Month: July 2026

J7 — the union of the largest Jewish communities in the USA, Canada, the UK, France, Germany, Australia, and Argentina.

On July 29, 2026, the union of the largest Jewish organizations J7 published the second annual report J7 Annual Report on Antisemitism 2026. The authors recorded more than 23,000 antisemitic incidents during 2025 and stated that it became the deadliest year for Jews in the diaspora since the terrorist attack on the AMIA Jewish center in Buenos Aires in 1994.

According to the report, as a result of antisemitic attacks in 2025, 20 people were killed: 15 at a Hanukkah celebration on Bondi Beach in Sydney, two near the Heaton Park Synagogue in Manchester, two near the Jewish Museum in Washington, and one woman after an attack on participants of a rally in support of Israeli hostages in Boulder, USA.

The numbers are frightening and require immediate reaction.

However, when reading the report, an equally heavy question arises: where are the Ukrainian Jews in this picture, whom Russia is killing with missiles, drones, and artillery, who are dying in the Ukrainian army, and whose synagogues, schools, cemeteries, and community centers are being destroyed by Russian strikes?

The answer is uncomfortable: the architecture of J7 is such that it is practically incapable of seeing these people.

This is not a global report, although its title sounds global

J7 is the Large Communities’ Task Force Against Antisemitism, a union of organizations from seven countries with the largest Jewish communities outside Israel. It includes the USA, Canada, the UK, France, Germany, Australia, and Argentina.

Ukraine is not among the J7 members. Nor are most Eastern European countries, former USSR countries, and many other territories where Jewish communities exist.

Officially, J7 states that the seven covered countries unite more than 90% of the diaspora’s Jewish population. But this only means that the report covers countries with the largest number of Jews. It does not make it a complete picture of all the threats faced by Jews outside Israel.

Moreover, the 2026 edition included a separate chapter on Ireland, although Ireland is not a J7 member and its Jewish community numbers about 2,200 people. In six months, 143 antisemitic incidents were registered there.

This is an important detail. It shows that the geographical boundaries of the report are not absolutely closed. With political and organizational will, the authors are capable of paying attention to a small community outside the seven countries.

But there is no special chapter on Ukraine, where Jews have been living under Russian missile and drone strikes for four years, in the report.

What is said in the J7 Annual Report on Antisemitism 2026

The J7 Annual Report on Antisemitism 2026 is the second annual report of organizations from the largest Jewish communities in the USA, Canada, the UK, France, Germany, Australia, and Argentina.

The authors studied antisemitic attacks, threats, vandalism, online harassment, incidents at universities, and attacks on Jewish institutions registered in 2025.

A total of 23,174 antisemitic incidents were recorded in the seven countries. This is less than the record figure of 2024, but 136% more than in 2022 — before the Hamas attack on October 7, 2023.

The number of violent cases, without comparable data for Canada, was 718. This is almost twice the level of 2022.

In four antisemitic attacks in Australia, the UK, and the USA, 20 people were killed. That is why the authors called 2025 the deadliest year for the diaspora Jews in over 30 years. However, this only refers to victims of registered antisemitic attacks in the countries covered by the study.

The most incidents were recorded in Germany — 8,725, in the USA — 6,274, in the UK — 3,700, in France — 1,320, in Australia — 1,654, in Canada — 788, in Argentina — 713.

The report highlights several main problems: the rise of physical violence, the harassment of Jews under the guise of anti-Zionism, the dangerous situation in universities, the spread of hatred on social networks, and the tendency of Jews to hide their identity.

J7 demands that states strengthen the protection of synagogues and schools, protect Jewish students, investigate threats, maintain a unified record of crimes, and hold social platforms accountable.

The report is important but covers only selected countries and antisemitic incidents. That is why Ukrainian Jews, dying under Russian strikes and defending Ukraine, remain outside its scope.

Why a Russian missile “doesn’t count”

The main reason lies in the methodology. J7 counts not all Jews killed by violence, but victims of antisemitic attacks.

For a murder or attack to be included in such statistics, it is necessary to establish that the person was attacked because of their Jewish origin, religion, connection to a Jewish organization, or to Israel. If a Russian missile hits a residential building in Kyiv, Odesa, Kharkiv, or Dnipro and kills a Jew there, their death is counted as part of Russian war crimes and Ukraine’s overall losses, but not as an antisemitic murder.

From the perspective of statistical purity, there is logic in this. It is not possible to automatically declare every strike on an area where a synagogue is located as a deliberate attack specifically on Jews. The organization Jewish Heritage Europe, analyzing the damage to Jewish objects in Ukraine, also noted that Jewish buildings themselves, according to available data, were not always specifically chosen targets.

However, the correct separation of categories has turned into a large blind spot.

If a Russian missile was not aimed at a person specifically because of their Jewishness, it does not mean that the death of this person is not related to the security of the Jewish community. If a synagogue is destroyed along with neighboring houses, it still ceases to be a place of prayer, food distribution, medicine, and assistance to the elderly.

The problem with J7 is not the refusal to call every Russian attack antisemitic. The problem is the absence of a second category that would take into account the consequences of war and state terror for Jewish communities.

About 200 fallen Jewish defenders of Ukraine

On June 8, 2025, the Federation of Jewish Communities of Ukraine reported that, according to its estimate, about 200 Ukrainian Jewish servicemen had died since the start of the full-scale Russian aggression.

This is not final state statistics, but an estimate by a Jewish organization involved in organizing funerals, reading Kaddish, and supporting the families of the deceased. But even such an approximate figure is ten times the number of people on which J7 called 2025 the deadliest year for the diaspora in three decades. These two figures cannot be directly compared, as they relate to different periods and different categories of violence. However, ignoring this discrepancy is also impossible.

In just two weeks in the spring of 2025, the deaths of three Jewish defenders of Ukraine became known.

32-year-old Odesa native Tzvi-Hirsh, or Grisha, Tzvergzde served in the 34th brigade. Before the army, he was a chef and dreamed of opening the first kosher restaurant in Europe with a Michelin star in Odesa. He left behind a wife and two small children.

Andrey Kurovsky from Zhytomyr taught computer science at the “Or Avner” Jewish school for over 20 years. After being wounded, he underwent rehabilitation and returned to the front. Kurovsky died of a heart attack during a Russian assault on the positions where his unit was located.

44-year-old Maksim Nelipa was a journalist and a well-known Ukrainian TV presenter. After being wounded in January 2025, he also returned to the army and became a company commander. His son Artem, serving in the “Golani” brigade of the IDF, learned of his father’s death while in Gaza.

For J7, these people are not victims of antisemitism. But for the Ukrainian and global Jewish community, they remain fallen Jews who gave their lives defending their country from Russia.

NAnews — Israel News believes that such a distinction needs to be explained to readers directly, not hidden within methodological notes.

Synagogues, schools, and cemeteries under Russian strikes

In February 2026, the United Jewish Community of Ukraine published a list of approximately 40 Jewish objects damaged or destroyed since the start of the full-scale Russian aggression.

The list included synagogues, schools, cemeteries, Holocaust memorials, charitable institutions, nursing homes, and community centers. The authors emphasize that the real losses may be significantly higher, especially in temporarily occupied territories where it is impossible to send specialists to check the condition of buildings.

Only during 2025 were recorded:

• damage to the historic Brodsky Synagogue in Odesa;
• damage to the building over the grave of Rabbi Nachman in Uman;
• significant destruction of the buildings of the Jewish orphanage in Odesa;
• damage to the “Beit Baruch” nursing home in Dnipro;
• a strike on the Avenue of the Righteous Among the Nations in Babyn Yar;
• damage to the “Nachlas Eliezer” synagogue in Odesa;
• two hits on the central synagogue of Kherson;
• damage to the Rosenberg Synagogue in Podil, Kyiv;
• destruction of about 240 graves in the Jewish section of the city cemetery in Kharkiv.

On October 23, 2025, a large element of a presumably Russian cluster munition pierced the roof of the central synagogue in Kherson, passed through the prayer hall, and stopped in the rabbi’s office. Community staff and a Jewish woman who lived there because her own home was in a too dangerous area were in the building.

Seven minutes before the hit, Rabbi Yosef-Yitzhak Wolf left the office. Three months earlier, a Russian drone crashed into a car in which the rabbi was traveling with his family.

The Kherson synagogue is not only a prayer building. It distributes food, medicine, and other assistance to the remaining residents of the city. Damage to such an object means a blow to the entire survival system of the local Jewish community.

On the same night, a Russian drone damaged the synagogue in Podil, Kyiv. Windows were broken, the facade was damaged, and a drone fragment got stuck in the building’s wall. Nearby residential buildings were also affected.

One can argue about whether each synagogue was pre-selected as a Jewish target. It is indisputable that Russian aggression physically destroys the space of Jewish life in Ukraine.

Dangerous wording about “the deadliest year”

The J7 phrase that 2025 became the deadliest year for the diaspora Jews since 1994 formally refers to those killed in registered antisemitic attacks in J7 countries.

This is exactly how it should be formulated.

Without this clarification, it creates the impression that the authors counted all Jews killed by violence outside Israel. This is not the case. The statistics do not include Ukrainian military Jews, Jewish civilians killed under Russian strikes, or people who died due to the destruction of homes, hospitals, energy, and other civilian infrastructure.

Nor do they include the losses of other Jewish communities outside the geography of J7.

Therefore, the main drawback of the report is not only in the choice of seven countries but also in the mismatch between the narrow methodology and the global sound of its conclusions.

When an organization declares a certain year “the deadliest for the diaspora,” it is obliged to either study the diaspora as a whole or clearly specify the boundaries of its statement each time.

Why Ukraine disappeared from the Jewish agenda

In March 2025, the Israeli Jewish People Policy Institute published a separate study on the impact of the Russian war against Ukraine on Jewish communities.

The institute highlighted several consequences: a large-scale humanitarian operation, the migration of Jews from Ukraine and Russia, new security expenses, and the strengthening of state antisemitism within Russia. The study directly noted that after the Hamas terrorist attack on October 7, 2023, the war in Israel and its consequences largely overshadowed the impact of Russian aggression on Jewish communities.

This explains but does not justify the absence of Ukraine in the J7 report.

After October 7, Jewish organizations understandably focused on Israel’s security, the rise of antisemitism in Western countries, universities, social networks, and the streets of major cities.

At the same time, a division arose: Jews in London, Paris, Berlin, or New York are considered victims of antisemitism, while Jews in Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odesa, and Kherson are only seen as part of the general population of a warring country.

NAnews — Israel News considers such a division artificial. A Jew forced to hide from a Russian missile in a synagogue basement does not become a less important part of the global Jewish community just because the operator of the Russian drone did not have a personal list of congregants.

Different categories cannot be mixed — but both must be seen

The simplest solution would be to record all Russian attacks on Jewish objects in the category of antisemitism. But that would be a mistake.

An antisemitic crime implies an established or reasonably presumed motive of hatred towards Jews. A Russian shelling of a residential area where a synagogue is located may be a war crime and an act of state terror, but not necessarily a separate antisemitic attack.

Mixing categories would make the statistics less reliable and allow critics to question the entire report.

The correct solution is not to change the meaning of the word “antisemitism,” but to expand the analysis of the security of Jewish communities.

It should be about two independent data sets:

1. Antisemitic crimes and incidents, committed out of hatred for Jews, Jewish organizations, or Israel.
2. The consequences of wars, state aggression, and political violence for Jewish communities, even if a specific antisemitic motive for a particular attack is not established.

These figures cannot be added together. But they must be published side by side.

What needs to change in the next J7 reports

First of all, J7 must honestly define the geographical limits of the study. The title, press releases, and media messages should indicate that the conclusions apply to the seven countries and additional studied countries, not to the entire global diaspora.

The next report should contain a separate chapter on Ukraine — based on the same principle by which Ireland was included in the 2026 report.

Such a chapter should take into account:

• the killed and wounded Ukrainian Jewish servicemen;
• confirmed cases of the death of Jewish civilians;
• damage to synagogues, schools, cemeteries, and memorials;
• the loss of community centers’ ability to distribute food and medicine;
• the evacuation of families, children, the elderly, and Holocaust survivors;
• the destruction of homes and displacement of community members;
• the reduction or cessation of Jewish life in frontline and occupied cities;
• the impact of Russian strikes on energy on the operation of Jewish institutions;
• Russian state propaganda and the use of Holocaust history to justify aggression.

To collect information, a permanent working group should be created with the participation of Ukrainian Jewish organizations, rabbis of different directions, researchers of Jewish heritage, and international humanitarian structures.

Each damaged object should be considered not only as a building. It should indicate how many people it served, what programs were conducted there, and what assistance the community lost after the strike.

Separately, a verifiable registry of fallen Jewish defenders of Ukraine should be created. It should contain names, biographies, and information about families — with the consent of relatives. Behind the overall figure of “about 200” are teachers, journalists, chefs, engineers, entrepreneurs, fathers, and mothers.

This is not a dispute about statistics, but a matter of visibility

The J7 report performs important work. It shows the growth of antisemitism, warns of threats, demands the protection of synagogues and Jewish schools, and forces governments to respond.

But the importance of this study does not exempt its authors from criticism.

One cannot claim global security for Jews while simultaneously ignoring one of the largest and historically most important Jewish communities in Europe, which lives under the blows of the Russian state.

One cannot record every Russian missile as an anti-Semitic crime. But one also cannot pretend that Jews killed by it are not part of the overall picture of threats to the diaspora.

Ukrainian Jews are dying on the front lines, losing relatives, homes, synagogues, schools, and cemeteries. They organize aid under shelling, pray during air raids, and stay with their cities even when Russia tries to turn them into ruins.

A future global report on the situation of Jews must see not only the person killed with an anti-Semitic slogan. It must also see the person killed by the missile of an aggressor state.

Otherwise, it will not be a complete picture of the security of the global Jewish community, but a report only on that part of Jewish victims that is conveniently placed in pre-defined statistical frameworks.

…
Is it ‘racism’ or ‘support by Russians for all enemies of Israel’? What is beginning to reach Israeli society, while the government ‘does not notice’ it: the Dolev Cohen scandal on Kan 11 - August 22, 2026 - Новости Израиля

Video: “Know Ours” – Kirill Karetnik – from Ukraine, moved to Israel in 2009, served in the army, worked, and became a politician - August 21, 2026 - Новости Израиля

The 7th Ukrainian Air Assault Corps celebrated 3 years: Jewish chaplain Yakov Sinyakov together with Ukrainian paratroopers - August 21, 2026 - Новости Израиля

On March 26, 2026, Federation of Jewish Communities of Ukraine reported an event that holds not only religious but also cultural and historical significance for Ukraine. The Judaica Department of the Institute of Manuscripts of the Vernadsky National Library of Ukraine received a Ukrainian edition of the Torah as a gift — a bilingual book with the original Hebrew text alongside the Ukrainian translation.

This is not just the transfer of a rare edition to the library’s collection. It is the first-ever Jewish translation of the entire Torah, or the Five Books of Moses, into Ukrainian. The very appearance of such a text can already be considered a milestone for Ukrainian Jewish life, for the academic community, and for the preservation of the country’s shared cultural heritage.

What exactly was transferred to the library

Two copies of the book were received by the Judaica Department. One was donated by the Ukrainian Association of Judaica, and the other by the Religious Community of Jews of Mariupol.

This adds additional depth to the event. The transfer took place on the eve of Passover, one of the main holidays of Judaism, as well as during the days of remembrance for the people of Mariupol who perished at the hands of Russian invaders in the Mariupol Drama Theater in March 2022.

Such context makes the news much broader than a regular report about a new library acquisition. The book is connected with living religious tradition, with the memory of a destroyed city, and with the attempt to preserve Jewish presence in Ukrainian history not only through archives but also through contemporary words.

Why this edition has already made history

The main thing in this story is the scale of the project itself. For the first time, a complete Jewish translation of the Torah into Ukrainian was accomplished. The edition is bilingual, which means it is important simultaneously for religious study, for the academic community, for the translation tradition, and for future work with Jewish heritage in Ukraine.

Such books do not appear by chance and are not made “for show.” They change the very architecture of the cultural space. When a sacred text becomes available in Ukrainian, it means that Jewish tradition gains another stable form of presence within Ukrainian culture.

Who initiated the publication of the Torah in Ukrainian

The publication was carried out in 2025 at the initiative of the Council of the Federation of Jewish Communities of Ukraine. The book was published in Kharkiv with a print run of 15,000 copies.

This is an important number. Such a print run indicates that the project was conceived not as a narrow symbolic gesture but as a real tool for spreading knowledge. We are not looking at a single copy for display or an academic rarity for a few specialists. This is a full-fledged edition intended for wide use.

Against the backdrop of war, such work resonates especially strongly. Ukraine continues to defend not only its territory but also its multilayered historical fabric, of which Jewish heritage is a part. It is in this context that the news of the book’s transfer to the Judaica collection acquires national significance.

In this sense, NAnews — News of Israel | Nikk.Agency view the story not as a local note for a narrow circle but as an important signal that Jewish life in Ukraine continues to speak, translate, preserve, and pass on its texts further, despite war and losses.

What Rabbi Meir Tzvi Stambler said

The head of the Council, Rabbi Meir Tzvi Stambler, emphasized that from now on, the knowledge of the Almighty — the study of the Torah — will also be heard in Ukrainian. He called this an outstanding milestone for the Jewish people.

There is no unnecessary rhetoric in these words. They accurately describe the essence of what happened. The sacred text is not just translated. It is included in a new linguistic space where it can live, be read, studied, and be part of everyday religious and cultural practice.

Memory, language, and tradition at the same time

The transfer of the Ukrainian edition of the Torah to the Vernadsky National Library is a story about a book, but not only about a book. It is a story about how language becomes a means of preserving tradition. About how a library becomes a place for recording not only the past but also the present. And about how even in years of war, projects emerge that work for decades ahead.

The event on the eve of Passover and during the days of remembrance for the victims of Mariupol makes this news especially strong. Here, the religious calendar, national pain, Jewish memory, and Ukrainian cultural work converge.

Therefore, we are not looking at a passing informational occasion, but an important sign of the times: the Torah in Ukrainian has already become part of history, and its appearance in the collection of the country’s main library cements this not only spiritually but also institutionally.

…
Is it ‘racism’ or ‘support by Russians for all enemies of Israel’? What is beginning to reach Israeli society, while the government ‘does not notice’ it: the Dolev Cohen scandal on Kan 11 - August 22, 2026 - Новости Израиля

Video: “Know Ours” – Kirill Karetnik – from Ukraine, moved to Israel in 2009, served in the army, worked, and became a politician - August 21, 2026 - Новости Израиля

The 7th Ukrainian Air Assault Corps celebrated 3 years: Jewish chaplain Yakov Sinyakov together with Ukrainian paratroopers - August 21, 2026 - Новости Израиля

July 29, 2026. Channel – Dmitry Doubov. What does the unexpected meeting between Netanyahu and Volodymyr Zelensky mean after almost three years of virtually no contact? This episode thoroughly examines the possible developments around Iran, Israel, the USA, Ukraine, and Russia, analyzes hidden diplomatic signals, and assesses the likelihood of a major regional war.

Today, events in the Middle East and Ukraine are ceasing to be separate crises. After the meeting between Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu at the White House, new signals have emerged that could change the entire security architecture of the region.

Why did Trump publicly refrain from limiting Israel? What four scenarios for the development of the conflict around Iran are currently being considered? What does the unexpected meeting between Netanyahu and Volodymyr Zelensky mean after almost three years of virtually no contact? And why might Ukraine’s strike on an Iranian vessel have consequences far beyond the Caspian Sea?

…
Is it ‘racism’ or ‘support by Russians for all enemies of Israel’? What is beginning to reach Israeli society, while the government ‘does not notice’ it: the Dolev Cohen scandal on Kan 11 - August 22, 2026 - Новости Израиля

Video: “Know Ours” – Kirill Karetnik – from Ukraine, moved to Israel in 2009, served in the army, worked, and became a politician - August 21, 2026 - Новости Израиля

The 7th Ukrainian Air Assault Corps celebrated 3 years: Jewish chaplain Yakov Sinyakov together with Ukrainian paratroopers - August 21, 2026 - Новости Израиля

July 29, 2026 The New York Times reported that Iran was considering a direct missile strike on Ukraine in response to an attack on an Iranian cargo ship in the Caspian Sea.

According to individuals familiar with intelligence data, Tehran discussed launching a ballistic missile with a relatively small warhead. The intended target could have been one of Ukraine’s Black Sea ports.

Iranian leadership, as sources from the American publication claim, hoped to deliver a limited and mostly symbolic strike. The missile was meant to demonstrate that the attack on the Iranian ship did not go unanswered, while causing relatively minor damage.

The problem was that no one could guarantee a similarly limited reaction from Ukraine. Western officials warned that after the launch of an Iranian ballistic missile, Kyiv might perceive the event as the start of a direct war and retaliate.

Therefore, the events that unfolded over just four days — from July 25 to 29, 2026 — brought Ukraine and Iran to the brink of open military confrontation.

July 25: Attack on the Anna ship in the Caspian Sea

The escalation began on Saturday, July 25, 2026.

On this day, the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that a Ukrainian drone attacked an Iranian commercial ship in the Caspian Sea. The explosion resulted in the death of one sailor, and another person was injured.

Later, Iranian sources named the ship — Anna. According to Ahmad Heydarian, the Iranian Consul General in Russian Astrakhan, legal procedures were initiated after the attack.

Tehran claims that Anna was a civilian cargo ship and did not carry military products. Iranian representatives stated that rolled sheet steel was on board.

The Ukrainian version differed. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that Ukrainian forces attacked a Russian warship and vessels used for transporting military cargo related to Iran in the Caspian Sea.

Thus, Iran called Anna a civilian ship, while Ukraine spoke of an operation against Russian-Iranian military logistics. There is no independent public confirmation of the cargo’s contents yet.

On the same day, July 25, the Iranian Foreign Ministry summoned the temporary chargé d’affaires of Ukraine in Tehran and delivered an official protest. In the Iranian statement, the attack was called a “hostile and criminal” act.

Tehran also stated that Kyiv was trying to expand the geography of Russia’s war against Ukraine and move it to the Caspian region.

July 26: Aragchi stated that the strike would not go unanswered

The next day, Sunday, July 26, 2026, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Aragchi moved to direct threats.

He stated that the attack on the Iranian ship “cannot go unanswered”. According to Aragchi, the incident allegedly violated the UN Charter and was aimed at expanding the war.

The Iranian minister also claimed that Ukraine acted in Israel’s interests and tried to draw European countries into the war between Iran and the United States.

It was after these statements that the threat stopped looking like mere diplomatic rhetoric. According to The New York Times, discussions began within Iran about specific military response options, including launching a ballistic missile at Ukraine.

July 26 Aragchi held separate phone conversations with the head of European diplomacy Kaja Kallas and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov.

In the conversation with Kallas, he demanded a reaction from the European Union to the strike on the ship. With Lavrov, the Iranian Foreign Minister discussed the consequences of the attack and the assistance provided to the crew in Russia’s Astrakhan region.

Simultaneously, despite public threats, Aragchi spoke of diplomatic efforts aimed at reducing tensions.

July 26–28: Iran discussed a strike on a Ukrainian port

According to data published on July 29 by The New York Times, over the next two days, Iranian representatives considered the possibility of launching a single ballistic missile.

The discussion allegedly involved a missile with a small warhead to inflict limited damage and present the attack as a symbolic response.

Other sources reported that a likely target could have been one of Ukraine’s Black Sea ports. The specific name of the port was not disclosed.

Iranian officials hoped that after one retaliatory launch, the confrontation would end. However, Western representatives warned that Tehran could not independently determine where the exchange of strikes would end.

If the Iranian missile hit port infrastructure, a civilian ship, or a residential area, Ukraine could respond with strikes on targets within Iran itself.

Mehdi Rahmati, an Iranian analyst close to government circles, said that there were different positions within the country. Some political figures demanded an immediate attack on Ukraine, while others advised restraint.

“Ukraine is not a small, insignificant country. It has experience in warfare and logistical support from America and Europe. We gain nothing by creating a new front,” Rahmati stated.

July 28: Conversation between Sibiga and Aragchi

The turning point came on Tuesday, July 28, 2026.

On this day, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sibiga held a phone conversation with Abbas Aragchi. The talks took place after several days of public threats and diplomatic attempts to prevent a direct Iranian strike on Ukraine.

According to Aragchi, Sibiga assured him that the hit on the Iranian ship was unintentional and Ukraine did not seek escalation.

Aragchi replied that Iran also did not want to expand the confrontation. However, he demanded compensation for the damage caused to the ship and its crew.

The Iranian state agency IRNA reported on the phone conversation late in the evening of July 28, and Aragchi’s statement on the need for compensation was published after midnight — July 29, 2026.

The Ukrainian side emphasized differently. Sibiga stated that Ukraine’s actions were solely aimed at protecting the country from Russian aggression, and civilian ships and peaceful people were not targets.

He also warned Tehran of the need to refrain from any steps leading to escalation and demanded an end to support for Russia’s war against Ukraine.

July 28: Israel discussed the Iranian threat with Ukraine

On the same day, July 28, 2026, Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar spoke with Andriy Sibiga.

Saar reported that the parties discussed the threats faced by Israel and Ukraine, including the threat from Iran. The Israeli minister also expressed interest in deepening cooperation with Ukraine.

This conversation was particularly important against the backdrop of Aragchi’s statements, attempting to portray the Caspian Sea attack as an operation carried out by Ukraine in Israel’s interest. Kyiv and Jerusalem did not confirm this version.

As noted by NANews — Israel News, the events of July 25–28 showed how quickly Russia’s war against Ukraine and the Middle Eastern confrontation could turn into a single theater of military operations.

Russian-Iranian connection

The escalation occurred against the backdrop of Russia’s long-term use of Iranian-designed drones for strikes on Ukraine.

Kyiv also claims that Moscow and Tehran’s cooperation extends to intelligence information. July 25 Zelensky stated that Russia was providing Iran with satellite images of US military facilities and Gulf states.

According to the Ukrainian president, only on July 19 and 20, 2026, Russian satellites observed four military bases: two in Bahrain, one in Jordan, and one in Kuwait. Zelensky claimed that these images were subsequently used by Iran in preparation and assessment of strikes.

Thus, Ukraine views the Caspian routes not as ordinary trade between Iran and Russia, but as part of a military infrastructure working against Ukraine and Western states.

July 29: Threat temporarily reduced, but not eliminated

On the morning of July 29, 2026, it became known that active diplomatic contacts had so far managed to stabilize the situation.

However, the phrase “Iran refused to strike” would be inaccurate. Tehran has not officially announced a refusal of retaliatory actions.

Iran continues to demand compensation, conducts legal procedures in connection with the attack, and retains the right to respond. Ukraine, in turn, does not renounce the right to target routes and ships that, according to its data, are used for Russian military logistics.

Therefore, the immediate threat of a missile launch may have been postponed or removed from the current agenda after the conversation on July 28, but the political cause of the confrontation has not disappeared.

For NANews — Israel News, the main conclusion is that in just four days — from July 25 to 29, 2026 — a strike on one ship almost led to the opening of a new front.

One Iranian missile on a Ukrainian Black Sea port could have been Tehran’s first direct strike on Ukrainian territory. And the further development of events would no longer depend solely on Iran’s intentions to make the attack “symbolic.”

…
Is it ‘racism’ or ‘support by Russians for all enemies of Israel’? What is beginning to reach Israeli society, while the government ‘does not notice’ it: the Dolev Cohen scandal on Kan 11 - August 22, 2026 - Новости Израиля

Video: “Know Ours” – Kirill Karetnik – from Ukraine, moved to Israel in 2009, served in the army, worked, and became a politician - August 21, 2026 - Новости Израиля

The 7th Ukrainian Air Assault Corps celebrated 3 years: Jewish chaplain Yakov Sinyakov together with Ukrainian paratroopers - August 21, 2026 - Новости Израиля

In the fourteenth part, we will analyze platforms that help small businesses in Israel work with video, audio, RSS feeds, link collections, social profiles, the open web, and additional content distribution channels. This is no longer just “another social network,” but a broader system: somewhere the business shows videos, somewhere it collects materials, somewhere it offers subscriptions, somewhere it pins a profile, and somewhere it creates an additional entry point for the audience.

For small businesses, this is especially important. A client can see the company through Google, through video, through bookmarks, through RSS, through a social feed, through a profile on a media platform, or through an external catalog. If all these points are styled consistently and lead to a clear central page, trust grows.

Nikk.Agency is engaged in website promotion, lead generation, and internet marketing in Israel. The agency works with Google Ads, Google Maps, local promotion, websites, content, landing pages, and business visibility in AI assistants.

For small businesses, this is especially important because they need not just views, but real inquiries: calls, applications, WhatsApp messages, website visits, and clients from the desired city or region. The agency’s website is available in Hebrew, Ukrainian, and Russian: Nikk.Agency — website promotion, lead generation, and internet marketing in Israel.

The example of NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News shows how different platforms can support a single project. The project is related to Israel news, Ukraine topics, Jewish communities, regional security, culture, international politics, and historical memory. But the same principle applies to small businesses: each external page should strengthen the brand, not live separately from it.

GreenCast: author’s page and additional publication channel

GreenCast is a publishing and authoring environment that can be used as an additional platform for placing materials, project profiles, and external presence. There is little open data about its large market share, so it is better to consider it not as the main promotion channel, but as an additional page in the overall digital map.

For small businesses, such platforms are useful when it is necessary to secure a brand description, provide a link to the main site, publish materials, and show that the project exists not only in one social network. This is especially important for companies that work with content, media, services, consultations, culture, or educational materials.

The author’s page GreenCast — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can work as an additional publication point for the project. For businesses, this is an example of how to expand presence not only through mass social networks but also through small external platforms.

Surf.social: open social web, RSS, and feeds from different sources

Surf.social is a tool from the open social web environment, associated with the idea of uniting different sources: RSS, blogs, profiles, videos, social publications, and thematic feeds. Its purpose is not to replace all social networks, but to gather different sources into a convenient feed.

For small businesses in Israel, this can be very useful. A company can create its own feed, add a website, RSS feed, YouTube channel, social profiles, blog publications, and external pages. As a result, the client receives not a chaotic set of links, but a more understandable stream of updates.

The profile Surf.social — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can work as part of such a system. For NAnews, this is especially logical because the project publishes materials on different platforms, and Surf helps present them as a single information feed.

Raindrop: bookmarks, collections, and a neat map of links

Raindrop is a service for saving and organizing bookmarks, links, collections, materials, and visual selections. It is used by individuals, teams, editors, marketers, designers, researchers, and businesses that need not just to save links, but to organize them by topics.

In its role, Raindrop is not a social network. It is a tool for structure. It helps gather important pages, articles, profiles, documents, videos, publications, and sources in one place. For businesses, this is especially useful if the company has many external profiles and needs to present them neatly.

For small businesses in Israel, Raindrop can become a public showcase of links: website, social networks, articles, videos, maps, reviews, partners, services, pages in different languages. Such a collection helps the client not get lost and quickly find the necessary entry.

The page Raindrop — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can work as a neat catalog of external materials for the project.

Spotify: audio, playlists, and presence in the streaming world

Spotify is one of the largest global audio platforms. It has been operating since 2008 and has become an important service for music, podcasts, playlists, audio content, and author presence. For businesses, it is not only a music platform but also another way to be visible in the audio environment.

In the market, Spotify holds one of the leading positions in global audio streaming. It is used by musicians, podcasters, brands, media, playlist authors, educational projects, and people who work with voice, sound, or audio formats.

For small businesses in Israel, Spotify can be useful if there are podcasts, audio reviews, collections, music projects, event recordings, audio versions of materials, or branded playlists. For example, a cafe can create playlists for atmosphere, an educational project — audio lessons, media — podcasts, and an agency — short explanations for clients.

The profile Spotify — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can be an additional audio point for the project.

Dailymotion: video hosting and additional video archive

Dailymotion is a video platform launched in 2005. It has become one of the older international video hosting services and is still used for placing videos, news, entertainment content, sports clips, media materials, and video archives.

In the mass market, Dailymotion does not compete with YouTube in scale, but it maintains its niche as an alternative video hosting. It is used by media, brands, authors, video projects, and companies that need an additional video placement channel.

For small businesses in Israel, Dailymotion can be useful as a backup or additional video archive. If a company is already shooting videos for YouTube, Facebook, TikTok, or a website, some materials can be adapted for other video platforms. This increases the lifespan of the content and expands the digital footprint.

The profile Dailymotion — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can work as an additional video page for the project.

Nicovideo: Japanese video environment and international presence

Nicovideo, also known as Nico Nico Douga, is a Japanese video platform operating since 2006. It is known for its culture of comments, fan communities, music, anime, games, streams, and user content.

In global reach, Nicovideo does not replace YouTube or TikTok, but it has strong cultural significance in the Japanese internet environment. For international projects, it can be an interesting additional point, especially if there are videos, cultural materials, music, media, or an audience interested in Japanese digital platforms.

For small businesses in Israel, Nicovideo is not suitable for everyone. But if the business is related to culture, video, creativity, international projects, anime, music, education, or media, such a platform can expand presence beyond familiar Western platforms.

The profile Nicovideo — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can be used as an additional international video point for the project.

Trovo Live: live broadcasts and working with a live audience

Trovo Live is a platform for live broadcasts, especially known in the gaming and streaming environment. In format, it is closer to Twitch: broadcasts, channels, subscribers, chats, donations, reactions, and live communication.

In market share, Trovo Live is significantly smaller than Twitch, YouTube Live, or TikTok Live. But it can be considered a niche platform for additional broadcasts, especially if live broadcasts, discussions, events, gaming or youth communities are important to the project.

For small businesses in Israel, Trovo Live may not be useful for everyone. But if there is a format of live communication — consultations, analyses, events, lectures, creative broadcasts, gaming activities, educational broadcasts, or presentations — such a platform can become an additional contact channel.

Trovo Live — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can be considered as a direction for future video presence if an active channel is created and designed.

FC2 Video: Japanese video platform and additional archive

FC2 Video is a video service in the FC2 ecosystem, a Japanese internet platform with various services for blogs, videos, hosting, and user content. FC2 Video can be used for placing videos and creating additional video presence.

In global scale, FC2 Video does not compete with YouTube or Dailymotion, but it has its niche, especially in the Japanese and international user environment. For a project that wants to have a wide map of video profiles, such a platform can be an additional archival channel.

For small businesses, this can be useful if there are already video materials and the task is to expand their availability. It is not worth building the main strategy around FC2 Video, but as an additional platform, it can strengthen the overall digital footprint.

The profile FC2 Video — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can be another video point for the project.

VHSky: video channels and presence in an alternative media environment

VHSky is a video platform with channels and user videos. There is little open data about its large market share, so it is better to consider it as a niche additional channel, rather than a replacement for YouTube, Vimeo, or Dailymotion.

For small businesses, such platforms are useful as a backup video archive. If a company shoots videos, interviews, explanations, announcements, or event fragments, they can be placed not only on one platform. This helps preserve content and increases the number of points where the brand can be found.

It is important not to turn such channels into empty pages. Even if the video platform is small, there should be a name, description, link to the main site, and a clear theme.

The channel VHSky — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can work as an additional video archive for the project.

Clip Place: short videos and additional content showcase

Clip Place is a video platform for channels and short visual materials. It can be used as an additional place for publishing videos, fragments, announcements, short explanations, and video covers.

In scale, Clip Place is not a competitor to YouTube or TikTok. But in a strategy of broad presence, such a platform can perform an auxiliary function: store videos, provide an additional brand page, support the project’s link map, and create another entry for the audience.

For small businesses in Israel, this is useful if the content is already created. One video can be used on several platforms: full format — on YouTube or Dailymotion, short version — on TikTok or Shorts, additional copy — on a niche video platform.

The page Clip Place — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can be one of such additional video showcases for the project.

Bark.video: video channels and distribution of visual materials

Bark.video is another video platform with the ability to place channels and video materials. There is little open data about its large market share, so it is better to consider it as an additional niche platform.

For businesses, such platforms make sense if video is already part of the content system. If a company does not shoot anything, opening many video channels is pointless. But if there are videos, explanations, posters, event recordings, interviews, or short visual fragments, they can be distributed across different platforms.

This approach helps not to depend on one video service and creates more points of presence in search. The main thing is that all pages are linked to the main site and a unified brand description.

The channel Bark.video — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can work as an additional video page for the project.

How to gather all this into a coherent system

The main mistake of small businesses is to open accounts and do nothing with them. If a company has GreenCast, Surf.social, Raindrop, Spotify, Dailymotion, Nicovideo, FC2 Video, VHSky, Clip Place, and Bark.video, but nowhere has a proper description, link to the site, and clear logic, the client will not see the benefit.

Each platform should have its own task. GreenCast — publication point. Surf.social — open feed and RSS. Raindrop — link map. Spotify — audio and playlists. Dailymotion, Nicovideo, FC2 Video, VHSky, Clip Place, and Bark.video — video archives and additional channels. Trovo Live — live broadcasts and live communication.

For small businesses in Israel, this is especially important because the audience is multilingual and makes decisions quickly. One client wants to watch a video, another — subscribe to updates, a third — open a link collection, a fourth — find a profile, a fifth — check the main site.

Why this is important specifically for Israel

The Israeli market is practical and fast. A client can watch a video, open a profile, check a site, view a link map, and write on WhatsApp in a few minutes. If everything looks connected, neat, and understandable, trust grows.

External platforms should not replace the main site. They should lead to it, strengthen it, and help a person see the brand in different formats: text, video, audio, RSS, collections, live broadcast, profile, archive.

The example of NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News shows that even different platforms can work as parts of one system. A reader can find the project through Surf.social, Raindrop, Spotify, Dailymotion, Nicovideo, FC2 Video, VHSky, Clip Place, or Bark.video, but everywhere should understand: this is one project about Israel, Ukraine, Jewish communities, regional security, culture, and historical memory.

Who can help with such promotion in Israel

Such services in Israel are provided by the partner agency of the project NAnews and sTDe | NAnews — Israel event poster.

Nikk.Agency is engaged in website promotion, lead generation, and internet marketing in Israel. The agency works with Google Ads, Google Maps, local promotion, websites, content, landing pages, and business visibility in AI assistants.

For small businesses, this is especially important because they need not just views, but real inquiries: calls, applications, WhatsApp messages, website visits, and clients from the desired city or region. The agency’s website is available in Hebrew, Ukrainian, and Russian: Nikk.Agency — website promotion, lead generation, and internet marketing in Israel.

Conclusion of the fourteenth part: GreenCast, Surf.social, Raindrop, Spotify, Dailymotion, Nicovideo, Trovo Live, FC2 Video, VHSky, Clip Place, and Bark.video help small businesses in Israel expand their presence through publications, RSS, bookmarks, audio, video, and live broadcasts. This is not a replacement for the main site, but an additional trust system that makes the brand more noticeable, understandable, and closer to the client.

…
Is it ‘racism’ or ‘support by Russians for all enemies of Israel’? What is beginning to reach Israeli society, while the government ‘does not notice’ it: the Dolev Cohen scandal on Kan 11 - August 22, 2026 - Новости Израиля

Video: “Know Ours” – Kirill Karetnik – from Ukraine, moved to Israel in 2009, served in the army, worked, and became a politician - August 21, 2026 - Новости Израиля

The 7th Ukrainian Air Assault Corps celebrated 3 years: Jewish chaplain Yakov Sinyakov together with Ukrainian paratroopers - August 21, 2026 - Новости Израиля

Ukrainian strikes on ships and Russian military facilities in the Caspian Sea may prove to be a significantly more important event than the destruction of several individual targets. For the first time, Ukraine has delivered a direct strike on a route that connects the military and economic systems of Russia and Iran, and Tehran has officially announced the death of its citizen and threatened Kyiv with consequences.

The incident shows that Russia’s war against Ukraine and Iran’s confrontation with Israel and the United States can no longer be viewed as completely separate crises. The same states exchange weapons, technologies, intelligence data, and combat experience. Now the confrontation has gone beyond indirect support: Ukraine and Iran have become participants in direct military escalation in the Caspian Sea.

What happened in the Caspian Sea

On July 25, 2026, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced successful long-range strikes on Russian targets in the Caspian Sea area. According to him, Ukrainian forces hit ships used to transport military cargo related to Iran, as well as a Russian warship.

The Security Service of Ukraine announced an attack on a Russian missile boat of the Molniya project, cargo ships Port Olya 2 and Begey, a radar station, the Filanovsky oil platform, the Tor-M2 air defense system, and drone warehouses.

The Ukrainian side claims that Port Olya 2 and Begey were under international sanctions and were involved in transporting military cargo between Iran and Russia. There is no independent confirmation of the full list of affected targets and the damage inflicted on them yet.

Tehran presented its own version of the events. The Iranian Foreign Ministry stated that the Ukrainian attack was directed against an Iranian commercial vessel. As a result of the explosion, one crew member was killed, and another was injured.

The temporary chargé d’affaires of Ukraine was summoned to the Iranian Foreign Ministry. There, the incident was called a “hostile and criminal act,” and it was stated that Iran reserves the right to defend its national interests and respond to Kyiv’s actions.

Thus, the confirmed elements of the story are the strike itself, the death of the Iranian sailor, Tehran’s diplomatic protest, and Ukraine’s statements about the defeat of Russian-Iranian logistics. At the same time, the status of the specific Iranian vessel and the nature of its cargo remain disputed: Iran speaks of civilian shipping, Ukraine of a military supply chain.

Why the Caspian is so important for Russia and Iran

The Caspian Sea has long been perceived by Moscow and Tehran as a relatively safe internal space. It is not directly connected to ocean routes controlled by Western naval forces, and most of its coastline belongs to states not participating in the sanctions blockade of Russia and Iran.

Iranian ports in the southern Caspian Sea are connected by sea routes to the Russian ports of Astrakhan and Olya. From there, cargo can be sent via the Volga, railways, and roads to central regions of Russia.

Through this corridor, the following can potentially be transported:

• drones and components for them;
• ammunition and missile components;
• electronics and dual-use goods;
• equipment for the defense industry;
• oil and other sanctioned goods.

The northern route becomes especially significant when Iran faces military pressure in the Persian Gulf, and movement through the Strait of Hormuz becomes dangerous and unstable. In such a situation, the Caspian becomes not just a trade route for Tehran but a strategic reserve artery connecting Iran with Russia and Eurasia.

The Wall Street Journal characterized the Ukrainian operation as a strike on the supply line between Iran and Russia and as a point where two wars converged in the Caspian Sea.

Why Tehran reacted so sharply

The death of an Iranian sailor could itself provoke a diplomatic protest. However, the harshness of Tehran’s statements is likely explained by a more serious concern: Ukraine has shown that the Caspian Sea can no longer be considered a guaranteed safe rear.

One strike cannot completely block trade between Russia and Iran. But regular attacks can create a constant risk for ships, terminals, oil platforms, and port infrastructure.

Russia will have to strengthen air defense over a vast territory, redeploy air defense systems from other directions, change ship movement schedules, and complicate transportation. Insurance and logistics costs will rise, and secret military cargo will be harder to disguise as ordinary trade.

Thus, Ukraine creates a problem not only by physically destroying cargo. It undermines the very sense of security of the route.

For Iran, this is especially painful. Tehran supported the Russian military machine, expecting that Ukraine’s retaliatory actions would remain limited to its territory and Russian targets. Now it becomes clear: participation in supplying Russia can lead to strikes directly on Iranian interests and communications related to Iran.

Russia and Iran are no longer fighting separately

Cooperation between Moscow and Tehran has long gone beyond ordinary diplomatic relations. Russia widely uses drones and technologies of Iranian origin against Ukraine. At the same time, Russian specialists gain practical experience using these systems and improve them.

Iran, in turn, is interested in Russian military technologies, electronic warfare means, aviation, intelligence information, and political support.

Volodymyr Zelensky also stated that Russia was providing Iran with satellite data on American and regional military facilities in the Middle East. According to the Ukrainian president, since early July, Russian satellites have been monitoring the states of the Persian Gulf and the American bases located there. He mentioned airbases in Bahrain, Jordan, and Kuwait.

Public evidence of such a transfer has not yet been presented by Kyiv. However, the statement itself shows how Ukraine describes what is happening: not as two parallel wars, but as a single Russian-Iranian system in which Moscow helps Tehran in the Middle East, and Iran supports Russian aggression against Ukraine.

The second step towards a world war

The Financial Times views the events in the Caspian Sea as another stage in the escalation of regional wars into a global confrontation.

The first such step, the publication calls the direct involvement of North Korean military personnel in Russia’s war against Ukraine. Soldiers from the East Asian state have become involved in the European war on Moscow’s side.

The second step is the direct confrontation between Ukraine and Iran. Before this, Tehran helped Russia with weapons and technologies but formally did not fight against Ukraine. After the strike on the ship and the death of an Iranian citizen, the situation changed: Iran officially calls Kyiv’s actions hostile and promises to respond.

This does not yet mean that World War III has already begun. There is still no general officially declared military confrontation between the major powers. Russia, Iran, China, and North Korea have also not created a formal military alliance comparable to NATO.

But a system of interconnected fronts, in which the same states operate, is becoming increasingly apparent.

The formation of an “axis of adversaries”

In American political and analytical circles, the concept of an “axis of adversaries” is increasingly used. It includes Russia, Iran, China, and North Korea.

These countries do not have a unified command, a common army, or an obligation to automatically enter the war for each other. However, they consistently help partners resist the US and its allies.

Each of these states has its own goals. Russia seeks to destroy Ukraine’s independence and restore its influence over former Soviet territories. Iran aims to oust the US from the Middle East and undermine Israel’s security. North Korea seeks military advantage over South Korea. China increases pressure on Taiwan and aims to change the balance of power in Asia.

But they share a common interest — weakening the US and the Western-created system of international alliances.

The Financial Times notes that the wars in Ukraine and Iran are already beginning to be perceived not as separate regional clashes but as parts of a broader confrontation.

China remains behind the line of direct confrontation

China is the strongest but at the same time the most cautious participant in the emerging system.

Beijing has not directly entered either Russia’s war against Ukraine or Iran’s war against the US and Israel. However, China’s economy, industry, and technological base help Russia and Iran recover losses and circumvent restrictions.

Russia receives electronics, industrial equipment, machinery, and dual-use goods from China. Iran uses Chinese components and navigation technologies to develop its missile and drone systems.

At the same time, China continues military pressure around Taiwan. If Beijing decides on a blockade or military operation, it could become the next and most dangerous stage of the globalization of current wars.

The US may then be forced to simultaneously support Ukraine in Europe, Israel and its partners in the Middle East, as well as Taiwan and regional allies in Asia.

This scenario could turn the system of interconnected regional conflicts into a full-fledged global confrontation.

Why Ukraine is expanding the front

For Ukraine, the strike on the Caspian has several levels of significance.

The first is immediate military. If the ships were indeed transporting weapons or components for the Russian military-industrial complex, their destruction reduces Moscow’s ability to strike Ukrainian cities.

The second is strategic. Ukraine shows that it can hit Russian targets at a great distance and create a threat to previously safe routes.

The third is diplomatic. Kyiv emphasizes that Russia and Iran are acting together, and therefore the defense of Ukraine is linked to the security of Israel, the US, the Persian Gulf states, and Europe.

Ukrainian actions in the Caspian Sea objectively coincide with the interests of states seeking to weaken Iran and limit its ability to circumvent sanctions. However, this does not prove the existence of a joint or secret operation by Ukraine, Israel, and the US.

A more cautious formulation is that Kyiv independently uses the coincidence of strategic interests and tries to show Washington: Ukraine can damage not only Russia but the entire Russian-Iranian military system.

The main weakness of the West

Russia, Iran, China, and North Korea are not ideal allies. There are disagreements, competition, and mutual distrust between them. But they consistently help each other where it weakens their common adversaries.

The Western camp faces the opposite problem. The US, Europe, Ukraine, Israel, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan have much greater combined economic and technological resources, but they often view each threat separately.

For part of Europe, Russia’s war remains exclusively a Ukrainian problem. Iran is perceived as a problem for Israel and the Persian Gulf states. Taiwan is considered a distant Asian issue. The threat of North Korea is a regional problem of the Korean Peninsula.

But the opposite side is already connecting these directions:

• Iranian drones attack Ukraine;
• North Korean military personnel help Russia;
• Russian combat experience and possibly intelligence data are used by Iran;
• Chinese components support Russian and Iranian production;
• Ukraine strikes Russian-Iranian communications in the Caspian Sea.

While democratic states discuss each war separately, authoritarian regimes create a common infrastructure of mutual support.

What might happen next

The further development of events will depend on Iran’s reaction.

Tehran may limit itself to diplomatic threats, as opening a new front against Ukraine will require additional resources and increase pressure on Iran itself.

But other scenarios are possible:

1. Iran may increase arms supplies to Russia.
2. Iranian intelligence services may attempt operations against Ukrainian interests outside Ukraine.
3. Russia and Iran may strengthen the protection of Caspian routes.
4. Moscow may more actively assist Tehran with intelligence data and technologies.
5. Ukraine may continue strikes on ships, ports, and infrastructure related to military transportation.

The most dangerous scenario is the formation of a sustainable cycle of retaliatory attacks, in which Ukraine will expand operations against Russian-Iranian logistics, and Tehran will begin to officially participate in actions against Kyiv.

Then Russia’s war against Ukraine will finally go beyond the European theater.

Not World War III — but no longer separate wars

It is premature to talk about the start of World War III. The US and China have not entered into direct military confrontation, Russia tries to avoid open war with NATO, and Iran, despite threats, has not yet declared itself a participant in Russian aggression against Ukraine.

But signs of globalization of the confrontation are already evident.

Wars are connected through weapons, people, technologies, satellite reconnaissance, supply routes, and sanctioned trade. Each new boundary becomes less distinct.

The Caspian strike showed that even a closed sea between Russia and Iran is no longer an isolated space. Ukraine has brought the fight to where Moscow receives resources to continue its aggression.

Conclusion for NANews

The Ukrainian operation in the Caspian Sea was a warning not only to Russia and Iran. It showed the whole world that the era of isolated regional wars is ending.

Russia, Iran, North Korea, and China already act as an interconnected system — albeit without an official alliance and common command. They exchange weapons, technologies, resources, and experience, simultaneously creating pressure on Ukraine, Israel, the US, Europe, South Korea, and Taiwan.

In response, Western states and their allies must stop treating Russian aggression, Iranian terrorism, and Chinese pressure as separate problems.

Ukraine is not only defending its own territory. By destroying Russian-Iranian military logistics, it strikes at a system that simultaneously threatens Europe, Israel, and American interests in the Middle East.

For NANews — Israel News it is fundamentally important to emphasize: supporting Ukraine and countering Iran are not two different directions of foreign policy. These are parts of one struggle against the emerging axis of states that help each other wage wars, circumvent sanctions, and deplete the resources of the democratic world.

The strike in the Caspian Sea has not yet become the start of a world war. But it has become one of the clearest pieces of evidence that the Russian war against Ukraine and the Middle Eastern confrontation are already beginning to merge into a single global front.

…
Is it ‘racism’ or ‘support by Russians for all enemies of Israel’? What is beginning to reach Israeli society, while the government ‘does not notice’ it: the Dolev Cohen scandal on Kan 11 - August 22, 2026 - Новости Израиля

Video: “Know Ours” – Kirill Karetnik – from Ukraine, moved to Israel in 2009, served in the army, worked, and became a politician - August 21, 2026 - Новости Израиля

The 7th Ukrainian Air Assault Corps celebrated 3 years: Jewish chaplain Yakov Sinyakov together with Ukrainian paratroopers - August 21, 2026 - Новости Израиля

A large-scale fire occurred in the religious and pilgrimage complex near the burial site of Rabbi Shneur Zalman of Liadi — the Alter Rebbe, founder of the Chabad-Lubavitch Hasidic movement and author of the book “Tanya,” in the city of Hadiach, Poltava region.

The fire started on Friday, July 24, 2026, at 11:36 PM, just a few dozen minutes before midnight. The fire engulfed the central building of the complex, which housed the main synagogue, kitchen, dining rooms, and accommodations for pilgrims. The fire continued into the night of Saturday, July 25, which according to the Jewish calendar corresponded to 11 Av 5786.

According to preliminary estimates by Chabad representatives, the material damage could amount to millions of dollars. This is not yet the final amount confirmed by a state examination, but the first estimate by the complex administration after inspecting the damage.

Previously we wrote:

Where did Ukraine get ≈17 million dollars for the repair of the “road to the grave of Shneur Zalman of Liadi (founder of Chabad)”: what is written in Israel and what documents show in Ukraine.

A “Cohen Bridge” was built in Ukraine for $1,000,000: in Hadiach, the Chabad shrine was made accessible to the descendants of ancient priests — what is it and for what purpose?

The central building is almost destroyed

The main building of the pilgrimage complex, also known as “Rabbeinu HaGadol” and the “Admor HaZaken” center, suffered the most serious damage.

The central part of the complex was almost completely destroyed by fire. The main synagogue burned down, significant damage was done to the professional kitchen, dining rooms, and facilities intended for accommodating and serving guests.

The fire destroyed the synagogue and heavily damaged the kitchen and guest infrastructure. Published footage after the fire shows that the roof of the central building collapsed, and the interior was burned out.

Official Ukrainian reports still use more cautious wording. According to the Main Directorate of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine in the Poltava region, the roof and walls of the religious organization’s building were seriously damaged. This difference in descriptions is explained by the fact that rescuers published operational information, while community representatives were later able to assess the condition of the interior.

People evacuated themselves and saved valuables

People who were in the synagogue at the time the fire started left the building on their own before the fire completely engulfed the central premises.

Some of them, along with local staff, managed to carry out religious valuables. Chabad representatives reported that several Torah scrolls were saved. The exact number of scrolls, books, and other items carried out has not yet been publicly disclosed.

According to available information, there are no dead or injured. Rabbi Shneur Zalman Deutsch, representing Chabad in Hadiach and responsible for the complex’s operations, as well as his wife and children, are safe. Ynet clarifies that the rabbi himself was not in the city at the time of the fire.

NANews — Israel News notes that the absence of casualties was the main positive outcome of the incident, considering the speed of the fire’s spread and the scale of the destruction of the central building.

What is known about the cause of the fire

A preliminary version is being considered that the fire could have started due to a short circuit or other electrical network malfunction.

However, the official cause of the fire has not yet been established. Specialists continue to inspect the damaged premises, and the investigation is considering all possible versions.

At the time of preparing the material, Ukrainian law enforcement agencies and the SES had not published a final expert conclusion. There is also no confirmed data on arson, anti-Semitic attack, or the impact of a Russian munition.

Therefore, claims of deliberate destruction of the complex or military attack currently have no official confirmation. The main working version remains a technical malfunction, but final conclusions should be made by fire-technical experts.

The available reports also do not yet specify the exact number of firefighters, the number of equipment units, and the time of complete fire extinguishment. It is known that eyewitnesses called rescuers shortly after the fire was discovered, and by July 25 the fire was extinguished.

Was the grave of the Alter Rebbe affected

It is necessary to clarify separately that the fire occurred in the central prayer and guest building located near the burial site of Rabbi Shneur Zalman.

In the published official and community reports, there is no information yet that the fire damaged the ohel itself — the structure directly above the grave of the Alter Rebbe. There is also no confirmation of the destruction of the burial itself.

Therefore, statements that the “grave of the founder of Chabad” burned in Hadiach are inaccurate. The destruction of the main synagogue and serious damage to the infrastructure of the pilgrimage complex near the grave has been confirmed.

What was in the complex

The Jewish religious community “Alter Rebbe” and the center of Hasidism “Admor HaZaken” are located on the outskirts of Hadiach, in the Poltava region. The complex was built with funds from benefactors and patrons from different countries around the world.

Before the fire, it housed:

• a large central synagogue;
• a library of religious literature;
• a mikvah;
• a professional kitchen;
• spacious dining rooms;
• dozens of rooms for pilgrims;
• separate residential and auxiliary buildings;
• premises for prayers, classes, and commemorative events.

The Federation of Jewish Communities of Ukraine indicates that the main task of the center was to provide thousands of pilgrims with housing, food, and everything necessary during their visit to the ohel of the Alter Rebbe.

The construction of the modern complex began almost two decades ago. The main building was completed in 2013, during events dedicated to the 200th anniversary of the passing of the Alter Rebbe. After that, the center continued to expand and develop.

Rabbi Shneur Deutsch manages the complex throughout the year, receives pilgrims, and provides assistance to Jewish communities in the Poltava region, where hundreds of Jews live.

Why Hadiach holds special significance for Jews

Shneur Zalman of Liadi, known as the Alter Rebbe and Baal HaTanya, was born in 1745 in Liozna, in present-day Belarus. He became the founder of the intellectual direction of Chabad Hasidism and wrote “Tanya” — one of the most important books in the Chabad tradition.

In 1812, during the war of the Russian Empire with Napoleon, the Alter Rebbe left Liadi. During the journey, he fell ill and died on December 26, 1812. His body was brought to Hadiach, Poltava province, where he was buried in the local Jewish cemetery.

Over subsequent generations, the grave of the Alter Rebbe remained a place of prayer and pilgrimage.

During the Holocaust, the Jewish community of Hadiach was almost completely destroyed. In the Soviet period, believers’ access to religious sites was severely restricted.

In the late 1980s, by order of the Lubavitcher Rebbe Menachem Mendel Schneerson, special emissaries began visiting and restoring the burial sites of Chabad leaders in the Soviet Union. In 1987–1990, Rabbi David Nachshon participated in these works, in particular.

After the collapse of the USSR, the area near the grave of the Alter Rebbe began to turn into a major international religious center.

About 10,000 visitors annually even during the war

Before the full-scale Russian aggression, the complex in Hadiach was visited annually by tens of thousands of people.

Even during the war, about 10,000 pilgrims a year continue to visit the grave of the Alter Rebbe. About a third of them visit Hadiach in connection with the yahrzeit of the Alter Rebbe — the anniversary of his passing, observed on 24 Tevet, usually in December or January.

At other times, organized groups of Ukrainian Jews, community representatives from different regions of Ukraine, as well as pilgrims from Israel, Europe, and the United States, arrive in Hadiach.

Due to the closure of Ukrainian airspace, many foreign visitors fly to Chisinau and then continue their journey to Hadiach by car. Such a trip can take from 12 to 15 hours.

Israeli sources call the complex near the grave of the Alter Rebbe the second largest place of Jewish pilgrimage and prayer in Ukraine after Uman.

The complex is planned to be restored

Rabbi Shneur Deutsch stated that the complex’s staff is in shock. According to him, the central building, into which years of work were invested, has practically turned to ashes.

Despite the scale of the destruction, the rabbi confirmed the intention to fully restore the complex. He acknowledged that the work would require significant resources and time but expressed confidence that Jewish communities and Chabad followers worldwide would join in the restoration.

The chairman of the Federation of Jewish Communities of Ukraine, Rabbi Meir Stambler, reported that the organization is awaiting the final results of the investigation and is maintaining contact with Ukrainian authorities.

The Federation is preparing to provide new religious books, sacred texts, and items necessary for restoring the complex’s prayer life. The final amount of damage, reconstruction budget, and start dates for construction work have not yet been announced.

There has already been a fire in the Jewish center in Hadiach

The current incident is not the first fire on the territory of the Jewish religious center in Hadiach.

On March 21, 2017, an auxiliary room of the Charitable Cultural and Religious Center, owned by the Federation of Jewish Religious Communities of Ukraine, caught fire.

At that time, firefighters extinguished the fire in about 40 minutes and managed to save the main building. The fire destroyed about 60 square meters of foam. The main version was a spark from welding work hitting the insulation.

The 2026 fire turned out to be incomparably more destructive: the main synagogue was destroyed, the central building almost completely burned out, and the damage is preliminarily estimated at millions of dollars.

What questions remain unanswered

The investigation and the complex’s management still need to establish:

• the exact technical cause of the fire;
• the final amount of material damage;
• a complete list of destroyed religious books and items;
• the condition of individual structures near the grave;
• the scope of work required for reconstruction;
• the timeline for restoring the synagogue, kitchen, and guest facilities.

NANews — Israel News will continue to monitor the situation. At the moment, the main confirmed fact is that in one of the largest fires in the complex’s history, no one died or was injured, and pilgrims and staff managed to save several Torah scrolls.

However, restoring one of Chabad’s most important centers in Ukraine will require significant international support and will likely take a considerable amount of time.

…
Is it ‘racism’ or ‘support by Russians for all enemies of Israel’? What is beginning to reach Israeli society, while the government ‘does not notice’ it: the Dolev Cohen scandal on Kan 11 - August 22, 2026 - Новости Израиля

Video: “Know Ours” – Kirill Karetnik – from Ukraine, moved to Israel in 2009, served in the army, worked, and became a politician - August 21, 2026 - Новости Израиля

The 7th Ukrainian Air Assault Corps celebrated 3 years: Jewish chaplain Yakov Sinyakov together with Ukrainian paratroopers - August 21, 2026 - Новости Израиля

Ukrainian long-range strikes have for the first time so clearly linked Russia’s war against Ukraine with the confrontation around Iran and American military facilities in the Middle East. Kyiv reported an attack on a Russian warship and vessels used to transport Iran-related military cargo in the Caspian Sea. Almost simultaneously, Tehran announced that an Iranian commercial vessel was damaged, one crew member was killed, and another was injured.

Against this backdrop, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced Ukrainian intelligence data indicating that Russia is conducting satellite surveillance of American military facilities and Gulf countries, after which the relevant images are transmitted to Iran for preparation and adjustment of strikes.

The events show that Russian-Iranian military cooperation is no longer limited to the supply of Shahed drones for strikes on Ukraine. According to Kyiv, Moscow is now helping Tehran with reconnaissance information in the Middle East, and Ukraine, in turn, has begun striking sea routes linking Russia and Iran.

What happened in the Caspian Sea on July 25, 2026

On Saturday, July 25, 2026, Volodymyr Zelensky reported on successful operations by Ukrainian forces in the Caspian region.

According to him, vessels used to transport military cargo related to Iran, as well as a Russian warship, were hit. The President of Ukraine did not disclose all operational details but hinted that this is a continuation of Ukraine’s strategy of so-called ‘long-range sanctions’ — strikes on facilities serving the Russian military industry, energy exports, and international military logistics.

Ukrainian sources also reported attacks on two Russian vessels — ‘Port Olya-2’ and ‘Begey’. Kyiv claims these ships were involved in transporting military cargo along the Caspian route between Russia and Iran.

In addition, there were reports of a strike on Russian oil and gas infrastructure in the Caspian Sea, including the Vladimir Filanovsky field platform operated by Lukoil. Previously, Ukraine had already struck Caspian oil facilities, viewing oil and gas export revenues as one of the sources of financing Russian aggression.

As of the time of publication, Russia has not provided a detailed official report on the consequences of the attacks and has not confirmed the Ukrainian version regarding the nature of the cargo on the ships.

Iran announced an attack on its commercial vessel

The Iranian Foreign Ministry reported that early in the morning of July 25, 2026, a Ukrainian attack led to an explosion on board an Iranian commercial vessel in the Caspian Sea.

According to Tehran’s official statement:

• one crew member was killed;
• another person was injured;
• the vessel was damaged as a result of the explosion;
• Iran attributed responsibility for the attack to Ukraine.

The Iranian foreign ministry called the incident a ‘hostile and criminal act’ and also stated that it violated Article 2, Paragraph 4 of the UN Charter, which prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of states.

Tehran claims that the strike could ‘further ignite and expand the flames of war’ and declared the right to defend its national interests and security. The Ukrainian chargé d’affaires was summoned to the Iranian Foreign Ministry, where an official protest was delivered.

However, Iran did not name the vessel allegedly damaged, did not disclose the nature of the cargo being transported, and did not report the exact location of the incident.

It is unclear whether it is the same ship

There remains a significant discrepancy between the statements of Ukraine and Iran.

Kyiv speaks of strikes on Russian ships and a Russian warship involved in transporting Iran-related military cargo. Tehran, in turn, claims that an Iranian commercial vessel was attacked.

It has not yet been independently established:

• whether the damaged Iranian vessel was one of the targets named by Ukraine;
• whether there were several separate attacks;
• under which flag the ship was sailing;
• who owned it;
• what cargo it was carrying;
• whether there was military equipment on board;
• where exactly the explosion occurred;
• what means of attack Ukraine used.

Therefore, claims about the ownership of the vessel and the nature of the cargo should be considered as statements by the parties, rather than a fully confirmed picture of the incident.

Why the Caspian route is so important for Russia and Iran

The Caspian Sea has become one of the key transport corridors between Russia and Iran. This route allows cargo to be transported directly between the ports of the two states, bypassing sea routes controlled by Western countries.

The Russian port of Olya in the Astrakhan region is of particular importance. Part of the cargo heading from Iran to Russia and back can pass through it.

Ukraine believes that this route is used to transport:

• drone components;
• ammunition;
• military systems and parts;
• dual-use equipment;
• components for weapons production;
• other cargo related to Russian-Iranian military cooperation.

On December 12, 2025, Ukraine reported a strike on two Russian ships, which, according to Kyiv, were transporting military equipment in the Caspian Sea. At that time, the first Ukrainian strike on a Russian oil platform in the region was also reported.

In March 2026, the Caspian Sea had already become the scene of attacks on cargo traveling between Russia and Iran. It was reported that Russia was trying to avoid open air deliveries to Iran and was increasingly using the sea corridor.

Zelensky announced the transfer of Russian satellite data to Iran

On the same day, July 25, 2026, Volodymyr Zelensky reported on another aspect of Russian-Iranian interaction.

According to him, Ukrainian intelligence has established that Russia is transferring satellite images of Gulf states and American military facilities in the Middle East to Iran.

‘Since the beginning of July, we have been recording active Russian satellite surveillance of Gulf states and American military facilities located there. These images then end up with Iran,’ Zelensky said.

The President of Ukraine claims that there is a clear connection between Russian surveillance and subsequent Iranian attacks. This involves both photographing objects before strikes, which can help in target selection and guidance, and post-attack observation to assess the damage caused.

According to Zelensky, on July 19 and 20, 2026, Russian satellites monitored at least four airbases:

• two facilities in Bahrain;
• one airbase in Jordan;
• one airbase in Kuwait.

Zelensky stated that the relevant data would be passed on to the United States and other partners of Ukraine.

Why satellite reconnaissance can be crucial

Satellite images allow tracking the location of aircraft, air defense systems, warehouses, runways, temporary structures, and other military infrastructure.

Regular imaging of the same object can show:

• aircraft movement;
• changes in base operations;
• deployment of air defense systems;
• the appearance of new warehouses or equipment;
• preparation for a military operation;
• the consequences of a missile or drone strike.

Transferring such information to Iran, if Ukrainian data is confirmed, could mean direct reconnaissance assistance to Tehran from Russia.

However, Ukraine has not yet presented public evidence that can be independently examined. Zelensky refers to intelligence information that Kyiv intends to pass on to partners.

How the US reacts to Kyiv’s statements

According to American media, US intelligence agencies are studying the issue of possible Russian assistance to Iran in preparing strikes on American facilities in the region.

Particular attention was drawn to the accuracy of some Iranian attacks. Washington is checking whether Tehran could have received:

• satellite images;
• target coordinates;
• electronic intelligence data;
• information for strike adjustments;
• assistance in assessing the consequences of attacks.

However, as of the time of publication, US authorities have not publicly confirmed that Russia indeed provided Iran with specific data for strikes.

US President Donald Trump previously stated that he sees no evidence of direct Russian or Chinese involvement in Iranian operations. According to him, the leadership of both countries assured Washington of their non-involvement.

Thus, the positions of Kyiv and the White House currently differ. Ukraine speaks of systematic Russian reconnaissance assistance, while the American administration has not publicly confirmed the existence of conclusive evidence.

Ukraine offers the Middle East experience in combating Iranian drones

Kyiv links its confrontation with Iran to the long-term use of Shahed drones by Russia against Ukrainian cities.

Iran has long denied supplying drones to Russia for the war against Ukraine. Later, Tehran acknowledged the transfer of a limited number of drones but claimed it happened before the start of the full-scale Russian invasion.

Ukraine and Western countries believe that Iran provided Russia not only with ready-made drones but also with technologies, components, and production solutions that allowed Moscow to launch serial production of Shahed analogs called ‘Geran’.

After several years of repelling massive attacks, Ukraine has accumulated significant experience in detecting and intercepting Iranian drones.

Zelensky previously stated that 11 Middle Eastern countries had approached Ukraine for consultations and assistance in countering Iranian drones.

Kyiv declared its readiness to provide:

• Ukrainian interceptor drones;
• air defense specialists;
• instructors;
• detection systems;
• electronic warfare technologies;
• practical experience in protecting cities and military facilities.

According to media reports, Ukrainian specialists could participate in the protection of American infrastructure in Jordan. However, Donald Trump later stated that American military personnel do not need Ukrainian assistance in this area.

An Iranian parliamentarian previously called Ukraine a ‘legitimate target’

Tensions between Kyiv and Tehran did not arise on July 25. On March 15, 2026, the chairman of the Iranian parliament’s national security and foreign policy commission, Ebrahim Azizi, made threats against Ukraine.

He stated that Ukraine allegedly helps Israel with the use of drones and thus ‘actually participates in the war.’

‘By supporting the Israeli regime with drones, the failing Ukraine is actually participating in the war. According to Article 51 of the UN Charter, its entire territory has become a legitimate target for Iran,’ Azizi wrote.

This statement was made more than four months before the attack in the Caspian Sea and was related to reports of possible Ukrainian assistance to Israel and the US in combating Iranian drones.

Ukraine then reminded that it was Iran that supplied Russia with drones and technologies used for strikes on Ukrainian residential buildings, power plants, hospitals, and civilian infrastructure.

Does Article 51 make all of Ukraine a ‘legitimate target’

Ebrahim Azizi’s reference to Article 51 of the UN Charter does not mean that Iran gains the right to attack any point in Ukraine.

Article 51 indeed recognizes the right of states to individual or collective self-defense in the event of an armed attack. However, international humanitarian law continues to apply even during war.

It requires distinguishing:

• military and civilian objects;
• military personnel and the civilian population;
• legitimate military targets and infrastructure not involved in hostilities.

Therefore, the statement that the ‘entire territory’ of a state becomes a legitimate target does not comply with the basic principles of international law. Even the right to self-defense does not permit indiscriminate attacks and strikes on the civilian population.

Iran’s position contains an obvious contradiction

After the attack in the Caspian Sea, Iran’s Foreign Ministry again stated that the Islamic Republic allegedly does not interfere in Russia’s war against Ukraine.

However, at the same time Tehran:

• transferred drones to Russia;
• provided Shahed production technology;
• developed military cooperation with Moscow;
• threatened Ukraine with strikes;
• called Ukrainian territory a ‘legitimate target’;
• opposed Ukrainian assistance to states attacked by Iran.

NANews — Israel News notes that this position appears contradictory. Tehran demands that Iranian ships be perceived as exclusively civilian objects, yet does not disclose the nature of the cargo transported on the Russia-Iran route and denies the significance of its own involvement in supplying the Russian military machine.

Possible response from Iran

After the strike on July 25, Iranian officials and media associated with the authorities spoke about a possible response to Ukraine.

Publications in pro-government resources reminded of the range of Iranian ballistic missiles and stated that Ukrainian territory is within their reach.

Some Iranian commentators mentioned the Khorramshahr-4 missile, whose range, according to Iranian statements, can reach about two thousand kilometers. However, to strike targets over a significant part of Ukraine’s territory, Iran would need to launch missiles from its own territory or use the territory of an allied state.

Tehran has not announced an official decision to strike Ukraine. Threats in the Iranian media should still be considered as an element of political and informational pressure.

Why this story is important for Israel

For Israel, the developments have direct significance.

For several years, Ukraine has been studying Iranian drones in real combat conditions. Its specialists have information about the Shahed’s design, flight routes, control system vulnerabilities, and interception methods.

Such experience can be useful to Israel and other countries in the region in repelling attacks from Iran and related groups.

At the same time, the possible transfer of Russian satellite data to Tehran means that the military partnership between Russia and Iran could be used not only against Ukraine but also against Israel, the USA, and the Gulf states.

Russian satellites are capable of observing Israeli airbases, seaports, energy facilities, and military infrastructure. If the information is indeed being transferred to Iran, it creates an additional threat to the entire region.

Chronology of main events

December 12, 2025 — Ukraine reports strikes on Russian ships and an oil platform in the Caspian Sea.

March 15, 2026 — Ibrahim Azizi states that due to assistance to Israel, Ukraine’s territory has allegedly become a ‘legitimate target’ for Iran.

March 19, 2026 — reports emerge of an attack on a Caspian convoy transporting military cargo between Russia and Iran.

From early July 2026 — according to Zelensky, Russia is actively observing Gulf countries and American facilities via satellites.

July 19–20, 2026 — Russian satellites, according to the Ukrainian version, are monitoring four airbases in Bahrain, Jordan, and Kuwait.

Early morning of July 25 — an explosion occurs on an Iranian ship in the Caspian Sea. Iran reports the death of one sailor and the injury of another.

July 25 — Ukraine confirms strikes on a Russian warship and ships transporting Iran-related military cargo.

July 25 — Tehran summons the Ukrainian chargé d’affaires and delivers a protest.

July 25 — Zelensky reports the possible transfer of Russian satellite intelligence to Iran.

July 25–26 — Iranian officials and pro-government media discuss a possible response to Ukraine.

The Caspian Sea becomes part of a larger war

Strikes in the Caspian Sea show that Ukraine’s strategy is changing. Previously, the main targets were Russian airfields, military factories, oil refineries, and depots, but now Ukraine is consistently expanding operations to international supply routes of Russia.

The Caspian corridor is of particular importance as it connects Russia with Iran — a state that helped Moscow establish the mass use of strike drones against Ukraine.

At the same time, Russian-Iranian cooperation, according to Kyiv, goes far beyond the Ukrainian front. Russia may provide Iran with reconnaissance capabilities for actions against the USA and its allies in the Middle East.

NANews — Israel News emphasizes: it remains unknown which ship was damaged on July 25, to whom it belonged, and what cargo was on board. However, the political significance of what happened is already evident.

Ukraine has demonstrated that it considers the maritime logistics of Russia and Iran as part of military infrastructure. Tehran reported a human casualty for the first time as a result of a direct Ukrainian attack. And Zelensky’s statements about Russian satellite assistance to Iran link the war against Ukraine with a broader confrontation involving Israel, the USA, and the Gulf states.

Events in the Caspian Sea may mark the beginning of a new phase, where Russian-Iranian military routes will be subject to regular attacks, and relations between Kyiv and Tehran will finally shift from diplomatic tension to direct military confrontation.

…
Is it ‘racism’ or ‘support by Russians for all enemies of Israel’? What is beginning to reach Israeli society, while the government ‘does not notice’ it: the Dolev Cohen scandal on Kan 11 - August 22, 2026 - Новости Израиля

Video: “Know Ours” – Kirill Karetnik – from Ukraine, moved to Israel in 2009, served in the army, worked, and became a politician - August 21, 2026 - Новости Израиля

The 7th Ukrainian Air Assault Corps celebrated 3 years: Jewish chaplain Yakov Sinyakov together with Ukrainian paratroopers - August 21, 2026 - Новости Израиля

A cemetery where history stands not in rows, but in wounds

The Jewish cemetery in Berdychiv is not just an old necropolis on the map of Ukraine. It is a place where the stones look as if the earth has been trying for many years to push out a memory that cannot be completely buried.

Here the matzevot stand unevenly, tilt, fall sideways, disappear into the grass, as if each stone has its own final pose. Some tombstones resemble heavy stone ‘boots’—such a shape can indeed be found in old Jewish burials. There are almost no images on them. Only letters, a dense weave of square Hebrew script, names, dates, blessings, traces of families that have long been absent from the living city conversation.

Sometimes you can see a short Cyrillic inscription on the stone: ‘Kloizner’, ‘Danzig’. For a casual passerby, these are just surnames. For descendants, a possible thread to a family that once lived, prayed, traded, argued, married, buried children and the elderly in a city that was called one of the symbols of Jewish life in Eastern Europe.

Berdychiv was not an ordinary Jewish shtetl. At the beginning of the 20th century, there were synagogues, prayer houses, schools, a hospital, an orphanage, libraries; the city remained a major Jewish center of Volhynia and Right-Bank Ukraine. According to ESJF, in 1907 the community maintained 6 synagogues and 72 prayer houses.

Why Berdychiv was called a Jewish city

The history of Jewish Berdychiv begins long before the catastrophe of the 20th century. The first mentions of the Jewish community of the city date back to the 16th century, and over time Berdychiv became one of the main centers of Jewish trade, Hasidic culture, and religious life in the region.

Not only local residents were buried here. Merchants who came to fairs, rabbis, tzaddiks, and people from smaller Jewish communities in the eastern part of the then Volhynia province found their final rest in the old cemetery. The most famous burial is associated with Rabbi Levi Yitzchak of Berdychiv, who died in 1809—his ohel remains a place of pilgrimage to this day.

That is why the cemetery in Berdychiv is perceived not as a local landmark, but as a fragment of a large Jewish map. For Israel, this is also not a foreign story: many families living in Israel today have roots that pass through Berdychiv, Zhytomyr region, Podolia, Volhynia, Kyiv, Odessa, Chernivtsi, Galicia.

Memory here is not museum-like. It is familial.

From matzevot to ghetto: how the city of memory became a city of disappearance

In the cemetery, the gap between those who were buried according to Jewish rites and those who disappeared without a grave is especially acute. This is the terrible line of Berdychiv: some received a stone, a name, and a place, others—only emptiness in family memory.

During the German occupation, Berdychiv became one of the places of mass extermination of Jews. The ghetto was created in the summer of 1941, and mass shootings took place in September. Yad Vashem indicates that on September 15, 1941, about 12,000 remaining Jews of Berdychiv were rounded up and destroyed with the participation of German units and local auxiliary police.

It was not a single tragic scene. It was a process of destroying an entire world.

In the Berdychiv area and near the village of Khazhin, there were places of mass shootings. The memorial project Connecting Memory writes that from mid-August 1941, the area near Khazhin was repeatedly used for the killing of Jews; only on September 4, 1941, 1,303 Jews from Berdychiv were shot there, and according to the Soviet Extraordinary State Commission, by the end of 1943, 10,656 people were killed there.

Why the absence of a grave is sometimes scarier than death

Jewish tradition attaches great importance to the memory of the name and the burial place. A grave is not just a stone. It is an opportunity to come, read, place a pebble, say Kaddish, explain to a child: ‘here is our person.’

When a person disappears in a ghetto, in a shooting pit, in a nameless list or without a list at all, the family loses not only a relative. It loses a point of return.

That is why the old matzevot of Berdychiv look so painful. They stand not only for those whose names are engraved on the stone but also for those who did not even receive this. In such a place, personal genealogy, Holocaust history, and Jewish memory cease to be different topics.

In the middle of this story, it is important to talk not only about Ukraine’s past but also about today’s Israeli memory. For readers of Nikk.Agency—Israel News | Nikk.Agency Berdychiv is not a distant point on the map of the Zhytomyr region, but part of a large family route: from the shtetls of Eastern Europe to Israel, from the language of ancestors to modern Hebrew, from lost archives to an attempt to restore at least names.

What remains today: cemetery, pilgrimage, and the duty of memory

It is estimated that the Berdychiv Jewish cemetery once had more than 10,000 burials, but only part of the tombstones have survived. One of the specialized resources indicates that out of a huge number of graves, about 550 matzevot remain, representing historical value and showing different stages of Jewish burial culture.

This is an important detail: the cemetery is not just ‘old.’ It is damaged by time, wars, Soviet indifference, destruction, oblivion, and partial restoration. Each preserved stone here works as a document, although it is not written on paper.

Berdychiv as a warning for the 21st century

Today, when Ukraine is once again living in conditions of war, the history of Berdychiv sounds especially harsh. Because Jewish cemeteries, places of shootings, synagogues, old houses, and family archives on Ukrainian soil are not abstract heritage. It is a memory that has once again found itself near the front, rockets, occupation, destruction of cities, and attempts to erase Ukrainian identity.

For Israel, this plot is also not external.

It reminds that the Jewish history of Eastern Europe did not end with emigration. It remained in stones, surnames, photographs, the silence of older relatives, in accidentally found documents, and in those places where descendants come already from Jerusalem, Haifa, Be’er Sheva, Tel Aviv, or Ashdod.

The Berdychiv cemetery speaks quietly but very accurately: a people exist not only where they have a state, an army, and a parliament. A people also exist where someone, decades later, searches for a surname on a tilted stone.

Why this story is not only about death

You can look at these matzevot as a symbol of loss. But that will not be the whole truth.

They also speak of the life that was before the catastrophe. Of a city where Jewish culture was not an appendix to someone else’s history, but one of the main forces of urban life. Of families who built houses, educated children, argued about politics, went to fairs, observed traditions or deviated from them, believed, doubted, fell in love, grew old.

That is why such cemeteries cannot be perceived only as ‘places of mourning.’ They are also an archive of dignity.

The toppled cemetery stones, resembling a herd of frozen sea creatures, are a very accurate image. Because these stones indeed seem to be stopped in motion. They are not completely dead. They continue to speak as long as someone comes, reads, photographs, translates, searches, remembers.

And so, the story of Berdychiv is not yet closed.

It continues in descendants who try to understand where their relatives lay. In researchers who restore the names of the murdered. In pilgrims coming to the grave of Rabbi Levi Yitzchak. In Ukrainians who preserve Jewish heritage as part of their own history. And in Israelis, for whom such places remain roots, even if these roots have grown through pain.

…
Is it ‘racism’ or ‘support by Russians for all enemies of Israel’? What is beginning to reach Israeli society, while the government ‘does not notice’ it: the Dolev Cohen scandal on Kan 11 - August 22, 2026 - Новости Израиля

Video: “Know Ours” – Kirill Karetnik – from Ukraine, moved to Israel in 2009, served in the army, worked, and became a politician - August 21, 2026 - Новости Израиля

The 7th Ukrainian Air Assault Corps celebrated 3 years: Jewish chaplain Yakov Sinyakov together with Ukrainian paratroopers - August 21, 2026 - Новости Израиля

NAnews Nikk.Agency – An independent information project created by a group of Israelis with Ukrainian roots.

Read news Israel – Ukraine

We talk about the relationship between Israel and Ukraine, about how the fate of the two peoples intertwine, and how historical and modern events affect our future.

Join NAnews Nikk.Agency In social networks:

🔹 WhatsApp: https://whatsapp.com/channel/0029vaztzqoiirusuqe7l1r

🔹 Telegram: https://t.me/agensnikk

🔹 X (Twitter): https://x.com/agensnikk

🔹 Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/nikk.agency.il

Our site – NAnews nikk.agency

Read news Israel – Ukraine

Website NAnews nikk.agency – This is an independent information resource that publishes materials about the relations of Israel and Ukraine in four languages:

🔹 Russian – https://nikk.agency/

🔹 Ukrainian – https://nikk.agency/uk/

🔹 English – https://nikk.agency/en/

🔹 Hebrew – https://nikk.agency/he/

Nanovos Nikk.agency – a private publication of Israelis with Ukrainian roots. News of Israel and Ukraine, relations between the two countries, the exposure of fakes, analyst. Read Russian, Ukrainian, English and Hebrew.

About NAnews nikk.agency

We are an independent project created by a group of Israelis with Ukrainian roots. NAnews is:

✅ Actual news of Israel and Ukraine

✅ Exposure of fakes and manipulations

✅ History, culture and social life of the two countries

✅ Honest information without political engagement

We Not related with parties, organizations or political groups and We are not financed by states. All work is carried out exclusively at the expense of project participants.

NAnews is more than news

We do not just cover events – we help to understand their depth, reveal the relationship and fight for historical truth.

We We cannot be silent About what is happening in Israel and Ukraine. This Our common world And we talk about him honestly.

Want to share the news?

Send materials, analytics, reports or announcements of important events. After checking the facts, we will post them on our website and in social networks.

📩 Send the news: https://t.me/send_news_nikk

Join the NAnews -nikk.agency

🔹 Site (in 4 languages): https://nikk.agency

Join NAnews nikk.agency In social networks:

🔹 WhatsApp: https://whatsapp.com/channel/0029vaztzqoiirusuqe7l1r

🔹 Telegram: https://t.me/agensnikk

🔹 X (Twitter): https://x.com/agensnikk

🔹 Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/nikk.agency.il

NAnews Nikk.agency – honest information without manipulations. Together we can more! 🇮🇱🇺🇦

NAnews nikk.agency – Independent information resource publishing Actual news of Israel In four languages: Russian, Ukrainian, English and Hebrew. We cover the events related to Israel and Ukraine, analyze international relations, expose fakes and represent exclusive opinions.

Follow News of Israel V NAnews nikk.agency – Honest information without manipulations.

Read news Israel – Ukraine

…
Is it ‘racism’ or ‘support by Russians for all enemies of Israel’? What is beginning to reach Israeli society, while the government ‘does not notice’ it: the Dolev Cohen scandal on Kan 11 - August 22, 2026 - Новости Израиля

Video: “Know Ours” – Kirill Karetnik – from Ukraine, moved to Israel in 2009, served in the army, worked, and became a politician - August 21, 2026 - Новости Израиля

The 7th Ukrainian Air Assault Corps celebrated 3 years: Jewish chaplain Yakov Sinyakov together with Ukrainian paratroopers - August 21, 2026 - Новости Израиля

June 10 is the birthday of the legendary “Dido Panas” – Petro Vesklyarov (Pinchas Khaimovich Vesklyar). The future actor was born in Talne, Uman County, Kyiv Province (now Cherkasy region) and came from a Jewish family.

A significant legend spread that, being the host of the children’s program “Good Night, Kids”, which was broadcast live, Grandpa Afanasiy ended the program with the phrase: “Such nonsense, kids…”

There is no tangible evidence that this happened (only one tape was preserved from the television archives), and the testimonies of witnesses are contradictory.

His signature greeting “Good evening to you, little ones, dear boys and girls” immediately transported you to some amazing world and heralded a fantastic adventure.

His fifteen-minute program “Good Night, Kids!” aired every Friday at 8:45 PM from 1964 to 1986 for 17 years (!).

From childhood. Who remembers? How many of us are here?

“Good evening to you, little ones, dear boys and girls…” This is how Grandpa Panas, the beloved of all, addressed Ukrainian kids from the TV screens in the program “Good Night, Kids.”

His colorful appearance (real Cossack mustache, beautiful embroidered shirt, warm voice with genuinely Ukrainian intonations); the interior of a Ukrainian room with towels; exclusively Ukrainian fairy tales made an unforgettable impression on both children and adults. For all viewers, he was familiar and recognizable.

The future actor was born in Talne, Uman County, Kyiv Province (now Cherkasy region). His birth surname was Vesklyar, and he came from a respectable Jewish family. The family lived in a so-called commune – a two-story house where several families settled. One room per family and a shared kitchen and dining room.

Petro became interested in theater in his youth. He visited the local drama club. It was here that actors from Cherkasy, who came on tour, noticed him. Thus, in 1932, Vesklyarov became an actor at the Cherkasy Workers’ and Peasants’ Theater.

At the beginning of the war, Petro was mobilized and sent to serve in the military theater of the Southwestern Front.

The 30-year-old artist was surrounded with the troops and ended up in a prisoner camp, where he introduced himself as Petro Vesklyarov. His atypical appearance and rich Ukrainian language saved him, and he escaped at the first opportunity. He returned to Kyiv, which was occupied by the Germans at the time. Concealing his origin, he found work on the railway and immediately created a theater club.

In late autumn 1941, the Germans began to gradually release Ukrainian prisoners home – Vesklyarov was freed. He did not return to the Cherkasy region, where the truth about his origin was known, and spent two years of occupation in Kyiv.

When the city became Soviet again, Vesklyarov returned to the frontline theater. He was demobilized in 1946.

He was not allowed to settle in the capital of the Ukrainian SSR (due to being on occupied territory – a “black mark” in his record for life), and was sent to Lutsk.

After the war, P. Vesklyarov was appointed to the Volyn Ukrainian Music and Drama Theater named after Shevchenko. Here the actor served until 1959, playing many interesting roles. Among them were Nikolai Zadorozhny (“Stolen Happiness” by I. Franko), the Commander (“The Stone Host” by Lesya Ukrainka), the Mayor (“The Inspector General” by N. Gogol)…

While working in Lutsk, he received an invitation to act in films. He moved to Kyiv. He proved himself as a brilliant supporting actor. Uncle Lev in “The Forest Song,” Grandpa Petriya in the film “Oleksa Dovbush,” Mr. Rector (“Viy”), Father Budulai (“Gypsy”)…

Vesklyarov’s last role in cinema was a peasant in the film “Forget the Word Death,” shot at the Odessa Film Studio in 1979. By that time, Petro Yefimovich was already widely known as Grandpa Panas from television. Which, by the way, was not only a positive but also a negative side: Vesklyarov was no longer invited to act in films. Whatever role he was offered, people saw only “Grandpa Panas” in the actor.

But this is probably not the main reason why Petro Vesklyarov was not offered leading roles or any roles at the “main” film studios. The reason is almost fantastic. In the USSR, a state of total Russification, actor Vesklyarov… practically did not speak Russian. Always – only in Ukrainian. To “language” questions, he jokingly replied: “I can’t learn Russian”… In the films where Vesklyarov still acted, his characters were voiced by other actors.

The actor died on January 5, 1994.

Colleagues remember Petro Yefimovich as a very sociable person, with a great sense of humor, a joker, and a wonderful storyteller.

Already grown-up people fondly remember him: “Sleep, my little one, hush, and the gray bunny is sleeping…”

A person who dedicated his entire life to ensuring that generation after generation of children in Ukraine heard the Ukrainian language, listened to Ukrainian fairy tales, joined Ukraine, and became Ukrainians. A person who proved with his entire life that even one warrior in the field is still a warrior and can still hope for victory. Even if everyone around considers Ukrainian a “rural dialect,” if they despise it and do not speak it – he still raises millions of children in such a way that they love and understand Ukrainian.

A deep bow and eternal respect. For everything. For the wonderful fairy tales, for the melodiousness of speech, for the crescent-shaped mustache, and the good smile. Bright and friendly, he became a grandfather for everyone. Every Ukrainian child had Grandpa Panas. Happy Birthday!

Read us on the channels Israel News Nikk.Agency Новини Ізраїлю

…
Is it ‘racism’ or ‘support by Russians for all enemies of Israel’? What is beginning to reach Israeli society, while the government ‘does not notice’ it: the Dolev Cohen scandal on Kan 11 - August 22, 2026 - Новости Израиля

Video: “Know Ours” – Kirill Karetnik – from Ukraine, moved to Israel in 2009, served in the army, worked, and became a politician - August 21, 2026 - Новости Израиля

The 7th Ukrainian Air Assault Corps celebrated 3 years: Jewish chaplain Yakov Sinyakov together with Ukrainian paratroopers - August 21, 2026 - Новости Израиля

Influential American supporter of Donald Trump and supporter of Israel, Laura Loomer, during a July trip to Ukraine, learned previously unknown details about the history of her Jewish family. Ukrainian archivists found information about her great-grandfather Pinkus Loomer, who was born in Vinnytsia on February 10, 1895, and later moved with relatives to Kyiv.

Loomer openly speaks about her Jewish heritage and has positioned herself as a consistent supporter of Israel for many years, paying special attention to combating anti-Semitism, the threat from Iran, and the security of the Jewish state. In 2026, she also opposed the strengthening of anti-Israel sentiments within the American conservative movement and criticized those MAGA representatives who questioned the US alliance with Israel.

Loomer received copies of archival documents during an interview with Ukrainian TV host Marichka Padalko. The conversation was published on July 24, 2026, as part of the “Marichka” project. Already on July 25, the story gained wide coverage in Ukrainian and international media.

The archival discovery turned out to be especially symbolic, as it occurred at a time of a sharp change in Loomer’s public position. Previously, she criticized American support for Ukraine and repeated Kremlin-spread claims, but after a personal trip, air raid alarms, meetings with Ukrainians, and visits to sites destroyed by Russian strikes, she acknowledged that her previous views were shaped by disinformation.

What Laura Loomer knew about her family

Before the trip, Loomer only knew that her family had Jewish roots and that her paternal ancestors emigrated to the United States from Kyiv. According to her, the family preserved several old photographs, and among the names of ancestors, Pinkus and Annie were mentioned.

“I am Jewish. And, according to my father, his grandfather and grandmother emigrated from Kyiv. That’s all I knew. I never saw my grandparents. My grandmother died before I was born, and my grandfather when I was only a year old or less. I only know that we have a few of their photographs, that their names were Pinkus and Annie, and that they were from Kyiv,” said Laura Loomer.

During the interview, Loomer said she had almost no other information. The information about the family’s origin was passed on to her by her father, but she had no detailed documents or extensive family history.

Ukrainian journalists and archivists managed to go further. The materials found showed that the Loomer family was connected not only with Kyiv but also with Vinnytsia.

TSN channel with the help of archive staff discovered information about Laura Loomer’s great-grandfather in Ukrainian archives. It turned out he was born in Vinnytsia on February 10, 1895. Later the whole family moved to Kyiv.

“It says here that the Loomer family is from Vinnytsia, modern Ukraine. Historical documents indicate that in 1875 they were officially enrolled in the bourgeois class,” read Laura Loomer.

In addition, the influencer was given copies of documents about her family stored in Ukrainian archives. She noted that she knew almost nothing about her family’s history but was very eager to learn about it.

“I would never have known all this if I hadn’t stopped believing Russian propaganda,” she said.

Laura Loomer was shocked by what she learned about her family’s origins. She also thanked the archive staff who helped find information about her family’s origins.

TSN directly names Pinkus Loomer as the great-grandfather of the American blogger. The date 1875, accordingly, does not refer to Pinkus himself, who was born twenty years later, but to an earlier generation of the family.

Upon receiving the documents, Loomer stated: “I would never have known all this if I hadn’t stopped believing Russian propaganda.” She thanked the archive staff and admitted that the news about her family’s origins was a strong emotional shock for her.

Can Loomer be called “half-Ukrainian”

Some headlines claimed that Laura Loomer was allegedly “half-Ukrainian.” However, the available documents allow us to confidently speak only about the Ukrainian roots of one branch of her family.

The exact share of origin in the published materials is not established. Therefore, it is more correct to write that Loomer has Ukrainian Jewish roots on her father’s side, and her great-grandfather was born in Vinnytsia and later lived in Kyiv.

There is also some confusion with the indication of the degree of kinship. In one part of the interview, it is said that Loomer’s father told her about his grandparents who emigrated from Kyiv. In this case, for Laura herself, they are great-grandparents. In another part of the retelling, the word “grandfather” is used. The most reliable guide remains the archival part of the TSN material, where Pinkus Loomer is directly named her great-grandfather.

The trip that changed Loomer’s position

Laura Loomer is known as one of the most prominent figures in the American conservative media environment and a consistent supporter of Donald Trump. Her social media audience approaches two million followers, and her publications regularly become part of discussions within the MAGA movement.

Previously, Loomer downplayed the consequences of the Russian invasion for years, opposed support for Ukraine, and repeated the thesis of alleged widespread Nazism in the country. This thesis is used by the Kremlin to justify the full-scale Russian aggression that began in February 2022.

Everything changed after the blogger decided to personally visit Ukraine. During her first air raid experience, she wrote that she had previously spoken about what was happening without proper empathy, but now considers “moral clarity” necessary.

For NAnews — Israel News, this part of the story has special significance. Loomer’s turnaround occurred not only after getting acquainted with the destruction but also after communicating with the Jewish community of Ukraine. Her personal family history additionally showed how closely intertwined the fates of American and Israeli Jews are with Ukrainian cities, which are being destroyed today by Russian strikes.

Meeting with Volodymyr Zelensky

On July 23, 2026, Laura Loomer met in Kyiv with the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky, and recorded an interview for her program Loomer Unleashed. Among the topics of conversation were Zelensky’s relations with Donald Trump, a tense meeting in the Oval Office, and a subsequent conversation between the two presidents in the Vatican in April 2025.

Zelensky stated that a short conversation with Trump in the Vatican became a turning point and allowed the nature of relations between them to change in approximately 15–20 minutes. After the publication of the interview fragment, Donald Trump positively assessed the conversation on his social network.

At the same time, Loomer’s visit was not pre-organized by Ukrainian state structures. Presidential representative Dmytro Litvin told the Associated Press that the President’s Office initially learned about her stay in the country from social media.

On July 24, Zelensky separately mentioned Loomer in his evening address. The President of Ukraine called her a person very close to Trump and noted that during the trip she saw Kyiv, the Lavra, Ukrainians, and what the country is going through in the face of ongoing aggression.

Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra and the strike on the Assumption Cathedral

One of the central points of the trip was a visit to the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra. On July 23, Loomer met with the First Deputy Head of the President’s Office, Serhiy Kyslytsia, after which they went together to the Assumption Cathedral.

On the night of June 15, 2026, during a massive Russian strike, a drone hit the cathedral, causing a fire. Loomer inspected the aftermath of the attack and sharply criticized the Kremlin’s attempts to simultaneously present Russia as a defender of Christianity and strike one of Ukraine’s main Orthodox shrines.

She drew attention to the damage to the building and images of Jesus Christ, questioning how a state can claim to protect the Christian faith while attacking an ancient monastic complex with strike drones.

Conversation with the Chief Rabbi of Ukraine Moshe Asman

During her stay in Kyiv, Loomer also visited the Central Synagogue of Ukraine and met with the Chief Rabbi of Ukraine, Moshe Asman.

Moshe Asman told her about daily Russian shelling, dead children and civilians, destroyed cities and villages, and the life of the Jewish community in a warring country. He emphasized that many of Loomer’s previous perceptions of Ukraine were shaped by Russian information campaigns.

After the meeting, the American blogger publicly rejected claims that Ukrainian Jews were allegedly hostages of a “Nazi regime.” She pointed to the active life of Jewish communities and the fact that the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky, is himself Jewish.

For NAnews — Israel News, it is important to note that Loomer’s story became an example of how direct acquaintance with Jewish life in Ukraine destroys one of the central constructs of Russian propaganda. Moscow has been trying for years to simultaneously use the theme of World War II and hide the consequences of its own strikes on Ukrainian cities, synagogues, churches, memorials, and mass burial sites.

Laura Loomer and Israel: Jewish identity and a tough stance on Iran

Israel occupies an important place in Laura Loomer’s public activities. She was born into a Jewish family, openly speaks about her heritage, and presents herself as a defender of Israel and Jewish communities in the United States. It is through this prism that she often views US foreign policy, the situation in the Middle East, and the struggle within the American conservative movement.

Loomer consistently supports Israel’s right to defense and advocates for maintaining a close alliance between Washington and Jerusalem. In the spring of 2026, she claimed to have warned Donald Trump about the possible weakening of support for Israel among future American presidents. According to her, Trump may be the last openly pro-Israel US president, although the White House did not confirm the content of this conversation.

A separate direction of her activity has been the fight against the spread of anti-Israel and anti-Semitic sentiments within the MAGA movement. In February 2026, Loomer sharply opposed further political rapprochement between Trump’s entourage and Tucker Carlson. The reason was his statements about Israel, criticism of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and appearances on platforms associated with Qatar and Saudi Arabia.

At the same time, Loomer’s position is not limited to ordinary support for Israel. She adheres to an extremely tough approach to the Islamic Republic of Iran, rejects concessions to Tehran, and opposes agreements that, in her opinion, could leave the Iranian regime with the ability to threaten Israel and the United States.

In July 2026, Loomer caused sharp criticism after publicly calling on Israel to strike participants at the funeral of former Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Her statement was perceived as a proposal to attack a mass event, thus causing accusations of incitement to violence. This episode shows that Loomer’s pro-Israel position is often accompanied by extremely radical rhetoric, which cannot be equated with Israel’s official policy.

Russia’s connection with Iran became one of the factors that influenced her change in attitude towards Ukraine. After the trip, Loomer began to view Russian aggression not as an isolated European issue but as part of a broader system of cooperation between Moscow, Tehran, and Beijing. She stated that this alliance poses a threat not only to Ukraine but also to the US and Israel.

That is why her meeting with the Chief Rabbi of Ukraine, Moshe Asman, had not only a Ukrainian but also an Israeli dimension for her. Loomer came to a country she previously perceived through Russian claims of Nazism but saw an active Jewish community, a Jewish president, and religious leaders openly supporting Ukraine’s defense.

For NAnews — Israel News, it is important to separate several circumstances in this story. Loomer is indeed a notable pro-Israel voice within MAGA and opposes anti-Semitism and the Iranian threat. At the same time, her political activity has repeatedly been accompanied by controversial statements, conspiracy theories, and radical formulations that cause criticism, including in the American Jewish community.

The family documents discovered in Ukraine gave her position an additional personal dimension. Loomer’s story now connects American politics, Israel, and Ukrainian Jewish communities through the fate of one family that began in Vinnytsia and Kyiv.

Why Loomer’s change of position matters

Laura Loomer does not hold an official diplomatic position, but she has significant influence over part of the conservative audience in the US and maintains direct contacts with people from Donald Trump’s entourage. Therefore, her public renunciation of Russian theses may have consequences far beyond her personal story.

For many years, criticism of Ukraine within the MAGA movement was built on the repetition of several theses: Ukraine is allegedly completely corrupt, aid to it does not serve US interests, and the Russian invasion is a reaction to Western actions. Loomer previously participated in spreading such views.

After the trip, she began to speak about Russian disinformation, the need to pressure Moscow, and Russia’s connection with the Iranian regime. Loomer supported strengthening sanctions and stated that the Russian economy must be made to pay for continuing aggression.

Her turnaround does not automatically mean a change in the position of the entire MAGA movement. There are still serious disagreements in the American conservative camp regarding military aid to Ukraine and the US role in European security. However, the public acknowledgment of a mistake by someone who previously actively repeated Russian theses has become a notable precedent.

Personal history against the backdrop of big politics

The story of Laura Loomer’s ancestors combined several plots at once: Jewish life in Vinnytsia at the end of the 19th century, the family’s move to Kyiv, emigration to the United States, and modern Russian aggression against Ukraine.

Before arriving in Kyiv, Loomer perceived Ukraine mainly through political disputes and social media publications. During the trip, she experienced an air raid, saw the consequences of Russian strikes, visited a damaged Orthodox shrine, talked with the Chief Rabbi of Ukraine Moshe Asman, met with Volodymyr Zelensky, and received documents about her own family.

That is why the found archival record became not just a genealogical detail. The great-grandfather of the influential American Trump supporter was born on February 10, 1895, in Vinnytsia, his family was part of the local Jewish community, then moved to Kyiv and emigrated to the USA. More than a century later, his great-granddaughter returned to Ukraine and admitted that she had been looking at her ancestors’ homeland through the prism of Russian propaganda for too long.

This does not prove that Laura Loomer is “half-Ukrainian.” But the documents confirm the main thing: part of her Jewish family’s history begins in Ukrainian Vinnytsia and Kyiv — cities that continue to live and defend themselves today from Russian terrorist strikes.

…
Is it ‘racism’ or ‘support by Russians for all enemies of Israel’? What is beginning to reach Israeli society, while the government ‘does not notice’ it: the Dolev Cohen scandal on Kan 11 - August 22, 2026 - Новости Израиля

Video: “Know Ours” – Kirill Karetnik – from Ukraine, moved to Israel in 2009, served in the army, worked, and became a politician - August 21, 2026 - Новости Израиля

The 7th Ukrainian Air Assault Corps celebrated 3 years: Jewish chaplain Yakov Sinyakov together with Ukrainian paratroopers - August 21, 2026 - Новости Израиля

One of Donald Trump’s most influential supporters in the American MAGA movement traveled to Ukraine to personally verify Russia’s claims of ‘Nazism’ and persecution of Jews. After Bucha, an air raid alert, the damaged Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra, and a conversation with the Chief Rabbi of Ukraine Moshe Asman, Laura Loomer publicly acknowledged that her previous beliefs were mistaken.

Laura Loomer came to verify Russian myths: after Bucha and a meeting with Moshe Asman, Trump’s ally admitted she was wrong.

On July 24, 2026, the Chief Rabbi of Ukraine Moshe Asman received American political blogger Laura Loomer — one of the most prominent and controversial representatives of the MAGA movement, with direct access to the entourage of US President Donald Trump — at the Central Synagogue of Ukraine.

The visit marked another stage in Loomer’s unexpected change of position, who until recently opposed American aid to Ukraine, repeated Russian claims of alleged ‘Nazism’ in the country, and stated that the war did not concern her.

Now she says she was under the influence of Russian propaganda and did not understand what Ukrainians go through daily.

Moshe Asman told Loomer about the war and the life of Jews in Ukraine.

In a message published on July 24, 2026, Moshe Asman stated that the conversation at the Central Synagogue was candid. The Chief Rabbi of Ukraine explained to the American guest that Russian aggression is not an abstract dispute between states but daily shelling, dead children, destroyed cities, and personal tragedies of millions of Ukrainian families.

Asman also shared what he and the Jewish community had to endure during the years of full-scale war.

A separate topic was the situation of Jews in modern Ukraine. For many years, Russian propaganda tried to portray Ukraine as a state where Jews are allegedly persecuted and religious life is restricted. According to Asman, these claims previously caused concern for Laura Loomer.

The Rabbi told her that Ukrainian Jews openly practice their faith, hold services, restore synagogues, create schools, help those in need, and are an integral part of Ukrainian society.

“The Jewish community lives here openly, freely practices their faith, restores synagogues, builds Jewish schools, and helps people,” emphasized Moshe Asman.

As a memento of the meeting, he gave Loomer his book “Between Miracle and Reality”, dedicated to the life of the Jewish community, the events of the war, and the Rabbi’s personal experience.

Who is Laura Loomer and why her visit matters

Laura Loomer does not hold positions in the US administration and is not an official advisor to the White House. However, she cannot be considered an ordinary blogger.

The Associated Press calls her a staunch ally of Donald Trump. Nearly two million users follow Loomer’s publications, and her campaigns against individual American officials have repeatedly led to personnel consequences within the administration. Donald Trump publicly called her a patriot and confirmed that he listens to her statements.

Loomer is an American of Jewish descent, openly supports Israel, and calls herself a Zionist. At the same time, she remains a highly controversial figure: American and Israeli media characterize her as a representative of the far-right political wing and remind of her harsh statements regarding Muslims and migrants.

It is Loomer’s closeness to Trump and her popularity among MAGA supporters that make her change of attitude towards Ukraine politically significant. Her audience largely consists of people who have heard about the war for years through American conservative channels, often repeating narratives favorable to the Kremlin.

Bucha was the first serious shock

During the trip, Loomer visited Bucha — a city that became one of the main symbols of Russian crimes against civilians.

She visited the Church of the Holy Apostle Andrew the First-Called and saw the site of the mass burial of residents killed during the Russian occupation in 2022. Bucha Mayor Anatoliy Fedoruk reported that the American blogger was told stories of specific victims and shown evidence of Russian military crimes.

After visiting Bucha, Loomer admitted that for years she believed false claims about the nature of the war.

Previously, she called Ukraine a country allegedly filled with ‘Nazi supporters’ and opposed support for Ukrainian defense. The Associated Press notes that such statements coincided with one of the main propaganda justifications Russia uses to explain its aggression.

The air raid alert changed the perception of the war

While in Ukraine, Loomer personally experienced an air raid alert for the first time.

She wrote that she hears the sirens and now understands: for Ukrainians, such a threat is part of everyday life. Loomer reminded that she had repeatedly said before that what was happening in Ukraine did not concern her, and then admitted that such words were wrong.

“We need moral clarity,” she stated after experiencing the alert.

For NAnews — Israel News, the fact of acknowledging the mistake is important. Loomer decided not to delete previous publications so that they remain evidence of how strongly the Russian information campaign can influence even experienced political activists with a large audience.

She essentially admitted that she was discussing the war without seeing its consequences and without talking to people who live under the constant threat of Russian missiles and drones.

Visit to the damaged Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra

The next important point of the trip was the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra.

Loomer visited the Assumption Cathedral and other objects of the complex damaged by a Russian strike on June 15, 2026. She was accompanied by the First Deputy Head of the Office of the President of Ukraine Serhiy Kyslytsia, Minister of Culture Tetyana Berezhna, and representatives of the national reserve.

After the strike, a fire broke out in the monastery complex, damaging the interior and exterior structures. Ukrainian authorities called the incident an attack on Christian cultural heritage. Russia denied responsibility and without evidence claimed that the destruction could allegedly have been caused by a Ukrainian air defense missile.

While inside the cathedral, Loomer criticized Putin’s statements about protecting Christianity. She stated that Russian authorities cannot portray themselves as defenders of the faith while simultaneously striking one of Ukraine’s most important Christian monuments.

Meeting with Zelensky and Trump’s reaction

On July 23, Laura Loomer met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky at the Mariinsky Palace.

She recorded an interview with him for her program Loomer Unleashed. Among the topics discussed were Ukraine-US relations, a previous tense meeting at the White House, and the subsequent restoration of contact between Zelensky and Trump.

The President of Ukraine stated that an important moment was their brief conversation at the Vatican, which allowed changing the nature of relations in 15-20 minutes.

The Ukrainian side emphasizes that Loomer’s trip was initially not organized by state structures. Zelensky’s representative Dmytro Litvin reported that the President’s Office learned about her visit from social media.

After the publication of a photo of Loomer with Zelensky, Donald Trump reacted to the meeting with the words: “Very good!!!”

This brief reaction is significant. It shows that Trump did not perceive the rapprochement of one of his most prominent supporters with Ukraine as a manifestation of disloyalty.

Chronology of Laura Loomer’s trip

Why the meeting with Moshe Asman was especially important

Bucha showed Loomer the consequences of Russian occupation. The air raid alert allowed her to feel the daily threat. The destruction at the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra demonstrated the inconsistency of Moscow’s claims about ‘protecting Christianity’.

The meeting with Moshe Asman shattered another Russian myth — about the allegedly ‘Nazi Ukraine’ where Jews are persecuted.

Loomer saw a functioning synagogue in the center of Kyiv, met with one of the most well-known Jewish leaders in the country, and heard about the development of religious life directly from a representative of the Ukrainian Jewish community.

For the Israeli reader, this part of the trip is of fundamental importance. Russia tried to use the memory of the Holocaust and the fear of anti-Semitism as a tool to justify aggression. But at the same time, Russian missiles and drones threaten Ukrainian Jews just as they do all other residents of the country.

Jewish schools are forced to equip shelters. Synagogues help evacuated families. Rabbis conduct funerals for fallen soldiers and civilians. Jewish communities collect humanitarian aid, support hospitals, and help elderly people survive the war.

Has the entire MAGA changed along with Loomer

It is premature to talk about a change in the position of the entire MAGA movement.

Among Trump’s supporters, there are still serious disagreements about military aid to Ukraine. Many influential American conservatives still believe that Washington should reduce its involvement in European security.

Laura Loomer also did not become a representative of the American government and did not receive the authority to negotiate on behalf of Trump.

But her trip can influence the informational discourse within the American right-wing movement. A person who previously repeated Russian narratives is now telling the same audience about Bucha, air raid alerts, destroyed churches, and the free life of Jews in Ukraine.

Moreover, Loomer links support for Ukraine with the security of Israel and the US. In her statements, she draws attention to Russia’s cooperation with Iran and claims that the Moscow-Tehran alliance makes Russian aggression part of a broader threat to Western countries.

Propaganda ends where personal experience begins

Laura Loomer’s trip does not negate her previous statements and does not remove questions about her political activities. However, the willingness to publicly admit a mistake remains a rare phenomenon in modern politics.

She came to Ukraine to verify Russian claims and discovered a reality opposite to the picture that had been spread for years among some American conservatives.

Bucha showed her the crimes of the Russian army. The air raid alert — the daily life of Ukrainians. The Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra — Russia’s strikes on Christian heritage. And the Chief Rabbi of Ukraine Moshe Asman — the real situation of Jews in the country.

At the end of the meeting, Asman thanked Loomer for the courage to come to Ukraine despite the danger and wished her wisdom, health, protection, and the ability to always remain on the side of truth and justice.

For NAnews — Israel News, this story is a vivid example that Russian propaganda cannot be defeated by official statements alone. Sometimes a person needs to see a mass grave with their own eyes, hear the sirens, and talk to people whose lives they previously assessed based on social media publications.

…
Is it ‘racism’ or ‘support by Russians for all enemies of Israel’? What is beginning to reach Israeli society, while the government ‘does not notice’ it: the Dolev Cohen scandal on Kan 11 - August 22, 2026 - Новости Израиля

Video: “Know Ours” – Kirill Karetnik – from Ukraine, moved to Israel in 2009, served in the army, worked, and became a politician - August 21, 2026 - Новости Израиля

The 7th Ukrainian Air Assault Corps celebrated 3 years: Jewish chaplain Yakov Sinyakov together with Ukrainian paratroopers - August 21, 2026 - Новости Израиля

32-year-old resident of Havat Gilad, Benyahu Malt, went to rescue a group of Israelis and was killed by shots from a weapon seized by the attacker from a local security service employee. After the third attack in Samaria in less than a day, the IDF sent five additional companies to the region, blocked the village of Tal, and exits from Nablus.

The morning of Friday, July 24, 2026, brought Israel another heavy news from Samaria. Near the Jewish settlement of Havat Gilad and the Palestinian village of Tal, clashes escalated into gunfire. As a result, 32-year-old Benyahu Malt was killed, and two more Israelis were seriously injured.

According to the IDF, one of the Palestinian attackers took a weapon from a Havat Gilad security service representative and opened fire on Israeli citizens. The shooter was eliminated almost immediately, and the weapon was recovered. Palestinian health authorities simultaneously reported the deaths of four Palestinians and injuries to four others. The full sequence of events and the circumstances of each participant’s death are still being established.

Benyahu Malt went to save people

The deceased Benyahu Malt lived in Havat Gilad, was part of the local rapid response team, and was responsible for agricultural work in the settlement.

He is survived by his wife Esther and two daughters aged 12 and 13.

When information about the attack on Israelis near the village of Tal was received, Malt went to the scene to help people in danger and organize their evacuation. During the rescue operation, he received a severe gunshot wound.

Arriving medics performed resuscitation measures, but could not save him. The head of the Shomron Regional Council, Yossi Dagan, called Malt a devoted family man and a person dedicated to the land of Israel and the security of his settlement.

This was not the first time Benyahu Malt went where people were in danger. Just a few days before his death, he participated in rescue operations during a devastating fire in Havat Gilad.

How the attack unfolded according to the IDF

According to the preliminary Israeli version, a group of Israelis was in the area of the village of Tal, located near Havat Gilad and southwest of Nablus. The army referred to them as “travelers” or participants in a hike.

At the same time, the IDF specifically noted that the group’s exit towards Tal was not pre-coordinated with the military.

Near the village, a clash with local residents began. According to Israeli sources, dozens of people attacked the group. Representatives of the Havat Gilad security service arrived at the scene to provide assistance.

During the clash, one of the Palestinians managed to seize the weapon of a local security officer and opened fire on the Israelis. Benyahu Malt, who arrived to evacuate people, received a fatal wound. Two more Israelis were injured.

The IDF reported that soldiers eliminated the shooter immediately after the attack and recovered the stolen weapon. The military continued to pursue possible accomplices and search for other participants in the clash.

Two wounded were taken to “Ichilov”

Two injured Israelis were evacuated by military helicopters to the “Ichilov” hospital in Tel Aviv.

One of the wounded, about 20 years old, was in critical condition. The second man, approximately 25 years old, was hospitalized in serious condition.

Initial reports from rescue services mentioned a larger number of victims, but confirmed data indicate one dead and at least two Israelis with gunshot wounds.

NANews — Israel News continues to monitor the condition of the wounded. At the time of preparing the material, a detailed medical forecast was not published.

Four dead Palestinians: circumstances are being clarified

The Ministry of Health of the Palestinian Authority stated that during the events near Tal, four Palestinians were killed, and four more were injured. Three of the injured, according to the Palestinian side, were in critical condition.

Israeli Russian-language media report that the deceased were four men from the Ali Ramadan family.

At the same time, the IDF officially described the circumstances of the elimination of only one person — the attacker who seized the weapon and opened fire on the Israelis. How the other three died, whether they were armed, and whether they directly participated in the attack, was not specified in the initial army reports.

The Associated Press also noted that the circumstances of the shooting immediately after the incident remained unclear. The Palestinian Ministry of Health stated that the four deceased were killed by Israeli forces.

The Palestinian side presents a different version of the start of the clashes

Representatives of the Palestinian side claim that the events did not start with an attack on travelers, but with the appearance of a group of Israelis near the houses of the village of Tal.

Local Fatah movement representative Issam Saifi told Reuters that approximately 25–30 Israelis allegedly entered the eastern part of the village and tried to break into two houses. According to him, local residents came out to meet them, after which the shooting began.

Saifi also claims that about half an hour later, the Israelis appeared in the western part of the village, and then the military arrived at the scene. These statements have not yet been confirmed by independent investigation results.

The Israeli side, on the contrary, claims that Palestinians attacked the Israelis in the area, and then one of the attackers seized the security officer’s weapon and used it for shooting.

Thus, the sides describe the start of the clash differently. However, the fact of weapon seizure and subsequent shooting at Israeli citizens is confirmed by the IDF. Final conclusions should be made after studying video recordings, testimonies of soldiers, local residents, and participants of the Israeli group.

The IDF sent five additional companies to Samaria

IDF Chief of General Staff Lieutenant General Eyal Zamir assessed the situation and ordered a significant increase in military presence in Judea and Samaria.

According to Israeli media, five additional companies of soldiers were sent to the region.

The army has been tasked with the following:

• strengthen the protection of Israeli settlements and roads;
• find all participants in the attack;
• prevent new terrorist attacks;
• continue operations in the areas of Beit Furik and Tubas;
• establish checkpoints on possible escape routes of the attackers.

The IDF temporarily blocked the village of Tal and exits from Nablus. The military began checking transport and search activities in the area of the attack.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu convened an emergency meeting to discuss possible response measures.

The third attack in Samaria in less than a day

The shooting near Havat Gilad was already the third attack in Samaria in about a day.

On July 23 near Elon Moreh, east of Nablus, two Palestinians attacked an Israeli who was extinguishing a field fire. The victim was seriously injured. The attackers were eliminated.

Later that same day, a stabbing attack occurred near the former settlement of Ganim, about five kilometers southeast of Jenin. One Israeli was lightly injured, and the attacker was eliminated.

After these events, the IDF began operations in Beit Furik and Tubas — localities from which, according to the army, participants in previous attacks arrived.

The sequence of three attacks in such a short time creates a difficult situation for Israeli security forces. It is not only about finding individual attackers but also about the risk of a chain reaction, where one terrorist attack becomes an example for the next.

Six days before the terrorist attack, Havat Gilad experienced a devastating fire

The tragedy of July 24 occurred less than a week after a large-scale fire destroyed a significant part of Havat Gilad.

The fire started on Saturday, July 18, 2026. According to updated data from settlement residents, the fire completely destroyed 22 residential houses, and another 13 houses and structures were seriously damaged. The settlement had to be evacuated.

Benyahu Malt participated in saving people and property during this fire.

Two days later, the Judea and Samaria district police concluded that there were sufficient grounds to consider the damage the result of hostile actions. Two suspects were detained. This decision allows the victims to apply for state compensation as victims of hostile action.

For the residents of Havat Gilad, these events combined into one difficult week: first, dozens of families lost their homes, and then the settlement lost a person who helped save others.

Questions that the investigation must answer

In addition to searching for possible accomplices of the shooter, Israeli security forces need to establish:

• why the group of Israelis headed to the village of Tal;
• who organized the outing and why it was not coordinated with the army;
• where the first clash began;
• how many people participated in the attack;
• how the weapon ended up in the shooter’s hands;
• who exactly opened fire at different stages of the clash;
• under what circumstances the other three Palestinians died;
• whether the military or local security service could have prevented the weapon seizure.

Answers are needed not only to restore the full picture of the incident. They should help determine whether there were mistakes in organizing security, information exchange, and responding to the appearance of a group not coordinated with the army in a potentially dangerous area.

Samaria enters a new period of tension

The events near Havat Gilad show how quickly a local clash can turn into a terrorist attack with human casualties.

One of the participants gained access to a security officer’s weapon, opened fire, and killed a person who came to save others. Simultaneously, the clash led to the deaths of four Palestinians, the circumstances of the deaths of three of whom are not yet publicly explained.

The main task of the IDF now remains to prevent new attacks. The reinforcement of Samaria with five companies, the blocking of Tal and Nablus, and the continuation of operations in Beit Furik and Tubas show that the army does not consider the incident an isolated episode but part of a dangerous series of attacks.

NANews — Israel News expresses condolences to the family of Benyahu Malt. He died when he went to help people in danger, leaving behind a wife and two minor daughters.

The investigation of the events near Havat Gilad continues. Data on the condition of the wounded, arrests of possible accomplices, and the exact sequence of the shooting may be supplemented after new official reports.

…
Is it ‘racism’ or ‘support by Russians for all enemies of Israel’? What is beginning to reach Israeli society, while the government ‘does not notice’ it: the Dolev Cohen scandal on Kan 11 - August 22, 2026 - Новости Израиля

Video: “Know Ours” – Kirill Karetnik – from Ukraine, moved to Israel in 2009, served in the army, worked, and became a politician - August 21, 2026 - Новости Израиля

The 7th Ukrainian Air Assault Corps celebrated 3 years: Jewish chaplain Yakov Sinyakov together with Ukrainian paratroopers - August 21, 2026 - Новости Израиля

Ukraine is not just holding back Russian aggression, but is changing the balance of power in the confrontation of democratic countries with Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea. However, Kyiv’s success still needs to be turned into a political and military victory — and this is where the West continues to hesitate.

The American publication The Hill published a column on July 23, 2026, with a provocative but far from unfounded conclusion: Ukraine may already be winning World War III for the West, which has not yet realized that it has begun.

The authors of the material are national security experts Mark Toth and Jonathan Sweet. The latter served for 30 years in the US Army military intelligence and headed the US European Command’s intelligence interaction unit from 2012 to 2014. Mark Toth specializes in foreign policy, military strategy, and national security. Their publication is an author’s column, not the official position of the US government or an editorial statement by The Hill.

The main idea of the authors is that what is happening in Ukraine has long ceased to be a local European war. Russian aggression has become the central open front of a much broader confrontation, in which Moscow receives help from China, Iran, and North Korea, while the opponents of this coalition are Western democracies and their partners.

World War III has already begun — but it looks different

Toth and Sweet wrote back in July 2022 that Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine became part of a global clash between the democratic world and a new authoritarian bloc.

However, this is not World War III in the classical sense — with an official declaration of war, stable fronts between great powers, and direct battles between the armies of the US, Russia, or China.

The modern global confrontation is conducted simultaneously by several methods:

• conventional weapons and drones;
• cyberattacks and sabotage;
• economic pressure;
• arms supplies through intermediary states;
• information operations;
• use of dependent armed groups;
• struggle for technology, sea routes, and energy resources.

That is why Western capitals often perceive Russian aggression against Ukraine, Chinese pressure on Taiwan, Iran’s nuclear and missile program, North Korea’s actions, and wars in the Middle East as separate crises.

The authors of The Hill suggest looking at them as interconnected elements of the struggle for a new world order.

Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea are indeed acting together

Cooperation between these states can no longer be called merely diplomatic.

NATO officially states that North Korea directly supports Russia with military personnel, weapons, and ammunition. Iran helps Moscow with drones and missiles. The alliance also points to the deepening strategic partnership between Russia and China, as well as the expansion of defense-industrial cooperation between Moscow, Iran, and North Korea.

At the same time, the forms of participation vary.

North Korea provides Russia with ammunition, weapons, and manpower. Iran has transferred strike drone technologies and supports Moscow with weapons. China has not openly entered the war but provides the Russian economy with a market, supplies dual-use goods and components, and helps Russia mitigate the effects of Western sanctions.

This is not yet a formal military alliance like NATO. However, the West is already facing a united system of states that help each other resist sanctions, maintain military production, and stretch US and European resources across multiple regions.

Why the authors say Ukraine is winning

It’s not about Russian troops already being expelled from Ukrainian territory.

Russia still occupies about 20% of Ukraine, including Crimea and areas of the Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson regions. Russian missiles and drones continue to attack Ukrainian cities, energy infrastructure, and civilians daily.

But the strategic goals with which Putin launched the full-scale invasion in February 2022 have not been achieved.

Moscow failed to:

• capture Kyiv;
• destroy the Ukrainian state;
• change the legitimate government;
• subjugate the entire country;
• eliminate the Ukrainian army;
• impose a Russian foreign policy orientation on Ukraine;
• split NATO.

Instead, Ukraine maintained statehood, gained candidate status for EU membership, deeply integrated into the Western security system, and created one of the most technologically advanced armies in the world.

Even after several years of Russian offensives, territorial changes remain incomparable to the losses incurred. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, in 2025, Russia captured approximately 5,000 square kilometers, or less than 1% of Ukraine’s territory.

In July 2026, former Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Oleksandr Syrskyi stated that since the beginning of the year, Ukrainian forces had reclaimed about 700 square kilometers. Data from independent analytical projects also show that recent Russian advances were measured in tens of square kilometers, not large-scale operational breakthroughs.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies estimates that in the first half of 2026, the loss ratio could have been nearly eight Russian servicemen to one Ukrainian. This is an analytical assessment that cannot be fully verified in wartime conditions, but it shows the scale of the price Moscow pays for extremely limited territorial results.

Ukrainian strikes have moved the war into the Russian rear

One of the main signs of the changing situation was the Ukrainian campaign of long-range strikes.

In the early years of the full-scale war, Ukraine primarily defended its own territory and depended on partners’ decisions that limited the use of transferred weapons against targets inside Russia.

By 2026, Kyiv had created its own long-range drone systems capable of striking Russian oil refineries, military airfields, ammunition depots, ports, railway hubs, and defense industry enterprises thousands of kilometers from Ukraine.

On July 6, 2026, Ukrainian drones attacked the Omsk oil refinery — the largest in Russia. The enterprise is located approximately 2,700 kilometers from territory controlled by Ukraine and can process about 460,000 barrels of oil per day.

After the strike, the plant halted processing, exacerbating the fuel shortage within Russia. Moscow was also forced to limit diesel fuel exports.

Long-range strikes solve several tasks at once.

They reduce Russia’s energy revenues, disrupt army fuel supplies, force Moscow to redeploy scarce air defense resources deep into the rear, and demonstrate to Russian society that the war started by Putin is no longer confined to Ukraine’s territory.

In July, Kyiv also formed a separate command for long-range strikes, responsible for systematic operations against Russian energy, military industry, and logistics.

Ukraine is depriving Russia of its advantage in the Black Sea

Equally important changes are occurring at sea.

Ukraine practically did not have a large military fleet capable of competing with Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. However, the use of maritime and aerial drones allowed the destruction of ships, attacks on port infrastructure, and pushing Russian forces away from the Ukrainian coast.

By July 2026, Ukrainian units began a large-scale operation to disrupt maritime supply to occupied Crimea.

Units of the Unmanned Systems Forces reported hitting more than 180 maritime objects in three weeks, including cargo ships, port cranes, ferries, and energy infrastructure. The Ukrainian strategy aims to gradually isolate Crimea from Russian transport routes through the Azov and Black Seas.

This fundamentally changes the perception of modern warfare.

A state without a traditional large fleet can, with relatively inexpensive drones, limit the actions of a naval force that has been considered dominant in the region for decades.

The West is already buying Ukrainian military experience

Ukraine is gradually transforming from a recipient of aid into a supplier of technology and combat experience.

In July 2026, Kyiv allowed six Ukrainian companies to export about 100 drones each to the US to participate in the Pentagon’s Drone Dominance program.

The first stage of the American competition was already won by a device jointly created by the Ukrainian company Skyfall and the British Skycutter. The program’s goal is to test small strike drones in conditions as close as possible to the real battlefield.

This is an important change.

In 2022, Western countries taught Ukrainian servicemen to use artillery, armored vehicles, and air defense systems. In 2026, NATO and American military are studying Ukrainian methods of drone production, data transmission, electronic warfare, and rapid technology implementation.

A Reuters commentary directly notes that Ukraine has become the world’s largest producer of military drones by quantity and can help NATO adapt extremely slow procurement systems to the pace of modern warfare.

At the NATO summit in Ankara on July 8, allies officially recognized that Ukraine contributes to transatlantic security. Alliance countries promised to provide Kyiv with military aid, equipment, and training worth about 70 billion euros in 2026 and to maintain a comparable level of support in 2027.

Russian influence is weakening beyond Ukraine

Toth and Sweet believe that Russia’s losses are already affecting its capabilities in other regions.

After the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, Moscow began discussing with the new Syrian authorities the change in the format of its bases in Tartus and Khmeimim. Russian representatives allow for the retention of only a reduced military presence.

In Africa, the situation has also become less favorable for Moscow. In April 2026, the Russian Ministry of Defense-controlled ‘African Corps’ confirmed the withdrawal of its units from Kidal in northern Mali after heavy fighting.

Subsequent attacks by armed groups demonstrated the inability of Moscow-supported authorities to guarantee security even in strategically important areas. This dealt a blow to Russia’s reputation as an alternative ‘security provider’ for African military regimes.

But it is too early to talk about a complete withdrawal of Russia from the Middle East or Africa.

Moscow retains bases, supplies oil to Syria, supports the governments of Sahel countries, and continues to seek access to natural resources. It is more accurate to speak not of the disappearance of Russian influence, but of the increase in its cost and the reduction of opportunities to simultaneously maintain positions in several regions.

China and Taiwan are closely studying Ukraine

Ukrainian experience also affects the situation in the Indo-Pacific region.

Taiwan is developing maritime drones, territorial defense systems, reservist training, and decentralized infrastructure, taking into account Ukraine’s actions against a significantly larger Russian army.

Taiwanese developers view maritime drones as a relatively inexpensive means against Chinese landing ships and naval blockades. Chinese military analysts, on their part, study Russia’s difficulties and try to understand how to avoid a protracted war, logistical destruction, and international isolation.

It would be premature to claim that Ukraine has already forced Beijing to abandon a possible operation against Taiwan.

However, the cost of a potential invasion has become significantly clearer. Ukraine has shown that even a smaller country can thwart the plans of a more powerful state if it has a motivated society, a developed technological industry, and partner support.

Why what is happening concerns Israel

For the Israeli audience, the main conclusion is that the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East cannot be considered in complete isolation from each other.

Iranian drone technologies that Russia uses to strike Ukrainian cities were created in the same military system that threatens Israel. Russia, Iran, and North Korea exchange weapons, technologies, and experience in circumventing sanctions. China provides them with economic and diplomatic space.

On the pages of NANews — News of Israel, we have repeatedly noted that tolerance for Russian aggression strengthens not only Moscow. It increases Iran’s resilience, facilitates the development of its military industry, and creates an international environment where the use of force increasingly brings political dividends.

The authors of The Hill mention the Hamas attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, as one of the events of the global confrontation that the West continued to view separately from Russia’s war against Ukraine.

At the same time, it is necessary to distinguish between confirmed facts and political assessment. There is no public evidence of a single command center managing Russian aggression, Iran’s actions, North Korea, China, and the Hamas attack simultaneously.

The point is different: each new crisis distracts attention, weapons, and financial resources of Western countries, facilitating the actions of other participants in the authoritarian bloc.

Therefore, Ukraine’s defeat would be a signal not only for Moscow. It would demonstrate to Tehran, Pyongyang, and Beijing that protracted aggression, nuclear blackmail, and reliance on the fatigue of democracies ultimately work.

Where the authors of The Hill may be exaggerating

The wording that Ukraine is already winning World War III is a strong political image, not an established fact.

Ukraine continues to suffer enormous human and economic losses. Millions of citizens remain abroad, a significant part of the territory is occupied, Russian strikes destroy cities and energy, and the Ukrainian army depends on stable supplies of air defense systems, missiles, ammunition, and financial assistance.

Russia has also not exhausted its ability to continue the war. Its economy is on a war footing, the state retains the ability to mobilize people, and China, Iran, and North Korea help compensate for the shortage of certain resources.

Therefore, Ukraine has not yet won the war in the usual military sense.

But it has already achieved a result that seemed almost impossible in February 2022: thwarted the plan to destroy the Ukrainian state, stopped the advance of the largest army in Europe, and turned Russian aggression into a protracted war of attrition, the consequences of which are felt from Siberia to Syria and Mali.

The West has gained an opportunity, but has not yet taken advantage of it

The main appeal of Toth and Sweet is not to Ukraine, but to Washington and Brussels.

Ukraine has already proven that it can resist, create its own weapons, strike at great depth, and change the rules of modern warfare.

Now the West faces a choice.

It can provide Ukraine with enough resources to consolidate success — strengthen air defense, expand joint arms production, completely block the export of Russian energy resources, and deprive Moscow of access to critical technologies.

Or continue to dose assistance, fearing ‘escalation,’ and give Russia time to recover.

As the authors of The Hill emphasize, World War III has not yet been won, but Ukraine has made victory possible for the West.

According to NANews — News of Israel, the key question is no longer whether Ukraine can stop Russia. It has proven this at the cost of enormous sacrifices.

The question is different: can the democratic world realize that Ukrainian soldiers are defending not only their own cities but also the world order, on which the security of Europe, the US, Israel, and other states directly depends.

If the West again tries to buy temporary peace with concessions to the aggressor, the next war may indeed cease to be a metaphor.

…
Is it ‘racism’ or ‘support by Russians for all enemies of Israel’? What is beginning to reach Israeli society, while the government ‘does not notice’ it: the Dolev Cohen scandal on Kan 11 - August 22, 2026 - Новости Израиля

Video: “Know Ours” – Kirill Karetnik – from Ukraine, moved to Israel in 2009, served in the army, worked, and became a politician - August 21, 2026 - Новости Израиля

The 7th Ukrainian Air Assault Corps celebrated 3 years: Jewish chaplain Yakov Sinyakov together with Ukrainian paratroopers - August 21, 2026 - Новости Израиля

In Poland and the Baltic countries, there are warnings about a possible Russian operation aimed at attacking NATO infrastructure and attempting to blame Ukraine. Potential targets include energy facilities, oil terminals, and the German brigade base under construction in Lithuania.

On NATO’s eastern flank, there is growing concern about a possible Russian provocation that should be serious enough to cause a political crisis but not lead to an immediate large-scale war between Russia and the North Atlantic Alliance.

The alleged scenario revolves around a limited strike on critical or military infrastructure in Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, or another regional state. The operation may use Ukrainian drones captured by Russia, and the Kremlin will try to blame Kyiv for the incident.

There is no public evidence that Putin has already approved a specific operation. The exact timing, targets, and final format of a possible attack are unknown. However, warnings are coming not only from journalists or independent experts but also from the leaders of Poland and Lithuania, who cite intelligence data.

Lithuania received intelligence signals

Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda confirmed on July 15, 2026, that the country’s intelligence structures received information about possible Russian provocations against Poland or the Baltic states. Their alleged goal may be to test NATO’s ability to maintain unity in the face of a limited and ambiguous attack.

Nausėda was not talking about a full-scale invasion but about targeted actions against critical infrastructure. These may include conventional military means, as well as sabotage, drones, cyberattacks, or other hybrid tools.

At the same time, the Lithuanian president emphasized separately: intelligence does not have specific information about the location and timing of a possible attack. According to him, Russian planning may still be ongoing, and the available data may only indicate the general goal of the operation.

This caveat is fundamentally important. It is not about a revealed plan for Russia’s war against NATO but about signs of preparing a limited operation capable of causing confusion, internal disputes, and a long discussion about who is responsible.

Russia may have accumulated Ukrainian drones

Polish Minister of National Defense Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz reported that Russian forces captured a significant number of Ukrainian drones. Some devices may have been intercepted or landed using electronic warfare means, after which they ended up in Russia’s possession.

According to the Polish minister’s assessment, such drones can be restored, equipped with explosives, and used for provocations against Poland or other states on NATO’s eastern flank. Warsaw believes that the threat also concerns Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Finland, and Romania.

This creates an especially complex problem for investigation. The debris of the device, electronic components, markings, and part of the software may indeed have Ukrainian origins. However, the launch site, drone control, and modifications made to it may already indicate a Russian operation.

The calculation may be based precisely on the first hours after the strike when the public does not yet know all the circumstances, and social networks are filled with photos of Ukrainian parts and statements about an alleged attack by Kyiv.

How a false flag operation might look

According to the Polish publication Wirtualna Polska, sources in law enforcement agencies are considering several options for possible escalation. The most likely is the use of drones externally linked to Ukraine. In the maximum scenario, the use of missiles against NATO military targets is allowed.

The list of possible targets is not officially confirmed. It is based on assessments of unnamed interlocutors of Polish journalists and therefore should not be perceived as an established operational plan of the Kremlin.

Special attention is paid to the Rudninkai military town, located approximately 20 kilometers from the Belarusian border. Infrastructure is being created there for the permanent deployment of the German 45th armored brigade.

The cost of the second phase of the project is estimated at about 1.3 billion euros, and the total area of the campus will be about 190 hectares. The first military personnel should begin to be stationed there in the fall of 2026, and full infrastructure for the German brigade should be ready by the end of 2027.

A possible strike on a not yet fully populated base would allow Russia to try to control the level of escalation: avoid a large number of casualties but simultaneously show that the deployment of German forces in Lithuania is associated with direct risk.

One of the political goals could be to pressure Berlin. The Kremlin is interested in making the German public perceive the permanent presence of the brigade in Lithuania not as a security guarantee but as a source of threat to German military personnel.

The informational groundwork is being prepared in advance

Russian state and pro-Kremlin information resources have already spread claims that Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia provided Ukraine with air corridors for attacks on Russian oil facilities in the Baltic region.

The foreign ministers of the three Baltic states jointly stated on April 10, 2026, that they never allowed their territory or airspace to be used for Ukrainian attacks against Russia. On July 10, representatives of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia reiterated this during a joint démarche at the Russian Foreign Ministry.

Such an information campaign may be a preparatory stage. First, the Russian audience is convinced that the Baltic countries are already participating in Ukrainian operations. Then any explosion, drone crash, or object damage can be presented as a natural consequence of the allegedly existing cooperation.

As a result, Russia gains the opportunity to pursue several goals simultaneously: discredit Ukraine, sow distrust between Kyiv and its allies, confuse the investigation, and delay NATO’s decision-making.

NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency notes that the main weapon in such an operation is not only the drone itself. Equally important are the first reports, photos of debris, statements from anonymous channels, and attempts to impose a ready-made version of events before the completion of technical expertise.

The Latvian border as another pressure point

Simultaneously, pressure on the Latvian border with Belarus has sharply increased. Its length is about 173 kilometers, with a significant part passing through forested and swampy areas, complicating control.

In 2025, Latvian authorities prevented 12,046 attempts of illegal border crossings. By mid-July 2026, about 8,000 such cases had been registered, with approximately a thousand occurring in the first two weeks of July alone.

For comparison: on the Polish-Belarusian border in the first half of 2026, slightly more than 260 attempts were recorded, while in Lithuania — 905. This indicates a noticeable shift in the main migration pressure towards Latvia.

The Polish Center for Eastern Studies believes that Latvian services are currently unable to independently eliminate all weaknesses on the external border of the European Union. Problems include limited resources, smuggler activities, and insufficient border infrastructure effectiveness.

There is no confirmed data on the mass penetration of sabotage groups disguised as migrants. However, the flow itself forces Latvia to distribute forces between border protection, infrastructure security, and airspace monitoring. For the organizer of a hybrid operation, this is already a beneficial result.

Lithuania has moved to practical protection of objects

Warnings did not remain only at the level of statements. Lithuanian Defense Minister Robertas Kaunas authorized the involvement of military personnel in protecting the liquefied natural gas terminal in Klaipeda and other strategic facilities on July 17.

Additional security was sent to the LitPol Link electrical connection with Poland, the substation in Alytus, and the Kruonis pumped storage power plant. From July 19 to August 19, a unit of up to 30 military personnel, transport, and a military boat were involved in the operation.

Vilnius emphasizes that the formal threat level has not been raised. The strengthening of security is called a preventive measure. However, the choice of objects shows which infrastructure elements the authorities consider most sensitive: energy connections with Europe, the gas terminal, hydroelectric power plants, and transport hubs.

The main goal is to test NATO

The alleged operation does not necessarily have to lead to significant destruction. For the Kremlin, it is more important to create a situation where NATO states begin to argue about the origin of the attack, the degree of proven Russian responsibility, and the need for a collective response.

Especially dangerous is a strike that falls above the level of a regular sabotage but below an obvious full-scale military attack. It is in such a gray zone that disagreements arise: whether to consider the incident a technical error, an independent Ukrainian operation, a Russian provocation, or an armed attack on an Alliance state.

Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty is not automatically triggered after any airspace violation. Allies must establish whether an armed attack occurred, determine its source, and obtain the affected state’s consent for collective action.

At the same time, NATO explicitly states that major cyberattacks and other serious hybrid actions can be recognized as an armed attack. The decision is made separately in each case, considering the scale, consequences, and evidence of the adversary’s involvement.

The first reaction to an ambiguous incident is likely to include intercepting air targets, exchanging intelligence data, conducting a technical investigation, and consultations under Article 4. Delaying this process may be one of Russia’s goals.

The eastern flank is already being strengthened

Today, NATO has nine multinational battle groups on the eastern front — from Finland and the Baltic states to Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, and Slovakia. The allies’ airspace is monitored around the clock as part of the Air Policing mission.

After Russian airspace violations in September 2025, the Alliance launched the Eastern Sentry operation. It includes additional fighters, helicopters, air defense systems, reconnaissance aircraft, transport aviation, and ships.

The Baltic Sea also hosts the Baltic Sentry mission, created to protect underwater cables and other critical infrastructure. NATO declares that it is ready to defend each ally and, if necessary, reinforce specific states with additional forces and air defense means.

The Kremlin rejects Lithuania’s statements and calls them an attempt to justify further militarization of the region. However, Russian denial does not negate the fact that the eastern flank states are already moving from warnings to practical protection of energy, transport, and military facilities.

Why this story is important for Israel

For the Israeli audience, this scenario is important not only as a European problem. Russia may try to apply a model well known to countries that regularly face drones, proxy structures, denial of responsibility, and pre-prepared information versions.

The provocation technology consists of several sequential stages: choosing a vulnerable object, using a weapon with a confusing origin, instant information injection, pressure on public opinion, and an attempt to prevent a unified response from allies.

NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency believes that the main question is not whether Putin will decide to start an open war against NATO. The danger of a limited strike, which the Kremlin will try to present as an accident, a Ukrainian mistake, or an unidentified incident, is much more realistic.

At the moment, there is no open evidence of an approved Russian plan. The named energy and military objects remain potential targets based on assessments of Polish sources.

But official statements from the leadership of Lithuania and Poland, the strengthening of infrastructure security, and the preparation of additional forces show: the risk is already perceived as serious enough for the region’s states to begin preparing for a possible provocation in advance.

…
Is it ‘racism’ or ‘support by Russians for all enemies of Israel’? What is beginning to reach Israeli society, while the government ‘does not notice’ it: the Dolev Cohen scandal on Kan 11 - August 22, 2026 - Новости Израиля

Video: “Know Ours” – Kirill Karetnik – from Ukraine, moved to Israel in 2009, served in the army, worked, and became a politician - August 21, 2026 - Новости Израиля

The 7th Ukrainian Air Assault Corps celebrated 3 years: Jewish chaplain Yakov Sinyakov together with Ukrainian paratroopers - August 21, 2026 - Новости Израиля

Touching footage remembered by all of Ukraine:

Exactly three years ago, the Defense Forces liberated Kherson. On November 11, 2022, Ukrainian troops entered the city, where they were greeted by locals with blue and yellow flags — the very ones that had been hidden from the occupiers. These fearless people immediately showed Putin’s army that it had come to the wrong place on tanks: “Kherson is Ukraine.” Many of them remain in the city today and do everything to ensure that, despite daily shelling by Russia, Kherson continues to live. Glory to all who fight! We remember those who gave their lives in battles for Ukraine.

Symbol of liberation: how the ATB truck appeared in the city

On the same day, November 11, 2022, when the Armed Forces of Ukraine entered liberated Kherson, residents saw an unexpected symbol of life returning on the streets — a truck with the logo of the Ukrainian retailer “ATB.”
The vehicle moved through the central streets, and people with flags waved at it and cried. This moment was captured on video, which spread across the country.

Everyone who saw the truck was joyful and confident that this was indeed the end of the occupation, even though Defense Forces units were only entering the outskirts of the city. Therefore, after some time, locals with blue and yellow flags were already waiting for Ukrainian defenders in the city center.

According to 24 Channel, behind the wheel was Eyal Israeli — an immigrant from Israel who has been living in Ukraine since the early 2000s.
When Russian troops left the city, he returned the truck stolen by the occupiers and drove through the streets with a Ukrainian flag.

Eyal and his friends drive around the city in the ATB truck, stopping at every billboard to remove the posters left by the Russians. “Kherson forever with Russia” — a fiction that disappears piece by piece from the streets to the cries of “Glory to Ukraine” and “Putin is a h***o!” On the billboards remain only the firmly glued pieces — the torn remnants of the “Russian world.”

We have already written about Eyal Israeli in the article – “Superhero ‘like from ‘Fauda” in the war against Russia: Israeli veteran on the banks of the Dnipro“

Eyal Israeli — the man who returned the symbol

According to colleagues and locals, Eyal had long worked in logistics and was a partner of the ATB network in the region.
During the occupation, he refused to leave the city, helped residents, and on the day of liberation — simply took and returned the truck.

Some Ukrainian publications write that in Israel he served in special units and from the first days of the invasion helped Ukrainian military with intelligence and volunteering.
But for the residents of Kherson, he became not a scout, but a person who first opened the streets for life and flags.

“Eyal heard a lot about how Ukrainians are called ‘neo-Nazis’ and now he already knows that he saw Nazis in Ukraine while he was in occupation. While the Russians were in the city, he did everything to make their life unbearable. And when collaborators stole ATB trucks, Eyal decided he would return them. And now he drives around the city in one of them. And on it is the first Ukrainian flag that appeared in Kherson. The first banner of freedom on the truck of the company that Eyal will always be grateful to, because in Kherson he was hired by ATB long ago without knowing the language — they taught him and did everything so that he could work.”

“On the streets, Eyal is now met by joyful and surprised people. Those who have not yet seen the military in the city were definitely sure that Kherson was free if ATB had already entered here. The truck drove into Freedom Square. There are no military here yet, but there are already people waiting for them. All in flags. Seeing the truck, the crowd began to chant ‘ATB! ATB!’, and when men in balaclavas got out of it, people thought they were military and chanted ‘AFU!’. But it was not them yet. Or rather, they were not yet in the center.”

Why this story is important

• Liberation is not only about the army and weapons, but also the courage of citizens who believe and act.
• The truck of the store chain became a symbol of the return to normalcy — food, work, life.
• An Israeli who decided to stay in a Ukrainian city during the occupation showed how the destinies of people from different countries unite in the struggle for freedom.
• For Ukrainians and the Jewish diaspora, this story is an example that true loyalty to a country is measured not by a passport, but by actions.

Strength in people

Kherson residents continue to live under daily shelling, but blue and yellow flags still hang on the houses.
The ATB truck that day became a sign that life is returning, and the people are unbroken.

This story remains in the memory of millions: not only as a video with flags but as proof that liberation always begins with one decisive person.

What you need to know about the liberation of Kherson?

• Kherson was the only regional center of Ukraine that the Russians occupied after the start of the full-scale invasion.
• After a long operation by Ukrainian troops, the Russian defense collapsed, causing the enemy to begin a panicked retreat to the left bank of the Dnipro, where they entrenched. Now Kherson is separated from the occupiers by the river and islands where battles are taking place. The city is under daily artillery fire, MLRS, KABs, and especially drones.
• Recently, Angelina Jolie visited Kherson. This happened despite the fact that Kherson is currently one of the most dangerous cities in Ukraine.

NANews — News of Israel and Ukraine.

…
Is it ‘racism’ or ‘support by Russians for all enemies of Israel’? What is beginning to reach Israeli society, while the government ‘does not notice’ it: the Dolev Cohen scandal on Kan 11 - August 22, 2026 - Новости Израиля

Video: “Know Ours” – Kirill Karetnik – from Ukraine, moved to Israel in 2009, served in the army, worked, and became a politician - August 21, 2026 - Новости Израиля

The 7th Ukrainian Air Assault Corps celebrated 3 years: Jewish chaplain Yakov Sinyakov together with Ukrainian paratroopers - August 21, 2026 - Новости Израиля

American intelligence agencies are investigating whether Russia could have helped Iran carry out precise strikes on secret CIA facilities in the Middle East. At the center of the investigation are attacks by modified Iranian Shahed drones, allegedly equipped with the Russian protected navigation system ‘Kometa-M’.

At least two CIA-related facilities were hit in March 2026. One was located on the grounds of the US embassy in Riyadh, the other in eastern Iraq. One of the Western intelligence documents, the contents of which were reviewed by Reuters, concludes that Russia ‘likely’ played a certain role in providing data used for targeting the strikes. The US intelligence has not yet reached a final conclusion, but the precision of the attacks is prompting Washington to consider the most dangerous scenario.

Information specifically about possible Russian assistance to Iran in targeting CIA facilities became public on July 22, 2026. The Reuters exclusive was published at 18:31 UTC, which is approximately 21:31 Israeli time. Reuters emphasized that the investigation into possible Russian involvement in the attacks on CIA facilities had not been publicly disclosed before.

However, certain parts of this story were known earlier:

• On March 3, 2026, Reuters reported that a suspected Iranian drone hit a CIA station located at the US embassy in Riyadh. At that time, a source claimed that there were no signs of intentional targeting specifically at the CIA unit.
• Also in March 2026, reports emerged that Russia had transferred the protected satellite navigation system ‘Kometa-M’ to Iran and was providing Tehran with other technical and intelligence support.
• Only on July 22 were all the elements first linked together: strikes on several CIA facilities, Russian versions of Shahed, ‘Kometa-M’, and the possible transfer of targeting data by Moscow.

If these suspicions are confirmed, this is no longer a typical Russian-Iranian partnership or another arms exchange deal. It would mean Moscow’s deliberate assistance in targeting American intelligence facilities — that is, the actual complicity of two regimes in direct attacks on US infrastructure.

For Israel, this story has direct military and political significance.

If Russia is indeed helping Iran not only to improve drones but also to obtain precise coordinates of closed American facilities, the same technologies and intelligence capabilities could be used against Israeli military bases, command centers, intelligence facilities, energy infrastructure, and defense industry enterprises.

Therefore, Jerusalem needs more than just to strengthen air defense: it is necessary to reconsider the political attitude towards Moscow. A state that supplies Iran with military technologies and possibly helps choose targets for strikes cannot continue to be perceived as a neutral mediator, with whom previous caution should be maintained at all costs.

Two drones and one breached wall

The strike on the American embassy in the capital of Saudi Arabia occurred on March 3, 2026. The Saudi Arabian Ministry of Defense reported that the diplomatic complex was attacked by two drones. A limited fire broke out, the buildings sustained material damage, but there were no casualties or injuries. Immediately after the attack, a Reuters source emphasized that there was no evidence of intentional targeting specifically at the CIA station at that time.

However, later, additional information became available to Western intelligence structures.

According to Reuters sources, the attack might have been constructed in an unusual scheme: the first drone breached the outer structure of the building, after which the second drone entered through the resulting opening and exploded inside. Such a sequence requires not just approximate coordinates of a large diplomatic complex, but high precision, stable navigation, and an understanding of the target’s structure.

This episode raised a question among intelligence analysts: did Iran have precise data on where within the embassy complex the CIA unit was located?

Theoretically, the station could have been hit accidentally during an attack on the embassy as a whole. But when information simultaneously emerges about another CIA facility being hit in Iraq, the version of a simple coincidence begins to look significantly weaker.

Russia possesses satellite observation means, extensive electronic intelligence capabilities, and years of experience studying American military infrastructure. Moscow also has an obvious interest in weakening the US presence both in Europe and the Middle East.

American intelligence agencies now have to determine whether the Russian side limited itself to supplying equipment or transferred specific coordinates, satellite images, and other target information to Iran.

What is the Russian ‘Kometa-M’

At the center of the technical part of the investigation is the Russian satellite navigation system of the ‘Kometa-M’ family.

This is not a device that independently searches for a target or recognizes a CIA building. ‘Kometa-M’ is a protected navigation module that allows a drone to continue moving along pre-loaded coordinates under conditions of active satellite signal jamming.

The main advantage of such a system is increased resistance to electronic warfare. A regular Shahed may deviate from the route if the GPS signal or another satellite system is jammed or spoofed. The Russian module helps filter out interference and maintain accuracy on the final flight segment.

The Main Intelligence Directorate of Ukraine documented various versions of Russian systems of the ‘Kometa’ family found in guided munitions and other types of Russian weapons. The Ukrainian component database, in particular, features the interference-resistant system ‘Kometa-M12’, manufactured by the Russian enterprise VNIIR-‘Progress’.

Intelligence sources cited by Reuters believe that Russia could have transferred more advanced navigation technology to Iran for upgrading Shahed. Such devices become significantly more dangerous: they do not turn into high-precision Western-level weapons but gain much more chances to reach the designated point directly.

This results in an extremely dangerous combination. Russia can provide coordinates and satellite information, Iran can prepare and launch drones, and the Russian navigation system can help them pass through jamming and approach the secret facility.

Each side can formally claim that it did not strike independently. But the result of such a division of roles remains the same explosion.

From Ukraine to the Persian Gulf

The connection between Russia’s war against Ukraine and current events in the Middle East is becoming increasingly evident.

Ukraine has become a huge testing ground for Russian developers, where Moscow has been testing Shahed for years, changing their design, improving navigation, complicating routes, and finding ways to bypass air defenses. Now, technologies created and tested on Ukrainian cities could allegedly have been transferred to Iran for attacks on American facilities.

This is the same technological conveyor of terror. Iran once transferred Shahed to Russia for strikes on Ukraine. Russia reworked these drones, improved individual systems, and gained combat experience in their mass use. Now, the upgraded solutions could return to Tehran — already with Russian intelligence capabilities.

European states warned Washington about this threat back in March 2026. According to Reuters, European ministers were planning to raise the issue of Russian support for Iran with Secretary of State Marco Rubio. Intelligence sources reported that Moscow was transferring satellite images and technologies to Tehran, helping to select American and regional targets. Sergey Lavrov denied reports of intelligence transfers, although the Russian side did not hide the existence of military cooperation with Iran.

NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency notes: the threat concerns not only the US and Ukraine. Any technology that increases the accuracy of Iranian drones automatically creates additional danger for Israel, American bases in the region, facilities in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Bahrain, Qatar, and Iraq.

Israel has already faced massive Iranian attacks. Therefore, the issue of Russian assistance to Tehran cannot be viewed as a distant episode of the Moscow-Washington confrontation. Russian navigation modules, satellite data, and experience in bypassing air defenses can ultimately be used against Israeli targets.

Americans are already dying

On July 17, 2026, two American servicemen were killed in Jordan while repelling an Iranian attack using ballistic missiles and drones. Another serviceman was initially considered missing. These data were officially confirmed by the US Central Command.

It is important to formulate the circumstances accurately: CENTCOM did not state that the military died solely from a direct hit by a ballistic missile. The official statement says they died during the defense against a combined missile-drone attack.

Nevertheless, after this episode, the question of Russia’s role became even sharper. Analysts are trying to understand whether Iran received Russian data only for the March attacks on CIA facilities or if Moscow could have helped Tehran in selecting American military targets in Jordan.

There is currently no public evidence of Russian involvement specifically in the July strike. But the very fact of such a question shows the depth of distrust that has arisen due to Moscow and Tehran’s cooperation.

This is no longer abstract geopolitics. American military personnel are dying, secret CIA facilities are being damaged, and drones created by Iran and improved with Russian technologies are becoming weapons of a common war against the West.

Washington talks to Moscow while intelligence checks its role

The ongoing diplomatic dialogue between the US and Russia makes the situation look particularly contradictory.

On July 23, 2026, Marco Rubio met with Sergey Lavrov in Manila on the sidelines of the ASEAN Regional Forum. The parties discussed Russia’s war against Ukraine, bilateral relations, and the possibility of resuming diplomatic efforts. At the same time, the American intelligence community continues to investigate whether Moscow helped Iran target CIA facilities.

Washington is trying to separate directions: talking to the Kremlin about Ukraine separately, fighting Iran separately, and investigating the transfer of intelligence data separately.

But Russia and Iran, apparently, have long not considered these conflicts separately.

For Moscow, the war in the Middle East can distract American resources from Ukraine, raise oil prices, create a rift between the US and allies, and increase the load on the Western air defense system. For Tehran, Russian assistance opens access to technologies that were improved during strikes on Ukrainian territory.

This creates a single front, even if its participants do not formalize an official military alliance.

What this threat means for Israel and how to respond

For Israel, the most dangerous aspect is not the mere fact that Iran has Russian navigation modules. The main threat arises when interference-protected navigation is combined with precise satellite images, intelligence data, and information about the internal structure of objects.

Iran has previously had coordinates of Israeli military bases, airfields, and enterprises. However, the ability to receive fresher data, refine the location of individual units, and program drones for sequential strikes significantly increases the danger. A scenario in which the first device damages the outer defense and the second is directed into the resulting gap is especially alarming for underground command posts, hangars, ammunition depots, radar stations, and protected communication facilities.

Israel needs to proceed from the fact that Russian-Iranian cooperation is no longer limited to the war against Ukraine. Technologies that Russia tested on Ukrainian cities can return to Iran in an improved form and then be used against Israel and American forces in the Middle East.

But technical measures alone are no longer sufficient. Israel must formulate a clear political position: assistance to Iran in increasing the accuracy of missile and drone strikes is a direct threat to Israel’s national security, regardless of which country these systems are used against today.

Jerusalem must officially demand explanations from Moscow regarding the transfer of navigation technologies, satellite information, and other means to Iran that can be used for target selection. If the American investigation confirms the transfer of CIA facility coordinates, Israel must publicly declare that Russia has ceased to be a neutral participant in the Middle Eastern confrontation and has effectively joined in strengthening Iran’s strike potential.

It is also necessary to abandon the policy where maintaining working relations with the Kremlin is automatically considered more important than publicly defending Israeli interests. Caution may have had an explanation while Russia posed a threat primarily through its presence in Syria. But if Moscow helps Iran improve weapons capable of striking secret facilities with increased accuracy, the previous model of relations becomes dangerous for Israel itself.

This does not mean that Israel is obliged to immediately sever diplomatic relations with Russia.

However, contacts with Moscow should depend on its actual behavior. Military-technical assistance to Iran should have a political price: reducing sensitive cooperation, restrictions on Russian structures associated with Iranian defense programs, and joining targeted sanctions against enterprises and specialists involved in the development of such systems.

The first practical task should be obtaining full intelligence information from the US about the March attacks on CIA facilities. It is important for Israel to know which versions of Shahed were used, which components were found in the wreckage, how accurately the devices maintained the route, and whether there are signs of coordinate loading with the participation of Russian specialists.

The second direction is the modernization of electronic protection. If ‘Kometa-M’ indeed increases the resistance of drones to conventional jamming, Israel will have to develop not only satellite signal suppression but also methods of navigation deception, control interception, physical destruction of drones at long ranges, and detection of devices before they enter Israeli airspace.

The third task is to revise the protection of strategic facilities. It is not enough to simply cover a base with an air defense system. It is necessary to consider the possibility of repeated strikes on one point, the use of several drones with different tasks, and attempts to hit an already damaged section of the building. Critical centers should have dispersed command posts, backup communication systems, and the ability to continue operating after a direct hit.

Israel should also significantly expand the exchange of experience with Ukraine. Ukrainian specialists have unique information about Russian versions of Shahed, ‘Kometa’ family modules, changes in drone design, and practical ways to counter them. Political distance from Kyiv in this area no longer looks like caution — it can turn into a refusal of information necessary for the protection of Israeli cities.

Cooperation with Ukraine should include regular exchange of technical data, joint analysis of wreckage, study of Russian navigation modules, and coordination of actions against companies supplying components for drone production. Israel should not wait until weapons tested against Ukraine are massively used against it.

At the same time, it is necessary to strengthen political coordination with the US and European states. If Moscow is indeed helping Tehran target American facilities, this creates a basis for a common sanctions and diplomatic response. Israel should participate in forming such a response, rather than trying to maintain separate relations with Russia in the hope that Moscow and Iran’s cooperation will not be directed against Israeli targets.

It is impossible to simultaneously consider Iran the main strategic adversary of Israel and turn a blind eye to the actions of a state that transfers technologies, intelligence capabilities, and combat experience to it. Such duality no longer protects Israel — it limits its ability to respond to the threat in advance.

If the investigation confirms the transfer of coordinates, Israel will have to reconsider its attitude towards Russia. A state that helps Iran increase the accuracy of strikes and choose secret targets becomes part of a hostile infrastructure, even if it does not formally launch missiles and drones independently.

The political conclusion must be crystal clear: relations with Moscow cannot be built as if Russian support for Iran does not concern Israel. It does — directly. Therefore, Israel needs to act before Russian intelligence data and navigation technologies are used for a strike on an Israeli facility, not after.

NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency considers it fundamentally important not to substitute the investigation with a ready-made verdict. American intelligence agencies have not yet presented public evidence that Russia transferred coordinates of the CIA station to Iran. It has not been established whether Russian specialists participated in programming routes or selecting targets.

But the already known circumstances look extremely alarming.

Two CIA facilities were hit. Iran used drones with unusually high precision. Russia provided Tehran with military technologies and, according to Western sources, satellite information. One of the intelligence documents concluded a likely Russian role in targeting the strikes.

If further investigation confirms the transfer of coordinates, Moscow will cross a qualitatively new line.

This will mean that Russia is not just selling or transferring weapons to Iran. It helps choose American targets, provides means for their destruction, and uses Tehran as an executor of attacks, retaining the ability to deny its own involvement.

And then the expression ‘Russian-Iranian partnership’ will become too mild.

It will be about the complicity of two terrorist regimes that have combined intelligence, technologies, and combat experience to strike Ukraine, Israel, American military personnel, and Western intelligence facilities.

The consequences of such a policy are already visible far beyond the European front. While some Western politicians continue to treat aid to Ukraine as an issue that can be postponed or used in negotiations, the technologies of the Russian war are spreading across the Middle East.

The war that was not stopped in Ukraine did not remain in Ukraine.

…
Is it ‘racism’ or ‘support by Russians for all enemies of Israel’? What is beginning to reach Israeli society, while the government ‘does not notice’ it: the Dolev Cohen scandal on Kan 11 - August 22, 2026 - Новости Израиля

Video: “Know Ours” – Kirill Karetnik – from Ukraine, moved to Israel in 2009, served in the army, worked, and became a politician - August 21, 2026 - Новости Израиля

The 7th Ukrainian Air Assault Corps celebrated 3 years: Jewish chaplain Yakov Sinyakov together with Ukrainian paratroopers - August 21, 2026 - Новости Израиля

In Uman on July 20, 2026, a ceremonial event was held in honor of the Israeli ambassador to Ukraine, Michael Brodsky, who is concluding his diplomatic tenure after five years of service.

This is about the farewell to the diplomat in connection with the end of his term.

The event was hosted by the Breslov Center in Uman and the city’s chief rabbi, Yaakov Jan. Participants thanked Brodsky for strengthening relations between Israel and Ukraine, his attention to the Jewish community, and his work during the particularly difficult years of the full-scale war, – reported the Israeli bhol.co.il on July 20, 2026, and posted many photos from the ceremony.

Michael Brodsky continues to serve as the Israeli ambassador to Ukraine. His diplomatic mission is expected to conclude in August 2026, but the exact date of the end of his term has not yet been publicly announced. The ceremony held in Uman on July 20 was a pre-arranged farewell to the diplomat before the end of his tenure.

Formally, the ambassador’s powers will cease after Israel notifies the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine about the end of his mission. The appointment of a successor does not in itself terminate the powers of the current ambassador.

Who participated in the ceremony

Representatives of several Jewish communities, Israeli organizations, diplomatic structures, and the Uman municipality attended the meeting.

Among the participants were:

• Chief Rabbi of Uman Yaakov Jan;
• Chairman of the Federation of Jewish Communities of Ukraine, Rabbi Meir Stambler;
• Chief Rabbi of Vinnytsia Shaul Horowitz;
• Chabad emissary in Kyiv and head of the Simcha school, Rabbi Moti Levengartz;
• Representative of the Federation of Jewish Communities Levi Edri;
• Representatives of ‘Ichud Hatzalah’ Matityahu Shapira and Naftali Rabinovich;
• Deputy Director General of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs Eli Ifrah;
• Israeli Consul in Moldova Sagi Rabovsky;
• Representative of the World Zionist Organization in Ukraine Nahman Steinenberg;
• General Director of the Breslov Center Michael Pinto;
• Deputy Mayor of Uman Oleg Ganis;
• Public figure of Uman Shlomi Elisha.

During the ceremony, words of gratitude were expressed for Brodsky’s activities throughout his tenure, especially during the war. The meeting concluded with wishes of success to the diplomat and hope for further strengthening of relations between Israel, the Jews of Ukraine, and the Ukrainian people.

What Brodsky was gifted and why

In a photo from the ceremony, it is seen that representatives of ‘Ichud Hatzalah’ presented Michael Brodsky with a silver model of an emergency medical vehicle encased in a transparent case, as well as a certificate of appreciation.

The certificate in Hebrew bears the diplomat’s name and reads:

“To Michael Brodsky — with gratitude and appreciation.”

The model of the vehicle symbolizes the work of ‘Ichud Hatzalah’ — the Israeli volunteer emergency medical service. Its representatives, Matityahu Shapira and Naftali Rabinovich, were among the official participants of the ceremony.

During the pilgrimage on Rosh Hashanah in Uman, tens of thousands of people are present simultaneously. Therefore, rescuers set up medical points, provide first aid, are on duty near prayer complexes, and interact with Ukrainian emergency services.

The original message does not state that the award is related to a specific rescue operation. Therefore, it is more accurate to explain it as a symbol of the long-term cooperation of the Israeli embassy with medical and rescue structures serving Israeli pilgrims.

Five years of Michael Brodsky in Ukraine

Michael Brodsky began his duties as the Israeli ambassador to Ukraine in August 2021.

On October 1, 2021, he presented his credentials to the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky. The meeting discussed bilateral relations, cooperation between Israel and Ukraine, the preservation of historical memory, and issues of Jewish life.

Brodsky was born on August 19, 1972. He graduated from Tel Aviv University with a bachelor’s degree in political science and a master’s degree in diplomacy and national security.

From 2003 to 2006, he worked as the press attaché of the Israeli embassy in Moscow, and from 2006 to 2008, he was a political advisor there. From 2009 to 2013, he headed the public diplomacy direction at the Israeli embassy in the United Kingdom.

From 2015 to 2018, Brodsky was the Israeli ambassador to Kazakhstan and a non-resident ambassador to Kyrgyzstan, and from 2019 to 2021, he served as the director of the First Eurasian Department of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

February 24, 2022: the embassy’s work turned into evacuation

Most of Brodsky’s tenure coincided with the full-scale Russian war against Ukraine.

The embassy was moved from Kyiv to Lviv a few days before the invasion. After February 24, 2022, the diplomats relocated to Poland and for several months operated essentially as an ’embassy in exile’.

According to Brodsky himself, at the start of the war, more than 10,000 Israeli citizens remained in Ukraine. Diplomats opened a hotline, received calls around the clock, and helped people leave by buses and cars through Ukraine’s western borders.

On March 4, 2022, Michael Brodsky was involved in a car accident in Poland on his way to Warsaw. He sustained minor injuries and was taken to Israel for treatment. Temporary leadership of the diplomatic work was assumed by Simona Galperin, who then headed the Eurasian direction of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

After treatment, Brodsky returned to work.

On May 17, 2022, he arrived in Kyiv and raised the Israeli flag near the embassy building. Together with Deputy Yoav Bistritzky, he led the first group of Israeli diplomats to return to the Ukrainian capital after the start of the full-scale invasion.

Why the ceremony was held in Uman

Uman is one of the most challenging areas of work for the Israeli embassy in Ukraine.

Every year on Rosh Hashanah, tens of thousands of Jews, many of whom hold Israeli citizenship, come to the city. They head to the grave of Rabbi Nachman of Breslov.

After the closure of Ukrainian airspace in February 2022, pilgrims have to travel through Moldova, Romania, Poland, Hungary, and other neighboring countries.

The Israeli embassy has to coordinate work with the Ukrainian government, the State Border Guard Service, the National Police, the authorities of the Cherkasy region, the Uman municipality, and transit countries.

On July 22, 2022, Brodsky urged Israelis to refrain from traveling to Uman. He warned that Ukraine is at war, and the embassy would not be able to guarantee the safety of pilgrims or provide full consular assistance in the event of a large-scale emergency.

Despite the warnings, the pilgrimage continued.

On September 9–10, 2023, Brodsky held talks with the leadership of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine. Israel and Ukraine agreed on measures to facilitate the entry of tens of thousands of pilgrims through the borders of neighboring countries.

On September 14, 2023, Ukrainian authorities reported the round-the-clock operation of seven police posts in places of mass gathering of pilgrims. About 30,000 guests were expected in Uman, and Israeli police assisted Ukrainian law enforcement.

At the end of September 2024, Brodsky reported the arrival of another group of Israeli police in Uman. According to him, more than 30,000 pilgrims were expected, although the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs again recommended citizens refrain from traveling to the warring country.

Following the pilgrimage on October 2–4, 2024, Ukrainian officials reported that about 35,000 people arrived in Uman.

This is why the Breslov Center viewed Brodsky not just as an ambassador in Kyiv, but as the main official intermediary between Israel, the Ukrainian authorities, and tens of thousands of pilgrims.

Who are the Breslov Hasidim

Breslov, or Breslov Hasidim, are followers of the teachings of Rabbi Nachman of Breslov.

Rabbi Nachman was born in 1772 in Medzhybizh and was the great-grandson of the Baal Shem Tov, the founder of Hasidism.

In September 1802, he moved to Breslov, a town in modern-day Vinnytsia region. The name of the movement comes from the name of Breslov. It should not be confused with Bratislava or the Polish Wrocław.

At the center of Rabbi Nachman’s teachings are personal prayer, spiritual joy, overcoming despair, and belief in a person’s ability to change their life.

One of the most well-known practices is hitbodedut — a solitary conversation with God in one’s own words.

Rabbi Nachman did not create a hereditary dynasty or appoint a successor. His closest disciple, Reb Natan Sternhartz of Nemirov, recorded and published the teachings of his mentor, supported the communities, and effectively led the movement, but did not proclaim himself the new rebbe.

Therefore, Breslov Hasidim still do not have a single supreme contemporary leader. There are different rabbis, communities, yeshivas, and organizations that recognize the spiritual authority of Rabbi Nachman.

Why they go to Uman

In the spring of 1810, the seriously ill Rabbi Nachman moved to Uman.

He spent the last months of his life there, addressed his followers on Rosh Hashanah 1810, and died on October 16, 1810, at the age of 38. He was buried in the old Jewish cemetery of Uman.

In the spring of 1811, Reb Natan organized an annual gathering of followers in Uman. Thus, the tradition of celebrating Rosh Hashanah near Rabbi Nachman’s grave began. In 1834, Reb Natan built a large synagogue for the gathering participants.

During the Soviet era, the pilgrimage was banned or conducted underground. Mass trips began to revive in the late 1980s and especially after Ukraine regained independence in 1991.

However, not every person who comes to Uman today is a Breslov Hasid in the strict sense. Among the guests are representatives of other religious directions, traditional Israelis, people who have returned to religious life, public figures, and those who perceive the trip as a one-time spiritual journey. Breslov sources also note that a significant portion of the pilgrims do not belong to the core of the movement.

Where they live and where they travel besides Uman

Most modern Breslov Hasidim do not live in Ukraine but in Israel.

The main communities and institutions operate in Jerusalem, Bnei Brak, Safed, and Yavneel. In Jerusalem and Bnei Brak, there are several thousand families that form the core of the movement. Synagogues, yeshivas, rabbinical educational institutions, and charitable foundations operate there.

Breslov centers and communities also exist in New York, Los Angeles, Lakewood, Montreal, London, and Paris. However, they do not have a single administrative structure that governs all the communities worldwide.

Uman is the main pilgrimage site for Rosh Hashanah, but Breslov Hasidim also visit:

• Breslov, where Rabbi Nachman lived and taught;
• Nemirov, associated with Reb Natan;
• Medzhybizh, where Rabbi Nachman was born and the Baal Shem Tov is buried;
• Berdychiv and other historical centers of Jewish life in Ukraine;
• Safed, Tiberias, and Mount Meron in Israel.

What is the Breslov Center in Uman

The Breslov Center in Uman, which hosted the ceremony in honor of Michael Brodsky, is a local religious, public, and coordination structure working with the Breslov community, pilgrims, Ukrainian authorities, and official representatives of Israel.

The origins of the organized activities of the center are linked to the work of Rabbi Yechiel Michel Dorfman. After leaving the USSR in 1969, he began preserving Rabbi Nachman’s grave, developing pilgrimage infrastructure, and building a large kloyz and mikvahs in Uman. This work was later continued by his students and representatives of Breslov communities.

The Israeli association ‘World Breslov Center’ was officially registered on June 24, 2003. It participated in maintaining the religious infrastructure of Uman, organizing pilgrimages, and negotiating with Ukrainian authorities.

The current ‘Breslov Center in Uman’, headed by the city’s chief rabbi Yaakov Jan and represented by Michael Pinto and Nahman Steinenberg, has been actively operating since at least 2024. However, open sources do not confirm that it is the direct legal successor of the association registered in 2003.

It is not the worldwide headquarters of Breslov Hasidism and does not own all the infrastructure near Rabbi Nachman’s grave. The center mainly deals with public relations, negotiations with authorities, pilgrimage preparation, coordination with police, diplomats, medics, and rescue organizations.

Who leads the center

The center operates under the leadership of the chief rabbi of Uman, Yaakov Jan.

Michael Pinto is listed as the general director of the Breslov Center. He is involved in organizational, public, and external work.

Nahman Steinenberg, a representative of the World Zionist Organization in Ukraine, also participates in the leadership and organization of the center’s external contacts.

In July 2024, the Breslov Center organized the first official visit of Uman’s mayor, Iryna Pletneva, and her deputies to Israel.

The Ukrainian delegation met with Minister of Culture and Sports Miki Zohar, Minister of Religious Services Michael Malkieli, and Minister of Internal Affairs Moshe Arbel. They discussed Uman’s preparation for Rosh Hashanah, security, municipal cooperation, and the reception of tens of thousands of Israeli citizens. The visit was organized by Michael Pinto and Nahman Steinenberg.

Where the center is located and what is in the quarter

The center’s work is concentrated in the area of the Jewish pilgrimage quarter around Rabbi Nachman’s grave.

Officially, the grave is located at: Uman, Hryhoriya Kosynky Street, 1.

On July 2, 2025, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine elevated the status of the site and recognized Rabbi Nachman’s grave as a monument of national historical significance. Before that, it had the status of a local significance monument.

However, a confirmed separate postal address for the administration of the Breslov Center itself is not specified in open publications. The center is better perceived as a coordination organization rather than just a single building.

In the pilgrimage quarter, there are:

• Rabbi Nachman’s grave;
• Synagogues and prayer halls;
• A large Breslov kloyz — a house of prayer and study;
• Mikvahs for religious purification;
• Hotels, apartments, and hospitality houses;
• kosher kitchens and dining rooms;
• medical points;
• charitable organizations;
• bookstores and centers for the distribution of religious literature.

However, all this does not belong to one structure.

The complex directly near the grave is managed by a separate organization — “Ihud Breslov in Uman”, or Breslov Union.

On August 25, 2025, this organization announced a project to reconstruct the complex costing more than two million dollars. The plan includes separate prayer halls for Ashkenazi and Sephardic rites, a women’s section, a dance hall, new sanitary facilities, and rest areas.

According to the organizers, the annual maintenance of the complex exceeds 800 thousand dollars, and preparation for Rosh Hashanah alone costs more than 350 thousand dollars.

Thus, the “Breslov Center” Pinto and Jan is primarily engaged in public relations, coordination, and interaction with the authorities, while “Ihud Breslov” manages the grave complex itself. These are different structures, although they may cooperate.

How the center works before Rosh Hashanah

Before the annual pilgrimage, center representatives participate in negotiations on:

• border operations and transport routes;
• accommodation for tens of thousands of people;
• sanitary conditions;
• water and electricity supply;
• police and rescue operations;
• medical points;
• access to shelters;
• actions during air raids;
• consular assistance to Israeli citizens.

In 2024–2025, the center also interacted with “Ihud Hatzalah” in preparing medical units and volunteers for the mass arrival of pilgrims. Organization representatives named Yaakov Jan as one of the center’s leaders, Michael Pinto as the general director, and Nachman Steinenberg as the coordinator of relations with the authorities.

The center’s work is not limited to the pilgrimage.

On September 6, 2025, the Israeli international cooperation agency MASHAV announced the installation of a water purification system at the Central City Hospital in Uman. The project was implemented jointly with the Israeli embassy and is intended to provide clean drinking water to the hospital and residents of nearby areas.

Michael Brodsky personally opened the installation during a visit to Uman. Michael Pinto and Nachman Steinenberg also participated in the event.

NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency notes that in this way, the center gradually transformed from a structure associated only with religious pilgrimage into a mediator between the Jewish community, the city of Uman, and Israeli governmental and public organizations.

How Brodsky was connected to the Breslov Center

Michael Brodsky did not publicly call himself a Breslov Hasid.

His connection with the center was diplomatic and practical.

Through the embassy, issues of entry for Israeli citizens, interaction with Ukrainian border guards, the arrival of Israeli police and medics, missile threat warnings, consular staff work, and contacts with the Uman municipality were resolved.

After the war began, these tasks became significantly more complicated. The pilgrimage effectively turned into an annual international operation involving the authorities of Ukraine, Israel, Moldova, and other transit countries.

Brodsky simultaneously warned citizens of the danger and continued negotiations, understanding that even after official recommendations, tens of thousands of people would still head to Uman.

That is why the Breslov Center organized a separate ceremony for him. For the center’s leadership, he was the main representative of Israel, with whom pilgrimage, security, medical, and humanitarian cooperation issues were resolved over five years.

The last weeks of the term and the new ambassador

Even before the ceremony in Uman, Michael Brodsky received official recognition from the Ukrainian capital.

On July 8, 2026, Kyiv Mayor Vitali Klitschko awarded him the “For the Defense of Kyiv” medal for supporting the Ukrainian capital during the war.

Klitschko thanked the diplomat for five years of service, open dialogue, partnership, and participation in joint projects. The parties discussed Israel’s assistance after the start of the full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022.

Brodsky, for his part, recalled the support Ukraine expressed to Israel after the Hamas terrorist attack on October 7, 2023.

The name of Brodsky’s successor has been known since the end of 2025.

On November 23, 2025, the Israeli government approved the appointment of career diplomat Roi Rosenblit as the new ambassador to Ukraine. Previously, Rosenblit was Israel’s ambassador to Senegal, worked as deputy head of diplomatic missions in Moscow and Cairo, and represented Israel in the Pacific region countries.

The formal transfer of powers is completed after diplomatic procedures and the presentation of credentials by the new ambassador to the Ukrainian side.

NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency notes that Michael Brodsky’s term was one of the most challenging in the history of the Israeli diplomatic mission in Ukraine.

He arrived in Kyiv in August 2021, when relations between the two countries were developing peacefully. Already six months later, the embassy had to evacuate citizens, leave the Ukrainian capital, and work from Poland.

Brodsky returned to Kyiv on May 17, 2022, continued working under air raid alerts, coordinated humanitarian projects, and simultaneously was responsible for the safety of tens of thousands of Israelis who annually come to Uman.

The ceremony on July 20, 2026 was not just a farewell to the ambassador. It summed up five years of cooperation, during which diplomacy was associated not only with negotiations between governments but also with the evacuation of people, medicine, community work, and citizen safety during the war.

…
Is it ‘racism’ or ‘support by Russians for all enemies of Israel’? What is beginning to reach Israeli society, while the government ‘does not notice’ it: the Dolev Cohen scandal on Kan 11 - August 22, 2026 - Новости Израиля

Video: “Know Ours” – Kirill Karetnik – from Ukraine, moved to Israel in 2009, served in the army, worked, and became a politician - August 21, 2026 - Новости Израиля

The 7th Ukrainian Air Assault Corps celebrated 3 years: Jewish chaplain Yakov Sinyakov together with Ukrainian paratroopers - August 21, 2026 - Новости Израиля

Israel, from the very beginning of the full-scale war, took a cautious position regarding military assistance to Ukraine. Officially, Jerusalem refused to supply Kyiv with lethal weapons, fearing deterioration of relations with Moscow for a number of reasons — which are not the subject of this article.

Nevertheless, under pressure from Western allies and against the backdrop of the Iranian Shahed drone threat, Israel gradually softened its stance on “defense-related equipment”.

Export Licenses

In February 2023, according to Walla and Times of Israel, Defense Minister Yoav Galant and Foreign Minister Eli Cohen for the first time approved export licenses for two Israeli companies to supply Ukraine with electronic warfare systems against drones with a range of up to ~40 km. Officials emphasized that this was not a change in policy, but a one-time permit for “non-lethal, purely defensive systems that do not kill Russian soldiers”.

It is known that one of these systems was a multi-purpose radar produced by the Israeli company RADA (now part of the American Leonardo DRS). When making this decision, Israeli officials also considered their own interest: to obtain data on how their technology would perform against Iranian drones on the Ukrainian front.

Moscow reacted painfully to such plans: already in early February 2023, the Russian Foreign Ministry publicly warned Israel against supplying weapons to Ukraine. That is probably why Israel chose an indirect path of assistance.

It was announced that Israel would help Ukraine create an early warning system for missile and drone attacks (an analogue of the Israeli “Tzeva Adom”), which formally pertains to civil defense and not the transfer of weapons. In March 2023, meetings were reported between representatives of Israel’s Home Front Command and Ukrainian officers in Poland to implement this warning system. In May 2023, testing of the Israeli warning system began in Kyiv: it was supposed to start in the capital and then expand to other cities. Thus, Israel demonstrated its readiness to help protect Ukraine’s population from attacks, but not by supplying weapons directly.

As already known, “צבע אדום‎” — in the Kyiv region on July 24, 2025, the Israeli-provided alert system was activated for the first time against missile attacks.

At the same time, there were behind-the-scenes negotiations on supplying anti-drone systems via third countries. Already at the beginning of 2023, a group of Lithuanian NGOs (Blue/Yellow, Laisvės TV, and others) launched a campaign Radarom! to raise funds for tactical radars for Ukraine.

Lithuanian journalist Andrius Tapinas stated that they “reached an agreement with Israeli manufacturers, the radars are ready – only money is needed”. In fact, Israel’s Ministry of Defense did not object to such radars being sold to Ukraine at the expense of Lithuanian donors. This unofficial supply channel allowed Jerusalem to formally maintain neutrality while responding to US calls to help Ukraine close its skies. The Israeli press noted that the deal became possible under allied pressure and was presented as an exception for humanitarian purposes — to protect civilians from shelling.

RADA RPS‑42: Technology and Capabilities

RADA RPS‑42 is a mobile multifunctional radar station with an active phased array antenna (AESA), designed to detect small UAVs, missiles, artillery shells, and other aerial targets at short and medium ranges. It has been produced by the Israeli company RADA Electronic Industries Ltd. since the early 2010s.
Since 2022, RADA has been part of the American defense holding Leonardo DRS. The station is widely used to protect military facilities and critical infrastructure in various countries, including Ukraine since 2023.

Technical specifications:

• Detection range for drones and artillery shells: up to 10–30 km (depending on target type)
• Detection of aerial targets (aircraft, helicopters): up to 100 km
• Weight of one radar panel: about 23 kg
• Deployment time: several minutes, can be installed on a vehicle, tripod, or stationary
• Technology: active phased array antenna (AESA), operates in the X-band
• Coverage: up to 360° (with four panels)
• Operating mode: stand-alone or integrated into complex defense systems

Purpose and applications:

• Detection and tracking of small and medium aerial targets: kamikaze drones, UAVs, rockets, and artillery shells, mortar bombs, missiles
• Protection of assets and troops from aerial threats: early warning of raids and missile attacks
• Integration into air defense and C-RAM systems (protection from artillery strikes)
• Application flexibility: suitable for protecting military convoys and bases as well as urban objects, infrastructure, and critical communications

RADA RPS‑42 is used in many armies around the world as part of modern anti-drone and counter-artillery complexes.

“Mobility, compactness, and multifunctionality — that’s why the RPS‑42 is so in demand in modern conflicts,” write analysts at Israel Defense (Israel Defense, July 2024).

Logistics and Supply Channels

The main channel through which Israeli RADA RPS-42 radars reached Ukraine was via Lithuania. On January 30, 2023, a large-scale fundraising campaign “RADAROM!” (“To the Radar!”) was launched in Vilnius to purchase tactical air target detection radars.

Within just a few weeks, Lithuanians raised about €14 million, enough to acquire 16 new-generation radar stations. The Israeli company RADA Electronic Industries (headquartered in Netanya) agreed to sell these radars. Officially, the transactions were processed through the American corporation Leonardo DRS, with which RADA merged in 2022.

This legally simplified re-export: in fact, the radars were supplied as products of the American branch (DRS RADA Technologies), and not directly from Israel. However, as Israel Defense emphasized, such transfers still required approval from Israel’s Ministry of Defense — which was obtained.

The Lithuanian side handled all the logistics.

In February–March 2023, Ukrainian military crews arrived for training on operating these radars: first in Lithuania, at ranges in Kaunas, and then part of the preparation took place in Poland together with Israeli specialists.

At the beginning of May 2023, the first stations arrived on Ukrainian soil.

On May 4, 2023, volunteers reported the delivery of the first three out of 16 radars to Ukraine.

The remaining sets were delivered as documents and equipment were prepared throughout May–June. Lithuanian TV channel LRT published footage of radar unloading and a joint photo of Ukrainian military and Radarom project volunteers in front of one of the stations. Ukrainian officials did not publicly disclose details of these deliveries (likely at Israel’s request), but Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda openly declared on February 24, 2023 that:

“Lithuania, to mark the anniversary of resistance, is buying modern radars for Ukraine.”

Thus, the delivery of RADA radars was carried out not directly by Israel, but through the acquisition by a third party (a NATO country) and transfer as a donation to Ukraine.

It is important to note that RADA RPS-42 radars are an integral part of the Israeli anti-drone system Drone Dome (by Rafael). The Drone Dome system uses up to four such radars for 360° coverage, electro-optical cameras, and electronic warfare equipment to suppress drones.

However, according to available information, Ukraine received specifically radar modules (RPS-42 and some newer ieMHR), without electronic warfare modules. They are integrated with other components of Ukrainian air defense.

According to reports, the company “Systems of Electronic Export” (SEE) — the Ukrainian radar integrator — together with Leonardo DRS representatives at the MSPO-2023 exhibition discussed equipping these radars with additional devices and integrating them into the national air defense system. Interestingly, SEE’s report noted: the delivered RPS-42s were regarded as “material and technical aid provided by the US government.”

Apparently, after the radar was purchased from Israel with Lithuanian money, their delivery and integration were coordinated with the US (possibly through the International Support Fund for Ukraine or directly via the Ukrainian Armed Forces command). In any case, by summer 2023 all 16 Israeli radars were in service with Ukraine.

Neither Israel nor Ukraine officially commented on this topic, but the presence of these advanced Israeli radars at the front became public knowledge thanks to volunteer reports and media publications. For example, the newspaper Haaretz on May 8, 2023 reported that “for the first time, Israeli anti-drone radars were deployed in Ukraine”, highlighting Lithuania’s role in their purchase. Walla reported that 16 units of RADA radars were acquired for Ukraine with Lithuanian funds to give citizens timely warnings of Russian attacks and provide the military with a chance to intercept threats.

Use of RPS-42 on the Ukrainian Front

After receiving the new Israeli radars, Ukrainian air defense forces quickly put them into service. According to the Lithuanian Blue/Yellow fund, the first RPS-42 units were “already deployed in their operational sectors” as of early May 2023.

According to open data, these radars are used both to cover major cities and strategic rear facilities, as well as directly on the front line. Their main function is detecting short-range air targets and issuing target designations. The multifunctional RADA radars can detect a wide spectrum of threats: from artillery mines and rockets to UAVs and aircraft. Under Ukrainian conditions, the main threats were Russian cruise missiles and Iranian Shahed kamikaze drones.

The RPS-42 stations were integrated into a unified air defense network for early detection of launches and flybys of such targets. The radar data allow operators to quickly calculate the trajectory and probable impact point of a missile, after which the warning system activates sirens precisely in those areas threatened by the attack. This sharply increases the effectiveness of civil defense: people get several extra minutes to seek shelter, and air defense units can better allocate resources.

There are photos showing Ukrainian crews training in Lithuania: a mobile RPS-42 radar on a tripod, soldiers learning to use the station interface. After training, these crews deployed radars in Ukraine.

According to OSINT observers, the first systems were installed in central regions of Ukraine in May 2023—likely to protect the capital region and energy infrastructure. Their geography later expanded.

RPS-42 radars are mobile: they can be towed on trailers, mounted on armored vehicles, or installed stationary on towers. Israeli sources note that these ground-based tactical radars can operate on the move and are adapted for field use (resistant to interference and portable). Walla reported that RADA radars can be quickly redeployed and used to protect maneuvering units on the front line. It is likely that some of the 16 systems were transferred specifically to the air defense units of ground brigades in key sectors—to detect enemy UAVs (recon and loitering munitions) as well as for counter-battery operations (detecting artillery fire).

RADA radars can detect mortar bombs and MLRS rockets at ranges up to 20–25 km, enabling rapid warning of their own units about incoming fire. Unsurprisingly, in official Ukrainian materials, these stations are referred to as “air and artillery reconnaissance radars”.

There is evidence that several RPS-42/ieMHR radars were integrated into some of Ukraine’s mobile anti-aircraft systems. For example, social networks discussed a mysterious Ukrainian counter-drone system based on a vehicle, using the Israeli radar together with Ukrainian or Western electronic warfare equipment. Details were not publicly disclosed, but logically, the targets detected by radar could be automatically handed off to fire or jamming assets (anti-aircraft guns, EW).

Ukrainian military and volunteers have repeatedly published photos and videos of RPS-42 in use.

In particular, on May 5, 2023, OSINT analyst OSINTdefender published images from central Ukraine showing the Israeli radar deployed and a Ukrainian soldier beside it. These images also appeared on Reddit and attracted wide attention. Lithuanian volunteers proudly noted that “all these radars were bought with donations from Lithuanians”, highlighting successful international cooperation.

Mobile radar reconnaissance posts allow the Ukrainian Armed Forces to monitor the airspace around the clock: a typical tactic is to place the radar on a hill or forest edge, briefly turn it on to scan the area, and then quickly change position to avoid enemy strikes. The Russian side has confirmed the effectiveness of these measures: according to the ZALA concern, Ukrainians try to minimize radar operating time, “turning them on briefly, camouflaging or placing them on mobile platforms” to make detection harder. However, as will be shown below, Russian intelligence is actively hunting for these Israeli radars.

Israeli radar use at the front was also noted by officials. For example, Ukraine’s Ambassador to Israel Yevgen Korniychuk in June 2023 said that Ukraine had started piloting the Israeli warning system and “the same ‘Red Alert’ system that has protected Israel for years has been adapted to our realities”.

This system, being implemented in Kyiv, is based on a network of short-range radars (including RADA) and electro-optical sensors to detect missile and drone launches. Korniychuk stressed that Israeli technology allows for local activation of sirens, saving air defense resources. Thus, on the front line, the RPS-42 fulfills a dual mission—military (detecting and tracking targets for engagement) and humanitarian (warning civilians about incoming attacks).

Effectiveness and Role of RPS-42 in Air Defense

The appearance of Israeli radars significantly enhanced Ukraine’s ability to counter drones and missile strikes. These radars belong to the class of multifunctional 4D AESA radars with electronic scanning, capable of simultaneously tracking dozens of targets. Here are the key advantages noted in various sources:

• Detection of small targets. The RPS-42 can detect objects with a very low RCS—such as quadcopters or loitering munitions—at ranges around 10 km. Larger drones (the size of “Orlan”) are detected at 40–45 km, and airplanes or helicopters up to 100–150 km (in some cases up to 200 km in ideal conditions). Previously, Ukraine lacked such small tactical radars, so many enemy drones could approach at low altitude undetected. Now, a radar “cocoon” of RPS-42 units surrounds critical assets, covering the blind spots of larger radars.
• Integration with air defense systems. Data from RPS-42 feeds into the unified information space of Ukraine’s air defense. The stations work in real time, instantly relaying coordinates and trajectory data of detected targets. This allows anti-aircraft crews (MANPADS, ZU-23-2, Gepard, Hawk, etc.) to get advance targeting and prepare to engage the target on approach. According to Israel Hayom, RADA radars “are not intended for interception, but serve as targeting systems for short-range air defense”. In effect, RPS-42 became the “eyes” of anti-aircraft complexes, increasing their effectiveness.
• Reduction in expensive missile expenditure. Israeli experts note that an early warning system based on these radars helps conserve expensive munitions. For example, knowing the exact course and target of a missile, there’s no need to use a surface-to-air missile if the forecast shows it will fall in an uninhabited area. Israel’s “Iron Dome” operates similarly, ignoring rockets heading for empty spaces. Now, Ukraine’s air defense can manage ammunition more wisely, intercepting only truly dangerous targets. Amid Russia’s mass drone and missile barrages, this is a vital factor for air defense survivability.
• Increased survivability of forces and assets. As mentioned, RPS-42 units are integrated with local alert systems. They allow the impact point of an enemy missile or UAV to be determined in seconds, activating sirens only in the specific locality at risk. Previously, lack of such data meant that air raids would be declared across multiple regions (covering huge areas), even if the real threat was to a single city. Now, the warning zone is narrower, support services can respond more efficiently, and people don’t spend unnecessary hours in shelters. Estimates suggest that the Israeli system (including RADA radars and Israeli algorithms) has already saved many lives by giving timely warnings of missile attacks in autumn 2023. For example, during a massive strike on power infrastructure in October 2023, sirens and mobile alerts in Kyiv were triggered precisely and in advance—thanks to the new detection system.

Ukrainian military personnel highly value the Israeli radars they’ve received. At a meeting with Leonardo DRS representatives in September 2023, the Ukrainian side presented a detailed report on combat experience with RPS-42. This feedback, according to SEE, will help improve the systems to suit Ukraine’s specifics.

Discussions covered further equipping the radars (possibly with power supplies, anti-UAV protection, compatibility with national IFF systems, etc.). The parties also agreed to organize expanded overseas instructor training so more radar crews could be trained in Ukraine. All this demonstrates that RADA radars have been successfully integrated into Ukraine’s air defense and will be used for the long term. Moreover, further acquisitions of similar systems are being considered: for example, in July 2023, the Lithuanian government decided to purchase additional mobile radars for Ukraine worth €13.5 million under a pan-European air defense initiative. Some of these funds may go to new Israeli ieMHR (upgraded RPS-42 with extended range).

The RADA company itself (Leonardo DRS ISR Division) has indirectly confirmed a surge in demand due to the war in Ukraine. Its 2022–23 financial reports record a sharp rise in tactical radar orders. Israeli press noted that “RADA shares soared 30% on expectations that the war in Ukraine would bring the company major orders”. While there was no direct report of deliveries to Ukraine, investors clearly associated RADA’s success with this situation.

Russian Claims of Destruction: Truth or PR?

Russian military forces quickly perceived the threat posed by Israeli radars in the hands of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

From summer 2024, the Russian Ministry of Defense and pro-government media began regularly claiming to have destroyed Israeli RADA RPS‑42 radar stations (or their export ieMHR variants) in the combat zone in Ukraine.

What exactly did the Russian side publish (some examples):

• July 14, 2024: The Russian Ministry of Defense press service announced the destruction of a RADA radar complex in the Zaporizhzhia sector. The official summary mentioned the strike location and claimed the station was hit by Russian artillery or a missile (TASS, 14.07.2024). No details—such as photos, videos, or coordinates—were provided.
• August 24, 2024: The ZALA media group published a video allegedly showing a Russian “Lancet” kamikaze drone striking an ieMHR radar complex. The video description did not include precise coordinates, and the clip lasts only a few seconds, making it impossible to clearly identify the object.
  The very next day, Israeli outlet Israel Defense published a review that explicitly pointed out: the video contains no convincing evidence, no characteristic details of the RADA casing, no geolocation, and it’s impossible to say whether an Israeli radar was really destroyed (Israel Defense, 25.08.2024).
• August 2, 2025: The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed in its daily briefing to have destroyed two Israeli RADA complexes—one in Donbas, the other in Sumy region. As before, there were no photos, videos, serial numbers, or geolocation (Russian MoD, 02.08.2025; direct link unavailable, only reported through internal briefings and Russian-language MoD Telegram channels).

How did Western and Ukrainian sources react?

• All of these statements were rapidly spread across Russian and Belarusian Telegram channels, as well as various military blogs, where the mention of Israeli-made equipment was presented as proof of direct military cooperation between Israel and Ukraine.
• However, not a single independent source—neither Western OSINT analysts (such as OSINTdefender, Ukraine Weapons Tracker, GeoConfirmed) nor Ukrainian specialized media—has confirmed any of these alleged losses.
• According to widely accepted standards for military verification, confirming the destruction of equipment should include:
  1. geolocation of the strike site;
  2. photos or videos with clearly identifiable equipment details;
  3. time-stamped evidence;
  4. ideally—independent analysis from multiple experts.

In the case of RADA RPS‑42/ieMHR, none of this was published:

• OSINT groups either did not attempt to analyze the Russian-reported footage due to low quality and impossibility of identification,
• or stated outright that they found no confirming materials (OSINTdefender, August 2025).

Why does this situation stand out compared to other battlefield losses?

• For Russian systems—such as S-300, S-400, etc.—in every high-profile case of destruction, Ukrainian forces and the OSINT community post photos and videos from the strike site, as well as satellite images and expert analysis of debris.
• Typically, such publications appear within a day of the incident, complete with geolocation, casing details, expert commentary, and wide discussion in open sources.
• With Israeli radars, this has never happened—all reports of RADA RPS‑42/ieMHR losses exist only at the level of official Russian statements, without real proof.

Conclusion:
As of August 2025, none of Russia’s claimed losses of RADA RPS‑42 or ieMHR have been confirmed by independent analysts, OSINT groups, or Western media. Therefore, any such claims should be treated with maximum skepticism—unlike truly verified cases of Russian equipment losses, for which details and evidence are always available.

Overview of Sources and Media Coverage

The topic of Israeli radar deliveries to Ukraine attracted significant attention both in the West and in Israel, Russia, and Ukraine itself. English-language sources provided detailed coverage of the appearance of RPS-42s in the Ukrainian Armed Forces. For example, The Kyiv Independent and Euromaidan Press reported on May 5, 2023, about the arrival of the first three radars, noting that the Radarom campaign had raised €14 million for 16 Israeli radars to protect Ukraine’s skies. Industry media (Army Recognition, Israel Defense) described technical details: what the system is, how the Israeli Red Alert works in Ukraine, what types of threats it can detect. Israeli press also actively covered the issue. Even before the delivery, Haaretz published an article, “For the First Time, Israeli Anti-Drone Radars Deployed in Ukraine”, describing the purchase of 16 systems through a Lithuanian organization. Popular publications like Israel Hayom and the site Walla ran stories on how Israel’s Defense Ministry approved the deal and how this affected the IAI state conglomerate’s radar monopoly. After reports of Israeli radar losses in Ukraine, Israeli media responded: for example, Israel Hayom in August 2024 wrote about the “Lancet” drone strike video on a RADA radar and mentioned the 16 radar deliveries to Ukraine in 2023. Thus, Israeli society was aware of these supplies, even if the government did not publicize them.

Russian media made the RPS-42 issue a part of their propaganda narrative.

Major agencies (RIA Novosti, TASS) regularly include phrases about the destruction of the “Israeli RADA radar” in their dispatches, sometimes to emphasize: look, Israel is secretly helping Kyiv, but we are destroying these “Western deliveries.” In October 2024, when the Russian army first “struck” an ieMHR radar, RIA “Novosti Krym” published a separate piece, “Israeli Radar Complex Destroyed for the First Time in the SVO Zone.” It described the radar’s characteristics in detail and even noted that RADA’s headquarters is in Israel with branches in the US.

This indicates an attempt by Russia to use the episode for diplomatic pressure—to signal to Israel that its equipment in Ukraine “will burn.”

In addition, pro-Kremlin military bloggers (Telegram channels) enthusiastically picked up the story: they posted footage of strikes on RPS-42s, called them “hunters of our drones and aircraft”, and praised “Lancets” for scoring a new high-profile target. Some of these videos later made it into Western platforms (Twitter/X, Reddit), adding to the overall picture.

Ukrainian officials do not directly comment on the Israeli radars in the media—likely due to the sensitivity for Israel. However, Ukrainian military regularly thank partners for strengthening air defenses. In Ukrainian Air Force briefings, mentions of “new tactical radars” appeared without details. Volunteers and journalists in Ukraine cover the subject more openly. For example, the Militarnyi portal reported in May 2023: “RADA ieMHR radars are on combat duty in Ukraine”, citing a report by Israeli volunteer N. Flyer. Ukrainian news sites (UP, Novoye Vremya) republished information from Haaretz and Lithuanian sources, explaining to readers what radars were received and why it matters.

Overall, the international reaction to the RPS-42 supply was positive. These radars were seen as “purely defensive assistance”, not causing direct harm to Russia, but saving Ukrainian lives. The US and allies approved Israel’s step.

Meanwhile, Israel tried to keep a balance: helping Ukraine within limits, while assuring Moscow that lethal weapons (such as missiles or the “Iron Dome”) would not be provided to Kyiv.

Nevertheless, a precedent was set—Israeli military technology on the Ukrainian front.

Their combat experience showed that RADA RPS-42/ieMHR radars have substantially strengthened Ukraine’s air defense, though they themselves have become a target in the high-tech duel of “radar versus drone.”

Ukraine received a much-needed tool for early threat detection, while Israel gained valuable experience and a real-world test for its systems amid modern drone and missile warfare.

Conclusion: Summary of the RADA RPS‑42 Issue

• Ukraine received 16 RADA RPS‑42 radars—all delivered via Lithuania with funding from Lithuanian citizens and companies, and with Israel’s formal approval.
• The complexes protect cities, infrastructure, and frontline positions, and are integrated into the national early warning system.
• No new deliveries have been recorded for 2025.
• Reports of radar losses come only from Russian sources and have not received any independent Western verification so far.

As of August 2025, despite some damage, at least eight to ten of the original sixteen radars remain in service with Ukrainian air defense, according to open sources. The remaining units continue to perform core missions—early detection of kamikaze drones, missiles, and artillery—minimizing civilian casualties and preserving critical infrastructure.

At the same time, international experts emphasize that Ukraine’s experience operating the RADA RPS‑42 has been valuable for the Israeli defense industry. Israel, despite isolated incidents, continues to adhere to a policy of limited defensive support for Ukraine and does not transfer offensive weapons.

NAnews — Israel News will continue to monitor this topic and publish only data that can be genuinely confirmed by open sources.

…
Is it ‘racism’ or ‘support by Russians for all enemies of Israel’? What is beginning to reach Israeli society, while the government ‘does not notice’ it: the Dolev Cohen scandal on Kan 11 - August 22, 2026 - Новости Израиля

Video: “Know Ours” – Kirill Karetnik – from Ukraine, moved to Israel in 2009, served in the army, worked, and became a politician - August 21, 2026 - Новости Израиля

The 7th Ukrainian Air Assault Corps celebrated 3 years: Jewish chaplain Yakov Sinyakov together with Ukrainian paratroopers - August 21, 2026 - Новости Израиля