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On Wednesday, July 15, 2026, at 5:00 PM in the Chernivtsi space “Hub 82” – presentation of the book “Not About War” (translated from Ukrainian “Not About War”) — a posthumous collection of artistic works and frontline letters of serviceman, journalist, videographer, photographer, artist, and writer Maksym Shvartsman.

The date was not chosen by chance. The presentation is exactly on the third anniversary of Maksym’s death, who died on July 15, 2023, during a combat mission in the Bakhmut direction.

The book was published by the Chernivtsi publishing house “Bukrek”. The meeting is moderated by candidate of historical sciences Natalia Nechaeva-Yuriychuk. As the organizers emphasize, this is not just a literary presentation, but an evening of returning the voice of a person whom the war deprived of the opportunity to fulfill his long-standing dream — to publish his own prose.

The Chernivtsi Jewish newspaper Czernowitzer Zeitung calls Maksym Shvartsman a Jewish defender of Ukraine and emphasizes the special significance of his story for the Jewish community of Chernivtsi. He belonged to Ukrainian Jewry, worked in media, engaged in art, raised children, and from the first days of the full-scale Russian invasion voluntarily stood up to defend Ukraine.

Maksym Shvartsman: from Kalanchak to Chernivtsi

Maksym Shvartsman was born on October 17, 1987, in Kalanchak, Kherson region.

After finishing school, he entered the Odessa National University, where he chose the specialty of a historian. However, he could not complete his studies: after his mother’s death, he had to earn a living on his own.

At different times, Maksym worked as a courier, cook, and took on other jobs, but his true calling remained creativity. He was interested in history, architecture, and archaeology, participated in excavations, loved nature, photographed, painted, wrote stories and songs, played the guitar, came up with scripts, and made short films.

After moving to Chernivtsi, Maksym started working on local television. Initially, he filmed news stories, then TV shows, commercials, and author projects. Later, he worked as an operator and photojournalist in several Chernivtsi media, including the information agency ASS.

Colleagues knew him primarily as a talented videographer and photographer. However, not everyone guessed that for many years Maksym wrote artistic prose and dreamed of engaging not only in television journalism but also in artistic cinema.

According to his wife’s recollections, he took the image very seriously: he set up the lighting, framed the shot, experimented with visual effects. At the same time, he called his works amateurish because he was worried that he did not receive professional director’s education.

His true dream was his own cinema. He wanted not just to capture what was happening, but to tell stories — through the frame, literature, music, and drawing.

Family, which became the main meaning of life

Maksym met his future wife Marina while working in the media field. They traveled together for shoots, participated in creative projects, and gradually became close.

Maksym and Marina had two children — daughter Sofia and son Adam. The family became the main center of his life. Relatives remember Maksym as a caring father and husband who did not divide household duties into “male” and “female”, took care of the children, cleaned, and washed clothes by hand when there was no washing machine in the rented apartment.

He learned to cook borscht, which the children called tastier than their mother’s. For some time, Maksym was practically a “stay-at-home dad”: he stayed home with the children while Marina worked.

The Shvartsman family dreamed of their own small house near Chernivtsi — with a garden and a place where the family could gather by the fire. Maksym loved to take the children to secluded places, which he called “thickets”, told them about the history of the region, nature, architecture, and old buildings.

At the beginning of 2014, the family lived for some time in Maksym’s native Kalanchak, Kherson region. Already then, Russian aggression against Ukraine entered their daily life: the occupied Crimea was nearby, and Marina later recalled how she looked out the window, fearing to see military equipment.

Creativity that Maksym did not want to leave

Maksym Shvartsman was not only a television operator and photographer. He wrote artistic prose and songs, painted, played the guitar, was interested in history and archaeology, came up with scripts, and dreamed of engaging in artistic cinema.

Even many colleagues, who knew him well as a talented operator, did not suspect for a long time that Maksym wrote stories and worked on a fantastic novella.

He took each frame seriously, set up the lighting, looked for unusual visual solutions, and wanted not just to capture events, but to tell stories. At the same time, Maksym remained very demanding of himself and often called his own works amateurish because he was worried that he did not receive professional director’s education.

Creativity was not a hobby for him that could be engaged in from time to time, but an important part of his personality. It was the inability to write, shoot, and develop in his favorite direction that later became one of the reasons why the family’s life in Israel did not work out.

End of 2014 — 2015: seven months in Israel

At the beginning of 2014, after the birth of their eldest daughter Sofia, Maksym and Marina Shvartsman moved from Chernivtsi to his native Kalanchak, Kherson region.

In Kalanchak, the family lived for about half a year. It was a time of Russian occupation of Crimea: Marina recalled that she went to the window and checked if military equipment appeared near the house.

Around the second half of 2014, the Shvartsman family returned to Chernivtsi. Maksym started working again, and soon Marina became pregnant with their son. Due to constant housing rentals and limited income, the family decided to use Maksym’s right to repatriation and try to start a new life in Israel.

The exact date of the move is not mentioned in the published interview. However, from the sequence of events, it follows that the family most likely arrived in Israel at the end of 2014 or the beginning of 2015.

In Israel, the Shvartsman family lived for about seven months. During this period, presumably in 2015, their son Adam was born. This dating is consistent with Marina’s later story: on September 1, 2022, Adam went to first grade, which allows us to date his birth to around 2015.

Which Israeli city the family chose is not specified in the available memories. It is only reliably known that Maksym rode his bicycle to work daily along a route that passed by the Mediterranean Sea.

To support his pregnant wife, and then his wife and newborn son, Maksym worked in a production workshop. For a person accustomed to journalism, filming, literature, and creative projects, monotonous physical work became a difficult test.

According to Marina’s recollections, Maksym once said: “I ride my bike past the Mediterranean Sea every day, but I can’t swim there.” It was not just about the lack of free time. This phrase conveyed his feeling of living next to beauty and freedom, which he could not enjoy due to constant work and financial pressure.

About seven months later, approximately in 2015, the family decided to return to Chernivtsi. After returning, Marina went to work, and Maksym, unable to immediately find a suitable place, stayed home with the children for some time and, as the family put it, became a “stay-at-home dad”.

Thus, the Israeli period in the life of the Shvartsman family can be dated approximately the end of 2014 — 2015. The exact dates of arrival and return, as well as the name of the city, Marina did not name in the published interview, so a more precise dating cannot be indicated without her direct confirmation.

For NAnews — News of Israel, the Israeli part of Maksym Shvartsman’s biography has special significance. His fate directly connects Israel, Jewish Chernivtsi, and Ukraine.

Maksym had the right to repatriation, his son was born in Israel, and the family itself gained experience living in the country. However, the home with which his work, creativity, public life, and subsequently military service were connected became Chernivtsi and Ukraine for him.

…

He supported his wife’s literary creativity as well. In 2022, Marina published her first novel “Christmas Count”. Maksym was already in service and could not attend the presentation, but his wife sent him a copy of the book. Later it was found among his most cherished belongings along with children’s drawings, documents, and chevrons.

February 24, 2022: the operator exchanged the camera for a weapon

Maksym’s native Kalanchak was among the first Ukrainian settlements captured by Russian troops in February 2022.

There remained his family home, childhood memories, and the graves of his mother and stepfather. The footage of Kalanchak’s occupation was a personal blow to him.

On February 24, 2022, Maksym decided to go to the military enlistment office and voluntarily joined the Chernivtsi territorial defense. Before that, he had no military experience, but he believed he could not stand aside.

A photographer and videographer, accustomed to holding a camera, took up arms to defend Ukraine.

At first, his unit was located in the Chernivtsi region. At Maksym’s request, his wife and children went to relatives in Poland, but after two months the family returned. Until the end of summer, he could sometimes come home, but in early September 2022, the 92nd battalion was sent to the Kharkiv region.

Maksym served as a shooter in the 92nd battalion of the 107th separate brigade of the Territorial Defense Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. His call sign was “Marvel”.

Initially, he performed combat missions in the Kharkiv direction, and then was transferred to the Donetsk region — one of the most difficult sections of the front.

For a long time, his wife did not even know his call sign. She accidentally saw the inscription Marvel on his uniform in one of the sent photos. Maksym himself tried not to tell his family the details of his service. During calls, he more often asked about the children, school, Marina’s work, and household matters than talked about what was happening at the front.

In Kharkiv, communication sometimes disappeared for periods ranging from three to ten days. Before going on a combat mission, Maksym usually only warned that he would not be able to write or call for some time.

Comrades remembered him as a person who did not look for excuses and did not refuse hard work. If it was necessary to dig positions, carry loads, or perform another task, he just went and did it.

When there was an opportunity to try to transfer to a safer position, Maksym refused to leave his unit. For him, it was a matter of responsibility to the people he served with and a matter of personal honor.

The last message and death near Bakhmut

The last message to his wife Maksym sent late in the evening on July 14, 2023. He warned Marina that the unit was moving to a new location and communication would probably be unavailable for one or two days.

The next day, July 15, 2023, a group of Ukrainian servicemen was performing a combat mission in the Bakhmut direction.

The unit took enemy positions but came under Russian artillery fire. Maksym Shvartsman was killed. He was 35 years old. Along with him, another serviceman was killed, and a third soldier was wounded.

In the first days, the family did not have complete information. Contradictory reports appeared, and Marina continued to hope that her husband might have survived.

Later, the unit reported that the bodies of the deceased were visible from a drone, but it was not possible to evacuate them immediately: the positions were temporarily occupied by Russian troops. After Ukrainian forces regained the territory, the bodies of the defenders were able to be retrieved.

Maksym was buried in the Alley of Glory at the Central Cemetery of Chernivtsi.

According to the Institute of Mass Information, Maksym Shvartsman became the 66th media worker killed as a result of Russian aggression against Ukraine.

Order “For Courage” and other awards

On November 16, 2023, the President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky signed a decree posthumously awarding Maksym Shvartsman the Order “For Courage” III degree.

The decree noted the courage and selflessness shown in defending the state sovereignty of Ukraine, as well as Maksym’s contribution to the development of television, radio broadcasting, and communications. The public announcement of the state award to the family was made in July 2024.

Maksym was also awarded the medal “For the Liberation of Kharkiv Region”, the award “For Services to Bukovina”, the badge of the Chernivtsi City Council “For the Glory of Chernivtsi”, and other regional distinctions. Some awards were given posthumously.

However, for family and friends, the memory of Maksym is not limited to military uniform, call sign, and state awards.

Marina Shvartsman emphasizes: she wants her husband to be remembered primarily as a living, kind, and talented person — a father who walked with his children, a husband who dreamed of a house with a garden, an operator who saw the world through a frame, and a writer who did not live to see his own book.

What is included in the book “Not About War”

“Not About War” is not a military chronicle or a collection of works by different authors. It is a posthumously published author’s book by Maksym Shvartsman.

The confirmed composition of the printed edition includes:

• several artistic stories;
• an unfinished fantastic novella “Guardians of Continuity”;
• letters and messages to his wife Marina, written from the front line.

Before the full-scale invasion, Maksym was known in Chernivtsi primarily as an operator and photographer. His prose remained almost unknown. The Russian war did not give him the opportunity to realize himself as a writer and independently prepare his works for publication, so the book is compiled from the texts he managed to write during his lifetime.

In the fantastic novella “Guardians of Continuity”, Chernivtsi occupies an important place — a city that Maksym loved and considered his second home.

This is not a dry description of streets and buildings. In the novella, the city appears as a living, ironic, and almost fairy-tale space. Maksym wrote about it with good humor and attention to detail, combining his own love for history, architecture, and fantasy.

The work remained unfinished.

Marina decided not to finish it for her husband. Maksym did not talk about the concept of his works until he completed them, so it is impossible to reliably restore the supposed continuation or ending. His wife preserved the text as the author left it.

Letters in which there is almost no war

A special part of the book consists of Maksym’s letters to Marina.

Although they were written on the front line, they contain almost no descriptions of hostilities. Maksym tried to separate the war from family life and not transfer the frontline reality into conversations with his wife and children.

He wrote about love, cared for Marina, was interested in the children, joked, recalled ordinary life, and continued to think about the future.

One of the letters he began after his 35th birthday, addressing his wife as a person who writes to her for the first time at a new age. Another letter was prepared in case of his death. In it, Maksym explained how he would like to be buried, supported Marina, and convinced her that she is strong and can continue to live.

This letter especially fully reveals his character. Even thinking about his possible death, he worried not about himself, but about his wife and children.

Once from the front, Maksym sent Marina an artistic text and explained that it was “not about war”. This phrase became the key to the posthumous edition: the book was created against the backdrop of war and contains letters from the front line, but it tells primarily about life, love, family, Chernivtsi, creativity, and human dignity.

The book was preserved and prepared by Marina Shvartsman

The decisive role in the appearance of “Not About War” was played by Maksym’s wife.

Marina preserved his manuscripts, electronic files, letters, messages, drawings, paintings, script sketches, and unfinished prose. However, for a long time, she physically could not force herself to reread the texts left after her husband.

Only about a year after his death did Marina find the strength to return to the manuscripts and begin editing them.

As early as 2025, she talked about plans to prepare a book that could include stories, scripts, artistic works, an unfinished novella, and Maksym’s letters. The final, publicly confirmed composition of the printed edition included stories, the novella “Guardians of Continuity”, and frontline letters. Organizers have not yet reported separately on the publication of scripts and paintings in the current edition.

For Marina, publishing the book is the fulfillment of a dream that Maksym did not have time to realize himself.

But it is also an attempt to return to readers the real Maksym Shvartsman — not only a soldier with the call sign “Marvel”, who died near Bakhmut, but a person who loved children, cooked borscht, made films, was interested in archaeology, drew, played the guitar, wrote stories, and dreamed of a house with a garden.

Memory as the responsibility of the living

For the Jewish community of Chernivtsi, the presentation of “Not About War” will be not only a literary event.

It is an evening of remembrance for a representative of Ukrainian Jewry, who had the right to repatriation, lived with his family in Israel, raised a son born there, but after the start of the full-scale invasion voluntarily stood up to defend Ukraine.

His story shows that resistance to Russian aggression united Ukrainians of different nationalities, cultures, and religious traditions.

NAnews — News of Israel tells the story of Maksym Shvartsman precisely because it is part of the shared Israeli-Ukrainian memory. It combines Jewish origin, Israel, Chernivtsi, occupied Kalanchak, Ukrainian culture, and the struggle for Ukraine’s freedom.

In Jewish tradition, the memory of the deceased is not only a recollection of the past but also the responsibility of those who continue to live.

After the name of the departed person, it is said: זכרונו לברכה — “May his memory be blessed”.

Maksym Shvartsman continues to live in his children, in preserved frames, drawings, letters, and the book, the appearance of which became possible thanks to the love and strength of his wife.

The war was able to cut short his life.

But it could not silence his voice.

May the memory of Maksym Shvartsman be blessed.

…
“Not About the War”: The book of Jewish defender of Ukraine Maksym Shvartsman was presented in Chernivtsi on the 3rd anniversary of his death at the front - July 21, 2026 - Новости Израиля

Did Azerbaijan stop Israel’s vote on recognizing the Armenian genocide? - July 20, 2026 - Новости Израиля

June 2026 was the hardest for Ukrainian civilians since April 2022 — UN data - July 20, 2026 - Новости Израиля

The Israeli government unanimously recognized the Armenian genocide, but parliamentary approval did not occur. According to Haaretz and Maariv, Azerbaijan engaged in direct contacts with Benjamin Netanyahu’s office and influenced ultra-Orthodox parties.

On June 28, 2026, the Israeli government unanimously supported Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar’s proposal for the official recognition of the Armenian genocide in the Ottoman Empire. Sa’ar called this step a moral and historical duty of the Jewish state, but less than a month later, it became clear that the decision could not be secured by a Knesset vote.

The issue was removed from the parliamentary agenda twice, after which the vote ultimately did not take place. Israeli media link this not to a usual lack of time, but to active pressure from Azerbaijan — one of Israel’s most important strategic, energy, and military partners.

Publications by Haaretz and Maariv reveal two parallel channels of influence on the Israeli leadership. The first went through the office of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and the second through deputies of the ultra-Orthodox parties Shas and United Torah Judaism, without whose support the government could not guarantee a majority in the Knesset.

What exactly did the Israeli cabinet decide

At the meeting on June 28, the Israeli government unanimously recognized the mass extermination of the Armenian people as genocide. Materials prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that systematic persecution began on April 24, 1915, with the arrests of representatives of the Armenian intelligentsia, clergy, and social elite in Constantinople.

After the destruction or deportation of the Armenian community leaders, the Ottoman authorities began mass expulsion of the population. Men were separated from their families, sent to forced labor, and killed, while women, children, and the elderly were driven towards the Syrian desert, where many died from hunger, thirst, disease, and violence.

According to the most common historical estimates, about 1.5 million Armenians became victims of this policy. Gideon Sa’ar stated that Israel must call what happened by its name, as the Jewish people cannot demand recognition of their own tragedy while simultaneously avoiding recognition of crimes against other peoples.

The Foreign Minister also emphasized that the decision is not revenge against Turkey for President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s hostile policy. According to him, the recognition is based not on current political circumstances but on historical facts and Israel’s moral responsibility.

After the meeting, it was reported that the government’s position should receive confirmation from the Knesset. It was at this stage that the process stopped, although the cabinet’s decision was not officially canceled.

Why the dispute over the status of recognition arose

The Israeli government presented the resolution on June 28 as official recognition of the Armenian genocide. At the same time, several media outlets reported that a separate Knesset vote was required to complete the political procedure, which would give the decision parliamentary legitimacy and make it less dependent on the position of a specific government.

Moreover, there were separate initiatives in parliament to recognize the genocide and establish an official day of remembrance. None of them had previously passed all the necessary stages, so the cabinet’s decision became Israel’s most serious step on this issue in the state’s history.

The difference between a government resolution and a parliamentary decision has not only legal but also political significance. The cabinet can change or revise its position, whereas Knesset support would turn recognition into a more stable state line.

Therefore, claiming that Israel completely abandoned recognition after pressure from Baku is incorrect. The government’s decision remains in force, but its parliamentary consolidation was halted.

Azerbaijan demanded a review of the decision

On June 29, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan officially expressed dissatisfaction with Israel’s position. In Baku’s statement, the recognition was called a ‘distortion of historical facts,’ and the expression ‘Armenian genocide’ was replaced with the phrase ‘events of 1915.’

The Azerbaijani side claimed that such decisions allegedly hinder reconciliation between Armenia and Azerbaijan and complicate the achievement of sustainable peace in the region. Baku openly called on Israel to reconsider the decision made by the government of Gideon Sa’ar and Benjamin Netanyahu.

Such a reaction was expected, as Azerbaijan traditionally supports Turkey’s position, which refuses to recognize the extermination of Armenians as genocide. However, judging by Israeli media publications, the official statement did not limit diplomatic pressure.

Baku’s contact with Netanyahu’s office

On July 19, Haaretz reported that Hikmet Hajiyev, the Azerbaijani president’s foreign policy advisor, contacted the Israeli Prime Minister’s office. According to an unnamed Israeli source, after this, Netanyahu ordered not to bring the issue to a Knesset vote.

However, there is no confirmation of a personal conversation between Netanyahu and Hajiyev. It is more accurate to say that the Azerbaijani representative approached the head of government’s office, after which a political decision was made to stop the parliamentary procedure.

According to Haaretz, the Israeli side assured Baku representatives that the vote would not take place. Netanyahu’s office and Hikmet Hajiyev did not publicly confirm this information, so it remains a media report based on sources within the Israeli political system.

However, a Maariv publication that appeared on July 20 supplemented this version and explained why Netanyahu might indeed have had problems with the majority.

Pressure through Shas and United Torah Judaism

According to Maariv political observer Anna Barsky, representatives of the Azerbaijani Jewish community approached deputies of the ultra-Orthodox parties Shas and United Torah Judaism. They were persuaded that recognizing the Armenian genocide at the Knesset level would harm relations between Israel and Azerbaijan.

During these contacts, the strategic ties between the two states, security cooperation, Azerbaijan’s proximity to Iran’s northern border, and Israel’s dependence on Azerbaijani oil were emphasized. For the ultra-Orthodox parties, these arguments apparently proved significant enough.

Representatives of Shas and United Torah Judaism informed the Likud leadership that they would not support recognition and might vote against it. After this, Netanyahu’s advisors concluded that there was no guaranteed majority for the decision in the Knesset.

The issue was removed from the agenda twice. As a result, the Prime Minister decided not to risk a public defeat and to limit himself to the already adopted government resolution.

For Netanyahu, losing the vote could have been worse than its complete absence. If the Knesset rejected the cabinet’s position, it would look like an official refusal by the Israeli parliament to recognize the Armenian genocide, despite the unanimous decision of the ministers.

NAnews — News of Israel notes that the versions of Haaretz and Maariv do not contradict each other. Most likely, pressure was exerted simultaneously on several levels: through direct contacts between Baku and the Prime Minister’s office and through work with parties on which the parliamentary majority depended.

Oil, weapons, and the border with Iran

The importance of Azerbaijan for Israel is hard to overestimate. According to Reuters, in 2025, Azerbaijani oil accounted for about 46.4% of all Israeli oil imports, the highest figure in the last decade.

Oil is delivered via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline and then shipped by sea from the Turkish port of Ceyhan. Supplies continued even after Turkish authorities announced the cessation of trade with Israel.

Azerbaijan is also a major buyer of Israeli weapons. Israel supplied Baku with drones, missile systems, reconnaissance technologies, and other military equipment that played a significant role in the conflicts around Nagorno-Karabakh.

For Jerusalem, the geographical location of Azerbaijan, which borders Iran, is also significant. For many years, relations between the two countries have been viewed in Israel as part of a regional system to contain Tehran.

That is why the issue of historical memory collided with specific interests of energy and national security. Recognizing the Armenian genocide was capable of jeopardizing relations that the Israeli leadership considers strategic.

Reaction of Turkey and Armenia

Turkey sharply condemned the decision made by Israel. Recep Tayyip Erdogan rejected the definition of the events of 1915 as genocide and accused Israel of trying to use historical tragedy in the current political confrontation.

Ankara continues to assert that Armenians died in conditions of war, unrest, and interethnic clashes, not as a result of a pre-planned policy of extermination. This position contradicts the conclusions of most genocide researchers and documents indicating the systematic nature of deportations and killings.

Unexpectedly restrained was the reaction of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. He stated that he does not want to participate in using the memory of the Armenian genocide as a political tool.

This position is related to the Armenian government’s attempts to normalize relations with Turkey and complete the peace process with Azerbaijan. Yerevan fears that recognition by third countries may be used not for historical justice but as a means of pressure in regional politics.

Why Israel avoided recognition for decades

The issue of the Armenian genocide has been repeatedly discussed in Israel. Over the years, corresponding initiatives have been supported by deputies of various parties, historians, public figures, and representatives of the Armenian community in Jerusalem.

In 2016, the Knesset’s Education, Culture, and Sports Committee recognized the genocide and called on the government to follow its example. However, the parliamentary committee’s decision did not become the official position of the entire state.

In 2018, another initiative reached discussion in the Knesset, but the vote was not completed. Bills submitted later also did not receive the necessary support.

The main reason for Israel’s caution for a long time was its relations with Turkey. After the deterioration of Israeli-Turkish relations, Azerbaijan came to the forefront, becoming Israel’s most important oil supplier, arms buyer, and partner in countering Iran.

In August 2025, Netanyahu personally stated in an interview with American host Patrick Bet-David that he recognizes the Armenian genocide. However, this statement was not an official state decision, and the Prime Minister mistakenly assumed that the Knesset had already adopted the corresponding resolution.

The government’s decision on June 28, 2026, became Israel’s most serious advancement on this issue. Nevertheless, it again stalled at the last political stage.

What is known as of July 20

The government decision to recognize the Armenian genocide has not been officially canceled. There are no reports that the cabinet has reviewed the June 28 resolution or abandoned the formulations contained in it.

At the same time, the Knesset did not approve the decision, no new voting date has been set, and the issue was removed from the agenda twice. Therefore, there is still no parliamentary or legislative consolidation of recognition in Israel.

The phrase ‘Azerbaijan forced Israel to abandon recognition of the Armenian genocide’ simplifies the situation. It is more accurate to say that Baku, according to Haaretz and Maariv, managed to stop the recognition’s approval in the Knesset but did not achieve the cancellation of the government’s decision.

NAnews — News of Israel considers it important to separate these two levels. The Israeli cabinet did indeed recognize the Armenian genocide, but strategic interests, oil dependence, and domestic political calculations did not allow this recognition to become a stable position of the parliament.

Gideon Sa’ar stated that recognition is Israel’s moral and historical duty. But when this moral duty collided with oil, arms contracts, relations with Azerbaijan, and opposition to Iran, the Israeli leadership preferred not to bring the decision to a final parliamentary vote.

…
“Not About the War”: The book of Jewish defender of Ukraine Maksym Shvartsman was presented in Chernivtsi on the 3rd anniversary of his death at the front - July 21, 2026 - Новости Израиля

Did Azerbaijan stop Israel’s vote on recognizing the Armenian genocide? - July 20, 2026 - Новости Израиля

June 2026 was the hardest for Ukrainian civilians since April 2022 — UN data - July 20, 2026 - Новости Израиля

The UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine confirmed the death of at least 293 civilians during June 2026. Another 1,990 people were injured.

The total number of confirmed civilian casualties for one month reached 2,283 people. This is the highest monthly death and injury toll among civilians since April 2022. The corresponding UN report was published on July 14, 2026.

It is important to understand the wording of the report accurately. June was not necessarily the deadliest month solely by the number of deaths, but the most severe by the combined number of killed and injured civilians.

According to the UN, in April 2022, 842 deaths and 1,905 injuries were confirmed. After that, for more than four years, the monthly figure did not reach the June 2026 level.

Losses continue to grow for the second consecutive month

In May 2026, the UN confirmed the death of 282 and injuries to 1,794 civilians. Thus, the June figure was 10% higher.

Compared to June 2025, the increase was 37%. A year earlier, during the same month, 249 deaths and 1,416 injuries were confirmed.

The statistics for the first half of the year look particularly alarming.

From January to June 2026, the UN confirmed the death of 1,396 civilians and injuries to another 7,978 people. In total, over six months, at least 9,374 civilians were killed or injured.

This figure is 37% higher than the data for the first half of 2025 and 114% higher than the results for the same period in 2024.

The head of the UN Monitoring Mission, Danielle Bell, called the situation a worrying escalation. According to her, the increase in losses is associated with the more intensive use of powerful types of weapons, which are especially dangerous when used in densely populated urban areas.

Missiles and long-range drones became the main cause of losses

Almost half of all civilian casualties in June were related to the use of long-range weapons.

Russian missiles and long-range strike drones killed 126 civilians and injured 907. In total, this type of weapon accounted for about 45% of all confirmed losses for the month.

The most severe consequences of such attacks were observed not near the front line, but in large cities, including Kyiv and Dnipro.

The number of civilian casualties from long-range Russian attacks in the first half of 2026 increased by 60% compared to the first six months of 2025.

This means that the danger to residents of Ukrainian cities is determined not only by proximity to the ground combat zone. Russian missiles and drones allow strikes on residential areas, transport infrastructure, and other targets at a significant distance from the front.

For readers of NAnews — News of Israel, this detail is especially important. Air alerts, the presence of air defense systems, and the city’s distance from the front do not mean a complete absence of threat. However, the Ukrainian situation has its own scale and specifics: the country’s territory is vast, and the ability to completely close the sky over all cities remains limited.

Frontline areas have turned into a zone of constant hunting

Another factor in the sharp increase in losses was the strike drones of a small radius, which Russian troops systematically use near the front line.

In June, such drones killed 89 people and injured 588. This is the highest monthly figure of civilian casualties from close-range strike drones since the start of the full-scale Russian invasion on February 24, 2022.

According to Danielle Bell, residents of frontline settlements increasingly tell UN staff that they feel like targets of hunting.

People are attacked during ordinary daily activities: when going for groceries, riding a bicycle, working in the yard, walking the dog, or trying to leave a dangerous area.

Such tactics change the very nature of life near the front. Previously, the main threat was artillery shelling and air bombs, the use of which could at least partially be assessed by the direction of hostilities. Small drones can observe roads, yards, and individuals for a long time, then deliver a pinpoint strike.

Aerial bombs, artillery, and mines

Long-range attacks and close-range drones were not the only causes of civilian losses.

In June, the UN recorded:

• 44 deaths and 280 injuries as a result of aerial bombs;
• 27 deaths and 171 injuries due to artillery shelling and attacks by multiple launch rocket systems;
• 7 deaths and 44 injuries from mines and other explosive remnants of war.

Mines and unexploded ordnance remain a long-term threat. They continue to kill people even where the intensity of hostilities has decreased or the front line has shifted.

Which regions suffered the most

In June, civilians were killed or injured in 13 regions of Ukraine and Kyiv.

The highest number of confirmed losses was recorded by the UN in four regions:

• Zaporizhzhia region — 23 deaths and 229 injuries;
• Kherson region — 18 deaths and 236 injuries;
• Dnipropetrovsk region — 25 deaths and 77 injuries;
• Kyiv — 11 deaths and 112 injuries.

The overwhelming majority of victims were in territory controlled by the Ukrainian government.

Of the 2,283 killed and injured, 2,226 people were affected in Ukraine-controlled territory. Another 57 confirmed cases occurred in territories occupied by the Russian Federation.

Therefore, the assertion that the main cause of the record increase in losses was precisely Russian strikes is based not only on the overall context of the war but also on the geography of UN-confirmed incidents.

UN statistics do not reflect the full scale of the tragedy

The figures presented are not final.

The UN includes a case in the official statistics only after verifying the information. Confirmation is based on interviews with witnesses and victims, medical documents, investigation materials, photographs, videos, information from local administrations, and other available data.

Some cases can be confirmed weeks or months later. Therefore, figures for previous periods may be revised in subsequent reports.

At the same time, the actual number of dead and injured is likely significantly higher. It is especially difficult to obtain verifiable information from occupied cities and areas where international observers do not have full access.

Since the start of the full-scale Russian invasion on February 24, 2022, the UN has confirmed the death of at least 16,431 civilians, including 803 children.

Another 48,613 civilians, including 2,960 children, were injured.

Thus, the total number of confirmed dead and injured civilians exceeded 65,000 people. However, even this huge figure reflects only those cases that the UN was able to independently verify.

June became a warning of a new phase of the war

The statistics for June 2026 show that the war is not becoming less dangerous for the civilian population.

Russia is expanding the use of long-range missiles and drones against cities, and in frontline areas, small strike drones are turning civilian daily life into a constant risk.

The increase in casualties is not occurring in the first weeks of the full-scale invasion when the front was rapidly moving, but after more than four years of war. This is what makes the UN’s conclusions particularly alarming.

NAnews — News of Israel highlights: behind the dry numbers of the report are people who died in their own apartments, on the streets, in cars, and during evacuation attempts. June 2026 showed that the scale of danger for the civilian population of Ukraine continues to increase, and the Russian war increasingly affects cities and people far from the immediate line of combat.

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The French carrier group led by the nuclear aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle spent five and a half months gathering intelligence on several crisis areas simultaneously — from Russia’s war against Ukraine to Israel’s actions in Lebanon, Iran’s missile launches, and the activity of armed groups in the Red Sea region.

The scale of the operation was described by Rear Admiral Thibault Odos de Posses, who commanded the French carrier group. The ships returned to Toulon on July 11, 2026, completing one of the longest and most unusual voyages in the modern history of the French fleet. During the mission, the group passed through the Atlantic, the Baltic Sea, the eastern Mediterranean, the Red Sea, and the northwestern Indian Ocean.

The mission began in the Atlantic and the Baltic Sea.

The aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle left Toulon on January 27, 2026. Initially, the voyage was not related to the Middle East: the ship and its escort were heading to the Atlantic to participate in large-scale joint and international exercises ORION 26.

The French military practiced high-intensity combat operations, interaction with allies, air and anti-submarine defense, protection of sea routes, and management of combined forces. The group included the aircraft carrier itself, escort frigates, the supply ship Jacques Chevallier, a nuclear attack submarine, and carrier-based aviation.

After the Atlantic stage, the group moved to the North and Baltic Seas. This area is directly significant for the security of Ukraine and NATO’s eastern flank: Russian warships and submarines operate here, routes of the Russian ‘shadow fleet’ pass, and underwater cables and other critical infrastructure of European countries are located.

However, within a few weeks, the initial plan had to be completely changed.

Macron urgently deployed the aircraft carrier south.

After the start of a new major escalation around Iran on February 28, 2026, the French command began preparing options for deploying the carrier group to the Middle East.

The official order was given by French President Emmanuel Macron on March 3. Charles de Gaulle, located in the Baltic Sea, was to urgently move south and take positions in the eastern Mediterranean.

The French group covered about six thousand kilometers in six days, transferring a full-fledged airbase to the new area with fighters, radar detection aircraft, air defense systems, and supplies for long-term operations.

About three thousand sailors were on the aircraft carrier and its accompanying ships. The Charles de Gaulle air wing included approximately 20 Rafale Marine carrier-based fighters, as well as long-range radar detection aircraft capable of controlling airspace at a significant distance from the ships.

Italy, Spain, and the Netherlands sent their forces to interact with the French group. According to the admiral, this confirmed that European countries increasingly rely on their own naval capabilities at a time when the US demands that Europe take more responsibility for its region’s security.

Three tasks for France in the eastern Mediterranean.

After Charles de Gaulle arrived in the eastern Mediterranean, Emmanuel Macron defined three main tasks for the group.

The first was the protection of French citizens, military bases, and units. At that time, about four thousand French military personnel were already in Abu Dhabi, Djibouti, and Lebanon.

The second task was the protection of Cyprus — a European Union state and a strategic partner of France.

The third direction was the formation of an independent French assessment of events in several theaters of military operations. In particular, the group was tasked with continuing to monitor the situation related to Russia’s war against Ukraine and tracking operations conducted by Israel in Lebanon.

This point shows that the carrier group was used not only as a strike force or deterrent tool. Charles de Gaulle became a mobile intelligence center, allowing Paris to obtain its own data and not rely entirely on information from the US or other allies.

What the French monitored in Israel and Lebanon.

The rear admiral reported that the group’s aircraft and ships monitored the tactical and operational movements of various conflict participants. The collected information was transmitted to the French strategic command, where it was compared with data from satellites, ground radars, reconnaissance aviation, and other sources.

Carrier-based aircraft could conduct long-range reconnaissance flights, including areas deep in Syria and Iraq. This allowed France to monitor the movement of aviation, the operation of air defense systems, missile and drone launches, the activity of pro-Iranian groups, and changes in the military situation around Lebanon.

The mention of Israeli operations does not mean that France conducted reconnaissance exclusively against Israel. It was about monitoring the entire conflict zone and all its participants: the IDF, Hezbollah, Iran-related formations, Syrian forces, and other military structures.

For Israel, this is of particular importance. France simultaneously supports Israel’s right to security, demands the disarmament of Hezbollah, helps the Lebanese army, and tries to participate in mechanisms to prevent a new war on the Israeli-Lebanese border.

As noted by NANews — Israel News, Paris seeks to maintain a special role in the region: not to join one side directly, but to have enough intelligence information to influence diplomatic and military decisions.

French ships tracked missiles towards Cyprus.

The escort frigates of Charles de Gaulle took positions between Syria and Cyprus.

During the mission, their radars detected ballistic missiles flying towards the island. The French military calculated the trajectories and warned the Cypriot authorities. According to the calculations, the missiles launched by Iran were supposed to fall into the sea, not reaching Cyprus’s territory.

France also deployed additional ships, aviation, and missile and drone defense systems in the region. Macron called this grouping unprecedented for modern French policy in the Middle East, while emphasizing its defensive nature.

What is known about monitoring the war in Ukraine.

The most closed part of the mission remains the Ukrainian direction.

The admiral confirmed that the situation around Ukraine was among the directions for which the group was to provide the French leadership with an independent assessment. However, he did not name specific Russian units, ships, airfields, or military facilities that were monitored.

There is also no confirmation that aircraft from Charles de Gaulle entered Ukrainian airspace or conducted flights directly over the Black Sea.

It is likely that a significant portion of the data was collected during the group’s stay in the Atlantic, North, and Baltic Seas. There, French ships could track the movements of the Russian fleet, submarines, reconnaissance aviation, and ships involved in bypassing sanctions. After redeployment to the Middle East, the carrier group’s information could be combined with data from other French and allied surveillance systems. This allows us to speak not of direct ‘monitoring of Ukraine,’ but of controlling Russia’s military activity and the overall situation around the war.

The French Ministry of Armed Forces officially confirmed that the group’s initial area of operations was in the North Atlantic and the Baltic, and the decision to redeploy it to the eastern Mediterranean was made only on March 3.

Charles de Gaulle was also constantly monitored.

Intelligence around the carrier group was mutual.

According to the French commander, Russian frigates, maritime patrol aircraft from different countries, and drones, which could belong to Israel, monitored the actions of Charles de Gaulle.

The admiral did not call such behavior hostile. He explained that a large carrier group inevitably attracts the attention of military intelligence, which tries to determine the mode of operation of its aviation, radar systems, movement routes, and the order of interaction of ships. Such observation has become almost an everyday part of naval operations.

A separate scandal arose after the location of the aircraft carrier was determined using data from the Strava sports app. One of the French sailors used the app during a workout, which helped match the route with commercial satellite images.

The command stated that the published position was not transmitted in real-time and did not affect the mission’s execution. Nevertheless, the rules for using phones and internet-connected apps on board were further tightened.

Through the Red Sea under missile threat.

The next stage of the voyage was the passage through the Suez Canal and the Red Sea.

The French group headed towards the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait and the Gulf of Aden. In this zone, the ships were under potential threat of missile and drone attacks.

During the passage, the frigates closed in on the aircraft carrier, the crews went to the highest level of combat readiness, and Rafale fighters constantly monitored the air situation. They were to detect, identify, and, if necessary, destroy any target threatening the ships.

Later, Charles de Gaulle was directed closer to the Red Sea as part of preparations for a possible European operation to restore safe navigation through the Strait of Hormuz. France and the United Kingdom discussed creating an international naval mission that would operate separately from American forces and only after the threat level decreased.

The aircraft carrier as a tool of intelligence and political pressure.

The voyage of Charles de Gaulle demonstrated how the role of aircraft carriers has changed in modern conflicts.

The French ship did not deliver large-scale strikes, but its very presence allowed Paris to demonstrate readiness to intervene, protect allies, control airspace, and gather intelligence over a vast territory.

The group operated simultaneously in the context of Russia’s war against Ukraine, the confrontation between Israel and Hezbollah, the conflict around Iran, threats to Cyprus, and instability in the Red Sea.

For France, this was an opportunity to obtain its own picture of events and maintain political independence. For Israel, the presence of the French carrier group meant the emergence of another powerful observation center nearby, capable of monitoring both Iranian and pro-Iranian forces and Israel’s actions.

NANews — Israel News notes: the main feature of the mission was not surveillance of one specific country, but simultaneous control of several interconnected conflicts. In modern warfare, data on the movements of aircraft, ships, missile systems, and drones can be as important as the direct use of weapons.

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The Ukrainian-German documentary film “Silent Flood” by director Dmytro Sukholytkyy-Sobchuk became one of the winners of the 43rd Jerusalem Film Festival.

The film received the Chantal Akerman Award in the category of experimental documentary cinema.

The names of the winners were announced on July 16, 2026 during a ceremony at the Jerusalem Cinematheque. The total value of the awards presented at the festival amounted to about one million shekels.

The victory of “Silent Flood” became one of the most notable results of Ukrainian participation in the festival, which took place in Jerusalem from July 9 to 19, 2026.

“Silent Flood”: the Ukrainian war beyond the battlefield

Dmytro Sukholytkyy-Sobchuk’s film tells the story of a secluded religious community living near a picturesque river canyon in western Ukraine.

The community members adhere to pacifist beliefs and strive to maintain a traditional way of life. However, their usual order is constantly disrupted by floods, and after the start of the full-scale Russian invasion, by war as well.

“Silent Flood” was created as a co-production between Ukraine and Germany. The film’s duration is 90 minutes. In Jerusalem, it was shown in Ukrainian with subtitles in Hebrew and English.

The director does not build the narrative around battles, military equipment, or destroyed cities.

He observes the everyday life of people who would like to exist outside modern politics and conflicts but gradually discover that staying completely aside is no longer possible.

Natural floods and war become two forces in the film capable of destroying the usual way of life. The first comes with water, the second with anxiety, mobilization, losses, and the need to redefine one’s relationship with the surrounding world.

The competition jury noted this particular approach.

The official decision states that Silent Flood directs the gaze to what remains beyond the battlefield and discovers a deep movement of history there.

According to the jury, the film creates a cinematic language that remains poetic, political, and deeply human at the same time. In the conditions of war, attentiveness, compassion, and contemplation turn into a form of resistance in the film.

The award received in Jerusalem is named after the Belgian director Chantal Akerman, one of the most influential figures in European auteur and experimental cinema.

In 2026, the winner of this competition was determined by Israeli artist and director Nevet Yitzhak. She considered films whose creators use documentary material but go beyond the usual reportage form.

Before Jerusalem, “Silent Flood” had already received international recognition.

At the IDFA documentary film festival in Amsterdam, the film was noted for the best cinematography. The visual work was done by Ivan Morarash, Oleksandr Korotun, Vyacheslav Tsvetkov, and Dmytro Sukholytkyy-Sobchuk himself. Despite the participation of four cinematographers, the film maintained a unified visual language.

Then the film received an award at the Krakow International Film Festival.

Thus, Jerusalem became another important point in the international journey of the film, which tells about Ukraine not through direct depiction of the front but through the lives of people whom the war gradually reaches.

Earlier, NAnews — Israel News reported that two Ukrainian films were presented at the 43rd Jerusalem Film Festival.

Besides “Silent Flood,” the main international competition included the film “To the Victory!” by Valentyn Vasyanovych. Its action unfolds in an imaginary post-war Ukraine, which many residents, including the main character’s family, are leaving.

Ukrainian director Serhiy Loznitsa was an honorary guest of the festival and the chairman of the jury for the feature-length Israeli cinema competition. Together with him, the winners were chosen by Alissa Simon and Jorge Stamadianos.

However, it is important to note that the decision to award “Silent Flood” was made separately: Loznitsa was not part of the jury for the Chantal Akerman competition.

The Ukrainian film was part of a large list of winners, which included films from Germany, North Macedonia, Israel, China, and other countries.

The main international winners of the festival

The main award of the international competition — The Nechama Rivlin Award for Best International Film — was won by the film “The Dreamed Adventure” by German director Valeska Grisebach.

This is a joint production of Germany, France, Bulgaria, and Austria with a duration of 167 minutes.

The main character agrees to help an old acquaintance and embarks on a dangerous journey with him. Gradually, the foreign adventure forces her to confront her own desires and inner contradictions.

The jury noted Valeska Grisebach’s directorial skill and how the film connects several major themes: European identities, state borders, and personal relationships between people.

The award for best acting went to Karlis Arnolds Avots, who starred in the film by Latvian director Viesturs Kairish “Ulya”.

The jury noted how the actor creates an image using movements, gaze, body plasticity, and facial expressions. His performance was described as serious, restrained, and visually expressive.

The best international debut was recognized as the film “17” by director Kosara Mitic, created in collaboration with North Macedonia, Serbia, and Slovenia.

The main character, 17-year-old Sara, hides her own secret during a school trip. The situation spirals out of control after she witnesses sexual violence against her friend Lina. The girls try to break the cycle of violence, and a special bond develops between them.

The jury called the film a harsh and uncompromising statement about violence, which had long been preferred to remain silent about.

A special mention in the debut competition was awarded to the film “Panda” by director Zhang Xinyang, representing Singapore, Hong Kong, and China.

The jury described it as a poetic and philosophical journey along the Yangtze River, reflecting on madness, acceptance of life, and the human ability not only to fear water but also to enter it.

The winner of the “In the Spirit of Freedom” competition, dedicated to solidarity, humanity, freedom, and justice, was the film “Skateboarding Is Not for Girls” by director Dina Duma.

The film tells the story of two sisters from the Roma community — Adela and Zara. After their father’s disappearance, the family finds itself in an even more difficult situation, and a relative offers to take the older girl to the Bulgarian bride market and marry her off for a reward.

The jury noted that the author addresses heavy themes but maintains room for humor, compassion, vitality, and the complexity of human characters in the film.

Winners of Israeli competitions

The main winner of the feature-length Israeli cinema competition was the film “Where To?” by director Assaf Machnes.

The film received three awards:

for best Israeli feature-length film;

for best screenplay;

for best acting by Ihab Salami.

The action takes place in Berlin.

55-year-old Palestinian taxi driver Hassan transports club and party-goers at night. He has become estranged from his eldest daughter and has been unable to free himself from memories of the past for many years.

One day, his passenger is a 25-year-old Israeli named Amir. A few months later, their paths cross again. Gradually, the night rides through Berlin turn into a story about pain, memory, exile, loneliness, and an attempt to understand another person.

The jury, chaired by Serhiy Loznitsa, noted the film’s ability to show the human above political beliefs and cultural conflicts.

The best Israeli feature-length documentary film was recognized as “I Am Neo” by director Yael Abecassis.

Neo was three and a half years old when a severe car accident led to brainstem damage. After five days between life and death, the child awoke, unable to breathe, speak, walk, or eat independently.

The parents began filming the events on camera. From hundreds of hours of family recordings, a film emerged about the child and his loved ones trying to practically rebuild their lives.

The jury called the film a patient, humane, and touching struggle for life.

The award for best Israeli debut went to the documentary film “Find Me, Okay?” by director Yula Gidron.

Its heroine is Eden Yerushalmi, kidnapped by Hamas terrorists from the Nova festival on October 7, 2023.

The film shows the struggle of Eden’s mother, sisters, and friend for her return, the collapse of hope after news of the hostage’s death, and the family’s attempt to continue living after the tragedy.

The award for best cinematography went to Meidan Arama for the film I Can’t Say No to Myself, for best editing to Gal Rosenbluth for the film Amal, and the prize for original music went to Asaf Talmudi, who worked on the film The Wedding Entertainer.

Among Israeli short films, the winner was Another Body by Orit Fuchs Rotem. Second place went to the film Fireworks, the best animated work was recognized as Saba, and the acting award went to Dar Zuzovsky for her role in the film Peppa the Great.

In the Israeli experimental cinema and video art competition, the main award went to the film A Pleasant Sail on Land by Gadi Yampel. The film Krav Maga by Tal Elkayam received a separate award for experimental cinema, and a special mention was given to the work Dragon by Natalia Riss.

The 43rd Jerusalem Film Festival showcased a very wide range of contemporary cinema: from stories about war, violence, and abductions to films about European identity, family trauma, coming of age, and the search for connection between people.

For NAnews — Israel News, the victory of the Ukrainian “Silent Flood” remains an especially important result.

However, it would be wrong to consider it separately from other laureates. Dmytro Sukholytkyy-Sobchuk’s film was part of a festival program where the main themes were human dignity, memory, freedom, resistance to violence, and the attempt to maintain the ability to see another person even during war.

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“Maccabi” Haifa indeed took concrete steps to sign the 28-year-old Ukrainian national team midfielder Oleksiy Hutsulyak. However, as of July 19, 2026, the player remains a free agent, with no official agreement announced with any Israeli, Turkish, or Arab club.

The story developed over several weeks: first, Hutsulyak ended his cooperation with Zhytomyr’s “Polissya”, then information about “Maccabi’s” interest appeared in Israel, and on July 16, the player’s agent first detailed the negotiations with clubs from Israel, Turkey, Belgium, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.

Summer 2024: Hutsulyak moves to “Polissya”

Oleksiy Hutsulyak joined Zhytomyr’s “Polissya” in the summer of 2024 after leaving “Dnipro-1”. The contract was for two years — until the end of June 2026.

During this time, the Ukrainian winger became one of the key players of the team.

Together with Hutsulyak, “Polissya” won the first bronze medals in the club’s history in the Ukrainian Premier League in the 2024/25 season. According to “Suspilne Sport”, he played 65 matches for the Zhytomyr team over two years, scored 20 goals, and made 10 assists. Some other sports sources account for 21 goals and 11 assists, so the differences are likely due to the methodology of counting tournaments and assists.

In the 2025/26 season, Hutsulyak played 25 matches in the Ukrainian Premier League and scored eight goals. His last championship game for “Polissya” took place on May 12, 2026, against “Epicenter”.

January 2026: conflict over transfer to U-19

On January 13, 2026, it became known that “Polissya” transferred Hutsulyak from the main team to the youth squad U-19.

Publicly, the club did not link this decision to contract negotiations, but Ukrainian media speculated that this might have been a way to pressure the player due to his reluctance to sign a new agreement.

Already on January 18, 2026, Hutsulyak was returned to training with the first team.

The management of “Polissya” explained this by the interests of the Ukrainian national team: in March, the national team had decisive playoff matches for the 2026 World Cup qualification, and Hutsulyak was one of its most productive players.

Later, the player’s agent, Oleh Avdysh, refused to directly answer whether the transfer to U-19 was an attempt at pressure. He stated that “Polissya” and Hutsulyak gave a lot to each other and that the player’s representatives do not want to return to negative moments.

End of June — July 1, 2026: contract completed

Hutsulyak’s contract with “Polissya” expired at the end of June 2026.

On July 1, 2026, the player officially bid farewell to the Zhytomyr club on social media. He emphasized that he spent exactly two years with the team and became part of the historic achievement — “Polissya’s” first bronze medals in the Ukrainian Premier League.

After the contract ended, Hutsulyak gained free agent status.

This means that a new club does not need to pay “Polissya” a transfer fee. However, the player himself may demand a higher salary, signing bonuses, and more favorable personal terms.

Later, Oleh Avdysh explained that Hutsulyak refused a new agreement not because of a desire to move to another Ukrainian club. According to the agent, the player had long planned to continue his career abroad and try his hand in a new championship.

July 4, 2026: interest from “Maccabi” first reported in Israel

On July 4, 2026, at 19:04, the Israeli publication Walla Sport reported that “Maccabi” Haifa was considering signing Hutsulyak.

At that time, it was about the club’s interest, not an agreed contract or official offer. Israeli journalists noted that teams from Belgium, Turkey, and the Gulf countries were also interested in the Ukrainian.

The publication from July 4 stated that Hutsulyak was not in a hurry to make a final decision and hoped to receive new offers after the 2026 World Cup.

At the same time, Israeli media cited his statistics for the Ukrainian national team: 16 matches and six goals. For “Polissya” in all tournaments of the 2025/26 season, he recorded nine goals and seven assists.

Thus, “Maccabi’s” interest arose or, at least, became public after Hutsulyak gained free agent status.

July 16, 2026: agent confirmed Israel’s concrete step

The main source of this story appeared on July 16, 2026, at 08:18.

It was then that the publication “Ukrainian Football” published a large interview with Hutsulyak’s agent, Oleh Avdysh. The player’s representative first detailed the teams and championships with which negotiations were conducted.

Avdysh confirmed serious interest from the Turkish “Kocaelispor”. According to him, this club was actively working on the possible transfer of Hutsulyak.

Besides “Kocaelispor”, three other Turkish teams were interested in the Ukrainian at that time. The agent named “Konyaspor” and “Chorum” but refused to disclose the name of the fourth club. Another team, which was in the top five of the Turkish championship at that time, also joined the negotiations.

To a direct question about “Anderlecht” and “Maccabi” Haifa, Avdysh replied:

“It’s ‘Anderlecht’. The Brussels team indeed showed serious interest, but their financial capabilities do not meet Oleksiy’s demands. The Israeli side also took a concrete step.”

Therefore, on July 16, the agent confirmed that there was not only preliminary interest from Israel but also a concrete action. However, he did not disclose the amount or specify whether it was a written offer, salary agreement, or the start of official negotiations.

Avdysh added that the most likely scenario is a move to Turkey or one of the Arab championships.

How much Hutsulyak wanted to earn

In the interview from July 16, the agent was directly asked about reports that Hutsulyak’s financial demands range from one to two million dollars a year.

Oleh Avdysh confirmed that this amount is close to reality. According to him, there are clubs on the market capable of meeting such demands.

For “Maccabi” Haifa, such a contract would mean turning the Ukrainian into one of the highest-paid players on the team.

However, the exact amount offered by the Israeli club was not publicly disclosed. Therefore, claims of specific 700, 800 thousand, or one million euros do not have sufficient official confirmation.

The agent also emphasized that salary is not the only criterion. For Hutsulyak, it is fundamentally important to choose a club whose performances will allow him to remain in the field of view of the Ukrainian national team’s coaching staff.

July 18, 2026: Israeli media announced that “Maccabi” lost the financial battle

On July 18, 2026, at 09:57, Walla Sport returned to Hutsulyak’s story and published an article with the headline: “Hutsulyak’s agent: ‘Maccabi’ Haifa did not match the received offers”.

This version was also spread by other Israeli sports publications, including Sport1.

The Israeli publication claimed that “Maccabi” could not offer financial conditions comparable to the offers from clubs in Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE.

However, there is an important nuance here.

In the original interview from July 16, the agent directly mentioned the mismatch of financial capabilities only concerning “Anderlecht”. Regarding “Maccabi” Haifa, he only stated that the Israeli side took a “concrete step”.

Therefore, the phrase that “Maccabi” could not match the competitors’ offers is logical but still an Israeli interpretation of the agent’s words, not his verbatim statement in the Ukrainian source.

Nevertheless, the overall conclusion seems obvious: if the conditions of the Israeli club suited the player, “Maccabi” would remain among the main contenders. By July 18, Turkey and the Gulf countries had already gained the advantage.

July 18: offer from “Al-Wasl” appeared

Also on July 18, 2026, Ukrainian media reported an offer from the “Al-Wasl” club from the United Arab Emirates.

According to Football24, citing the “TaToTake” project, the club was ready to offer Hutsulyak about 1.5 million euros per season. Officially, “Al-Wasl” did not confirm this information.

This amount corresponds to the range of one to two million dollars, which the player’s agent confirmed on July 16.

It is the clubs from the UAE and Saudi Arabia that have the ability to offer conditions that are difficult for not only “Maccabi” Haifa but also many European teams to compete with.

July 19: “Konyaspor” dropped out of the race

On the morning of July 19, 2026, new information about the Turkish direction appeared.

Sport.ua reported that “Konyaspor” is not actually working on signing Hutsulyak and that the Ukrainian’s name is not on the team’s transfer list.

This message contradicts the agent’s words from July 16, who confirmed “Konyaspor’s” interest.

There are two possible explanations: either the situation changed within three days, or the initial interest did not turn into real negotiations. In any case, as of July 19, the option with “Konyaspor” was no longer considered relevant.

At the same time, the information about the interest of “Kocaelispor”, “Chorum”, an unnamed Turkish club, and a team from the top five of the Turkish championship was not officially refuted.

Who is Oleksiy Hutsulyak

Oleksiy Hutsulyak was born on December 25, 1997 in Krasyliv, Khmelnytskyi region.

He is 187 centimeters tall. His main position is a flank midfielder or winger. He can play on the right, left, and closer to the center of the attack.

During his career, Hutsulyak played for Lviv’s “Karpaty”, Chernihiv’s “Desna”, “Dnipro-1”, and Zhytomyr’s “Polissya”. He also had a period in the structure of the Spanish “Villarreal”, but he did not play for the main team of the Spanish club.

The player has 16 matches and six goals for the Ukrainian national team. In 2025, he became the top scorer of the Ukrainian national team, scoring five goals.

Main conclusion

The interest of “Maccabi” Haifa in Oleksiy Hutsulyak was real.

It was not just a name on the list of potential newcomers: the player’s agent confirmed that the Israeli side took a concrete step.

However, by mid-July 2026, the financial bar had risen to a level where “Maccabi” had to compete with Turkish clubs and teams from Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

For NAnews — Israel News, this story shows that Israeli clubs continue to closely monitor the Ukrainian market. One of the most productive players of the Ukrainian national team could indeed have ended up in Haifa, but the economic capabilities of the Gulf clubs and the Turkish championship pushed the Israeli option to the background.

As of July 19, 2026, Hutsulyak remains a free agent. “Maccabi” Haifa has effectively dropped out of the main contenders, but the player’s final decision and his new club have not yet been officially announced.

…
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The United States is preparing a large-scale reinforcement of its air group in the Middle East. Dozens of additional tanker aircraft are being sent to Israel, and F-35 fighters and specialized F-16s designed to suppress air defense systems are being transferred from American airbases in the UK and Germany.

This is not just a show of force.

The infrastructure being created allows American aviation to stay over Iran longer, increase the number of combat sorties, support operations against radars and anti-aircraft complexes, and, with a political decision from Washington, significantly expand the list of targets.

About 60 tankers were already in Israel

The American publication Axios reported on July 17, 2026, that President Donald Trump’s administration notified Israel of the decision to send several dozen additional military tanker aircraft to the country.

According to the publication, at that time about 30 American tankers were at Ben Gurion International Airport, and approximately the same number were at Ramon Airport in southern Israel.

Thus, even before the new transfer, the American group numbered about 60 tanker aircraft. After the arrival of additional machines, its number could indeed approach one hundred, although the Pentagon has not officially announced the exact number of aircraft.

Axios links the decision to discussions in the White House Situation Room about new options for a military campaign against Iran.

Among the scenarios presented to Donald Trump were strikes on Iranian infrastructure, new attacks on nuclear program facilities, and a possible operation against the alleged underground site Pickaxe Mountain. A final decision to move to such a large-scale campaign had not been made at the time of publication.

However, the transfer of dozens of tankers itself shows that the US is creating opportunities to expand the war in advance.

A large number of such aircraft is necessary not for a single attack, but for a prolonged air operation in which fighters, reconnaissance aircraft, and other aviation must remain at a significant distance from their bases for hours.

The war has already transitioned to a mode of daily American strikes

The United States Central Command reported that on the night of July 18, 2026, American forces conducted the eighth consecutive night of strikes on Iran.

According to an official CENTCOM statement, the targets were coastal surveillance facilities, air defense systems, naval forces, as well as missile and drone storage sites. The American military stated that they continue to reduce Iran’s ability to conduct attacks and control the Persian Gulf region.

This makes the transfer of tanker aircraft especially important.

American strikes are no longer a one-time operation. They have turned into a consistent campaign that requires constant aviation presence, regular aircraft rotation, and continuous in-air refueling.

NANews — Israel News notes: the concentration of dozens of American tankers at Israeli airfields indicates preparation not only for the continuation of current strikes but also for the possibility of their rapid expansion.

Why tankers determine the scale of the air war

The KC-135 Stratotanker remains the main aerial refueling aircraft of the US Air Force. According to official information from the US Air Force, these machines provide fuel for Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and allied aviation.

The newer KC-46A Pegasus has expanded refueling, cargo transport, and medical evacuation capabilities. They were created as a replacement for the aging KC-135 fleet and can be used simultaneously in several types of operations.

The presence of dozens of such machines allows:

keeping fighters in the air longer;

increasing the flight range of combat aviation;

conducting repeated target approaches;

supporting round-the-clock air patrols;

refueling aircraft operating against Iranian air defenses;

reducing dependence on airfields located close to Iran.

In fact, each additional tanker increases not only the range but also the intensity of the entire air campaign.

F-35s are being sent from the UK, F-16 Wild Weasel from Germany

The American specialized publication Air & Space Forces Magazine reported on July 17, 2026, that the Pentagon is simultaneously transferring additional combat aircraft to the Middle East.

F-35A Lightning II fighters from the 48th Fighter Wing, based at RAF Lakenheath, are being sent from the UK.

F-16 Fighting Falcon from the 480th Fighter Squadron are being transferred from Spangdahlem Air Base in Germany.

This is an important clarification: some reports mentioned F-15s supposedly being transferred from Germany. American sources indicate that it is specifically about specialized F-16s.

The official website of Spangdahlem Air Base confirms that the 480th Squadron is capable of performing Wild Weasel missions — suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses.

Its F-16s are designed to detect and engage active radars, anti-aircraft missile systems, and other elements of the air defense system.

The task of such aircraft is to clear the way for the main strike aviation.

First, F-16 Wild Weasel detects radar activity and forces the enemy to activate detection systems. Then radar and anti-aircraft missile positions can be suppressed by electronic warfare means or destroyed by munitions.

After this, F-35s, bombers, and other strike aircraft can operate with less risk.

In March 2026, Air & Space Forces Magazine already reported that F-16 Wild Weasel from Germany participated in operations against Iranian air defenses. Simultaneously, F-35s and F-15Es, based in the UK or transferred from there to the region, were used in the campaign.

The figure ’14 aircraft’ requires caution

In foreign publications, the number 14 American tanker aircraft does indeed appear, but it does not refer to the last July weekend.

The American publication The War Zone reported that just before the start of hostilities on February 28, 2026, nine KC-46A Pegasus and five KC-135 Stratotanker — a total of 14 machines — arrived at Ben Gurion. After the start of the war, the American presence at the airport increased significantly.

There is no independent confirmation that another 14 tankers arrived specifically on July 17–18 in available American and international sources.

Therefore, in publications, it is safer to talk about the confirmed transfer of several dozen additional aircraft, rather than asserting as an established fact the arrival of specifically 14 machines on the last weekend.

At the same time, the overall trend is undeniable: the American air group in Israel is expanding.

Ben Gurion was overwhelmed with military aviation

The presence of dozens of American aircraft has already affected the operation of Israel’s main international airport.

Reuters reported on May 28, 2026, that due to the deployment of American military aviation, Ben Gurion was operating at about a third of its normal capacity.

According to the head of the Airports Authority, up to 70% of the airport’s space and infrastructure capabilities were restricted for military needs. This posed a threat of mass flight cancellations during the summer vacation period.

Reuters had already published materials on May 19 confirming the presence of a large number of American tankers at the airport’s parking areas. Thus, the American group began forming long before the current July reinforcement.

Placing some aircraft in Ramon helps reduce the load on Ben Gurion, but the arrival of several dozen more machines again raises questions about available parking, technical maintenance, security, and the organization of military flights alongside civilian aviation.

What the transfer of nearly a hundred tankers means

Tanker aircraft themselves do not strike Iranian targets.

But they make a large-scale and prolonged air war possible.

Without refueling, a fighter is limited by its fuel supply and must quickly return to base. With the support of KC-135 or KC-46, it can remain in the operation zone much longer, await strike orders, escort other aircraft, or re-attack a target.

The simultaneous arrival of F-35s and F-16 Wild Weasel shows the intended structure of the American operation.

Specialized F-16s are to suppress radars and anti-aircraft complexes. Stealthy F-35s can penetrate areas with remaining air defenses, gather intelligence, and deliver precise strikes. Tankers provide the necessary range and flight duration for both groups.

NANews — Israel News notes that this is about creating an entire air system: tankers ensure the duration of the operation, F-16s clear the airspace, and F-35s and other strike aircraft can operate over Iran with less risk.

Main conclusion

American and international sources confirm that the US is sending several dozen additional tanker aircraft to Israel.

About 60 such machines were already at Ben Gurion and Ramon by July 17, 2026, so after the transfer is completed, the total number of the group could approach one hundred aircraft.

Simultaneously, the Pentagon is transferring F-35s from the UK and specialized F-16 Wild Weasel from Germany. The latter are intended to suppress and destroy Iranian radars and air defense systems.

Against the backdrop of eight consecutive nights of American strikes on Iran, this does not look like a symbolic gesture, but rather as preparation of infrastructure for a prolonged and potentially more extensive air war.

…
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The resignation of Ukraine’s Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov brought to light a conflict that had been developing within the Ukrainian military-political leadership for a long time. At the center of the confrontation were Fedorov’s relations with the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Oleksandr Syrskyi, differing views on conducting the war, defense procurement, and control over the distribution of the enormous military budget.

Published on July 18, 2026, by The New York Times.

According to the American publication, one of the main reasons for the conflict was Fedorov’s attempt to redirect more resources to drones and robotic systems. Oleksandr Syrskyi, on the contrary, insisted on continuing large purchases of artillery ammunition necessary for the Ukrainian army for heavy positional battles in the east of the country.

However, the story turned out to be significantly more complex than a usual dispute over whether it is better to fight with drones or artillery.

Behind Volodymyr Zelensky’s personnel decision was a protracted conflict between two centers of Ukraine’s defense management, which by mid-July had practically ceased to interact normally.

Six months at the head of the Ministry of Defense

Mykhailo Fedorov headed Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense on January 14, 2026.

Before that, he led the Ministry of Digital Transformation, participated in the creation of the state application “Diia”, the launch of the “Army of Drones” project, the expansion of Starlink usage, and the development of the Ukrainian market for unmanned systems, electronic warfare means, ground robots, and missiles.

Fedorov came to the defense department with a reputation as a technological reformer.

He intended to restructure the cumbersome military procurement system, accelerate the delivery of weapons to combat units, and use battlefield data to determine which drones and other systems truly show results.

Reuters notes that Fedorov tried to apply an approach to the army based on technology, measurable efficiency, and quick decision-making. This inevitably led him to clash with the existing military bureaucracy and high command.

But just six months after his appointment, he lost his position.

During a government reshuffle, Fedorov’s candidacy was not included in the new Cabinet of Ministers. Yevhen Khmara, who previously served as acting head of the Security Service of Ukraine, was appointed as acting Minister of Defense.

The conflict between Fedorov and Syrskyi came to the surface

After the decision on his resignation, Fedorov publicly accused Oleksandr Syrskyi of blocking the Ministry of Defense’s initiatives, backstage intrigues, and deliberate sabotage of reforms.

According to the former minister, at the beginning of his work, he proposed to Zelensky to replace the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and the Chief of the General Staff.

The president then refused.

Fedorov claims that after this, he agreed to try to establish joint work with the military leadership, but the initiatives proposed by the Ministry of Defense were systematically blocked. He also stated that Syrskyi avoided direct and open discussions about the accumulated problems.

Fedorov, however, did not deny the military merits of the Commander-in-Chief. In particular, he acknowledged Syrskyi’s role in the defense of Kyiv in 2022.

His complaints primarily related to the existing culture of army management, attitude towards servicemen, inability to quickly implement new solutions, and resistance to changes.

Volodymyr Zelensky himself also acknowledged that the conflict existed and reached a level where the Minister of Defense and the Commander-in-Chief could not interact normally without the president’s mediation.

According to sources in Ukrainian media, Zelensky considered it unacceptable for the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff to effectively fight each other during the war.

Drones versus artillery shells

The most high-profile part of the story is related to defense procurement.

The New York Times claims that Fedorov blocked some purchases of artillery ammunition, seeking to redirect the freed-up funds to drones.

Syrskyi, according to this version, considered such a decision dangerous. Despite the rapid development of drones, Ukrainian troops continue to engage in heavy ground battles where artillery remains one of the main means of fire support.

Fedorov acknowledged that he canceled or revised some tenders for the purchase of 155-millimeter NATO-standard artillery shells. He also suspended contracts for certain types of short-range ammunition.

According to the former minister, the review of these purchases saved about 100 million dollars. At the same time, he claimed that Ukraine continued to purchase long-range artillery ammunition and did not intend to completely abandon artillery.

A representative of one of the Ukrainian defense enterprises reported that military contractors received letters about the cessation of some shell purchases. It was assumed that the army could temporarily use existing stocks while expanding the use of drones.

This is where the main question arose.

The General Staff determines the army’s needs for weapons based on the situation at the front. The Ministry of Defense is responsible for financing, contracts, and the actual acquisition of weapons.

If the ministry begins to review the military command’s requests, it effectively gains the ability to influence not only contract prices but also the very strategy of the war.

Fedorov did not propose to completely abandon artillery

The public description of the conflict as a choice between artillery and drones simplifies the situation.

As early as June 24, 2026, Fedorov named among Ukraine’s main needs air defense, the expansion of drone and missile production, as well as long-range strike capabilities.

Thus, it was probably not about a complete abandonment of traditional weapons, but about the redistribution of the defense budget.

Fedorov wanted to direct more money to drones, robotic systems, digital management, and units capable of proving their effectiveness.

Syrskyi and his supporters feared that an excessively rapid transition to such a model could leave frontline units without the necessary amount of shells, equipment, and personnel.

In essence, the parties argued about the pace and scale of the army’s technological restructuring.

What results did Fedorov present

Before leaving office, Fedorov named 22 achievements of the Ministry of Defense during his leadership.

Among them are the expansion of purchases of FPV drones, fiber-optic drones, interceptor drones, ground robotic complexes, and long-range strike systems. The ministry also developed a support program for modern drone-assault units.

According to the department, Ukrainian units from the beginning of 2026 to June 22 confirmed more than 800,000 hits on Russian targets using drones.

Already on July 17, the Ministry of Defense reported that the number of Russian targets hit by drones exceeded one million. On the same day, the department announced the signing of contracts for drones worth more than 333 billion hryvnias in the first half of the year.

These figures are published by the Ministry of Defense itself and reflect the official assessment of the results of Fedorov’s team’s work.

There is no complete independent audit of the effectiveness of all programs yet. However, even critics of the former minister recognize his role in scaling up Ukrainian drone production and turning drones into one of the main elements of modern warfare.

Political version of the resignation

The TSN material also presents a political version of what happened.

A deputy from the “Holos” party, Mykola Davyduk, suggested that Fedorov’s growing popularity and the well-known drone program could have caused concerns in Volodymyr Zelensky’s political circle.

According to this version, presidential advisers could have portrayed Fedorov as a potentially independent and overly popular political figure.

The New York Times also recalled that Zelensky had previously dismissed the popular Commander-in-Chief Valeriy Zaluzhnyi, who was considered a possible competitor to the president in future elections.

Later, the head of military intelligence Kyrylo Budanov received a position in the presidential administration. Some analysts interpreted this as an attempt to keep a popular security official within the current political team.

However, there is no evidence that Fedorov was preparing his own political project or intended to participate in the presidential elections.

Therefore, political jealousy remains a version, not a confirmed reason for the resignation.

Why Zelensky retained Syrskyi

Volodymyr Zelensky was effectively faced with a choice between a reformist minister and the commander-in-chief of the active army.

Replacing Syrskyi during ongoing heavy fighting could have caused temporary disorganization of the entire military vertical.

Fedorov’s resignation also created serious risks but did not directly affect the system of operational command of the troops.

As a result, Zelensky retained Syrskyi and sacrificed the Minister of Defense.

This does not necessarily mean that the president fully supported the methods of the Commander-in-Chief. Rather, in the conditions of war, he chose to maintain the existing system of army management.

At the same time, Zelensky appointed Yevhen Khmara as acting Minister of Defense and stated the need to continue technological operations, develop unmanned systems, and maintain direct funding for combat units.

Thus, official Kyiv is trying to show that Fedorov’s resignation does not mean abandoning his technological course.

The resignation caused rare military protests

The decision to leave Fedorov led to protests, unusual for wartime Ukraine.

For two consecutive days, thousands of people gathered near the President’s Office in Kyiv. Participants demanded the resignation of Oleksandr Syrskyi and the return of Fedorov to the leadership of the defense system.

Among the protesters were veterans, relatives of servicemen, and supporters of the army’s technological modernization. Similar actions took place in other Ukrainian cities.

After Fedorov’s resignation, Deputy Commander of the Air Forces Pavlo Yelizarov, associated with the development of drone operations, submitted a resignation report.

Several high-ranking military officials also publicly supported the continuation of reforms.

The scale of the reaction showed that Ukrainian society perceived what happened not as an ordinary government reshuffle.

For many, the resignation became a symbol of the struggle between the new technological model of the army and the old military system, which is accused of excessive centralization, large losses, and resistance to change.

What really cost Fedorov his position

It cannot be asserted that Mykhailo Fedorov lost his post solely because of one canceled contract or a dispute over 155-millimeter shells.

A combination of factors led to the resignation.

First and foremost, it was a personal and managerial conflict with Oleksandr Syrskyi, which made normal interaction between the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff practically impossible.

The second factor was a different understanding of the future of the war. Fedorov tried to accelerate the transition to drones, robots, digital systems, and resource distribution based on proven effectiveness.

The military command continued to insist on the need for artillery, infantry, mobilization, and a traditional vertical of management.

Finally, Fedorov’s reforms affected the interests of major arms suppliers and the existing system of military budget distribution. The former minister himself stated that the review of procurements threatened the business interests of individual companies, but there is no independent evidence of organized pressure from the defense industry yet.

NANews — Israel News notes: Fedorov’s resignation was not the end of the conflict, but its public beginning.

Zelensky retained Syrskyi but simultaneously promised to continue the technological reforms associated with the name of the dismissed minister.

Now the main indicator will be not personnel statements, but the real decisions of the new leadership: whether the review of procurements will continue, whether support for effective drone units will be maintained, and whether the General Staff will gain full control over the distribution of defense funds.

The high-profile resignation showed that Ukraine faced not just a dispute between two leaders. The country must decide whether it can combine the traditional military system with a technological army — or whether the struggle for control over the war will continue under a new Minister of Defense.

…
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How did four Ukrainian Jews — Jan Koum, Leonid Radvinsky, Michael Polsky and Max Levchin — go from childhood in Kyiv, Odesa and the Kharkiv region to a combined net worth of over $25 billion in the United States?

Each of them founded or led a world‑class company: Jan Koum was one of the creators of WhatsApp, Leonid Radvinsky turned OnlyFans into a global phenomenon, Michael Polsky founded Invenergy LLC in the “green” energy sector, and Max Levchin co‑founded PayPal and now runs Affirm.

This is reported in a publication by Forbes. By the number of billionaire immigrants, Ukraine ranked 9th among 41 countries.

From Kyiv’s Courtyards to Global Heights

How Their Stories Began in Ukraine

• Jan Koum was born in February 1976 on the outskirts of Kyiv. In the family of an electronics engineer there were no trendy computers, but there were radios that the boy would take apart and reassemble. In a school BASIC club he wrote his first programs to send text messages over a local network.
• Leonid Radvinsky was born in the early 1970s in Odesa, near the famous Privoz Market. Together with his mother he sold souvenirs to tourists, calculating profit and bargaining for every dollar. These lessons in commerce and the ability to connect with people laid the foundation for his entrepreneurial drive.
• Michael Polsky was born in 1947 in a rural area of the Kharkiv region. In his free time he built wind turbine models from bicycle spokes and tin cans, dreaming of an energy future. After technical college he worked at a power plant, where he first encountered the ideas of alternative energy.
• Max Levchin was born in July 1975 in Kyiv into a family of historians. At school he became passionate about chess and the Pascal programming language. By organizing a “Young Programmer” club, Max not only deepened his algorithmic knowledge but also learned to share expertise and build teamwork.

In the Emigration Lab — A Step West

Each of them took the risk to leave their homeland and go to the United States with minimal resources:

1. Jan Koum arrived in 1992 with his mother and grandmother under a repatriation program. For the first years he worked as a cleaner and barista to pay for his studies at San Jose State University.
2. Leonid Radvinsky settled in Chicago on a humanitarian visa, graduated from Northwestern University, and began working in internet marketing.
3. Michael Polsky was invited as an energy specialist in 1976. With $500 in his pocket, he got a job as an electrician, and twenty years later founded his own company, Invenergy.
4. Max Levchin obtained political asylum in 1991, moved to Memphis, and by the end of the decade had co‑founded PayPal.

Breakthroughs and Achievements

• WhatsApp by Jan Koum and Brian Acton amassed over 2 billion users in a few years, and its sale to Meta netted Koum over $16.9 billion.
• OnlyFans by Leonid Radvinsky became a platform generating over $1.3 billion in annual revenue and awarded him personal dividends of over $1 billion.
• Invenergy by Michael Polsky executed projects worth more than $7 billion, including wind and solar farms across America.
• Affirm Holdings under Max Levchin’s leadership became a key player in fintech, and Levchin’s net worth is estimated at approximately $2.1 billion.

How They Stay Connected to Ukraine Today

• Jan Koum supports several educational programs and grants for IT camps in Kyiv, aiming to inspire a new generation of programmers.
• Leonid Radvinsky donated $5 million in 2022 to humanitarian aid for Ukraine, affected by military conflict.
• Michael Polsky speaks at European energy conferences promoting green economy practices in Eastern Europe.
• Max Levchin organizes student exchanges between Kyiv Polytechnic Institute and American universities, supporting young engineers.

On the NAnews – Israel News website, we share how mutual support and knowledge exchange strengthen bridges between Israel and Ukraine.

Conclusions and Significance

• Childhood interests — whether radio electronics or chess — can lead to global discoveries.
• Emigration tests resilience: courage and adaptability turn challenges into opportunities.
• Maintaining cultural roots and caring for one’s homeland create synergy between innovation and tradition.

These stories from NAnews inspire Israeli startups and show that by combining diaspora experience and technology, we can reach new heights.

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In 12 days of the ‘MoLoChKa’ operation, Ukrainian drones, according to the command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces, hit 159 vessels of the Russian ‘shadow fleet’ in the Azov and Black Seas. The campaign’s goal is not the mass sinking of tankers, but the paralysis of Russia’s maritime logistics, the supply of occupied Crimea, and the transportation of oil, fuel, and goods circumventing sanctions.

On July 17, 2026, the commander of the Armed Forces of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces, Robert Brovdi, known by the call sign ‘Madyar’, summarized the interim results of the ‘MoLoChKa’ operation.

According to him, from July 6 to 17, Ukrainian units hit 159 vessels used in Russian maritime logistics:

• 117 vessels — in the Azov Sea;
• 42 vessels — in the Black Sea.

On the night of July 17 alone, 12 more vessels were attacked in the Black Sea: nine dry cargo ships, one tanker, one gas tanker, and one tugboat.

These figures are already being called one of the largest episodes of drone use against Russian maritime logistics. However, it is important to understand: 159 affected vessels do not mean 159 sunken ships.

What does the name of the operation ‘MoLoChKa’ mean

The name of the operation turned out to be an abbreviation.

On July 15, Robert Brovdi deciphered it as follows:

MLChK — ‘Moscow Will Lie Through Crimea’, meaning ‘Moscow will lie through Crimea’.

According to the Ukrainian command’s plan, it is not about a single series of strikes, but a systematic campaign against the infrastructure that allows Russia to hold the occupied peninsula and use it as a military base.

It includes attacks on maritime transport, oil depots, energy facilities, railway hubs, bridges, substations, and other elements of supplying Russian troops in southern Ukraine.

The strategy’s meaning is to gradually turn Crimea from a convenient military foothold into a territory whose maintenance requires more and more fuel, equipment, ships, air defense systems, and repair resources from Moscow.

Crimea holds not only military but also symbolic significance for the Kremlin. Its capture has been portrayed by Russian propaganda for many years as one of Putin’s main achievements. Therefore, the destruction of the peninsula’s logistical connections can simultaneously inflict military, economic, and political damage.

159 affected vessels — not 159 sunken ships

Headlines about ‘knocked out’ or ‘destroyed’ vessels can create the false impression that Ukrainian forces sent almost one and a half hundred ships to the bottom in 12 days.

The SBS command describes the operation’s goal differently.

Ukrainian drones are supposed to deprive the vessel of the ability to move normally, navigate, and maintain communication. Robert Brovdi stated that the task is to turn a self-propelled vessel into a drifting ‘blind and deaf’ barge.

At the same time, according to him, operators try not to pierce the hulls of tankers to prevent large-scale oil spills and pollution of the Azov and Black Seas.

Drones can hit:

• the captain’s bridge;
• radar equipment;
• satellite communication antennas;
• navigation systems;
• control elements;
• engine and steering mechanisms;
• equipment necessary for safe passage through straits and ports.

After such a strike, the vessel may not sink but lose the ability to continue the voyage independently. It has to be towed, repaired, have its crew changed, or be taken out of service for a long time.

That is why Ukrainian targets include not only tankers and dry cargo ships but also tugboats. Russia uses them for rescuing and evacuating already damaged vessels.

How the operation developed

The operation began on July 6 with attacks on vessels in the Azov Sea, after which Ukrainian units quickly increased the number of strikes.

By July 14, the Ukrainian command reported 116 affected vessels in the Azov Sea. Reuters confirmed that maritime movement in the region was seriously disrupted, although the agency could not independently verify the condition of each vessel from the Ukrainian list.

After that, the operation moved to the Black Sea. In a few days there, according to SBS data, tankers, gas carriers, dry cargo ships, and tugboats were attacked, increasing the total to 159.

Why the Azov Sea is so important for Russia

The Azov Sea is one of the key links in Russia’s system for transporting oil, oil products, grain, and other goods.

Through the Don River and the Volga-Don Canal, it is connected to Russia’s internal waterways. Small ‘river-sea’ class tankers can pick up cargo in internal Russian ports, pass through the Don, and enter the Azov Sea.

Further, oil can be transshipped onto larger tankers waiting in the Black Sea.

Large sea vessels cannot always enter Azov ports due to limited depth and large draft. Therefore, Russia needs an intermediate feeder fleet — relatively small tankers, dry cargo ships, and auxiliary vessels.

Strikes on this fleet disrupt several logistical chains at once:

• fuel delivery to occupied Crimea;
• supply of Russian troops in southern Ukraine;
• transportation of oil and oil products;
• export of Russian goods through the Azov Sea;
• operation of ports and transshipment points;
• movement through the Kerch Strait;
• schemes to bypass international sanctions.

In NAnews — Israel News they note: the operation against vessels is not an isolated maritime campaign. It is connected with a broader Ukrainian strategy of strikes on oil refineries, oil depots, energy, and transport infrastructure of Russia.

If maritime delivery becomes too dangerous, Moscow is forced to transfer cargo to road and rail. But these routes are closer to the range of Ukrainian missiles and drones.

What happened to shipping

The consequences of the operation are recorded not only in reports from the Ukrainian command.

Reuters reported that after the start of the strikes, Russia temporarily stopped or seriously restricted movement through the Don-Azov Canal. This route connects the Don with the Azov Sea and is used for transporting oil, grain, and other goods.

Satellite images also showed a sharp decrease in the number of vessels near the Kerch Strait.

According to Reuters, in early June, more than 40 vessels were waiting to pass in the strait area. After a series of Ukrainian attacks, satellite images showed only a few noticeable vessels in the same zone.

Ukrainian Navy representative Dmytro Pletenchuk stated that for Russian logistics, the Azov Sea is effectively turning into a closed water area. According to him, Russian vessels began moving to the Taman area and looking for safer anchorage spots.

But the concentration of dozens of vessels in a limited area creates new problems: they are easier to detect, harder to disperse, and more difficult to protect simultaneously with air defense and electronic warfare means.

Impact on oil, Crimea supply, and the Russian budget

Russian oil exports remain one of the most important sources of revenue for the budget, which finances the war against Ukraine.

Some vessels are used directly for delivering fuel to Crimea and occupied territories. Others are involved in transporting oil, oil products, and goods between Russian ports and external markets.

Ukrainian Navy representative Dmytro Pletenchuk called oil the ‘blood of war’ and the Russian economy. According to him, small Azov tankers delivered oil to large ships in the Black Sea, but now this scheme has been disrupted.

At the same time, the term ‘shadow fleet’ should be used cautiously.

The Ukrainian side applies it to vessels involved in Russian oil, sanction, and military logistics. However, not every affected vessel is necessarily under personal sanctions by the EU, USA, or UK.

Reuters previously checked part of the first attacked tankers and found that not all of them were officially listed in international sanctions lists. Therefore, it is more accurate to speak of vessels that Ukraine refers to as the Russian ‘shadow fleet’ or the system supporting the Russian economy and military logistics.

Why the strikes affected the grain market

The Azov Sea is used not only for oil transportation.

A significant portion of Russian grain exports passes through this region. According to Reuters, routes through the Azov Sea and the Don-Azov Canal may be linked to up to a quarter of Russian wheat exports.

After shipping restrictions, European wheat futures rose by about 4% and reached their highest level in several weeks.

This shows that the Ukrainian operation can have consequences far beyond the combat zone.

Increased risks affect:

• freight costs;
• marine insurance;
• delivery times;
• global grain prices;
• the willingness of foreign companies to send ships to Russian ports;
• Russia’s ability to fulfill export contracts.

Russian authorities began considering redirecting part of the grain cargo to other ports in the Black and Baltic Seas. However, this increases distances, transportation costs, and the load on railway infrastructure.

Legality of strikes and Ukraine’s position

Russia called Ukrainian attacks ‘terrorism’ and ‘piracy’.

Ukraine rejects these accusations and states that the vessels are used to support the Russian army, supply occupied Crimea, and finance the war.

Dmytro Pletenchuk reminded that Crimea, according to international law, remains the territory of Ukraine. Therefore, vessels entering the ports of the occupied peninsula without Kyiv’s permission are considered violators by the Ukrainian side.

At the same time, there is no independent international legal assessment of each of the 159 episodes yet. Nor has a complete list of all vessels with their names, owners, flags, cargo nature, and damage degree been published.

What is confirmed, and what remains Ukraine’s statement

As of July 17, several levels of confirmation can be confidently stated.

The Ukrainian command stated:

• 159 ships affected;
• 117 targets were in the Sea of Azov;
• 42 — in the Black Sea;
• the task is to paralyze Russian logistics;
• ships are predominantly disabled, not sunk.

Independent sources confirm:

• a sharp reduction in ship movement;
• restrictions in the Kerch Strait and the Don-Azov Canal;
• concentration of ships in safer areas;
• disruption of Russian export routes;
• the impact of events on grain prices;
• the need to redirect cargo through other ports.

It is currently impossible to independently confirm:

• the exact damage to each of the 159 ships;
• the number of ships completely decommissioned;
• the number of ships that have already been towed and repaired;
• the affiliation of each ship to the internationally recognized ‘shadow fleet’;
• the full composition of the cargo they carry.

A new stage of the war at sea

Over several years, Ukraine, with virtually no classic large military fleet, managed to change the balance of power in the Black Sea with the help of sea and air drones.

Now this tactic is spreading to the Sea of Azov and the internal Russian transport system.

Operation ‘MoLoChKa’ shows a transition from single strikes on individual ships to the systematic destruction of the entire logistics chain: tanker, tugboat, port, oil depot, canal, railway, substation.

For Russia, the problem is not only the cost of damaged ships. Each new strike forces route changes, increased security, dispatch of tugs, equipment repairs, higher insurance costs, and delivery delays.

NAnews — News of Israel notes: even if most of the 159 ships remain afloat, the strategic effect of the operation is measured not by the number of sunken hulls. It is measured by how many Russian routes have ceased to function normally and how many additional resources Moscow is forced to spend on ensuring occupied Crimea.

The main result of the operation at the moment is not ‘159 sunken ships’, but the actual transformation of the Sea of Azov and the adjacent part of the Black Sea into a zone of constant risk for Russian logistics.

This is what lies behind Robert Brovdi’s formula: ‘Moscow will lie through Crimea’.

…
“Not About the War”: The book of Jewish defender of Ukraine Maksym Shvartsman was presented in Chernivtsi on the 3rd anniversary of his death at the front - July 21, 2026 - Новости Израиля

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Boombox starts “Dronotour ’26” from Israel: Tel Aviv and Haifa are the first in the big 2026 route. The Ukrainian band Boombox announced a big concert route “Dronotour ’26” for November–December 2026.

For the Israeli audience, there is a particularly important detail in this poster: the tour starts from Israel.

The first concert is scheduled for November 10, 2026 in Tel Aviv, at the Reading 3 club.

The next day, November 11, 2026, the band will perform in Haifa, at the Theatron Hatzafon hall.

Details and tickets are published on the tour page on UNOW: https://unow.com.ua/tour/boombox-eu/

Why this tour starts with special meaning

Boombox is one of the most recognizable Ukrainian musical phenomena of the last two decades.

The band was founded in 2004 and became known for its combination of rock, hip-hop, soul, and live stage energy.

But after February 2022, Boombox’s story gained another dimension.

The band’s leader, Andriy Khlyvnyuk, became one of the voices of Ukrainian resistance.

His a cappella performance of “Oh, the Red Viburnum in the Meadow” on Sophia Square in Kyiv became a symbol of Ukraine’s struggle and gained viral popularity far beyond the country’s borders.

This song was picked up by musicians, volunteers, artists, and ordinary people in different countries.

Thus, the Ukrainian melody turned into an international flash mob supporting Ukraine.

Therefore, “Dronotour ’26” is not just a concert route.

It’s a meeting with a band for whom music, stage, donations, merch, and public voice have become part of one big story — a story of help, memory, resistance, and connection with Ukraine.

Boombox concerts in Israel

Tel Aviv — November 10, 2026

The first concert of “Dronotour ’26” will take place in Tel Aviv.

Venue — Reading 3.

The UNOW page for this date lists the starting ticket price — from 249 ILS.

For Israel, this is the main start of the tour: it is from Tel Aviv that the entire Boombox route through European countries begins.

Haifa — November 11, 2026

The second Israeli concert will take place in Haifa.

Venue — Theatron Hatzafon.

The tour page lists the starting ticket price — from 219 ILS.

For northern Israel, this is a separate important date because Haifa traditionally gathers a large audience connected with Ukraine, Ukrainian culture, and the Russian-speaking scene without political slogans, but through music, memory, and personal experience.

Details and tickets are published on the tour page on UNOW: https://unow.com.ua/tour/boombox-eu/

Route of “Dronotour ’26” by cities

Bratislava — November 19, 2026

After the Israeli concerts, the tour will continue in Bratislava.

Venue — MMC.

This date opens the European part of the route after the start in Israel.

Frankfurt — November 21, 2026

The next stop is Frankfurt.

The concert will take place at Haus Sindlingen.

Germany occupies a prominent place in the tour route: several German cities are included in the Boombox poster.

Stuttgart — November 22, 2026

In Stuttgart, the band will perform at LKA Longhorn.

This date follows immediately after Frankfurt and continues the German block of the tour.

Düsseldorf — November 24, 2026

The concert in Düsseldorf is scheduled at Stahlwerk.

In the tour poster, this city is listed as one of the key stops in Germany.

Bremen — November 26, 2026

In Bremen, Boombox will perform at Aladin Music-Hall.

The route in Germany continues almost throughout the second half of November, showing the scale of the band’s audience outside Ukraine.

Dresden — November 27, 2026

The next date is Dresden.

Venue — Club Tante JU.

For Ukrainian listeners in Germany, such concerts often become not only a musical evening but also a meeting of the community, friends, and people with a shared memory of home.

Hanover — November 29, 2026

In Hanover, the concert will take place at Kulturzentrum FaUST.

This date closes another stage of the German part of the route before Hamburg.

Hamburg — November 30, 2026

The last November concert of the tour is announced in Hamburg.

Venue — Grosse Freiheit 36.

After Hamburg, “Dronotour ’26” will move to the December part of the route.

Dublin — December 2, 2026

Boombox will start December in Dublin.

Venue — Opium.

The band’s message separately emphasized that the route goes “from Israel to Germany, from England to Poland, from Ireland to Slovakia and the Czech Republic.”

Dublin just becomes the Irish point of this big tour.

London — December 3, 2026

In London, Boombox will perform at Electric Brixton.

The British date follows immediately after Dublin and is part of the December block of the tour.

Prague — December 5, 2026

In Prague, the concert will take place at SaSaZu.

The Czech Republic became one of the countries on the route where the Ukrainian audience has been particularly noticeable since 2022.

Krakow — December 7, 2026

The Polish part of the tour will start in Krakow.

Venue — Klub Studio.

The UNOW page for this date lists the starting ticket price — from 179 PLN.

Warsaw — December 9, 2026

The final date of the poster is Warsaw.

The concert will take place at Progresja.

The tour page lists the starting price — from 199 PLN.

It is Warsaw that concludes the announced route of “Dronotour ’26”.

What Boombox is bringing to this tour

The tour description states that Boombox will present the maxi-single “Zhiviy“.

The program will also include songs from various albums of the band.

Boombox formulated this very precisely: they will bring a new maxi-single on tour, enhanced by compositions under which listeners grew up, and under which their children are now growing.

This is an important detail.

Boombox has long ceased to be a band of one generation.

For some listeners, this is the music of student years and first concerts.

For others, it is the voice of wartime, a symbol of support for Ukraine, and a reminder that culture can also be a form of resistance.

The band separately addressed listeners with a request to buy tickets in advance, as well as to prepare money for donations and merch.

Therefore, the name “Dronotour” in this poster sounds not like an ordinary marketing move, but as a continuation of the line in which concerts help gather support for Ukraine.

Where to see details and buy tickets

Tickets, prices, cities, and venues are published on the UNOW tour page.

Before purchasing, it is worth carefully checking the city, date, venue, and ticket category.

For Israel, two dates are currently listed in the poster:

November 10, 2026 — Tel Aviv, Reading 3

November 11, 2026 — Haifa, Theatron Hatzafon

Details and tickets are published on the tour page on UNOW: https://unow.com.ua/tour/boombox-eu/

For NAnews readers — Israel News this is one of the main Ukrainian music posters of autumn 2026 in Israel.

Because “Dronotour ’26” starts here — from Tel Aviv and Haifa.

…
“Not About the War”: The book of Jewish defender of Ukraine Maksym Shvartsman was presented in Chernivtsi on the 3rd anniversary of his death at the front - July 21, 2026 - Новости Израиля

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A series of Ukrainian attacks on Russian ships in the Azov and Black Seas has escalated from isolated sabotage operations into a large-scale campaign against Russia’s military and economic logistics. The restriction of navigation, the destruction of an FSB ship, rising wheat prices, and the search for new routes for grain export have even led pro-Kremlin military bloggers to publicly question why Russian ports and the fleet have been left virtually defenseless.

There has been no literal uprising in Russia yet. There are no protesting sailors on the streets, and the Black Sea Fleet command has not turned against the Kremlin.

However, something unusual has happened in the Russian information system: pro-military Telegram channels, which for years justified the war against Ukraine, have begun openly accusing officials and military leadership of failing to protect their own fleet.

The trigger was a series of Ukrainian strikes conducted from July 6 to 15, 2026. Over nine days, Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces claimed to have hit 116 ships in the Azov Sea, after which the operation moved to the Black Sea, where on the night of July 14-15, another 20 Russian ships were struck.

Nine days that changed the situation in the Azov Sea

Commander of the Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces Robert Brovdi, known by the call sign ‘Madyar,’ reported that Ukrainian units consistently attacked Russian tankers, bulk carriers, tugs, ferries, and other vessels involved in transportation between the Azov Sea, the Volga-Don Canal, the Kerch Strait, and the Black Sea.

The goal was not necessarily to sink every vessel. The Ukrainian side aimed to disable ships, force crews to abandon them, and leave damaged vessels adrift without the ability to continue operations.

Special attention was paid to the so-called feeder fleet — small and medium tankers that deliver petroleum products from Russian river and Azov ports to larger tankers waiting in the Black Sea.

Strikes on such a system can disrupt several logistics chains at once:

• fuel delivery to occupied Crimea;
• supply of Russian military facilities;
• export of petroleum products;
• transportation of grain and other agricultural cargo;
• movement of ships between the Don, Azov, and Black Seas.

Reuters notes that the exact location and timing of each strike shown by the Ukrainian military could not be independently verified. The number 116 is also based on Ukrainian command data and does not mean that all these ships were sunk. However, subsequent navigation restrictions, satellite images, and admissions by Russian regional authorities confirm that the operation had real consequences.

Russia itself closed key maritime routes

On July 10, 2026, Russian border services effectively halted passage through the Azov-Don Canal — a shipping route connecting the Don River with the Azov Sea.

Simultaneously, shipping companies received notification that applications for passage through the Kerch Strait from 18:10 local time would not be accepted. The Russian side did not specify the duration of the restrictions.

The Kerch Strait is the only maritime exit from the Azov Sea to the Black Sea. The Azov-Don Canal, in turn, connects the Azov Sea with Russia’s internal waterways system.

As a result, commercial vessels could move within the Azov Sea but could not normally leave it through the Kerch Strait or go through the canal towards the Don and Volga. Russian authorities did not officially announce a complete closure of the area, but industry sources confirmed the presence of restrictions.

Satellite images show a sharp change in maritime traffic. On June 6, 2026, more than 40 ships were waiting to pass near the Kerch Strait. In images from July 11, only a few ships remained in the same area.

Reuters examined more than 30 satellite images and noted that before the start of the Ukrainian campaign, ship clusters near the strait were regularly observed. After the restrictions were introduced, the usual picture disappeared.

According to the Institute for the Study of War, the number of Russian ships in the Azov Sea decreased from 267 on June 30 to approximately 120 by July 11 — about 55%. Some ships left before the routes were closed, some may have turned off their transponders, and damaged ships were sent for repair or remained in the area.

Russian grain exports were hit

The Azov Sea is important for Russia not only from a military standpoint.

Up to a quarter of Russia’s wheat exports pass through the ports and routes of this region. The Rostov region and Krasnodar Krai are among Russia’s main grain-producing regions, and nearby ports are used for exporting grain, sunflower oil, and other goods.

After information about navigation restrictions emerged, Euronext wheat prices rose by almost 4%, reaching a six-week high.

On July 14, 2026, the Minister of Agriculture and Food of the Rostov region, Anna Kasyanenko, acknowledged that the region, along with exporters, began working on alternative routes for grain export due to ‘temporary difficulties’ with navigation in the Azov Sea.

The Russian Federal Ministry of Agriculture simultaneously claimed that the events would supposedly not affect the domestic market and the country’s export capabilities. But the very fact of urgently seeking bypass routes shows that the problem has gone far beyond military reports.

Redirecting cargo to rail or distant ports means additional costs, a shortage of wagons, overloading of transport infrastructure, and increased delivery times. Even if Russia can partially restore exports, its cost inevitably rises.

The destruction of the ‘Izumrud’ and questions to Russian command

A separate symbol of this campaign was the destruction of the Russian border patrol ship of the second rank ‘Izumrud’, belonging to the Coast Guard of the FSB Border Service.

The Ukrainian Navy reported that the ship was attacked near Novorossiysk by a marine drone Sargan-3000. According to Ukrainian data, there were casualties and injuries among the crew.

On July 14, 2026, the Ukrainian Navy published a satellite image of the damaged ship near the quay wall. The Ukrainian side stated that the image confirms the destruction of the ‘Izumrud.’ Russia did not provide detailed official information about the ship’s condition.

This ship was already known in Ukraine.

On November 25, 2018, the ‘Izumrud’ participated in a Russian operation in the Kerch Strait when Russian forces attacked Ukrainian military boats ‘Berdyansk’ and ‘Nikopol,’ as well as the tug ‘Yany Kapu.’ At that time, 24 Ukrainian sailors were captured.

Almost eight years later, the ship that participated in that operation itself became the target of a Ukrainian marine drone.

Even Kremlin supporters began asking questions

It was the strike on the FSB ship that caused an especially sharp reaction in the Russian pro-military community.

A military blogger associated with the Kremlin publicly asked why the entrance to the port was not blocked by protective nets and why Russian forces could not detect Ukrainian drones in advance.

He also accused officials of insufficient attention to protecting Russian ports from marine and aerial drones.

Another Russian milblogger posed an even more unpleasant question for the command: how did Ukrainian devices manage to approach the FSB ship unnoticed and strike near one of the most important basing areas of the Russian fleet.

The Institute for the Study of War notes that such criticism does not come from the Russian opposition but from people who support the war and demand that the Kremlin conduct it even more harshly. Therefore, their outrage cannot be considered an anti-war protest.

This is a different type of conflict — a clash between Russian propaganda, which for years told of the country’s complete security, and the reality in which Ukrainian drones reach ships, ports, and logistics facilities far from the front line.

The Black Sea became the next stage

After the active phase of the operation in the Azov Sea was completed, the Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces shifted strikes to the Black Sea.

On the night of July 14-15, 2026, according to Robert Brovdi, another 20 Russian ships were attacked:

• 17 oil tankers;
• two gas carriers;
• one tug.

Brovdi stated that the previous phase with 116 targets in the Azov Sea was completed, and the new phase will focus mainly on the Black Sea.

Thus, Russia faced not isolated attacks but a consistent campaign covering the entire connected maritime system: internal waterways, the Azov Sea, the Kerch Strait, occupied Crimea, and the Black Sea.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov called the attacks ‘terrorism’ and stated that Ukraine’s actions allegedly go beyond piracy.

The Ukrainian side responds that the targets are ships and vessels that support the Russian military machine, ensuring the transportation of fuel, petroleum products, and other resources used to continue the war.

Robert Brovdi responded to Lavrov with the phrase:

‘No piracy, Lavrov — just business. Your bloody business.’

Reuters quotes a source in the Russian shipping industry who compared the ships in the Azov Sea to targets before a firing squad and suggested that soon there may be almost no undamaged ships left in the area. Several grain carriers attacked on July 13 and 14, according to industry sources, caught fire.

Why this story is important for Israel

For Israel, events in the Azov and Black Seas have not only military significance.

Russia remains one of the world’s largest exporters of grain and sunflower oil. Any prolonged restrictions on maritime trade can affect global prices, insurance rates, freight costs, and supply routes to the Mediterranean and the Middle East.

The first consequences have already manifested in the European wheat market, although it is too early to assert that the July campaign will lead to a long-term increase in food prices in Israel.

The strategic aspect is no less important.

Ukraine demonstrates that relatively inexpensive unmanned systems can paralyze ship movement, force the enemy to close straits and canals, and pose a threat to a larger fleet without classical sea superiority.

For Israel, which simultaneously faces threats from drones, missiles, attacks on maritime routes, and attempts to disrupt trade through the Red Sea, the Ukrainian experience is of particular interest.

NANews — Israel News views the events not as a story of a sudden ‘rebellion’ by Russian propagandists, but as a sign of a deeper crisis.

The Kremlin promised that the war would not approach Russian cities and ports. Now Russian ships are burning in the Azov Sea, an FSB ship is destroyed near a base, exporters are seeking bypass routes, and war supporters are asking where the protection they were told about four years ago has gone.

The Ukrainian operation has not yet completely destroyed Russian maritime logistics. There is no independent confirmation of the defeat of each of the claimed 136 ships.

But the main result is already clear: Russia is forced to change routes, restrict its own navigation, and spend more resources on protecting ports that were recently considered a safe rear.

And the public panic of pro-military Russian channels shows that marine drones hit not only ships.

They destroy one of the Kremlin’s main myths — the myth of a state capable of controlling the sea, protecting its own territory, and continuing the war against Ukraine with impunity.

…
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In his native Buchach, a monument was erected in his honor, one of the city’s streets is named after him, and a bas-relief of the writer is at the entrance to the local “ART-Court.”

Shmuel Agnon (born July 17, 1888, Buchach, Ukraine) is a famous Jewish writer whose life and work are closely connected with Ukraine. The events of his most famous novels, “The Bridal Canopy” and “A Guest for the Night,” for which he received the Nobel Prize in Literature, take place in his native Buchach and its surroundings.

In Ukrainian Buchach

To date, not many of Agnon’s works have been translated into Ukrainian, but interest in them is growing in Ukraine, which means that Ukrainian readers are in for an acquaintance with his books.

The Nobel Prize in Literature laureate of 1966 “For his profoundly original narrative art with motifs from Jewish folk tales.” He became the first laureate of one of the Nobel Prizes representing Israel. He wrote in Hebrew and Yiddish.

The influence of the Talmud on Shmuel Agnon’s work was significant. He was born as Shmuel Yosef Halevi Czaczkes in July 1887 in Buchach, now Chortkiv district of Ternopil region. His father, Shalom Mordechai Halevi Czaczkes, was a rabbi and fur trader, knowledgeable in the Torah and Talmud, and often explained them to the local Jewish community.

Shmuel’s mother, Esther Farb, and grandfather, Yehuda Farb, were also educated people. Shmuel attended a cheder and received a good home education, studying Yiddish, Hebrew, German, and Ukrainian languages, as well as the Talmud under his father’s guidance.

Starting to write early, at the age of 8, Shmuel published stories in local newspapers. At 19, he moved to Lviv and worked in a Jewish newspaper. In 1907, his first novella “Forsaken Wives” was published, which in Hebrew sounds like “Agnon,” becoming his pseudonym and official surname since 1924.

Palestine and Berlin

In the same year, Agnon went to Palestine, and then to Berlin, where he wrote, lectured, gave private Hebrew lessons, and published works in the newspaper Jude.

He was supported by patron Zalman Schocken, who provided a five-year scholarship for organizing an anthology of Jewish literature and writing new works. Agnon’s works were published in German at Schocken’s publishing house in Berlin.

Love Against All Odds

In Berlin, Shmuel Agnon found true love — Esther Marks, or “dear Esterlein,” as he called her. The girl’s father was against their marriage, but they married anyway, and the ceremony was conducted by Rabbi Yechiel Yaakov Weinberg.

They had a daughter, Emuna (“faith”), and a son, Shalom Mordechai, whom they called Hemdat (“soul’s desire”) at home.

Three Destroyed Homes

In 1924, the family moved to Jerusalem. The move was preceded by tragedy: the writer’s house in Hamburg burned down, destroying the library and manuscripts, including the novel “The Community of the Ever-Living.”

Agnon decided to return to the Promised Land. He moved to Jerusalem first, and a year later called for Esther and the children. In 1927, an earthquake occurred in Jerusalem.

“The disaster did not destroy our souls,” Agnon wrote, “only the house we lived in.”

Two years later, in 1929, the new Agnon home in Jerusalem was looted during Arab riots. “Esterlein,” he wrote to his wife, “we need to start everything anew: the house is ruined, things are stolen or broken. But… do not grieve and do not think about it.”

World Fame and the Nobel Prize

Agnon gained world fame in the late 1940s when his works began to be published in English. In 1966, Agnon became the first writer writing in Hebrew and Yiddish to receive the Nobel Prize for the novels “The Bridal Canopy” and “A Guest for the Night.”

In his speech, he noted that he draws inspiration from spiritual literature.

“Keep Quiet! Agnon is Working!”

Israel is proud of its Nobel laureate. When a construction site was opened in the Talpiot area, Mayor Teddy Kollek installed a sign saying: “Keep quiet! Agnon is working!” European critics compared him to Marcel Proust, James Joyce, and William Faulkner.

Agnon wrote in various genres but was wounded by the fact that many of his readers became victims of the Holocaust. His last novel, “Just Recently,” set in Palestine during the Second Aliyah, is dedicated to the catastrophe of European Jewry.

Memory of the Writer

Shmuel Agnon died of a heart attack on February 17, 1970, in Jerusalem at the age of 82. He was buried on the Mount of Olives, and his apartment became a memorial museum.

In his native Buchach, which he last visited in 1930, a monument was erected in his honor, a street is named after him, and a bas-relief of the writer adorns the entrance to the local “ART-Court.”

…
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On July 15, 2026, Israeli lawyer Alex Zernopolsky announced the conclusion of a case that his office had been handling for about three years: the Jerusalem District Court ordered the Population and Immigration Authority to grant permanent status to Liza K. and her mother Oksana K.

This decision comes after four years of struggle, numerous appeals, administrative procedures, and a court appeal. In 2022, Israeli authorities demanded that the mother and her minor daughter leave the country and return to Ukraine — at a time when their native Kherson was under Russian occupation.

Now the court has recognized that serious errors were made in the consideration of the case, and the family’s real connection to Israel was not properly assessed.

Deportation to Kherson during a full-scale war

Oksana K. first came to Israel in 2011. She later married an Israeli citizen, and in 2012 began the process of legalizing her status based on marriage. Her daughter Liza, who came to the country as a child, lived with her in Israel.

The family settled in Petah Tikva. Liza attended an Israeli school, spoke Hebrew fluently, and spent almost her entire conscious life in Israel.

Oksana’s husband died in August 2019. After his death, the usual procedure for obtaining status was halted, and the mother and daughter appealed to the Ministry of Interior to allow them to stay under special humanitarian circumstances.

The review was delayed.

On February 24, 2022, a few hours after the start of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, Oksana and Liza attended a scheduled meeting at the Population Authority. They waited about six months for a response to their appeal.

In early September 2022, the Ministry of Interior reported that it did not consider their situation sufficient humanitarian grounds. The women were ordered to leave Israel within 14 days and return to Kherson, which was then under Russian control. Oksana’s eldest son was serving in the Armed Forces of Ukraine and participating in combat at that time.

At the time of the decision, Liza was still a minor. She was born on December 6, 2004, so in September 2022 she was 17 years old, not 15, as stated in some later retellings of this story.

Why the Ministry of Interior denied the family

The Population Authority argued that long-term residence in Israel alone is not sufficient reason to grant status.

In its official response, the agency stated that Oksana, besides her daughter, had no close relatives in Israel, while her son and sister remained in Ukraine. The Ministry of Interior also cited Oksana’s trips to Ukraine and questioned whether Israel was truly the center of the family’s life.

Some officials’ doubts concerned Oksana’s relationship with her deceased Israeli husband. According to the Population Authority, the legalization process was stopped and resumed several times, and the circumstances presented were insufficient to grant humanitarian status.

However, the agency’s formal approach almost did not take into account the daughter’s life.

Liza grew up in Israel, graduated from school here, spoke mainly in Hebrew, had friends, a team, coaches, and a professional future in the country. Ukraine remained her country of birth, but practically all her social and sports life was connected to Israel.

Israeli team — without Israeli status

Liza began playing handball shortly after arriving in the country. In the second grade, she enrolled in the Maccabi Petah Tikva sports school and later joined the youth and reserve teams of Israel.

The Israeli Handball Federation publicly supported the athlete back in September 2022. The women’s team coach, Reuven Yosfolski, described her as a tall, strong, and athletic handball player with serious technical capabilities and prospects in Israeli sports.

An absurd situation arose: Liza trained in the Israeli team uniform and was supposed to represent Israel in competitions, but the state itself refused to recognize her as a permanent resident.

Due to the lack of regulated status, she could not work normally, serve in the IDF, use regular medical insurance, or freely travel to international tournaments. In 2023, the athlete said she missed the European Championship, although she remained on the team until the last moment: the lack of documents prevented her from traveling with the team.

Liza also could not fulfill another dream — to undergo military conversion. Her school friends received draft notices and began service, while the girl who wanted to voluntarily serve Israel remained without official status.

Meanwhile, her sports career continued. Liza played for the adult team Maccabi Petah Tikva, was recognized as one of the breakthrough athletes of the season, and during her loan to Bnot Herzliya, participated in the club’s championship playoff matches.

Three years of administrative struggle

Alex Zernopolsky’s office got involved in the case at the stage of appealing the deportation decision.

After filing the appeal, the initial decision was overturned, and the mother and daughter’s application was sent for consideration by the interdepartmental humanitarian commission. However, this did not mean immediate receipt of documents.

According to Zernopolsky, the Ministry of Interior continued to delay the process. Family representatives were told that the police’s position was awaited, then claimed that the decision was under review by the central office. The internal appeal remained unanswered for a long time.

On July 31, 2023, the humanitarian commission reviewed the case again, but by September, a final decision had still not been made. The mother and daughter continued to live in Israel without regulated status, medical insurance, or certainty about the future.

The case then went through the Appeals Tribunal for Entry and Stay in Israel and reached the Jerusalem District Court.

What the Jerusalem District Court recognized

The final turn occurred on July 5, 2026.

Judge Tamar Bar-Asher of the Jerusalem District Court granted the administrative appeal of Liza K. and Oksana K. The court ruled that the Appeals Tribunal incorrectly assessed their connection to Israel.

The judge noted that Oksana’s trips to Ukraine could not automatically be used as evidence that the center of the family’s life was outside Israel. These trips needed to be considered in the context of her marriage, family situation, and many years of living in the country.

One of the key violations was that the Population Authority staff did not conduct a separate full interview with Liza. Her individual story — childhood in Israel, education, language, sports career, social connections, and desire to serve in the IDF — was not properly studied.

The court also took into account the conclusion of the representative of the Ministry of Social Affairs, who recommended granting the mother and daughter’s request.

As a result, the court not only sent the case for another review but ordered the Population Authority to grant both women permanent resident status in Israel.

“As if I was released from prison”

After the decision, 21-year-old Liza told Israeli media that for the first time in many years, she felt solid ground under her feet.

She compared the years of uncertainty to being in detention and said she now finally feels part of the country. Obtaining permanent status allows her to voluntarily enlist in the IDF, begin the conversion process, and continue her professional sports career without previous restrictions.

Alex Zernopolsky called the decision the end of years of injustice against the widow of an Israeli citizen and her daughter — an athlete representing Israeli handball.

“I am glad that justice for the mother and daughter was achieved, even if delayed by several years,” the lawyer said after the court’s decision.

Why this decision is important for Israel

Liza K.’s story shows how serious the consequences of a formal approach to humanitarian cases can be.

A person can grow up in Israel, graduate from an Israeli school, speak Hebrew, represent the national team, aspire to serve in the IDF, and still remain a temporary foreigner to the state system for years.

The court’s position on minor children included in their parents’ immigration cases is especially important. Their circumstances cannot be considered only as an attachment to the mother’s or father’s documents. State bodies are obliged to separately assess where the child grew up, what language they speak, where they study, with which society they are connected, and which country they truly consider their home.

For Liza and Oksana K., the court decision ended almost four years of struggle against deportation.

For the Israeli system, this decision served as a reminder: humanitarian circumstances consist not only of passport stamps, entry and exit dates, or formal procedural stages. Behind each such case is a human life that cannot be put on hold for four years.

Page – Law Office of Alex Zernopolsky

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On the morning of July 15, 2026, Russian forces dropped six guided aerial bombs on the Sumy urban community. One of the bombs exploded near medical facilities where people were present and transport was moving. Three civilians were killed, and another 17 people were injured.

The Russian attack on Sumy continued practically all night and morning.

Initially, Russian forces used a cluster munition against a private housing area, then attacked city gas stations and residential buildings with drones, and around 09:00 began dropping guided aerial bombs on the regional center.

According to the head of the Sumy Regional Military Administration, Oleg Grigorov, Russian aviation carried out six strikes with guided bombs on the territory of the Sumy community.

One of the aerial bombs hit near medical facilities — in an area with heavy movement of people, cars, and public transport. The other five strikes, according to preliminary data, targeted infrastructure facilities.

Three dead, among the injured — a 16-year-old teenager

Initially, authorities reported three dead and seven injured. However, as people sought medical help, the number of injured increased to 17 people.

Among the injured is a 16-year-old boy.

He and two other seriously injured individuals underwent surgery. The remaining injured were examined by doctors, and some people were discharged from hospitals after receiving medical assistance.

Among the dead are confirmed a man and a woman.

The third deceased suffered such severe injuries that specialists could not even determine the person’s gender immediately after discovering the body. The identities of all the deceased are being clarified.

Oleg Grigorov called the incident another deliberate strike by Russian forces on the civilian population.

At the epicenter of one of the explosions were civilians and transport. This means that the Russian side could not have been unaware of the consequences of using a heavy aerial bomb in a busy urban area.

The bomb fell near the sidewalk

Journalists from the local publication ‘Kordon.Media’, who worked directly on the scene, reported that one of the Russian aerial bombs hit a flowerbed near the sidewalk.

In the nearby buildings, the blast wave shattered windows. Cars near the impact site were damaged.

After the first explosions, eyewitnesses reported a fire and burning cars. Medics, rescuers, police, and utility services were working on the scene.

The exact names of the medical facilities were not disclosed by the authorities for security reasons.

It has also not been officially reported which specific modification of guided aerial bombs was used by Russian aviation. In the regional administration’s reports, the munitions are referred to as guided bombs.

The air raid alert lasted from early morning

The air raid alert in the Sumy district was announced around 05:12.

The military warned of the threat of Russian drones and the possible use of guided aerial bombs.

The first powerful explosions, associated with a series of strikes with guided bombs, sounded around 09:00. For more than 30 minutes afterward, city residents continued to hear explosions.

The Ukrainian Air Force reported several times about the launches of aerial bombs towards Sumy, including repeated launches.

Thus, people were under the threat not of a single strike, but of a prolonged series of aerial attacks.

For the border regional center, this creates an especially dangerous situation: the distance to the launch site is small, and the time between the warning and the possible impact of the bomb can be extremely short.

Before the aerial bombs, the city was attacked by drones

The strikes with six guided bombs were a continuation of attacks that began at night.

Russian FPV drones and ‘Molniya’ type drones struck gas stations in the Kovpakovsky and Zarechny districts of Sumy.

As a result of one of the hits, a 63-year-old suburban minibus driver received severe multiple injuries. The man was hospitalized.

A fire broke out at one of the gas stations, which was extinguished.

Around 07:20, a Russian drone hit a residential building in the Kovpakovsky district.

A fire started in the house, the roof of the building and the garage were damaged. In the neighboring house, the blast wave shattered windows.

There was no one in the attacked house at the time of the hit. However, in the neighboring building, there was an elderly immobile woman. She was taken to the hospital with an acute stress reaction.

About an hour later, another Russian drone struck nearby, causing a new fire.

Cluster strike on the evening of July 14

In fact, the current attack on Sumy began on the evening of July 14, 2026.

According to preliminary conclusions of specialists, Russian forces shelled the outskirts of the city with a long-range multiple launch rocket system, using a cluster combat element.

The strike hit a private residential area.

At least ten households were damaged. Seven residents of Sumy were injured in the attack, including an 11-year-old boy.

Two adults — a 30-year-old man and a 59-year-old woman — received severe injuries.

Unexploded cluster elements were found in the affected area. Explosive technicians examined the area and neutralized the found munitions.

The use of cluster elements in a residential area poses a threat not only during the shelling itself.

Unexploded parts of munitions can remain on streets, in yards, near houses and cars, turning into delayed-action mines for residents and rescuers.

The third deadly airstrike in less than two weeks

The attack on July 15 was already the third heavy strike with guided aerial bombs on Sumy in less than two weeks.

Strike on July 11

On July 11, during the day, Russian aviation dropped three guided bombs on the Zarechny district of Sumy.

One of the strikes hit a road and a public transport stop. Another hit an infrastructure facility.

As a result of the attack, five people died immediately after the strike, including a 13-year-old girl. Later, a 48-year-old woman who received critical injuries died in the hospital.

Thus, the number of dead increased to six people.

A total of 44 injured required medical assistance. As of July 14, 17 injured remained in hospitals, including four children. Two adults were in serious condition.

The blast wave damaged residential high-rise buildings, hundreds of windows and balcony structures, cars, and civilian infrastructure facilities.

Strike on July 3

On the evening of July 3, Russian forces also attacked Sumy with guided aerial bombs and drones.

One of the bombs hit the central part of the city — in the area of a high-rise residential building, a store, and a road where many people were present.

Four civilians were killed: two men, a young woman, and her five-year-old daughter.

The deceased woman’s older daughter was injured and hospitalized.

According to updated data, 36 people were injured. Twenty high-rise residential buildings, three private houses, and three non-residential buildings were damaged.

Sumy is being turned into a constant zone of aerial terror

The strikes on July 3, 11, and 15 show that these are not isolated random hits.

Russian forces are consistently using guided aerial bombs, drones, multiple launch rocket systems, and cluster munitions against the regional center.

The targets and impact zones include roads, public transport stops, residential buildings, gas stations, medical facilities, and other civilian infrastructure.

In just the three mentioned guided bomb attacks in Sumy, at least 13 people have been killed, and dozens of civilians have been injured.

NAnews — Israel News highlights: what is happening in Sumy should be considered not only as another front-line report.

This is a systematic use of powerful aerial munitions against a large city where families continue to live, hospitals operate, public transport runs, and people are forced to go out on the streets daily.

The Israeli audience is well aware of how important early warning systems, protected spaces, and the time available to the civilian population after an alarm signal are.

However, in the case of guided aerial bombs, Sumy residents often have only a few minutes, sometimes even less, to find a safe place.

After the strikes on July 15, rescue and medical services continued to work at the impact sites. Authorities warned residents not to approach damaged areas due to the risk of new attacks and the possible presence of unexploded munitions.

NAnews — Israel News continues to monitor updates on the condition of the injured and the consequences of the Russian attack on Sumy.

The data on the number of dead and injured may be updated.

…
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Ukrainian center Dmitry Skapintsev completed his performances for the basketball club Hapoel Jerusalem after one season in Israel. The contract with the 28-year-old basketball player was not extended, and now the former New York Knicks player has gained free agent status.

Hapoel Jerusalem officially announced the departure of the Ukrainian on July 14, 2026.

“Dima, thank you very much for your dedication, commitment, and fight in every minute spent on the court. We wish you great success in the future,” reads the farewell message from the Jerusalem club. The Israeli sports channel Sport5 emphasizes that Skapintsev leaves the team after one season and that his departure is another element of a large-scale roster overhaul.

At the same time, this is not about a scandal, disciplinary conflict, or early termination of the agreement.

In August 2025, Skapintsev signed a one-season contract with an option to extend for another year. Hapoel decided not to use the option provided by the agreement, so the cooperation ended after the first season.

From the NBA and G League to Jerusalem

Dmitry Skapintsev was born on May 12, 1998, in Cherkasy. The height of the Ukrainian basketball player is about 216 centimeters. He plays as a center and is capable of covering the position of a power forward.

Before moving to Israel, Skapintsev went through an unusual path for a Ukrainian basketball player.

He played in Ukraine and Lithuania, after which he went to the USA. Skapintsev spent most of his American career in the NBA G League, where he played for the farm teams of the New York Knicks, Boston Celtics, and Portland Trail Blazers.

On December 23, 2023, the New York Knicks signed a two-way contract with Skapintsev. The Ukrainian played two games in the NBA regular season, getting a few minutes of playing time, and then returned to the G League.

In the 2024/25 season, Skapintsev averaged 9 points, 7.9 rebounds, and 2.7 assists in the G League. At the time of his transition to Israel, he was considered a physically powerful center with experience in training and games in the North American basketball system.

Hapoel’s head coach Yonatan Alon noted his toughness, rebounding ability, decision-making under the basket, and potential to strengthen the team in the paint after signing the Ukrainian.

However, Skapintsev failed to become a stable player in the main rotation in Jerusalem.

“I don’t fully understand my role”

Problems with playing time became noticeable during the season.

In February 2026, Skapintsev admitted that he did not fully understand his role in Hapoel. According to the Ukrainian, at the beginning of the season, he received more minutes, but later his participation in games decreased.

The center explained that he tries to do everything he can to return to a stable rotation. At the same time, he noted that the head coach preferred players he had worked with for more than a year.

These words help to better understand the club’s subsequent decision.

Skapintsev’s departure cannot be called a surprise solely because of his statistics. The Ukrainian was useful in rebounding and rim protection but did not secure a stable role in the team and rarely spent significant stretches on the court.

At the same time, Hapoel did not officially name the player’s professional performance as the reason for not extending the contract. In the farewell message, the club, on the contrary, emphasized his attitude to work, dedication, and fight.

What the official statistics show

Ukrainian sports media publications presented different figures regarding Skapintsev’s performances in Israel.

Football24 reported that in 14 Israeli championship games, the Ukrainian averaged 6.1 points, 2.1 rebounds, and 0.6 assists.

However, the official statistics of the Israeli Basketball Super League show different results for the regular season:

• 14 games;
• 8 starts;
• 16.9 minutes on the court;
• 5.4 points;
• 5.8 rebounds;
• 0.5 assists;
• 1 block;
• 0.6 steals per game on average.

Skapintsev made 66.7% of his two-point shots and 71.4% of his free throws. In total, he scored 75 points and grabbed 81 rebounds in the regular season.

Thus, the figure of 2.1 rebounds provided by the initial Ukrainian source does not match the data from the Israeli league. Rebounding was one of the most noticeable strengths of the Ukrainian center.

In the playoffs, Skapintsev participated in two more games. On average, he scored 5.5 points and grabbed 3.5 rebounds in 13.5 minutes.

In the EuroCup, the Ukrainian played 15 games. His stats were 4.4 points, 3.2 rebounds, and 0.3 assists in about ten minutes of playing time.

Considering the Israeli championship, playoffs, EuroCup, and Winner Cup, Skapintsev played about 34 official games for the Jerusalem club.

Not a failure, but not a breakthrough

Skapintsev’s first season in Israel is hard to call a failure.

When the Ukrainian received playing time, he regularly helped the team in rebounding, created physical pressure under the basket, and used his height advantage. The figure of 5.8 rebounds in 16.9 minutes in the regular season confirms that the center remained quite effective in a limited stretch.

But the modern Hapoel, aiming for leading positions in Israel and Europe, needed a player who could either consistently play in the starting lineup or become a key element of the second unit.

Skapintsev found himself between these roles.

He started in eight regular-season games but spent less than 17 minutes on the court. In the EuroCup, his playing time was even less — about ten minutes. This meant that the coaching staff did not consider the Ukrainian as the team’s main center.

As noted by NAnews — News of Israel, in this case, it is more accurate to talk not about the failure of the Ukrainian basketball player, but about the mismatch of his playing qualities with the role the coaching staff was ready to offer him.

Hapoel began a major overhaul

The decision not to extend the contract with Skapintsev was made against the backdrop of significant changes in the Jerusalem club.

In the Israeli regular season, Hapoel finished third, winning 18 out of 26 games. In the playoffs, the team reached the semifinals, where they lost to Hapoel Tel Aviv in a series with a score of 0:3.

In the EuroCup, the Jerusalemites took first place in their group but ended their performances in the quarterfinals. In the decisive match, Hapoel lost to the Turkish Turk Telekom with a score of 90:91.

After the end of the season, Yonatan Alon, who had led Hapoel for three years, left the team.

Experienced Serbian specialist Sasha Obradovic was appointed as the new head coach. The club’s management announced its intention to build a team capable of competing for all Israeli titles and potentially entering the EuroLeague.

Against this backdrop, Skapintsev’s departure looks like part of the overall restructuring of the roster to meet the new coach’s requirements.

The club has already started signing new basketball players, including front-line players. Therefore, the decision to forgo the option in the Ukrainian’s contract is likely not related to one specific game or episode but to the formation of a new team model.

Hapoel has not officially confirmed this, so it is a conclusion drawn from the sequence of the club’s personnel decisions.

The Ukrainian stayed in Israel during the escalation

Skapintsev’s behavior during the security escalation in Israel deserves special attention.

In June 2026, several foreign basketball players from Hapoel decided to leave the country. Skapintsev was among the legionnaires who stayed in Israel after the club’s management provided players with additional security guarantees.

For the Ukrainian basketball player, the topic of war and security holds special significance.

Back in February, Skapintsev said that he studied the situation in Israel before moving. He emphasized that what was happening in the country at that time could not be compared to the full-scale war in Ukraine.

The decision to stay with the team in a difficult moment partially explains why Hapoel specifically mentioned the Ukrainian’s dedication, commitment, and fight in the farewell address.

One of the best matches for Ukraine — before leaving the club

It is symbolic that the announcement of Skapintsev’s departure from Hapoel came shortly after one of the center’s best matches for the Ukrainian national team.

On July 2, 2026, Ukraine defeated Georgia with a score of 95:76 in a nominally home match of the 2027 World Cup qualification held in Riga.

Skapintsev started in the starting five, scored 17 points, and grabbed 14 rebounds, achieving a double-double. Thanks to this victory, the Ukrainian national team advanced to the second stage of the World Cup qualification ahead of schedule.

This match showed that the Ukrainian remains capable of being a noticeable and productive basketball player with sufficient playing time and a clear role on the court.

Therefore, leaving Hapoel should not be perceived as the end of his career at a high level.

Skapintsev is 28 years old — for a center, this is an age when basketball players often reach the peak of their physical capabilities and professional stability.

What will happen next

After Hapoel’s refusal to use the extension option, Dmitry Skapintsev became a free agent.

At the moment, the new club of the Ukrainian center has not been officially announced.

Considering his NBA and G League experience, performances in the EuroCup, playing for the Ukrainian national team, and rare physical attributes for European basketball, Skapintsev may interest teams from the championships of Israel, Turkey, Poland, Lithuania, Germany, or other European countries.

The main question for the Ukrainian will be not only the level of the next club but also the role they can offer him.

The season in Jerusalem showed that Skapintsev is capable of effectively rebounding and protecting the space under the basket, but he needs stable minutes and the trust of the coaching staff.

For NAnews — News of Israel, this story is important not only as another transfer news.

Dmitry Skapintsev became one of the few Ukrainian basketball players in recent years to play simultaneously in a leading Israeli club, a European tournament, and the Ukrainian national team.

He leaves Jerusalem without scandal and public mutual claims. Hapoel thanked the Ukrainian for his professionalism and fight, and Skapintsev himself gets the opportunity to find a team where his height, experience, and play under the basket will be used much more actively.

…
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Representatives of Ukraine were among the participants of the international educational seminar of Keren Kayemet Le-Israel, which brought together 209 educators, teachers, and leaders of Jewish schools from 26 countries in Israel.

Over eight days, participants familiarized themselves with modern life in Israel, visited historical and natural sites, met with Israeli educators, local authorities, security personnel, and community members who have experienced difficult events in recent years.

The international program took place in Israel from July 7 to 14, 2026 under the leadership of the educational division of KKL — Keren Kayemet Le-Israel, also known as the Jewish National Fund.

Ukraine among 26 countries — but the names of the participants have not yet been announced

The Israeli publication Yeshuvnik reported that representatives from the USA, Canada, Germany, France, Lithuania, Ukraine, Moldova, Romania, South Africa, Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, and other countries participated in the annual seminar.

Thus, the participation of the Ukrainian delegation is officially confirmed by the organizers.

However, KKL and Israeli media have not yet reported how many educators came from Ukraine, which cities and educational institutions they represented, nor have they published their names.

It is only known that among the 209 participants were teachers, directors, and leaders of Jewish schools, as well as specialists in formal and informal Jewish and Zionist education.

For Ukraine, participation in such a seminar is of particular importance.

Ukrainian Jewish schools and communities continue to operate under conditions of full-scale war, air raids, forced family migration, and partial transition to distance learning.

Therefore, the opportunity for direct communication with colleagues from Israel and other countries becomes not only a professional exchange but also a way to maintain the connection of Ukrainian Jewish youth with Israel, Jewish history, and international communities.

The very fact of the presence of representatives from Ukraine shows that Ukrainian Jewish education remains part of the global Jewish space even under the conditions of ongoing Russian aggression.

What was included in the educational program

The seminar was not an ordinary familiarization trip but a week-long educational program across different regions of Israel.

Participants visited natural, archaeological, and historical sites, learned about the work of KKL, met with educators, security personnel, municipal leaders, and local residents.

Special attention was paid to communities affected after the terrorist attack on October 7, 2023, and the subsequent war.

Educators were told not only about the consequences of the tragedy but also about the restoration of Israeli settlements, mutual assistance, the return of residents, and the work of educational institutions in crisis conditions.

The organizers aimed to show participants modern Israel not only through media reports and political debates but through direct meetings with people.

Educators were to see a country that simultaneously faces military, social, and educational challenges and continues to restore affected communities.

For many foreign teachers, such meetings become the basis for future lessons and conversations with students.

NANews — News of Israel notes that educators often become the main source of systematic knowledge about Israel for children in the diaspora.

The perception of Israel by the next generation of Jewish youth depends on the materials and personal stories they bring home.

Education after October 7

The official program of the American delegation allows for a more detailed understanding of the main directions of the international seminar.

Participants were offered lectures, discussions, and practical sessions dedicated to teaching Jewish history and Zionism after October 7.

The program also included familiarization with KKL educational materials, visits to Jewish National Fund sites, historical places of the Jewish people, and participation in volunteer work.

The issue of how to talk to children and teenagers about Israel in conditions of war, rising anti-Semitism, and harsh international debates was separately considered.

For educators, this is a challenging task.

They need to talk about the terrorist attack, hostages, casualties, and war, but at the same time not turn the study of Israel solely into a conversation about violence and tragedy.

That is why the organizers included topics of Israeli society’s resilience, mutual responsibility, community restoration, ecology, the country’s history, and modern educational work in the program.

KKL also provided educators with materials they could use after returning to their own schools.

American participants, for example, had previously committed to preparing educational projects for their educational institutions in collaboration with JNF-USA representatives.

They were expected to talk about the trip on social media, speak to their community, and incorporate the experience gained into school programs.

These conditions apply directly to the American delegation, but they show the general approach of the organizers: the seminar should continue in the form of lessons, events, and projects after the participants return home.

Educators are called ‘messengers of Israeli history’

KKL Chairman Eyal Ostrinsky stated that the decision of hundreds of Jewish educators to come to Israel during a difficult period is an expression of trust, responsibility, and shared destiny.

According to him, educators become a kind of ‘messengers of Israeli history’ in their communities.

Direct acquaintance with the country, its people, and the values of Zionism should provide them with tools for educating the next generation of the Jewish people.

KKL emphasizes that such educational programs help strengthen ties between Israel and Jewish communities in the diaspora.

The task is not only to transmit knowledge.

Participants from different countries get to know each other, discuss teaching methods, and have the opportunity to create joint educational programs.

After the seminar, they return to their countries with materials, personal impressions, and contacts of colleagues.

For representatives of Ukraine, this experience can be especially important, as Ukrainian Jewish schools are simultaneously part of Ukrainian society, the international Jewish space, and the system of relations between Ukraine and Israel.

Ukrainian educators participate in KKL programs not for the first time

The participation of the Ukrainian side in the KKL international seminar has a long history.

In July 2023, a similar program was attended by 250 educators from 22 countries and 27 educational institutions.

At that time, KKL separately reported that Ukraine was represented by 14 teachers.

One of the participants was Ukrainian educator Natala Androshenko.

She said that materials from previous KKL seminars were used in her school in geography, ecology, history, Jewish tradition lessons, and in the study of nature.

According to her, such classes helped students become closer to Israel and better understand Zionism.

Androshenko also noted the value of communication with directors and educators of Jewish schools from different countries.

There is no confirmation that she participated in the 2026 seminar.

However, her story shows how the knowledge gained by Ukrainian educators in Israel is subsequently used in working with children in Ukraine.

This practical result is one of the main meanings of the program.

Educators do not just visit Israel but return to their schools with ready-made methodological materials, new contacts, and personal stories.

For NANews — News of Israel, the participation of Ukrainian representatives in the seminar is also important as an example of the ongoing dialogue between Israel and Ukraine at the level of education and Jewish communities.

Such connections do not always receive noticeable attention in major media, but they are the ones that form long-term relationships between countries.

Political statements change, governments argue, but the work of teachers with children continues for years.

What remains unknown

KKL confirmed the presence of representatives from Ukraine but did not publish the composition of the delegation.

At the time of publication, the following are unknown:

— the exact number of participants from Ukraine;

— their names and positions;

— the cities they represented;

— the names of Jewish schools and organizations;

— the separate program of the Ukrainian group;

— the topics or projects that Ukrainian educators plan to implement after returning.

Therefore, it cannot yet be asserted that a certain number of Ukrainian teachers or representatives of specific organizations arrived in Israel.

But the very fact of Ukrainian participation is confirmed by both the Israeli publication and the KKL announcement.

From July 7 to 14, 2026, representatives of Ukraine, along with educators from 25 other countries, studied Israel’s experience, exchanged educational practices, and discussed how to preserve the Jewish identity of the next generation in a world that has become even more complex and divided after October 7.

…
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There is no direct evidence of the murder of American Senator Lindsey Graham today. But it is too early to completely dismiss the version of poisoning.

Too many things coincided in time: the last visit to Kyiv, the agreement with the White House on a sanctions bill painful for the Kremlin, the return to Washington — and the sudden death of a politician who was officially declared wanted in Russia and portrayed for years as one of Moscow’s main enemies.

Preliminary examination indicates aortic dissection associated with atherosclerotic vascular disease. This is a real and often lightning-fast cause of death. However, the death certificate has not yet been finalized: forensic experts continue toxicological and microscopic studies. Therefore, the question of possible exposure to a foreign substance is technically still open.

The last 36 hours of Lindsey Graham

July 10, 2026 Lindsey Graham was in Kyiv. This was his tenth visit to Ukraine since the start of the full-scale Russian invasion.

The senator met with Volodymyr Zelensky, discussed Ukraine’s air defense needs, missile production for Patriot systems, and increasing economic pressure on Moscow. He also familiarized himself with Ukrainian production of Skyfall drones.

But the most dangerous result of this trip for the Kremlin was something else.

In Kyiv, Graham announced that he and other senators had reached an agreement with Donald Trump’s administration on an updated sanctions bill against Russia.

“We have reached an agreement with the White House on the version of the Russian sanctions bill that they will support. This means it will become law,” Graham told reporters.

The project provided for punishment not only for Russian structures but also for states, banks, and companies that continue to buy Russian oil and gas, thereby financing Putin’s war machine. In fact, it was an attempt to hit one of the Kremlin’s main sources of income.

In the evening of July 11, less than two days after this statement, the 71-year-old senator suddenly died in Washington.

Shortly before his condition worsened, he spoke with Donald Trump. The US president later said that Graham sounded a little tired, but otherwise spoke normally. Shortly thereafter, emergency services received a report of cardiac arrest at the senator’s home.

It was this sequence — Kyiv, Russian sanctions, return, and sudden death — that raised the question of possible poisoning not only among anonymous social media users.

Russia had an obvious motive

Lindsey Graham was not just one of Ukraine’s supporters in the Senate.

He belonged to a small group of American politicians who for years consistently demanded moving from words to real economic and military pressure on Moscow. At the same time, Graham remained a close ally of Trump and could persuade the US president on issues of Ukraine, Russia, Iran, and Israel.

For the Kremlin, this made him significantly more dangerous than an ordinary senator.

In March 2022, Graham publicly called for someone inside Russia to “remove” Putin. The Russian Foreign Ministry officially protested, and the White House was forced to separately state that the assassination of a foreign leader is not US policy.

In May 2023, the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs added the American senator to the official wanted list. The reason was his statements during a visit to Kyiv, which Russian propaganda presented as approval of the death of Russians. The full recording of the meeting showed that two of Graham’s phrases were edited together and were not one statement, but Moscow still began criminal prosecution against him.

Thus, at the time of his death, Lindsey Graham was simultaneously:

• one of the most consistent supporters of Ukraine;
• the author of a personal threat against Putin;
• a person declared wanted by the Russian authorities;
• the main driver of a new sanctions mechanism against buyers of Russian energy resources;
• an influential intermediary between Ukraine and Trump.

The presence of a motive in itself proves nothing. But to claim that the Kremlin was indifferent to whether Graham would continue his work is also impossible.

Poisoning is not fantasy, but part of the history of Russian special services

Host Greg Kelly, asking Trump about a possible Russian trace, put it very bluntly: “Russians have a habit of poisoning those they don’t like”.

The phrase sounds harsh, but it is based not only on political rhetoric.

In November 2006, former FSB officer Alexander Litvinenko was poisoned in London with radioactive polonium-210. A British public inquiry concluded that Andrei Lugovoy and Dmitry Kovtun likely acted under FSB direction, and the operation was likely approved by then-FSB head Nikolai Patrushev and personally by Putin.

In March 2018, Sergei and Yulia Skripal were poisoned with a nerve agent in Salisbury, UK. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons independently confirmed the findings of British laboratories on the use of a highly toxic nerve agent. The UK blamed the operation on the Russian state.

In August 2020, Alexei Navalny was poisoned. OPCW laboratories found biomarkers of a cholinesterase inhibitor in his blood and urine, structurally similar to substances in the same group as the Novichok family components.

These episodes do not prove Russia’s involvement in Graham’s death. But they prove something else: the use of poisons against political opponents, defectors, and people deemed enemies of the Kremlin cannot be considered impossible or uncharacteristic of the Russian system.

This has already happened. Moreover, it happened abroad, using rare substances and with the calculation of denying Moscow’s involvement.

For Russian special services, poison is not only a means of physical elimination. It is also a message: borders do not protect, and death can look like an illness, accident, or unexplained medical catastrophe.

What the official medical version says

The preliminary conclusion of the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner of the District of Columbia sounds specific: aortic dissection due to atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease.

Aortic dissection occurs when the inner lining of the body’s largest artery tears, allowing blood to penetrate between the layers of the vessel wall. The condition can develop very quickly and lead to massive internal bleeding, disruption of blood supply to organs, and cardiac arrest. Age, hypertension, and atherosclerosis are known risk factors.

Therefore, the natural cause of death looks medically plausible.

But the word “preliminary” in this story is of fundamental importance.

The official cause and manner of death will be recorded only after the completion of toxicological and microscopic analysis. At the moment, US authorities have not reported finding poison, stimulant, nerve agent, or other suspicious substances in Graham’s body.

At the same time, the detection of aortic rupture describes the immediate mechanism of death. By itself, it is not yet separate evidence that there was no external influence. Toxicology is supposed to check this.

For NAnews — Israel News it is crucial to separate two formulations: claiming that Russia killed Graham today is impossible; claiming that the Russian version has already been completely refuted is also premature.

Why Trump does not believe in poisoning

Donald Trump publicly rejected the version of Russian involvement.

Answering Greg Kelly’s question, the president said he would “gladly” support a conspiracy theory but believes the senator had serious health problems. Trump added that Graham’s father died at about the same age, and the senator’s own problems were deep and difficult to detect.

But the president’s words are a political and personal assessment, not an investigative conclusion.

Trump did not present toxicological results and did not report an intelligence check of the senator’s last route. His position, judging by the public explanation, is based primarily on medical information about Graham’s illness.

The FBI confirmed that it is assisting local authorities and has provided necessary resources. However, the agency has not announced the start of an investigation into a foreign operation, and law enforcement agencies have not publicly reported signs of violent death.

Why the issue still needs to be fully investigated

The version of the Russian trace is based not on evidence but on a combination of circumstances:

July 10 Graham announces in Kyiv the advancement of sanctions capable of hitting Russian oil and gas exports.

July 11 he returns to Washington, talks to Trump, and suddenly dies.

Russia had previously declared him wanted, and Russian propaganda had portrayed the senator as an enemy for years.

Russian special services have a documented history of using toxic substances against people the Kremlin considered a threat.

At the same time, the final toxicological conclusion has not yet been published.

American activist Laura Loomer demanded a full investigation and directly asked: “Did Russia just poison Lindsey Graham?” She also reminded of previous threats against the senator. Loomer herself is known for spreading conspiracy theories, so her words cannot be considered evidence. But the demand to wait for full toxicology in this situation seems reasonable.

A check of the entire chain of Graham’s last days is necessary: flights, food and drinks, meetings, hotels, transportation, contacts, surveillance camera recordings, and possible unusual medical visits. Even the discovery of a suspicious substance will not yet prove Russian involvement — data on the method of delivery, performers, and customers will be required.

However, closing the case before obtaining these results would be as irresponsible as declaring the senator’s death a proven murder today.

Russia could well have done it — but there is no evidence yet

As of July 14, 2026, the most confirmed version of Lindsey Graham’s death is sudden aortic dissection against the background of chronic vascular disease.

But the Russian version does not look absurd.

The Kremlin had a motive. Russian special services have the necessary capabilities. Poisoning opponents outside Russia is part of the documented history of the Putin regime. And Graham’s death occurred at a time when he was close to passing sanctions threatening Russian oil and gas revenues.

Therefore, the correct conclusion today should sound like this:

Russia could well have been interested in eliminating Lindsey Graham, and the use of poison fully corresponds to the known methods of Russian special services. However, this can be considered an established fact only after the appearance of toxicological, investigative, or intelligence evidence.

Until the completion of examinations, the version of natural death remains the main one. But calling any question about the Russian trace a “crazy conspiracy theory” before the publication of final results is too hasty.

Monitoring of the final toxicological conclusion and new FBI statements on this case can be set.

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Ukraine Officially Returns to Haifa: after 11 years of absence, a consular representation will once again appear here. NAnews – Israel News reports on how the network of Ukrainian diplomatic missions in Israel has evolved from 1991 to the present day.

What we will cover in this article:

• Diplomatic relations between Ukraine and Israel were established on 26 December 1991, and by October 1992 the Embassy of Ukraine in Tel Aviv had already opened.
• In 1998, Aron Maiberg was granted the status of Honorary Consul of Ukraine in Haifa, marking the first step toward developing a consular network in the country; his mandate was extended several times by Ukraine’s MFA.
• From 2008–2014, Haifa hosted a General Consulate headed by Ihor Vitaliyovych Turchyn.
• Since 2013, Jerusalem has been home to an Honorary Consulate led by Ofer Kerzner.
• In 2025, the process began to open a new Honorary Consulate of Ukraine in Haifa, which is to be headed by Alex Zernopolski.

After Tel Aviv and Jerusalem — Ukraine Returns to Haifa

For the first time in over a decade, the north of Israel will once again have a Ukrainian consular representative. On 14 August 2025, Ukraine’s Ambassador to Israel Yevhen Korniychuk announced on “The Best Radio of Israel” that lawyer Alex Zernopolski will become the Honorary Consul of Ukraine in Haifa.

According to him, the candidate approval process lasted about ten months, and now it remains only to receive final confirmation from Israel’s MFA. The consular office will operate in Haifa — Israel’s third-largest city and the center of the northern region. The decision is driven both by the growing needs of the Ukrainian diaspora and the city’s strategic importance in the country’s economy.

From Diplomatic Relations to the First Consulates

Diplomatic relations between Ukraine and Israel were established on 26 December 1991. By October 1992, the Embassy of Ukraine opened in Tel Aviv. The first ambassador was Yurii Shcherbak, who served from 29 October 1992 to October 1994. Since the early 2000s, Ukraine has gradually expanded its network of diplomatic institutions to serve not only the capital region but also major centers where a significant portion of Ukrainians reside.

Embassy of Ukraine in Tel Aviv: Historical Overview, Functions, and Cultural Role

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Israel’s main airport faces the threat of a new transportation crisis. Due to the resumption of military escalation between the US and Iran, Washington has suspended the withdrawal of tanker aircraft from Ben Gurion. If the previously agreed schedule is not restored, the airport may run out of parking spaces for passenger liners as early as July 23.

The Israel Airports Authority warns: in such a case, about ten flights will have to be canceled daily. In terms of passengers, this means approximately 50,000 canceled airline tickets each month.

The situation is especially dangerous because the crisis is unfolding at the height of the summer season, when Ben Gurion is supposed to serve from 80,000 to 94,000 passengers a day.

Four planes returned, eight refused to withdraw

The new escalation became known on July 14, 2026.

The US was supposed to withdraw another eight tanker aircraft from Ben Gurion by the end of the week. This stage was part of an agreement reached after several months of pressure from the Israeli Ministry of Transport and the Airports Authority.

However, due to the resumption of hostilities against Iran, the American command suspended the withdrawal of aviation.

Moreover, four tankers that had previously left the airport returned to Ben Gurion.

The Israel Airports Authority stated that such a change of plans has “immediate and serious operational significance.” If American aviation does not start freeing up parking spaces, starting from July 23, there will be a significant shortage of spaces for civilian aircraft at the airport.

Israeli Transport Minister Miri Regev ordered not to allow the landing of additional American tankers without prior coordination.

Thus, the conflict between Israeli civilian agencies and the American military has reached a new level. Israel does not refuse strategic cooperation with the US but demands that military needs do not paralyze the country’s civil aviation.

The problem is not only in the number of aircraft.

Tankers are significantly larger than many passenger planes, require larger parking spaces, special ground services, security, fuel, and separate procedures for departure. Their landing or urgent takeoff during peak hours forces dispatchers to rearrange the civilian schedule.

In March or May, such an operation could delay other flights by about half an hour. In July and August, when planes take off and land almost continuously, one such disruption can cause a multi-hour chain of delays affecting hundreds of flights.

From the first tankers to an actual military base

American planes began arriving at Ben Gurion even before the start of the large-scale war with Iran.

On February 23, 2026, American tanker aircraft and C-17 military transport planes were spotted at Israel’s main civilian airport. By that time, military aviation observers had counted more than 85 tankers and over 170 transport aircraft sent by the US to the Middle East region since mid-February.

On the night of February 27, at least nine more American tankers arrived at Ben Gurion. Simultaneously, American F-22 fighters and accompanying aircraft were stationed at the Ovda airbase.

On February 28, 2026, the US and Israel launched a large-scale military operation against Iran.

Aerial tankers became one of the most important elements of the campaign. They allowed American and Israeli fighters and bombers to stay in the air longer and strike targets deep within Iranian territory.

After the start of the war, Israel’s airspace was closed. On March 2, Ben Gurion began gradually resuming operations, initially in a very limited format and mainly for Israeli airlines.

However, American tankers did not disappear from the airport.

According to satellite images studied by the Financial Times, there were about 36 military tanker aircraft at Ben Gurion in early March.

After the ceasefire, which came into effect on April 8, their number did not decrease but increased to about 47.

By mid-May, there were already at least 52 American military aircraft at the airport. The reasons for placing such a large group specifically at Israel’s main civilian airport, rather than at military bases, were not fully explained officially.

By this time, Ben Gurion had effectively ceased to cope simultaneously with civilian and military tasks.

The head of Israel’s Civil Aviation Authority, Shmuel Zakai, stated that Ben Gurion had turned into an American military airfield with limited civilian activity.

The Director General of the Airports Authority, Sharon Kedmi, reported on May 28 that the airport was using only about one-third of its operational capacity. According to him, approximately 70% of Ben Gurion’s activities were limited due to the space and resources occupied by American aviation.

In two months, the Airports Authority lost about 700 million shekels. If the situation continued as it was, losses could grow to several billion.

The passenger traffic forecast for 2026 had to be reduced from 18 million to 15 million people. Up to three million passengers risked facing cancellations or being unable to purchase tickets.

Many El Al, Arkia, and Israir planes had to be kept outside Israel. This meant additional expenses for parking, crews, and maintenance, as well as reducing the number of flights Israeli companies could perform daily.

NAnews — Israel News notes that it’s not just about inconveniences for tourists. For Israel, which effectively has one main international aviation hub, the overload of Ben Gurion quickly turns into a national economic and transportation problem.

Foreign carriers also received another reason not to return to Israel. The reduction in supply amid high demand created conditions for further increases in ticket prices.

June crisis: 2.4 million trips were at risk

By mid-June, the number of American planes reached maximum levels.

According to Miri Regev, there were about 72 American tankers and military transport aircraft at Ben Gurion. The Airports Authority cited the figure of 74 aircraft.

Another 26 American machines were stationed at Ramon Airport in southern Israel, occupying about 90% of the available parking spaces there. Meanwhile, according to Israeli officials, at that time, not a single American tanker was stationed at Israeli Air Force bases.

On June 10, Miri Regev publicly criticized the situation, stating that if US President Donald Trump does not intend to continue the war against Iran, American planes should vacate Ben Gurion.

On June 14, the minister sent an urgent letter to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

She demanded the relocation of at least 30 American aircraft to Israeli Air Force bases or outside the country. Otherwise, Regev warned, about 2.4 million tickets sold for the summer months and the period of the autumn Jewish holidays would be at risk of cancellation.

This figure included trips of Hasidim to Uman for Rosh Hashanah.

The critical date was announced as June 16, 2026.

It is in mid-June that the Airports Authority allocates summer slots to airlines — the time during which a carrier has the right to land or take off a plane.

If an airline does not receive the necessary slot, it is forced to cancel the flight. At the same time, Israeli law allows the carrier not to pay standard compensation if the passenger was warned of the cancellation at least 14 days in advance.

Therefore, on June 16, foreign companies could begin to massively cancel July flights without incurring additional compensation costs.

Miri Regev warned of direct damage in billions of shekels to airlines, the tourism industry, and Israel’s economy. She also noted that mass cancellations would harm the country’s reputation as an aviation destination and could deter carriers just beginning to return after the April ceasefire.

At the last moment, Israel and the US managed to find a temporary solution.

On June 16, Israeli media reported that in the coming days, 20 planes would be transferred to Israeli Air Force bases, and another 17 machines would leave Ben Gurion by the end of the month. At the time of publication, there was no official confirmation of the full schedule.

By June 24, about 20 American planes had indeed been withdrawn.

But this was still not enough. Of the 99 parking spaces intended for civilian passenger aircraft, only 65 remained free.

For normal operations in July, at least 80 parking spaces were required, and for the August peak — all 99.

Sharon Kedmi warned that without freeing up at least 15 more spaces, cancellations could affect about 100,000 passengers. In June, Ben Gurion served more than 65,000 people a day, while in August, between 70,000 and 100,000 passengers were expected daily.

By early July, the situation began to improve.

On July 1, Lufthansa and ITA Airways resumed flights to Israel. Austrian Airlines had previously returned, and Air Europa restored service to Madrid. The Ministry of Transport announced an agreement to accelerate the withdrawal of American aviation: about 30 planes were to be moved in the first stage and another 20 later.

However, the achieved normalization proved to be unstable.

On July 7, 2026, the US resumed strikes on Iran after attacks on merchant ships in the Strait of Hormuz. The American command announced the targeting of more than 80 targets, including ships and objects of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Iran responded with strikes on American targets in the Persian Gulf countries.

On July 13, Donald Trump officially notified the US Congress that hostilities had resumed on July 7.

Amid this escalation, the American military decided to keep the tankers in close proximity to the operations zone again. That is why the previously agreed withdrawal of eight planes was stopped, and four machines returned to Ben Gurion.

Now the consequences of the military decision may become noticeable as early as July 23.

By the end of the month, passenger traffic is expected to exceed 80,000 people almost every weekday.

On July 16, about 91,000 passengers were forecasted.

On July 26 — about 90,000.

The maximum load is expected on July 30: approximately 94,000 passengers and about 560 takeoffs, landings, and other aviation operations.

In total, about 2.3 million passengers are expected to pass through Ben Gurion in July, which is approximately 25% more than in July 2025.

Therefore, even the daily cancellation of ten flights will have a cumulative effect. Over the month, this is about 300 flights and 50,000 unrealized flights.

The main question now is whether Israel and the US can find alternative places for the tankers — at military bases or outside the country — without weakening American capabilities in the war against Iran.

NAnews — Israel News emphasizes: the history of American tankers has shown how closely Israel’s security is now linked to the daily lives of citizens.

The decision made by the American military command due to attacks in the Strait of Hormuz and strikes on Iran may determine in a few days whether tens of thousands of Israelis can go on vacation, return home, or meet with relatives.

Ben Gurion has simultaneously become an international airport, a logistics center for war, and one of the most vulnerable points of the Israeli economy. As long as American tankers remain on its parking spaces, each new turn of the conflict with Iran will directly affect passengers, airlines, the tourism industry, and ticket prices.

…
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