Asher, followed by Yitzhak Goldknopf and Yitzhak Pindrus. The party remains one of the key Haredi forces and a traditional participant in coalition negotiations.

38. נעם לישראל — ‘Noam for Israel’. Leader — Avi Maoz. The party is running separately and occupies a strictly religious-conservative position.

Why small parties still matter

A list that failed to overcome the 3.25% threshold but received more than 1% of valid votes can claim one unit of state funding for the election campaign. In the 26th Knesset elections, the size of such a unit is about 1.835 million shekels.

This does not mean that the state pays millions just for registration. To receive compensation, it is necessary to gather a significant number of real votes. But the 1% threshold creates an intermediate goal for a party that does not expect to immediately receive four mandates.

In the 2026 elections, the rules for letter designations have also changed. Now a list can use a combination of up to three Hebrew letters. Therefore, the ballot includes options that form words, such as דרך — ‘path’, צדק — ‘justice’, and בקר — ‘morning’.

At the same time, disputes arose over separate designations. Several projects wanted to obtain the letter ב; combinations כן and בי were also in demand by more than one list. The CEC must consider the previous rights of parties and the consent of the holders of the designations, so the final appearance of the ballot will be determined after verification.

But for NANews — News of Israel the main storyline of this campaign is still not in the ‘Pirates’, Sharshar’s crown, or the name ‘Paradise’. Most of these projects will almost certainly remain far from the Knesset. The real threat to large camps is created by parties that receive about 2–4% and are a few tenths of a percent from the threshold.

That is why Smotrich preferred to unite with Feiglin, while Ben-Gvir and Ofer Winter are going independently. On the other flank, Gantz retained a separate list despite weak polls, while Hendel and Zelekha, on the contrary, united and in some studies already cross the threshold.

For the future coalition, this has direct significance. If a party receives 3.3%, it enters the Knesset with approximately four mandates. If the result falls to 3.2%, it receives zero. A difference of one-tenth of a percent can simultaneously remove one potential partner from parliament and increase the relative share of votes of all passing parties.

Therefore, after October 27, it will be important to look not only at the winner. Equally significant will be the sum of the votes of the parties that stopped just below 3.25%. It is there that tens or even hundreds of thousands of votes may disappear, which will then change the balance of power between the two blocs.

38 lists show a characteristic feature of Israeli politics: it is relatively easy to start national elections, but turning a political idea into seats in the Knesset is much more difficult. In one ballot, there are former prime ministers, generals, ultra-Orthodox parties, Arab movements, economists, ‘Pirates’, religious activists, and a man in a crown.

NANews — News of Israel will continue to monitor which lists the CEC will finally approve on September 27, what designations they will receive, and who will approach the critical mark of 3.25% on October 27.

…
Felix Shinder in Israel in 2026: “Lemonchiki”, klezmer, three concerts and Odessa, which you can’t take with you – it travels itself – October 15 – Haifa, October 21 – Netanya, October 23 – Bat Yam - September 10, 2026 - Новости Израиля

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Several days of diplomacy ended with a new night of rockets and Shahed drones. Two people died in Kyiv, a market was destroyed near Odesa, and passengers on the Kyiv-Sumy train had to be urgently evacuated.

Author: Elena Gunko

On the night of September 8, 2026, Russian forces once again launched missiles and drones at Ukraine. Kyiv was one of the main targets. By morning, there were two fatalities and ten injured in the capital, with five hospitalized, two in serious condition. Residential buildings, warehouses, and garages were on fire, and a school and other civilian facilities were damaged.

But Kyiv was only part of that night. Near Odesa, the strike hit a market: trade pavilions were destroyed, and three people were injured. In the Sumy region, Russian forces attacked the locomotive of the Kyiv-Sumy passenger train. Passengers and the train crew were evacuated in time, and no one was injured.

All this happened shortly after Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner completed their trip to Kyiv. Before Ukraine, representatives of Donald Trump spent more than three hours in talks with Putin in Moscow, then discussed a new peace format with Volodymyr Zelensky. While the American guests were in the capital, the intensity of strikes on Kyiv sharply decreased. After their departure, the pause ended.

For NAnovosti — Israel News | Nikk.Agency, it is important not to turn coincidence into something proven. There is no confirmation that the timing of the Russian attack was chosen specifically because of Witkoff and Kushner’s departure. But the sequence of events is established: Moscow — Kyiv — talks about a new peace proposal — departure of the Americans — massive strike on the Ukrainian capital.

People had to be evacuated from damaged homes

In the Holosiivskyi district of Kyiv, a Russian attack damaged a residential building. Some people were trapped in apartments, and rescuers had to enter and evacuate residents. At another address, a garage caught fire, and the flames spread to a neighboring non-residential building and business center. A fire also broke out on the premises of an educational institution.

Another incident occurred at a 26-story non-residential building: damage was sustained on the upper floors. No fire broke out there, but the spread of consequences shows how little one line “the air defense worked” says about that night.

In the Solomianskyi district, three-story and five-story residential buildings were on fire. In the five-story building, people also could not get out on their own. Rescuers evacuated residents from the damaged building. In the early stages of dealing with the aftermath, emergency services reported 13 people rescued.

The numbers of the injured changed throughout the morning. Initially, authorities reported six injured, then seven, later ten, and two dead. These are not different versions of events: medics, rescuers, and police continued to inspect damaged sites and clarify people’s conditions.

In the Darnytskyi district, warehouse premises and a garage on the territory of a private house were on fire, and a car was damaged. In the Podilskyi district, fire engulfed warehouses, garage boxes, and cars. In the Shevchenkivskyi district, a fire also broke out on warehouse territory. In total, city authorities reported damage to civilian infrastructure at more than 16 locations.

The emotion of this night is hard to convey in interception percentages. In one place, firefighters extinguish a warehouse, in another, they break into an apartment where people remain. Two people did not survive until morning.

175 targets neutralized — and simultaneously 29 impact sites

The attack began on the evening of September 7. Russia used anti-ship Oniks, Iskander-M ballistic missiles, KN-23, and S-400 complex missiles, 32 air-launched Kh-101 cruise missiles, as well as 166 strike drones and decoy drones.

By 08:30, the Ukrainian Air Force reported 175 destroyed or suppressed targets. Air defense neutralized 31 of 32 Kh-101 and Iskander-K cruise missiles, 142 of 166 drones, and two targets from the combined group of ballistic and anti-ship missiles.

There is an important data boundary here. From the morning report, it is impossible to conclude that only two ballistic missiles were launched or that the exact percentage of their interception is known: the total number of launches in this combined category was not named by the Air Force at that time. What is known is that Ukrainian authorities separately emphasize that ballistics remain the most challenging target.

And another figure changes the perception of the air defense result: missile and strike UAV hits were recorded at 29 locations. At nine additional sites, downed targets or their debris fell. Thus, a high share of intercepted cruise missiles and drones coexisted with dozens of real episodes on the ground.

Kyiv was attacked in several waves. First, drones approached the capital. Then the Air Force began warning about ballistic targets. After four in the morning, new warnings about ballistics appeared, followed by Kh-101 entering Ukraine’s airspace.

This is a specific mechanism of a combined strike: air defense does not receive one set of identical targets to destroy in a few minutes. It works for hours against drones, then against ballistics with a completely different reaction time, then against cruise missiles that can change routes and approach from different directions.

Market near Odesa and Kyiv-Sumy passenger train

The main directions of the strike were called the Kyiv and Odesa regions by the Ukrainian military. In the suburbs of Odesa, the Russian attack hit a market. Trade pavilions were damaged, and three people were injured.

The Russian side regularly claims to strike military, industrial, and logistical targets. On the morning of September 8, Ukrainian services simultaneously recorded consequences in residential buildings, on the premises of an educational institution, at the market, and near civilian transport.

In the Sumy region, the strike hit the locomotive of the Kyiv-Sumy passenger train. This is an important specification: not just an abstract “railway infrastructure,” but a train carrying ordinary passengers and operated by a train crew. People were evacuated from the train in time. This time, no one died.

The phrase “this time” is not accidental here. On August 13, NAnovosti reported on a strike on a passenger train in the Odesa region, where the driver and his assistant died, and hundreds of passengers were evacuated from the train. Strikes on railway infrastructure have long been not an episode for Ukraine but a constant risk for civilian communication.

Supermarkets and “Nova Poshta” do not directly relate to the attack on September 8 but to a broader series of Russian strikes in recent weeks — it is crucial not to mix them. On August 27–28, attacks destroyed Nova Poshta sorting centers and damaged commercial warehouses, retail facilities, and consumer logistics around Kyiv and in other regions.

NAnovosti has already compiled this chain of strikes on Ukraine’s civilian economy: postal centers, trade facilities, book warehouses, food and commercial logistics. The current market near Odesa and the Kyiv-Sumy train add two more types of infrastructure on which ordinary daily life depends.

Kushner and Witkoff left — the brief silence ended

The political context makes this attack particularly severe. Just two days before it, Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner were at the negotiating table in Kyiv. Before that, they met with Putin in the Kremlin. The Americans came with an attempt to launch a new stage of negotiations and after the meetings talked about the possibility of further work on a peace proposal.

On September 6, NAnovosti detailed the conclusion of the Kyiv negotiations. Zelensky even allowed himself dark humor, thanking the guests for “working better than Patriot” during their stay. Behind this joke was a very real meaning: Kyiv had several unusually calm hours.

The morning of September 8 made this phrase much less funny. As soon as the American diplomatic mission ended, the capital was again under ballistic, cruise missiles, and Shahed drones. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sibiga directly linked the sequence of events with the question of how seriously Moscow takes the diplomatic process.

There is no confirmed data that Russia deliberately waited for the Americans to leave. However, it is known that even before their trip, Moscow was already increasing pressure: On September 5, Russia struck areas of Kyiv airports before Witkoff and Kushner’s route Moscow — Kyiv.

And already in the morning after the new strike, Sergey Lavrov stated that the West allegedly repeatedly prevented Ukraine from making peace, so with its “new ideas,” it should “not fuss too much.” In the same interview, the head of the Russian Foreign Ministry claimed that there is currently no real negotiation process.

The contrast turned out without the need to add anything. Representatives of the US president come to Moscow and Kyiv to seek a path to a new negotiation format. Hours after their mission ends, residential buildings burn, a market is destroyed, and a passenger train is evacuated. And the head of the Russian Foreign Ministry suggests that the same Western mediators should not rush too much with peace initiatives.

Ballistics before winter remains the most dangerous part of the equation

After the attack, Zelensky separately spoke about the good result against cruise missiles and the significantly more difficult situation with ballistic targets. Ukraine is again asking partners to increase the supply of interceptor missiles.

The problem here is measured not only by tonight. There are several weeks left until winter. In previous autumn-winter seasons, Russia systematically struck Ukrainian energy — generation, substations, networks, and other critical infrastructure. Kyiv is already discussing a separate “winter package” with the US, where energy protection and air defense are central issues.

A ballistic missile gives significantly less time for detection and interception than an ordinary Shahed or cruise missile. Reliable protection requires specialized complexes and a sufficient stock of expensive interceptors. That is why one indicator — for example, 31 intercepted cruise missiles out of 32 — does not answer the question of how well the city is protected from the entire set of Russian means of destruction.

Ukraine is trying to cover two horizons simultaneously. The first is today: to receive additional missiles for existing Western complexes. The second is to create its own European-Ukrainian anti-ballistic contour. NAnovosti previously analyzed the FREYJA project and the Patriot deficit problem: its own interceptor is still in development and cannot replace the systems Kyiv needs this winter.

This is where the diplomatic conversation with the US becomes extremely practical. Peace plans, demarcation lines, and new negotiation formats can be discussed, but until the moment of real ceasefire, Ukraine needs physical interceptor missiles. Otherwise, Moscow will again be able to accompany the next negotiation initiative with a ballistic strike.

More than half of the Shahed were already reactive

The second systemic problem of this night is not the number of Shahed itself, but their change. The Air Force reported that more than half of the Shahed used by Russia were reactive.

An ordinary Shahed is relatively slow. This allows the use of mobile fire groups, anti-aircraft installations, aviation, electronic warfare, and increasingly cheap Ukrainian interceptor drones against it. A reactive device leaves significantly less time between detection and the moment it is over the target.

Russia has been using such drones not for the first time. On August 26, NAnovosti recorded reactive Shahed in another major attack, and on August 27–28, Ukrainian military again reported a large share of them. The night of September 8 shows that it is already difficult to consider them experimental single launches.

For Ukraine, a technological race is beginning. If a fast drone has to be destroyed by an expensive anti-aircraft missile, Russia gains a favorable cost exchange even with a successful interception. Therefore, Ukrainian companies are working on faster interceptor drones, which should close the gap between cheap mobile means and expensive classic air defense systems.

Zelensky held a separate meeting on reactive Shahed even before the current attack. Ukrainian manufacturers are already showing prototypes of high-speed interceptors, but the next problem is seriality: a single device does not change anything in a raid where dozens of reactive targets are launched.

This is the specific mechanism of the new threat: Russia is trying to make a cheap mass drone fast enough to push Ukraine into a more expensive layer of defense. Kyiv’s response is to make fast interception cheap and mass again.

Why this technology already concerns Israel

For the Israeli reader, the reactive Shahed is not an exotic detail of a war far in Eastern Europe. The Shahed family itself appeared in Iran. Then Russia received the Iranian technological base, deployed its own mass production, and began modifying the device for the war against Ukraine.

The reverse movement of technologies can also no longer be considered exclusively theoretical. In the spring, Zelensky publicly claimed that Russia supplies the Shahed it produces to Iran. Western intelligence structures also studied possible Russian assistance to Tehran in improving these devices, including navigation means and resistance to interference. The scale and full composition of such technological exchange are not publicly disclosed — this data boundary must be maintained.

But for Israel and the Gulf states, the risk is clear even without exaggerations. Ukraine receives daily what cannot be reproduced on a training ground: experience in dealing with massive waves of Shahed, route changes, new speeds, combining drones with ballistics, and attempts to overload the air defense system.

Israel, for its part, has one of the most developed layered air and missile defense architectures in the world. The Gulf countries have significant resources and themselves live next to the Iranian missile-drone threat. Ukraine knows what happens with Shahed after hundreds of real combat launches.

NAnovosti — Israel News | Nikk.Agency believes that this is where a practical field for much closer cooperation between Israel, Ukraine, and the Arab states of the region emerges: early detection, cheap interceptors, data exchange on new modifications, and joint testing of means to combat mass drones.

This does not mean that the Ukrainian system can simply be transferred to Israel or vice versa. Territory, air defense density, threat geography, and available complexes differ. Ukraine’s value lies in the accumulated statistics of real war. Israel’s value lies in a multi-layered system against different classes of missiles and drones.

And while diplomats argue about the next peace proposal, the technological race has not stopped for a single night. On September 8, more than half of the Russian Shahed, according to Ukrainian military data, were already reactive. For Kyiv, this is a problem of this morning. For countries threatened by Iran and its armed allies, these are data that are wiser to study before the next war, not after it begins.

The next specific diplomatic stage is also already outlined: Kyiv expects to continue discussing American proposals and the winter air defense package in the coming weeks, including on the sidelines of the September UN General Assembly. After the night of September 8, the question of interceptors for Ukraine has become not an appendix to these negotiations, but one of the conditions for how many people will survive the next Russian attack.

…
Felix Shinder in Israel in 2026: “Lemonchiki”, klezmer, three concerts and Odessa, which you can’t take with you – it travels itself – October 15 – Haifa, October 21 – Netanya, October 23 – Bat Yam - September 10, 2026 - Новости Израиля

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An additional screening of the documentary film ‘Kuzma: Scary Funny’, dedicated to Andriy Kuzmenko — Kuzma Skryabin, will take place in Haifa. The new session is scheduled for October 4, 2026 at HOT CINEMA in Grand Canyon.

After the first screenings in Israel, the organizers opened ticket sales for an additional session in Haifa.

Tickets for the additional screening ‘Kuzma: Scary Funny’ in Haifa — October 4

Additional screening in Haifa — October 4

📍 October 4, 2026 (Sunday) — Haifa
HOT CINEMA, Hall No. 5, Grand Canyon
Derech Simcha Golan, 54
Film duration — 2 hours 13 minutes
Language — Ukrainian, subtitles — English
Doors open — 18:45
Screening starts — 19:00

Before the film, songs by the band ‘Skryabin’ will be performed by plus 380ID project.

Buy tickets for the additional screening on October 4 in Haifa

Previously, two screenings of the film were scheduled in Israel: August 30 in Tel Aviv and September 3 in Haifa. Now Israeli viewers have another opportunity to see the film on the big screen.

Who is Kuzma Skryabin

Kuzma Skryabin is the stage name of Andriy Kuzmenko. He was born on August 17, 1968, and became known primarily as the leader of the band ‘Skryabin’, whose history began in the late 1980s.

The group started with experimental electronic music, synth-pop, and underground sound, and later became one of the most popular musical projects in Ukraine.

Songs by ‘Skryabin’ were played on radio, television, concerts, and festivals, and Kuzma himself gradually became not only a musician but also one of the most recognizable figures in Ukrainian popular culture.

He was known as a person with sharp humor, strong self-irony, and the ability to talk about complex things without pathos. In songs and interviews, Kuzma reflected on love, loneliness, growing up, war, politics, human weaknesses, and ordinary life.

For many listeners, Andriy Kuzmenko was not just a performer of popular songs. He was perceived as a person who spoke with his own voice and did not try to fit into a convenient public image.

The musician died on February 2, 2015 in a car accident. He was 46 years old. After his death, songs, interviews, and archival recordings continued to live on, and interest in Kuzma’s personality only increased over time.

A film in which Kuzma tells about himself

The documentary drama ‘Kuzma: Scary Funny’ is built not only on the memories of the musician’s friends, relatives, and colleagues.

The main narrator of his own story is actually Andriy Kuzmenko himself.

Viewers will see his interviews, home videos, concert recordings, television performances, trips, communication with loved ones, and fragments of ordinary life.

The team of KNIFE! Films found and processed more than 400 hours of video and audio materials, as well as over 22 thousand photographs.

The authors collected materials from family archives, private collections, television funds, and people who knew Kuzma or worked with him.

This approach allows not just hearing another retelling of the musician’s biography, but seeing the living Andriy Kuzmenko again — during work, travels, rehearsals, conversations, and performances.

Rare recordings of the 1990s

A special place in the film is occupied by recordings from the 1990s — the period of the formation of the band ‘Skryabin’.

The wider audience is much more familiar with the later Kuzma — a popular singer, TV host, and author of sharp public statements. However, the early history of the group, its musical experiments, and first steps to fame remain much less known.

The creators of the film do not try to present Kuzma exclusively as an impeccable hero or turn the film into an official monument.

At the center of the story should be a living person — cheerful, sharp, vulnerable, contradictory, and sincere.

The Ukrainian premiere of the film took place in August 2026 — shortly before Andriy Kuzmenko’s birthday. In 2026, he would have turned 58 years old.

‘Kuzma: Scary Funny’ is shown in more than 30 countries worldwide

The organizers of the international distribution announced that the film ‘Kuzma: Scary Funny’ will be shown in more than 30 countries worldwide. The published list included dozens of countries on several continents.

The international program included the USA, Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, Italy, Poland, the Netherlands, Czech Republic, Sweden, Hungary, Austria, Ireland, Iceland, Moldova, Albania, Norway, Croatia, Portugal, Cyprus, Belgium, Luxembourg, Slovakia, Denmark, Israel, Turkey, Estonia, Australia, New Zealand, France, Romania, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland, Kenya, South Korea, and Japan.

Such a scale of international distribution shows that the film is aimed not only at the Ukrainian audience.

Through the story of Andriy Kuzmenko, the film allows us to see the changes that have occurred in Ukrainian music, culture, and society over several decades.

Why this film is important for the Israeli viewer

For the Israeli audience, this story has a separate significance. Many people from Ukraine live in Israel, who remember the songs of ‘Skryabin’ from their youth.

For some viewers, the film becomes a meeting with music and a person who remained part of their own history. For others, it is an opportunity to get acquainted for the first time with one of the most recognizable Ukrainian artists of recent decades.

The Israeli partner of the project is the company Created in Ukraine, which is engaged in screenings of Ukrainian cinema in Israel.

Previously, the company organized screenings in Israel of films ‘Mavka’, ‘Pamfir’, ‘Dovbush’, ’20 Days in Mariupol’, ‘I, ‘Pobeda’ and Berlin’ and other Ukrainian projects.

It also held Ukrainian Cinema Days in Israeli cinematheques and cooperated with the Ukrainian Cultural Center at the Embassy of Ukraine in Israel.

When and where to watch ‘Kuzma: Scary Funny’ in Haifa

The main current schedule for Israeli viewers now is the additional screening on October 4, 2026.

📍 Haifa — October 4, Sunday
HOT CINEMA, Hall No. 5, Grand Canyon
Derech Simcha Golan, 54

🎬 Duration — 2 hours 13 minutes
🇺🇦 Language — Ukrainian
🇬🇧 Subtitles — English
🚪 Doors open — 18:45
▶️ Start — 19:00

Before the start of the film, songs by ‘Skryabin’ will be performed by plus 380ID project.

BUY TICKETS — HAIFA, OCTOBER 4

NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency continues to follow Ukrainian cultural events and screenings of Ukrainian cinema in Israel.

…
Felix Shinder in Israel in 2026: “Lemonchiki”, klezmer, three concerts and Odessa, which you can’t take with you – it travels itself – October 15 – Haifa, October 21 – Netanya, October 23 – Bat Yam - September 10, 2026 - Новости Израиля

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A Facebook post titled “Heirs of Khmelnytsky?” about an alleged secret agreement between Ukraine and Syria and Mossad’s measures has gone viral. We have reconstructed the chain of publications and checked what is confirmed in this story and what remains, to put it mildly, a rumor.

Spoiler: The “news” first appeared in a Telegram channel with 9,000 subscribers.

Author: Pavel Shveiko | NANews

“Heirs of Khmelnytsky?” — this is the sensational question that begins the post, which appeared on Facebook on September 8, 20226, by … let’s call him “author” (why it’s written in lowercase will become clear after reading the article). The reader is then offered not a question, but an almost complete picture: Israel is allegedly alarmed by the “secret cooperation” between Ukraine and Syria, Kyiv is supposed to send UAV instructors, Turkey acts as a mediator, two training centers are being prepared in Yafur and Masyaf, and Mossad is supposedly already developing measures to disrupt the project and prevent Ukrainian specialists from entering Syria.

At the end, there is a link not to a document, statement, or well-known Israeli media, but a short attribution: “reports News of Israel.” This became the starting point of the investigation. We tried to find a publication from such an outlet, trace the text’s timeline, and separately verify each detail.

The “author” himself, judging by the text of the post, is not the source of the information. His post uses text that almost matches the Russian-language version, which by that time was already spreading on Telegram and websites, and he added his own headline “Heirs of Khmelnytsky?” This historical framework connects modern Ukraine with the memory of mass violence against Jews during the uprising of Bohdan Khmelnytsky.

None of the found NANews — News of Israel sources from which the story about Syria spread contains such wording.

How “News of Israel” reached Russian Telegram channels and media and then to the “author”

The earliest version of the story we found appeared on September 4 at 13:39 in the Israeli Telegram channel “ללא צנזורה חדשות ישראל בטלגרם” — “News of Israel without Censorship in Telegram”.

Almost all future elements of the story are found here: the alleged secret agreement between Kyiv and Damascus with Ankara’s mediation, Ukrainian UAV instructors, two sites — near Yafur and Masyaf — and possible Mossad actions.

But the original post contains important details that will later begin to change.

The channel does not write about a Mossad document or an Israeli intelligence statement, but about:

“a source whose data is stored in the editorial office, relying on Israeli intelligence reports.”

The publication contains neither the name of this person, nor the reports themselves, nor a second confirmation.

The geography is indicated correctly here: Masyaf is located in the Hama province.

And the wording about Mossad sounds like:

צעדי מניעה וסיכול אפשריים

meaning “possible preventive and thwarting measures”.

The Israeli channel does not report a planned attack on Ukrainians and does not use the expression “destabilizing measures.”

Three days later, the story emerges outside of Israel.

On the morning of September 7, at 08:20, the Azerbaijani Referans publishes material citing “News of Israel”. Here, one of the main “fingerprints” of the subsequent chain appears: Masyaf is already mistakenly located in the Homs province, not Hama.

In the evening, Musavat publishes a similar text. It also cites “News of Israel,” repeats Homs, and writes that Mossad is preparing “preventive and disrupting/thwarting measures” against the centers and the arrival of Ukrainian specialists.

After this, we see a very rapid spread in the Russian-speaking space.

One of the first major nodes discovered is the Russian Telegram channel “Militarist”. On September 7 at 11:07, it publishes the text almost in the form that later reached Facebook:

“Yafur”;

“Masyaf in the Homs province”;

“a direct threat to national security”;

and finally:

“Mossad is developing possible preventive and destabilizing measures…”

At the end, the already familiar:

“reports News of Israel”.

The post received tens of thousands of views.

A few minutes later, this version begins to live its own life.

The Russian Telegram Win-Win publishes almost the same text but adds its own preface:

“Unexpected hint from Mossad”

and the question:

“Do we not know something?”

The error “Masyaf — Homs” is preserved, as are “preventive and destabilizing measures.”

This is an important stage: the message ceases to be just a retelling and receives a political interpretation.

Further, Win-Win begins to be quoted by other Russian-speaking channels.

For example, “First Kharkiv” directly shows the mark Forwarded from Win-Win and reproduces the entire construction — from “unexpected hint” to “News of Israel.”

Even more indicative is the reaction of the large Russian Z-channel “Blue Z Beard” with an audience of over 100,000 subscribers. It gives a direct link to the Win-Win publication and formulates the conclusion itself:

“Syria will develop the UAV direction through Ukraine”,

after which it adds reasoning that Russia has left Syria and “now it’s too late.”

That is, the unconfirmed message is already beginning to be used not as a rumor, but as evidence of the consequences of Russian policy in Syria and Ukrainian penetration there.

The same text appears in the Telegram channel StorMap, retaining all the characteristic features of the Russian version: Yafur, Masyaf in Homs, and the phrase about “preventive and destabilizing measures.”

By 14:20, the story goes beyond Telegram.

The Russian aggregator Pressa24 publishes the full text almost unchanged and, which is especially useful for tracing the chain, directly indicates the source — infantmilitario, that is, the Telegram channel “Militarist.”

Thus, the source can already be traced documentarily:

“Militarist” → Pressa24.

The spread does not end there.

On September 7 at 15:39, the Russian “Military Review” publishes an editorially rewritten news. The mysterious name “News of Israel” disappears, but all key unconfirmed theses are preserved as facts: secret agreement, Ukrainian instructors, two training centers, Masyaf again turns out to be in Homs, and Mossad is allegedly “developing possible measures” against their arrival.

After this, it is the “Military Review” version that begins to multiply on the network as a regular journalistic material.

VPK name reproduces it and directly indicates that the rights to the material belong to “Military Review”.

An almost identical text appears on the websites “Unity”, Nextwar, and other resources. In “Unity,” even the same author — Maxim Svetlyshev — and the same erroneous geography “Masyaf, Homs province” are preserved.

At 16:33, the message is published by the already registered Russian online media “Public News Service”. Here, the degree of confidence increases once again. If the initial Israeli Telegram spoke of an unnamed source, then the PNS begins the text with the words:

“Israeli intelligence agencies have identified secret military cooperation”,

and then reports the agreement as an established fact. The source for these claims is not provided to the reader. The error “Masyaf — Homs” is again preserved.

By evening, the text goes to forums and regional platforms. For example, on the Anapa resource, a user reproduces exactly the Win-Win version with the phrases “Unexpected hint from Mossad” and “Do we not know something?”

Later, another branch of distribution appears. The Telegram channel “World Events Now” at 22:49 publishes this story already with a reference to Storychase.

By this point, it is almost impossible for the reader to establish the original source: one resource refers to “News of Israel,” another — to “Militarist,” a third — to “Military Review,” a fourth — to Storychase.

But the error “Masyaf is located in Homs” allows seeing the kinship of these publications almost like a fingerprint.

In the earliest Israeli version we found — Hama.

In the Azerbaijani version — already Homs.

In “Militarist” — Homs.

In Win-Win — Homs.

In Pressa24 — Homs.

In “Military Review” — Homs.

In PNS — Homs.

If these editors independently received information from different Israeli intelligence sources, the mass reproduction of the same geographical error would be difficult to explain.

It is much simpler to explain that they are working with the same text chain or derivatives from it.

How the message then returned to Hebrew — more cautiously

Against this background, the publication of the Israeli Carmel News looks especially interesting.

There, the story reappears in Hebrew, but with noticeably more cautious wording.

The channel writes several times:

“according to reports”,

calls the cooperation a factor that “may pose a threat”, not an established “direct threat,” and only reports that Mossad:

“is considering possible steps”

to disrupt or thwart the creation of centers and prevent the arrival of Ukrainian specialists.

And Masyaf is again in its real place — in the Hama province.

On September 7 at 23:30, the Arab research center Hadarat reprints exactly this cautious Carmel version and directly indicates the source as “the Jewish site Carmel News”. In the Arabic text, Hama is also correctly stated, and “according to reports” disclaimers are used.

A paradoxical picture emerges.

The story starts in a small Israeli Telegram channel as a message from an anonymous source.

After translation and several reprints, it becomes almost official information from Israeli intelligence in the Russian-speaking space.

Russian Telegram channels add emotional prefaces.

Russian sites turn it into full-fledged news publications.

And when the story returns to the Israeli information space through Carmel News, the wording becomes cautious again: “according to reports,” “may pose a threat,” “Mossad is considering possible steps”.

This is why the Facebook reference to the mysterious “News of Israel” creates a false impression of a much more serious source than the one we managed to find in reality.

At the moment, it is most likely that the name News of Israel arose as an English abbreviation or translation of one of the Israeli Telegram resources, rather than as a reference to a major Israeli editorial office with its own investigation.

But an important caveat remains: we managed to reconstruct the earliest available and indexable chain, not to prove that the post on September 4 was the moment of the story’s initial creation. Theoretically, the author of the Israeli Telegram channel could have had an earlier source, a closed chat, or a message that is not indexed now.

Public evidence of this source has not yet been provided.

This does not prove that the initial information was fabricated. But it shows the mechanism of distribution: an unconfirmed message with anonymous attribution is translated, shortened, and amplified several times until it begins to look like an established fact.

Why it is so easy to believe this rumor

Almost all the surrounding context is real.

On April 5, 2026, Volodymyr Zelensky indeed made the first official visit to Syria and met in Damascus with President Ahmed al-Sharaa. The Office of the President of Ukraine reported a “strong interest in exchanging military and security experience”. On the same day, a new trilateral format Ukraine–Syria–Turkey took place, where security was one of the central topics.

A few days later, the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry called this triangle a promising mechanism linking the Black Sea, the Mediterranean, Europe, and the Middle East.

Turkey is indeed involved in restructuring the Syrian armed forces. On August 13, 2025, the defense ministers of Turkey and Syria signed a memorandum on joint training and consulting. Reuters reported that the cooperation includes assistance to Syria with weapons, logistical equipment, and military training.

Ukraine has real experience in sending specialists on unmanned systems to the Middle East. In March 2026, Kyiv sent experts to the region’s states to help combat Iranian drones. Ukrainian specialists publicly worked in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE.

There is also a Syrian episode.

In December 2024, the Washington Post, citing informed sources, reported that Ukrainian intelligence sent about 20 experienced operators and approximately 150 FPV drones to Syrian rebels shortly before the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. Reuters separately retold this message.

Thus, the very idea of the appearance of Ukrainian UAV specialists in Syria does not seem technically incredible. But plausibility is not yet proof of a specific secret agreement.

Why Yafur and Masyaf appeared in the story

Even two geographical names are chosen to make the story sound convincing.

In Yafur, about 30 kilometers west of Damascus, there really was a military training infrastructure. In September 2019, AFP was present at the base where Russian military advisors were training a new Syrian elite battalion: assault operations, working with weapons, demining, and other tasks.

Therefore, the use of a military facility in the Yafur area for the training of the new Syrian army is infrastructurally possible. But there is no open evidence that a Ukrainian-Syrian UAV center is currently being created there.

With Masyaf, the connection with drones is even more direct.

Masyaf is located in Hama province, not Homs. An investigation by the Syrian Center for Media and Freedom of Expression states that since 2023, Syrian structures, together with Russian specialists, have been working on the development of FPV drones, and one of the involved facilities was a research center in Masyaf. The focus was on increasing the range, flight time, and payload of the devices.

This area is well known to Israeli intelligence services. Israel has repeatedly attacked the military infrastructure located there. In January 2025, the IDF officially confirmed that in September 2024, Israeli commandos conducted a complex operation in the Masyaf area against an underground precision missile production facility.

So the author of the original message did not name random points on the Syrian map. Both have a military history. This increases the plausibility of the rumor’s construction, but does not confirm its content.

And the conflict between Israel and Turkey is also real

The most convincing part of the overall background appeared literally a few weeks before the current story.

Reuters reported that on August 14, 2026, Mossad chief Roman Hoffman spoke with Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaybani. One of the main topics was the expanding Turkish military presence in Syria — weapons, drones, and the possibility of deploying Turkish forces.

After this, Israel struck the Syrian airbase Abu al-Duhur. The Israeli side expressed concerns that the facility could be used by Turkey. Ankara and Damascus denied the preparation of a permanent Turkish base and spoke of cooperation in training and experience sharing.

The US began promoting a mechanism to prevent direct confrontation between Israel, Turkey, and Syria.

Therefore, the assertion that Israel is closely monitoring Turkey’s military buildup in Syria has a serious factual basis.

It is this reality that allows the story of Ukrainian instructors to be integrated into it almost seamlessly.

What the check did not confirm

As of September 8, 2026, we have not been able to obtain independent confirmation of the five central claims of the disseminated message.

There is no confirmation that Kyiv and Damascus have indeed signed a separate secret agreement on UAVs.

There is no confirmation that the two specific facilities in Yafur and Masyaf are currently being converted specifically for a program involving Ukraine.

There is no confirmation that Ukrainian instructors have been ordered to arrive there.

There is no confirmation from official Israeli structures that Ukraine’s participation in the Syrian program is recognized as a ‘direct threat to national security.’

And finally, there is no independent confirmation that Mossad is developing operational measures specifically against the arrival of Ukrainian specialists.

We did not find such data in Reuters, major Israeli editorial offices, or official statements from Israel, Ukraine, or Turkey.

There is an Israeli Telegram post referencing an anonymous person allegedly relying on intelligence reports. After it, a chain of translations and reprints begins, in which geography, source, and the degree of categoricalness of the formulations change.

Therefore, calling the whole story a proven fake now would be as much an overstatement of the available evidence as calling it confirmed Mossad information.

More precisely: before us is an unconfirmed intelligence-looking throw-in, embedded in a completely real geopolitical context and noticeably amplified during dissemination.

And ‘Khmelnytsky’s Heirs?’ have already appeared on Facebook. This headline does not add any document, source, or new fact to the story. It preemptively suggests to the reader to perceive the unconfirmed rumor as evidence of a Ukrainian threat to Israel — a conclusion that the data we found does not yet confirm.

Who needs this? The Russian trace that cannot be ignored

At this point, a question arises, without which the investigation would be incomplete: who benefits from convincing Israelis that Ukraine is secretly preparing people in Syria who will be able to launch drones against Israel tomorrow?

We have no evidence that this particular throw-in was launched by a Russian special service. But the Russian trace here cannot be considered a fantasy, if only because Moscow’s operations to influence Israel through information have already been documented by Israeli researchers themselves.

The Institute for National Security Studies in Israel — INSS — described in detail the Russian campaign Doppelganger back in 2024. Researchers found that Russia created copies of Israeli media, spread fake publications through networks, and artificially accelerated them with thousands of accounts on X and Facebook. After October 7, the intensity of Russian operations against the Israeli audience increased.

But for our story, another detail is especially important.

INSS directly wrote that before October 7, one of the goals of the Russian disinformation campaign in Israel was to convince Israeli society not to support Ukraine. Later, the topics expanded to internal Israeli conflicts, the war with Hamas, and Israel’s relations with the US.

In a separate INSS study, specific tools of Russian influence in Israel were analyzed: Doppelganger, promoting materials through Israeli media, and a Telegram group called ‘Ukrainazis’, spreading pro-Russian messages among the Israeli audience. The authors of the study called such activities an increase in the level of Russian hostile activity against Israel.

Another INSS analysis, based in part on materials from an American investigation of Russian influence operations, showed that Moscow sought to influence Israeli public opinion in support of the Russian position in the war against Ukraine. Digital media, social networks, and fabricated content were used for this.

The mechanism is very similar to what we are observing now.

It is not necessary to create a completely fictional story. It is much more effective to take several real elements:

Ukraine is indeed cooperating with the new Syria.

Turkey is indeed helping to rebuild the Syrian army.

Ukraine indeed has extensive experience in drone warfare.

Yafur was indeed used for training Syrian military personnel.

Military developments, including work with unmanned systems, indeed existed in Masyaf.

Israel is indeed concerned about the expansion of Turkish military presence in Syria.

And then one unproven connecting link is inserted between these facts: allegedly there is a secret agreement, Ukrainian instructors are already preparing to go to two specific centers, and Mossad considers their appearance a threat to Israel.

After this, the story begins to work on its own.

The reader no longer needs to write: ‘Ukraine is preparing Syria for war with Israel.’ He should come to this conclusion on his own.

That is why the Facebook post headline ‘Khmelnytsky’s Heirs?’ is so important. It translates the story from the realm of modern politics into a historical emotional plane: Ukrainians — Khmelnytsky — pogroms — Jews — now again a threat to Israel.

From the point of view of information impact, the construction is almost perfect.

And here the case of Artem Kirpichenok appears

Against this background, it is impossible to completely ignore another story that is unfolding in Israel literally simultaneously.

Russian-Israeli historian and publicist Artem Kirpichenok was detained by the Shin Bet on August 2, 2026, after arriving at Ben Gurion Airport. On September 4, it became known that he was charged with serious state security offenses. Most of the case materials are under strict publication ban.

It was on September 4, that is, on the same day when the earliest Israeli publication we found about the ‘secret Ukrainian-Syrian agreement’ appeared, that the Israeli State Prosecutor’s Office announced another extremely unusual case.

According to the data allowed for publication, an Israeli citizen was involved by foreign intelligence structures and participated in foreign influence activity against the State of Israel. The Times of Israel reported this directly in the material about Kirpichenok, but emphasized: due to the publication ban, it is currently impossible to officially establish whether it is about him.

This is an extremely important boundary.

We cannot assert that Kirpichenok worked for Russia.

We also cannot yet assert that the foreign influence case announced by the prosecutor’s office on September 4 is exactly his case.

But there are additional circumstances that make the Russian direction a legitimate question for journalistic investigation.

A family representative of Kirpichenok told Meduza that, according to unofficial information available to the family, he is suspected of contacts with a representative of foreign intelligence. At the same time, the interlocutor separately stated:

‘nothing Arab is visible in the case’

and clarified that, according to their information, it is not about an agent from Iran or Lebanon. After this, the interlocutor himself raised the question of possible Russia.

Kirpichenok, meanwhile, is a citizen of Russia and Israel, has lived in Russia for many years. The Times of Israel also notes that he wrote about Israel and Turkey and that Haaretz characterized him as a participant in a small Russian leftist environment supporting the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

The Israeli Russian-language publication Channel 9 has already brought this version directly to the headline: ‘Accused of espionage for Russia: Kirpichenok has already been brought to trial’. But this remains a media report, not a conclusion allowed for publication by the Shin Bet.

And here accuracy is especially important.

One might ask: if it were another Iranian agent network, why does the state maintain such a strict secrecy regime?

This question is logical, as Israel has repeatedly publicly disclosed cases of citizens accused of working for Iranian intelligence in recent years.

But the publication ban itself is not proof of a Russian trace. The Shin Bet and the court can classify a case for many reasons: intelligence methods, the identities of other figures, international cooperation, ongoing operational activities, or information, the disclosure of which could harm state security.

Therefore, the correct conclusion is different.

The version about Russia today looks significantly more serious than simple conspiracy, but remains a version until the publication ban is lifted.

Why these two stories should be considered together

It’s not that Kirpichenok is necessarily connected to the throw-in about Ukraine and Syria. There is currently no evidence of such a connection.

It’s about something else.

Russian influence operations have already been documented in Israel, including those aimed at weakening support for Ukraine.

In early September, the Shin Bet and the prosecutor’s office are simultaneously conducting a strictly classified case about a person who, according to information allowed for publication, foreign intelligence could have used in a foreign influence operation against Israel.

And it is precisely in these same days that a perfectly constructed story for Russian-speaking Israel begins to spread:

Ukraine cooperates with Israel’s enemies.
Ukrainians train the Syrian army.
Mossad is trying to stop them.
And on top — ‘Khmelnytsky’s Heirs?’

Who benefits from such a result?

Russia — quite obviously.

It simultaneously solves several tasks: worsens Israelis’ attitude towards Ukraine, creates the impression that Kyiv is acting against Israel’s security, uses historical Jewish trauma as an emotional amplifier, and shifts attention from Russian-Iranian military cooperation to a fictional or as yet unproven Ukrainian threat.

And this is especially noteworthy now, when Russia itself is deepening military-technical cooperation with Iran. The Financial Times in September 2026 revealed a secret Russian program to help Tehran develop supersonic cruise missiles — weapons potentially of direct significance to Israel’s security.

It turns out to be an almost mirror-like information construction.

Russia is really helping to arm Iran — a strategic adversary of Israel.

But another story is thrown into the information space:

the main potential problem for Israel suddenly becomes Ukrainians who are allegedly going to train Syrians.

We cannot yet prove that it was Moscow that launched this particular story.

But we can already say much more: such a throw-in fully corresponds to the known goals and methods of Russian influence operations against Israel and Ukraine, which Israeli specialists have previously documented.

Therefore, the question now is not only ‘is it true that Ukrainians are going to Masyaf?’.

There is a second question:

is someone trying again to make Israelis see an enemy in Ukraine — at a time when real Russian technologies, specialists, and weapons continue to strengthen Iran?

…
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“And so I want to say to the Ukrainian people, who are having such a hard time right now, but every day of your struggle you are free people, and you live a full life, which is very important, of course, to win, but no matter how hard this life is, life in voluntary annexation to Russia will be much worse.”

Israeli politician and human rights activist Natan Sharansky believes that Russia’s war against Ukraine may be approaching a turning point, and prolonged hostilities are gradually becoming a threat to Putin’s regime itself. The former Soviet dissident, who personally met with the Russian president, said this in a large interview with Radio Liberty, published on September 6, 2026.

Author: Editorial Staff of NANews

In a conversation with Oksana Maksimlyuk, Sharansky spoke not only about Russia and the possible end of the war. A separate part of the interview is devoted to the relations between Israel and Ukraine, military cooperation, Ukrainian drones, missile defense, elections during the war, and what the two countries can learn from each other today.

NANews — News of Israel gathered the main theses of this conversation. The full interview, lasting more than 50 minutes, can be watched below.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ci4DKDwnLG4

Sharansky: the war weakens Putin as a dictator

One of the central theses of the interview concerns the state of the Russian regime.

Sharansky believes that the continuation of the war destroys the image of Putin, on which a significant part of the Russian political system has relied for many years: the image of a strong leader capable of guaranteeing the elites security and access to resources.

According to him, at the beginning of the war, representatives of the military and economic elites could reason roughly like this: whether they like Putin or not, he remains a strong leader, so it is more profitable to be under his protection.

Now the situation, Sharansky believes, is gradually changing.

The longer the Russian army cannot achieve its goals in Ukraine, the more people die, and the stronger the consequences of the war are felt inside Russia, the more grounds the elites have to doubt Putin’s ability to control the situation.

Sharansky associates this with the intensification of internal repression.

According to his logic, a dictator tightens the screws not when he feels absolutely confident, but when he needs more control to maintain the system.

“A weak dictator cannot survive,” he formulated his assessment.

At the same time, Sharansky suggests that Putin might already want to end the war, but he needs an outcome that can be presented inside Russia as a result, not a defeat. Therefore, the possibility of retaining part of the occupied Ukrainian territory remains a principled issue for the Kremlin.

“We are most likely in the last year of the war”

The most notable statement was made when Sharansky was asked how much longer the Russian elites can tolerate what is happening — are we talking about months, several years, or a much longer period.

He first replied that there is “much less ahead than has passed,” after which he made a more specific assumption:

“I think we are most likely in the last year of the war.”

However, Sharansky himself immediately limited the categoricity of this forecast, adding that these could be his “good wishes.”

Therefore, it is not about a specific date for the end of the war or information about a forthcoming agreement. This is Sharansky’s political assessment, based primarily on his understanding of the internal weakening of the Russian regime.

For him, the key factor remains Ukraine’s ability to continue resisting. The longer the Russian leadership does not achieve results, he believes, the more serious the pressure on the system from within becomes.

Why general mobilization could become a problem for the Kremlin

Another separate block of the conversation is the possible new mobilization in Russia.

Sharansky considers it indicative that the Kremlin has so far preferred various forms of covert recruitment of people to general mobilization.

In his opinion, Putin could have long announced a more large-scale draft if he were not afraid of the reaction of Russian society.

A significant part of the population can distance themselves from the war while someone else is fighting directly: contractors, prisoners, or residents of remote regions. A completely different effect arises when the state demands to go to the front directly from a person or members of their family.

Therefore, the expansion of mobilization, Sharansky believes, can seriously change the internal situation.

He suggests that the Kremlin will continue to primarily expand covert mobilization.

At the same time, Sharansky warns that the behavior of a weakening regime becomes less predictable. Speaking about Putin, he used the definition “wounded beast”, capable of going far.

The man who personally met with Putin

The biography of Sharansky himself gives special weight to this part of the interview.

He said that he met with Putin several times: back in the late 1990s, and then after he came to presidential power. The last such meeting, according to Sharansky, took place in 2005. After that, he decided that continuing such meetings was “indecent” for him.

Sharansky claims that initially, it was extremely important for Putin to be recognized by the West. Russia was supposed to be perceived again as one of the great powers, and the Russian leader himself was to be accepted on equal terms by the leaders of the USA and other Western countries.

Later, according to Sharansky, a turning point occurred.

Putin realized that democratic leaders replace each other, while he himself intends to remain in power indefinitely. At the same time, the former Israeli minister believes, the idea of his own historical mission began to form in the Russian president.

And it is not about the restoration of the Soviet Union as a communist project.

Sharansky believes that Putin is closer to the idea of the Russian Empire — a state that expands its territory and “gathers lands.”

It is through this logic that he views Moscow’s actions in Chechnya, Georgia, Belarus, and Ukraine.

At the same time, the full-scale invasion, according to Sharansky, showed a fundamental miscalculation by the Kremlin. Putin underestimated the formed Ukrainian nation, overestimated the Russian army, and did not expect the West to provide Ukraine with such prolonged support.

Sharansky’s Donetsk and Putin’s myth of “Russian cities”

The topic of Ukraine for Sharansky is not only foreign policy.

He was born in 1948 in Stalino — today’s Donetsk — and lived there for the first years of his life.

Sharansky recalls a predominantly Russian-speaking city, where Ukrainian was the second language. But precisely because of this, he especially sharply rejects the thesis used by the Kremlin that Donbas is supposedly originally part of some exclusively Russian historical territory.

According to him, the assertions of the Putin regime that the Ukrainian nation supposedly did not exist, and the cities of eastern Ukraine are “Russian,” are “nonsense.”

For Sharansky, Donbas is part of Ukrainian history.

After the Russian aggression in 2014, his personal attitude towards Moscow also changed. Sharansky said that he previously had quite good relations with the Russian leadership, but after the start of the war, Putin in his eyes turned into a war criminal.

Sharansky himself, according to him, has since become a kind of lobbyist for Ukraine’s interests in Israel.

Israel and Ukraine: no longer one-sided assistance

One of the most interesting parts of the interview for the Israeli audience concerns the future of relations between the two countries.

Sharansky suggests abandoning the notion that cooperation should look exclusively like Israel helping Ukraine.

Over the years of the war, Ukraine itself has become a source of military and technological experience that other countries are interested in.

Sharansky separately noted the development of Ukrainian drone technologies. Israel, in turn, has vast experience in countering missile threats.

According to his formula, Ukraine has made tremendous progress in drones, Israel — in combating ballistic missiles, so the two countries have much to offer each other.

Moreover, Sharansky claims, such cooperation is already gradually developing.

He separately noted: not everything happens publicly.

The former Israeli minister also acknowledged that Israel’s previous caution regarding military assistance to Ukraine was largely related to Russia.

After the appearance of Russian military forces in Syria, Israel needed to regularly act against Iranian military infrastructure without entering into direct conflict with Moscow. This is what the Israeli leadership long explained as the need to maintain working relations with the Kremlin.

Sharansky himself now considers such a policy a mistake.

The situation, in his opinion, has fundamentally changed also because Russia and Iran have become close partners.

He formulates the interest of the two countries very simply: Iran is Israel’s main enemy, Russia is Ukraine’s main enemy, and Moscow and Tehran act together.

This creates a completely different basis for Israeli-Ukrainian cooperation.

What Sharansky said about Patriot

The interview also included a statement about Patriot systems.

Sharansky claims that American complexes, previously located in Israel, were eventually transferred to Ukraine through the USA.

But the main limitation today, he believes, is not so much the number of installations themselves, but the lack of ammunition for them.

According to him, neither Israel nor the USA previously anticipated wars of such duration and intensity.

At the same time, Ukraine, he believes, has reached such a technological level in certain areas during the war that now even Israel has something to learn from it.

Elections during the war: why Israel and Ukraine are in different conditions

Another topic of conversation is Ukrainian elections.

Sharansky reminded that Israel almost never refuses elections due to war. Military personnel can vote, and the size of the country allows the process to be technically organized even in extremely difficult circumstances.

But he considers it wrong to directly transfer this experience to Ukraine.

Part of Ukrainian territory is occupied. Millions of citizens are abroad. A huge number of people serve in the army. In these circumstances, organizing full-fledged elections becomes not only a political but also a huge technical and security problem.

Therefore, Sharansky says he understands the position of Volodymyr Zelensky.

However, there is another side to the problem: a democratic state cannot exist indefinitely without elections and political accountability of power.

Therefore, any real pause in the war that allows for safe and full voting, Sharansky considers important to use for elections.

“Ukraine is becoming the shield of Europe”

In the interview, Sharansky returns to his own dissident past.

In Soviet camps, he recalls, representatives of various national movements — Ukrainians, Jews, Lithuanians, Armenians — discussed the possible collapse of the USSR.

According to him, they were convinced: if Ukraine becomes independent, the Soviet Union can no longer be preserved.

Sharansky expected that after gaining independence, Ukraine would quickly become one of the most important European powers due to its industrial, scientific, and human potential. Reality turned out to be much more complicated.

But today his assessment has changed again.

According to the former Soviet dissident, Ukraine during this war is effectively completing the process of its entry into the free world and simultaneously becoming its protector.

He formulated this especially vividly:

Ukraine today is possibly becoming one of the greatest nations in Europe and the ‘shield of Europe’.

That is why the final part of the interview is not so much about politics as about freedom.

Sharansky recalls his own nine years in Soviet prisons and camps. According to him, at a certain point, he realized: if the main goal becomes physical survival at any cost, the jailers gain complete power over a person.

But if a person decides to remain free regardless of circumstances, taking away this freedom becomes much more difficult.

He addressed this thought to Ukrainians, tired after many years of war: every day of resistance means that Ukraine continues to exist as a free country.

And this, perhaps, is the main thesis of Sharansky’s entire conversation — much broader than any prediction about whether the war will end in a few months or a few years.

…
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The White House raised the issue of the old Jewish cemetery in Uman, where disputes over construction and earthworks continue. The story has already reached the Supreme Court of Ukraine, and in the summer of 2026, human bones were again found near the grave of Rabbi Nachman.

Author: Victoria Katsman

The Uman issue reached the White House

On September 4, 2026, the charitable foundation ‘Historical and Cultural Center of the City of Uman’ reported that the issue of the ancient Jewish cemetery in Uman was raised during a meeting of leading American rabbis with US President Donald Trump and his administration.

The meeting itself took place on September 3 at the White House, on the eve of Rosh Hashanah. According to the foundation, Rabbi Moshe David Niederman spoke about ‘illegal and unauthorized constructions’ and cases of finding ‘human bones’ during earthworks.

Niederman is the head of United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburg and North Brooklyn and a long-time participant in international projects to protect Jewish cemeteries. Also visiting the White House were Satmar Rebbes Aaron Teitelbaum and Zalman Leib Teitelbaum, Bobov Rebbe Ben Zion Halberstam, Vizhnitz-Monsey Rebbe Israel Hager, head of Beth Medrash Govoha Malkiel Kotler, and Aaron Mendel Twersky. The delegation met with Donald Trump, Vice President J.D. Vance, Jared Kushner, and administration representatives.

American religious media confirm Niederman’s visit, the discussion of the protection of Jewish cemeteries, and the subsequent meeting of the delegation with Trump in the Oval Office. However, the White House did not publish a detailed official transcript of the conversation about Uman. Therefore, the wording that Trump was specifically informed about the details of Uman’s construction and the findings of remains is attributed to the foundation by NANews, rather than presented as a separately confirmed quote from the president or administration.

Bones near the grave of Rabbi Nachman

For Uman, the issue is not new. On July 31, 2026, fragments of human bones were discovered near the grave of Rabbi Nachman, where workers were laying a trench for electrical communications. The executive director of the foundation, Irina Rybnytska, stated that the find once again shows the need for special control over any earthworks in the area of the old cemetery. NANews – News of Israel | Nikk.Agency previously detailed the state status of Rabbi Nachman’s grave and the history of this place.

Similar finds have been recorded before.

In 2022, about thirty bone fragments were discovered in the pilgrimage area after earthworks. At that time, the origin of the remains required examination, and representatives of the Hasidic community linked them to the old Jewish cemetery. The US State Department, in its annual reports on religious freedom, also recorded complaints from Jewish organizations about ‘illegal hotel construction’ near the cemetery and Rabbi Nachman’s grave, possible damage to burials, and the risk of raising human remains.

What the Supreme Court of Ukraine has already decided

The legal side of the conflict reached the Supreme Court of Ukraine. On July 22, 2025, the court considered case No. 580/5629/24 regarding the historical and architectural support plan of Uman.

In 2024, the city council approved documentation where the protective zone of the monument was effectively limited to the site of the grave itself. The Supreme Court recognized the decision as ‘illegal,’ indicating that the city did not take into account previously approved boundaries and protection regimes. The court also found that the plan materials were not submitted to the Ministry of Culture for the legally required approval.

Why this cemetery is important

The history of the cemetery is significantly older than modern pilgrimage.

This territory is associated with the burials of Jews who died during the Uman massacre of 1768. Rabbi Nachman of Breslov died in Uman in 1810 and wished to be buried next to these victims. In 1994, by decree of the President of Ukraine, a historical and cultural center was established at the site of his burial, and in 1995, the grave received protected status. Ukraine and the USA also concluded an agreement on the protection of cultural heritage, which explains the constant involvement of American structures in the preservation of Jewish monuments.

Niederman is not new to Uman

Niederman is not new to Uman. In June 2024, he was part of an American Jewish delegation discussing the preservation of the cemetery with the head of the State Service of Ukraine for Ethnic Policy and Freedom of Conscience, Viktor Yelensky. In May 2026, he met again with the Ukrainian side and thanked the state for the opportunity to continue pilgrimage during the Russian aggression against Ukraine. In 2026, Rabbi Nachman’s grave also received the status of a national monument, which strengthened the state level of protection of the site.

Why this is not a conflict with Ukraine

At the same time, the current appeal to the White House cannot be described as a conflict between American rabbis and Ukraine. Ukrainian agencies continue to cooperate with Breslov on the preparation of the annual pilgrimage. NANews has already reported that on September 3, Rabbis Yaakov Shiloh and Natan Ben-Nun presented Viktor Yelensky with a certificate of appreciation for assistance in organizing Rosh Hashanah 5787. Separately, the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a memo for tens of thousands of Israelis heading to Uman under wartime conditions.

The new presentation of the issue to Trump shows something else: despite court decisions, protective zones, and years of negotiations, the problem of the physical preservation of the cemetery remains unresolved.

For religious organizations, it is crucial that any construction and earthworks take into account the possibility of burials. For Ukrainian authorities, the task is more complex: simultaneously protecting cultural heritage, controlling urban development, and ensuring the safety of the largest annual Jewish pilgrimage in the country while Russia continues its full-scale war. Now this issue has once again reached the international political level.

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El Al removed Moscow from the schedule until March 25, 2027, and suggested passengers travel via Baku. The attempt to replace Moscow with St. Petersburg has also not yielded results yet.

Author: Pavel Shveiko

El Al extended the suspension of direct flights Tel Aviv — Moscow until March 25, 2027. This means that Israel’s national carrier will not return to the Moscow route for the entire winter season, and passengers who still need to get to the Russian capital are offered a route via Baku.

What El Al offered passengers

The company informed travel agents that the decision is related to the security situation in Russia and recent aviation events. El Al stopped flights to Moscow on June 25. Initially, it was a matter of a few days, then the pause was extended, and now it has stretched until next spring.

Passengers of canceled flights can choose one of four options: exchange the ticket for a direct El Al or Sun D’Or flight to a European city, arrange the route Tel Aviv — Baku — Moscow, receive a voucher or a full refund. On the Baku — Moscow segment, the carrier will be Azerbaijan Airlines. For the new flight, a transfer within three days before or after the original date is allowed without penalty and additional fare difference.

It didn’t work out with St. Petersburg either

The attempt to replace Moscow with St. Petersburg has not worked yet. El Al wanted to open a direct route Tel Aviv — St. Petersburg, but did not receive a positive decision from the Russian aviation authorities.

We have already discussed this story in the article “Russia blocked El Al for the sake of Aeroflot”. Israeli media reported, citing their sources, that Moscow may link permission for El Al with the return of Aeroflot to Israel. Russian authorities have not officially confirmed such a connection, so it remains a version, not an established fact.

On August 30, the Leningrad region was subjected to a major drone attack, and Pulkovo Airport temporarily stopped receiving and sending planes. St. Petersburg, which was considered a calmer alternative to Moscow, also came under the influence of the war.

What now with Israel — Russia flights

Direct air communication between Israel and Russia has not been completely stopped: flights continue to be operated by Red Wings and Azimuth. But El Al is not planning to return to Moscow yet.

NANews — News of Israel previously detailed how Ukrainian drones and the “Kover” regime disrupt the operation of Russian airports.

The next review date is March 25, 2027. If the situation in Russian airspace does not become more stable, El Al may reconsider the return date again.

…
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Russian state structures are beginning the digital documentation of monuments related to biblical history, the Second Temple era, and Jewish Jerusalem. However, in Moscow and Ramallah, they are exclusively presented as ‘Palestinian cultural heritage’ and included in a project personally approved by Putin, dedicated to ‘Africa and the Islamic World.’

At first glance, it seems to be about scientific cooperation, creating three-dimensional models, and saving antiquities. But the agreement emerged amid a sharp conflict between Israel and the Palestinian Authority over the right to manage archaeological sites in Judea and Samaria and to determine whose history they tell.

Therefore, the memorandum should be considered not only as an archaeological project but also as part of the struggle for archaeological sovereignty.

Russia has chosen a non-neutral position in this struggle. It provides the Palestinian Authority with state scientific institutes, technology, the authority of the Hermitage, and the infrastructure of Rossotrudnichestvo, helping to establish monuments of biblical and Jewish history in the international arena specifically as ‘Palestinian’ heritage.

What Russia and the Palestinian Authority signed on July 9

On July 9, 2026, a memorandum was signed between the ‘Center for Rescue Archaeology of the Institute of History of Material Culture’ of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the ‘Ministry of Tourism and Antiquities’ of the Palestinian Authority.

The document was signed by the director of the Russian Center, Natalia Solovyova, and the Palestinian minister, Hani Al-Hayek.

The ceremony was attended by the General Director of the State Hermitage, Mikhail Piotrovsky, and the Deputy Representative of Russia to the Palestinian National Authority, Artur Antonyan. The moderator was the head of the Rossotrudnichestvo representation, Timofey Bokov.

The ‘Russian House in Palestine’ itself reported that it coordinated the preparation of the project and is ready to continue facilitating Russian-Palestinian cooperation in the field of ‘cultural heritage.’ This is important: it is not about a private expedition of scientists, but about the work of the Russian state mechanism of humanitarian presence. The official website of Rossotrudnichestvo confirms that its foreign representations have been operating under the informal name ‘Russian House’ since 2021, and the representation in Bethlehem is part of this structure.

Project supported by Putin

The memorandum became part of a larger Russian initiative — ‘Digital Archive of Monuments of Africa and the Islamic World’.

The project is being implemented by the State Hermitage and the Center for Rescue Archaeology of the IHMC RAS. Mikhail Piotrovsky presented it on March 25, 2026, at a meeting of the Russian Council for Culture, after which Putin publicly promised support.

Russian reports indicate that the program is planned until 2028. It is planned to include at least 30 full-fledged three-dimensional models of monuments. The Hermitage will collect bibliographic data and provide expert support, while archaeologists will conduct digital filming, create geospatial models, and form information systems for research, monitoring, restoration, and educational projects.

Which objects Russia plans to start with

In the first stage, Russian specialists plan to select three or four archaeological sites that the Palestinian Authority considers most important. However, the full list of monuments has not yet been published.

Russian reports mention only two specific objects:

Solomon’s Pools — בריכות שלמה — near Bethlehem;

Tell es-Sultan — תל א־סולטאן, also known as תל יריחו, Tell Jericho, — ancient Jericho.

Roman cisterns, remains of aqueducts, Christian temples, and Islamic structures were mentioned only as examples of the rich archaeological heritage of the region. There is no confirmation that they are already included in the first phase of the Russian-Palestinian project.

Special attention was paid by the director of the Center for Rescue Archaeology of the IHMC RAS, Natalia Solovyova, to Solomon’s Pools. She expressed a desire to conduct their digital documentation, while acknowledging that a ‘very complex situation’ has developed around the monument.

This phrase has not only scientific but also political significance.

Solomon’s Pools — the water system of Jewish Jerusalem

In Israeli archaeology, Solomon’s Pools are called בריכות שלמה — Breichot Shlomo.

The associated water system is known as אמת המים התחתונה לירושלים — the Lower Aqueduct to Jerusalem.

Israeli archaeological materials attribute the creation of this aqueduct to the Second Temple period, most likely to the Hasmonean or Herodian era. Water flowed from the area of Solomon’s Pools to Jerusalem, with the Temple Mount — הר הבית — being the final point of the system.

This means that it is not just about ancient reservoirs near modern Bethlehem.

The pools and the associated aqueduct were part of the infrastructure of Jewish Jerusalem and served the city during the existence of the Second Temple.

Later, the system was used, repaired, and rebuilt by the Romans, Byzantines, Muslim rulers, Mamluks, and Ottomans. However, the later stages of exploitation do not negate the origin of its main ancient layer and its direct connection to the Temple Mount.

Therefore, presenting Solomon’s Pools exclusively as ‘Palestinian cultural heritage’ conceals the most important part of the object’s history.

The modern administrative status of the monument does not change the fact that its ancient water system was created in the Jewish period for Jewish Jerusalem.

Tell es-Sultan — biblical Jericho

The second specifically named object is Tell es-Sultan, תל א־סולטאן.

In Israel, the name תל יריחו — Tell Jericho is also used, meaning the Jericho mound.

Israeli archaeology identifies it with יריחו המקראית — biblical Jericho.

At the same time, Tell es-Sultan is a multi-layered monument. Its oldest structures appeared in the Neolithic era — thousands of years before the formation of the Jewish people and long before the Arab conquest of the region.

Therefore, it would be incorrect to claim that the entire archaeological complex was created by Jews.

But it is equally incorrect to present Tell es-Sultan as a monument of Arab or Islamic origin.

Numerous layers of settlement have been discovered on the mound — from prehistoric periods to the Bronze and Iron Ages. Jericho itself occupies a central place in the Tanakh and Jewish historical memory, primarily in the story of the Israelites crossing the Jordan and conquering the city by Joshua.

Thus, Tell es-Sultan is not exclusively a Jewish monument, but it is inseparable from biblical and ancient Israelite history.

Its oldest layers existed long before the emergence of Arab and Islamic identity in the region.

Why the choice of these objects has political significance

Both named monuments in Russian-Palestinian publications are presented as part of ‘Palestinian cultural heritage,’ and the entire project is included in the program of digital documentation of monuments of Africa and the Islamic World.

But neither Solomon’s Pools nor Tell es-Sultan were created as Islamic monuments.

Solomon’s Pools and the Lower Aqueduct are associated with the Second Temple era, the Hasmonean or Herodian period, and the water supply of the Temple Mount.

Tell es-Sultan arose millennia before the advent of Islam and is simultaneously biblical Jericho, occupying an important place in the history of the Jewish people.

That is why the Russian digitization of these objects cannot be considered only as technical work.

The created archive will include official names, descriptions, historical periodization, bibliography, and data on the cultural affiliation of the monuments.

If Solomon’s Pools are described only as a ‘Palestinian object,’ and their connection to the Second Temple and the Temple Mount becomes secondary or disappears altogether, the digital archive will become a tool for the political reinterpretation of Jewish heritage.

The same applies to ancient Jericho.

Russia is effectively helping the Palestinian Authority to establish its own representation of objects in the international arena, which were either created in the Jewish period or have fundamental significance for the biblical history of Israel.

Why a digital model is not just a photograph

Three-dimensional fixation of a monument can indeed be an important tool for preservation. It allows for the accurate recording of the shape of structures, their position, dimensions, and current state.

However, the digital archive consists not only of geometry.

The model is accompanied by:

• the official name of the object;
• the country and territory to which it is assigned;
• a description of its origin;
• historical periodization;
• bibliography;
• information about the creators and users of the monument;
• museum and educational interpretation;
• indication of the institution that manages the data.

This is where neutral technical fixation ends and politics begins.

Whoever creates the digital archive gets the opportunity to determine whether the water system will be described as a structure of the Second Temple era or simply as a ‘Palestinian monument.’ Whether it will be said that the aqueduct supplied water to the Temple Mount, or this connection will disappear behind a general formulation about the heritage of the ‘Islamic World.’

Therefore, it is not only about who physically controls the ancient stones.

It is about who will write the official digital biography of the monument.

Solomon’s Pools: the water system of Jewish Jerusalem

Solomon’s Pools are located south of Bethlehem, in the territory transferred to the management of the Palestinian Authority under the Oslo Accords.

Their traditional name does not prove a direct connection to King Solomon. However, the ancient water system has a very definite connection to Jewish history and Jerusalem of the Second Temple era.

The Israel Antiquities Authority indicates that the Lower Aqueduct ran from Solomon’s Pools approximately 21 kilometers to the Temple Mount. It was built during the Second Temple period, most likely during the Hasmonean kings.

The aqueduct directed water to Jerusalem and the Temple Mount, providing the city and temple complex during the period of Jewish statehood. The system continued to be used and rebuilt in later Roman, Byzantine, Islamic, and Ottoman periods, but later repairs do not change the origin of its fundamental historical layer.

This is a fundamental point.

The water system connecting Solomon’s Pools to the Temple Mount was not created by Arabs or the modern Palestinian Authority. Its foundation dates back to the Jewish period of the Second Temple and, likely, to the Hasmonean state.

Modern administrative control over the site cannot change the historical origin of the structure.

Roman, Christian, Islamic, and Ottoman chapters of its history can be acknowledged. But the fact that the ancient aqueduct was part of the infrastructure of Jewish Jerusalem cannot be erased.

Why a conflict has already erupted around the pools

The Russian agreement did not appear in a historical vacuum.

At the end of May 2026, Solomon’s Pools were visited by Israel’s Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, deputies, and representatives of the ‘Religious Zionism’ party. Israeli participants in the trip called the object a monument of the Hasmonean era and the Second Temple and claimed that its transfer to Palestinian management was a mistake of the Oslo Accords.

According to Palestinian and Turkish publications, Smotrich stated that maintaining Palestinian Authority control over the object is unacceptable and that Israel must change the current situation.

The Palestinian reaction was immediate.

Local activists and official structures began calling on residents to be constantly present near the pools to prevent their alleged transfer to Israel. In Palestinian publications, the object was called part of ‘Arab and Islamic identity,’ and Israeli actions were described as an attempt to ‘Judaize’ it.

By the end of June, the conflict had moved from statements to physical confrontation. The state agency WAFA reported that on June 26, Israeli military used stun grenades and tear gas near the pools against Palestinians present there. According to the agency itself, there were no casualties.

Already in early July, Hani Al-Hayek visited the object again and announced that the Palestinian Authority would intensify local and international actions for its protection. The Palestinian ministry directly called Solomon’s Pools an integral part of the national identity of the Palestinian people.

And on July 9, a few weeks after the escalation, the same minister signed a memorandum with the Russian state archaeological center.

Such a coincidence of context cannot be ignored.

Russia proposes to digitize not a random monument, but an object around which a struggle for administrative control, historical affiliation, and national interpretation is currently taking place.

Tell es-Sultan: ancient Arabs, but not exclusively Jewish

The second named object became Tell es-Sultan — ancient Jericho.

Here it is necessary to maintain historical accuracy.

The main structures, thanks to which Tell es-Sultan was included in the UNESCO World Heritage list, belong to the Neolithic. Already in the 9th–8th millennia BCE, a large permanent settlement with a wall, moat, and monumental tower existed at this site.

This means that the oldest layers of Tell es-Sultan appeared long before the formation of the Jewish people — and thousands of years before the Arab conquest of the region.

Therefore, it would be a mistake to claim that the entire Tell es-Sultan was built by Jews.

But it is equally mistaken to turn it into a monument of Arab origin.

Jericho occupies an exceptional place in the Tanakh and Jewish historical memory. The archaeological mound contains not only Neolithic and Bronze Age layers but also remains from the Iron Age. The report on research from 2019–2023 describes structures dating approximately to 1136–960 and 732–535 BCE — periods overlapping with the history of ancient Israel and Judah.

In 2023, UNESCO included the object in the World Heritage list as a monument located in the ‘State of Palestine.’ At the same time, the organization itself clarified that the decision focuses on the prehistoric mound, while later Jewish and Christian heritage is located in the broader historical context of Jericho and is not the main subject of this particular nomination. Israel called the decision politicized.

Thus, the exact wording should be:

Tell es-Sultan is not exclusively a Jewish monument, but it is certainly not a monument of Arab origin. Its main layers are much older than the Arab presence, and ancient Jericho is inseparable from biblical and Jewish history.

When such an object is included in the Russian archive of ‘monuments of the Islamic World,’ a legitimate question arises: what relation does prehistoric Jericho and its ancient Israelite layers have to the origin of the Islamic World?

Sebastia: the dispute over the capital of the ancient Kingdom of Israel

Solomon’s Pools and Jericho are only part of a broader archaeological conflict.

Another center of his became Sebastia — ancient Samaria, located near Shechem.

The complex contains remnants of the capital of the Northern Kingdom of Israel from the 9th century BCE, as well as Roman, Byzantine, Crusader, and Ottoman structures.

The Israeli side views the preservation and development of Sebastia as protecting one of the key sites of biblical and ancient Israeli history. The Palestinian administration claims that under the guise of archaeology, Israel is trying to separate the monument from the modern Palestinian city and gain control over the land, roads, water sources, and tourism revenues.

At the end of 2025, Israel announced a plan to seize approximately 1,800 dunams — about 445 acres near the complex for its development. Palestinian local authorities stated that the project affects about five thousand olive trees.

Here the same question arises again: who will tell visitors the story of Samaria?

Will it be the capital of the ancient Kingdom of Israel, around which Roman and Byzantine structures later appeared? Or will the entire complex be primarily presented as ‘Palestinian national heritage,’ with the ancient Israeli period becoming just one of the less noticeable points?

Israel attempted to create its own heritage protection body.

On May 12, 2026, the Knesset approved in the first reading a bill to create the Judea and Samaria Heritage Authority.

The proposal provided for the direct responsibility of the State of Israel for antiquities, archaeology, and heritage monuments in the region. The new structure was to engage in excavations, preservation, restoration, site management, research, education, and international scientific relations. The project also included powers related to the acquisition and expropriation of land for the protection of monuments.

The Palestinian administration viewed the law as an attempt to extend Israeli civil authority over territories under Palestinian administration.

Minister Hani Al-Hayek — the same person who later signed an agreement with Russia — claimed that control over antiquities would be used to expand Israeli presence and settlements.

At the same time, the proposed mechanism was opposed by the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities. Scientists warned that separate civil administration could be perceived worldwide as annexation and harm international relations of Israeli science.

But in its address, the academy simultaneously emphasized an important point: Jewish heritage is a central value of archaeological research throughout the Land of Israel and should be actively studied and presented to the public. The scientists’ dispute concerned not the significance of Jewish history, but the proposed legal mechanism for its protection.

On June 2, 2026, the advancement of the law was temporarily halted after intervention by Benjamin Netanyahu. And while Israel debated internally about the correct mechanism for protecting its archaeology, the Palestinian administration began strengthening international partnerships in the same field.

Five weeks later, it secured an agreement with the Russian state archaeological center.

Russia entered the dispute not as a neutral mediator.

Russia could propose a trilateral scientific project.

It could invite specialists from the Israel Antiquities Authority, Russian and Palestinian archaeologists, create an international commission, and separately stipulate that the digital description should reflect all historical periods — prehistoric, Canaanite, ancient Israeli, Judean, Hellenistic, Roman, Byzantine, Islamic, and Ottoman.

Nothing of the sort is mentioned in the published reports.

Russia’s partner became exclusively the Ministry of Tourism and Antiquities of the Palestinian administration.

The sites for the first works are chosen by the Palestinian side.

The Russian project calls them ‘Palestinian monuments’ and simultaneously includes them in the archive of Africa and the Islamic world.

The ‘Russian House’ provides organizational coordination.

The Hermitage collects bibliographic materials.

The Russian academic structure creates digital models.

At the same time, Russian reports on Solomon’s Pools do not emphasize that the associated aqueduct was built during the Second Temple period and led directly to the Temple Mount. In the description of ancient Jericho, its place in Jewish and biblical history is also not highlighted.

According to NAnews — News of Israel, this means that Moscow has already accepted the main Palestinian framework: the modern administrative control of the Palestinian administration is used as a basis for presenting the millennia-old heritage as the national heritage of ‘Palestine.’

That is why the project cannot be considered completely neutral.

Russia is not just helping to preserve ancient walls. It is helping one side of the conflict to form an official digital narrative about them.

Archaeology as a tool of state recognition.

For the Palestinian administration, the digital archive has significance far beyond science.

Such materials can be used:

• in museums and tourist centers;
• in school and university programs;
• in international exhibitions;
• in diplomatic presentations;
• in applications and reports for UNESCO;
• in scientific publications;
• to prove the ability to independently manage heritage sites;
• to consolidate modern Palestinian state terminology.

The appearance of a Russian state partner increases the political weight of such an interpretation.

Now it will not only be a Palestinian database. It could become a joint Russian-Palestinian archive, supported by the RAS, the Hermitage, Rossotrudnichestvo, and the Russian government.

In the future, these materials will be referenced by researchers, journalists, museums, and international organizations.

If an object is initially described in the database as ‘Palestinian heritage of the Islamic world,’ correcting such a representation later will be significantly more difficult.

Is it necessary to deny later periods?

No.

The history of Judea, Samaria, Jerusalem, Bethlehem, and Jericho is multilayered.

Canaanite cities, ancient Israeli kingdoms, Judea, Hellenistic states, the Roman and Byzantine Empires, Islamic caliphates, Crusader states, the Mamluk Sultanate, and the Ottoman Empire existed in these territories.

All these periods deserve study.

But respect for later layers does not require abandoning the historical origins of earlier structures.

If the aqueduct was built by the Hasmonean kings for Jewish Jerusalem and the Temple Mount, it remains part of Jewish heritage, even if it was repaired by other authorities a thousand years later.

If Samaria was the capital of the ancient Kingdom of Israel, this cannot be changed by a modern border or a new tourist brand.

If Tell es-Sultan existed thousands of years before the Arab conquest, it cannot honestly be presented as an object of Arab origin.

The modern administration of the territory and the historical belonging of the monument are not the same.

What the Israeli government should do.

The Israeli government should not limit itself to observing the Russian-Palestinian project.

First of all, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should request from Russia the full text of the memorandum, the list of objects, the funding order, the rules for access to information, and the conditions for using the created 3D models.

The Israel Antiquities Authority should demand clarifications on the scientific methodology of the project: who will compile the descriptions, what periodization is planned to be used, and whether the Hasmonean era, the Second Temple, the ancient Kingdom of Israel, and the connection of objects with the Temple Mount will be reflected in the materials.

It is necessary to find out who will own the original digital data and whether the Palestinian administration will be able to independently change the descriptions and names of objects.

Israel should propose the participation of its own specialists or the creation of an independent international council that will ensure the representation of all historical periods without politically erasing the Jewish layer.

In parallel, Israel needs to accelerate its own digital documentation of the monuments of Judea and Samaria and publish quality materials in Hebrew, English, Russian, and Arabic.

Special attention should be paid to Solomon’s Pools, the Lower Aqueduct, Sebastia, ancient Jericho, and other objects around which there is already an international struggle for interpretation.

Israel cannot remain silent.

The memorandum of July 9 is a warning.

While within Israel there are debates about laws, ministry powers, and international reactions, the Palestinian administration acts consistently. It attracts foreign partners, creates digital archives, consolidates its own terminology, and forms an international image of the archaeology of Judea and Samaria as exclusively ‘Palestinian national heritage.’

Russia has provided it with state institutions and scientific authority for this.

And it is especially alarming that the Russian archive of Africa and the Islamic world is planning to include a system built during the Second Temple period for the water supply of the Temple Mount, and ancient Jericho, which existed millennia before the emergence of Islam.

NAnews — News of Israel believes that the Israeli government should pay attention to this project and officially respond.

It is necessary to demand transparency, the participation of Israeli specialists, and full recognition of Jewish historical periods in the created digital archive.

It is not about wanting to erase the Roman, Christian, Islamic, or Ottoman history of these places.

It is about the inadmissibility of erasing our history.

Solomon’s Pools and the aqueduct to the Temple Mount are part of the heritage of Jewish Jerusalem.

Samaria is the capital of the ancient Kingdom of Israel.

Jericho is one of the central cities of the biblical memory of the Jewish people, even if its oldest layers are older than all modern national identities.

This is our heritage — not because other peoples have no connection to this land, but because the most important structures and historical layers of these objects were created in biblical, ancient Israeli, and Judean periods.

Modern agreements cannot change their origin.

But Israel’s silence may allow others to rewrite how this origin will be presented to the world.

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Israel has for the first time allowed it to be reported that a citizen of the country is accused of actions under the direction of foreign intelligence structures and influence activities. At the same time, the court kept the name, the name of the intelligence, the nature of the contacts, and the alleged assignments closed – against the backdrop of a story that has been discussed for a month, this creates an extremely unusual situation.

Author: R.Verter

One permitted formula and four prohibitions

On September 4, 2026, the State Prosecutor’s Office filed an indictment against an Israeli citizen in the Central District Court and requested that he be kept in custody until the end of the process. The investigation was conducted by the SHABAK and the police. The permitted wording states that the accused acted under the direction of foreign intelligence agencies and participated in ‘influence activities.’

The court allowed this to be published after an appeal by journalists, but kept the name, personal data, affiliation with a foreign service, the nature of the contact, and specific assignments closed. This boundary is mandatory for our text: the Israeli court has not yet officially allowed the publication of the accused’s name specifically in the context of today’s indictment. It is not allowed to associate the surname with the accusation as an established fact. The prohibition applies precisely where the information of the new indictment begins.

What twenty days give if the surname is removed

The man was detained after arriving at Ben Gurion about a month ago. For the first 20 days, he was prohibited from meeting with a lawyer. The investigation was conducted by a narrow police group, the case was controlled by State Prosecutor Amit Aisman and Government Legal Advisor Gali Baarav-Miara. The defense is represented by Inna Lebedinskaya-Katz.

It is easy to mix two chronologies here, so we separated them. For today’s unnamed accused, only ‘about a month’ has been officially published. In the public story, the arrival date is known – August 2. From August 2 to September 4, 33 days pass; 20 days make up just over 60% of such a period. This comparison shows the scale of the closed phase but does not establish the identity of the accused.

The August line exists separately

In parallel, since the beginning of August, the story of Artem Kirpichenko has been publicly discussed. On August 5, NANews wrote in detail about his detention after arriving from Yerevan, his biography, service in the IDF, studies at the Hebrew University, and subsequent life in Russia. At that time, the reason for the detention was not officially named.

On August 29, we returned to this story after the Russian Human Rights Council appealed to the UN. The Russian side allowed for political persecution ‘for views,’ although it had not seen the case materials. Even then, the defense reported that a prosecutor’s declaration was expected on September 1, and then the case would go to the district court. September 4 was indeed named as the date of the next procedural step.

Iran, conference, and the boundary of the permissible

Kirpichenko has a separate biographical detail: in 2018, he visited Iran. His acquaintances claimed that after that, he still came to Israel without problems. The very fact of the trip is publicly known, but it cannot be linked to the current accusation: the court did not disclose the country, service, or content of the alleged contacts.

There is also a story with a trip to Israel in August. Family representatives said that Kirpichenko came for a conference; later, they claimed that the municipality of the alleged venue was not aware of the event. The version of a ‘trap’ came from Kirpichenko’s supporters and was not confirmed.

The defense has its version

The defense of today’s accused claims that he lives abroad, rarely came to Israel, and did not have access to classified information. Lebedinskaya-Katz stated that the defendant ‘did not and physically could not cause’ harm to the state. She also claims that foreign contacts did not instruct him to collect or transmit information about Israel.

Previously, Kirpichenko’s supporters reported on lengthy interrogations and pressure. A family representative conveyed his words that the confession was obtained ‘under investigative pressure.’ There is no independent confirmation of these claims. For the court, the case materials, which are almost completely closed, will matter.

Why the name of the intelligence changes the picture

There is a telling comparison. On August 6, NANews analyzed another case of Ashkelon residents accused of working for Iran: there, the prosecution publicly named Iran and described the alleged assignments. In the current case, even the affiliation of foreign intelligence remains prohibited from publication.

In July, NANews analyzed the State Comptroller’s report on foreign influence from Russia and Iran. It recorded problems of coordination of state structures and the absence of a unified national policy against foreign influence. Therefore, the very wording of the new accusation deserves attention separately from the identity of the accused.

A representative of Kirpichenko’s family told a foreign publication that, according to their ‘unofficial information,’ the alleged contact is supposedly not related to Iran or Lebanon. Then he speculated about Russia. These are the words of the family, not the investigation. The state did not name Russia in the published part of the accusation.

Secrecy works unusually here for another reason. The court revealed the legal core of the case only after a press request, while the public discussion of the August detention had been going on for weeks. There was a gap between the biographical story known to the public and what the state officially allows to be associated with the new process.

It turns out to be a rare construction of secrecy: the general meaning of the accusation is already allowed, but four key elements – the name, intelligence, connection, and assignments – remain closed. For NANews – News of Israel, the main guideline here is simple: to record only what the court allowed to be published, and to keep the August public chronology nearby, without turning coincidences into evidence.

…
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Before starting, it is important to clarify: this article and its accompanying illustration are created with respect for rabbis, Haredim, and halachic tradition. For someone unfamiliar with the laws of kashrut, the debate about chicken breeds, the structure of their legs, and the continuity of consumption tradition may seem unusual or even amusing. However, behind these details lies a serious question: how does an ancient legal system apply its principles to breeding, industrial poultry farming, and new genetic technologies? This complex process of seeking an answer is precisely what the material is dedicated to.

On July 28, 2026, the British Jewish publication The Jewish Weekly published an article “Kosher Chicken Pedigree: 5 Ways Rabbinic Authority Keeps It Safe”, dedicated to an unusual question: how much is the modern industrial chicken connected to the bird whose kosher status has been confirmed by Jewish tradition for generations.

At first glance, the question itself seems strange. Chicken is sold in almost every kosher butcher shop in Israel, served at Shabbat meals, and produced under the supervision of major kashrut organizations. However, the modern broiler grows significantly faster than its ancestors, has a different body shape, and is the result of complex crossbreeding of several breeding lines.

Therefore, the rabbinic discussion is not about whether chicken is allowed at all. The main question is different: how far can breeding change a known bird before it needs to be re-confirmed as belonging to the species covered by the ancient kosher tradition?

Why birds turned out to be more complicated than cows and fish

For land mammals, the Torah establishes two external signs: the animal must have split hooves and chew the cud. This rule is formulated in the book of Leviticus, 11:3, and repeated in the book of Deuteronomy, 14:6.

For fish, fins and scales are necessary. These signs are named in Leviticus, 11:9–12, and repeated in Deuteronomy, 14:9–10.

Regarding birds, the Torah uses a different principle. Instead of a set of universal signs, it lists prohibited categories of birds. The first list is found in Leviticus, 11:13–19, the second in Deuteronomy, 14:12–18.

In the Babylonian Talmud, in the tractate “Chullin”, 63b, the sages explain that the biblical list covers 24 categories of prohibited birds. The tractate “Chullin” is dedicated to the laws of slaughtering animals and birds, their permissibility for food, and other kashrut issues.

The problem arose later when ancient names ceased to unequivocally correspond to specific biological species.

Jewish communities found themselves scattered across different countries. The same bird could be called by different words, and the same name in two regions sometimes referred to completely different animals. The biblical classification was also not a modern zoological system, where each species is assigned a single Latin name.

The Mishnah provides signs of a permitted bird in the tractate “Chullin”, 3:6. The Mishnah is the foundational compilation of the Oral Torah, finalized in the Land of Israel around the beginning of the 3rd century CE.

In this section, the following are listed:

• the presence of a crop;
• a muscular stomach, the inner lining of which can be separated by hand;
• a special back toe, located slightly higher than the others;
• the absence of predatory behavior, called “dores”.

The last criterion caused especially many disputes. Rabbis explained differently what exactly “dores” means: whether the bird grabs prey with its claws, holds food with its foot, catches it in the air, or eats the prey alive.

A specific case that increased caution is described in the Babylonian Talmud, tractate “Chullin”, 62b.

There, a bird called “tarnegolta de-agma”, or swamp chicken, is discussed. Initially, an opinion allowing its consumption is presented, but then Marimar reported that the bird was seen grabbing and eating prey. After this, it was recognized as prohibited.

Thus, it is not about an indefinite range of pages or a legend without a specific source, but about an exact Talmudic episode on the sheet “Chullin”, 62b.

Rashi — Rabbi Shlomo Yitzhaki, who lived in 1040–1105 in the French city of Troyes, — commented on this episode as a warning against hastily permitting unknown birds. Rashi is considered the main medieval commentator on the Tanakh and the Babylonian Talmud; his explanations are still printed in almost all traditional editions of these texts.

It is from this discussion that the principle was strengthened, according to which one external inspection may not be enough: a person can misinterpret the structure or behavior of a bird.

Therefore, the most important significance was given to masoret — the continuous tradition of consuming a specific bird in a reliable Jewish community.

This approach was enshrined in “Shulchan Aruch”, section “Yoreh De’ah”, 82:2–3.

“Shulchan Aruch” was compiled by Rabbi Yosef Karo, who lived in 1488–1575. He was born in Spain, lived in the Ottoman Empire after the expulsion of Jews, and then settled in Safed. Yosef Karo is known as one of the main systematizers of Jewish law.

The Ashkenazi practice was added to this code by RAMA — Rabbi Moshe Isserles, who lived approximately in 1530–1572 in Krakow. His notes, known as “Mapah”, made “Shulchan Aruch” a generally accepted code for Ashkenazi communities as well.

Historical excursion: chicken was not always common food

The ancestor of the modern domestic chicken is considered to be the red junglefowl of Southeast Asia.

According to modern archaeological research, the domestication process began approximately around 1500 BCE and may have been associated with the spread of dry rice cultivation. Birds gained constant access to grain and gradually began to live alongside humans.

From Southeast Asia, chickens spread along trade routes. In the Mediterranean, they appeared around the first millennium BCE, but were initially perceived more as exotic, ritual, or status animals.

In some early European burials, chickens were buried separately or together with people. They became common mass food much later.

This history helps to understand why in biblical texts the chicken does not occupy as prominent a place as the sheep, goat, or dove.

Fattened birds served at King Solomon’s table are mentioned in the book of 1 Kings, 5:3 according to the Jewish numbering of the Tanakh. In most Christian and Russian Synodal editions, the same place is designated as 3 Kings, 4:23.

The verse states that the daily supply of the royal court included large and small cattle, wild animals, and “barburim avusim” — fattened birds.

Saadia Gaon believed that “barburim” referred to geese.

Saadia ben Yosef, known as Saadia Gaon, lived in 882–942. He was born in Faiyum, Egypt, and later headed the famous Talmudic academy of Sura in Babylonia, on the territory of modern Iraq. The title “gaon” denoted the head of one of the leading Babylonian academies. Saadia is known as a philosopher, linguist, translator, and one of the first major systematic commentators on the Tanakh in Arabic.

Rashi offered another interpretation: in his opinion, “barburim” could have been fattened chickens. This version is presented in his commentary on 1 Kings, 5:3, where he also refers to the Talmudic discussion in the tractate “Bava Metzia”, 86b.

By the Talmudic era, the chicken was already a well-known domestic bird.

In the Babylonian Talmud, tractate “Bava Metzia”, 86b, Rabbi Yochanan says: “The best of domestic animals is the ox, and the best of birds is the chicken.”

Rabbi Yochanan bar Nappaha was one of the leading sages of the Land of Israel in the 3rd century and died approximately in 279. He was born in Tzippori and later headed a major rabbinic academy in Tiberias. His statements occupy an important place in both the Jerusalem and Babylonian Talmuds.

The Jewish tradition of consuming chicken, thus, was formed gradually. Masoret is not a biological certificate preserved in written form since Sinai, but a continuous practical chain.

Parents showed children which birds their community consumed. Shochtim knew which animals they were allowed to slaughter. Rabbis ensured that unknown varieties were not introduced into the diet without verification.

Five levels of kosher tradition protection

Based on examples provided by The Jewish Weekly, five interconnected levels of kosher tradition protection can be distinguished.

The first level is the biblical list of prohibited birds, found in Leviticus, 11:13–19, and Deuteronomy, 14:12–18. It sets the initial Torah norm and requires determining whether the bird under investigation belongs to one of the prohibited categories.

The second level is the Talmudic signs, listed in the Mishnah, tractate “Chullin”, 3:6, and thoroughly analyzed in the Babylonian Talmud on sheets “Chullin”, 59a–63b.

Rabbis pay attention to the presence of a crop, the structure of the muscular stomach, the arrangement of toes, and the absence of predatory behavior. These signs help to investigate an unfamiliar bird, but by themselves do not always provide a definitive answer.

The third level is masoret, that is, the continuous tradition of consuming a specific bird in a recognized Jewish community. The requirement for masoret is formulated in Rashi’s commentary on “Chullin”, 62b, and enshrined in “Shulchan Aruch”, “Yoreh De’ah”, 82:2–3.

The fourth level is rabbinic responsa and decisions of halachic authorities. They become necessary when new breeds, hybrids, or breeding technologies appear that did not exist at the time of the classical sources.

The fifth level is practical verification. It may include examining live birds, long-term observation of their behavior, studying the origin of the breeding line, and verifying the claims of breeders and producers.

It is precisely the combination of all these levels that explains why the kosher status of chicken cannot be determined by a single laboratory examination.

A biologist can establish the kinship of breeds, but the halachic answer also depends on tradition, external structure, behavior, line origin, and decisions of previous rabbinic authorities.

19th century: when huge Asian chickens were brought to Europe

The first major dispute over new breeds arose long before the advent of genetic laboratories.

In the mid-19th century, large Asian chickens, known as Cochin-China or Cochins, began to be massively imported into Europe. They were noticeably different from the familiar European birds: they were significantly heavier, had a massive body, unusual plumage, and feathered legs.

Rabbis faced the question: is the Cochin a new breed of the common domestic chicken or a completely different bird that requires a separate masoret?

The discussion became especially acute in the 1860s. Some authorities believed that external differences did not negate the bird’s belonging to the common chicken. Others argued that tradition could not be automatically transferred to an animal noticeably different from all known community breeds.

An additional argument was crossbreeding. Cochins could produce viable offspring with common domestic chickens. Some rabbis considered this proof of belonging to one permitted species.

The Talmudic principle, according to which permitted and prohibited species do not produce viable common offspring, is discussed in the tractate “Bechorot”, 7a. However, in the Talmudic text itself, this question is formulated concerning mammals, not directly to birds.

Chatam Sofer — Rabbi Moshe Sofer, who lived in 1762–1839, — considered the possibility of applying this principle to birds in the responsum “Chatam Sofer”, “Yoreh De’ah”, No. 74.

Moshe Sofer was born in Frankfurt am Main, and from 1806 until his death, he led the community and yeshiva of Pressburg — modern Bratislava. He became one of the most influential halachic authorities in Central Europe and one of the main defenders of traditional Judaism in the era of Enlightenment and religious reforms.

Chatam Sofer used the possibility of crossbreeding as a serious argument but simultaneously considered the objection that the Talmudic principle from “Bechorot”, 7a, might apply only to mammals.

“Avnei Nezer” is the name of the collection of responsa by Rabbi Avraham Bornstein, who lived in 1838–1910 in Poland. He was the rabbi of Sochaczew, an outstanding halachic authority, and the founder of the Sochaczew Hasidic dynasty.

In the responsa “Avnei Nezer”, “Yoreh De’ah”, Part I, No. 75, he thoroughly analyzed the crossbreeding of an unknown bird with a recognized kosher line. Avraham Bornstein considered viable offspring a serious proof that it was about varieties of one species.

At the same time, later researchers noted that the position of “Avnei Nezer” cannot be applied without restrictions: in the neighboring responsum No. 76, he again emphasized the importance of masoret and did not consider one fact of mating sufficient in all possible cases.

Maharam Schick — Rabbi Moshe Schick, who lived in 1807–1879, — considered the problem in the responsa “Maharam Schick”, “Yoreh De’ah”, Nos. 98–100.

He was born in Brezova on the territory of modern Slovakia, studied under Chatam Sofer in Pressburg, and from 1861 until his death was the rabbi of Khust — a city located today in the Zakarpattia region of Ukraine. Maharam Schick was considered one of the greatest students of Chatam Sofer and an important halachic authority of Hungarian and Carpathian Jewry.

He divided several different cases:

• whether the new breed itself can be consumed;
• whether the hybrid can be eaten if the mother was a common chicken;
• whether the decision changes if the unknown breed was the mother;
• what is the status of eggs laid by the hybrid bird.

This discussion shows how complex halachic analysis can be. It took into account not only external signs but also maternal and paternal lines, egg origin, status of doubt, and the appearance of the hatched chick.

How the industrial chicken appeared

Until the 20th century, chickens were usually bred primarily for eggs. Meat was obtained from old layers or surplus young roosters. Specialized meat chickens in the modern sense practically did not exist.

The situation changed after World War II when the demand for affordable animal protein sharply increased in the USA.

In 1945, the A&P trading network, together with the US Department of Agriculture and agricultural consultants, launched the Chicken of Tomorrow contest.

Breeders were offered to develop a bird that grows faster, converts feed into meat more efficiently, and has a larger breast part.

In the 1946–1947 contests, hundreds of lines were grown under the same conditions and compared by growth rate, health status, feed consumption, and carcass structure.

Subsequently, the White Plymouth Rock and meat Cornish lines became the basis for modern Cornish Rock hybrids.

It is important to understand: the common industrial broiler is usually the result of breeding and multi-stage crossbreeding of chicken lines, not a bird into which a gene from another animal was necessarily introduced in a laboratory way.

Since the 1950s, the main directions of breeding have been growth rate, breast meat yield, survival, and feed efficiency.

Research shows that when grown under the same conditions, the growth rate of broilers between 1950 and 2005 increased by more than 400%.

Early contest winners raised a four-pound bird in about 12 weeks and consumed about 12 pounds of feed. A modern broiler can reach five pounds in approximately 42 days, using less than 10 pounds of feed.

Externally, this is indeed a significantly changed bird: massive breast, rapid weight gain, different body balance, and reduced activity.

This is why some rabbis questioned whether the previous masoret applies to an animal so altered by targeted breeding.

For readers of NAnews — News of Israel, it is important to separate two concepts here. A genetically altered chicken in the broad biological sense by breeding and a genetically edited bird by laboratory methods are not the same.

White Leghorn and checking the position of the toes

In the early 2000s, a rumor spread that white Leghorns, widely used for egg production, allegedly lost their kosher status due to years of breeding.

The reason was the position of the toes on the perch.

This criterion goes back to the Mishnah, tractate “Chullin”, 3:6, where Rabbi Eliezer bar Tzadok says that a bird that places two toes on each side of a rope can be considered predatory.

Some observers saw that Leghorns sometimes sit in a “2–2” position and suggested that breeding had given them a trait characteristic of a prohibited bird.

The question was investigated by the Jerusalem BADATZ “Eda Haredit” with the participation of a bird specialist.

Observation showed that the Leghorn usually places its toes in a “3–1” scheme. The “2–2” position occurs temporarily when the bird is just sitting down, trying to hold on to a slippery or uncomfortable perch, or experiencing leg problems.

In March 2004, the Orthodox Union published a conclusion that white Leghorns and the eggs they lay are kosher.

The Orthodox Union is an American Orthodox organization created at the end of the 19th century. Its OU Kosher division is one of the largest international kosher certification systems.

This episode shows that rabbis did not limit themselves to references to old texts. They observed live birds and checked whether the disputed behavior was permanent and natural or occurred only in certain circumstances.

Warning of Rav Shmuel Wosner

In 1998, Rabbi Shmuel Wosner expressed concern about the rapid changes in industrial chickens.

Shmuel Ha-Levi Wosner lived from 1913–2015. He was born in Vienna, studied at the Yeshiva “Chachmei Lublin” in Poland, moved to the Land of Israel before World War II, and later became one of the leading halachic authorities in Bnei Brak.

He is best known for his multi-volume collection of responsa “Shevet Ha-Levi”, after which he was often referred to in rabbinic literature.

Wosner outlined his position on new chickens in a separate letter in 1998. He pointed out that modern birds result from the mixing of different lines, some of which may not have clearly confirmed masoret, and called for a return to breeds with more understandable origins whenever possible.

Other rabbis and experts disagreed with this conclusion. They argued that breeders continue to crossbreed varieties of domestic chickens, and that accelerated growth, increased weight, and changes in individual characteristics do not necessarily create a new halachic species.

A practical question also arose: where to find a “pure” European chicken?

Over the decades, industrial poultry has displaced many old breeds. Proving that a specific line is a direct and completely unchanged descendant of the chickens eaten by pre-war European Jews has proven almost impossible.

The Paradox of the Belgian Braekel

Supporters of returning to old breeds found a farmer in Belgium who bred Braekel chickens and kept detailed records of their origins.

Eggs were delivered to Israel, after which the breeding of Braekels began.

Proponents of the project claimed that the Braekel is an old European chicken with a more reliable pedigree, whereas modern industrial birds are opaque hybrids.

But Rabbi Moshe Sternbuch put forward the opposite argument: a continuous masoret exists precisely with the ordinary chicken that Jews have been buying and consuming daily for decades.

Moshe Sternbuch was born in 1926 in London, later moved to Israel, and became one of the leading ultra-Orthodox halachic authorities in Jerusalem. He is known for his multi-volume responsa “Teshuvot Ve-Hanhagot” and his many years of work in the rabbinical court “Edah HaCharedit”.

The Braekel looks different, matures more slowly, and was previously unknown to most Israeli communities. Therefore, it may require separate confirmation.

Thus, a halachic paradox arose. From the perspective of genetic pedigree, the old pure breed seems more reliable. But from the perspective of living religious practice, the stronger tradition may belong to the modern broiler, which has been slaughtered and consumed under rabbinic supervision for decades.

STAR-K refused to automatically include the Braekel in the list of permitted breeds due to questions about the transmission of masoret.

STAR-K is a Baltimore-based American kosher certification organization, known for its publications on the application of halachic norms to modern food production.

However, the dispute did not lead to a general ban on ordinary industrial chickens.

The Ukrainian Trace in the Debate on the Kashrut of New Chicken Breeds

Rabbis from cities now located in Ukraine played a particularly notable role in the discussions of the 19th and early 20th centuries.

It was in Lviv, Brody, Komarno, Skala-Podilska, Khust, and Mukachevo that different answers were formulated on how to apply the previous tradition to new breeds and their offspring.

There was no single solution in these lands. Lviv and Brody were relatively close to each other, but the positions of their leading rabbinic authorities represented two opposing approaches.

Lviv: Permission Based on a Combination of Evidence

One of the main participants in the polemic was Rabbi Yosef Shaul Nathanson, who lived from 1808–1875.

He was born in Berezhany, a city in the modern Ternopil region, and in 1857 became the rabbi of Lviv, where he served until his death.

Nathanson was considered one of the greatest halachic authorities in Galicia. He is best known for his multi-volume collection of responsa “Shoel U-Meshiv”, in which he answered questions from various areas of Jewish law.

His position on new chickens was relatively permissive. For the Lviv rabbi, not only the reports of local traders were important, but also information from other Jewish communities where similar birds were already being raised and consumed.

He tried to determine whether the imported chickens were truly unknown birds or varieties of the already accepted domestic chicken.

This approach was especially important for Lviv, a major trade and religious center connected with communities in Moldova, the Ottoman and Russian Empires, Western Europe, and the Land of Israel.

In fact, the Lviv position allowed for the tradition to be transmitted between recognized Jewish centers. If a specific bird was already consumed in another reliable community and considered there as a variety of the ordinary chicken, this became a serious basis for its acceptance in Lviv.

Brody: Without a Separate Tradition, a New Bird Cannot Be Accepted

Rabbi Shlomo Kluger, who lived approximately from 1785–1869, took a significantly stricter position.

He was born in Komarov and spent most of his rabbinic career in Brody, in the modern Lviv region. There he served as a dayan—a judge of the rabbinical court—and preacher for about fifty years.

Shlomo Kluger was one of the most prolific halachic authors of the 19th century. He authored hundreds of responsa and commentaries, including the collection “Ha-Elef Lecha Shlomo”.

In the “Yoreh De’ah” section of this collection, he examined birds brought from America or considered American and argued that without confirmed masoret, they could not automatically be recognized as kosher.

He did not consider it possible to accept a new bird just because it resembled the familiar chicken.

For the Brody rabbi, the continuity of known practice was decisive. If the imported variety had not previously been encountered in Eastern Europe and was not consumed by previous generations of local Jews, it could not automatically receive the status of an ordinary chicken.

The disagreement between Lviv and Brody concerned the very mechanism by which Jewish tradition responds to the emergence of new animals.

The Lviv approach allowed for the consideration of evidence from other communities and a combination of proofs. The Brody approach required significantly more caution and placed the burden of proof on those who wanted to introduce a new bird into consumption.

As a result, different practices could exist in a relatively small area. A bird permitted by one authority might not be consumed by the followers of another.

Komarno: The Strictness of the Hasidic Community

A strict position was also supported by Rabbi Yitzchak Isaac Yehuda Yechiel Safrin, who lived from 1806–1874.

He operated in Komarno, located in the modern Lviv region, and became the founder of the independent Komarno Hasidic dynasty.

Safrin was not only a Hasidic leader but also a prolific kabbalistic and halachic author. Among his most famous works are the commentary on the Torah “Eichal Ha-Bracha”, the commentary on the Zohar “Zohar Chai”, and the work on the laws of “Shulchan Aruch” “Shulchan Ha-Tahor”.

The Komarno court adhered to increased caution in matters of food and the origin of animals.

Therefore, new breeds might not be accepted even when permissive decisions already existed in neighboring cities.

The Komarno example shows that the real map of kashrut in Galicia was determined not by administrative boundaries but by the authority of specific rabbis and Hasidic courts.

A family’s decision depended on which rabbi they consulted, which community tradition they adhered to, and whose conclusion they considered binding.

Skala-Podilska: What to Do with the Offspring of Mixed Breeds

A separate place in this story is occupied by Rabbi Shlomo Drimer.

The exact year of his birth is not always indicated in available historical sources, but it is known that in 1830 he became the rabbi of Skala—modern Skala-Podilska in the Ternopil region—and served there until his death in 1872.

Shlomo Drimer founded a rabbinical dynasty, whose representatives led the Skala community for over a hundred years. He is known as the author of the collection of responsa “Beit Shlomo” and the work “Shoresh Yaakov”.

In Skala, the question took on a particularly practical character. Imported birds had already begun to be crossbred with local chickens, and offspring of mixed origin appeared on the markets.

Discussing only the original imported breed became insufficient. It was necessary to determine the status of its offspring.

Establishing the exact pedigree of each bird was impossible. After several generations, new traits spread among the local population, and the boundary between the old and imported chicken became increasingly blurred.

In the responsa “Beit Shlomo,” Drimer examined the origin of a specific egg, the maternal line, and the possibility of permitting offspring when combining several doubts.

This approach allowed avoiding a situation where the unclear origin of one ancestor would prohibit the entire mixed population of the region.

It was in Skala that the practical problem became particularly clear: a strict prohibition regarding a single rare bird could still be observed, but after mass crossbreeding, it became almost unenforceable.

How the Dispute Ended in Galicia

The polemic began to fade in the second half of the 19th century.

An important role was played by information that some controversial varieties were already being consumed by Jews in the Land of Israel.

A key figure was Rabbi Chaim Halberstam, who lived from 1793–1876.

He was born in Tarnogrod, and from 1830 until his death, he was the rabbi of Sanz—modern-day Nowy Sącz in Poland. Chaim Halberstam became the founder of the Sanz Hasidic dynasty and one of the most influential rabbis in Galicia.

He is also known as “Divrei Chaim”—after the name of his collection of responsa and commentaries.

Initially, Chaim Halberstam was cautious about new birds and personally adhered to a stricter practice. However, in 1866, after verifying additional evidence, he recognized the tradition of consuming the Cypriot variety as sufficiently reliable and permitted it.

After this, the permissive practice began to spread much more widely. The decision of the Sanz rabbi did not cancel previous objections but provided communities with a strong halachic support.

Ultimately, the situation was changed by the mass mixing of breeds. New lines spread so widely that even opponents of their consumption faced the impossibility of separating their offspring from ordinary local chickens.

In this regard, the position of Rabbi Shimon Sofer is cited in halachic literature, as outlined in the responsa “Michtav Sofer,” “Yoreh De’ah,” No. 3.

Shimon Sofer lived from 1820–1883. He was born in Pressburg, was the son of the Chasam Sofer, and in 1861 became the chief rabbi of Krakow. In addition to his halachic activities, he represented Jewish interests in the Austro-Hungarian parliament.

He acknowledged that after the widespread distribution of hybrids, it was practically impossible to find a chicken about which one could confidently say that there was no admixture of new lines in its origin.

Thus, in Galicia, the dispute ended not with a formal victory for one side and not with a single gathering of rabbis. It was gradually changed by practice itself: permissive decisions became widespread, and new breeds mixed with the local population.

Mukachevo: A New Boundary at the Beginning of the 20th Century

In Transcarpathia, the dispute resumed around another bird.

At the beginning of the 20th century, chickens of the Faverolles breed, distinguished by having five toes on each foot, were brought to Eastern Europe from France.

This feature should not be confused with the special hind toe of a permitted bird mentioned in the Mishnah, tractate “Chullin,” 3:6.

The Talmudic “additional toe” refers to a hind toe located above the main line of the other toes. In the case of Faverolles, it was a full-fledged fifth toe and a noticeably different foot structure.

Rabbi Chaim Elazar Shapira, who lived from 1868–1937, considered such a difference significant.

He headed the rabbinical court and Hasidic community of Mukachevo, and from 1913 was the chief rabbi of the city and leader of the Mukachevo Hasidic dynasty.

Shapira is best known for his multi-volume collection of responsa “Minchat Elazar”, after which he is often referred to in halachic literature.

He did not claim that having five toes necessarily made the bird forbidden. The main problem was that the noticeable anatomical difference did not allow for the automatic extension of the local tradition of the ordinary chicken to the Faverolles.

In the Mukachevo case, the strict position received broad support. Students of Chaim Elazar Shapira prepared separate halachic justifications against the automatic recognition of this breed.

Thus, a boundary was effectively drawn between economic changes and pronounced anatomical features.

Large size, high productivity, or rapid growth were no longer perceived as sufficient reasons for prohibition. But a bird that significantly differed in structure from the accepted local chicken required independent halachic justification.

What Approach Ultimately Took Hold

In the lands of modern Ukraine, no single decree on new breeds emerged.

However, the practice of Lviv, Brody, Komarno, Skala-Podilska, Khust, and Mukachevo helped formulate an important distinction.

Ordinary new lines of domestic chickens were gradually accepted. This was facilitated by evidence from other communities, permissive responsa from influential rabbis, and the impossibility of separating numerous hybrids from the old population.

Birds with pronounced anatomical differences continued to be considered separately. In their regard, the stricter Mukachevo approach retained influence in subsequent halachic literature.

What Present Genetic Editing Will Change

Today, poultry farming is approaching a new stage. Researchers are working with CRISPR and other genome editing technologies, trying to create chickens resistant to viruses, better able to withstand heat, or possessing other specified properties.

Here, old disputes about selection and interbreeding no longer provide a complete answer.

Rabbis will need to determine:

• whether a bird remains the same halachic species after a targeted genome change;
• whether the source of the added genetic material matters;
• whether the decision changes if editing affects appearance or behavior;
• whether the previous masoret applies to subsequent generations;
• whether a microscopic change can be considered insignificant for halachic classification.

This question cannot be mixed with the ordinary Cornish Cross.

The modern industrial broiler is primarily formed through traditional selection, hybridization, and selection, even if breeders use complex genetic calculations.

Cultivated meat, grown from cells without the birth and slaughter of a whole bird, is considered separately.

Its status depends not so much on the breed of the chicken, but on the origin of the cell line, the composition of the nutrient medium, and whether the final product is considered meat from the perspective of Halacha.

Why ordinary chicken is considered kosher today

Despite ongoing discussions, the largest kashrut organizations have not declared standard industrial broilers or white leghorns as a newly prohibited bird.

The main arguments remain:

1. modern lines continue to biologically and externally relate to domestic chickens;
2. they originate from the crossing of known chicken breeds;
3. their meat and eggs have been continuously consumed by Jewish communities;
4. the birds have been slaughtered for decades under the supervision of authoritative rabbinical organizations;
5. attempts to find persistent signs of predatory birds in them have not received convincing confirmation.

NAnews — News of Israel emphasizes: the belonging of the bird to a permitted species is only the first stage.

The meat of a specific chicken becomes suitable for kosher cuisine after proper shechita, inspection for damage, blood removal, salting, and passing through the entire production chain under supervision.

Therefore, the publication of The Jewish Weekly does not mean that the kashrut of ordinary chicken is under threat.

On the contrary, it shows how the halachic system works: new technologies are not automatically accepted, but they are not prohibited just because they did not exist in Talmudic times.

Rabbinical authorities compare classical texts, accumulated tradition, biological data, and practical observations.

It is precisely because of this that the chicken on the Shabbat table remains connected not only with the modern poultry farm but also with the centuries-old chain of Jewish communal memory.

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Felix Shinder in Israel in 2026: “Lemonchiki”, klezmer, three concerts and Odessa, which you can’t take with you – it travels itself – October 15 – Haifa, October 21 – Netanya, October 23 – Bat Yam - September 10, 2026 - Новости Израиля

Jews from Ukraine: The History of the “Jewish Kuren” in the Ukrainian Galician Army of 1919 - September 9, 2026 - Новости Израиля

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The Chief Rabbi of Ukraine, Moshe Reuven Asman, reported on September 2, 2026, that a serviceman of the Armed Forces of Ukraine with the call sign “Hasid” received a new award and became a full holder of the “Star of Glory.” The wording of the basis is also unusual: the award followed “for the execution of special tasks from the High Command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.”

Asman did not name the real name of the serviceman, nor the unit, nor the nature of these tasks. He only wrote that “Hasid” is a believer of his community, and added: “I am sincerely proud that there are such Jews in our community.”

For NANews, this is not the first appearance of “Hasid.” We have already detailed his story after another award. At that time, it was possible to gather a rather rare combination of open information: the person hides his face and name, but at the same time appears for years in official and semi-official materials about the training of Ukrainian military personnel.

Now the “Star of Glory” has been added to this biography. And this is where the story becomes more complicated than a short Facebook post. Author: Lev Varshavsky

What is the “Star of Glory”

An award with this name exists in the system of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine.

The GUR in its official publications called the “Star of Glory” its highest award. It was awarded to military intelligence officers and servicemen for special merits, including the execution of reconnaissance and special tasks.

It is important to clarify immediately: this is not a state award of Ukraine at the level of the title Hero of Ukraine or the Order “For Courage.” The “Star of Glory” is a departmental award, but within the structure of military intelligence, its status is the highest.

There is another detail without which Asman’s expression “full holder” is difficult to understand.

In the GUR award catalogs, there are separately “Star of Glory” I degree and “Star of Glory” II degree.

If it is about this award, the expression “full holder” usually means receiving all existing degrees. That is, “Hasid” must have received both.

But this is where the line is drawn between what is known and what only follows from the combination of signs.

Asman’s publication does not contain the words “GUR of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine.” The degree of the current award is not specified. No certificate is published. There is no order number. Therefore, the phrase “Hasid received both degrees of the highest GUR award” would be too categorical for now.

At the same time, three elements coincide at once: the name “Star of Glory,” the presence of two degrees in the GUR award, and the expression “full holder.” This is added to the basis for the award — special tasks of the high military command.

This is no longer a random coincidence of names. But the last documentary link is not yet available in open access.

Who is this person anyway

“Hasid” has appeared in Ukrainian materials for at least several years.

He was presented as an instructor with serious combat experience, engaged in the training of infantry, mechanized units, and scouts. In materials about the training of Ukrainian fighters, he appeared not as a media hero, but as a person training those who were to go to the front afterward.

The State Border Guard Service of Ukraine talked about his participation in the training of the assault brigade “Steel Border.”

In the same context, his experience related to special units of Ukraine and Israel was mentioned.

And here, in retellings, the biography began to be filled with details that the primary publications do not confirm. On the internet, “Hasid” is often directly called a former fighter of the Israeli special forces. We did not find a reliable open document that would allow us to assert this.

There is a connection with Israel. The formula “Israeli special forces” is already a stronger statement.

NANews has already analyzed the broader topic of Jewish servicemen in the Armed Forces of Ukraine. There arose a similar problem: there is no official statistics of the Ukrainian army by nationality, so the picture has to be assembled from individual people, community publications, military obituaries, awards, and unit reports.

“Hasid” is one of the rare cases when a person is simultaneously quite well-known and almost completely anonymous.

He met with Zelensky

There is another detail that poorly matches the image of a completely “shadow” serviceman.

On April 6, 2026, Volodymyr Zelensky met with rabbis of Ukrainian cities and representatives of Jewish communities on the eve of Passover. Among the participants was a serviceman of the Armed Forces of Ukraine with the call sign “Hasid.”

NANews wrote about this meeting separately.

That is, we have a person whose real name is still not mentioned, but who is allowed to an official event with the president of the country as a representative of that part of the Jewish community that directly participates in the defense of Ukraine.

For a public biography, this is a rather unusual combination.

He can be shown next to the president.

You can talk about awards.

You can discuss his work as an instructor.

But you cannot name the name and explain what exactly he is doing now.

After Asman’s message, this contrast became even more noticeable.

The Jewish line here is not decorative

The call sign “Hasid” was not invented by journalists.

The serviceman himself openly spoke about his Jewish identity and religious tradition. Asman now directly calls him a person of his community.

The rabbi had previously talked about Jews serving in the Armed Forces of Ukraine and relations between Ukraine and Israel. Over the years of war, this topic has long ceased to be limited to a few well-known names.

Jews of Ukraine found themselves in combat units, territorial defense, medical service, volunteer structures, and army chaplaincy.

There are also those who have died.

In a large material on August 29, 2026, NANews collected stories of Jews and people with Israeli biographies who died defending Ukraine. The open name list remains incomplete. Representatives of Jewish structures name numbers significantly exceeding the number of cases that can be independently restored from publications.

This is a separate problem of any attempt to count “Jews in the Armed Forces of Ukraine”: the army does not divide its servicemen in public statistics by religion and nationality.

Therefore, the story of each specific person acquires an unusually large significance.

There are also chaplains

In the Ukrainian army, the Jewish component has long existed not only at the level of individual fighters.

NANews talked about the orthodox Jew Yakov Sinyakov, who became a military chaplain. There are other representatives of Jewish military clergy.

This is already an institutional part of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

The religious community accompanies its servicemen not only through humanitarian aid or public prayers. There are chaplains, official contacts with military leadership, funerals of the deceased according to Jewish rites, and people like “Hasid,” who combine religious identity with professional military service.

Therefore, Asman’s current message looks different if you read it not separately, but within this story.

He congratulates not a random Jew who found himself in the army.

He writes about a person of his community who has been present in the military context for many years and now, according to the rabbi, received a distinction for special tasks of the high command.

What is connected with Israel here

“Hasid” indeed has an Israeli part of his biography.

But to conclude from this that we have an “Israeli fighting for Ukraine” would be inaccurate.

In known publications, he appears primarily as a serviceman of Ukraine. Israel appears as part of his experience, training, and Jewish biography.

For the Israeli audience, something else is more important.

Over the years of war, a whole layer of people has emerged whose lives physically connect the two countries. Some repatriated to Israel but returned to defend Ukraine. Some have children serving in the IDF while the parents are in the Ukrainian army. Some gained military experience in Israel and then apply it in Ukraine. There are those who died with dual or complex Ukrainian-Israeli biographies.

This is not a single group and not one political story.

“Hasid” is another example of such a connection, and one of the most closed.

NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency has been collecting these biographies for several years precisely because official Ukrainian-Israeli relations do not explain everything that happens between the two societies.

Diplomacy may argue about weapons, Russia, or votes at the UN.

And all this time, people serve, fight, die, and receive awards.

And what do we really know in the end

There is a message from Moshe Reuven Asman.

He claims that “Hasid” became a full holder of the “Star of Glory.”

There is a specific wording of the basis: the execution of special tasks of the high command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

There is a GUR award with exactly this name.

It is officially one of the highest departmental distinctions of military intelligence and has I and II degrees.

There is a long-standing public history of “Hasid” as an instructor and serviceman.

There is his confirmed participation in Zelensky’s meeting with Jewish leaders.

There is a connection with Asman’s community.

There is an Israeli part of his military biography, but without confirmation of popular formulations about specific service in the Israeli special forces.

And there is a large void where the most interesting begins: what exactly special tasks he performed.

Open sources do not provide an answer to this question.

And for now, this is perhaps the only part of the story that really should not be filled with guesses.

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Felix Shinder in Israel in 2026: “Lemonchiki”, klezmer, three concerts and Odessa, which you can’t take with you – it travels itself – October 15 – Haifa, October 21 – Netanya, October 23 – Bat Yam - September 10, 2026 - Новости Израиля

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On June 29, 2026, the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine recorded: Russian authorities in the occupied territories continue to forcibly conscript protected persons into the Russian armed forces. In March, the UN separately described the mechanism by which a Russian passport, military registration, and conscription become links in one chain.

I, R.Verter, for NANews — News of Israel compared data from the Ukrainian GUR, Russian figures, the reconstruction by ‘Important Stories’, UN documents, and an investigation into violence within the Russian army. There is no single figure to date. But the sources allow us to see how tens of thousands of people went through this system and what happened to those who tried to leave it.

When searching for “how many Ukrainians Russia mobilized in the occupied territories” or “is mobilization ongoing in 2026”, it is important not to mix data from different years. 55–60 thousand is the estimate of Ukrainian intelligence by mid-2023, more than 73 thousand is the independent reconstruction of the Donetsk and Luhansk corps, 78.9 thousand is the figure of the Russian General Staff cited in the investigation. These are different slices of one process.

73 thousand were seen through army bureaucracy

On June 4, 2025, ‘Important Stories’ published a study based not only on statements from the parties but on leaks of lists of Russian servicemen wanted for unauthorized absence and desertion. Journalists noted personal tags of the ‘AB’ series. Until early 2023, this series was characteristic of military personnel from the occupied parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, and later it was also used for recruited prisoners from ‘Storm Z’.

By ‘DNR’ and ‘LNR’ here are meant entities created with Russian support in the captured areas of Ukraine’s Donetsk and Luhansk regions. After the full-scale invasion, their armed formations were finally integrated into the Russian military system.

The most important thing in the study is not the letter series itself. The numbers formed sequences. In some blocks, surnames were in alphabetical order, in others — in the order of the unit’s regular list. Journalists found 79 alphabetical sequences and another 13 blocks related to the structure of the units. Additional verification was provided by relatives’ announcements about the missing: the numbers of people not in the leak stood between neighboring surnames. Thus, a minimum estimate appeared — 48.9 thousand people in the Donetsk and 24.1 thousand in the Luhansk formations, totaling more than 73 thousand.

This figure probably does not cover everyone. Almost two thousand people from the leak were included in the Russian army by a secret order on January 1, 2023. According to a source from ‘Important Stories’, the order formalized as Russian servicemen even those who did not sign a report on continuing service and did not conclude a contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense. From the initial mobilization to the appearance of a personal number, almost a year could pass. A person who died, went missing, or dropped out earlier might not be counted at all.

That is why there are estimates of 55–60 thousand, 73 thousand, and 78.9 thousand. They relate to different arrays and moments of the war. And taking into account people who already served in these corps before February 24, 2022, the total number of formations, according to researchers, could exceed 100 thousand.

The passport turned out not to be the end of pressure, but the beginning of the next stage

For the Israeli reader, it is important here to distinguish between the usual mobilization of a state of its citizens and the actions of an occupying power. Article 51 of the Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits the occupying power from forcing protected persons to serve in its armed or auxiliary forces. Pressure to achieve formally voluntary enlistment is also prohibited. Human Rights Watch in its 2026 report qualifies the Russian forced conscription of Ukrainian citizens in the occupied territories as a war crime.

The UN report from March 20, 2026 shows that it does not necessarily start with a summons. After the illegal annexation, Russia began to consider Ukrainians without Russian documents as ‘foreigners’. Access to medicine, pensions, social assistance, work, property, banking services, and insurance was gradually linked to the possession of a Russian passport. At checkpoints, people without it faced enhanced checks, interrogations, and searches.

Then the military part of the system was activated. After imposing Russian citizenship, Ukrainian men 18–30 years old were considered subject to conscription by the Russian authorities. According to the UN, since October 2023, five conscription campaigns have already taken place in the occupied territories. Moscow does not publish separate complete statistics, but documents studied by the UN indicate thousands of illegally conscripted residents.

This report contains details that disappear behind large statistics. A 21-year-old resident of the Zaporizhzhia region told the UN that in 2023 he was forced to obtain a Russian passport to be able to move around. But immediately after receiving the document, he was ordered to undergo military registration. He left the occupied territory to avoid ending up in the Russian army.

Another case is a young man from the Luhansk region. He left a few days before his eighteenth birthday precisely because of the fear of Russian conscription. In these two stories, the chain is clearly visible, which is not conveyed by a single figure: a document is needed for a person for ordinary life, but the same document opens the next stage for the occupation administration — military registration and the possibility of conscription.

What losses and desertion from units say

Already in the first year of the full-scale war, formations from the Donetsk and Luhansk regions suffered huge losses. ‘Important Stories’ cites data on more than 20 thousand killed and wounded, and the estimate used by the BBC Russian Service for those killed from the two occupied regions was 21–23.5 thousand people. These figures cannot simply be subtracted from 73 thousand: sources and methodologies differ. But they show why the number ever mobilized is not equal to the number of people currently in the ranks.

Another significant array is desertion. In the largest blocks of tags, covering two to four thousand servicemen, 8 to 19% of the personnel were wanted for unauthorized absence. Of the 11.5 thousand people with ‘AB’ series tags, at least 2.7 thousand were detained. At the time of the study, 2817 servicemen from these territories were still on the federal wanted list, and for more than 800, the search was discontinued.

This is an important boundary. Among the residents of occupied Ukraine who ended up in the Russian army, there were people who consciously fought on the side of Russia. But mass mobilization, the coercion described by the UN, and thousands who tried to leave the units do not allow automatically considering every person in such units as a volunteer.

Refusal to assault does not mean the possibility of simply leaving

A separate layer of this story is violence already within the Russian army. In October 2025, ‘Verstka’ compiled a card index of 101 servicemen whom colleagues and relatives accused of so-called ‘nullifications’: extrajudicial killings, torture to death, and sending people into assaults from which it is almost impossible to return. Among the reasons in the collected testimonies was the refusal to go on an assault.

One of the described cases concerns servicemen who, according to colleagues, were ordered to move forward through a minefield. After the refusal, two died. In another story, a conscript claimed that those who refused to carry out obviously deadly tasks were shot. These are testimonies, not statistics of the entire Russian army, but they show why the question ‘why didn’t the person just refuse?’ may not have an obvious answer.

Here, too, it is important not to turn the investigation into the slogan ‘refused — will definitely be killed’. Such a universal dependency is not proven by the sources. But another link appears: a person may first fall under the pressure of the occupation administration, then under military registration and conscription, and already within the unit face the threat of punishment for refusing to carry out a deadly order.

And this is not a closed chapter of the first months of the invasion. On June 29, 2026, the UN again recorded the continuation of forced conscription in the occupied territory. And on July 16, Human Rights Watch reported another long-term element: in Russian schools in the captured territories, boys are directed to military registration, simultaneously integrating military training and militarized education into the educational system.

For NANews — News of Israel, this is where the main meaning of this story lies. Occupation changes not only the map and administration. It can first put a person before a choice between Russian documents and normal everyday life, then turn these documents into a basis for military registration, and then demand to serve in an army fighting against his own country.

And therefore, tens of thousands here are not just a figure in military statistics. Behind it is visible a mechanism: the mass recruitment of 2022, military formalization, huge losses, attempts to escape, pressure through documents, and new conscription campaigns. UN documents show that in 2026 this mechanism has not disappeared.

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Felix Shinder in Israel in 2026: “Lemonchiki”, klezmer, three concerts and Odessa, which you can’t take with you – it travels itself – October 15 – Haifa, October 21 – Netanya, October 23 – Bat Yam - September 10, 2026 - Новости Израиля

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On August 31, 2026, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan gathered the highest political and military leadership for the first time under the Mecca Defense Alliance. For Israel, the question is no longer whether a new bloc exists, but why the war with Iran provided Jerusalem with proof of its value to the Gulf countries—and at the same time did not make it part of the emerging security architecture.

On August 31, 2026, in Istanbul, the foreign ministers, defense ministers, and top military leadership of Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan held the first meeting of the Strategic Political and Defense Committee, established under the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement. This is already the second stage of a story that began on August 7 in Mecca: then Mohammed bin Salman, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and Shehbaz Sharif signed an agreement that an armed attack on one of the three countries should be considered an attack on all three.

The formula itself sounds almost like NATO’s Article 5, so the new bloc quickly received the labels “Islamic NATO” and “Meccan Pact.” But after the meeting in Istanbul, something more important than a label emerged. The three countries began turning the political declaration into a permanent mechanism: a secretariat is being created in Saudi Arabia, the first secretary-general for three years should be a representative from Pakistan, and cooperation will cover the connectivity of armed forces, defense industry, joint technology development, and production.

For NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency, the sensation around the name is not important, but rather the more uncomfortable question. The war with Iran showed that Israel is capable of practically helping Arab states repel Iranian strikes. So why is Saudi Arabia, which itself faced the threat of regional escalation, institutionalizing a defense alliance not with Israel, but with Turkey and Pakistan?

I, Stas Shifer, for this material compared what changed after the signing of the agreement on August 7 with previous NANews materials on Saudi normalization, Israeli assistance to the UAE, and the Iran-Russia military link. And the main change is visible precisely over time: on August 7 we had an agreement, and by August 31 there was already a secretariat, a permanent committee, and talk of expansion. This is not yet NATO, but it is no longer just a photo of three leaders after the ceremony.

From agreement to structure: what emerged in three weeks

NANews has already analyzed the moment of signing in the material “Turkey joined the defense alliance with Saudi Arabia and nuclear Pakistan: what the principle ‘an attack on one is an attack on all’ changes for Israel”. At that time, the central fact was precisely the formula of collective defense.

After Istanbul, an institutional shell was added to it. The joint statement of the three countries speaks of the need to make collective deterrence and defense effective, strengthen the interaction of armed forces, jointly develop technologies and production. This is an important detail. Military alliances become real not at the moment when leaders sign a beautiful document, but when people, procedures, permanent structures, joint projects, and regular meetings appear.

The Meccan alliance does not yet have integrated command at the NATO level, no publicly described automatic military response, and no published full set of operational protocols. Therefore, the phrase “a new NATO has already been created” would be an exaggeration. But calling the agreement symbolic is now difficult. The secretariat means that cooperation should not depend on a single meeting of leaders.

There is another boundary that is important not to blur. The official joint statement on August 31 explicitly names the defense industry, joint technology development, and production. Intelligence sharing as a separate formalized point is not prescribed there. Therefore, I would not write that the three states have already created a common intelligence system. Intelligence assistance may be part of practical defense cooperation, but it is not the same.

The very fact of such clarification is important for understanding the scale. We are not looking at a ready-made Middle Eastern NATO analog with a headquarters, unified command, and pre-written war scenarios. We are looking at the process of its institutionalization. It is this process that matters for Israel.

Why Pakistan and Turkey are needed by Riyadh right now

If you look at the new bloc only through Iran, Saudi Arabia’s choice indeed seems strange. Israel has powerful missile defense, intelligence capabilities, early warning systems, and real experience intercepting Iranian missiles and drones. Turkey and Pakistan, on the other hand, do not show a desire to turn the agreement into a mechanism for a future war with Tehran.

But this may be part of Saudi calculation.

Riyadh needs not just a partner against one specific enemy. It needs a set of insurances. Pakistan provides Saudi Arabia with decades-built military ties, a large army, a defense industry, and the status of a nuclear power. Turkey provides a large NATO state army, its own rapidly growing defense industry, drone technologies, experience in operations outside the country, and political influence in several regions.

The background here is especially important. The new trilateral mechanism did not arise out of thin air on August 7. As early as September 17, 2025, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan concluded a separate mutual defense agreement. There, almost the same logic already appeared: an attack on one of the parties is considered an attack on both. Thus, Mecca in 2026 did not create a Saudi-Pakistani military link—it expanded an already existing structure with Turkey.

And this is one of the details that get lost in a short news summary. If you start the story only from August 2026, it seems that the three leaders suddenly decided to create a new bloc after the war with Iran. If you add September 2025, the picture is different: Saudi Arabia was already looking for alternative security guarantees, and the current war accelerated the process.

For Riyadh, the appeal lies precisely in multivectorism. The kingdom maintains the closest relations with the US, receives American weapons, and negotiates a nuclear program, but at the same time builds a regional mechanism. This reduces dependence on a single guarantor. In the next crisis, Saudi Arabia wants to have not one phone in Washington, but several centers of power interested in its security.

And here the first non-obvious connection appears. Pakistan and Turkey are useful to Riyadh also because they are not part of Israel’s strategy against Iran. Such an alliance leaves Saudi Arabia room for maneuver: to contain Tehran without declaring itself a participant in the Israeli camp; to cooperate with the US without giving Washington a monopoly on security; to maintain its own role in the Muslim world.

The war with Iran gave Israel a chance—and showed the limit of this chance

Here arises a real paradox for Israel.

During the war with Iran, the theory of joint regional air defense practically became practice. On April 26, Axios reported that Israel deployed an Iron Dome battery, interceptors, and several dozen Israeli military personnel to operate the system in the United Arab Emirates. Later, US Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee publicly spoke about the deployment of Israeli batteries and personnel in the Emirates.

NANews analyzed this episode in detail in the material “Israeli ‘Iron Dome’ in the UAE—if Axios data is confirmed, this is a new level of alliance against Iran”. Today that text reads differently. Then the main question was: can the Iranian threat turn the Abraham Accords from diplomatic normalization into real defense partnership?

Now we have a partial answer: with the UAE—yes, at least at the level of specific military assistance. But Saudi Arabia chose a different structure for an institutional alliance.

Here it is necessary to explain the term itself. The Abraham Accords are a process of normalization of Israel with a number of Arab countries, initiated in 2020 with US mediation. For the Israeli reader, the UAE is already habitually perceived as a partner, but historically open military cooperation of Israel with an Arab state is not a routine thing. Therefore, the appearance of an Israeli battery with Israeli operators in the Emirates during a real war became a fundamentally new level of relations.

And it is here that a missed opportunity arises.

Iranian missiles and drones do not divide the countries of the region into participants and non-participants of the Abraham Accords. Israel has a multi-layered air and missile defense system, the Gulf states have their own radars, bases, American infrastructure, air defense systems, and advantageous geographical position. A connected network of warning and interception is potentially stronger than a set of isolated national systems.

That is, the war created the very moment when a common threat could sharply accelerate the political integration of Israel with moderate Arab states.

But at the same time, it demonstrated the limit of technology. Israel can be an extremely useful partner at the moment when missiles are flying, and still remain too complex a partner for a formal political alliance. Military value and political acceptability are different things.

Why a common enemy did not make Saudi Arabia an ally of Israel

In Israel, it is very easy to build a linear chain: Iran attacks Israel and the Gulf countries → Israel and the Saudis have a common enemy → therefore, normalization should accelerate.

But the Middle East does not work that way.

Saudi Arabia indeed perceives Iran as a serious threat. But at the same time, it does not want to live in a system where its choice is reduced to two options: depend on the US or join the Israeli camp. The Meccan alliance creates a third option—a regional insurance with states whose cooperation does not require the Saudi leadership to explain to its and the Arab audience an open defense alliance with Israel.

Turkey is especially indicative here. Ankara competes with Tehran in a number of regions and is not an Iranian ally, but at the same time its relations with Israel are much more conflictual. Therefore, the same structure can perform different functions for different participants: for Saudi Arabia, it is an additional insurance against Iran and other crises, for Turkey, it is also a way to prevent Israel from becoming the sole center of a new regional architecture.

It is here that I separate fact from political assessment.

The fact is that the normalization of Saudi Arabia with Israel remains blocked, and Riyadh continues to demand a real political path to Palestinian statehood. On August 25, the Trump administration again tried to link the implementation of the US-Saudi nuclear agreement to the recognition of Israel, but the Saudi position on the Palestinian issue has not disappeared.

My assessment is different: the government of Benjamin Netanyahu has made the price of public rapprochement with Israel for the Saudi leadership extremely high. Netanyahu can be briefly called a toxic partner for Riyadh, but this word itself explains nothing. It is important to show the mechanism: the war in Gaza, the absence of an acceptable political horizon for the Saudis on the Palestinian issue, and the inability to sell the Arab audience a historic normalization without a reciprocal political result from Israel.

NANews already has an important background on this line. In the material “Israel lost the price of normalization: Saudi Arabia got a path to F-35 and uranium enrichment” we analyzed how part of the American incentives for Riyadh began to exist separately from the recognition of Israel.

Then the situation changed again: Washington tried to return normalization to the US-Saudi deal. This is important not only for understanding Trump’s relations with Mohammed bin Salman. Israel is actually competing to ensure that normalization itself remains a strategically irreplaceable asset for Saudi Arabia, and not just one of the possible bonuses.

Six-seven potential participants can change the scale of history

There is another element due to which the Meccan alliance cannot be considered only as a triangle Ankara—Riyadh—Islamabad.

Pakistani Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar stated that six or seven Muslim states have shown interest in joining. The full list is not publicly named. Therefore, today it is impossible to write that “seven more countries are joining the alliance.” Only the presence of interest and work on the mechanism of possible expansion is confirmed.

This distinction seems small, but for a news text, it is fundamental. “Seven countries are joining” means an almost ready expansion. “Six-seven states have shown interest” means the beginning of a negotiation competition, where some potential participants may eventually refuse.

Bangladesh has already publicly discussed such a possibility. Turkey separately named Egypt as a natural potential partner. And one Egypt would be enough for the political weight of the structure to noticeably increase: it is the largest Arab country by population, a country with a peace treaty with Israel, controlling the Suez Canal and possessing one of the largest armies in the region.

If other states begin to join the alliance, the question for Israel will also change.

So far, the Meccan alliance can be considered an additional trilateral mechanism. But if it becomes a platform where Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Egypt, and other Muslim states discuss joint weapons, technologies, production, air defense, and crisis response, an independent decision-making center will emerge.

And the absence of Israel will then acquire practical significance.

Not because the participants will automatically become enemies of Israel. That would be too simplistic a conclusion. Egypt has had a peace treaty with Israel for decades. Potential participants are capable of simultaneously cooperating with Jerusalem and being part of another defense structure.

The problem is different: standards, purchases, joint production, political consultations, and rules for responding to regional crises will be formed in a room where Israel is not present.

Search formulations “Meccan Pact against Israel,” “Islamic NATO against Iran,” “Saudi Arabia Turkey Pakistan military alliance,” or “new Muslim military alliance” therefore still give too crude a picture. Another is confirmed: there is a collective defense agreement; it has already received permanent institutions; the founders are preparing the possibility of expansion; a specific opponent is not named in the agreement. For Israel, the risk is not in the proven emergence of a hostile bloc, but in the gradual formation of a regional security system in which Israel ceases to be a mandatory participant.

What Israel risks losing—and what can still be preserved

NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency has been writing for many months about how the war with Iran connects plots that previously seemed separate.

In the material “Iran and Russia: how the war in Ukraine became a testing ground for a future war against Israel and the US” we showed the flip side of the same problem: technologies, drones, tactics, and accumulated combat experience can transition between the Russian-Ukrainian and Middle Eastern theaters of war.

The Ukrainian experience here is needed not for an obligatory insert about Ukraine. It shows that the modern security system is built not only around formal agreements. It is built around the compatibility of systems, the production of drones and interceptors, intelligence, logistics, repair, ammunition, and the ability to quickly adopt the experience of someone else’s war.

It is precisely these connections that the Meccan alliance is now trying to gradually institutionalize.

Israel has very strong cards: air and missile defense, radars, intelligence, cybersecurity, precision weapons, anti-drone solutions, and real experience in repelling massive attacks. The episode with the UAE showed that an Arab country is capable of turning to Israel at the moment of immediate threat and receiving practical military assistance.

This is a serious strategic asset.

But an asset is useless if it cannot be turned into stable political relations.

The next Israeli government—regardless of its party composition—will receive not an abstract task “to improve relations with the Arab world,” but a much more specific one. It is necessary to maintain and expand defense coordination with the UAE and Bahrain, retain strategic relations with Egypt and Jordan, return the political meaning of Saudi normalization, and offer the countries of the region a system of cooperation that does not force them to choose between Israel and their own Muslim partners.

This does not necessarily have to be a mirror “anti-Meccan pact.”

A more realistic goal is a network of bilateral agreements, early warning systems, compatible air defense elements, data exchange, defense technology projects, and further development of opportunities that emerged after the Abraham Accords. In other words, Israel does not necessarily have to sit at every regional table. But it needs to ensure that no serious security system in the region can fully function without Israeli capabilities.

That is why the meeting on August 31 in Istanbul is more important than the loudest formula “an attack on one is an attack on all.”

It shows that after the war with Iran, the states of the region are not waiting for Washington or Jerusalem to offer them a ready-made architecture. They are building their own.

For Israel, this is a warning on several levels at once. A common enemy does not by itself create an alliance. Military superiority does not guarantee political influence. Supplying technology in a moment of crisis does not mean that the recipient of this assistance will choose Israel as its main strategic partner.

In 2026, Israel has already proven that it is capable of physically helping an Arab state defend against Iranian fire.

Now the task is much more difficult: to prove that Israel can be not only a supplier of interceptors when missiles are already flying but also a long-term partner in creating the rules of the region before the next war.

Sources joint statement of the Strategic Political and Defense Committee of the Meccan Agreement on August 31, 2026; official statements of Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan; Reuters; Axios; previous NANews materials.

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Felix Shinder in Israel in 2026: “Lemonchiki”, klezmer, three concerts and Odessa, which you can’t take with you – it travels itself – October 15 – Haifa, October 21 – Netanya, October 23 – Bat Yam - September 10, 2026 - Новости Израиля

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On August 31, 2026, an official reception was held in Tel Aviv to mark the 35th anniversary of Ukraine’s independence. At the event, Ukraine’s ambassador to Israel, Yevhen Korniychuk, urged the Israeli side to “join forces” against common enemies and threats, and Israeli Minister Zeev Elkin addressed the guests in Ukrainian.

The diplomatic reception itself could easily have been left in the protocol section. But I, Viktoria Katzman, compared Korniychuk’s speech with what Israel and Ukraine have publicly said to each other in recent months. It turns out to be not a festive formula: the theme of a common enemy is gradually transitioning from Ukrainian statements to official Israeli rhetoric.

If you are looking for what Yevhen Korniychuk said in Tel Aviv on August 31, who represented Israel at the celebration of Ukraine’s Independence Day, and why Russia and Iran appear again in this story, it is important to distinguish three levels: the words of the Ukrainian ambassador, the already officially established dialogue between Israel and Ukraine on the Iranian threat, and specific joint decisions that have not yet been announced.

Main source: publication of the Embassy of Ukraine in the State of Israel from August 31, distributed jointly with the Ukrainian Cultural Center in Tel Aviv.

The reception was on August 31, while Independence Day is on the 24th.

Ukraine celebrates Independence Day on August 24: it was on August 24, 1991, that the Verkhovna Rada adopted the Act of Declaration of Independence. In 2026, it marked 35 years since that date. The diplomatic reception in Tel Aviv took place a week later — on August 31. The 35th anniversary of independence was officially celebrated in Ukraine on August 24.

According to the embassy, among the guests were representatives of the Knesset, the Israeli government, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the diplomatic corps, Ukrainian public activists, members of Israeli Friends of Ukraine, and Israelis supporting Ukraine. Fallen defenders of Ukraine were honored with a minute of silence.

Korniychuk reminded that the full-scale Russian aggression has been ongoing for four and a half years, that missiles and drones continue to strike cities and civilian infrastructure, and simultaneously stated: in 2026, Ukraine managed to “bring the war back to Russian territory,” striking strategic targets far from the front line.

Moreover, this statement did not sound in a vacuum. Already on September 1, the day after the reception, another Russian airstrike on Kyiv and the Kyiv region resulted in the death of 12 people. Thus, Korniychuk’s words about ongoing attacks were not an anniversary retrospective but a description of a war that was literally happening at that time.

What do “common enemies” mean if the ambassador did not name them?

In the published text of Korniychuk’s speech, he does not list countries after the words about “common enemies and threats.” Therefore, I will not directly insert names into this quote that are not there.

But the political context here is quite transparent.

On July 23, 2025, Foreign Ministers Gideon Saar and Andriy Sybiha in Kyiv officially agreed to launch a strategic dialogue between Israel and Ukraine on the Iranian threat. Saar then emphasized that Iranian weapons and technologies threaten not only Israel: the same drone technology is used against Ukraine.

In February 2026, a separate Strategic Israel–Ukraine Security Dialogue took place in Tel Aviv. NANews detailed the strategic dialogue between Israel and Ukraine — there, it was not about ceremonial friendship, but about the connection between the security of Europe and the Middle East, defense technologies, and the strengthening of Russian-Iranian cooperation.

In April, Sybiha, after a conversation with Saar, again stated that Ukraine is ready to cooperate with Israel on common security challenges and specifically mentioned threats from Iran. And on July 29, he accepted Saar’s invitation to visit Israel for the 35th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the two states.

Therefore, Korniychuk’s phrase is not a declaration of a joint Ukrainian-Israeli front against Russia and Iran. But it is a continuation of the existing logic: Russia is waging war against Ukraine, Tehran has become a military partner of Moscow, and Israel considers Iran one of the main threats to its own security.

The most important thing happened before the reception — in Netanyahu’s letter.

There is a detail without which Korniychuk’s speech on August 31 looks much weaker than it actually was.

On August 24, Benjamin Netanyahu sent a congratulatory message to Volodymyr Zelensky on Independence Day. The letter became publicly known on August 26, when it was published by the Ukrainian president.

And in the document, the Israeli prime minister used a completely direct formulation:

“Our two countries face a common threat from Iran.”

NANews — Israel News separately analyzed Netanyahu’s letter to Zelensky and the important limitation of this story: Netanyahu did not announce a military alliance with Ukraine, arms supplies, a joint air defense system, or any new defense agreement.

But the language itself has changed.

Before this, it was Ukrainian diplomats who were particularly persistent in explaining to Israel why the Russian-Iranian connection concerns both countries. Now the formula “common threat” has already appeared in the document of the Israeli prime minister.

That is why I read Korniychuk’s words at the reception not as an attempt on August 31 to invent a new agenda, but as a public continuation of a conversation that is already ongoing between Kyiv and Jerusalem.

Why Elkin’s speech in Ukrainian is not a decorative detail

The embassy specifically noted that Zeev Elkin addressed the participants of the evening in Ukrainian.

For the Israeli reader, two explanations are needed here immediately.

Firstly, Elkin is not Israel’s finance minister. The finance minister is Bezalel Smotrich. Elkin’s official position is additional minister in the Ministry of Finance; he has held it since November 2024.

Secondly, the Ukrainian language at this event has a biographical dimension for him. Elkin was born in 1971 in Kharkiv, studied at Kharkiv University, and repatriated to Israel in 1990.

He is already involved in the practical Ukrainian-Israeli agenda. On December 4, 2025, in Jerusalem, Elkin, together with Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Taras Kachka, co-chaired a meeting of the joint Ukrainian-Israeli commission on trade and economic cooperation. This was the first meeting of the commission since the start of the full-scale Russian aggression; the previous one took place back in November 2021.

So, behind the person who spoke in Ukrainian to the guests on August 31, there is not only a Kharkiv biography but also a specific role in the revived intergovernmental dialogue.

“2000 Meters to Andriivka” already has a separate history in Israel

The second part of the evening was not dedicated to diplomacy. Guests were shown the documentary film by Mstyslav Chernov “2000 Meters to Andriivka” — the story of Ukrainian fighters who, during the 2023 counteroffensive, break through a fortified forest strip to the village of Andriivka occupied by Russian troops near Bakhmut.

And here is an Israeli detail that is not in the usual description of the film.

In 2025, “2000 Meters to Andriivka” won the main prize of the international competition DocAviv in Tel Aviv. Therefore, on August 31, the film effectively returned to the city where it had already received serious professional recognition.

With the “Oscar,” the wording should be kept as accurate as possible. Ukraine indeed officially selected the film as its entry for the 98th Academy Awards in the International Feature Film category. But it did not make it to the 15-film shortlist of the international category.

However, “2000 Meters to Andriivka” made it to the Oscar shortlist for Documentary Feature Film. This is a significant achievement, but a shortlist does not yet mean a final nomination for the award.

But with the “Emmy,” the status is already different. On May 29, 2026, the Associated Press reported that the film won the News & Documentary Emmy Award in the category Outstanding Direction: Documentary. In total, the film received six nominations for this award.

The embassy thanked the film club “Znyato v Ukraini / Created in Ukraine” for organizing the screening, specifically naming Svitlana Kozyreva and Roman Karasyk for promoting Ukrainian cinema in Israel and helping to showcase the film.

What really changed after August 31 — and what is still missing

I would not call this reception “Israel’s turn to Ukraine.” There are no facts for such a conclusion yet. No new arms supplies, joint air defense project, or agreement that would turn political formulations into commitments have been announced.

But the sequence of events is already difficult to consider coincidental.

In July 2025, Saar and Sybiha launch a dialogue on Iran. In February 2026, a strategic security discussion takes place in Tel Aviv. In the spring, Kyiv talks about common threats. In August, Netanyahu himself calls Iran a common threat to Israel and Ukraine. A few days later, Korniychuk in Tel Aviv proposes joining forces against common enemies.

And here appears another layer that is crucial for the Israeli audience. NANews detailed the Russian-Iranian military connection: initially, Iran provided Russia with Shahed and related technologies, then the Russian war against Ukraine became a multi-year environment for testing and improving mass missile-drone attacks.

Therefore, the question “what does Ukraine have to do with Israel’s security?” is becoming less theoretical.

For NANews — Israel News, the next verifiable milestone is already visible: will Andriy Sybiha’s agreed visit to Israel take place, and will practical projects emerge after political words — countering drones, protecting critical infrastructure, civil defense, defense technologies, or exchanging accumulated combat experience.

This will be more important than the diplomatic reception.

On August 31, Kyiv once again formulated the proposal. But after Netanyahu himself called Iran a common threat to both countries, the next question is already addressed to Jerusalem: will this formula remain the language of letters and speeches — or will it become a working policy.

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Felix Shinder in Israel in 2026: “Lemonchiki”, klezmer, three concerts and Odessa, which you can’t take with you – it travels itself – October 15 – Haifa, October 21 – Netanya, October 23 – Bat Yam - September 10, 2026 - Новости Израиля

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Sara Netanyahu raised the question of why Yair Golan was “so quickly ready to act” on the morning of October 7. I checked the chronology of his trip to the south, the preserved correspondence with the rescued, the history of 244 thousand publications, and Benjamin Netanyahu’s own words about the “betrayal” version.

On the evening of August 31, 2026, Sara Netanyahu, the wife of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, gave an interview to Channel 14 and spoke about Yair Golan — a reserve major general, former deputy chief of staff of the IDF, and current leader of the “Democrats” party. She “noted” that on the morning of October 7, 2023, Golan was very early “dressed and ready,” while, according to her, others, including the prime minister, “did not yet know what was happening.”

There was no direct accusation that Golan knew in advance about the Hamas attack. When asked about the “betrayal from within” version, Sara Netanyahu replied that she did not want to talk about it and did not know. But the very formula of “Golan’s suspiciously early readiness” has been part of the conspiracy campaign around October 7 for several years.

On the morning of September 1, Golan announced on the army radio station “Galei Tzahal” that he intended to file a defamation lawsuit against Sara Netanyahu.

I, Alexander Khmelnitsky, for NANews — News of Israel compared the current scandal with earlier testimonies about Golan’s actions on October 7. Here, the sequence of events is more important than the party position.

If you search today for “Sara Netanyahu Yair Golan,” “did Yair Golan know in advance about October 7,” “betrayal of October 7,” or “Yair Golan’s lawsuit,” it’s easy to mix facts and political accusations. It is established: Golan went south after the attack began and participated in rescuing people. No public evidence has been presented that he knew about the impending attack in advance.

What is known about Golan’s departure time

In the historical archive of testimonies “Edut 710,” Golan’s account is preserved: he began receiving the first reports of what was happening around 6:30 a.m. After that, he put on his uniform and left for the south in his own car around 8:00.

The Hamas attack began around 6:29. So, it was not a departure before the attack, but about an hour and a half after it began.

Initially, Golan was at the IDF Home Front Command headquarters — more familiar to Israelis as Pikud Ha-Oref — in Ramla, then at the Urim base. After that, he was engaged in searching for people hiding after the attack on the Nova festival. Relatives sent coordinates, which he tried to reach.

Later, Golan spoke of three trips to the Nova area and six people rescued. His own account should not close the question by itself. Therefore, I separately checked whether there are independent traces of these trips. They exist.

Correspondence from October 7 has been preserved

In the interactive archive of the Israeli public broadcaster KAN “7.10.360”, there is a story of the rescue of journalist Nir Gontage’s son.

At 15:37, Gontage informed Golan that people were hiding in the garden. At 15:39, Golan requested a contact for communication. Further in the correspondence, the location was clarified. At 16:21, Golan reported that he would connect with them in about a minute. At 17:15, Gontage was already thanking him.

This does not restore every minute of Golan’s day. But it is an independent time trace of a specific rescue operation, and the messages were created directly on October 7, 2023, not after three years of political disputes.

There are also testimonies from the families of the rescued, which appeared immediately after the attack. Therefore, the very fact of the rescue trips is based not only on Golan’s later stories about himself.

Here, the conspiracy construction begins to clash with the chronology. If the argument is that a person was “suspiciously early ready,” it is important first to establish when he even learned about the attack and when he left. Available evidence points to events already after the attack began.

Where did the 244 thousand tweets come from

In January 2026, FakeReporter, an Israeli organization researching disinformation campaigns, presented material titled “244 Thousand Tweets: The Campaign Against Yair Golan Revealed.”

This figure requires precision. It’s not about 244 thousand messages only about Golan’s trips to Nova. FakeReporter described a broader array of publications in which different versions were repeated: “as if Golan knew about the attack in advance, was connected with a ‘spy,’ collaborated with ‘Nukhba,’ or participated in ‘state betrayal.’”

“Nukhba” — Hamas assault units, whose militants participated in the invasion on October 7.

Therefore, Sara Netanyahu’s words caused such a reaction not by themselves. The question of why Golan was “dressed and ready” earlier than others fell into an already existing and widely disseminated narrative.

Why the reaction went beyond the left camp

Golan today leads the “Democrats” — a left-wing party formed after the merger of “Avoda” and MERETZ. Therefore, the defense from his own supporters is easily explained by party struggle. A much more indicative reaction is another.

Former Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot called the version of betrayal a conspiracy theory without factual basis and reminded that Golan went on his own to save people on October 7.

Former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett, a politician from another camp, stated that Golan got into a car with a weapon on the morning of October 7 and “went straight into hell,” risking his life for others.

Actor and publicist Hanoch Daum separately emphasized that he never voted for Golan and seriously disagreed with him in views, but considers it necessary to thank him for going to save Israelis on the morning of October 7.

That is why the scandal turned out to be broader than another quarrel between the government and the opposition. Another question arises: can the actions of a person who went to a mass murder area to save people be retrospectively turned into a basis for suspicion precisely because he arrived there quickly?

Netanyahu himself previously rejected “betrayal”

There is another detail without which the current story seems incomplete.

On February 5, 2026, Benjamin Netanyahu spoke at a closed meeting of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee. MP Chili Tropper asked him about the version of internal betrayal. The prime minister’s response, later published by several Israeli media, was unequivocal: there was an intelligence failure, but “there was no betrayal”.

This does not mean that one phrase from the prime minister can close the investigation into the causes of the disaster. But for the current dispute, the fact is important: Sara Netanyahu brought back into public discussion a motive that her husband himself rejected several months earlier.

At the same time, no public evidence has been presented that Golan knew about the impending attack in advance.

What the lawsuit might change

At the time of preparing the article, Golan announced his intention to sue, but I found no confirmation of the lawsuit’s registration. Therefore, writing that “Yair Golan has already sued Sara Netanyahu” would be incorrect for now.

If the lawsuit does appear, the dispute will move from television and social networks to where precise words and context will have to be analyzed. Golan has a chronology: the attack began around 6:29, he received the first messages after it started, left around 8:00, and individual rescue actions are independently confirmed.

Sara Netanyahu has another significant circumstance: she did not make a direct statement that Golan “participated in a conspiracy” or “knew about the attack in advance.” If the case goes to court, the line between a hint and a direct accusation may become one of the central issues.

I would not reduce this story to an unfortunate phrase on television. After October 7, Israel is still trying to answer a much heavier question: why did state and security mechanisms not stop the disaster, and who is responsible for it.

The “betrayal from within” theory offers a simple and emotionally strong answer to an extremely complex failure. But a simple answer becomes an established fact only when evidence appears.

In the case of Yair Golan, the available chronology today shows otherwise: he learned about the attack after it began, then went south and saved people. And Benjamin Netanyahu, with whom Sara Netanyahu now compares his actions, himself previously told MPs: “there was no betrayal”.

For NANews — News of Israel, this is the main result of the check: political assessments can be anything, but the sequence of events cannot be rearranged for the sake of a convenient version.

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Felix Shinder in Israel in 2026: “Lemonchiki”, klezmer, three concerts and Odessa, which you can’t take with you – it travels itself – October 15 – Haifa, October 21 – Netanya, October 23 – Bat Yam - September 10, 2026 - Новости Израиля

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“Ukrainian-Jewish Encounter” continues its project about famous Israelis of Ukrainian origin – Natan Sharansky.

Today, Natan Sharansky remains a good friend of Ukrainians at the level of diplomatic relations between Ukraine and Israel. His clear stance on international support for Ukraine after the start of the large-scale Russian invasion became a call for the Israeli government to decisively condemn the attack on Ukraine. Natan Sharansky firmly emphasized that Israel must unwaveringly stand on the side of the Ukrainians.

Natan (Anatoly) Sharansky (b. 1948) is one of the most prominent human rights activists, a well-known Israeli political figure of Ukrainian-Jewish origin.

In addition, he actively participated in the Jewish movement in the USSR, demonstrations, and protests. In 1977, Natan Sharansky was arrested for anti-Soviet agitation, and the following year he was sentenced to 13 years in prison on charges of espionage for the USA.

Only thanks to numerous petitions from influential world politicians and demonstrations in 1986, through an agreement between the USSR and the USA, Natan Sharansky was freed from the repressive grip: he was exchanged for one of the Soviet spies arrested in the West. Immediately after the exchange, Natan was honorably received by Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres and his deputy Yitzhak Shamir.

In the same year, Sharansky founded the public organization “Zionist Forum,” which aimed to unite repatriates from the Soviet Union, and already in 1995, he started the political party “Israel for Aliyah.” In Israel, Natan Sharansky continued his active human rights activities, gaining experience as a recognized, influential Israeli politician. He was a member of the Knesset for a long period and also had experience working as a minister and deputy prime minister in the Israeli governments, chaired the executive council of the Jewish Agency for Israel, and the supervisory board of the Babi Yar Holocaust Memorial Center.

In January 2023, Natan Sharansky turned 75 years old. He dedicated almost his entire conscious life to active human rights struggle, the protection of human rights, political activity, as well as the development of close diplomatic and interethnic ties between Israel and Ukraine.

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Felix Shinder in Israel in 2026: “Lemonchiki”, klezmer, three concerts and Odessa, which you can’t take with you – it travels itself – October 15 – Haifa, October 21 – Netanya, October 23 – Bat Yam - September 10, 2026 - Новости Израиля

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Historian Alexander Alferov – since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion — an officer of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, served in the units of the Special Operations Forces “Azov-Kyiv” and the 3rd Separate Assault Brigade. Holds the rank of reserve major of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Since June 27, 2025 – head of the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory.

The name of Kyiv in the popular imagination is almost inextricably linked with the figure of the legendary Kyi. This version, recorded in the “Tale of Bygone Years,” has long become part of the school canon and national myth.

But ancient Kyiv, as sources from the 10th century claim, had another name — rare, mysterious, and almost vanished from historical memory. This name is Sambatas. And it is around this name that a complex and underestimated discussion about the early history of the city is taking place today.

Sambatas, the Sambation River, and Kyiv

The existence of the second name was reminded by historian Alexander Alferov, analyzing Byzantine sources that are rarely cited outside the academic environment. His conclusions are based not on later chronicles but on the direct testimony of a contemporary of the events.

The discussion is about the treatise “On the Governance of the Empire,” created in 948 by the Byzantine Emperor Constantine Porphyrogenitus. In this text, Kyiv is named the capital of Rus’ — and at the same time, its second name is indicated: Sambatas.

This mention is unique. Neither in later Byzantine chronicles, nor in ancient Russian chronicles, nor in Western European sources does Sambatas appear again. Historians do not have parallel texts or archaeological finds that directly confirm or refute this name.

It is this singularity of the source that makes Sambatas especially important.

Researchers are not just dealing with an alternative name for the city, but with a trace of a vanished layer of historical reality — possibly associated with another language, another culture, or a different circle of contacts.

The origin of the word Sambatas remains a subject of debate. No version is recognized as definitive, but each reflects a certain historical context of the region.

The Turkic interpretation associates Sambatas with the concept of a “high fortress” or fortified elevation. This interpretation seems logical from the geographical perspective of Kyiv and the role of the city as a defensive center.

The Scandinavian version suggests a possible origin from sand-bakki — “sandy shoal” or “shore.” It fits well with the idea of the Dnieper as a key trade route and the presence of the Varangians in the region.

The Gothic hypothesis proposes reading Sambatas as “a place for gathering boats,” emphasizing the transport and military function of the city. The Baltic version, in turn, interprets the name as “a structure on the edge” or “a house on a protrusion,” based on phonetic parallels.

A special place in this series is occupied by the Jewish interpretation. It connects Sambatas with the mythical river Sambation, known from ancient Judaic texts. According to these sources, Sambation is a river beyond which the “lost tribes of Israel” supposedly reside, and which flows turbulently for six days a week and stops on the Sabbath.

This version does not imply a literal identification of Kyiv with the biblical myth. However, it points to possible cultural and intellectual contacts in the region in the early Middle Ages, including the presence of Jewish communities, traders, and intermediaries whose ideas might be reflected in geographical names.

It is important to emphasize: none of the hypotheses has a decisive advantage. Sambatas remains a linguistic and historical mystery, the significance of which cannot be reduced to one people or one language.

According to Alferov, the very fact of the existence of such a name speaks of the multi-layered identity of early Kyiv. The city was formed at the intersection of trade routes, cultural zones, and religious traditions, and its history cannot be explained by a single chronicle version.

The history of Sambatas is a reminder that the past of Kyiv is much more complex than familiar schemes. Behind the well-known name lie layers of forgotten meanings that still require understanding — something that NANews — News of Israel | Nikk.Agency regularly engages in.

Sambation: where it is mentioned, how it is described, and what it meant

Sambation is a mythological river known from Judaic, ancient, and medieval sources. It was never considered a real geographical object and in all texts serves as a symbolic boundary, not a river in the literal sense.

In Judaic sources, Sambation is mentioned in the Babylonian Talmud, tractate Sanhedrin 65b. It states that “the ten lost tribes of Israel” are located beyond the Sambation River. The context is a discussion of the boundaries of the inhabited world and the fate of the exiled tribes, not a description of a specific locality.

The Midrashic tradition (including Bereishit Rabbah and later aggadic texts) describes the properties of the river in detail. According to these texts, Sambation:

• boils, throws stones, sand, and dust six days a week;
• completely stops on the Sabbath;
• remains impassable, as crossing on the Sabbath is prohibited by religious law.

Thus, Sambation becomes a double boundary — physical and religious, which cannot be overcome by force or by observing the law.

In ancient tradition, Sambation is mentioned by Josephus Flavius in the work “The Jewish War” (Book VII). He describes a river that throws stones and becomes calm on the seventh day. For Flavius, Sambation appears as part of the ideas about distant eastern lands and has no precise localization.

In medieval Byzantine and Latin texts, Sambation is included in encyclopedic and chronicle writings as an element of the “wondrous geography of the East.” Here it is no longer directly associated with religious polemics but serves as an inherited image from the Jewish tradition.

The spelling of the term depends on the language of the source:

• Hebrew — סמבטיון (Sambation);
• Greek — Σαμβατίων (Sambatíon);
• Latin — Sambation, Sambatyon, Sabbatyon.

Geographical attachment in all sources remains undefined. In different eras, Sambation was conditionally “placed”:

• in Mesopotamia,
• in Central Asia,
• in the Caucasus,
• beyond the Caspian Sea,
• in an undefined “East.”

These versions do not contradict each other, as Sambation was understood not cartographically, but cosmologically — as a boundary between the known world and the space of exile, between the ordinary flow of time and the religious cycle.

Conclusion: Sambation is a stable mythological image present in several traditions. No source describes it as a real river, but all use it as a symbol of the limit, the expectation of return, and the messianic future.

Alexander Alferov

Full name — Alferov Alexander Anatolyevich.

Ukrainian historian, candidate of historical sciences, radio host, public and political figure. Born on November 30, 1983, in Kyiv (Ukrainian SSR). By nationality — Ukrainian.

He is a researcher at the Institute of History of Ukraine of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, specializing in the history of Ukraine in the 16th–18th centuries, sigillography, genealogy, the history of the Cossack elite, and historical institutions.

Graduated from the National Pedagogical University named after M. P. Drahomanov with a degree in “history teacher, law teacher.” In 2012, he defended his candidate dissertation on the role of the Cossack-elite family Golubov in the history of Ukraine.

Since 2008, he has been working as a radio host on Ukrainian Radio “Culture,” author and host of the program “Historical Frescoes.” He was also a TV host on the public TV channel UA: Culture.

At different times, he held positions as a researcher, press secretary of the People’s Deputy of Ukraine Andriy Biletsky, and head of the press service of the “Azov” regiment.

Since the beginning of the full-scale war — an officer of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, served in the units of the Special Operations Forces “Azov-Kyiv” and the 3rd Separate Assault Brigade. Holds the rank of reserve major of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

On June 27, 2025, he was appointed head of the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory.

Author of more than 100 scientific publications, as well as numerous books and catalogs dedicated to Ukrainian sigillography, Cossack history, genealogy, and archival sources. In 2009, he discovered a copy of the “Constitution of Pylyp Orlyk” in Old Ukrainian in Russian archives.

Awarded the Order of Merit III degree, the presidential award “For Participation in the Anti-Terrorist Operation,” the medal “For Sacrifice and Love for Ukraine,” and a number of professional awards.

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On May 3rd, 127 years have passed since the birth of Golda Meir. The most influential woman of the 20th century was born in Kyiv and became one of the founders of the State of Israel.

Meir was one of the most prominent figures in world politics for over 30 years. She became the Prime Minister of Israel during one of the most difficult periods in the country’s history.

Her famous quote: “You cannot negotiate peace with those who have come to kill you”, remains relevant today, both for Israel and Ukraine. Section Jews from Ukraine.

Golda Meir (born Golda Mabovich) was born on April 21, 1898 (May 3, new style) in Kyiv to a Jewish family. Her father, Moshe Mabovich, was a carpenter, and her mother, Bluma Naidich, worked at home. In 1903, when Golda was 8 years old, her family emigrated to the USA, where she finished school and a teacher’s college.

In 1921, Golda moved to Palestine, where she began her Zionist activities. She became one of the closest associates of David Ben-Gurion, playing a key role in the creation of the State of Israel in 1948. Golda Meir held several important government positions in Israel:

• Minister of Labor and Social Welfare (1949–1956)
• Minister of Foreign Affairs (1956–1966)
• Minister of the Interior (1970)
• Prime Minister of Israel (1969–1974)

Golda Meir passed away on December 8, 1978, in Jerusalem. She left a lasting legacy in Israel, with her memory preserved in street and square names, as well as memorial plaques and statues. A Golda Meir Square was named in her honor in Tel Aviv, along with streets in Jerusalem. Her contribution to the creation of Israel remains invaluable, and her name continues to symbolize strength and determination.

Golda Meir was born on April 21, 1898 (May 3, new style) in Kyiv, on Baseyna Street, to a Jewish family. Her father, Moshe Mabovich, was a carpenter, and her mother, Bluma Naidich, worked at home. The family went through difficult times, and Golda often recalled her childhood as a time of need, when there was not enough food and warmth at home. In her memoirs, she wrote about how her father nailed doors in response to rumors of possible pogroms, which left a deep mark on her consciousness and shaped her views on life.

The family lived in a modest apartment on the ground floor of a two-story house located on Baseyna Street in Kyiv, near Bessarabska Square. Golda later described this place as a “wretched and damp room.” In her memoirs, she emphasized that her father dreamed of escaping poverty and opened a carpentry shop, but his attempts were unsuccessful, and their family continued to live in need.

Family roots and childhood in Kyiv

Golda was named after her great-grandmother on her mother’s side, a woman who lived to be 94 and always added salt to her tea instead of sugar to remember the bitterness of life in the Jewish diaspora. This heritage deeply influenced her character and worldview. The Meir family was from Pinsk (modern-day Belarus), and they moved to Kyiv in search of a better life. Moshe Mabovich, Golda’s father, was a carpenter, and thanks to passing qualification exams, he was able to move with his family to Kyiv, despite the strict restrictions for Jews in the Russian Empire.

Connection to Ukraine in her memoirs

In her autobiography “My Life”, Golda Meir devoted attention to her childhood in Kyiv. She described how, at that time, there was a lack of resources in her family, and life in Russia was unsafe for Jews. Golda remembered that in Kyiv, she realized that “justice does not exist in the world.” This left a strong impression on her and shaped her resilience, which later manifested in her political life.

When she was 8 years old, the family moved to Pinsk, and then emigrated to the United States. These years in Kyiv left a deep mark on Golda, and she always remained attached to her Ukrainian roots. She was proud of belonging to a resilient Jewish family that had survived many hardships. Golda believed that her upbringing in Kyiv, as well as the experience of living in a Jewish ghetto, toughened her and prepared her for life in Israel.

Square and memorials in Kyiv

In Kyiv, in 2024, a Golda Meir Square was named on Borychev Tik Street (17, 19, 21). This square was opened in 2024, marking an important moment in preserving Golda’s memory in her hometown. A memorial plaque on House No. 5-A on Baseyna Street, where she lived until 1903, also serves as a reminder of her connection to Kyiv. The plaque was installed in 1998, and it is another sign of respect and recognition for her contribution to the history of Israel and the Jewish people.

Golda Meir Street in Kyiv was renamed in 2022. It was formerly called Krasnodarska Street and was located in the “Nivki” metro area. The renaming was part of an initiative to honor outstanding personalities and symbolized the recognition of Golda Meir as a native of Kyiv and an important figure in the history of Israel.

Famous quotes by Golda Meir

Golda Meir was not only an outstanding political leader but also a person with a bright, independent character. Her thoughts on war, politics, the role of women, and life’s challenges will forever remain in history as a symbol of strength of spirit and the pursuit of justice. Here are some famous quotes from this remarkable woman that reflect her views on life, politics, and Israel:

1. On the position of prime minister:
   • “It was never in my plans to become prime minister. I never thought about positions. I became prime minister — and I did it, just like my milkman became the commander of our outpost on Mount Hermon. Neither he nor I particularly enjoyed the job, but both of us tried to do it as best as we could.”
2. On Israel:
   • “Moses led us through the desert for 40 years to bring us to the only place in the Middle East that has no oil.”

• On how to govern a small country:
  • “The world is cruel, selfish, and brutal. The suffering of small nations goes unnoticed. Even the most educated governments and democracies, led by decent people who represent decent people, are not too inclined to think about issues of justice in international relations. We cannot always rely on their advice, and thus we must have the courage to look at things realistically and act as our instinct for self-preservation tells us.”
• On the Holocaust:
  • “ […] We couldn’t believe that such a horrible crime could be committed, or that the world would allow it to happen. No, we were not naive. We simply could not imagine something our imagination had never conceived. But now there are no horrors that I can’t imagine.”
• On independence:
  • “Two dangers face those of us who emerged as a new independent country: the first is the danger of being stuck in the past; the second is the illusion that political independence will immediately solve all our problems.”
• On war:
  • “We could not afford the luxury of pessimism, so we made completely different calculations, based on the fact that we all — all 650,000 of us — had such a strong will to live that it was impossible to understand outside of Israel. If we didn’t want to be thrown into the sea, we had no choice but to win. And so we won.”
• On peace:
  • “It will be a great day when Arab farmers cross the Jordan not on tanks, but on tractors and extend a hand of friendship — farmer to farmer, human to human. Perhaps this is a dream, but I am sure that one day it will come true.”
• On life’s challenges:
  • “I learned a very important lesson: a person can always do a little more than seemed possible yesterday.”
• On the position of women:
  • “The fact that I am a woman has never hindered me. I never felt awkward or inferior, I never thought that men were better than women or that giving birth to a child was a misfortune. Never. And men, on their part, never gave me any special privileges. But, as it seems to me, it’s true that for a woman who wants to lead not only a domestic but also a public life, everything is significantly more difficult than for a man, because she bears a double load.”

From NAnews – “Jews from Ukraine”

Golda Meir, born in Kyiv, became a symbol of resilience, determination, and an unwavering pursuit of independence for the Jewish people. Despite the hardships of her childhood in Kyiv, she became a figure ready to fight for the rights and dignity of the Jewish people. Golda Meir, despite poverty and harsh circumstances, was able to achieve greatness and change the course of history by playing a key role in the founding of the State of Israel.

Her quotes continue to inspire millions of people around the world, and her legacy lives on in commemorative sites in Kyiv and other cities where she was born and raised. Golda Meir remains a symbol of struggle and fearlessness for all Jews, especially those coming from Ukraine, who continue to defend their rights and independence.

NAnews (news about Israel and Ukraine) takes pride in telling the story of great personalities like Golda Meir and emphasizes the importance of her connection to both Ukraine and Israel. We believe that the memory of such individuals helps preserve historical unity between the nations and inspires for the future.

Additional information about Golda Meir and her Ukrainian roots is available in articles on our website:

We have already written:

• Golda Meir: Birth, Biography, and Career
  • Article about Golda Meir, her birth on May 3, 1898, in Kyiv, her family, and life before emigration. This article covers key moments of her childhood in Ukraine and her career before she became Prime Minister of Israel.
• Video Teaser about Golda Meir
  • Video teaser dedicated to Golda Meir, focusing on her influence on the development of Israel and her role in world politics.
• Streets of Golda Meir and Vladimir Jabotinsky
  • Story about how streets in Israel were named after Golda Meir and Vladimir Jabotinsky, two great figures in the history of Israel and Zionism.
• Golda Meir’s Grandson
  • Article about Golda Meir’s grandson, who continues to support her legacy and influence, along with interesting facts about the Meir family.
• Exhibition about Golda Meir
  • Overview of an exhibition dedicated to Golda Meir, organized in Israel, featuring information about her life, career, and achievements.
• Square and Memorial Plaque for Golda Meir in Kyiv
  • Story about the memorial plaque on the house in Kyiv where Golda Meir lived until 1903, as well as the square dedicated to her, opened in 2024.
• Golda Meir on Israeli Banknotes
  • History of how Golda Meir was depicted on Israeli banknotes, reflecting her significance to the state.
• Jewish Conference of 1938
  • Article about the events of the Evian Conference in 1938, in the context of the struggle for Jewish rights and the efforts Golda Meir made in international politics to address issues related to the Holocaust.

Section Jews from Ukraine

The “Jews from Ukraine” section on the NAnews website is dedicated to the history and lives of emigrants from Ukraine who became significant figures in Israel and the world. We explore their journey, achievements, and impact on both countries, as well as important moments connected to the Jewish heritage of Ukraine.

Read more about Golda Meir and other important figures whose roots and fates are intertwined with the history of Ukraine and Israel. It is essential for us not only to preserve the memory of such individuals but also to highlight their contributions to the development of society and strengthening ties between the two nations.

Our section continues to tell the stories of notable personalities who have made significant contributions to historical processes and became symbols of the struggle for independence, human rights, and freedom. Golda Meir is a vivid example of how Jews who grew up in Ukraine managed to influence international politics and create an independent state for the Jewish people.

We take pride in being at the center of these stories and continue sharing them with our readers, supporting the unique heritage of Ukrainian Jews in Israel.

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