Month: September 2026

On June 29, 2026, the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine recorded: Russian authorities in the occupied territories continue to forcibly conscript protected persons into the Russian armed forces. In March, the UN separately described the mechanism by which a Russian passport, military registration, and conscription become links in one chain.

I, R.Verter, for NANews — News of Israel compared data from the Ukrainian GUR, Russian figures, the reconstruction by ‘Important Stories’, UN documents, and an investigation into violence within the Russian army. There is no single figure to date. But the sources allow us to see how tens of thousands of people went through this system and what happened to those who tried to leave it.

When searching for “how many Ukrainians Russia mobilized in the occupied territories” or “is mobilization ongoing in 2026”, it is important not to mix data from different years. 55–60 thousand is the estimate of Ukrainian intelligence by mid-2023, more than 73 thousand is the independent reconstruction of the Donetsk and Luhansk corps, 78.9 thousand is the figure of the Russian General Staff cited in the investigation. These are different slices of one process.

73 thousand were seen through army bureaucracy

On June 4, 2025, ‘Important Stories’ published a study based not only on statements from the parties but on leaks of lists of Russian servicemen wanted for unauthorized absence and desertion. Journalists noted personal tags of the ‘AB’ series. Until early 2023, this series was characteristic of military personnel from the occupied parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, and later it was also used for recruited prisoners from ‘Storm Z’.

By ‘DNR’ and ‘LNR’ here are meant entities created with Russian support in the captured areas of Ukraine’s Donetsk and Luhansk regions. After the full-scale invasion, their armed formations were finally integrated into the Russian military system.

The most important thing in the study is not the letter series itself. The numbers formed sequences. In some blocks, surnames were in alphabetical order, in others — in the order of the unit’s regular list. Journalists found 79 alphabetical sequences and another 13 blocks related to the structure of the units. Additional verification was provided by relatives’ announcements about the missing: the numbers of people not in the leak stood between neighboring surnames. Thus, a minimum estimate appeared — 48.9 thousand people in the Donetsk and 24.1 thousand in the Luhansk formations, totaling more than 73 thousand.

This figure probably does not cover everyone. Almost two thousand people from the leak were included in the Russian army by a secret order on January 1, 2023. According to a source from ‘Important Stories’, the order formalized as Russian servicemen even those who did not sign a report on continuing service and did not conclude a contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense. From the initial mobilization to the appearance of a personal number, almost a year could pass. A person who died, went missing, or dropped out earlier might not be counted at all.

That is why there are estimates of 55–60 thousand, 73 thousand, and 78.9 thousand. They relate to different arrays and moments of the war. And taking into account people who already served in these corps before February 24, 2022, the total number of formations, according to researchers, could exceed 100 thousand.

The passport turned out not to be the end of pressure, but the beginning of the next stage

For the Israeli reader, it is important here to distinguish between the usual mobilization of a state of its citizens and the actions of an occupying power. Article 51 of the Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits the occupying power from forcing protected persons to serve in its armed or auxiliary forces. Pressure to achieve formally voluntary enlistment is also prohibited. Human Rights Watch in its 2026 report qualifies the Russian forced conscription of Ukrainian citizens in the occupied territories as a war crime.

The UN report from March 20, 2026 shows that it does not necessarily start with a summons. After the illegal annexation, Russia began to consider Ukrainians without Russian documents as ‘foreigners’. Access to medicine, pensions, social assistance, work, property, banking services, and insurance was gradually linked to the possession of a Russian passport. At checkpoints, people without it faced enhanced checks, interrogations, and searches.

Then the military part of the system was activated. After imposing Russian citizenship, Ukrainian men 18–30 years old were considered subject to conscription by the Russian authorities. According to the UN, since October 2023, five conscription campaigns have already taken place in the occupied territories. Moscow does not publish separate complete statistics, but documents studied by the UN indicate thousands of illegally conscripted residents.

This report contains details that disappear behind large statistics. A 21-year-old resident of the Zaporizhzhia region told the UN that in 2023 he was forced to obtain a Russian passport to be able to move around. But immediately after receiving the document, he was ordered to undergo military registration. He left the occupied territory to avoid ending up in the Russian army.

Another case is a young man from the Luhansk region. He left a few days before his eighteenth birthday precisely because of the fear of Russian conscription. In these two stories, the chain is clearly visible, which is not conveyed by a single figure: a document is needed for a person for ordinary life, but the same document opens the next stage for the occupation administration — military registration and the possibility of conscription.

What losses and desertion from units say

Already in the first year of the full-scale war, formations from the Donetsk and Luhansk regions suffered huge losses. ‘Important Stories’ cites data on more than 20 thousand killed and wounded, and the estimate used by the BBC Russian Service for those killed from the two occupied regions was 21–23.5 thousand people. These figures cannot simply be subtracted from 73 thousand: sources and methodologies differ. But they show why the number ever mobilized is not equal to the number of people currently in the ranks.

Another significant array is desertion. In the largest blocks of tags, covering two to four thousand servicemen, 8 to 19% of the personnel were wanted for unauthorized absence. Of the 11.5 thousand people with ‘AB’ series tags, at least 2.7 thousand were detained. At the time of the study, 2817 servicemen from these territories were still on the federal wanted list, and for more than 800, the search was discontinued.

This is an important boundary. Among the residents of occupied Ukraine who ended up in the Russian army, there were people who consciously fought on the side of Russia. But mass mobilization, the coercion described by the UN, and thousands who tried to leave the units do not allow automatically considering every person in such units as a volunteer.

Refusal to assault does not mean the possibility of simply leaving

A separate layer of this story is violence already within the Russian army. In October 2025, ‘Verstka’ compiled a card index of 101 servicemen whom colleagues and relatives accused of so-called ‘nullifications’: extrajudicial killings, torture to death, and sending people into assaults from which it is almost impossible to return. Among the reasons in the collected testimonies was the refusal to go on an assault.

One of the described cases concerns servicemen who, according to colleagues, were ordered to move forward through a minefield. After the refusal, two died. In another story, a conscript claimed that those who refused to carry out obviously deadly tasks were shot. These are testimonies, not statistics of the entire Russian army, but they show why the question ‘why didn’t the person just refuse?’ may not have an obvious answer.

Here, too, it is important not to turn the investigation into the slogan ‘refused — will definitely be killed’. Such a universal dependency is not proven by the sources. But another link appears: a person may first fall under the pressure of the occupation administration, then under military registration and conscription, and already within the unit face the threat of punishment for refusing to carry out a deadly order.

And this is not a closed chapter of the first months of the invasion. On June 29, 2026, the UN again recorded the continuation of forced conscription in the occupied territory. And on July 16, Human Rights Watch reported another long-term element: in Russian schools in the captured territories, boys are directed to military registration, simultaneously integrating military training and militarized education into the educational system.

For NANews — News of Israel, this is where the main meaning of this story lies. Occupation changes not only the map and administration. It can first put a person before a choice between Russian documents and normal everyday life, then turn these documents into a basis for military registration, and then demand to serve in an army fighting against his own country.

And therefore, tens of thousands here are not just a figure in military statistics. Behind it is visible a mechanism: the mass recruitment of 2022, military formalization, huge losses, attempts to escape, pressure through documents, and new conscription campaigns. UN documents show that in 2026 this mechanism has not disappeared.

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Russia continues to urge residents of occupied Ukraine: how tens of thousands of people ended up in the Russian army - September 2, 2026 - Новости Израиля

Saudi Arabia is building a military alliance with Turkey and Pakistan. Why, after the war with Iran, has Israel found itself outside the new security system - September 1, 2026 - Новости Израиля

In Tel Aviv, the Ukrainian ambassador called on Israel to unite against common threats: behind this phrase already stands Russia-Iran - September 1, 2026 - Новости Израиля

On August 31, 2026, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan gathered the highest political and military leadership for the first time under the Mecca Defense Alliance. For Israel, the question is no longer whether a new bloc exists, but why the war with Iran provided Jerusalem with proof of its value to the Gulf countries—and at the same time did not make it part of the emerging security architecture.

On August 31, 2026, in Istanbul, the foreign ministers, defense ministers, and top military leadership of Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan held the first meeting of the Strategic Political and Defense Committee, established under the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement. This is already the second stage of a story that began on August 7 in Mecca: then Mohammed bin Salman, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and Shehbaz Sharif signed an agreement that an armed attack on one of the three countries should be considered an attack on all three.

The formula itself sounds almost like NATO’s Article 5, so the new bloc quickly received the labels “Islamic NATO” and “Meccan Pact.” But after the meeting in Istanbul, something more important than a label emerged. The three countries began turning the political declaration into a permanent mechanism: a secretariat is being created in Saudi Arabia, the first secretary-general for three years should be a representative from Pakistan, and cooperation will cover the connectivity of armed forces, defense industry, joint technology development, and production.

For NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency, the sensation around the name is not important, but rather the more uncomfortable question. The war with Iran showed that Israel is capable of practically helping Arab states repel Iranian strikes. So why is Saudi Arabia, which itself faced the threat of regional escalation, institutionalizing a defense alliance not with Israel, but with Turkey and Pakistan?

I, Stas Shifer, for this material compared what changed after the signing of the agreement on August 7 with previous NANews materials on Saudi normalization, Israeli assistance to the UAE, and the Iran-Russia military link. And the main change is visible precisely over time: on August 7 we had an agreement, and by August 31 there was already a secretariat, a permanent committee, and talk of expansion. This is not yet NATO, but it is no longer just a photo of three leaders after the ceremony.

From agreement to structure: what emerged in three weeks

NANews has already analyzed the moment of signing in the material “Turkey joined the defense alliance with Saudi Arabia and nuclear Pakistan: what the principle ‘an attack on one is an attack on all’ changes for Israel”. At that time, the central fact was precisely the formula of collective defense.

After Istanbul, an institutional shell was added to it. The joint statement of the three countries speaks of the need to make collective deterrence and defense effective, strengthen the interaction of armed forces, jointly develop technologies and production. This is an important detail. Military alliances become real not at the moment when leaders sign a beautiful document, but when people, procedures, permanent structures, joint projects, and regular meetings appear.

The Meccan alliance does not yet have integrated command at the NATO level, no publicly described automatic military response, and no published full set of operational protocols. Therefore, the phrase “a new NATO has already been created” would be an exaggeration. But calling the agreement symbolic is now difficult. The secretariat means that cooperation should not depend on a single meeting of leaders.

There is another boundary that is important not to blur. The official joint statement on August 31 explicitly names the defense industry, joint technology development, and production. Intelligence sharing as a separate formalized point is not prescribed there. Therefore, I would not write that the three states have already created a common intelligence system. Intelligence assistance may be part of practical defense cooperation, but it is not the same.

The very fact of such clarification is important for understanding the scale. We are not looking at a ready-made Middle Eastern NATO analog with a headquarters, unified command, and pre-written war scenarios. We are looking at the process of its institutionalization. It is this process that matters for Israel.

Why Pakistan and Turkey are needed by Riyadh right now

If you look at the new bloc only through Iran, Saudi Arabia’s choice indeed seems strange. Israel has powerful missile defense, intelligence capabilities, early warning systems, and real experience intercepting Iranian missiles and drones. Turkey and Pakistan, on the other hand, do not show a desire to turn the agreement into a mechanism for a future war with Tehran.

But this may be part of Saudi calculation.

Riyadh needs not just a partner against one specific enemy. It needs a set of insurances. Pakistan provides Saudi Arabia with decades-built military ties, a large army, a defense industry, and the status of a nuclear power. Turkey provides a large NATO state army, its own rapidly growing defense industry, drone technologies, experience in operations outside the country, and political influence in several regions.

The background here is especially important. The new trilateral mechanism did not arise out of thin air on August 7. As early as September 17, 2025, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan concluded a separate mutual defense agreement. There, almost the same logic already appeared: an attack on one of the parties is considered an attack on both. Thus, Mecca in 2026 did not create a Saudi-Pakistani military link—it expanded an already existing structure with Turkey.

And this is one of the details that get lost in a short news summary. If you start the story only from August 2026, it seems that the three leaders suddenly decided to create a new bloc after the war with Iran. If you add September 2025, the picture is different: Saudi Arabia was already looking for alternative security guarantees, and the current war accelerated the process.

For Riyadh, the appeal lies precisely in multivectorism. The kingdom maintains the closest relations with the US, receives American weapons, and negotiates a nuclear program, but at the same time builds a regional mechanism. This reduces dependence on a single guarantor. In the next crisis, Saudi Arabia wants to have not one phone in Washington, but several centers of power interested in its security.

And here the first non-obvious connection appears. Pakistan and Turkey are useful to Riyadh also because they are not part of Israel’s strategy against Iran. Such an alliance leaves Saudi Arabia room for maneuver: to contain Tehran without declaring itself a participant in the Israeli camp; to cooperate with the US without giving Washington a monopoly on security; to maintain its own role in the Muslim world.

The war with Iran gave Israel a chance—and showed the limit of this chance

Here arises a real paradox for Israel.

During the war with Iran, the theory of joint regional air defense practically became practice. On April 26, Axios reported that Israel deployed an Iron Dome battery, interceptors, and several dozen Israeli military personnel to operate the system in the United Arab Emirates. Later, US Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee publicly spoke about the deployment of Israeli batteries and personnel in the Emirates.

NANews analyzed this episode in detail in the material “Israeli ‘Iron Dome’ in the UAE—if Axios data is confirmed, this is a new level of alliance against Iran”. Today that text reads differently. Then the main question was: can the Iranian threat turn the Abraham Accords from diplomatic normalization into real defense partnership?

Now we have a partial answer: with the UAE—yes, at least at the level of specific military assistance. But Saudi Arabia chose a different structure for an institutional alliance.

Here it is necessary to explain the term itself. The Abraham Accords are a process of normalization of Israel with a number of Arab countries, initiated in 2020 with US mediation. For the Israeli reader, the UAE is already habitually perceived as a partner, but historically open military cooperation of Israel with an Arab state is not a routine thing. Therefore, the appearance of an Israeli battery with Israeli operators in the Emirates during a real war became a fundamentally new level of relations.

And it is here that a missed opportunity arises.

Iranian missiles and drones do not divide the countries of the region into participants and non-participants of the Abraham Accords. Israel has a multi-layered air and missile defense system, the Gulf states have their own radars, bases, American infrastructure, air defense systems, and advantageous geographical position. A connected network of warning and interception is potentially stronger than a set of isolated national systems.

That is, the war created the very moment when a common threat could sharply accelerate the political integration of Israel with moderate Arab states.

But at the same time, it demonstrated the limit of technology. Israel can be an extremely useful partner at the moment when missiles are flying, and still remain too complex a partner for a formal political alliance. Military value and political acceptability are different things.

Why a common enemy did not make Saudi Arabia an ally of Israel

In Israel, it is very easy to build a linear chain: Iran attacks Israel and the Gulf countries → Israel and the Saudis have a common enemy → therefore, normalization should accelerate.

But the Middle East does not work that way.

Saudi Arabia indeed perceives Iran as a serious threat. But at the same time, it does not want to live in a system where its choice is reduced to two options: depend on the US or join the Israeli camp. The Meccan alliance creates a third option—a regional insurance with states whose cooperation does not require the Saudi leadership to explain to its and the Arab audience an open defense alliance with Israel.

Turkey is especially indicative here. Ankara competes with Tehran in a number of regions and is not an Iranian ally, but at the same time its relations with Israel are much more conflictual. Therefore, the same structure can perform different functions for different participants: for Saudi Arabia, it is an additional insurance against Iran and other crises, for Turkey, it is also a way to prevent Israel from becoming the sole center of a new regional architecture.

It is here that I separate fact from political assessment.

The fact is that the normalization of Saudi Arabia with Israel remains blocked, and Riyadh continues to demand a real political path to Palestinian statehood. On August 25, the Trump administration again tried to link the implementation of the US-Saudi nuclear agreement to the recognition of Israel, but the Saudi position on the Palestinian issue has not disappeared.

My assessment is different: the government of Benjamin Netanyahu has made the price of public rapprochement with Israel for the Saudi leadership extremely high. Netanyahu can be briefly called a toxic partner for Riyadh, but this word itself explains nothing. It is important to show the mechanism: the war in Gaza, the absence of an acceptable political horizon for the Saudis on the Palestinian issue, and the inability to sell the Arab audience a historic normalization without a reciprocal political result from Israel.

NANews already has an important background on this line. In the material “Israel lost the price of normalization: Saudi Arabia got a path to F-35 and uranium enrichment” we analyzed how part of the American incentives for Riyadh began to exist separately from the recognition of Israel.

Then the situation changed again: Washington tried to return normalization to the US-Saudi deal. This is important not only for understanding Trump’s relations with Mohammed bin Salman. Israel is actually competing to ensure that normalization itself remains a strategically irreplaceable asset for Saudi Arabia, and not just one of the possible bonuses.

Six-seven potential participants can change the scale of history

There is another element due to which the Meccan alliance cannot be considered only as a triangle Ankara—Riyadh—Islamabad.

Pakistani Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar stated that six or seven Muslim states have shown interest in joining. The full list is not publicly named. Therefore, today it is impossible to write that “seven more countries are joining the alliance.” Only the presence of interest and work on the mechanism of possible expansion is confirmed.

This distinction seems small, but for a news text, it is fundamental. “Seven countries are joining” means an almost ready expansion. “Six-seven states have shown interest” means the beginning of a negotiation competition, where some potential participants may eventually refuse.

Bangladesh has already publicly discussed such a possibility. Turkey separately named Egypt as a natural potential partner. And one Egypt would be enough for the political weight of the structure to noticeably increase: it is the largest Arab country by population, a country with a peace treaty with Israel, controlling the Suez Canal and possessing one of the largest armies in the region.

If other states begin to join the alliance, the question for Israel will also change.

So far, the Meccan alliance can be considered an additional trilateral mechanism. But if it becomes a platform where Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Egypt, and other Muslim states discuss joint weapons, technologies, production, air defense, and crisis response, an independent decision-making center will emerge.

And the absence of Israel will then acquire practical significance.

Not because the participants will automatically become enemies of Israel. That would be too simplistic a conclusion. Egypt has had a peace treaty with Israel for decades. Potential participants are capable of simultaneously cooperating with Jerusalem and being part of another defense structure.

The problem is different: standards, purchases, joint production, political consultations, and rules for responding to regional crises will be formed in a room where Israel is not present.

Search formulations “Meccan Pact against Israel,” “Islamic NATO against Iran,” “Saudi Arabia Turkey Pakistan military alliance,” or “new Muslim military alliance” therefore still give too crude a picture. Another is confirmed: there is a collective defense agreement; it has already received permanent institutions; the founders are preparing the possibility of expansion; a specific opponent is not named in the agreement. For Israel, the risk is not in the proven emergence of a hostile bloc, but in the gradual formation of a regional security system in which Israel ceases to be a mandatory participant.

What Israel risks losing—and what can still be preserved

NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency has been writing for many months about how the war with Iran connects plots that previously seemed separate.

In the material “Iran and Russia: how the war in Ukraine became a testing ground for a future war against Israel and the US” we showed the flip side of the same problem: technologies, drones, tactics, and accumulated combat experience can transition between the Russian-Ukrainian and Middle Eastern theaters of war.

The Ukrainian experience here is needed not for an obligatory insert about Ukraine. It shows that the modern security system is built not only around formal agreements. It is built around the compatibility of systems, the production of drones and interceptors, intelligence, logistics, repair, ammunition, and the ability to quickly adopt the experience of someone else’s war.

It is precisely these connections that the Meccan alliance is now trying to gradually institutionalize.

Israel has very strong cards: air and missile defense, radars, intelligence, cybersecurity, precision weapons, anti-drone solutions, and real experience in repelling massive attacks. The episode with the UAE showed that an Arab country is capable of turning to Israel at the moment of immediate threat and receiving practical military assistance.

This is a serious strategic asset.

But an asset is useless if it cannot be turned into stable political relations.

The next Israeli government—regardless of its party composition—will receive not an abstract task “to improve relations with the Arab world,” but a much more specific one. It is necessary to maintain and expand defense coordination with the UAE and Bahrain, retain strategic relations with Egypt and Jordan, return the political meaning of Saudi normalization, and offer the countries of the region a system of cooperation that does not force them to choose between Israel and their own Muslim partners.

This does not necessarily have to be a mirror “anti-Meccan pact.”

A more realistic goal is a network of bilateral agreements, early warning systems, compatible air defense elements, data exchange, defense technology projects, and further development of opportunities that emerged after the Abraham Accords. In other words, Israel does not necessarily have to sit at every regional table. But it needs to ensure that no serious security system in the region can fully function without Israeli capabilities.

That is why the meeting on August 31 in Istanbul is more important than the loudest formula “an attack on one is an attack on all.”

It shows that after the war with Iran, the states of the region are not waiting for Washington or Jerusalem to offer them a ready-made architecture. They are building their own.

For Israel, this is a warning on several levels at once. A common enemy does not by itself create an alliance. Military superiority does not guarantee political influence. Supplying technology in a moment of crisis does not mean that the recipient of this assistance will choose Israel as its main strategic partner.

In 2026, Israel has already proven that it is capable of physically helping an Arab state defend against Iranian fire.

Now the task is much more difficult: to prove that Israel can be not only a supplier of interceptors when missiles are already flying but also a long-term partner in creating the rules of the region before the next war.

Sources joint statement of the Strategic Political and Defense Committee of the Meccan Agreement on August 31, 2026; official statements of Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan; Reuters; Axios; previous NANews materials.

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Russia continues to urge residents of occupied Ukraine: how tens of thousands of people ended up in the Russian army - September 2, 2026 - Новости Израиля

Saudi Arabia is building a military alliance with Turkey and Pakistan. Why, after the war with Iran, has Israel found itself outside the new security system - September 1, 2026 - Новости Израиля

In Tel Aviv, the Ukrainian ambassador called on Israel to unite against common threats: behind this phrase already stands Russia-Iran - September 1, 2026 - Новости Израиля

On August 31, 2026, an official reception was held in Tel Aviv to mark the 35th anniversary of Ukraine’s independence. At the event, Ukraine’s ambassador to Israel, Yevhen Korniychuk, urged the Israeli side to “join forces” against common enemies and threats, and Israeli Minister Zeev Elkin addressed the guests in Ukrainian.

The diplomatic reception itself could easily have been left in the protocol section. But I, Viktoria Katzman, compared Korniychuk’s speech with what Israel and Ukraine have publicly said to each other in recent months. It turns out to be not a festive formula: the theme of a common enemy is gradually transitioning from Ukrainian statements to official Israeli rhetoric.

If you are looking for what Yevhen Korniychuk said in Tel Aviv on August 31, who represented Israel at the celebration of Ukraine’s Independence Day, and why Russia and Iran appear again in this story, it is important to distinguish three levels: the words of the Ukrainian ambassador, the already officially established dialogue between Israel and Ukraine on the Iranian threat, and specific joint decisions that have not yet been announced.

Main source: publication of the Embassy of Ukraine in the State of Israel from August 31, distributed jointly with the Ukrainian Cultural Center in Tel Aviv.

The reception was on August 31, while Independence Day is on the 24th.

Ukraine celebrates Independence Day on August 24: it was on August 24, 1991, that the Verkhovna Rada adopted the Act of Declaration of Independence. In 2026, it marked 35 years since that date. The diplomatic reception in Tel Aviv took place a week later — on August 31. The 35th anniversary of independence was officially celebrated in Ukraine on August 24.

According to the embassy, among the guests were representatives of the Knesset, the Israeli government, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the diplomatic corps, Ukrainian public activists, members of Israeli Friends of Ukraine, and Israelis supporting Ukraine. Fallen defenders of Ukraine were honored with a minute of silence.

Korniychuk reminded that the full-scale Russian aggression has been ongoing for four and a half years, that missiles and drones continue to strike cities and civilian infrastructure, and simultaneously stated: in 2026, Ukraine managed to “bring the war back to Russian territory,” striking strategic targets far from the front line.

Moreover, this statement did not sound in a vacuum. Already on September 1, the day after the reception, another Russian airstrike on Kyiv and the Kyiv region resulted in the death of 12 people. Thus, Korniychuk’s words about ongoing attacks were not an anniversary retrospective but a description of a war that was literally happening at that time.

What do “common enemies” mean if the ambassador did not name them?

In the published text of Korniychuk’s speech, he does not list countries after the words about “common enemies and threats.” Therefore, I will not directly insert names into this quote that are not there.

But the political context here is quite transparent.

On July 23, 2025, Foreign Ministers Gideon Saar and Andriy Sybiha in Kyiv officially agreed to launch a strategic dialogue between Israel and Ukraine on the Iranian threat. Saar then emphasized that Iranian weapons and technologies threaten not only Israel: the same drone technology is used against Ukraine.

In February 2026, a separate Strategic Israel–Ukraine Security Dialogue took place in Tel Aviv. NANews detailed the strategic dialogue between Israel and Ukraine — there, it was not about ceremonial friendship, but about the connection between the security of Europe and the Middle East, defense technologies, and the strengthening of Russian-Iranian cooperation.

In April, Sybiha, after a conversation with Saar, again stated that Ukraine is ready to cooperate with Israel on common security challenges and specifically mentioned threats from Iran. And on July 29, he accepted Saar’s invitation to visit Israel for the 35th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the two states.

Therefore, Korniychuk’s phrase is not a declaration of a joint Ukrainian-Israeli front against Russia and Iran. But it is a continuation of the existing logic: Russia is waging war against Ukraine, Tehran has become a military partner of Moscow, and Israel considers Iran one of the main threats to its own security.

The most important thing happened before the reception — in Netanyahu’s letter.

There is a detail without which Korniychuk’s speech on August 31 looks much weaker than it actually was.

On August 24, Benjamin Netanyahu sent a congratulatory message to Volodymyr Zelensky on Independence Day. The letter became publicly known on August 26, when it was published by the Ukrainian president.

And in the document, the Israeli prime minister used a completely direct formulation:

“Our two countries face a common threat from Iran.”

NANews — Israel News separately analyzed Netanyahu’s letter to Zelensky and the important limitation of this story: Netanyahu did not announce a military alliance with Ukraine, arms supplies, a joint air defense system, or any new defense agreement.

But the language itself has changed.

Before this, it was Ukrainian diplomats who were particularly persistent in explaining to Israel why the Russian-Iranian connection concerns both countries. Now the formula “common threat” has already appeared in the document of the Israeli prime minister.

That is why I read Korniychuk’s words at the reception not as an attempt on August 31 to invent a new agenda, but as a public continuation of a conversation that is already ongoing between Kyiv and Jerusalem.

Why Elkin’s speech in Ukrainian is not a decorative detail

The embassy specifically noted that Zeev Elkin addressed the participants of the evening in Ukrainian.

For the Israeli reader, two explanations are needed here immediately.

Firstly, Elkin is not Israel’s finance minister. The finance minister is Bezalel Smotrich. Elkin’s official position is additional minister in the Ministry of Finance; he has held it since November 2024.

Secondly, the Ukrainian language at this event has a biographical dimension for him. Elkin was born in 1971 in Kharkiv, studied at Kharkiv University, and repatriated to Israel in 1990.

He is already involved in the practical Ukrainian-Israeli agenda. On December 4, 2025, in Jerusalem, Elkin, together with Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Taras Kachka, co-chaired a meeting of the joint Ukrainian-Israeli commission on trade and economic cooperation. This was the first meeting of the commission since the start of the full-scale Russian aggression; the previous one took place back in November 2021.

So, behind the person who spoke in Ukrainian to the guests on August 31, there is not only a Kharkiv biography but also a specific role in the revived intergovernmental dialogue.

“2000 Meters to Andriivka” already has a separate history in Israel

The second part of the evening was not dedicated to diplomacy. Guests were shown the documentary film by Mstyslav Chernov “2000 Meters to Andriivka” — the story of Ukrainian fighters who, during the 2023 counteroffensive, break through a fortified forest strip to the village of Andriivka occupied by Russian troops near Bakhmut.

And here is an Israeli detail that is not in the usual description of the film.

In 2025, “2000 Meters to Andriivka” won the main prize of the international competition DocAviv in Tel Aviv. Therefore, on August 31, the film effectively returned to the city where it had already received serious professional recognition.

With the “Oscar,” the wording should be kept as accurate as possible. Ukraine indeed officially selected the film as its entry for the 98th Academy Awards in the International Feature Film category. But it did not make it to the 15-film shortlist of the international category.

However, “2000 Meters to Andriivka” made it to the Oscar shortlist for Documentary Feature Film. This is a significant achievement, but a shortlist does not yet mean a final nomination for the award.

But with the “Emmy,” the status is already different. On May 29, 2026, the Associated Press reported that the film won the News & Documentary Emmy Award in the category Outstanding Direction: Documentary. In total, the film received six nominations for this award.

The embassy thanked the film club “Znyato v Ukraini / Created in Ukraine” for organizing the screening, specifically naming Svitlana Kozyreva and Roman Karasyk for promoting Ukrainian cinema in Israel and helping to showcase the film.

What really changed after August 31 — and what is still missing

I would not call this reception “Israel’s turn to Ukraine.” There are no facts for such a conclusion yet. No new arms supplies, joint air defense project, or agreement that would turn political formulations into commitments have been announced.

But the sequence of events is already difficult to consider coincidental.

In July 2025, Saar and Sybiha launch a dialogue on Iran. In February 2026, a strategic security discussion takes place in Tel Aviv. In the spring, Kyiv talks about common threats. In August, Netanyahu himself calls Iran a common threat to Israel and Ukraine. A few days later, Korniychuk in Tel Aviv proposes joining forces against common enemies.

And here appears another layer that is crucial for the Israeli audience. NANews detailed the Russian-Iranian military connection: initially, Iran provided Russia with Shahed and related technologies, then the Russian war against Ukraine became a multi-year environment for testing and improving mass missile-drone attacks.

Therefore, the question “what does Ukraine have to do with Israel’s security?” is becoming less theoretical.

For NANews — Israel News, the next verifiable milestone is already visible: will Andriy Sybiha’s agreed visit to Israel take place, and will practical projects emerge after political words — countering drones, protecting critical infrastructure, civil defense, defense technologies, or exchanging accumulated combat experience.

This will be more important than the diplomatic reception.

On August 31, Kyiv once again formulated the proposal. But after Netanyahu himself called Iran a common threat to both countries, the next question is already addressed to Jerusalem: will this formula remain the language of letters and speeches — or will it become a working policy.

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Sara Netanyahu raised the question of why Yair Golan was “so quickly ready to act” on the morning of October 7. I checked the chronology of his trip to the south, the preserved correspondence with the rescued, the history of 244 thousand publications, and Benjamin Netanyahu’s own words about the “betrayal” version.

On the evening of August 31, 2026, Sara Netanyahu, the wife of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, gave an interview to Channel 14 and spoke about Yair Golan — a reserve major general, former deputy chief of staff of the IDF, and current leader of the “Democrats” party. She “noted” that on the morning of October 7, 2023, Golan was very early “dressed and ready,” while, according to her, others, including the prime minister, “did not yet know what was happening.”

There was no direct accusation that Golan knew in advance about the Hamas attack. When asked about the “betrayal from within” version, Sara Netanyahu replied that she did not want to talk about it and did not know. But the very formula of “Golan’s suspiciously early readiness” has been part of the conspiracy campaign around October 7 for several years.

On the morning of September 1, Golan announced on the army radio station “Galei Tzahal” that he intended to file a defamation lawsuit against Sara Netanyahu.

I, Alexander Khmelnitsky, for NANews — News of Israel compared the current scandal with earlier testimonies about Golan’s actions on October 7. Here, the sequence of events is more important than the party position.

If you search today for “Sara Netanyahu Yair Golan,” “did Yair Golan know in advance about October 7,” “betrayal of October 7,” or “Yair Golan’s lawsuit,” it’s easy to mix facts and political accusations. It is established: Golan went south after the attack began and participated in rescuing people. No public evidence has been presented that he knew about the impending attack in advance.

What is known about Golan’s departure time

In the historical archive of testimonies “Edut 710,” Golan’s account is preserved: he began receiving the first reports of what was happening around 6:30 a.m. After that, he put on his uniform and left for the south in his own car around 8:00.

The Hamas attack began around 6:29. So, it was not a departure before the attack, but about an hour and a half after it began.

Initially, Golan was at the IDF Home Front Command headquarters — more familiar to Israelis as Pikud Ha-Oref — in Ramla, then at the Urim base. After that, he was engaged in searching for people hiding after the attack on the Nova festival. Relatives sent coordinates, which he tried to reach.

Later, Golan spoke of three trips to the Nova area and six people rescued. His own account should not close the question by itself. Therefore, I separately checked whether there are independent traces of these trips. They exist.

Correspondence from October 7 has been preserved

In the interactive archive of the Israeli public broadcaster KAN “7.10.360”, there is a story of the rescue of journalist Nir Gontage’s son.

At 15:37, Gontage informed Golan that people were hiding in the garden. At 15:39, Golan requested a contact for communication. Further in the correspondence, the location was clarified. At 16:21, Golan reported that he would connect with them in about a minute. At 17:15, Gontage was already thanking him.

This does not restore every minute of Golan’s day. But it is an independent time trace of a specific rescue operation, and the messages were created directly on October 7, 2023, not after three years of political disputes.

There are also testimonies from the families of the rescued, which appeared immediately after the attack. Therefore, the very fact of the rescue trips is based not only on Golan’s later stories about himself.

Here, the conspiracy construction begins to clash with the chronology. If the argument is that a person was “suspiciously early ready,” it is important first to establish when he even learned about the attack and when he left. Available evidence points to events already after the attack began.

Where did the 244 thousand tweets come from

In January 2026, FakeReporter, an Israeli organization researching disinformation campaigns, presented material titled “244 Thousand Tweets: The Campaign Against Yair Golan Revealed.”

This figure requires precision. It’s not about 244 thousand messages only about Golan’s trips to Nova. FakeReporter described a broader array of publications in which different versions were repeated: “as if Golan knew about the attack in advance, was connected with a ‘spy,’ collaborated with ‘Nukhba,’ or participated in ‘state betrayal.’”

“Nukhba” — Hamas assault units, whose militants participated in the invasion on October 7.

Therefore, Sara Netanyahu’s words caused such a reaction not by themselves. The question of why Golan was “dressed and ready” earlier than others fell into an already existing and widely disseminated narrative.

Why the reaction went beyond the left camp

Golan today leads the “Democrats” — a left-wing party formed after the merger of “Avoda” and MERETZ. Therefore, the defense from his own supporters is easily explained by party struggle. A much more indicative reaction is another.

Former Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot called the version of betrayal a conspiracy theory without factual basis and reminded that Golan went on his own to save people on October 7.

Former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett, a politician from another camp, stated that Golan got into a car with a weapon on the morning of October 7 and “went straight into hell,” risking his life for others.

Actor and publicist Hanoch Daum separately emphasized that he never voted for Golan and seriously disagreed with him in views, but considers it necessary to thank him for going to save Israelis on the morning of October 7.

That is why the scandal turned out to be broader than another quarrel between the government and the opposition. Another question arises: can the actions of a person who went to a mass murder area to save people be retrospectively turned into a basis for suspicion precisely because he arrived there quickly?

Netanyahu himself previously rejected “betrayal”

There is another detail without which the current story seems incomplete.

On February 5, 2026, Benjamin Netanyahu spoke at a closed meeting of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee. MP Chili Tropper asked him about the version of internal betrayal. The prime minister’s response, later published by several Israeli media, was unequivocal: there was an intelligence failure, but “there was no betrayal”.

This does not mean that one phrase from the prime minister can close the investigation into the causes of the disaster. But for the current dispute, the fact is important: Sara Netanyahu brought back into public discussion a motive that her husband himself rejected several months earlier.

At the same time, no public evidence has been presented that Golan knew about the impending attack in advance.

What the lawsuit might change

At the time of preparing the article, Golan announced his intention to sue, but I found no confirmation of the lawsuit’s registration. Therefore, writing that “Yair Golan has already sued Sara Netanyahu” would be incorrect for now.

If the lawsuit does appear, the dispute will move from television and social networks to where precise words and context will have to be analyzed. Golan has a chronology: the attack began around 6:29, he received the first messages after it started, left around 8:00, and individual rescue actions are independently confirmed.

Sara Netanyahu has another significant circumstance: she did not make a direct statement that Golan “participated in a conspiracy” or “knew about the attack in advance.” If the case goes to court, the line between a hint and a direct accusation may become one of the central issues.

I would not reduce this story to an unfortunate phrase on television. After October 7, Israel is still trying to answer a much heavier question: why did state and security mechanisms not stop the disaster, and who is responsible for it.

The “betrayal from within” theory offers a simple and emotionally strong answer to an extremely complex failure. But a simple answer becomes an established fact only when evidence appears.

In the case of Yair Golan, the available chronology today shows otherwise: he learned about the attack after it began, then went south and saved people. And Benjamin Netanyahu, with whom Sara Netanyahu now compares his actions, himself previously told MPs: “there was no betrayal”.

For NANews — News of Israel, this is the main result of the check: political assessments can be anything, but the sequence of events cannot be rearranged for the sake of a convenient version.

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“Ukrainian-Jewish Encounter” continues its project about famous Israelis of Ukrainian origin – Natan Sharansky.

Today, Natan Sharansky remains a good friend of Ukrainians at the level of diplomatic relations between Ukraine and Israel. His clear stance on international support for Ukraine after the start of the large-scale Russian invasion became a call for the Israeli government to decisively condemn the attack on Ukraine. Natan Sharansky firmly emphasized that Israel must unwaveringly stand on the side of the Ukrainians.

Natan (Anatoly) Sharansky (b. 1948) is one of the most prominent human rights activists, a well-known Israeli political figure of Ukrainian-Jewish origin.

In addition, he actively participated in the Jewish movement in the USSR, demonstrations, and protests. In 1977, Natan Sharansky was arrested for anti-Soviet agitation, and the following year he was sentenced to 13 years in prison on charges of espionage for the USA.

Only thanks to numerous petitions from influential world politicians and demonstrations in 1986, through an agreement between the USSR and the USA, Natan Sharansky was freed from the repressive grip: he was exchanged for one of the Soviet spies arrested in the West. Immediately after the exchange, Natan was honorably received by Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres and his deputy Yitzhak Shamir.

In the same year, Sharansky founded the public organization “Zionist Forum,” which aimed to unite repatriates from the Soviet Union, and already in 1995, he started the political party “Israel for Aliyah.” In Israel, Natan Sharansky continued his active human rights activities, gaining experience as a recognized, influential Israeli politician. He was a member of the Knesset for a long period and also had experience working as a minister and deputy prime minister in the Israeli governments, chaired the executive council of the Jewish Agency for Israel, and the supervisory board of the Babi Yar Holocaust Memorial Center.

In January 2023, Natan Sharansky turned 75 years old. He dedicated almost his entire conscious life to active human rights struggle, the protection of human rights, political activity, as well as the development of close diplomatic and interethnic ties between Israel and Ukraine.

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