Month: August 2026

Three boys from the Jewish orphanage “Alumim” in Zhytomyr and two of their friends celebrated their bar mitzvah in Ashkelon three years after fleeing from Putin’s aggression. Israel became their new home — they speak Hebrew, study in Chabad schools, and dream about the future despite the trauma of the past.

This story is a symbol of the strong connection between the Jewish people of Ukraine and Israel, and proof of a true miracle made possible thanks to love, faith, and the support of the entire community.

Under bombs — into the future: children of the “Alumim” orphanage celebrate bar mitzvah in Israel

On June 26, 2025, the Israeli portal ynet reported on an emotional event: a bar mitzvah for five teenagers, three of whom are alumni of the Jewish orphanage “Alumim” in Zhytomyr, held in Ashkelon. This was not just a religious ritual. It was an act of return, maturity, recognition, and reunion with Jewish destiny.

Three years ago, these children, like thousands of other Jews in Ukraine, woke up to the sounds of explosions. Since then, their path has been full of pain — but also care, friendship, faith, and new hope in Israel.

“Alumim” Orphanage: an island of love and light

The “Alumim” orphanage, founded in 2006 in the village of Zarechany, became the heart of Jewish life in Western Ukraine. It was established by Rabbi Shlomo Wilhelm with support from the Or Avner Foundation and the Federation of Jewish Communities of Ukraine.

• Education based on Jewish traditions and Hebrew
• Children from 2 to 18 years old, including orphans and children from disadvantaged families
• Schooling, sports, psychological care, and a warm family atmosphere

“It was not just a structure. It was a real home,” staff members recall.

Before the war began in 2022, “Alumim” was a symbol of Jewish care and a “family home” for dozens of children. After the invasion, the building emptied — but its spirit moved to Israel.

Zhytomyr — cradle of Jewish culture

Zhytomyr is a historic center of Jewish life in Ukraine. It had schools, printing houses, yeshivot, and underground Chabad cheders in the 20th century that survived repression. Before the war, Jews made up one-third of the city’s population — over 30,000 people.

The “Alumim” orphanage became the center of Jewish childhood in the region. Living conditions, care, and religious atmosphere made it a unique place. After the war began, educators were left with 80 children and enormous responsibility — and the idea of evacuation was born.

Putin’s aggression destroys childhood

On February 24, 2022, Putin’s army launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Zhytomyr came under attack, and the orphanage was in danger. Bombs fell near the home where 80 children lived.

“We woke up to deafening noise. Outside — smoke and sirens. 80 children panicked. Educators had to hide their fear while bombs kept falling,” — recalls Malka Buket.

Escape under fire

The decision to evacuate the children came quickly. First — to Chernivtsi, then — to Israel. The border was crossed on foot, without documents, with small children carried in arms. It was a heroic evacuation.

KKL-JNF and Keren LeYedidut carried out an emergency evacuation of about 100 children aged 2 to 18.

Nes Harim: first Jewish refuge

Upon arrival in Israel, children were placed in the Nes Harim center in the Jerusalem Forest. Volunteers provided clothing, toys, psychological support, and Hebrew classes. They celebrated holidays and slowly adapted to their new life.

Ashkelon: new life and bar mitzvah

In 2025, the children moved to Ashkelon. On June 26, five teenagers, three of them from “Alumim,” celebrated their bar mitzvah. The event was organized by Rabbi Shlomo Wilhelm. Rabbis, local leaders, and Minister Yaakov Margi attended.

“Each child has their own story and pain. But to see them happy, confident, and speaking Hebrew — it’s a miracle,” said Rabbi Wilhelm.

“Just as Jews received the Torah at Mount Sinai, so our children receive it here in Ashkelon — with love and light,” said Rabbi Mendel Lieberman.

Table: journey from war to bar mitzvah

NAnews — Israel News

NAnews emphasizes: the story of the “Alumim” children is not just a humanitarian case. It is proof of the strength of the Jewish community, the bond between Ukrainian and Israeli Jews, and the ability to overcome even war.

While Putin’s army drops bombs on children’s heads, Israel extends a helping hand. The bar mitzvah in Ashkelon is not the end — it’s just the beginning. These children now have a home. A community. A future.

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Bar Mitzvah in Israel Three Years After Evacuation from Ukrainian Zhitomir from Russian Bombs: The Fate of Jewish Children from Ukraine - August 4, 2026 - Новости Израиля

The mechanics of “resetting”: why there are no riots in the Russian Federation, even though the war against Ukraine has long become a systemic humiliation of its own citizens - August 4, 2026 - Новости Израиля

Open conflict between the Minister of Defense and the IDF command: who decides the fate of army commanders? - August 3, 2026 - Новости Израиля

The question “why doesn’t Russia rebel” is being asked in Ukraine and increasingly in Israel, where the war in Europe is not seen as a “distant conflict” but as part of a common axis of threats: Moscow–Tehran (Hamas, Hezbollah, Houthis, and other allied RF terrorist formations), suppression technologies, drones, missiles, sanctions, Syria. On the surface, the answer seems simple: fear and propaganda. But that’s too narrow. NV report offers a set of explanations — weak horizontal connections, targeted “deals” of the state with families, a repressive environment, fatigue without organization. The essence is that the Kremlin has turned the war into a controlled conveyor, where the “human cost” does not turn into political action.

We will add our own analysis to this: which arguments really hold, where they are insufficient, and what might break the current model.

1) Disunity and lack of horizontal connections — this is not a metaphor, it’s infrastructure

The argument about “weak horizontal connections” often sounds like a psychological diagnosis, but in reality, it is institutional. Protest is not an emotion, but logistics: where to gather, how to spread information, who organizes legal protection, who coordinates mutual aid, where are the media channels, how to collect money, how to connect different cities.

In Russia, this infrastructure has been systematically dismantled for years: public organizations were declared “foreign agents,” independent media were closed, local activists were imprisoned, any “self-organization” was labeled as a threat to the state. The result: even if there are many dissatisfied people, they do not form an active network. This explains the paradox: high fatigue coexists with a low capacity for collective action.

Another important point: disunity is not a “national character,” but the result of policy. The regime encourages atomization: let people compete with each other for resources, status, safety. Disunited people are easier to control. This is not unique to Russia; it is a standard tool of authoritarian systems that fear not protests, but solidarity.

2) “Deals” with families and private compensation instead of public justice

The second pillar is targeted “tension relief” through money and administrative decisions. The family of a deceased person may receive compensation, benefits, “help” with documents. From a moral standpoint, this does not negate the tragedy. But from a management standpoint, it works: the pain becomes a private matter for the family, not a public conflict.

This mechanism has two bonuses for the authorities. The first is the neutralization of a potential pressure group. Relatives of the deceased could become a mass movement, as has happened in other wars. But when each case is “closed” separately, a unified subject does not form.

The second is the attachment of a person to the state. The family becomes dependent on payments and decisions of officials. This encourages silence: “just so it doesn’t get worse,” “don’t take away benefits,” “don’t start problems.” In an authoritarian system, even formal assistance often acts as a tool of control.

3) Fear is important, but not directly: fear is a network of small threats

Yes, repression suppresses protest. But the risk of prison is not as effective as the sum of small threats: job loss, problems at the university for children, pressure on business, fines, searches, “preventive conversations,” the risk of being listed as unreliable. This makes publicity toxic. A person may hate the war but chooses the strategy of “not sticking out.”

Here is an important detail: fear works as long as people believe that the regime has long arms and that resistance is pointless. As soon as there is a sense of the regime’s instability, fear begins to fail. Therefore, repressive regimes often appear “monolithic” right up to the moment when they break down sharply. Not because people suddenly became brave, but because fear ceased to be rational.

4) Propaganda is not the main engine. The main engine is the habit of powerlessness and the lack of experience of results

Explaining everything with propaganda is convenient, but it’s an oversimplification. Propaganda helps justify the war in conversation and reduces cognitive dissonance. But even many of those who do not believe the TV do not protest.

The reason is deeper: a significant part of society has no experience that protest brings change. If a person sees for decades that the authorities do not respond, elections do not change reality, rallies end in detentions — a habit of political helplessness forms. Not “I support,” but “I decide nothing.” This is the foundation of passivity.

The scheme looks cynical: the regime can tolerate growing discontent if this discontent is not organized and does not turn into action. Therefore, the authorities fear not criticism in the kitchen, but coordination on the street.

5) The war is unevenly distributed: capitals lived “as if nothing was happening” for a long time

Our key addition to NV’s logic is the unevenness of pain. The war in Russia has long been “smeared” across the periphery. Recruitment, losses, death notices, material incentives hit harder on poor regions, small towns, national outskirts. And large cities — especially Moscow and St. Petersburg — tried to live in showcase mode: cafes, shopping centers, services, holidays.

The regime does everything to prevent the war from becoming “capital.” Because the protest potential in capitals is higher: more people with resources, more connections, more media coverage. As long as the war remains “regional” in terms of human cost, the likelihood of a nationwide explosion is lower. This is not an excuse. This is an explanation of the mechanics.

6) The alternative to protest is departure, evasion, internal sabotage

Another reason for the “silence” is not because people are satisfied, but because the protest has gone into other forms. Some have left (including to Israel). Some have gone into “internal emigration”: silence, refusal to participate in politics, minimizing contact with the state. Some evade: relocations, fake certificates, gray schemes, avoiding military enlistment offices, refusal of publicity.

This slowly but steadily destroys the social fabric. The problem is that such “quiet protest” does not give an immediate political effect but undermines trust and manageability. The regime can live with this as long as it maintains forceful control and financial cushions.

7) The army as a mirror of society: money becomes a tool of coercion

NV describes an important point about the “contract model” and payments. On paper, this looks like a voluntary choice. In practice, more often — as economic coercion. When there is no decent work in the region, high payments for a contract turn into a trap. The regime buys the loyalty of poverty.

At the same time, the increase in payments is a sign of a problem, not strength. If recruitment were stable, there would be no need to constantly raise the price of human life. When the price rises, it means motivation falls, and the risk of refusal increases.

And then a toxic internal economy of the army appears: extortion, “paid” decisions, corruption, violence. This destroys morale and discipline. And this is also a factor that can lead to unexpected breakdowns — not necessarily mass riots in the squares, but to a loss of manageability within the institution that should be the regime’s support.

8) Does this mean there will be no rebellion? No. It means that rebellion depends not on morality, but on manageability

The most common mistake is to expect a rebellion as “moral retribution”: since the war is unjust, people must come out. In reality, mass protests arise when manageability breaks down: when the usual model “you endure — we maintain the appearance of normality” stops working.

Triggers that can really change the picture:

— Mobilization affecting large cities massively.
If the war ceases to be “regional” and becomes “capital,” the protest risk rises sharply.

— Economic blow that cannot be masked by payments and loans.
When incomes fall, jobs disappear, “peaceful” expectations collapse — passivity decreases.

— Management collapse in the regions.
If local elites stop “resolving” the consequences of the war, accumulated anger can become massive.

— Major military failure.
Not in the form of “news,” but in the form of a breakdown of the sense of control, when even apolitical people begin to think that the authorities are leading the country to disaster.

9) Why is this important to Israel

For Israel, the question is not academic. Russia has long ceased to be a “neutral player” and actively interacts with Hamas, with Iran, its terrorist proxies — Hezbollah, and other terrorists) and its military capabilities. Any strengthening or weakening of Russian stability reflects on regional threats: technology supplies, sanctions regimes, political deals in Syria, export of repressive practices.

As long as the Kremlin maintains internal stability through disunity and redistribution of pain, it can continue the war and simultaneously negotiate in the Middle East. But this model has a limit. When the war begins to “come home” — to capital families, to the economy, to everyday life — the regime faces what it fears most: not criticism, but a mass refusal to be governed.

This is precisely the practical meaning of the “zeroing theory.” The war turns into a mechanism that nullifies a person — their rights, safety, dignity, choice. But the system holds as long as the nullification remains individual, fragmented, “one by one.” As soon as it becomes collective and synchronous — the walls begin to crack.

NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency

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Bar Mitzvah in Israel Three Years After Evacuation from Ukrainian Zhitomir from Russian Bombs: The Fate of Jewish Children from Ukraine - August 4, 2026 - Новости Израиля

The mechanics of “resetting”: why there are no riots in the Russian Federation, even though the war against Ukraine has long become a systemic humiliation of its own citizens - August 4, 2026 - Новости Израиля

Open conflict between the Minister of Defense and the IDF command: who decides the fate of army commanders? - August 3, 2026 - Новости Израиля

An unprecedented public dispute has erupted in Israel between Defense Minister Israel Katz and the IDF command. On the evening of August 2, 2026, Katz announced on the “Patriots” program on Channel 14 that the new commander of the Central Military District should be Major General David “Dado” Bar-Kalifa, who will replace Major General Avi Blut.

However, almost immediately after the minister’s speech, the army press service reported that his statement was not coordinated with Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir. The IDF emphasized: Blut continues to command the Central District, enjoys the full confidence of the Chief of Staff, and decisions on replacing generals should be made in accordance with established procedures.

On the morning of August 3, Katz’s office tried to shift the focus. Representatives of the minister stated that he allegedly did not announce the immediate dismissal of Blut, but only confirmed a future personnel rotation proposed by the Chief of Staff himself back in the spring.

As a result, several questions were at the center of the scandal: who appoints generals in Israel, can the defense minister publicly announce the successor of the current commander without coordinating the timing with the Chief of Staff, and is a military commander obliged to abandon a professional security decision if it contradicts the minister’s political line.

What exactly did Israel Katz say

During an interview on Channel 14, Katz sharply criticized Avi Blut for his actions in the case of settler Tal Inon Dardik.

The minister stated that the commander of the Central District and the Jerusalem District Prosecutor’s Office went to court contrary to his policy. Katz acknowledged that the general might have had legal authority for such a step, but emphasized that military command should consider the decisions of political leadership.

After this, Katz announced that he decided to implement the appointment of Major General Dado Bar-Kalifa to the position of commander of the Central District.

“I announced that I decided to implement the decision — to appoint Major General Dado Bar-Kalifa as the commander of the Central District,” the minister said.

Katz described Bar-Kalifa as a representative of the “generation of heroes and victory” and expressed confidence that he would pursue a more aggressive policy.

From the context of the television appearance, it could be concluded that Katz decided to replace Blut due to disagreements over the Dardik case. This is why the first reports from Israeli media presented the statement as an announcement of the general’s resignation live on air.

The IDF publicly opposed the minister’s version

The reaction of the army press service followed almost immediately.

The IDF stated that the defense minister’s words were not coordinated with Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir. The army separately emphasized that Avi Blut continues to command the Central District “in a complex environment, professionally, courageously, and selflessly.”

“Major General Avi Blut enjoys full confidence,” the statement said.

In addition, the IDF reported that the Chief of Staff does not intend to change commanders in key positions during the current sensitive period. If a decision on a personnel replacement is made, it must be made by the Chief of Staff, after which it will be approved in accordance with existing rules.

This statement was essentially a public refutation of the defense minister’s words. The army command made it clear that there was no agreed decision on the immediate termination of Blut’s powers.

For the Israeli security system, such an exchange of statements is extremely unusual. As noted by NANews — News of Israel, disputes between the defense minister and the Chief of Staff have occurred before, but they were usually discussed in closed meetings, not in a live television broadcast.

Katz stated that it was not about dismissal

After the sharp reaction of the IDF, Katz’s office presented a different version of events.

According to the minister’s representatives, back in late April 2026, Eyal Zamir recommended appointing Dado Bar-Kalifa as the next commander of the Central District. The Chief of Staff allegedly asked Katz to interview the candidate.

In June 2026, the minister met with Bar-Kalifa and concluded that he was a suitable candidate. Therefore, the statement on air, according to Katz’s office, was not about the immediate dismissal of Blut, but about appointing Bar-Kalifa during the next personnel cycle.

Thus, the parties are essentially talking about different things.

The main dispute, therefore, concerns not only Bar-Kalifa’s candidacy but also the timing, the order of announcing the decision, and who had the right to publicly announce the future replacement.

Who appoints generals in the IDF

The assertion that generals are appointed exclusively by the Chief of Staff is incomplete. But the defense minister cannot unilaterally appoint or remove a district commander.

According to the current system, the Chief of Staff determines candidates for positions at the major general level and presents the chosen candidate to the defense minister. The minister acts as the approving authority.

The State Comptroller of Israel indicated that the Chief of Staff is the body that appoints officers starting from the rank of colonel, and the defense minister approves such appointments. For positions at the major general level, the process takes place directly between the Chief of Staff and the minister: the former determines the candidate, the latter must approve it.

Therefore:

• Katz cannot independently appoint a new district commander without the Chief of Staff’s decision;
• Zamir cannot finalize the appointment without the minister’s approval;
• both parties must agree on the candidate, timing, and order of assuming the position;
• announcing the decision live on air does not replace the official personnel procedure.

The State Comptroller also previously noted that the procedure for appointing major generals was not fully formalized and largely relied on the established practice of negotiations between the defense minister and the Chief of Staff.

This is why the current public dispute has created such a dangerous precedent: each side can claim that the other is interfering with its authority.

The case of Tal Inon Dardik

The immediate reason for the confrontation was the case of settler Tal Inon Dardik.

An administrative restraining order was in effect against him, signed by the commander of the Central District on the recommendation of the Shin Bet. Such orders can prohibit a person from being in certain areas of Judea and Samaria, returning to a specific outpost, contacting certain people, or moving freely.

The decision can be made based on closed intelligence materials that are not always fully provided to the suspect and his lawyers.

Dardik was prohibited from being at the farm outpost where he lived. After violating the order’s conditions, he was detained. Therefore, formally, he was in custody not because of administrative detention without trial, but because of the alleged violation of the administrative restraining order.

According to a Shin Bet document published by Israeli media on July 22, 2026, Dardik is suspected of involvement in violence, abuse, and severe sexual humiliation of a Palestinian.

The police reported that during the investigated incident, a group of Jews attacked Palestinians, among whom were women and children. Several victims, according to the investigation, were tied up, and four required medical assistance. The mere existence of suspicions does not mean that Dardik’s guilt has been established by the court.

No ordinary criminal indictment was filed against him. This is why the security services used administrative measures, relying on closed information about the alleged danger.

Why the commission lifted the restrictions

The military appeals commission did not find Dardik innocent and did not reject the Shin Bet’s intelligence materials.

The dispute concerned whether the commander of the Central District had the right to require Dardik to serve house arrest at his mother-in-law’s house. The commission ruled that a relative cannot be forced to provide her home for the execution of an administrative restriction.

The army was offered to find another realistic solution. This could be another agreed apartment or separate housing that the state would have to rent to enforce the order.

Thus, the commission’s decision was primarily procedural. It did not mean that Dardik was found not involved in the alleged violence or that the Shin Bet abandoned its assessment of his danger.

The minister visited Dardik in custody

Even before the current conflict, Katz took an extremely unusual step — personally met with Dardik at his place of detention.

Along with the minister, reserve Colonel Avichai Tanami, appointed by Katz as a special coordinator for working with the so-called “hill youth,” attended the meeting.

During the meeting, Dardik was offered several alternative options for house arrest. However, he refused them and demanded to be allowed to stay either in his own home or in his parents’ house. At that time, Dardik was on a hunger strike.

On July 28, 2026, Katz stated that due to deficiencies in the order’s issuance, it should not be extended, and the problem should be solved “by other means.”

However, this statement did not mean the immediate cessation of existing restrictions. According to Ynet, the order was calculated to last until the end of 2026. In addition, the appeal of the prosecutor’s office and the Central District concerned not Katz’s decision on future extension, but the court’s requirement to find an enforceable alternative to the current house arrest.

Blut and the prosecutor’s office continued to consider Dardik potentially dangerous and appealed to the Jerusalem District Court, trying to maintain the restrictions in another form.

It was this step that Katz called actions contrary to the minister’s policy.

Avi Blut remains the commander

As of August 3, 2026, Avi Blut has not been officially dismissed and continues to hold the position of commander of the Central District.

He assumed the position in July 2024, replacing Major General Yehuda Fuchs, who commanded the district for about three years.

Blut comes from the religious Zionism community, wears a knitted kippah, and previously held positions as commander of the Judea and Samaria Division, commander of the commando brigade, commander of the “Maglan” unit, and military secretary to the prime minister.

Therefore, the current dispute is difficult to present as a usual confrontation between a right-wing government and an allegedly “left-wing” army general. In reality, it is about a deeper question: is a district commander obliged to follow the professional assessment of the IDF and the Shin Bet, even if this assessment contradicts the defense minister’s policy.

Reaction of the opposition and the settler movement

Katz’s statement was criticized by representatives of the opposition and former high-ranking military officials.

Former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett stated that the government is trying to “dismantle the IDF from within.” Former Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot called the incident an unprecedented decline in relations between political and military leadership and emphasized that the army should not become a tool for party primaries.

Reserve Major General Ofer Winter also criticized the manner in which Katz announced the commander’s replacement.

Notably, representatives of the settler movement also spoke out against the way Katz announced the replacement of the commander.

The head of the Beit El local council, Shay Alon, stated that the unexpected announcement live on air without coordination with the Chief of Staff harms the settlements and the fight against terror. The Judea and Samaria Settlements Council also supported Blut, noting his results in countering terrorist structures.

At the same time, Knesset member Limor Son Har-Melech from the “Otzma Yehudit” party supported Katz. She stated that Blut allegedly paid more attention to prosecuting settler activists than fighting Palestinian terror and acted contrary to the elected leadership’s policy.

Why this conflict is more important than the fate of one general

The dispute over Avi Blut and Tal Inon Dardik goes far beyond a single personnel appointment.

Political leadership has the right to determine Israel’s overall defense policy. However, operational decisions about specific threats are made by professional structures — the army, the Shin Bet, the police, and the prosecutor’s office.

If a minister can force a military commander to abandon a security assessment due to political pressure, there is a risk of politicizing IDF decisions. But if the army command can completely ignore the orders of the elected minister, the opposite problem arises — the erosion of civilian control over the armed forces.

As emphasized by NANews — News of Israel, the stability of the Israeli system depends not on the victory of one side, but on adherence to procedure. The Chief of Staff must professionally select candidates, the defense minister must approve appointments and determine overall policy, and decisions on specific cases must be made based on law and verifiable security assessments.

At the moment, Katz considers Dado Bar-Kalifa the future commander of the Central District. The IDF, in turn, states that Blut continues to perform his duties and his replacement is not planned in the near future.

Until the parties agree on an official personnel procedure, the minister’s statement on television remains a political declaration, not a completed appointment.

…
Bar Mitzvah in Israel Three Years After Evacuation from Ukrainian Zhitomir from Russian Bombs: The Fate of Jewish Children from Ukraine - August 4, 2026 - Новости Израиля

The mechanics of “resetting”: why there are no riots in the Russian Federation, even though the war against Ukraine has long become a systemic humiliation of its own citizens - August 4, 2026 - Новости Израиля

Open conflict between the Minister of Defense and the IDF command: who decides the fate of army commanders? - August 3, 2026 - Новости Израиля

On April 2, 1917, the Provisional Government officially abolished religious and national restrictions in the former Russian Empire. For Jews, this meant the end of the Pale of Settlement — one of the most well-known systems of state discrimination in European history. Formally, the document was adopted on March 20, 1917, according to the old style, which is April 2 according to the new. It was this act that closed an era in which origin and faith determined where a person could live, what they were allowed to do, and to what extent they were recognized as a full-fledged resident of the country.

For the Israeli audience, this date is important not as a museum reference.

It is important because it shows the mechanism of anti-Semitism in action. First, the state declares the Jew a “special case.” Then it draws boundaries of permissible existence on the map. Then this administrative discrimination begins to affect education, trade, property rights, career, mobility, and security.

The history of the Pale of Settlement is not only about the past of the Russian Empire but also about how power turns the Jewish question into a tool of governance, suspicion, and pressure.

How the empire created an anti-Semitic geography

The Pale of Settlement did not arise out of nowhere.

After the partitions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the second half of the 18th century, Russia acquired vast territories along with a large Jewish community. It was about 900,000 Jews who found themselves inside the empire after the partitions of Poland. The Russian authorities, who previously did not want to allow a mass Jewish presence within their old borders, decided not to equalize these people in rights but to allocate a special residential zone for them.

This is how the Pale of Settlement was formed. In 1783, 1791, and 1794, Catherine II issued decrees restricting the commercial rights of Jews to territories recently annexed from Poland and the Ottoman Empire. Later, this regime turned into a stable system: the Jewish population could be used in the new western and southern lands but was not allowed free integration into central Russia. Even in the descriptions of historians, it is clear that economic calculation and traditional anti-Jewish prejudices were combined here.

It is important to understand the scale.

The Pale of Settlement was not a small enclave but a vast area of almost 500,000 square miles, stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea. It included large parts of present-day Ukraine, Poland, Belarus, Lithuania, Moldova, and other territories. But the large size did not make this regime softer. On the contrary: it was a gigantic zone of limited existence, within which additional prohibitions also applied. Jews were often forbidden to settle in certain municipalities, especially in rural areas, and living outside this zone was generally not allowed.

What the Pale of Settlement did to Jewish life in the lands of present-day Ukraine

For Ukraine, this history is especially important because a significant part of the Pale of Settlement passed through Ukrainian provinces.

By the beginning of the 20th century, the Pale included, in particular, the Kyiv, Podolia, Volhynia, Poltava, Chernihiv, Kherson, Yekaterinoslav, and Taurida provinces. According to the 1897 census, 4,899,300 Jews lived there — 94 percent of the entire Jewish population of the Russian Empire. Of these, 82 percent lived in cities, towns, and shtetls, and in the urban structure of the region, Jews made up 36.9 percent. In other words, the empire not only limited geography. It forcibly formed a special social world of crowding, forced urbanization, and constant legal vulnerability.

It was from this environment that the shtetls of Eastern Europe, familiar from family memory and Jewish literature, grew.

But this picture cannot be romanticized.

The shtetl was not a freely chosen form of life but largely a consequence of legal pressure. The Pale of Settlement directed Jews into trade, crafts, intermediary professions, small urban businesses because access to land, wide resettlement, and many other forms of normal economic life were restricted by law. Later, under Alexander II, exceptions appeared for some merchants, craftsmen, educated people, and those who served in the army, but this did not cancel the main principle: freedom for a Jew was considered not a right but a rare exception.

Such a system almost inevitably generated violence. At the beginning of the 20th century, a new wave of pogroms swept across Ukraine. After Kishinev in 1903 and Gomel in 1903, a series of attacks also engulfed Ukrainian cities, and in 1905, major pogroms occurred in Kamianets-Podilskyi, Yekaterinoslav, Kyiv, Kremenchuk, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Chernihiv, Simferopol, and other places.

When the state singles out a group as “alien” for decades, public violence receives a ready ideological framework.

It is no coincidence that millions of people began to leave. Between 1881 and 1914, about two million Jews left the tsarist empire and went to the West, primarily to the USA. This was an exodus not only from poverty but also from a political regime that explained to Jews from generation to generation that they lived in the empire conditionally, under supervision, and according to separate rules.

For many families in Israel, the memory of this era has been preserved not in textbooks but in the biographies of grandfathers and great-grandfathers. And therefore, in the material for NAnews — News of Israel | Nikk.Agency April 2 is not an abstract anniversary, but a date that is still heard in the family history of the Jewish East of Europe.

Formally, the system began to crumble during the First World War.

In 1915, significant parts of the Pale turned into a frontline zone, many Jews fled east, and the authorities were forced to lift some residence restrictions almost everywhere except the capitals. But legally, the point was only put by the Provisional Government in the spring of 1917. From that moment, the state no longer had the right to divide residents by national-religious criteria in matters of residence and civil rights.

Why this story resonates again today when it comes to Putin’s Russia

Of course, modern Russia is not the 19th-century Russian Empire, and a literal Pale of Settlement does not exist today.

But the historical logic of anti-Semitism has not disappeared. It has simply changed form.

If earlier the authorities restricted Jews through maps and laws, today they increasingly use the Jewish theme as a political tool, a propaganda plot, and a language of suspicion. The US State Department, in its report on religious freedom in Russia for 2023, wrote about the rise of openly anti-Semitic rhetoric in the public space. And in January 2024, the State Department released a separate material on how successive occupants of the Kremlin used anti-Semitism for disinformation and propaganda.

One of the most famous examples is the words of Sergey Lavrov in May 2022, when he, responding to a question about the Jewish origin of Volodymyr Zelensky, claimed that Hitler allegedly had Jewish roots. Israel called this an unforgivable lie and summoned the Russian ambassador, and the German government’s commissioner for combating anti-Semitism also condemned this statement. It was not about a marginal figure from the street, but about the foreign minister of a nuclear power.

A year later, Putin himself went even further.

In June 2023, he publicly stated that Zelensky was allegedly “a disgrace to the Jewish people.” This was said about the President of Ukraine, whose family is directly connected to the history of the Holocaust and whose Jewish origin has long been known. This approach is important not only for its crudeness. It shows the very principle: the Kremlin again turns to the theme of Jewishness not as a real human identity but as a tool for political humiliation, substitution, and manipulation.

In the fall of 2023, this atmosphere went beyond television rhetoric. In Makhachkala, an anti-Semitic crowd stormed the airport in search of passengers from a flight from Tel Aviv. People were “caught” right after arrival, and then Putin blamed the West and Ukraine for what happened, without providing evidence. A few days later, Reuters separately wrote that local Jews felt particularly vulnerable after these events. When the authorities play with xenophobic myths for years, they cannot seriously pretend that outbreaks of street hatred arise on their own.

In the summer of 2024, Dagestan was again at the center of events: armed attackers attacked a synagogue and a church in Derbent, as well as facilities in Makhachkala. Reuters noted that the synagogue caught fire, and the former chief rabbi of Moscow, Pinchas Goldschmidt, after these events, spoke about the worsening situation of Jews in Russia, ongoing anti-Semitism, and that many would be better off leaving the country. This is no longer a dispute about words. It is a matter of the physical safety of Jewish communities.

There is also another important symptom — pressure on Jewish organizations.

In 2022, the Russian Ministry of Justice demanded the liquidation of the Russian branch of “Sohnut,” a structure associated with the repatriation of Jews to Israel. Reuters noted at the time that many in Israel saw this as a political signal against the backdrop of Russia’s war against Ukraine and deteriorating relations with Jerusalem.

This episode itself is not equal to the Pale of Settlement, but it clearly shows the old habit of the state: Jewish autonomy, Jewish connections with the outside world, and Jewish self-organization are perceived as something that can be controlled and suspected at any moment.

That is why April 2, 1917, sounds modern again today.

Then not just an old norm was abolished, but the very idea that a Jew should live by separate rules. In the empire, these rules were drawn on the map.

In Putin’s Russia, they are more often drawn through propaganda, hints, conspiracy theories, xenophobic mobilization, and selective pressure. The form has changed, but the logic is recognizable: Jewishness is again turned not into part of normal civil life, but into a political object. And therefore, the memory of the abolition of the Pale of Settlement is not only about the past. It is also a way to more accurately see what is happening now.

…
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On August 2, 2026, the Chief Rabbi of Ukraine, Moshe Reuven Asman, spoke about the matzah production operating in the country, which is sent to Jewish communities worldwide under the Made in Ukraine label. The Rabbi reported that he visited one of the production sites in Uman. Another matzah bakery operates in Dnipro.

According to Moshe Asman, the enterprise is currently expanding and looking for new employees. The published announcement mentions a salary of approximately 60 to 80 thousand hryvnias per month, free housing, and the opportunity to work in a team, a significant part of which consists of Ukrainians with Jewish roots.

According to the official NBU exchange rate on August 3, 2026, the declared salary of 60–80 thousand hryvnias corresponds to approximately 4.1–5.5 thousand shekels per month. For Ukraine, this is a high level of pay: the offer is about two to two and a half times higher than the average salary in the country, and considering free housing, it looks especially attractive for production workers. However, it is unclear from the announcement whether the amount is before or after taxes.

“Few people know, but a matzah bakery has been operating in Ukraine for many years, making matzah for the whole world under the Made in Ukraine brand,” the rabbi wrote.

NAnovosti studied the history of the enterprise and found that it is most likely about the company “Tiferet HaMatzot” — Tiferet HaMatzot, producing handmade kosher matzah in Dnipro and Uman. This is not a seasonal small bakery, but a Ukrainian production created more than two decades ago, whose products are indeed purchased in Israel, the USA, the UK, and other countries.

What the enterprise offers to new employees

According to Moshe Asman’s publication on August 2, 2026, vacancies are open in production. The rabbi specifically emphasized that the labor of employees is “valued with dignity.”

The announcement lists the following conditions:

However, the publication does not specify specific professions, shift duration, number of working days, registration procedure, or whether the amount is before or after taxes. Therefore, the salary and free accommodation should be correctly presented as the conditions stated in Moshe Asman’s announcement.

Contact numbers were published.

The number of the Dnipro enterprise is also listed in the open catalog of Ukrainian companies. It is reported that the private enterprise “Tiferet HaMatzot” was officially registered on December 4, 2002, and its main activity is the production of bread and bakery products.

More than 20 years of Ukrainian matzah

The history of “Tiferet HaMatzot” began in Dnipro in the early 2000s. According to Chabad org, its own matzah production in the city was launched in 2002. Before that, the Jewish community of Dnipro, like many other communities of the former Soviet Union, received matzah mainly from Moscow. After the restoration of Jewish religious life in independent Ukraine, the situation changed: Dnipro not only provided itself with matzah but also sent it abroad.

According to Ukrainian registration data, the enterprise was legally registered in December 2002. In a number of publications, the opening of the production site is attributed to 2003. Thus, by 2026, the production has been operating for about 23 years.

The project developed as a family business associated with the Stambler family. In 2021, a second production branch was opened in Uman — a city that occupies a special place in Jewish life in Ukraine and annually receives tens of thousands of Hasidic pilgrims. The management of the new site was associated with Mendy Stambler.

How much matzah is produced in Dnipro and Uman

Public data on volumes differ as they relate to different years, seasons, and production sites.

In February 2022, just before the start of Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine, management reported that about 90 people worked at the two enterprises. The production plan for that year was approximately 100 tons of handmade matzah.

Most of the products were intended for export to the countries of the former Soviet Union, Western Europe, and other regions. A separate part was intended for 160 Jewish communities that were part of the Federation of Jewish Communities of Ukraine.

In February 2024, the head and founder of the Dnipro enterprise, Stella Umanskaya, said that only the site in Dnipro produces about 60 tons of matzah per year. Among the supply directions, she named the USA, Israel, France, Belgium, Italy, and Hungary.

In reports after the Russian missile strike on Uman in December 2025, a figure of about 70 tons of products was mentioned. Probably, different figures reflect the volumes of a specific site, a separate season, or the entire production association. Therefore, the most accurate general formulation is as follows: Ukrainian enterprises annually produce tens of tons of handmade matzah, and the declared total plans in certain years reached 100 tons.

Ukrainian matzah is sold in 14 countries

In December 2023, Ukrainian Forbes reported that the products of “Tiferet HaMatzot” are exported to 14 countries.

Among the main markets were named:

• Israel;
• USA;
• United Kingdom;
• France;
• Belgium;
• Italy;
• Portugal;
• Canada;
• Mexico;
• Argentina;
• Australia;
• Hungary.

The enterprise gained fame thanks to the combination of Ukrainian wheat, manual labor, and strict kosher control. Ukrainian matzah was present in the markets of Israel and the USA even in the early years of the bakery’s operation. In a publication by the Jewish Telegraphic Agency from March 2004, it was reported that a significant part of the products was sent to Israel, Western Europe, and the United States.

For the Israeli audience, this story is especially important. A product without which Passover is unimaginable has been produced in Ukraine for many years and reaches the tables of Israeli families. This is one of the little-known but real examples of economic and cultural ties between Ukraine and Israel.

As NAnovosti — News of Israel notes, the Made in Ukraine label in this case means not just the country of origin. Behind it are Ukrainian wheat, jobs for representatives of Jewish communities, and the preservation of religious tradition during the war.

Why handmade matzah must be prepared in 18 minutes

“Tiferet HaMatzot” primarily produces handmade shmurah matzah. The word “shmurah” translates as “guarded” or “carefully controlled.”

The process begins with the control of wheat and flour. It is necessary to prevent the grain from coming into contact with moisture, which could lead to fermentation. Only two main ingredients are used in the bakery — flour and water.

After they are combined, a strict countdown begins. From kneading the dough to completing the baking, no more than 18 minutes should pass. Workers quickly knead the dough, divide it into parts, roll out thin round sheets, pierce them, and send them into a hot oven.

A large timer is installed at the Dnipro enterprise, counting down each production cycle. After the batch is completed, work surfaces and tools are thoroughly cleaned so that dough residues do not start to ferment and do not get into the next batch.

The work requires high speed and precise coordination. That is why experienced employees are of particular value to the enterprise: a sequence violation or delay can make the entire batch unsuitable for use on Passover.

Production continued after the start of the full-scale war

As early as February 22, 2022, two days before the full-scale Russian invasion, the bakery management reported that they were trying to produce as much matzah as possible in advance in case of transport stoppage and supply disruptions.

At that time, representatives of the enterprise stated that even in the event of the start of a major war, they would try to maintain production, as Jewish communities must receive matzah for Passover.

These words turned out not to be an exaggeration. Production indeed continued to operate during air raids, power outages, and Russian attacks on Ukrainian cities.

A Russian drone nearly destroyed the bakery in Dnipro

On the evening of March 29, 2023, Russian drones attacked Dnipro. One of the drones broke through Ukrainian air defense and hit an enterprise located next to the main Dnipro matzah bakery.

Surveillance cameras inside the building recorded a bright flash. The explosion shook the bakery, after which the electricity went out. A large fire started at the neighboring facility, threatening production and stocks of already prepared matzah.

Ukrainian rescuers managed to stop the spread of the fire. The matzah bakery itself survived and continued preparing products for Passover.

A missile fell 50 meters from the bakery in Uman

The second production site was threatened on December 26, 2025, when Russian troops launched a missile strike on Uman.

According to Ukrainian authorities, six people were injured in the attack, including two children. Residential buildings and other infrastructure were damaged in the city.

Later, representatives of the Jewish community reported that the missile fell approximately 50 meters from the “Tiferet HaMatzot” matzah bakery. At that moment, dozens of employees were inside.

The blast wave knocked out windows, damaged the main entrance, and the technical equipment in the yard. None of the enterprise’s workers were injured.

Thus, both sites — in Dnipro and Uman — have been in close proximity to Russian strikes during the years of the full-scale war.

Not just a religious product, but also jobs

The matzah bakery was conceived from the very beginning not only as a production project. It became a source of permanent employment for representatives of the local Jewish community.

As early as 2015, journalists wrote that the enterprise provided stable work for dozens of Jews and non-Jews in the region, where the economic situation was complicated by Russian aggression in eastern Ukraine. For many employees, the bakery was not a temporary seasonal job but a permanent place of work.

Moshe Asman’s new publication shows that this social aspect has been preserved. Now the enterprise offers a salary that significantly exceeds the average income in many Ukrainian regions and also provides housing.

At the same time, potential employees should separately clarify the terms of the employment contract, schedule, probation period, salary after taxes, and requirements related to observing kosher rules.

Why this story is important for Israel

The story of “Tiferet HaMatzot” connects several topics at once: Jewish tradition, Ukrainian production, international export, and the life of communities during the war.

Matzah from Dnipro and Uman:

• is sold in Israel and the USA;
• is supplied to European Jewish communities;
• is distributed free of charge among some needy Jews in Ukraine;
• creates jobs in Dnipro and Uman;
• continues to be produced despite Russian attacks;
• preserves the technology of handmade shmurah matzah.

For NAnovosti — News of Israel, it is especially significant that the enterprise continues to expand after strikes that could have completely stopped production. Ukrainian matzah has become not only a product for the international market but also a symbol of preserving Jewish life in a country experiencing a full-scale war.

Moshe Asman’s publication on August 2, 2026, effectively opened up to a wide audience a little-known part of Ukrainian-Israeli relations. On store shelves or on the festive table in Israel, there may be matzah, handmade by Ukrainian workers in Dnipro or Uman — under air raid sirens, with all religious requirements observed, and with the label Made in Ukraine.

…
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Reliable hosting for a website, including for an Israeli site, does not necessarily have to cost hundreds of shekels per month. We talk about the capabilities of the company “Hosting ‘Ukraine’”, compare prices with other providers, and explain why NANews – Israel news uses the ‘Business 4G’ plan.

An Israeli company’s website can be hosted on a server outside of Israel and still function properly in Hebrew, English, or multiple languages simultaneously. For visitors, the speed of page loading, stability, security, and accessibility of the site are important, not the country of registration of the hosting company.

One such international solution is the company “Hosting ‘Ukraine’”, operating on the domain Ukraine.com.ua.

It offers:

1. regular virtual hosting,
2. enhanced business plans,
3. VPS,
4. dedicated servers,
5. domain registration,
6. corporate email, and
7. cloud services.

The main reason we consider this service not as a random advertising recommendation is personal experience: the NANews site is hosted on the ‘Business 4G’ plan of the company “Hosting ‘Ukraine’”.

NANews is a multilingual news project on WordPress with a large number of publications, images, constant database updates, and regular visits by search robots. We use this plan ourselves and therefore recommend it to Israeli site owners based on real work, not just descriptions on the provider’s page.

What is known about the company “Hosting ‘Ukraine’”

The service’s history began in 2004 when the hosting infrastructure was launched for its own projects and client sites. Public hosting appeared in 2006, and in 2008 the company moved to the address Ukraine.com.ua and began actively promoting site hosting services.

In 2010, the number of servers serving the hosting exceeded 100. In 2013, the company opened a data center with 28 server racks with a calculated capacity of 240 kW, and in 2015 it received ICANN accreditation. By 2020, the number of servers exceeded 1000. In 2021, a second server with a capacity of 350 kW was launched.

The exact current number of clients is not published on the open page, so it would be incorrect to provide an unconfirmed figure. But the published history shows that this is not a newly created small project, but an infrastructure that has been developing for more than twenty years.

The company declares its own server infrastructure, server connections at 10 Gbps, and a total network bandwidth of 280 Gbps. NVMe disks, AMD EPYC and AMD Ryzen processors, ECC error-correcting memory, and IPv6 support are used.

The company calls its service the first fully automated hosting and domain registrar in Ukraine. Ordering services, activating hosting, registering domains, payments, and a significant part of technical operations are performed automatically. According to the company, the API covers 99% of the control panel functions.

This is hosting for any sites

The company’s name does not limit the geography of clients or the language of hosted sites.

On the servers, you can host:

• an Israeli company’s site;
• a project in Hebrew;
• a site in English;
• a multilingual portal;
• an online store;
• a news resource;
• a lawyer’s, realtor’s, or private clinic’s site;
• a blog;
• an educational platform;
• a corporate portal;
• an application in PHP, Python, or Node.js;
• several sites of a web studio.

The service interface and control panel are available in English, Russian, and Ukrainian. The site’s content can be in any language.

For Hebrew, the right-to-left text direction — RTL — is important. It depends not on the hosting, but on the WordPress theme, template, and CSS. Modern management systems use UTF-8 encoding, so Hebrew works correctly on the server just like English or any other language.

Why an Israeli site does not necessarily need to be hosted in Israel

The physical location of the server affects network latency but is not the only or even always the main factor in site speed.

WordPress loading is significantly affected by:

• the quality of the theme;
• the number and quality of plugins;
• the size of images;
• caching;
• the state of the database;
• third-party advertising scripts;
• connected fonts;
• video;
• the overall weight of the page.

A well-optimized site on an international server can load faster than a poorly configured site physically located in Israel.

For the Israeli audience, Cloudflare can also be connected. CDN stores the site’s static files in a distributed network and delivers them to the visitor from the nearest available node. This reduces the impact of the distance to the main server and simultaneously helps filter out some malicious traffic.

The company declares a direct connection of the data center to major international communication operators and the ability to move sites between servers without stopping their operation. The online migration technology has been used since 2009.

Regular hosting for small sites

For a business card site, blog, landing page, or small company, it is not necessary to immediately purchase a powerful business plan.

The minimum ‘Fast’ package provides:

• 10 GB on an NVMe disk;
• hosting for one site;
• 512 MB memory limit;
• free SSL;
• automatic backups;
• email on your domain;
• protection against malicious bots;
• antivirus check;
• five-day test.

The price starts from €4 per month with long-term payment. The monthly price is €7.

According to the official exchange rate of the Bank of Israel on July 31, 2026, one euro equals 3.5 shekels.

Therefore, €4 is approximately ₪14, and €7 is about ₪25 excluding the bank’s currency transaction fee.

The ‘Best’ plan provides 20 GB, allows hosting up to five sites, and increases the memory limit to 1 GB. The cost starts from €8 per month, and monthly payment is €13 — approximately from ₪28 to ₪46.

The ‘Quality’ plan provides 30 GB and a memory limit of up to 1.5 GB. It costs from €12 per month or €18 with monthly payment — approximately from ₪42 to ₪63.

The ‘from’ prices apply when a long payment period is selected. Before ordering, you need to check the final cost and the period for which the payment is deducted.

What is included in regular hosting

Even the minimum package provides not only space for files.

Among the declared features:

• NVMe disks;
• free SSL certificate;
• Apache and OpenLiteSpeed;
• MySQL 8.4 or 5.7;
• different PHP versions;
• SSH;
• Python;
• Git and SVN;
• Memcache and OPcache;
• IPv6;
• backup;
• antivirus;
• two-factor authentication;
• protection against CMS password guessing;
• email with POP3, IMAP, and SMTP;
• email virus and spam check;
• automatic installation of popular CMS.

Some additional features and cloud services may be paid separately. Therefore, before ordering a specific plan, you need to check the marks and notes in the current description.

WordPress, WooCommerce, and other systems

Through the control panel, you can automatically install WordPress, Joomla, OpenCart, Drupal, MODX, PrestaShop, Moodle, and other CMS.

For a regular company site or blog, the minimum plan is sufficient. For several projects, the ‘Best’ package is suitable. A small WooCommerce store can also start with regular hosting if the catalog is still small and there are not many heavy extensions on the site.

A more powerful solution will be needed when:

• traffic increases;
• the database grows;
• the WooCommerce cart slows down;
• many plugins are installed;
• the site regularly experiences sharp traffic spikes;
• several active projects are running simultaneously;
• the regular plan starts hitting CPU or memory limits.

Why did NANovosti choose the ‘Business 4G’ plan

NANovosti operates on the ‘Business 4G’ plan. This is the main practical argument for our recommendation.

A news project differs from a regular business card website. It constantly adds materials and images, updates plugins, supports multilingualism, search indexing, caching, backups, and additional WordPress features.

‘Business 4G’ provides:

• 32 GB on an NVMe disk;
• 4 GB of RAM;
• two CPU cores;
• PHP memory limit up to 4 GB;
• the ability to host multiple sites and subdomains within the resources;
• MySQL 8.4 or 5.7;
• OpenLiteSpeed;
• PHP-FPM;
• Node.js;
• Python;
• Redis, Memcached, and OPcache;
• SSH;
• Git and SVN;
• free SSL;
• backups;
• email on a separate mail infrastructure;
• antivirus;
• two-factor authentication;
• protection against password guessing;
• a five-day trial period.

The current price of the plan is €38.44 per month. At the representative rate of the Bank of Israel, this is about ₪135 per month, before any possible Israeli bank commission.

Balance is important to us. The plan provides dedicated resources but does not require self-administering a full VPS.

How business hosting differs from a regular plan

On shared hosting, sites of different clients use common server resources and operate within set limits.

On business hosting, CPU cores and memory are allocated to a specific account. They do not have to be shared with neighboring sites. Additionally, there are no restrictions on the number of CPU minutes, the number of files, and the size of the database, although the total disk volume and allocated resources of the plan are maintained.

In terms of resource allocation, this is similar to a VPS. But VPS has an important complexity: the operating system, web server, security, and updates need to be maintained independently or by hiring an administrator.

On business hosting, management remains as simple as on a regular plan. Backups are stored separately, email does not consume hosting account resources, and DDoS protection and standard server settings are provided by the provider.

This is why ‘Business 4G’ turned out to be convenient for NANovosti: we received 4 GB of memory and two cores without the need to turn site maintenance into independent Linux server administration.

Comparison with similar Israeli hosting

Comparing ‘Business 4G’ with the cheapest Israeli shared hosting is incorrect. The closest class of services is a managed VPS or specialized powerful WordPress hosting with comparable CPU and memory.

One of the Israeli providers offers a fully managed WordPress VPS with two cores, 4 GB RAM, and 100 GB SSD for $145 per month. At the Bank of Israel rate on July 31, 2026, this is approximately ₪443 per month. The cost includes management, cPanel, LiteSpeed, protection, and backup infrastructure.

The same provider’s regular managed VPS with two cores, 4 GB RAM, and 100 GB SSD costs $53 per month — about ₪162. However, this is already a server service, the set of included features and the nature of management need to be checked separately.

Another Israeli provider offers a managed Linux server with 4 GB RAM, four cores, and 50 GB SSD for ₪357 per month before VAT. The price includes server management, support, and site transfer. After adding Israeli VAT, the cost becomes even higher.

Against this background, ‘Business 4G’ for approximately ₪135 per month looks significantly more affordable. This does not mean that all offers are completely identical: Israeli servers may have more disk space, more cores, local infrastructure, and support in Hebrew.

But for a site owner, the end result is important. If you need 4 GB RAM, two CPU cores, WordPress, SSL, backups, email, protection, and a simple panel without self-administration, the price of ‘Business 4G’ is noticeably lower than many comparable managed solutions in Israel.

How much can be saved

‘Business 4G’ costs about ₪135 per month, or approximately ₪1620 per year at the current representative rate.

The Israeli managed WordPress VPS from the comparison costs about ₪443 per month, that is, more than ₪5300 per year before considering possible additional payments.

The difference exceeds ₪3600 per year.

Even when compared to a cheaper Israeli VPS for about ₪162 per month, the ‘Business 4G’ plan remains cheaper, while simultaneously providing a ready hosting environment without the need to independently configure the operating system and server software.

For a small site, the savings on a regular plan can be even more noticeable. The minimum package of ‘Hosting “Ukraine”‘ starts at about ₪14 per month, while Israeli WordPress hosting often costs tens of shekels monthly.

Security and protection against attacks

For sites targeting Israel, protection against attacks is of particular importance. This concerns businesses, public organizations, media, and information projects.

The company claims HTTP flood filtering, UDP flood blocking at the router level, and the use of separate server infrastructure for handling SYN floods. Also applied are:

• antivirus scanning;
• malicious file detection;
• protection of login to admin panels;
• blocking of malicious bots;
• two-factor authentication;
• SSL;
• email protection;
• automatic backups.

No hosting can guarantee absolute invulnerability. A WordPress owner must still regularly update the core, theme, and plugins, remove unused extensions, and apply unique passwords.

Backup outside the main server

The company automatically creates backups of sites and allows users to create custom copies through the panel.

The official page states that a hosting copy is created once a week, and mailboxes are copied every two hours to servers in Germany. The company also claims to store backups in several countries.

This is especially important given that the main data center is located in Kyiv and continues to operate during Russian aggression.

At the same time, for a critically important project, it is advisable to adhere to the universal rule: keep another independent copy outside the main hosting. It can be stored in cloud storage, on a separate server, or a local device.

Domains for Israeli sites

The company registers hundreds of international and national domain zones and is ICANN accredited.

For example, a .com domain costs €19 per year — approximately ₪67 at the current rate. Prices for .com.ua, .in.ua, .shop, .store, .site, and other zones are also published on the main page.

Domain and hosting do not have to be purchased from the same company.

An Israeli .co.il domain can be registered with an accredited local registrar, and the site files can be hosted on ‘Hosting “Ukraine”‘. To do this, it is enough to point the domain’s DNS records to the server.

The visitor will see the usual .co.il address and will not know the hosting location from the site name.

Interface and management

The panel allows managing:

• sites;
• files;
• domains;
• databases;
• PHP versions;
• SSL certificates;
• mailboxes;
• backups;
• SSH access;
• resource statistics;
• security settings;
• temporary developer access.

The delegation function allows providing a programmer or SEO specialist with limited temporary access without sharing the main account password.

This is convenient for an Israeli business owner who orders site creation and promotion from an external specialist.

Which plan to choose

For one small company site, portfolio, landing page, or blog, the ‘Fast’ plan is usually sufficient.

When you need to host up to five projects, it is more reasonable to consider the ‘Best’ plan.

For a web studio or a larger site, there is the ‘Quality’ plan.

For an active online store, news resource, several loaded sites, or a project that no longer fits within regular limits, business hosting should be considered.

The ‘Business 4G’ plan is especially interesting for projects that need:

• 4 GB RAM;
• two dedicated cores;
• a large WordPress database;
• WooCommerce;
• multiple sites;
• Redis;
• OpenLiteSpeed;
• PHP-FPM;
• increased stability under load;
• simple management without a separate system administrator.

It is on this plan that NANovosti operates.

When is it better to choose an Israeli provider

Local hosting may be preferable when:

• technical support in Hebrew is mandatory;
• the server must be physically located in Israel;
• the contract requires data storage in a specific jurisdiction;
• an Israeli tax document from the supplier is needed;
• minimal network latency is critical;
• the company requires fully individual server support on-site.

But for a regular business website, WordPress project, online store, or informational resource, these conditions are not always necessary.

Why we recommend “Hosting ‘Ukraine’”

Our recommendation is based on personal use.

NANovosti operates on the ‘Business 4G’ plan. For a multilingual news site, it provides sufficient memory and processor resources, while we do not have to maintain the VPS ourselves.

We received:

• dedicated resources;
• a clear control panel;
• WordPress;
• OpenLiteSpeed;
• backups;
• SSL;
• mail;
• protection;
• developer tools;
• the ability to increase resources as the site grows.

At a cost of about ₪135 per month, this plan is noticeably cheaper than many comparable managed solutions from Israeli providers.

For a small project, you can start with a regular plan from €4 per month. If the site grows, the transition to business hosting is automatic and, according to the company, seamless for visitors.

Reliable hosting for a site in Israel without overpaying

An Israeli site does not necessarily need to be hosted by an Israeli provider. It is much more important to get sufficient resources, stable operation, backups, SSL, protection, and the ability to restore the site after a failure.

“Hosting ‘Ukraine’” offers all this at a price that for many projects is noticeably lower than local rates.

The service is suitable for sites in Hebrew, English, and other languages, supports WordPress and WooCommerce, provides regular and enhanced business plans, and allows scaling the project without an immediate transition to a self-managed server.

View current rates and register via the NANovosti affiliate link:

https://www.ukraine.com.ua/?page=916943

This is an affiliate link. If the reader registers and purchases a service, the NANovosti editorial team may receive a reward. Clicking the link does not increase the cost for the client. Prices and exchange rates should be checked directly before payment.

…
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The Washington Post drew attention to the conversation between Benjamin Netanyahu and Volodymyr Zelensky, which took place on July 28 at the funeral of Senator Lindsey Graham. Due to the lack of sound, the content of the conversation remains unknown, but later reports emerged that the politicians discussed drones and modern military technologies.

July 31, 2026 the American newspaper The Washington Post reported on a brief conversation between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, which took place three days earlier — July 28, 2026 — before the funeral of American Senator Lindsey Graham in Washington.

The newspaper wrote that the politicians were seen having a conversation that “appeared to be a stern exchange”. In the original, The Washington Post used the cautious wording what appeared to be a stern exchange. At the same time, representatives of Israel and Ukraine refused to inform the publication about what exactly the leaders were talking about.

It is important to emphasize: The Washington Post’s publication does not contain a claim of a quarrel or diplomatic scandal. Journalists described the impression from a video recording in which Netanyahu and Zelensky are talking with serious faces and actively gesticulating. There is no sound on the recording, and no official transcript was published, so it is impossible to determine the exact content or tone of the remarks.

The conversation took place on July 28 at Lindsey Graham’s funeral

Netanyahu and Zelensky met at the Washington National Cathedral before the start of the farewell ceremony for Lindsey Graham. Both politicians held separate closed meetings with US President Donald Trump shortly before the funeral.

This was the first personal conversation between Netanyahu and Zelensky in almost three years. Before that, they met in September 2023, and their last known phone conversation took place in January 2025. The Times of Israel reported that the politicians tried to organize a full-fledged meeting in Washington, but it never took place.

As a result, a few minutes of communication before the funeral service became the only publicly recorded personal conversation between the leaders of Israel and Ukraine during their simultaneous stay in the US capital.

The video shows Netanyahu emotionally explaining something to Zelensky, accompanying his words with gestures. The President of Ukraine listens attentively and then responds. However, at the end of the conversation, both politicians smile and shake hands.

The Times of Israel described the conversation as quite serious but correct and friendly. This is another reason not to present the video recording as evidence of a conflict between the politicians.

What exactly The Washington Post wrote

The Washington Post article was published on July 31, 2026, at 07:00 Eastern Time. Its main topic was not the conversation between Netanyahu and Zelensky itself, but the discussion in Congress about expanding cooperation between the US and Israeli defense industries.

The episode at Graham’s funeral was cited as part of a broader context. The newspaper noted that Israel and Ukraine are simultaneously seeking military aid, air defense systems, interceptor missiles, and access to American defense technologies from Washington.

The Washington Post characterized the position of the two US allies as a kind of “zero-sum game”. The publication meant that limited American stocks of certain types of weapons have to be distributed between the war in Russia against Ukraine and the war involving the US and Israel against Iran.

During Zelensky’s meeting with Trump, the Ukrainian president raised the issue of obtaining 300 Patriot interceptors. According to The Washington Post, Trump explained that it would be difficult to satisfy this request because such missiles are being used on the Iranian front.

Against this backdrop, the serious conversation between Netanyahu and Zelensky could indeed have concerned issues directly affecting the ability of both countries to protect their cities from missiles and drones. However, the content of the conversation was not officially disclosed.

Was there a skirmish between the leaders

It is only reliably known that the conversation appeared serious. The assertion that Netanyahu and Zelensky exchanged sharp remarks remains an assumption.

Therefore, the correct wording is as follows: Netanyahu and Zelensky had a serious conversation that might have appeared stern from the outside, but there is no evidence of a quarrel.

NANews — News of Israel notes that The Washington Post’s wording was cautious. The newspaper wrote not about a skirmish that took place, but about a conversation that appeared to be a stern exchange.

Later, a version about FPV drones appeared

After the video recording spread, the New York Post, citing an unnamed Israeli official, reported that Netanyahu and Zelensky discussed drones, including FPV drones.

According to the publication’s source, Israel and Ukraine faced a common problem — the rapid development of inexpensive strike devices capable of hitting military personnel, equipment, and infrastructure.

Special attention could have been paid to drones controlled via fiber optic cable. Such devices do not depend on the usual radio channel, so traditional electronic warfare means cannot always suppress the connection between the operator and the drone. The New York Post also reported that the conversation concerned the battlefield situation and the effectiveness of new military technologies.

Over the years of full-scale Russian aggression, Ukraine has accumulated extensive practical experience in using FPV drones and countering them. Israel also faces the development of unmanned systems in Iran and Tehran-supported armed groups.

This version explains why the politicians might have been talking emotionally and actively gesticulating. Discussing the threat of new drones does not necessarily imply a conflict between the interlocutors.

At the same time, the New York Post’s report cannot be considered an official transcript: it is based on information from sources, and the office of the Israeli Prime Minister and the office of the Ukrainian President did not publish the full content of the conversation.

Why a full-fledged meeting did not take place

Before the politicians arrived in Washington, the possibility of a separate meeting between Netanyahu and Zelensky was discussed. However, it was not possible to organize it.

The Times of Israel, citing a report from Haaretz, wrote that the office of the Israeli Prime Minister initially proposed holding a meeting, but after the Ukrainian side agreed, no final confirmation followed. At the same time, official representatives of the two countries did not publicly explain why the talks did not take place.

The refusal or inability to hold a full-fledged bilateral meeting became an additional backdrop for interpreting the video recording. The serious faces of the politicians began to be perceived as evidence of tension in relations between Kyiv and Jerusalem.

However, on the same day, a phone conversation took place between Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar and his Ukrainian counterpart Andriy Sybiha. Saar stated that the ministers discussed common challenges, including the threat from Iran, and invited Sybiha to visit Israel.

This indicates that the political dialogue between the countries continues despite disagreements over military aid to Ukraine.

The Iron Dome and Netanyahu’s decision

In The Washington Post’s publication, the leaders’ conversation was placed alongside the story of an attempt to transfer Israeli Iron Dome missile defense system batteries located in the US to Ukraine.

According to the newspaper, in 2023, Lindsey Graham supported the transfer of these systems to Ukraine to protect the civilian population from Russian attacks. However, Netanyahu used the terms of the US-Israeli joint production agreement and blocked the transfer. The batteries were paid for by the American government, but Israel retained the right to final approval of their use.

The Israeli embassy in Washington explained this decision by the concern that Iron Dome technologies could fall into Iran’s hands. At the same time, the diplomatic mission noted that Israel returned Patriot batteries to the US, after which Washington was able to send them to Ukraine.

This story remains one of the most painful issues in Israeli-Ukrainian relations. Since 2022, Kyiv has repeatedly requested air and missile defense systems necessary to protect cities from Russian missiles and Iranian drones.

The Israeli side has long explained its cautious position by its own security needs, the risk of technology leakage, and the need to maintain freedom of action in the region.

What resources Israel and Ukraine are fighting for

The parallel visits of Netanyahu and Zelensky to Washington showed how much both countries depend on the decisions of the White House and the capabilities of the American military-industrial complex.

Ukraine needs Patriot interceptors, radars, ballistic missile countermeasures, and ammunition production technologies. Israel needs American interceptors, aviation munitions, and support in confronting Iran.

The problem is that the production of complex missiles takes a long time, and existing stocks are not unlimited. As a result, Washington is forced to determine how much weaponry to leave for its own army and how much to send to allies.

This is what The Washington Post called a zero-sum competition: additional missiles for one front may mean a reduction in the available quantity for another.

At the same time, such rivalry does not exclude cooperation between Israel and Ukraine. Both countries are confronting military technologies related to Iran. Russia uses Iranian drones and Russian modifications of these devices against Ukrainian cities, while Israel directly faces Iran and its supported forces in the Middle East.

NANews — News of Israel believes that exchanging Ukrainian experience in combating FPV drones and Israeli developments in detecting and intercepting aerial targets could serve the interests of both countries.

Why Graham’s funeral became a diplomatic event

Lindsey Graham died on July 11, 2026 at the age of 71 due to heart disease. He was one of the most prominent supporters of an active US role in world politics and consistently supported Israel and Ukraine.

The day before his death, Graham was in Kyiv and met with Zelensky. It was his tenth visit to Ukraine since the start of full-scale Russian aggression in February 2022. In the last days of his life, the senator also promoted a new package of sanctions against Russia.

At the same time, Graham remained one of the most consistent supporters of Israel in Congress and advocated for a tough policy towards Iran.

Therefore, Trump, Netanyahu, Zelensky, representatives of the US administration, and American lawmakers were all present at his funeral. The mourning ceremony effectively turned into a platform for informal diplomacy.

What happened after the conversation

After the ceremony, neither Netanyahu nor Zelensky publicly disclosed the content of their conversation. No official announcements of any agreements reached followed either.

During his visit to Washington, Zelensky discussed with Trump the licensing of production of interceptors for Patriot and other forms of defense cooperation. He also met with representatives of Lockheed Martin and stated that Ukraine is ready to share experience and technologies with countries helping to protect human lives.

Netanyahu held a separate meeting with Trump, focusing on Iran and regional security. The White House described both meetings — with Netanyahu and Zelensky — as positive and productive.

Thus, the video recording of the conversation between the two leaders became just a small, albeit symbolically important, episode of a busy diplomatic day.

What can be stated for sure

The Washington Post reported on the episode on July 31, 2026, three days after Lindsey Graham’s funeral. The newspaper reported that the conversation between Netanyahu and Zelensky appeared to be a serious or stern exchange, but emphasized that both sides refused to comment on it.

The recording contains no sound, so it is not possible to speak of a confirmed quarrel. At the end of the conversation, the politicians smiled and shook hands, and Israeli media described the conversation as serious but correct.

The most likely topic, according to later reports, was FPV drones and modern military technologies. However, there is still no official transcript.

The story is important not because of the expressions of Netanyahu and Zelensky, but because of the deeper context: the complex Ukrainian-Israeli relations, the common threat from Russian-Iranian military cooperation, the struggle for American interceptors, and the need to seek new directions for interaction between Israel and Ukraine.

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On the Golan Heights, about 16 km from the Sea of Galilee (Kinneret), there is a place that initially disappoints in person — and then suddenly overwhelms. Gilgal Refaim (גלגל רפאים) is translated in various ways: Wheel of Ghosts, Circle of Spirits, sometimes even Ring of Giants. And yes, it is called the Israeli Stonehenge — not because it “sounds nice,” but because the resemblance in idea and mystery is indeed persistent.

Especially in spring, when the Golan is green, the air is wet from the grass, and the first flowers emerge where there was mud yesterday, this structure seems not just ancient — it seems stubbornly alive. Massive. Too calm for something that is about five thousand years old.

And yet, getting there is not always easy: the road requires a decent car and a willingness to walk.

Here is a link to Google Maps – https://maps.app.goo.gl/sYoit28RBqSTPTaL9

Stones that look like “just a pile” from the ground

Gilgal Refaim consists of approximately 42,000 basalt boulders, with a total weight estimated at up to 40,000 tons. At eye level, it often looks like a chaotic heap of stones — without an “entrance,” without a beautiful composition, without a convenient sign saying “look here.”

But all the magic is that the structure is only readable from above.

There are five concentric circles, and the largest of them is about 156 meters in diameter. And this is one of those rare cases where the phrase “seen from above” is not a journalistic metaphor: in the modern era, the object was indeed recognized and described thanks to aerial surveys.

There is another detail that catches the eye: unlike the British Stonehenge, there are no hewn vertical pillars here. The Israeli version is made of unprocessed stones, piled on top of each other. As if it was important for the builders not to “show technique,” but to create mass. Perimeter. Boundary.

What the “Wheel” looks like and why it deceives from the ground

From the ground, Rujm el-Hiri often looks like a disorderly stone scatter. But from above, the main thing is visible: a system of concentric circles converging towards the center, where a tumulus is located.

Facts in numbers (according to the most common descriptions):

• More than 42,000 basalt boulders

• The outer circle is about 150–160 m in diameter

• The total weight of the complex is estimated at approximately 37,500–40,000 tons

• The dating is usually attributed to the turn of the 4th–3rd millennia BC (early Bronze Age), but ranges in sources may vary

When “it was discovered” and who took it on

Sometimes it is written that the object was “discovered from the air.” It is more correct to say this: after 1967, the monument was systematically recorded and described during surveys of the area, and then it became the subject of regular research, including excavations and mapping.

In recent years, geophysics and remote analysis of the terrain and structure have been added to the study.

Observatory, calendar, or… why was it built at all?

Scientists still do not have a single answer as to why this was built. There are many versions, and each sounds like a separate genre — from strict archaeology to biblical legend.

The most common explanations usually look like this:

Observatory. For a long time, it was believed that the openings and directions in the walls were related to the points of sunrise on the days of the summer and winter solstices. The version is beautiful, logical, almost “textbook.” But it has a weak point: recent studies, taking into account soil shifts and changes in the orientation of the structure over time, make this hypothesis more cautious.

Cult of the dead. In the center is a tumulus with a burial chamber. And here is an important nuance that makes the story even stranger: it is often indicated that the tumulus could have appeared about a thousand years later than the circles themselves. That is, the “heart” of the complex could have been added later — meaning the monument’s purpose could have changed.

Sky burial. This is a term for the practice where the deceased was left in an open place, and the flesh was eaten by birds — primarily vultures. This form of burial is known in the region in earlier periods. The version sounds harsh, even unpleasant — but that’s why it sometimes seems plausible: the ancient world did not have to be “beautiful.”

Gathering place for tribes. Perhaps it was a ritual center for nomadic peoples — a meeting point, negotiations, rituals, status demonstration. Stone as a “contract” that cannot be taken away.

Calendar. A similar idea: the place could serve as a primitive calendar and mark key points of the annual cycle — primarily solstices. This does not necessarily contradict the ritual version: in ancient societies, the calendar and cult were often the same.

Connection with giants. The Golan is a territory that biblical tradition associates with giants. Therefore, a tempting legend arises: supposedly, giants built it for giants, “tomb of giants,” and some even say “grave of Goliath.” This is no longer science, but mythology — but mythology that clings to the stones as tightly as moss.

Between spirits and Golgotha: why the name sounds so strong

The name Gilgal Refaim is not just “beautiful words.” It is itself like a hint that does not fully explain anything.

Gilgal (גִּלְגָּל) — circle, wheel. The root is associated with the idea of rolling, rotating, folding. In biblical language, “gilgal” is also a place where stones were set in a circle as a sign of memory. And yes, from a close root comes the word gulgoleth (גולגולת) — “skull,” from which the well-known word “Golgotha” grew. It is not a fact that this is a direct semantic bridge, but the feeling of “stones as memory” arises almost automatically here.

Refaim (רְפָאִים) — a complex word: both giants and spirits. In biblical texts, the Rephaim are an ancient people of giants who lived, among other places, on the Golan; in later poetry and tradition, they are already “shadows of the dead,” inhabitants of the underworld.

Therefore, there are so many translations: this name simultaneously holds two worlds — the physical and the “invisible.”

Why it’s important not to fall into “monographs about giant-occupiers”

Such places always attract not only archaeologists and historians. They are loved by writers, directors, esoteric enthusiasts — and, unfortunately, those who build pseudo-historical theories under a political slogan.

Gilgal Refaim sometimes appears in texts where authors confidently prove that “giants lived here in ancient times” and then draw conclusions not about archaeology, but about modernity. And here it is useful to at least understand the basics: what exactly is this object, what time is it from, how is it structured, why are there so many versions around it.

Because, no matter how you look at it, this stone structure is interesting in itself without any “additional tales.” Simply because it stands on the Golan — and is silent. And we are still trying to understand what exactly ancient people wanted to fix in basalt: calendar, memory, fear, power… or something for which we do not yet have words.

…
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Jewish American actor, director, and screenwriter Jesse Eisenberg, known for films such as “The Social Network,” “Now You See Me,” “Zombieland,” and “Real Pain,” has arrived in Ukraine as a volunteer for an international humanitarian mission.

As of August 1, 2026, Eisenberg is in the Lviv region, where a program of psychological and creative support for children and adolescents affected by the consequences of the full-scale Russian aggression is being implemented.

The actor did not arrive for the filming of a new feature film, a premiere, or an official ceremony. He joined the project The Campfire Project, which the American organization conducts in collaboration with the Polish-Ukrainian humanitarian organization Folkowisko. The main work takes place in the village of Nahachev in the Lviv region, near the border with Poland.

The project began preparations long before the actor’s arrival.

The official story of the current mission did not begin in the last days of July.

On July 1, 2026, the organization Razom for Ukraine introduced the participants of its I’mMortal Fellowship program. Among the selected projects was the initiative Gathering Around the Fire: Arts, Healing, and Resilience.

The partners of the project were named as The Campfire Project from New York and Folkowisko Ukraine from Nahachev in the Lviv region. The program was initially designed for local children and families, as well as for people forced to leave other regions of Ukraine. It included theater, music, dance, visual arts, and psychological support methods that take into account the traumatic experience of war.

Simultaneously, the organizers planned training for Ukrainian teachers, psychologists, social workers, and representatives of humanitarian organizations. They are to be provided with methods that can be used after the American team’s visit.

In preparing this part of the program, materials from the World Health Organization and the Jameel Arts and Health Lab were taken into account. Thus, it is not about a one-time performance by celebrities in front of children, but an attempt to create a system that can continue to work with the efforts of Ukrainian specialists.

On July 5, Jesse Eisenberg first spoke about the upcoming trip.

Jesse Eisenberg publicly announced his intention to go to Ukraine on July 5, 2026 at the Karlovy Vary International Film Festival in the Czech Republic.

The actor said that he is organizing the trip together with his family. His wife Anna Strout works in the New York public school system and teaches art. According to Eisenberg, she was supposed to work directly with the children.

The couple learned about the program through American actress Jessica Hecht, one of the founders of The Campfire Project. Eisenberg then explained the distribution of roles very simply: his wife would teach, their son would communicate and play with the children, and he himself would film what was happening on his phone and document the camp’s work.

The actor emphasized that his family lives in comfortable conditions and believes it is right to use any real opportunity to help others. At the same time, Eisenberg did not exaggerate the significance of his participation and separately noted that volunteers cannot stop the war but can come and support the children.

This clarification is important: Jesse Eisenberg is not a professional psychologist or art therapist. He joined the mission as a volunteer, a member of the creative team, and a person documenting the project. Polish organizers also reported that he would participate in art classes and help the team develop methods for working with children who have experienced war trauma.

On July 27, the actor appeared in Polish Gorajec.

The next confirmed stage of the trip relates to July 27, 2026.

On this day, Polish Radio Rzeszów reported that Jesse Eisenberg arrived in the village of Gorajec in southeastern Poland. There is the base of the organization Folkowisko, which is involved in preparing the humanitarian mission.

Before crossing the Ukrainian border, the actor spent several days in Gorajec. He got acquainted with the work of Folkowisko, met with local residents, visited a historic wooden church, and attended a vintage car rally. The Polish publication was updated on July 30 when additional information about his further trip appeared.

Gorajec in this story turned out not to be a tourist stop. It was here that Eisenberg met the people and organization that, after the start of the full-scale war, created humanitarian, educational, and cultural programs on both sides of the Polish-Ukrainian border.

On July 29, it became known that the actor would work with children.

On July 29, 2026, the Polish Tygodnik Zamojski published details of the mission.

The publication reported that Eisenberg became a volunteer for the joint humanitarian and educational project of Folkowisko and The Campfire Project. In the following days, he was supposed to work with children growing up under Russian attacks, air raids, and a constant sense of danger.

President of Stowarzyszenie Folkowisko Marcin Piotrowski stated that the actor’s participation is an important gesture because children need people willing to give them their time, energy, knowledge, and attention.

On July 31, it was confirmed that Eisenberg was already in Ukraine.

On July 31, 2026, Ukrainian media and representatives of The Campfire Project confirmed that Jesse Eisenberg arrived in the Lviv region.

In the evening of July 31, TVP World also reported on the trip, calling it a joint Polish-American humanitarian initiative for Ukrainian children. The TVP publication appeared after several days of Eisenberg’s stay in Polish Gorajec and his subsequent move to the Lviv region.

What is happening in Nahachev.

The first main stage of the mission is called Therapeutic Arts Camp.

It is designed for one week. An international team of 12 artists, creative therapy specialists, and mental health professionals arrived in Nahachev. Jesse Eisenberg, his wife Anna Strout, and their son joined the program.

Children participate in theater workshops, dance and movement classes, draw, engage in visual arts, and receive individual psychological consultations.

The main task is not just to entertain the participants. Through creative work, children are helped to safely express fear, anxiety, anger, and other feelings that arose due to the war, forced relocation, loss of home, or prolonged life under the threat of Russian attacks.

Eisenberg himself explained the meaning of the project as follows: art should help people who were forced to leave their homes or are trying to cope with the consequences of the war to free and express their emotional life.

How many children are participating.

In reports published after the start of the camp, different numbers were mentioned.

On July 31, The Gaze reported on more than 70 children and adolescents. UA.NEWS indicated that 70 children are participating in the program. In later reports from Ukrainian media, it was already mentioned more than 80 participants.

Most likely, the number of children increased during the organization of the camp. The final consolidated figure has not yet been published by The Campfire Project, so it is more accurate to say that the program covered at least 70 children and adolescents, and according to some data, more than 80.

Among them are both residents of the Lviv region and families who relocated from other parts of Ukraine due to hostilities and Russian occupation.

After the camp, training for Ukrainian specialists will take place.

The mission does not end with the week-long camp.

Its second stage provides for a separate intensive seminar for Ukrainian teachers, psychologists, social workers, artists, and humanitarian organization employees.

Participants are to be taught methods of using theater, music, dance, and visual arts when working with trauma. The goal is that after the departure of American volunteers, help for children does not stop.

According to the organizers, the entire Polish-American-Ukrainian trip is designed for about two weeks: the first part is dedicated to direct work with children, the second to the training of local specialists.

This part makes the initiative particularly significant. The international team is not just conducting a temporary event but is leaving Ukrainian specialists with tools for further independent work.

The mission takes place against the backdrop of ongoing Russian attacks.

The program began at a time when Russian strikes on Ukraine did not cease.

On the night of July 30, 2026, when mission participants were already in the border region, Russian troops carried out one of the largest combined strikes on Ukraine. Russia used more than 70 missiles and over 280 strike drones.

Kyiv and the Kyiv region, as well as the Dnipropetrovsk, Lviv, Poltava, Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, Sumy, Vinnytsia, Cherkasy, and Ivano-Frankivsk regions were under attack and threat.

Thus, the conversation about children’s war trauma for camp participants is not an abstract theory. Air raids, missiles, and strike drones remain part of the daily life of Ukrainian families.

Who created The Campfire Project.

The Campfire Project was established in 2017, during the Syrian migration crisis.

The organization was created by American actress Jessica Hecht and producer Jenny Gersten. They began using theater, music, dance, and other creative practices to support refugees and displaced people.

Subsequently, The Campfire Project conducted missions in Greece, Moldova, and Uganda, and in July 2024 launched a program for migrants in New York. The development of activities is carried out by psychologists, creative therapy specialists, and artists.

The current mission in Ukraine continues this work but takes into account Ukrainian culture and the specific experience of children living during the full-scale Russian war.

For NAnews — News of Israel, it is fundamentally important to note: this is not a promotional trip of a star, but a project that was prepared in advance and unites international specialists with Ukrainian organizations.

Why Ukraine has personal significance for Eisenberg.

Jesse Eisenberg was born on October 5, 1983 in New York in a Jewish family. His ancestors came from Eastern Europe, primarily from Poland and territories that are now part of Ukraine.

During the trip, Eisenberg said that part of his family survived World War II in Lviv. According to him, relatives were saved by people living near the place where the humanitarian mission is now taking place. Therefore, the trip to this region became not only a volunteer but also a deeply personal journey for him.

The actor’s relationship with his family’s history is especially vividly manifested in the film “Real Pain”, released in 2024.

Eisenberg wrote the script, directed, and played one of the main roles. The film tells the story of two American Jewish cousins who travel to Poland to reconnect with their family’s history and honor the memory of relatives who survived the Holocaust.

The basis of the film was real family memories of Eisenberg and his trip to Poland in 2008, when he visited the house that belonged to his relatives until 1939.

On March 4, 2025, Eisenberg received Polish citizenship.

Another important date was March 4, 2025.

On this day, Polish President Andrzej Duda officially handed Jesse Eisenberg documents granting Polish citizenship during a ceremony in New York.

The presidential office noted that the actor was born into a Jewish family, and his ancestors came from Poland, including Krasnystaw. Eisenberg himself linked obtaining citizenship with the desire to restore his family’s historical connection with Poland and contribute to improving relations between Jews and Poles.

The current trip to Ukraine became the next stage of this return to Eastern Europe — not only for exploring family history but also for helping people experiencing a new war.

Eisenberg’s connection with Israel.

Jesse Eisenberg is connected to Israel through his Jewish heritage, family history, and creative activities.

A particularly important event was his first visit to Israel in July 2014. At that time, Israeli cities were under rocket attacks, and many foreign performers and artists canceled planned visits.

Eisenberg did not cancel his trip.

On July 24, 2014, he appeared at the Tel Aviv theater “Beit Lessin”, where the premiere of his play “The Revisionist” in Hebrew took place. After the performance, the actor participated in a meeting with the audience. The play was written by him in 2013 and is dedicated to the meeting of a young American with an elderly relative who survived the Holocaust.

The visit took place shortly before the temporary ban by the US Federal Aviation Administration on flights to Israel. Despite the situation, Eisenberg stated that he had no doubts about the decision to come.

He called Israel a “wonderful country” and said that he had a very good week there. The actor’s words were met with applause by the Israeli audience.

During that trip, Eisenberg visited Jerusalem, Haifa, and Acre. He also said that he would like to see southern Israel during his next visit.

This story shows that his connection with Israel is not limited to a formal mention of Jewish heritage. In a difficult period for the country, Eisenberg personally came to support the Israeli theater and the presentation of his play in Hebrew.

From family memory to helping children.

In Jesse Eisenberg’s biography, several historical and human lines are intertwined.

His ancestors were Jews from Eastern Europe. A significant part of the family faced the Holocaust. The actor himself restores the connection with Poland, addresses Jewish memory in his work, visited Israel during rocket attacks, and now works with children growing up under the threat of Russian missiles and drones.

The current mission cannot return destroyed homes or lost loved ones to children. But it can provide them with a safe space, adult attention, and the opportunity to express feelings for which it is difficult to find words.

For NAnews — News of Israel, this trip is important in this context. Jewish memory in the case of Jesse Eisenberg becomes not only an appeal to the tragedies of the past but also a basis for concrete help to those experiencing war today.

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