In the current election campaign in Israel, Ukraine has so far hardly been mentioned as an independent point of future policy. According to open pre-election materials that NAnews managed to verify, Yair Lapid became the first of the major Israeli politicians of the 2026 campaign not only to express support for Ukraine but also to directly link the attitude towards it with what his political camp intends to do after returning to power.
Author: Elena Gunko
In a large interview with the Russian-language project “Ulpan Politika“ (released on YouTube on September 16, 2026), he formulated this without diplomatic fog:
“If we return to power, we will do much more than we did then.”
By “then,” Lapid means 2022 — the period of the government of Naftali Bennett and Lapid himself, when Israel helped Ukraine humanitarianly, opened a field hospital, provided protective equipment, but refused to supply Kyiv with Israeli weapons and air defense systems. Now one of the two leaders of the united list “Beyahad” tells voters that such a level of participation is no longer sufficient.
And immediately after this, Lapid names a reason that for the Israeli audience is perhaps even more significant than the promise to increase aid to Ukraine itself.
Moreover, the wording itself deserves separate attention. According to open speeches and pre-election materials that NAnews managed to verify, this is the first case we found in the 2026 campaign where an Israeli politician of such a level — a former prime minister and current opposition leader — so directly publicly calls Russia an ally of Iran and immediately links this with the need to change Israel’s relations with Ukraine.
Lapid says:
“Now Russia is an ally of Iran. They act together in various military spheres.”
For Israeli politics, this wording is much harsher than the usual talks about “Moscow and Tehran rapprochement,” “military cooperation,” or “strategic partnership.” Lapid does not leave this connection at the level of diplomatic terminology: in his argumentation, Russia turns out to be an ally of a state that Israel considers its main regional adversary.
And Ukraine here appears not separately from Israeli security.
Lapid directly links the Russian war against Ukraine with the fact that Moscow and Tehran have deepened cooperation in the military sphere over the past years. From this, he derives a change in Israel’s own interest:
“And this, of course, strengthens our connection with the Ukrainians”.
It turns out to be quite a consistent construction. Russia is increasingly interacting with Iran; Iran poses a direct threat to Israel; Ukraine is fighting Russia and at the same time has accumulated technologies and combat experience that can be useful to Israel itself. Therefore, according to Lapid’s logic, relations with Ukraine cease to be only a matter of supporting a country attacked by Russia — they become part of Israel’s own security calculation.
That is why his next phrase about Ukraine already sounds completely different than it might have sounded in 2022.
This is already a different conversation than the one Israel had in the first months after the Russian invasion.
In 2022, one of the reasons for Jerusalem’s caution was the Russian military presence in Syria and the need to maintain the freedom of action of Israeli aviation against Iranian forces. At that time, the Bennett-Lapid government tried to help Ukraine while not bringing relations with Moscow to an open confrontation. Now Lapid himself claims that the balance of power has changed, and Russia has effectively ended up on the other side of the same strategic line on which Israel opposes Iran.
And further, the interview becomes even more interesting: Lapid talks not only about how much Israel can give Ukraine but also about what Ukraine can give Israel today.
He calls it:
“a two-way street.”
According to Lapid, Ukrainians have developed technologies and capabilities over the years of war that interest Israel, primarily in the field of combating drones. His next conclusion is also extremely direct: “the space for military cooperation has expanded”.
And then he returns once again to the pre-election promise:
“if we return to power, our policy will be bolder than in 2022”.
To a direct question from journalists about whether this includes military aid to Ukraine, Lapid did not promise specific weapons systems but replied:
“we must do everything possible to help Ukraine”.
This is where an important boundary lies. Lapid did not promise Ukraine Iron Dome, Arrow, David’s Sling, or any other specific Israeli weapons. He did not name any system, timeline, or volume of possible supplies. But politically, his wording still goes noticeably further than the position of the 2022 government: aid to Ukraine and possible military cooperation with it are marked for the first time in this campaign as part of the course that one of the leaders of a major Israeli bloc proposes to pursue after the elections.
What has changed since 2022
To understand how far Lapid is now departing from the previous line, it is necessary to restore not only political statements but also the factual picture of the first months of the full-scale war.
Israel indeed helped Ukraine. In March 2022, the government approved the creation of the “Kohav Meir” field hospital in the western part of the country. The official decision was presented by Prime Minister Naftali Bennett, Foreign Minister Yair Lapid, and Health Minister Nitzan Horowitz. About 21 million shekels were allocated for the launch of the hospital, with Israeli medics and specialists from Sheba Medical Center participating in the project.
Later, the Israeli Foreign Ministry reported that about seven thousand patients passed through “Kohav Meir.” Israel supplied Ukraine with medicines, medical equipment, generators, water purification systems, and other humanitarian aid.
But weapons were a different story.
This is where the red line of the Bennett-Lapid government lay. Kyiv wanted to receive Israeli air defense systems and repeatedly raised this issue publicly. Jerusalem, meanwhile, agreed to humanitarian aid, protective equipment, and later — assistance in creating an early warning system, but did not move to direct supplies of Israeli combat systems.
Therefore, Lapid’s current words cannot be reduced to the usual: “we have always supported Ukraine and will continue to support it.” He is talking about revising the scale of the previous policy.
Moreover, he repeats this thought twice. First — “we will do much more,” then — “our policy will be bolder.”
These are two formulations in one answer. Not a random slip.
Why Russia and Iran are mentioned in the same line here
During the first months of the full-scale war, the Russian factor for Israel looked completely different than for most European countries.
Russian troops were in Syria. Israel regularly struck targets there related to the Iranian presence and the transfer of weapons to Hezbollah. A mechanism to prevent unintended clashes between forces operated between Israel and Russia.
Therefore, any sharp deterioration in relations with Moscow was considered in Jerusalem not only as a diplomatic conflict around Ukraine. It could affect Israel’s freedom of action on its northern borders.
In the new interview, Lapid returns to this argument. But he says that the previous construction has effectively ceased to be what it was then. At the same time, Russia appears as a military partner of Iran — a state that Israel considers one of the main threats to its security.
And this is no longer just Lapid’s pre-election formula.
On July 23, 2025, during the visit of Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar to Kyiv, Israel and Ukraine officially agreed to start a strategic dialogue on the Iranian threat. The Ukrainian Foreign Ministry then separately stated the potential for cooperation between the two states in defense technologies and the intention to seek joint projects in the defense industry.
That is, the link Ukraine — Russia — Iran — Israel’s security, which Lapid is now using, no longer exists only in journalism or pre-election speeches. A separate official channel of negotiations on the common Iranian threat between Kyiv and Jerusalem has already been created.
Lapid goes further: he proposes to make this the basis for closer military cooperation.
What Ukraine can give Israel
Here his “two-way street” becomes especially substantial.
In the first months of the war, the conversation almost always revolved around the question: what can Israel give Ukraine?
Iron Dome? Detection systems? Interceptor missiles? Electronic equipment? Intelligence technologies?
Four and a half years later, the reverse question has appeared.
What can Ukraine give Israel?
Ukraine today has enormous practical experience in drone warfare. Not polygonal and not theoretical. Russian strikes forced Ukrainian defense to almost continuously change ways of detecting and destroying drones, reduce interception costs, integrate radars, electronic warfare means, mobile groups, aviation, software, and its own interceptor drones into one system.
This is happening right now. On September 15, 2026, Reuters reported on the testing of a new Ukrainian drone interception tool: according to Volodymyr Zelensky, the Ukrainian development has already managed to destroy a Shahed, although technical refinement is still ongoing. Reuters also noted that Ukraine is actively developing cheaper interceptor drones and is already offering accumulated experience to other countries, including Middle Eastern countries.
This is exactly what Lapid seems to be talking about when he highlights drone combat technologies.
For Israel, this is not an exotic experience of a distant war.
Iran and its allies have made drones a permanent part of the Middle Eastern war. Israel has faced both single UAVs and massive combined attacks where drones are used simultaneously with ballistic and cruise missiles.
At the same time, Israeli air defense itself is built in several echelons. Iron Dome is primarily intended for shorter-range threats; David’s Sling and Arrow solve other tasks. The mass use of cheap drones creates a separate economy of war: it is not reasonable to shoot down every cheap target with an expensive missile.
And Ukrainians have been trying to solve this problem for several years in conditions where the cost of interception is as important as the probability of interception itself.
NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency has already analyzed Ukrainian anti-drone experience and why it may be of interest to Israel. Therefore, today’s phrase by Lapid did not arise from nowhere: military-technological mutual interest between the two countries is gradually becoming a quite separate topic of relations between Kyiv and Jerusalem.
Is this already military aid?
Journalists of “Ulpan Politika” did not leave room for diplomatic evasion here and asked a direct clarifying question: does the new policy include military aid?
And received:
“we must do everything possible to help Ukraine.”
But this phrase cannot be turned into the headline “Lapid promised weapons to Ukraine” — there is no such promise in the interview.
He leaves himself very broad space.
“Doing everything possible” can mean defensive technologies, joint developments, detection systems, exchange of combat experience, company cooperation, specialist training, intelligence interaction, and may, with the appropriate decision of the future government, include weapons.
But the latter is already a possible scenario, not a commitment made by Lapid.
However, another part of his answer is spoken literally: “the space for military cooperation has expanded”.
And this is significant. It is no longer just about humanitarian cargoes and political solidarity.
The Ukrainian Foreign Ministry in July 2025 already spoke after negotiations with Israel about “significant potential in the field of defense technologies” and prospects for joint projects.
Now one of the leaders of a major Israeli pre-election bloc is effectively transferring this idea into his future state policy.
Another part of the conversation: Lapid on his own mistake before the invasion
Immediately after the Ukrainian block, “Ulpan Politika” asks Lapid a rather uncomfortable question.
In early February 2022, as foreign minister, he did not expect an imminent full-scale clash between Russia and Ukraine. A few weeks later, Russian troops began the invasion.
Lapid did not deny that he was wrong.
His explanation boils down to the fact that many Western politicians tried to analyze Moscow’s actions from the position of rational logic, whereas the decision for a full-scale invasion, in his opinion, was not rational. He links this mistake to the attempt of rational politicians to predict the actions of authoritarian leaders based on their own ideas about the benefits and costs of war.
This fragment is significant for the current interview for another reason.
Lapid simultaneously defends Israel’s caution in 2022 — and says that in 2026 he would act differently.
That is, he does not renounce his previous policy in hindsight. His argument is different: the war, Russia, Moscow’s relations with Iran, and Ukraine itself have changed.
Hence — “we will do much more.”
And what about the Jewish communities of Russia and Ukraine
There is another layer that is easy to lose in Israel if the whole dispute is reduced to air defense and Russian troops in Syria.
Lapid talks about large Jewish communities in both countries.
According to him, Israel must take their situation into account regardless of whom it conducts a political dialogue with — Moscow or Kyiv. For him, Israel is not only the state of its citizens but also the center of the Jewish world, and therefore bears responsibility for Jews outside the country.
This explains another part of Israel’s caution regarding Russia.
But at the same time, he says that there are situations where one still has to take a moral position. As an example, he cites February 2022, when he publicly put Israel on Ukraine’s side, despite warnings about possible problems with Moscow and risks for Russian Jews.
So Lapid’s current position is not that the Russian factor has completely disappeared.
He says something else: the balance has changed.
Explanation for Israeli readers: Ukraine is no longer just a request for Iron Dome
In the Israeli discussion, Ukrainian requests were often reduced to one well-known brand — “Iron Dome.”
This greatly simplifies the real picture.
Iron Dome was primarily created to intercept shorter-range missiles and is only one layer of Israel’s multi-tiered air and missile defense system. Different means are used against ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, various drones, and other types of targets.
The Ukrainian problem has become even more complex over the years of war.
Russia can launch a large number of drones in one attack, use false targets, change routes, altitudes, and configurations of devices, and simultaneously use cruise and ballistic missiles.
Shooting everything down with expensive interceptors is simply impossible.
Hence Ukraine’s search for cheaper solutions: its own interceptor UAVs, mobile groups, electronic warfare, new detection means, and constantly changing tactics. In September 2026, Ukraine continues to test new developments precisely in this area.
Therefore, Lapid speaks of two-way traffic.
In 2022, Ukraine mainly asked: what can Israel give us?
In 2026, a second question arises: what from the Ukrainian experience will be useful to Israel?
For the Israeli reader, this is perhaps the main shift in the entire Ukrainian fragment of the interview.
Not charity. Not a gesture of solidarity.
Coincidence of certain threats and mutual military interest.
What else was in the big interview — in theses
Ukraine occupies only one part of Yair Lapid’s conversation with ‘Ulpan Politica’. We deliberately do not retell the other answers in detail — it is better to read them in full in the original.
Lapid spoke about the events before October 7, 2023, and claimed that he received information about the growing threat. He stated that, being in power at that time, he would have strengthened the southern border and called up reservists if necessary. This is Lapid’s own position and his assessment of what decisions should have been made, not our established conclusion about the causes of the October 7 catastrophe.
He explains in detail the alliance with Naftali Bennett and the logic of the united list. According to Lapid, the alliance of the political center and liberal right may become a more sustainable governance model than the previous division of camps. This is his political concept and one of the central themes of the current campaign.
A separate conversation concerns the Russian-speaking electorate. After the question of why there is no Russian-speaking candidate in the first fifteen places of the ‘Beyahad’ list, Lapid essentially suggests that this audience consider him their representative. It is from here that the phrase ‘I am your candidate’ is taken for the title of the original interview. In the same answer, he reminds of his position in support of Ukraine after the start of the full-scale invasion.
Lapid also talks about the problems of new immigrants: the cost of living, education, bullying of Russian-speaking teenagers, and bureaucracy in recognizing foreign diplomas. As a characteristic example, he cites a person who received medical education in Kyiv and was forced to wait several years for an Israeli license.
On the Palestinian issue, Lapid says that after October 7, he does not see the possibility of implementing the two-state model in the foreseeable future, although he maintains the idea of a future separation of Israel from the Palestinians. This is his current political position, which significantly differs in terms and practical conclusions from what he said at the UN General Assembly in 2022.
The call for the Haredim is discussed separately. Lapid proposes financially ceasing state support for those who do not serve, as well as educational institutions that do not teach basic general education subjects. Again, this is about the program of his political camp, not the current norm.
The interview is better read in full.
For NANews, there was a separate Ukrainian plot in this conversation, so we deliberately analyzed it in detail.
But the interview itself is much broader.
There are things that cannot be properly retold in two paragraphs: Lapid’s own version of the events before October 7, relations with Netanyahu, explanation of the alliance with Bennett, the structure of the united list, conversation about Russian-speaking Israelis and new immigrants, Haredim, the Palestinian issue, and what kind of Israel Lapid proposes to build after the elections.
Therefore, the full conversation is worth reading directly on our colleagues’ website ‘Ulpan Politica’: ‘I am your candidate’: a big interview with Yair Lapid.
And if you leave only the Ukrainian part from almost the entire interview, it turns out to be a rather specific set of statements.
Lapid tells the Israeli voter that the policy of 2022 is already insufficient for the situation of 2026.
Russia, in his wording, has become an ally of Iran. Ukraine has accumulated drone combat technologies that are of interest to Israel. Military cooperation between Kyiv and Jerusalem can be broader than before. And if his political camp returns to power, Israel, Lapid promises, will do ‘much more’ for Ukraine, and the policy itself will be ‘bolder than in 2022’.
What exactly will be behind these words — joint technologies, exchange of experience, defense projects, or already direct arms supplies — Lapid has not yet determined.
But for the first time in this election campaign, the issue of relations with Ukraine sounded not as a recollection of the war that began four years ago, and not as a routine foreign policy remark.
It sounded as part of a proposal about what Israel’s policy will be after the elections.
…
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