Month: September 2026

FERMA and Roshen on our shelves, Ukrainian butter in 25-kilogram blocks for the food industry, hundreds of tons of deliveries over eight months. Ukraine is losing export revenue, while Israel ranks among the top three largest buyers of its butter. How much do we buy, where is Ukrainian production sold, and what share of the Israeli market can it occupy by the end of 2026?

Author: Stas Shifer

From January to August 2026, Ukraine exported 6.2 thousand tons of butter — 47.5% less than in the same period last year. In monetary terms, the decline is even more significant: export revenue decreased by 59.4%, to 34.4 million dollars. These data from the State Customs Service of Ukraine were published by AgroTimes on September 22.

For Israel, there is a detail in this statistic. While Ukrainian producers are losing foreign markets, our country remains one of the main buyers of their products.

In the top three are Moldova with a share of 44.8%, Azerbaijan with 16.3%, and Israel with 10.1%. These three destinations account for more than 71% of Ukrainian butter exports.

And it’s not about any special deliveries exclusively for people from Ukraine. Ukrainian butter is already sold in regular Israeli supermarkets, under brands whose names do not necessarily tell every buyer about the country of origin.

How much Ukrainian butter does Israel receive

If we apply Israel’s share of 10.1% to the total Ukrainian export revenue, it amounts to approximately 3.47 million dollars for the first eight months of 2026.

The average export cost of a ton of Ukrainian butter during this period was about 5550 dollars. At this price, Israeli purchases correspond to approximately 625 tons.

Here, a caveat is necessary: this is an editorial calculation, not a published separate customs statistic in kilograms. Specific Israeli contracts may differ in price from the overall Ukrainian export figure.

But the trade direction is well-traced in previous years.

According to World Bank WITS data, in 2023, Israel imported about 1069 tons of butter and other dairy fats from Ukraine, worth 6.44 million dollars. In 2024, deliveries decreased to 407 tons for 2.93 million dollars. This accounted for 7.3% of the total Israeli import of the corresponding commodity group by physical volume.

In 2025, purchases increased again. Ukraine supplied Israel with butter and dairy fats worth approximately 6.12 million dollars, with the total Israeli import of this category at 50.8 million. The Ukrainian share reached approximately 12% in monetary terms.

An important detail for understanding the statistics: the international customs group HS 0405 combines butter and other dairy fats. This is not exclusively the familiar 200-gram packs that Israelis buy for breakfast.

Therefore, Ukraine’s share in imports and its share in Israel’s total consumption are not the same.

FERMA and Roshen: what exactly do Ukrainians supply to our supermarkets

One of the most noticeable Ukrainian brands is FERMA, a product of Terra Food. In Israel, natural butter with 82.5% fat content, made from pasteurized cream and packaged in 200-gram packs, is sold.

In the CHP price comparison catalog, it is listed under the name חמאה FERMA 82.5%. Its barcode is 4820217240114.

The product is featured in the catalogs of Shufersal, Carrefour, Victory, Yohananof, Keshet Teamim, Tiv Taam, and other chains. Availability naturally depends on the specific branch. September offers include prices around 9–10 shekels per pack, and noticeably higher.

The second example is Roshen 82.5%. In Israel, under this name, two variants of Ukrainian butter in 200-gram packaging are sold. The composition indicates pasteurized cream, the country of production is Ukraine.

Their presence on Israeli shelves is not news of recent weeks. As early as spring 2025, Ynet reported on the spread of Ukrainian butter FERMA and Roshen, which was gradually replacing more expensive European brands. The importer was Diler B.M.D. International.

But there is another part of the trade that you won’t see in supermarkets.

The Israeli company KFI offers Ukrainian unsalted butter with 82% fat content, produced by PJSC Ternopil Dairy Factory.

The specification indicates consumer packages of 200 grams and industrial blocks of 25 kilograms. The latter are intended for enterprises using butter in the production of other products. These can be confectionery, bakery products, and ready-made food items.

The company also indicates ISO 22000 certification and Badatz Beit Yosef kashrut, including the “Chalav Yisrael” status for Passover. For kashrut-observant Israelis, this is significant information: “Chalav Yisrael” means milk production is controlled according to certain requirements of Jewish religious law.

Customs records provide additional confirmation that Ukraine supplies natural butter to Israel, not just dairy spreads. The documents include categories 0405101100 — butter in consumer packaging up to a kilogram, and 0405101900 — other forms of natural butter with a fat content not exceeding 85%. Separate batches of the second type reach 25 tons.

By the way, trade records do not automatically assert that each such batch had exactly 82.5% fat content. This is a characteristic of a specific product, not the entire Ukrainian export category.

What share of the Israeli market can Ukrainian butter capture

And here it is worth looking at Israel’s own figures.

According to a review by the Ministry of Agriculture, published by Calcalist on June 28, 2026, 15.8 thousand tons of butter were sold in Israel in 2025. Of these, 62% were table butter and 38% were for industrial consumption.

Moreover, these two segments are structured differently.

About 83% of table butter was produced directly in Israel, mainly by Tnuva. However, industrial production is much more dependent on external suppliers: imports provided 59% of the corresponding segment.

If the current pace of Ukrainian exports to Israel continues until the end of 2026, the volume of deliveries may amount to about 900–975 tons.

When compared to the full Israeli market of 2025, this is approximately 6% of annual consumption.

This is a forecast estimate, not an officially recorded share of Ukrainian butter in Israel. It assumes that deliveries will continue at approximately the same pace, and the overall volume of the Israeli market will not change significantly.

For scale — six percent means almost a thousand tons of butter per year. And this is a product that can end up not only directly in consumers’ refrigerators but also in Israeli food enterprises.

At the same time, a drop in the purchase price does not necessarily mean that butter becomes cheaper in the store. According to the same review by the Israeli Ministry of Agriculture, after the market opened to imports and state price control was lifted, the cost of imported butter for consumers rose from 37.6 shekels per kilogram in 2021 to 65.5 shekels in 2025.

The Ukrainian factory sells the product at one price. The Israeli buyer receives it after transportation, inspection, certification, storage, the work of the importer, and the retail network. The entire difference between these two prices is not always related to the producer itself.

This market feature NANews — News of Israel | Nikk.Agency has already thoroughly analyzed in a material about the growth of Ukrainian dairy supplies: from January to July 2026, Israel purchased almost 10 million dollars of Ukrainian dairy products, but the expansion of imports does not yet guarantee lower prices for Israeli families.

Why Ukrainian butter is losing buyers even though production is growing

To understand what is happening, it is useful to return to the previous year.

In 2025, Ukraine exported about 15 thousand tons of butter, earning approximately 107 million dollars. This was a very noticeable growth compared to 2024. But already in 2026, the situation changed: demand in foreign markets weakened, and global prices went down.

At the Global Dairy Trade auction on September 15, butter prices fell by 5.7%, to 4760 dollars per ton. GDT is an international trading platform whose prices are used as one of the benchmarks for the global dairy market. This is not about the retail price of butter in Israel, but about large international contracts.

According to Ukrainian industry analysts, an important role was played by the increase in dairy product supply in the EU and other major producing regions, as well as the fall in prices for dairy fats. The European market no longer provides Ukrainian producers with the previous sales conditions. Even access within duty-free quotas does not solve the problem if the price offered by the buyer becomes unprofitable.

Against this backdrop, two figures are noteworthy.

In the first seven months of 2026, Ukraine exported 5.6 thousand tons of butter for 31.1 million dollars. In eight months — 6.2 thousand tons for 34.4 million. This means August added approximately 600 tons and 3.3 million dollars. July exports, for comparison, amounted to about 1070 tons.

At the same time, domestic production did not stop. According to the State Statistics Service of Ukraine, in the first half of the year, enterprises produced 40.8 thousand tons of butter, ghee, and other dairy fats of the corresponding category — 7.9% more than a year earlier.

It turns out to be not the most pleasant situation for the producer: more products are being produced, but selling abroad is becoming less and cheaper.

At the same time, Ukraine is sharply increasing purchases of imported dairy products. According to the Union of Dairy Enterprises of Ukraine, from January to August 2026, exports of all dairy products decreased by 20.5%, to 176.9 million dollars. Imports increased by 24.7%, to 247.2 million.

The trade balance shifted from a positive 24.1 million dollars a year earlier to a negative 70.3 million. And the import of butter itself in physical terms increased by 2.6 times. The share of butter and dairy fats in the August export revenue of the dairy industry, meanwhile, fell from 36% to 15%.

The situation itself does not mean that Ukrainian enterprises have stopped supplying the domestic market. Different categories of goods with various characteristics and prices are imported. But the previous trade structure is noticeably changing, and for processors, this is already a serious challenge.

Why for Israel this story is broader than one pack of butter

On our shelves, Ukrainian products are also present in other dairy categories. For example, on September 28, NANews reported on Russian strikes on the “Rud” enterprise in Zhytomyr, known for its kosher ice cream supplies to Israel.

This is another part of the same economic connection. Enterprises in Ukraine are trying to maintain production, export, and buyers under conditions of war, infrastructure damage, and additional logistics costs.

For Israel, Ukrainian butter is another source of imported products in a market where local producers maintain strong positions. For Ukraine, it is an opportunity to retain export sales when European prices and external competition force them to seek additional directions.

Can this affect prices in our stores? So far, there is no basis to promise this. Even an increase in supplies may remain unnoticed for the family budget if additional competition does not reach the final retail price.

However, the buyer can already see the result of this trade without any customs tables. Just look at a pack of FERMA or Roshen in a regular Israeli supermarket: natural butter, Ukrainian production, Israeli labeling, and kashrut.

And behind this small pack are quite tangible hundreds of tons of trade for both countries, which continue to cross borders even when the overall Ukrainian butter export falls by almost half.

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The 42nd International Film Festival opened in Haifa on September 26, 2026. Until October 3, audiences can expect Israeli premieres, international competition films, and documentary stories. The program also includes Ukraine: a journey of a mother and daughter to the shelled Kharkiv and the story of Ukrainian emigrants whose lives are divided between Kyiv and Israel.

Author: Victoria Katsman

Haifa has once again become the capital of cinema

On Saturday, September 26, the official opening ceremony of the 42nd International Film Festival took place at the Haifa Auditorium. It traditionally takes place during Sukkot — one of the main Jewish holidays, when Israelis have the opportunity to spend a few days with family, travel, or go to the movies.

The main events take place in the cultural complex on HaNassi Blvd, 142, in the Merkaz HaCarmel area. Films are also shown at the Haifa Cinematheque, Rappaport Halls, Tikotin, and other festival venues.

At the opening, an event occurred that deserves special attention. Two singers took the stage — Israeli Yuval Raphael and Iranian exiled performer Golazin Ardestani, known by the stage name Gola.

The musical program featured New Day Will Rise — the song with which Raphael represented Israel at Eurovision 2025 and took second place, scoring 357 points. The performance took place with the participation of the Haifa Symphony Orchestra conducted by Eran Rimi.

Two women from countries whose relations are defined by years of confrontation met on the Israeli stage. The words about the coming of a new day in such a performance took on a completely different context. The organizers officially confirmed the participation of both singers, although the published program does not specify the distribution of vocal parts in the composition itself.

The evening was hosted by Lior Ashkenazi. The opening film was chosen as “Our Loves” by Avi Nesher — a drama in which the personal stories of several characters intertwine with the tragic events of October 7, 2023. The director himself was awarded for his outstanding contribution to Israeli cinema.

But for those from Ukraine living in Israel today, there are two more particularly close stories in the current program.

“Journey Dreams”: the road to Kharkiv during the war

One of the films in the Israeli cinema competition program is the documentary film Journey Dreams directed by Mani Lozovsky. Its duration is 60 minutes, production — Israel, 2026.

It is the story of a mother and daughter who embark on a journey through Ukraine during the full-scale Russian war.

Their road leads to Kharkiv — the second-largest city in Ukraine, located near the Russian border. Since February 2022, it has been regularly shelled by Russia and has become one of the symbols of Ukrainian resistance.

But the film is not only about the destroyed city.

The daughter tries to understand her own roots, her attitude towards Ukraine and Russia, and what it means to belong to a certain place. The mother has a more defined position: her home is Israel. She goes to visit a childhood friend in Kharkiv, and along with that, returns to memories of life in the Soviet Union.

Their views do not always coincide. Through ordinary conversations on the road, the story of the family, emigration, and the difficult search for identity gradually unfolds.

For the Israeli audience, there is a quite recognizable conflict here. Many families of repatriates from the former USSR live in several cultural spaces at once: parents remember the Soviet past, children grew up in Israel, and relatives and friends remained in Ukraine.

The full-scale Russian invasion has given these family ties a completely different meaning. Returning to the city of childhood can now mean a trip to a place where sirens and explosions continue to sound.

When and where to watch:

September 27, Sunday, 16:00 — Haifa Cinematheque.

The film is in Russian and Hebrew, with English and Hebrew subtitles provided.

Journey Dreams — film description and tickets.

“Stars”: he returned to Kyiv, she stayed in Israel

The second story related to Ukraine is the short film Stars directed by Hila Elena Roizenman.

It is a 17-minute Israeli film from 2026, shot in Russian. It is included in the short film competition program Women: Fragments and Dreams.

The main characters are Ukrainian emigrants Yana and Sasha, who were once united by dance and romantic relationships.

Then their paths diverged. Sasha returned to Kyiv and managed to build his life, Yana stayed in Israel, giving up her former hopes.

Ten years later, they meet again. They have only one day and one night ahead to try to overcome the distance accumulated over the years of separation and figure out if there is anything left of their former love.

Everything happens in a world already changed by war.

This is not a documentary chronicle of hostilities and not a story about the front. Here, Ukraine is present through the fates of people who found themselves in different countries, through an unfulfilled joint future, and questions that remained unanswered for years.

NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency has repeatedly addressed how the Russian war affects families with Israeli citizenship. Recently, we reported on the death of a 14-year-old Israeli during a Russian strike on Kyiv on September 25. The festival addresses another side of these relationships — human stories, memory, love, and lost closeness.

The film “Stars” stars Lenna Freifeld, Anatoly Weissman, and Svetlana Demidova.

The screening will take place on September 29 at 18:30 in the Tikotin Hall. Russian audio track, subtitles in Hebrew and English.

Official program page and tickets.

It is important to clarify: both films are Israeli productions. They are connected to Ukraine primarily by their plots and characters, not by the country of production.

What else will be shown at the 42nd Haifa Film Festival

This year’s program combines major Israeli cinema, European premieres, documentaries, short films, and retrospectives.

Among the notable participants in the international program is French director François Ozon with an adaptation of Albert Camus’ famous novel “The Stranger.” The action takes place in French Algeria in the 1930s, and the central figure remains Meursault — a man whose behavior raises uncomfortable questions about morality and social expectations.

Andrey Zvyagintsev presents “Minotaur” — a drama about a Russian businessman whose usual life begins to crumble in 2022. The film is a co-production of France, Latvia, and Germany. It is shown in Russian with Hebrew and English subtitles.

British director Danny Boyle brought the film INK, dedicated to the rise of the tabloid The Sun and Rupert Murdoch’s media business. It is a story about journalism, power, commercial interests, and the transformation of the press into a tool of mass influence.

The program also includes “The Wizard of the Kremlin” by Olivier Assayas — a political drama related to the formation of the modern Russian political system.

Israeli competition films occupy a special place. This year, seven feature films and five documentary feature films are competing for festival awards.

Special screenings, meetings with filmmakers, family programs, and outdoor events are provided for viewers. Many foreign films are accompanied by Hebrew and English subtitles, although the language conditions of each session need to be checked separately.

From a small beginning to one of Israel’s main film festivals

The Haifa International Film Festival appeared in 1983. It became Israel’s first international film festival and gradually turned into an annual event that attracts audiences from all over the country.

Its holding during Sukkot has long become a city tradition. For a few days, Carmel turns into a large cinematic quarter, where ordinary walks in Haifa are combined with premieres, film discussions, and meetings with directors.

According to the municipality, the festival annually gathers about 80,000 viewers in cinemas, and thousands more attend street events and open screenings.

Since 2022, the festival has also gained special significance for Israeli short filmmakers: the winner of the corresponding competition category can qualify for participation in the Oscar selection.

Haifa is generally different from other major Israeli cities with its cultural environment. Here, Jewish and Arab communities coexist, numerous repatriates live, and the Russian language has long become a familiar part of the city’s space.

Therefore, two stories about Ukraine in the festival program look quite organic. This is cinema not only about war but also about people for whom the question “where is my home?” does not always have a simple answer.

Where to watch films and how to purchase tickets

The 42nd International Haifa Film Festival will last until October 3, 2026.

The main venue is located at: HaNassi Blvd 142, Haifa — Haifa Auditorium on Carmel.

The official website offers schedules, film descriptions, language and subtitle information, and ticket purchases.

Full program of the 42nd Haifa Film Festival.

For those living in Haifa and northern Israel, this is an opportunity to see international premieres almost next to home. And two films related to Ukraine allow us to look at the war through the fates of people who left, returned, or continue to live between two countries, preserving the memory of both.

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An exhibition about Golda Meir was held at the Kyiv Art Gallery, including images of Golda in Ukrainian embroidered shirts with her most famous quotes. - October 7, 2026 - Новости Израиля

Ukraine to Israel on October 7: “We stand together in memory and pain” - October 7, 2026 - Новости Израиля

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Atlit Yam is located 10 meters underwater off the coast of the city of Atlit near Haifa. These remains of a vast coastal settlement from the Neolithic era tell the story of a once-thriving community that existed almost 9000 years ago.

It was believed that at the beginning of the Holocene, the Atlit Yam community settled in this place more than 8000 years ago. Although it is completely submerged at present, during the settlement, this place was much higher than the current sea level and boasted very fertile lands intended for agriculture – writes IFL Science.

Discovered by marine archaeologist Dr. Ehud Galili in 1984, this site has since been excavated to glimpse into the lives of the people who once lived there.

On a large area of 40,000 square meters, marine archaeologists found houses, wells, and even graves. It is believed that along with the bones of domesticated sheep, pigs, and dogs, large rectangular stone structures, still standing under the waves, were used as animal pens or as enclosures for separating cultivated fields.

In this area and its surroundings, 65 human skeletons were found, most of which are in single graves, and some remain relatively intact. Also, the remains of a mother and child were discovered at the site, revealing the earliest known cases of tuberculosis. Fragments of human bones, as well as animal remains and stone tools, were found at the bottom of a 5.5-meter well dug by the village residents.

In the center of the settlement stand seven large stone monoliths surrounding a freshwater spring. It is believed that this structure served as a site for water rituals.

Who needs Atlantis when you have Atlit Yam?

Arrowheads, sickles, spearheads, and knives, as well as large accumulations of flint, were excavated in this area. It was found that one flint collection consists of 8755 flint artifacts. Interestingly, the specific material found at this site appears to have been discovered more than 10 kilometers away from Mount Carmel.

It seemed to have been occupied for a short time, but there were speculations as to why this area was abandoned. Some suggest that rising sea levels may have led to the village being abandoned, while other theories point to the consequences of a tsunami.

The tsunami theory is supported by what appears to be abandoned remains of large piles of fish at the site. These valuable goods were not intentionally left, so their existence suggests that the village may have met a much harsher fate.

In the region surrounding the Carmel coast, there are 17 submerged prehistoric sites, ranging from the pre-ceramic Neolithic period of Atlit Yam to the ceramic Neolithic sites dating from 8000 to 6500 years ago. Excavations of this area by marine archaeologists began in 1960, and since then, the rich heritage of the land underwater continues to enrich our knowledge of the life of Neolithic settlements.

Discuss:

Who needs Atlantis when you have Atlit Yam?

Who needs Atlantis when you have Atlit Yam? – source IFL Science.

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An exhibition about Golda Meir was held at the Kyiv Art Gallery, including images of Golda in Ukrainian embroidered shirts with her most famous quotes. - October 7, 2026 - Новости Израиля

Ukraine to Israel on October 7: “We stand together in memory and pain” - October 7, 2026 - Новости Израиля

In Tel Aviv, ‘Theater Therapy’ will take place: how Ukrainian theater sought freedom after decades of bans – October 8, 2026 - October 6, 2026 - Новости Израиля

…
An exhibition about Golda Meir was held at the Kyiv Art Gallery, including images of Golda in Ukrainian embroidered shirts with her most famous quotes. - October 7, 2026 - Новости Израиля

Ukraine to Israel on October 7: “We stand together in memory and pain” - October 7, 2026 - Новости Израиля

In Tel Aviv, ‘Theater Therapy’ will take place: how Ukrainian theater sought freedom after decades of bans – October 8, 2026 - October 6, 2026 - Новости Израиля

…
An exhibition about Golda Meir was held at the Kyiv Art Gallery, including images of Golda in Ukrainian embroidered shirts with her most famous quotes. - October 7, 2026 - Новости Израиля

Ukraine to Israel on October 7: “We stand together in memory and pain” - October 7, 2026 - Новости Израиля

In Tel Aviv, ‘Theater Therapy’ will take place: how Ukrainian theater sought freedom after decades of bans – October 8, 2026 - October 6, 2026 - Новости Израиля

On October 4, 2026, the “Day of Chernivtsi 2026” will be held at the Ukrainian Cultural Center in Tel Aviv. This time, the organizers offer to get to know the city not only through its history, old photographs, and stories — but also literally by taste.

Author: R.Verter

The evening program includes a story about the culinary traditions of Chernivtsi, tasting of dishes characteristic of Bukovina, a quiz with prizes, dancing, photographs, and fundraising for the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

The event is being prepared by “Historical Arsenal: Meetings and Lectures with Iryna Sakhno” together with the Ukrainian Cultural Center in Tel Aviv. These same venues have already held events in Israel dedicated to Chernivtsi.

In Tel Aviv, the Day of Chernivtsi will be celebrated on October 4 — the same weekend when the city itself traditionally celebrates its birthday. In Chernivtsi, City Day falls on the first Saturday of October and is associated with the first written record of the city on October 8, 1408.

What was eaten in Chernivtsi and why the city’s cuisine turned out the way it did

One of the central parts of the evening will be a gastronomic excursion by Iryna Sakhno.

Throughout its history, Chernivtsi lived at the crossroads of Ukrainian, Jewish, Romanian, Austrian, Polish, and other cultures. States and borders changed, languages on the streets and rules of city life changed — but recipes remained in families, mixed, and passed from neighbor to neighbor.

This is exactly what the organizers propose to talk about on October 4: how the large and rather complex history of the city was reflected in the most ordinary Chernivtsi plate.

And then the theory can be practically tested.

The tasting of dishes is prepared by a native of Chernivtsi, Halyna Doskalyuk.

One of them is mariturs. For the Israeli reader, the word may sound unusual: this is what they call an assortment of homemade pickled vegetables — cucumbers, peppers, tomatoes, and other seasonal vegetables in Bukovina. This is not a restaurant reconstruction, but a quite lively home tradition that is still preserved in the region.

There will also be Chernivtsi forshmak. In Israel, most readers probably don’t need an explanation of what forshmak is, but the Chernivtsi version has its own local tradition. The organizers promise to serve it with homemade sourdough bread from Halyna.

Another dish is kapronova babka, which guests of previous meetings could already try. This is one of the dishes of the modern Bukovinian gastronomic tradition, which is also found in stories about the cuisine of the Chernivtsi region.

Not just food

The evening will not be limited to just mariturs.

A separate story for the guests was prepared by a Chernivtsi native, Olexander Gusak. The organizers call him an intellectual from Chernivtsi and promise a separate story about the city.

Then — a quiz with prizes. So knowledge about Chernivtsi, Bukovina, and their traditions may come in handy right on the spot.

After the conversational part, the program will become noticeably less academic: Roman Zots is responsible for the dances, and Tatiana Gur will be taking photographs of the evening.

During the event, there will also be a fundraising in support of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

Why Chernivtsi is so recognizable in Israel

For Israel, this story is not foreign at all.

Chernivtsi was one of the important centers of Jewish life in Bukovina. In 1908, the famous Chernivtsi Conference on Yiddish was held here, and Jewish culture was a natural part of city life for decades, alongside Ukrainian, German, and Romanian.

After World War II, many natives of Bukovina ended up in Israel. Along with them, family stories, music, and, of course, recipes moved here.

NANovosti has already detailed the history of the city and why Chernivtsi and Israel are much more connected than it might seem at first glance.

Therefore, the current evening in Tel Aviv is a story not only for those who were born in Chernivtsi or once lived there.

NANovosti — News of Israel | Nikk.Agency has already written about the previous Chernivtsi evening in Tel Aviv. The new format noticeably shifts the focus towards gastronomy: the city is offered to be remembered through dishes, homemade bread, old recipes, and conversations at the table.

October 4 — another date in the city’s history

The date of the event also has an interesting historical coincidence.

It was on October 4, 1875, that the solemn inauguration of Chernivtsi University, founded by Emperor Franz Joseph, took place. Subsequently, the university became one of the symbols of the city.

At the same time, the organizers themselves in the published announcement do not associate the choice of the event date with the anniversary of the university’s opening, so it is more correct to speak of a coincidence rather than a reason.

What will happen on October 4

So, the program of the “Day of Chernivtsi 2026” in Tel Aviv includes:

— a story by Iryna Sakhno about the culinary history of Chernivtsi;

— tasting of dishes by Halyna Doskalyuk;

— Bukovinian mariturs;

— Chernivtsi forshmak with homemade sourdough bread;

— kapronova babka;

— a story by Olexander Gusak;

— a quiz and prizes;

— fundraising for the Armed Forces of Ukraine;

— dances with Roman Zots;

— photography by Tatiana Gur.

Date: October 4, 2026.

Place: Ukrainian Cultural Center in Tel Aviv.

Event page:
https://www.facebook.com/events/2057065661602232/

The organizers invite not only natives of Chernivtsi. The evening is open to everyone interested in Bukovina, the history of the city, Ukrainian and Jewish culture — or just wants to finally find out what mariturs are and why after the first one you usually want to take another.

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An exhibition about Golda Meir was held at the Kyiv Art Gallery, including images of Golda in Ukrainian embroidered shirts with her most famous quotes. - October 7, 2026 - Новости Израиля

Ukraine to Israel on October 7: “We stand together in memory and pain” - October 7, 2026 - Новости Израиля

In Tel Aviv, ‘Theater Therapy’ will take place: how Ukrainian theater sought freedom after decades of bans – October 8, 2026 - October 6, 2026 - Новости Израиля

On September 2, 2025, Odessa Mayor Gennady Trukhanov, on behalf of the entire city, presented Roman Shvartsman with the title of “Honorary Citizen of the City of Odessa”.

They congratulate him warmly and in a homely way, calling him “our Romochka”. They emphasize that he truly deserves this award.

As is customary in Jewish tradition, they wish him “Mazal Tov” and long life – “up to 120”.

It is noted that Roman Markovich managed to survive Nazism and the Soviet system, and there is confidence that he will cope with modern challenges, including Rashism.

Roman Markovich Shvartsman, born on November 7, 1936, in Bershad, Vinnytsia region, at the age of five, ended up in the Bershad ghetto, where he spent 3.5 years in inhumane conditions. This experience left an indelible mark on his fate and became the foundation of his struggle for truth and memory.

According to Odessa portal “Dumskaya”, the city council plans to confer this title on him in the near future.

Roman Shvartsman himself confirmed this information to a “Dumskaya” correspondent and shared his emotions.

“For me, it is a great honor and deep excitement to be presented for the title of Honorary Citizen of Odessa,” Shvartsman noted.

He added that this is the highest award from the city where he has lived his entire life after the war, and which has become for him a “source of revival and strength.”

“This is recognition not only of my work but of everyone whose memory I try to preserve. All those who passed through ghettos and concentration camps. All who gave their lives fighting Nazism. All who today fight for Ukraine’s independence… The title of ‘Honorary Citizen of Odessa’ is not just for me. It is for everyone who survived, who remembers, who passes the truth on. It is for Odessa, which has always been a multicultural, free, and strong-spirited city. I am grateful to everyone who supports this initiative. For me, this is not the end, but a new obligation: to work even harder, speak even louder, and remember even deeper,” said Roman Shvartsman.

After the war ended in 1955, he moved to Odessa, where he studied at Vocational School No. 2 as a “mechanic-assembler.” Later, he graduated from the Odessa Institute of Marine Engineers, becoming a mechanical engineer. His entire working life was connected to the “Poligraphmash” factory, where he worked for over 30 years, showing the highest professionalism and dedication.

Decades of community work

Since 1990, Roman Shvartsman has been actively involved in public life as the head of the Odessa Regional Association of Jews – former prisoners of ghettos and concentration camps. In 1992, he became a member of the international organization of former prisoners of ghettos and concentration camps, founded in Odessa. He remains an active member, uniting those who remember the tragic pages of history.

Shvartsman also serves as the Vice President of the All-Ukrainian Association of Jews – former prisoners of ghettos and concentration camps, led by Boris Zabarko. He is also Deputy Chairman of the Council of the Odessa Society of Jewish Culture and Head of the socio-cultural center.

The Holocaust Museum and monuments – a lifetime’s work

Shvartsman played a huge role in creating the Holocaust Museum in Odessa, which opened on June 22, 2009. In his words:

“This museum should become a school, a university for the young, so that they understand what the Holocaust was.”

Today, the museum has over 4,000 exhibits and, over the years, has been visited by about 20,000 people – diplomats, students, schoolchildren, tourists, and Israelis, for whom the memory of the Holocaust is inseparable from their identity.

Thanks to Shvartsman’s persistence, over 30 monuments and memorials have been established in Odessa, Odessa region, and Mykolaiv region. Among them is the Memorial Complex on Lustdorf Road, the site where 25,000 Jews were killed. In 2015, in the village of Hvozdivka2, a mass grave containing the remains of 3,500 Jews was discovered, above which a memorial was erected at Shvartsman’s initiative.

“Wherever you dig, you’ll find bones – teeth and skulls. It’s horrible.”

Speech in the Bundestag and international recognition

On January 30, 2025, Roman Shvartsman spoke at the German Bundestag during a session dedicated to the memory of the victims of National Socialism. His words to the deputies became a symbol of the parallel between the horrors of the Holocaust and the modern aggression of putin against Ukraine:

“At that time, Hitler tried to kill me because I was a Jew. Now putin is trying to kill me because I am Ukrainian,” he declared, speaking in the German parliament on January 29, 2025, during the session dedicated to the memory of the victims of Nazism.

Shvartsman also called on Germany to actively support Ukraine and increase arms supplies:

“I appeal to you: arm us so that putin ends this war of annihilation.”

He especially emphasized Ukraine’s need for long-range missiles.

Shvartsman reminded everyone that it is the duty of current generations to prevent new catastrophes and protect civilians from violence.

His speech received a standing ovation and the support of German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier. He urged Germany to increase support for Ukraine and stressed the moral duty of everyone – to stop new barbarism.

Awards and recognition

For decades of work and service to society, Roman Shvartsman has received numerous awards:

• Order of Merit III degree (2006) – for personal courage and the fight against fascism.
• Order of Merit II degree (2013) – for the development of the veteran movement and patriotic education of the youth.
• Order of Merit I degree (2018) – for outstanding contributions to the development of Ukraine and high professionalism.
• Title of “Honored Machine Builder of the Ukrainian SSR” (1989).
• Medals “For Labor Distinction” (1977) and “Veteran of Labor” (1985).
• Honorary award of the Odessa mayor “Labor Glory.”
• German Cross of Merit (2003).
• Jubilee medals for national and international merits.

Memories of the Holocaust

Recalling his childhood, Roman Shvartsman shared that in early July 1941, his mother tried to evacuate with eight children. However, due to the advance of German and Romanian troops, the evacuation attempt failed. In August 1941, the occupiers entered Bershad and created two ghettos, one of which housed Shvartsman’s family.

25,000 Jews from Bessarabia and Vinnytsia region were deported to the ghetto. During the years of occupation, the Nazis murdered 13,871 Jews.

In 1942, while Roman’s older brother was working on repairing a bridge over the Dokhno River, he was shot by Romanian guards. This tragedy formed the basis for one of the films by Israeli director Boris Mavtzer. Shvartsman recalls the unbearable living conditions, constant hunger, and fear. On March 29, 1944, the town of Bershad was liberated.

Odessa honors its hero

Today, the Odessa City Council is preparing to confer the title of Honorary Citizen on Roman Shvartsman. For Shvartsman himself, this is not just an honor, but a new challenge and responsibility:

“This is recognition not only of my efforts but of all those who survived the Holocaust and continue to fight for Ukraine’s freedom.”

The site NAnews – Israel News emphasizes: Shvartsman’s fate is an important example of the unity of the Jewish and Ukrainian peoples, who together oppose hatred and aggression.

The story of Roman Shvartsman is a reminder that the Jewish people and Ukrainians, despite all trials, continue to fight for truth and freedom. The site NAnews – Israel News is confident: such heroes help us remember the lessons of the past and build a peaceful future.

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January 27, International Day of Remembrance of the Holocaust Victims.

In Israel, on the mountain of memory in Jerusalem, is located “Yad Vashem” – A place that for many has become a symbol of sorrow, memory and hope. Today we want to tell in the heading “Jews from Ukraine “ You are a story Mordechai Shenhavi – A person thanks to whom the dream of preserving memory has become a reality.

The story of Mordechai Shenhavi from Dilok, the creator of the Israeli Memorial “Yad Vashem”, emphasizes the deep connection of the Jewish community of Ukraine while preserving the memory of the Holocaust.

Mordechai Shenhavi (Alpenbein), a native of the Ukrainian city of Volochisk (now the Khmelnitsky region, Ukraine), went down in history as the creator of the Israeli memorial “Yad Vashem”, dedicated to the memory of the victims of the Holocaust.

His personal history is an example of not only the struggle to preserve the memory of the tragedy of the Jewish people, but also the unique connection of Ukraine and Israel.

Mordechai Shenhavi was born in 1900 in Voloshka, a small town on the territory of the modern Khmelnitsky region of Ukraine. His family, like many Jewish families of that time, was engaged in trade, but because of difficult living conditions, he first emigrated to Budapest, and then to Vienna.

Already in his youth, Mordechai was fond of socialist and Zionist ideas, which became the basis for his future life. He became one of the founders of the organization Ga-shomer Ga-Tsair (“Young Guardians”), uniting young Jewish activists.

Volochisk, located in the Khmelnitsky region of Ukraine, has deep Jewish roots, which have been formed for centuries. The first mention of the city dates back to 1463, and from the 18th century the Jewish community began to actively develop here.

By 1765, 384 Jews lived in Voloshka, by 1897 their number increased to 3295 people, which was 49.1% of the city’s population. Jews played an important role in the economic life of a drag, engaged in crafts, trade and banking. There were several synagogues in the city, as well as educational and charitable institutions.

At the beginning of the 20th century, in Voloshka, the heyday of Jewish public life was observed. The Women’s Jewish School, a private male school, as well as a loan-saving partnership acted.

The tragedy of the Holocaust

During the Second World War, Volochisk became a place of tragedy for the Jewish community. After the occupation of the city, by the Nazis in 1941, a ghetto was created in Voloshka, where thousands of Jews were kept. In August 1942, 8634 Jews were killed, and about 4,000 people were shot on September 11 of the same year. In total, 9975 people became victims of the Holocaust in the area of ​​the Dilogysk.

On the site of these terrible events today, monuments are erected, reminiscent of the tragedy of the Jewish people. The old Jewish cemetery and the memorial in the new cemetery retain the memory of the dead.

Volochisk in Soviet times and today

After the end of the Second World War, the Jewish community of Dilot began to gradually recover, although its number never reached the pre -war level. In Soviet times, Jewish life was significantly limited by the anti -religious policy of the USSR. Most synagogues were closed, and cultural and religious activities were suppressed.

By the 1970s, only about 150 Jews lived in Voloshka. Many of them emigrated to Israel, the United States and other countries during the Great Aliyah 1970-1990s.

Today, the Jewish community of the drags has been significantly reduced. According to data in the 2020s, only a few Jewish families live in the city. The memory of the once flourished community is preserved thanks to preserved monuments, cemeteries and local initiatives to restore historical memory.

Moving to Palestine and the first steps to the “poison of yours”

In 1919, Mordechai through Odessa emigrated to Palestine. Working in Kibbutz, he continued to develop his ideas about the importance of memory and heritage.

According to legend, in 1942 he had a dream: the Jews carried a tombstone on his shoulders and put them in a large monument, symbolizing the memory of their life. This dream inspired Mordechai to create a memorial where the names of all the victims of the Holocaust would be immortalized.

“We must create a place where every victim of the Holocaust will be remembered by a name where the history of our people will be preserved forever,” wrote Shenhavi.

The idea “poison of yours”

On September 10, 1942, Mordechai presented the first project of the memorial in the leadership of the Jewish National Fund. His idea included:

• A park with an area of ​​200 hectares.
• A symbolic cemetery for those who died in exile and Palestine.
• The pavilion, where the names of all the victims of the Holocaust will be collected.
• Archives, museum, research center and even a hotel complex.

Although the project met criticism and misunderstanding, Schenhavi continued to promote it. In 1945, after the end of World War II, the idea of ​​“poison of Vashem” received support for leaders such as David Ben-Gurion.

Project implementation

In 1953, the efforts of Mordechai Shenhavi adopted the State Law on the creation of the Yad Voyem memorial. Shenghavi himself became the first director of the memorial, actively collecting exhibits and archival materials.

However, due to political intrigues, he soon left this position. Despite this, his contribution became fundamental: “poison of yours” became one of the most significant monuments of memory of the Holocaust in the world.

The meaning “poison of yours” for the world

Today, “poison of yours” is not just a museum, but a symbol of memory and struggle against evil. He is the second in attendance by a place in Israel after the crying wall. The memorial annually visits more than a million people, including heads of states and international leaders.

Conclusion

The history of Mordechai Shenhavi and the Jewish community of Dylochiska shows how important the memory and connection of generations are to preserve heritage. Read more amazing stories about the contribution of Jews from Ukraine in the heading “Jews from Ukraine“ on Nanovosti – Israeli News.

Nanovosti – Israeli News He continues to tell stories uniting Jewish and Ukrainian peoples in order to preserve the past and build a better future.

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In Kyiv, two September days of Jewish Open Space took place. In the photos, everything looks quite easy: young people are laughing, someone is dancing, Yiddish is heard, there is a playground nearby, workshops. After the second weekend, the organizers wrote that despite the security situation, the festival took place and became a ‘place of support’ for people.

We could end on that note — a Jewish festival in wartime Kyiv, what more is there to explain.

But then half of the story would be lost.

Jewish Open Space has been held for more than ten years, growing from a single Kyiv event into a program in several countries, and its organizer is not CHABAD, not a state Jewish structure of Ukraine, and not a secular cultural fund. The festival grew around the Kyiv Jewish Messianic Community, whose participants believe in Yeshua — Jesus — as the Messiah of Israel. The community itself does not hide this, but on the festival poster, the religious component is much less noticeable than the music and apples with honey.

The author of NANews Pavel Shveyko explored where a simple urban Jewish festival ends and the history of the community itself begins. No spoiler needed here: the boundary is quite blurred.

September 5 — park, Yiddish, and open-air cinema

In 2026, the Kyiv program was divided into two dates — September 5 and 12. The festival’s official website confirms both dates for Kyiv.

The first day took place in Natalka Park. The Kyiv poster described the program as follows: Yiddish songs with a modern DJ set, round dances to live music, sports activities, thematic workshops, and a children’s zone. Separately, at 18:30, a free screening of Jewish cinema was announced at the Wave complex on the Dnipro embankment. Entry was made free, anyone could come.

This is probably the familiar face of Jewish Open Space. Not a conference behind closed doors and not a worship service with mandatory registration, but an urban space where you can come with your family, listen to music, eat something, talk, dance.

This is how the festival was built before.

September 12 — already ‘Nyvky Hall’

There was a slight confusion with the second date. Early announcements mentioned other venues, but the final poster for September 12 already indicated ‘Nyvky Hall’, Brest Avenue, 84, time — from 15:00 to 19:30. There, too, were listed a concert of Yiddish songs with a DJ set, workshops, live music, round dances, a thematic cafe, Jewish souvenirs, and a children’s zone. Entry was again free.

Why exactly the venue changed, we will not assert. We do not have a statement from the organizers with the wording ‘moved due to threat’ — so we should not speculate for them.

But the factor of war is completely open. On the official Jewish Open Space website, it is now separately stated that a shelter is provided near each festival venue in Ukraine, and visitors are asked to go there during an air raid alert. For today’s Kyiv, this is already a usual organizational detail. Although, if you think about it, it’s not usual at all.

And the date of September 12 turned out to be special for another reason.

On the evening of September 11, 2026, Rosh Hashanah 5787 began, and Saturday, September 12, was the first day of the Jewish New Year — and simultaneously Shabbat. The holiday ended on the evening of September 13. Therefore, apples, honey, and the New Year’s motifs of the festival were not a ‘Jewish-style’ decor, but a direct reference to the calendar.

For an Israeli, however, another question immediately arises. We will return to it.

Jewish Open Space did not appear yesterday

According to the history of the festival itself, sources allow us to confidently go back to about 2014. In a master’s thesis from the Ukrainian Catholic University, written in 2021 based in part on interviews with representatives of the Kyiv Jewish Messianic Community, it is stated that at that time Jewish Open Space had been held for seven years. The current KJMC formulates it more simply: the festival has existed for ‘more than 11 years’.

Large pre-war festivals were held in Mariinsky Park.

In 2019, the city ‘Vechirniy Kyiv’ wrote about performances by the National Academic Orchestra of Folk Instruments of Ukraine, the Revutsky Chapel, Jewish ensembles, and invited performers. Organizer Andrey Lugovsky was presented directly — as an assistant to the rabbi of the Kyiv Jewish Messianic Community.

The KJMC itself now speaks of about 10,000 visitors to that festival in Mariinsky Park. This is the organization’s figure, not an independent count, so we will not mix one with the other. But it at least allows us to imagine the scale of the event.

And here a question arises, without which it is difficult to write honestly about Jewish Open Space: what is this Kyiv Jewish Messianic Community?

The community is over thirty years old

The current international structure is called the Kingdom Jewish Messianic Confederation — KJMC. Its central Kyiv community traces its history back to 1995. It is led by Boris Grisenko, whom the organization calls the senior rabbi and head of the confederation.

The About KJMC page currently lists 58 communities and groups in 21 countries. Regarding the size of the Kyiv community itself, the site is not entirely accurate: one page mentions more than 1,700 participants after the start of the war, another — more than 2,000. Before the full-scale invasion, the organization indicated more than 2,200 people. Therefore, we will not give one current figure as ironclad.

But there is no ambiguity with the doctrine.

KJMC directly calls itself a global messianic Jewish movement and speaks of its goal to help Jews ‘discover their Messiah — Yeshua’. The Kyiv community describes itself as an association of Jews and non-Jews who believe that Yeshua is the Messiah of Israel and the whole world.

There, festivals, concerts, and theatrical performances are named as one of the ways to introduce people to Jewish culture, biblical traditions, the God of Israel, and the activities of the community.

So the connection of Jewish Open Space with the religious mission is not a journalist’s guess and not someone else’s accusation. The organization itself says this.

And here a document was found that puts many things in place

There is a source more interesting than advertising pages.

In 2021, Lidiya Moskal defended a master’s thesis at the Ukrainian Catholic University on the theology of the Kyiv Jewish Messianic Community. It contains a separate section on evangelization, based, among other things, on interviews with KEMO representatives.

Community elder Andrey Lugovsky told the researcher that bringing the Gospel to people is the community’s primary goal. The author of the work then describes several levels of such activity — and the largest annual mass event is named as Jewish Open Space.

According to research data from that period, about 700 community volunteer ministers were involved in the festival. The park was divided into thematic zones, concerts and workshops were held, and visitors were then invited to KEMO’s ongoing clubs and other meetings.

But here we must refrain from a convenient and too simple conclusion.

The work describes the community’s activities before 2020. It shows how KEMO itself then viewed Jewish Open Space within its evangelization system. This is a serious historical source, but it does not automatically prove that a person who came in 2026 to listen to Yiddish or bring a child to a workshop necessarily ended up at a religious sermon.

On the other hand, today’s KJMC still calls the festival a way to talk about the faith and mission of the community. This line has not been broken. Just the form has become broader.

That is why NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency separates two things that are easy to mix: the real open cultural program of the festival and the religious identity of the organization that makes this festival.

Both exist simultaneously.

After the Russian invasion, another line appeared — help

In the current description of Jewish Open Space, much more space is devoted to social work than before.

The official website writes about chaplains who visit the military and visit the wounded in hospitals, about volunteer activities and charitable dentistry. KJMC separately talks about humanitarian aid, work with internally displaced people, mobile dentistry in de-occupied areas of the Kyiv region, assistance to military personnel, and projects for people who have experienced war trauma. These are the organization’s own data, and this is how they should be correctly presented.

In recent years, the word ‘festival’ has therefore come to mean something slightly different than in pre-war Mariinsky Park. Music, dances, theater, Jewish symbolism, children remained. Nearby — collections, help, talks about the war, and a shelter nearby.

Some things the war simply placed side by side, although they used to live separately.

This is also visible in other Jewish projects in Ukraine. NANews recently talked, for example, about the Sholem Aleichem Museum in Kyiv and how the living culture of Yiddish is preserved there, as well as about the EU and UNESCO project to preserve the Jewish documentary heritage of Ukraine. Jewish Open Space is in the same large Ukrainian-Jewish reality, but organizationally and religiously, it is a completely different story.

From Kyiv, the festival has spread to several countries

On the official schedule for 2026, Kyiv, Lviv, Berdychiv, Uzhhorod, Khmelnytskyi, and Vinnytsia in Ukraine are now marked. Beyond its borders — Helsinki, Porvoo, Bern, Amsterdam, Stuttgart, Cologne, and Sacramento. If you count cities, not separate dates, it turns out to be 13 cities in six countries.

And here, too, the numbers had to be checked because the organization’s own sites slightly argue with each other. One KJMC page attributes 15 cities in six countries to 2024, another writes about 15 cities already in seven countries in 2025. Therefore, retrospective figures are better left with the note ‘according to KJMC data’, rather than building an exact statistical ladder from them.

However, the fact of expansion is not in doubt. In 2026, the official festival website already shows Ukraine, Germany, Finland, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the USA. Moreover, the programs differ. In American Sacramento, for example, a street festival, Israeli dances, modern Jewish music, and further weekly meetings after the event itself are announced.

So it is not just one Kyiv concert being exported. A model is being exported.

Explanation for Israeli readers: who are Messianic Jews

For a reader in Israel, the word ‘messianic’ fundamentally changes the context.

Participants in the messianic movement may consider themselves Jews and maintain Shabbat, Jewish holidays, prayer forms, music, dances, Hebrew, elements of tradition. But at the same time, the central part of their faith is the recognition of Yeshua — Jesus — as the Messiah and the use of the New Testament.

The main directions of modern Judaism — Orthodox, Conservative, Reform, and Reconstructionist — do not recognize Messianic Judaism as a direction of Judaism. At the same time, the messianic movement itself disagrees with such external classification and speaks of itself precisely as a continuation of Jewish faith in the Messiah.

From here, the seemingly strange date of the Kyiv festival becomes clearer.

September 12, 2026 — the first day of Rosh Hashanah and Shabbat. For an Orthodox Jewish community, a public program with a DJ set, music, and similar activities at this time would be impossible according to the rules of observing Shabbat and the holiday. For a Messianic community, religious practice is arranged differently.

There is another point because names often get mixed into one heap. KJMC and Jewish Open Space — not Jews for Jesus. Jews for Jesus is a separate organization. It belongs to the broader field of the messianic movement, but it is not the same legal or organizational entity.

For an Israeli reader, this is probably the key to understanding the whole story. The inscription ‘Jewish festival’ here does not automatically mean an event of the Judaism that a person is used to encountering in Israel.

So what happened on September 5 and 12 in Kyiv

If you only look at the photos — a good open Jewish festival. And that’s not untrue.

There were Yiddish, music, children, workshops, cinema, dances. People came. Despite the war, the event took place, the organizers themselves later described the second weekend as a space where one could breathe a little and be together.

But if you dig one layer deeper, the Kyiv Jewish Messianic Community with a thirty-year history appears. Even deeper — its own mission, Yeshua, work with Jews, and the international KJMC created around the community. Then you go back outside — and there is charitable dentistry, help for the military, children, festivals already in Germany and Finland.

All this is Jewish Open Space. Not one part instead of the others.

And maybe that’s why the project has survived several very different eras. Mariinsky Park and the multi-thousand pre-war festivals. COVID. The Russian invasion. The emigration of part of the community. The relocation of the format to other countries. Kyiv air raid alerts.

And in September 2026, people gathered again in Kyiv. First in the park, a week later — in ‘Nyvky Hall’. Yiddish was played next to the DJ console, apples with honey made it to the poster, and there was a shelter nearby.

For Jewish Open Space, this mix seems to be normal life already.

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For the 85th anniversary of the Babi Yar tragedy in Kyiv, not just one ceremony and not just one memorial day are being prepared. The National Historical and Memorial Reserve “Babi Yar” presented a program that begins on September 28, 2026, and continues almost until the end of October. A round table, an exhibition on the history of the Roma, an interfaith prayer, a new edition of Anatoly Kuznetsov, a digital archive, books, a museum forum. Another project — an audio guide — is still without a final date.

Author: Pavel Shveiko

The central historical point here remains the same. On September 29 and 30, 1941, 33,771 Kyiv Jews were shot in Babi Yar. This number refers specifically to the two days of mass murder and comes from German documentation. The killings in Babi Yar did not end there: during the Nazi occupation, Roma, Soviet prisoners of war, psychiatric hospital patients, and other people were also shot here. Historians estimate the total number of victims at about 100,000.

For the Israeli reader, there is another detail that is better understood immediately. The National Historical and Memorial Reserve “Babi Yar,” which publishes the current program, is a state Ukrainian institution. And the Holocaust Memorial Center “Babi Yar,” associated with many well-known projects, archives, and a new synagogue on the memorial’s territory, is a separate structure. In the news, their names are often shortened to one “Babi Yar,” hence the confusion.

September 28. “Babi Yar: 85 Years Later”

The first event will take place on September 28 at 13:00 in Kyiv Hall. It is a round table “Babi Yar: 85 Years Later,” initiated by the State Service of Ukraine for Ethnopolitics and Freedom of Conscience.

The very name of the state body sounds unusual to an Israeli. Simply put, it is a Ukrainian service that deals with issues of national minorities, interethnic relations, religious communities, and freedom of religion. Therefore, its participation in such a discussion is quite logical: Babi Yar has long gone beyond just the historical study of 1941. It is also a question of how the state remembers the destroyed communities today.

The organizers have not yet disclosed all the participants of the round table in detail. Therefore, it is not worth attributing any statements or conclusions to it in advance. The topic and the framework are known — what happened to the memory of Babi Yar 85 years later.

September 29. Exhibition “INVISIBLE. The Past and Present of the Roma”

The next day, on September 29 at 12:00, the exhibition “INVISIBLE. The Past and Present of the Roma” will open in the Winter Garden of the Kyiv National University of Construction and Architecture.

It is being made together with ARCA — the Agency for the Advocacy of Roma Culture, the Ukrainian Center for Holocaust Studies, and KNUCA, with the support of the German Embassy in Kyiv and the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory.

At first glance, the question may arise: why is a separate large exhibition dedicated to the Roma in the Babi Yar anniversary program? Because the history of the place itself does not end with the shooting of Kyiv Jews on September 29–30.

Roma were also victims of the Nazi extermination policy, and people of Roma origin were killed in Babi Yar. The exhibition, however, tells not only about World War II. The organizers combine archival evidence and the history of genocide with the life of Roma in modern Ukraine.

That is, it is not an attempt to mix different groups of victims into one common mass. Rather, on the contrary — to show who exactly was destroyed and why. For the history of Babi Yar, this is fundamental: the Soviet system for decades preferred a more convenient depersonalized formula about the dead “Soviet citizens.”

September 29. Interfaith prayer in Babi Yar itself

On the same day, on September 29 at 17:00, an interfaith prayer event in memory of the victims of Babi Yar will take place directly in the National Historical and Memorial Reserve.

It is held together with the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory and the State Service for Ethnopolitics and Freedom of Conscience.

The interfaith format here is not accidental. Jews were the main group of victims of the largest shooting on September 29–30, 1941, and it was these events that made Babi Yar one of the symbols of the Holocaust. But later, people from other groups were killed in the same place. Therefore, representatives of Judaism and various Christian denominations are present at memorial ceremonies.

There is also a direct bridge to Israel in the current anniversary. On September 29, a memorial ceremony for the 85th anniversary of Babi Yar will also take place at Yad Vashem in Jerusalem. Among the announced participants are Yad Vashem Chairman Dani Dayan, Natan Sharansky, Ukraine’s Ambassador to Israel Yevgeny Korniychuk, and representatives of the community of immigrants from Ukraine.

NANews has already detailed this ceremony and why the 85th anniversary of Babi Yar in 2026 simultaneously becomes a Ukrainian and Israeli event.

September 30. New Ukrainian edition of Kuznetsov’s “Babi Yar”

There is a discrepancy with this program item.

The publication of the National Reserve states October 30, 18:00. But a separate fresh announcement of the presentation of the new edition of Anatoly Kuznetsov indicates September 30, also at 18:00, in the Kyiv bookstore Readeat. Therefore, those planning to attend the presentation should double-check the date directly before the event.

The new edition already exists and was released specifically for the 85th anniversary. The “Phronesis” publishing house prepared the Ukrainian text translated by Oleg Protsenko, with illustrations by Matvey Weisberg. Among the presentation partners, the reserve also names the Jewish Confederation of Ukraine, the communication group Ideas&Strategy, and “General Chereshnya FPV.”

And here the history of the book itself sometimes turns out to be no less important than the literary evening around it.

Anatoly Kuznetsov was born in Kyiv in 1929 and grew up in Kurenivka — very close to Babi Yar. When the mass killings began in September 1941, he was twelve. Later, as a teenager, he began recording what he saw and heard.

In 1966, “Babi Yar” was published by the Soviet magazine “Youth,” but the text underwent serious censorship. A few years later, Kuznetsov ended up in the UK and took the full version of the book on film. So the phrase “new edition” here is somewhat misleading. It is not just an old book returning — it is a text around which the debate on how to talk about Babi Yar continued for decades.

NANews detailed the history of Kuznetsov, Soviet censorship, and the new Ukrainian edition of “Babi Yar”.

It is at this point that NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency sees an important part of the entire current program. Memory is not just a wreath at a monument. Sometimes it is a book from which pages were once cut out, and sixty years later they are read again in the city where it all happened.

October 5. Launch of the Babi Yar digital archive

On October 5 at 16:00 in the “Ukraine” hotel, the pilot launch of the digital archive of the National Historical and Memorial Reserve “Babi Yar” is planned.

The project partner is Research Centre Ukraine / Max Weber Foundation. The Max Weber Foundation is a German scientific organization working with international historical and humanitarian research; its Ukrainian research center appeared during the current war.

At first glance, the digital archive loses to prayer or a large exhibition in terms of emotionality. In fact, for Babi Yar, this is one of the key projects.

Because behind the known numbers, one still has to look for specific people.

The separate Holocaust Memorial Center “Babi Yar” already has extensive work with names and documents. According to data that Natan Sharansky cited in September 2026, researchers managed to establish more than 29,000 names of victims, and the array of digitized materials approached 10 million documents.

Here it is again important not to confuse the two organizations: the new archive is launched on October 5 by the state National Reserve, while the project of restoring names, which Sharansky spoke about, is led by the Holocaust Memorial Center.

About how today the names of the dead are being returned and why Natan Sharansky continues to travel for this work to Kyiv during the war, NANews told separately.

October 7. “War and Occupation. Germany and Ukraine in 1939–1945”

Another book meeting will take place on October 7 at 14:00 in the “Ukraine” hotel. There are presentations and discussions of the book “War and Occupation. Germany and Ukraine in 1939–1945” announced.

So far, this is one of the least detailed points of the program. The reserve reports the title, date, and place, but does not provide a detailed composition of the discussion in the main announcement. And here it is better to leave exactly what is known, without beautiful guesses about “what conversation will take place.”

The inclusion of such a book in the program is understandable. Babi Yar cannot be considered separately from the German occupation of Kyiv and the Nazi policy in Ukraine in general. The mass murder on September 29–30, 1941, occurred just a few days after German troops occupied the city.

October 22–23. “Memory under Occupation: Holocaust Museums in Wartime”

Here again, there is a clarification to the initial program.

The post of the National Reserve states: October 22, online. However, the Ukrainian Center for Holocaust Studies in a separate announcement already indicates October 22–23, 2026, Kyiv. The forum is called “Memory under Occupation: Holocaust Museums in Wartime.”

It is organized by the National Historical and Memorial Reserve “Babi Yar” and the Lviv Memorial Museum of Totalitarian Regimes “Territory of Terror.”

The organizers call the forum the first working meeting of Ukrainian museums, archives, and memorial institutions that deal with the memory of the Holocaust and mass killings during World War II.

And here 1941 already collides with 2026 almost without historical distance.

How to store an archive when the country is under missile and drone attacks? What to do with museum collections in territories threatened by occupation? How to continue working with the Holocaust when employees and visitors themselves live during the war? For Ukrainian museums, this is not an academic seminar about someone else’s experience.

Judging by the more recent profile announcement, the format October 22–23 in Kyiv now looks relevant. But since the initial program of the reserve speaks of online, the final technical details should still be checked closer to the forum.

Date still to be determined. Audio guide “Road of Memory”

The last project cannot yet be tied to a specific day.

The reserve is preparing an audio guide “Road of Memory” together with the RememberUs.org foundation and the Ivan Franko National Academic Drama Theater. The project is supported by the German Embassy in Kyiv.

For a person who has never been to Babi Yar, the problem of space itself needs to be explained here. Today it is already part of a large modern Kyiv, not an empty ravine on the city outskirts, as the place looked in 1941. The territory has changed, been built up, the Soviet authorities partially changed the very relief, roads, parks, and various monuments appeared.

Therefore, it is difficult for a visitor to simply come and “see Babi Yar.” Many important points are impossible to read without explanation. The audio route is supposed to connect the modern space with what happened here before.

The presentation date of the “Road of Memory” is still being clarified.

Why so many different events around one anniversary

The entire program is stretched over almost a month, and in this, perhaps, there is logic. One ceremony on September 29 can remind of the date. It cannot show 85 years of what happened with memory afterward.

After the war, Babi Yar remained a problematic place for Soviet authorities for a long time. The Jewish identity of the main group of victims of the September shooting was not emphasized. When in 1966 people began to gather at Babi Yar themselves, Soviet authorities closely monitored what was happening. Among those who spoke then were Viktor Nekrasov and Ivan Dziuba, and Dina Pronicheva, who survived the shooting, came.

NANews detailed how the first independent gatherings of Babi Yar memory took place in 1966.

Sixty years later, the situation looks almost mirrored. The state institution itself gathers a round table. An exhibition about the Roma opens nearby. The full Kuznetsov is published in Ukrainian. The archive is planned to be digitized. Museum workers discuss how to preserve memory during the current war.

And on the same day when prayers will be held in Babi Yar in Kyiv, people will gather for a ceremony at Yad Vashem in Jerusalem.

It turns out to be not very even, but a lively line: Kyiv — Babi Yar — Jewish memory — Ukrainian memory — Israel. Sometimes these lines diverged for decades. In September 2026, they are again close.

And still, at the center are not the anniversary and not the big program.

September 29 and 30, 1941 — 33,771 Jews killed.

This is what made Babi Yar what it is today. And no subsequent hundred thousand, archives, museums, or round dates should blur this first point.

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An exhibition about Golda Meir was held at the Kyiv Art Gallery, including images of Golda in Ukrainian embroidered shirts with her most famous quotes. - October 7, 2026 - Новости Израиля

Ukraine to Israel on October 7: “We stand together in memory and pain” - October 7, 2026 - Новости Израиля

In Tel Aviv, ‘Theater Therapy’ will take place: how Ukrainian theater sought freedom after decades of bans – October 8, 2026 - October 6, 2026 - Новости Израиля

Project “УкраЇдиш” (UkraYiddish), created by the Jewish musician Oles Volynchik, became a symbol of the interaction of two great cultures – Ukrainian and Jewish.

Through music and song translations, he creates a unique space where tradition and modernity intertwine.

As part of its project, music translates Ukrainian songs into Yiddish and Jewish songs into Ukrainian. Traveling around Ukraine, he records his unique compositions with local musicians.

Videos have already been released from Lviv, Dnieper (CDC “Menorah”) and Kharkov. A video from Odessa will be released in a month.

How did “UkraYiddish” come about?

Oles Volynchik (Amiram in Hebrew) is a musician living in Germany, but working at the intersection of Ukrainian and Jewish cultures. His project “УкраЇдиш” includes:

• Translations of Ukrainian folk songs into Yiddish. For example, “Oh at the cherry orchard” sounded in the language of Ashkenazi Jews.
• Translations of Jewish songs into Ukrainian. One of these was the song “Oyfn veg shteyt a boym”, a deep parable that takes on a new meaning in the context of modern events.
• Musical travels around Ukraine. Oles collaborates with musicians from Lvov, Kharkov, Dnieper, Odessa to create unique videos.

As the musician himself notes:

“The cultures of Ukrainians and Jews have always intersected and enriched each other. Jewish culture is an integral part of the cultural heritage of Ukraine.”

Kharkov: “Oh at the cherry garden” in Yiddish

Kharkov became one of the first cities where a music video was recorded as part of the project. The song “Oh at the Cherry Orchard,” known to all Ukrainians, sounded in Yiddish.

Entry details:

• Translation, vocals and guitar: Oles Volynchyk
• Clarinet: Gennady Fomin
• Video: Kharkiv Media Hub
• Audio: Anton An

This folk composition, translated into Yiddish, symbolizes the connection between the traditions of the two peoples.

“This song is a bridge between our history and modernity,” noted Oles Volynchik.

Dnepr: “Oyfn veg shteyt a boym” in Ukrainian

In Dnepr, on the roof of the Menorah Center, the famous Jewish song “Oyfn veg shteyt a boym” was performed, translated into Ukrainian.

Song Context:

• Written by Itzik Manger in 1938.
• Theme of the song: freedom, pain of loss, nostalgia.
• The translation into Ukrainian emphasized the relevance of the words in the context of modern warfare.

Entry details:

• Guitar and vocals: Oles Volynchyk
• Video: Yuri Smirnov and Elena Bubnova

“This song penetrates the soul of everyone who knows what loss and hope are,” the musician shared his impressions.



Lviv: “Charming violin” in tango style

In Lvov, “The Charming Violin,” the famous Ukrainian love song, was translated into Yiddish and performed in tango style.

Recording participants:

• Accordion: Orest Nakonechny
• Guitar and vocals: Oles Volynchyk
• Video: Andrey Kravchuk

This composition combined the romance of Ukrainian melody with Jewish flavor.

Odessa: Upcoming video

Oles Volynchik completed work on the video in Odessa, which will be released in a month. This city, with its rich Jewish heritage, will become another pearl in the Ukraindish music collection.

“Odessa is a place where culture speaks all languages. Expect surprises! ” – the musician intrigued.

The project is like a bridge between Ukraine and Israel

“УкраЇдиш” is not only a musical project, but also a cultural bridge between Ukraine, Israel and the global Jewish diaspora. It unites people through common values ​​and music, which is especially important in the face of complex geopolitical challenges.

Our website NAnews – Israel News regularly covers such initiatives, emphasizing the importance of strengthening ties between our peoples.

Values ​​of “UkraYiddish”

1. Recognition of cultural heritage.Jewish culture in Ukraine is part of a common heritage, which Volynchyk emphasizes.
2. Strengthening dialogue.Translations of songs promote mutual understanding between the Ukrainian and Jewish peoples.
3. Support for Ukraine and Israel.Project participants take a clear pro-Ukrainian and pro-Israeli position.

“Glory to Ukraine! עם ישראל חי!” – the motto of the participants of “УкраЇдиш”.

“UkraYiddish” on social networks

The project is actively distributed through the platforms:

• YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/@UkraYiddish .
• TikTok: https://www.tiktok.com/@ukrayiddish
• Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/UkraYiddish/
• Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/ukra.yiddish/

These resources help popularize culture among young people and support dialogue between diasporas.

Why is this important?

The УкраЇдиш project is a reminder of how culture unites peoples. Against the backdrop of geopolitical challenges, such initiatives are becoming an important element in preserving identity and strengthening international cooperation.

We, the editors NAnews – Israel Newsare confident that projects like Ukraydish will help create a world where the Jewish and Ukrainian peoples can overcome challenges together and build a future.

………………..

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An exhibition about Golda Meir was held at the Kyiv Art Gallery, including images of Golda in Ukrainian embroidered shirts with her most famous quotes. - October 7, 2026 - Новости Израиля

Ukraine to Israel on October 7: “We stand together in memory and pain” - October 7, 2026 - Новости Израиля

In Tel Aviv, ‘Theater Therapy’ will take place: how Ukrainian theater sought freedom after decades of bans – October 8, 2026 - October 6, 2026 - Новости Израиля

On the night of September 24, 2026, Russian strikes on Ukraine resulted in at least eight deaths and more than twenty injuries. Not only Kyiv and major cities were hit. In the Kharkiv region, a missile hit a farm where people were working at the time; in the Odesa region, a hospital, an educational institution, residential buildings, and a shopping center were damaged.

In Kyiv, after a combined attack, two deaths and eight injuries were confirmed. A maternity hospital was damaged — no patients or staff were injured — nine private houses, two post offices, more than 30 cars, and office buildings were damaged. The consequences were recorded in four districts of the capital.

In the village of Stara Hnylytsia, Kharkiv region, a Russian strike hit a farm. According to updated data, six workers — two men and four women were killed, and another 12 people were injured. All the victims worked at the same enterprise. Later, local authorities clarified that the missile hit a vegetable storage where people were present at the time.

In the Odesa region, two more people were injured. A hospital, a gymnasium, residential buildings, warehouse facilities, and a shopping center, which had already been attacked by Russia before, were hit. The roof of the city hospital department and food warehouses were damaged, windows in the school and residential buildings were broken, and cars were damaged.

This is how the beginning of September 24 looks even before discussing the number of drones launched and types of missiles. Maternity hospital, farm, hospital, school, residential buildings, cars. Ukrainian authorities call such strikes a continuation of attacks on civilian infrastructure; the circumstances of each hit are separately documented by the police and the prosecutor’s office.

Author — Elena Gunko, NANews. Author’s page.

282 drones plus ballistic and ‘Zircons’

Now the scale of the entire attack.

It began in the evening of September 23, around 18:00, and continued into the morning of September 24. According to the Ukrainian Air Force, Russia used 282 drones of various types, along with them — ‘Zircon’ anti-ship missiles, ‘Iskander-M’/KN-23 ballistic missiles, S-400 missiles in strike application, and ‘Banderol’ and ‘Dany-T’ type munitions.

The main directions of the strike were named as Kyiv and Odesa regions.

By 08:00, the Ukrainian side reported 227 destroyed or suppressed air targets: 219 UAVs, four ‘Zircons’, three ballistic missiles, and one ‘Banderol’/’Dany-T’ munition. Hits were recorded in 13 locations, and debris from intercepted targets fell in ten other locations. The attack was not over at that time — some drones were still in the air.

And then the map began to spread westward.

After the night ballistic strikes, groups of drones moved through the central regions of Ukraine towards Khmelnytskyi, Rivne, Ternopil, and Volyn regions. Explosions were reported in Khmelnytskyi, in Vinnytsia, near Kremenets, in Rivne, and Lutsk. In Khmelnytskyi, a drone hit a multi-story building, damaging apartments, balconies, and cars.

So the morning did not mark the end of the night attack. The air raid alert simply shifted further westward.

Kyiv: missiles arrived during Zelensky’s meeting with American congressmen

There is a coincidence in this night that seems almost too obvious, although nothing needs to be inferred here.

When the ballistic strike on Kyiv began, Volodymyr Zelensky was in New York meeting with members of the US House of Representatives. And he was discussing sanction pressure on Russia and Ukraine’s protection against ballistic missiles with them.

This is not a journalistic reconstruction. The time of the strike was directly reported by the Office of the President of Ukraine.

The conversation involved American congressmen Brian Fitzpatrick, Mike Quigley, Marcy Kaptur, Jared Golden, Joe Wilson, and Gregory Meeks. After the attack began, Zelensky again spoke to the Americans about the need for additional missile interceptors.

Does the coincidence of timing prove that Russia specifically scheduled the launches for this meeting? No. There is no such data, and attributing such a plan to Moscow would already be an assumption.

But the sequence itself is quite harsh. In New York, they discuss where Ukraine can get additional means against ballistics. At the same time, ballistic missiles fly to Kyiv.

And this is already the second heavy strike on the capital in a row

Kyiv did not have time to recover from the previous attack.

September 23, a day before the current strike, two people also died in the capital. By evening, the number of injured had risen to 43 people, more than twenty were in hospitals.

Now — another two dead and eight injured.

In the Podil district, a maternity hospital was damaged. Cars caught fire in the parking lot near the medical facility, where one of the deceased was found. The diagnostic center located nearby was also damaged.

In the Dniprovskyi district, a private house was destroyed, neighboring buildings were damaged. In the Solomianskyi district, warehouses were partially destroyed, and the fire spread to the basement premises. In the Darnytskyi district, missile debris fell on the roadway.

And already against this background, the second half of the current story begins — diplomatic.

Because in New York, they are now trying to talk about stopping the strikes

September 22, Zelensky met with US President Donald Trump during the UN General Assembly. They discussed possible steps for de-escalation and how Ukraine will get through the upcoming winter.

One of the options is quite narrow. Not trying to solve the entire war with one agreement, but first stopping at least part of the strikes.

Primarily on energy.

The scheme looks roughly like this: Ukraine stops strikes on agreed Russian oil refining and energy facilities if Russia, on its part, stops strikes on Ukrainian power plants, networks, and other energy infrastructure.

NANews detailed this option back on September 11 in the article ‘Trump’s Plan B: Energy, Black Sea and a Chance for a Winter Break’. At that time, it looked more like American intelligence of possibilities. Now the conversation has become more specific.

And here it is easy to make a mistake in words. Energy truce is not peace and not even necessarily a ceasefire across the entire front. Soldiers do not disappear, territorial disputes remain, regular combat operations may continue.

Just one piece of the war is being temporarily removed.

The next piece is the Black Sea and grain

In New York, Zelensky also met with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The conversation again returned to the sea: shipping safety, Ukrainian ports, grain export.

This direction for Israel is no longer theoretical.

Ukrainian ships leave the Odesa region into the Black Sea, pass the Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmara, and the Dardanelles — and end up in the Mediterranean Sea. In September, Ukrainian wheat reappeared among shipments on the Israeli route.

We detailed this route in the article ‘Ukrainian Wheat is Going to Israel Again: Export Accelerated Almost Twice Under Russian Port Blockade’. The specific volume of September shipments to Israel was not disclosed, but the Israeli direction is present in the documents.

Therefore, damaged warehouses and infrastructure in the Odesa region are not just a local Ukrainian story.

For Israel, the distance from Odesa to the Mediterranean Sea ends quite quickly: the Bosphorus — and then already the very maritime market on which Israel heavily depends.

Russia, meanwhile, does not close the negotiation channel

This is where it gets strange.

On the night of September 24, missiles and hundreds of drones fly. People die on a farm, a maternity hospital is damaged, objects in the Odesa region are burning.

And almost simultaneously, Russian representative Kirill Dmitriev heads to New York for negotiations with Steve Witkoff, Jared Kushner, and other representatives of the Trump administration.

The meetings are supposed to concern Ukraine, energy, Russian-American relations, and further diplomacy.

So Moscow does not break the American channel. On the contrary, it continues to work even against the backdrop of another major air attack.

For readers of NANews — News of Israel | Nikk.Agency, there is a familiar thing from the Middle East: negotiations and hostilities can quite coexist. The mere fact of a meeting of intermediaries does not yet mean that the parties have already agreed to reduce the intensity of the war.

And the names of the intermediaries are well known to Israel. Steve Witkoff worked for Trump on the Middle East direction, Jared Kushner was one of the architects of Trump’s first-term diplomacy and the Abraham Accords. Now the same American link is involved in the Russian-Ukrainian direction.

Israel joined the call for a ceasefire a few hours before the attack

There is another direct Israeli episode.

September 23, before the night attack, a group of states at the UN made a joint statement in support of Ukraine and called on Russia to agree to a complete, immediate, and unconditional ceasefire.

Israel participated in this initiative.

NANews already separately analyzed the document in the article ‘More than 51 Countries at the UN, Including Israel, Called on Russia to Agree to a Ceasefire’. There is also an important legal reservation: the collective statement of states is a political position, not a UN Security Council resolution and not a legally enforced ceasefire.

The document concerns not only the cessation of hostilities itself. It includes the return of deported Ukrainians and children, prisoner exchange, and Black Sea security.

The last point for Israel is again quite practical.

If Ukrainian ports operate worse, if ships are forced to change routes, if insurance becomes more expensive — the consequences gradually reach the Eastern Mediterranean.

What weapons might be unclear to the Israeli reader

For a person in Israel, the word Shahed no longer requires a long explanation. But 282 Russian UAVs this night — these are not 282 identical Iranian drones.

In one attack, Russian-made strike Shaheds, ‘Gerberas’, decoys, devices of other types, and new jet versions can be used. Some are launched specifically to overload air defense: radars, mobile groups, and anti-aircraft systems must simultaneously track many targets, not all of which carry the same combat charge.

Reuters separately noted that the appearance of faster jet drones complicates the work of Ukrainian air defense. They are faster than the usual propeller-driven Shaheds, which means there is less time for detection and interception.

With ballistics, there is another problem.

‘Iskander-M’ and North Korean KN-23 fly along a ballistic trajectory at very high speed. That is why Ukraine constantly requests additional Patriot systems and interceptor missiles for them.

The S-400 is more familiar to the Israeli reader as a Russian air defense system. But missiles of this family are also used by Russia against ground targets.

And ‘Zircon’ was primarily created as high-speed anti-ship weaponry. Russia has already used such missiles for strikes on Ukrainian territory.

Hence the complexity of the combined attack: slow drones, fast jet UAVs, decoys, ballistics, and missiles of other types appear almost in one time window. For the air defense system, these are completely different tasks.

And yet negotiations continue

After everything that happened this night, it is easy to write that diplomacy is over.

But that is not true yet.

The American negotiation channel is active. Dmitriev is going to talk with Witkoff and Kushner. Ukraine confirms its readiness to discuss energy restrictions and the sea. The US is trying to understand if the conversation can at least be translated into a technical format.

Even a future trilateral meeting of Zelensky, Trump, and Putin was discussed. Among the possible venues, the December G20 summit in Miami was mentioned, but as of September 24, such a meeting has not been scheduled. There is an idea — there is no agreement on the meeting yet.

And therefore, the night of September 24 does not prove that negotiations are disrupted.

It shows something else.

There remains a huge distance between the very fact of negotiations and the real reduction of the war.

What remains after this night

Eight dead in just three episodes that started this morning. Two — in Kyiv. Six — on the farm in Stara Hnylytsia. More than twenty injured. Damaged maternity hospital, nine private houses, post offices, hospital, school, shopping center, warehouses.

And simultaneously — New York, the UN, negotiators, talks about an energy truce and a safe Black Sea.

Perhaps this is now the most accurate picture of the process.

Diplomacy exists. But so far, it has not stopped anything.

Its results will need to be checked not by the number of meetings and statements, but by much simpler things: will missiles stop flying at energy, will strikes on ports cease, will civilian ships be able to pass through the Black Sea, and will at least one regime appear that both sides will truly observe.

As of the morning of September 24, 2026, such a regime does not exist.

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An exhibition about Golda Meir was held at the Kyiv Art Gallery, including images of Golda in Ukrainian embroidered shirts with her most famous quotes. - October 7, 2026 - Новости Израиля

Ukraine to Israel on October 7: “We stand together in memory and pain” - October 7, 2026 - Новости Израиля

In Tel Aviv, ‘Theater Therapy’ will take place: how Ukrainian theater sought freedom after decades of bans – October 8, 2026 - October 6, 2026 - Новости Израиля

On September 23, 2026, in New York, on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, the Peace Council presented the first detailed program for the recovery of the Gaza sector. It is designed for six months after the actual launch, includes 66 projects, and is estimated at approximately $2.45 billion. But a caveat is immediately needed here: the money has not yet been fully collected, the start date of the program has not been determined, and the construction itself is tied to an issue that Israel and mediators have not yet resolved — how exactly the disarmament of Hamas should take place.

Initial reports claimed that the recovery should begin in 2027. This is not in the published document of the Peace Council. It states otherwise: programs are ready to launch “as soon as funding and access allow”, and the six-month period is counted from the moment the executors enter Gaza. Tony Blair, involved in the leadership of the Council, indeed spoke about the transition from preparation to implementation “within the next year,” but he did not name a fixed start date.

The material was prepared by the author of NANews Lev Varshavsky. The basis for the analysis was the official 6-Month Gaza Recovery Program, reports from Israeli media, and Israeli data on the future Palestinian police.

This is not a plan to restore the entire Gaza for $2.45 billion

Here, the numbers are easy to confuse. The Peace Council estimates the direct physical damage in Gaza at approximately $35.2 billion, and the total cost of recovery and reconstruction over the next decade at approximately $71.4 billion. The current $2.45 billion is only the first package, designed to launch basic services, temporary housing, infrastructure, new administration, and security system.

The six blocks of the program look like this: about $1.205 billion is allocated for infrastructure, $303 million for humanitarian and social recovery, approximately $35 million for economic launch, $17 million for digitalization, about $10 million for legal system recovery, and at least $885 million for security and new power infrastructure. The last figure explains a lot: almost every third dollar of the starting budget is related not to concrete and hospitals, but to the question of who will control Gaza after Hamas.

$400 million for temporary housing, $275 million for debris and ammunition

The largest civilian item is approximately $400 million for temporary housing. This primarily refers to insulated residential modules for people who are still in tents. Another $275 million is planned to be spent on dismantling, sorting, and recycling debris, simultaneously clearing the area of unexploded ordnance.

About $100 million is allocated for transport, $78 million for the repair of partially damaged houses. The restoration of five more hospitals is estimated at $67 million, a separate program for the repair and equipment of medical institutions at another $50 million. About $35 million is allocated for generators and fuel, $30 million for roads, and $20 million for emergency water supply and sewage restoration. The official document of the Council claims that more than 85% of the road network in the sector is damaged.

There are also smaller but quite indicative projects: desalination plants, solar panels, restoration of the fishing port, border crossings, land cadastre, warehouse center, and power grids. The UAE separately proposes to build a pilot residential area for approximately 50 thousand people currently in tents.

The media write about another scale of the housing problem. One of the projects should provide mobile housing for approximately 400 thousand residents, while more than a million people are still estimated to live in tents or other temporary structures. Turkey promised about 70 thousand mobile homes, and another 5 thousand homes provided by Egypt and Qatar remain on the Egyptian side of the border due to the lack of Israeli permission for their import.

So even a six-month program, if fully implemented, does not close the housing issue.

The money is promised. But a promise and the transfer of money are not the same

The Peace Council does not yet have all the $2.45 billion specified in the program. At the February donor meeting, about a dozen countries promised approximately $17 billion, but by September 23, about $280 million had actually been transferred. Nikolay Mladenov explains the difference by saying that the Council requests money gradually, as specific programs are ready to launch.

The official document itself has a rather practical wording: states and other partners can finance a separate project, an entire block, or provide equipment and property instead of money. In other words, we are not looking at a $2.45 billion check lying on the table, but a catalog of already calculated projects for which funding still needs to be collected and physical access obtained.

This is where NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency separates the presentation from what is happening on the ground: 66 budget lines already exist, but the very possibility of fulfilling them depends not so much on excavators and cement, but on the arrangement of power and security in Gaza.

Blair says: Hamas agreed. Israel sees the situation as more complex

The most politically sensitive part of the presentation came from Tony Blair.

He stated that under the cities of Gaza there remain kilometers of tunnels, weapons depots, and weapons production facilities, and that the new civilian administration will not be able to manage the sector until this system is destroyed. Then Blair said: Hamas agreed to this, and the implementation should proceed step by step.

But the wording “Hamas agreed to lay down arms” without continuation would be too simple.

On July 30, the movement agreed to the demilitarization roadmap proposed by the Peace Council. However, implementation stalled due to a dispute over the sequence of actions. The Council’s scheme involves gradual disarmament and inspection of individual areas in parallel with the phased withdrawal of the IDF. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu demands a different sequence: first, complete and verifiable disarmament of Hamas, then further changes in the deployment of Israeli troops.

NANews thoroughly analyzed this conflict around the 15-point roadmap: the dispute is no longer so much about the ultimate goal — a demilitarized Gaza — but about who takes the first irreversible step.

Later Jared Kushner discussed the same scheme directly with Hamas representatives in Cairo. The American side is trying to link disarmament, the transfer of power to a technocratic administration, the advancement of international forces, and the phased change in the deployment of the IDF into one verifiable process.

$20 million even provided for voluntary surrender of weapons

In the published budget, a separate line is Decommissioning Program — about $20 million. This is a program to encourage the voluntary surrender of weapons and ammunition with their subsequent destruction or safe disposal.

Simultaneously, about $15 million is planned to be used for the physical elimination and filling of tunnels under objects necessary for the first recovery projects. This does not yet mean that the entire underground complex of Hamas can be neutralized for such an amount: the program relates to sites that will be needed directly for the launch of the first wave of construction.

In the May report of the Peace Council to the UN Security Council, it was mentioned about 350 kilometers of tunnels that will need to be neutralized, and about 70 million tons of debris, part of which contains unexploded ordnance. The same report estimated that about 85% of the buildings and infrastructure in the sector were damaged or destroyed.

This also explains the figure “70% of Gaza is destroyed” appearing in publications. Blair himself used a similar estimate during the current presentation, but such an indicator is not specified in the official two-page document of the Peace Council. Other metrics are used there — $35.2 billion in physical damage and more than 85% of the damaged road network. Therefore, turning “70%” into an official statistical estimate of the entire document would be incorrect.

International forces: first 500, then thousands

The commander of the International Stabilization Forces, American General Jasper Jeffers, presented a five-stage demilitarization scheme.

The initial group should consist of about 500 military personnel from Morocco and Kosovo. Further, it is planned to join military personnel from Albania, Kazakhstan, and other countries. A broader initial structure, which Israeli sources reported earlier, provides for about 2,500 military personnel, and a permanent facility in the Rafah area is already being designed with the possibility of accommodating up to 5,000 ISF personnel.

About $140 million is allocated for the mobilization, training, and equipping of the ISF in the six-month plan, and another approximately $275 million for permanent infrastructure in Rafah. The overall Peace & Security block exceeds $885 million.

Jeffers’ logic is movement district by district. Weapons and tunnels are neutralized, international structures verify the result, the new Palestinian administration enters the territory, and after confirmed demilitarization, the next stage of IDF withdrawal should occur. It is this last link that causes the main objections of the current Israeli government.

220 thousand applications to the new police — Israel approved about 16 thousand

The Peace Council is simultaneously trying to create a Palestinian police force that should be responsible for internal civil security instead of Hamas.

According to published Israeli data, approximately 220 thousand applications were received. Israel checked the candidates and preliminarily approved about 16 thousand people, who were deemed not connected with Hamas. The final police strength is expected to be at the level of 10–12 thousand officers. Training is planned to be conducted in Egypt.

But here again, the same political deadlock appears. The media report that Israel has not yet allowed some of the already verified candidates to leave Gaza for training in Egypt. About $120 million is allocated in the six-month program for the mobilization and initial training of the police.

So the future police already exist in the budget, there is a huge base of candidates, and an Israeli check has been conducted. But the structure itself is not yet functioning in the form in which it should replace the armed power of Hamas.

Who should manage Gaza at all

Civil administration is supposed to be transferred to the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza — NCAG, a Palestinian technocratic structure operating within the Peace Council system.

The head of the committee, Ali Shaat, described the future model with the formula: “one authority, one law, one weapon”. The committee plans to audit the existing administration, personnel, finances, property, and public services, and even before the full entry of NCAG into management, five urgent directions are planned: garbage removal, winter preparation, water and sewage restoration, medical evacuations, and temporary housing.

Blair simultaneously touched on a much more distant political perspective. According to him, the issue of Palestinian statehood is not being resolved now, but the possibility of such development should remain open, provided Israel’s security is ensured. This is Blair’s position and the architects of the current international mechanism, not the agreed position of the Israeli government.

4G, digital ID, Gaza Tech Park — and even Palestinian Airlines

Some of the 66 points are more like an attempt to immediately build a new economic system rather than emergency aid.

The plan provides for the restoration of 4G, digital identification of residents, an electronic healthcare system, digital payments, cloud storage of government data, e-learning, small business grants, a regional production park, and Gaza Tech Park. It is also proposed to create a special fund to attract private investment.

There is even a point of about $1 million to preserve the license and the last plane of Palestinian Airlines to ensure pilgrimage flights to Mecca.

The idea of turning Gaza into an open tax-free economic zone is indeed being discussed by the Peace Council. It was mentioned even during the presentation of the overall model in February: it was proposed to reduce corruption and intermediary costs, transition to transparent digital payments and trade. But in the current official list of 66 six-month programs, there is no separate project “tax-free Gaza.” Therefore, this is still a concept of the future economic structure, not an approved line of the current budget.

Ukrainian perspective: $2.45 billion clearly shows the difference between damage, need, and real money

For Ukraine, there is no direct political connection here, and comparing the wars themselves would be incorrect. But the recovery mechanism provides a rather illustrative example of why the figures “cost of destruction,” “cost of recovery,” “promised aid,” and “money actually reaching projects” cannot be mixed.

According to the latest joint assessment by the Ukrainian government, the World Bank, the EU, and the UN, Ukraine’s recovery needs for a decade are estimated at almost $588 billion, while the direct physical damage by the end of 2025 was about $195 billion. Separately, almost $28 billion is required for debris clearance and the elimination of explosive items.

In Gaza, the scale is different, but the financial logic is similar: there is an assessment of damage, there is a ten-year cost of recovery, there is a first set of projects, there are donor promises — and there is a completely different amount that is actually available today.

That is why the phrase “$2.45 billion was allocated for the recovery of Gaza” would be incorrect.

Explanation for Israeli readers: who is who

Peace Council, Board of Peace — an international mechanism created within the framework of US President Donald Trump’s plan, also receiving a UN Security Council mandate for transitional management and recovery of Gaza. It does not replace the Israeli government and is not a UN subdivision.

NCAG — a Palestinian technocratic committee, which is supposed to gradually take over the civil administration of Gaza. It should work without Hamas and gain control over public services, budget, border crossings, and civil police.

ISF — International Stabilization Force. Their task is to ensure a transitional security regime, participate in demilitarization, support the new police, and be located between territories transferred to the new administration and Israeli forces.

Demilitarization in the Council’s documents is not just the transfer of rifles. It includes the weapons of armed groups, depots, production of rockets and ammunition, as well as the neutralization of tunnel infrastructure.

What happens next

There is now a fairly detailed scheme of what to build, how much it approximately costs, and who should manage Gaza. There is no other — agreed mechanism that would allow transitioning from the scheme to construction.

If Hamas begins verifiable disarmament, and Israel and the Peace Council agree on the order of further IDF actions, international forces and NCAG can move district by district. Then the first humanitarian and infrastructure programs can start without waiting for the full ten-year reconstruction.

If the dispute over the sequence remains, 66 projects may continue to exist for a long time as ready budget lines.

And this is perhaps the main result of the presentation on September 23: the problem of Gaza’s recovery is no longer in the absence of a blueprint. The blueprint has appeared — down to the number of buses, mobile homes, police officers, solar panels, and servers.

But it is built around one condition that currently exists mainly on paper: post-war Gaza must remain without an independent armed structure of Hamas, and the new authority must gain a real monopoly on weapons and governance. As long as Israel, Hamas, and the Peace Council understand the order of reaching this point differently, $2.45 billion remains the cost of a prepared program, not a started reconstruction.

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Ukrainian cities will join the memorial event for the victims of the October 7, 2023 attack — RUN 7.10. The All-Ukrainian Association of Maccabi Organizations announced runs and walking routes in various cities of Ukraine and opened registration for everyone interested. The organizers’ wording here says more than a usual sports announcement: “We run and walk together with Israel”.

This is not a competition for seconds, places, and medals. “Maccabi-Ukraine” calls RUN 7.10 a decentralized and completely voluntary civil memory project, aimed at creating a shared moment of memory, unity, and hope through movement. The material for NANews was prepared by Stas Shifer, and this story has an Israeli part, without which the very name RUN 7.10 can be understood too literally — just as the date of another event.

RUN 7.10 is already being prepared in Israel itself

In Israel, on October 7, 2026, there is an initiative with almost the same name — רצים 7.10, “Running 7.10”. The idea is not built around a single central start: in different parts of the country, people gather in local groups to remember the deceased, walk or run the route, and do it simultaneously with others.

This format does not have the usual structure of a large commercial race with timing and competition for results. The distance has symbolic significance — 7.10 kilometers, meaning the date itself, October 7, is turned into a route.

The Ukrainian announcement is built very similarly: the same decentralized principle, voluntary participation, and almost literal connection of memory, unity, and hope. At the same time, there is no confirmation in open sources that the Ukrainian RUN 7.10 is formally a subdivision or official continuation of a specific Israeli organizational team. Therefore, merging the two initiatives into one project would be incorrect. But the cultural and symbolic connection is obvious here, especially since “Maccabi-Ukraine” itself writes: “We run and walk together with Israel”.

Why exactly 7.10 kilometers

For Israel, the distance of 7.10 km did not appear yesterday. After the attack by Hamas and other armed groups on October 7, 2023, running communities began dedicating this distance to the deceased, hostages, and affected settlements in the south of the country.

One of the formats involved runs specifically through kibbutzim, moshavim, and cities that were attacked. People ran 7.10 kilometers not so much as a sports distance but as a memorial route. The date ceased to be just a calendar entry and gained a physical dimension: seven kilometers and one hundred meters that a person covers themselves.

Therefore, 7.10 in the name of the current Ukrainian event is not just a beautiful number next to the word RUN. In Israeli practice in recent years, it has already become a separate symbol of memory.

From the Maccabiah in Israel to RUN 7.10 in Ukraine

There is another line, without which the current announcement looks much narrower than it is. Just a few months ago, the Ukrainian team participated in the XXII World Maccabiah in Israel.

Ukraine was represented by 50 athletes from 11 cities, competing in 13 sports. The delegation included participants from Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odesa, Dnipro, Vinnytsia, Zaporizhzhia, Mykolaiv, Poltava, Chernivtsi, Lviv, and Khmelnytskyi.

NANews has already reported on the “Maccabi-Ukraine” delegation at the XXII World Maccabiah and the participation of Ukrainian athletes in Israeli competitions.

It turns out to be a fairly short time chain. In the summer, Ukrainian athletes come to Israel for the main international event of the Maccabi movement, and in September, the same Ukrainian organization announces a memorial event on October 7 within the country.

And for NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency, this connection makes the story more than just a sports announcement: here, the connection between Ukraine and Israel is manifested not through another diplomatic protocol, but through a public organization and people who are simply invited to go out, walk or run the route.

What is “Maccabi-Ukraine”

“Maccabi-Ukraine” is the Ukrainian part of the large international Jewish sports movement Maccabi. The All-Ukrainian Association of Maccabi Organizations has been officially operating in Ukraine since the 1990s, but the history of Jewish sports societies “Maccabi” on the territory of present-day Ukraine is much older.

Such organizations existed as early as the beginning of the 20th century, including in Odesa and Bukovina. The modern international movement unites sports and public structures in dozens of countries, and the World Maccabiah in Israel remains its largest event.

After October 7, the memory of the deceased and affected became a separate part of the work of the global movement. Therefore, the Ukrainian initiative is in a context understandable for “Maccabi”: sports are used not instead of memory, but as one of the ways to preserve it.

What happened on October 7

On the morning of October 7, 2023, Hamas and other armed formations from the Gaza Strip attacked southern Israel. Militants infiltrated Israeli settlements, military bases, and the territory of the Nova music festival.

As a result of the attack, about 1,200 people were killed, and 251 people were captured and taken to the Gaza Strip. For Israel, October 7 became not only the beginning of the ensuing war but also a separate national trauma, around which memorials, archives of testimonies, public ceremonies, sports events, and local memory initiatives appeared in subsequent years.

Therefore, for the Israeli reader, the phrase RUN 7.10 is perceived somewhat differently than just the name of a race. The numbers here already carry their own meaning.

Explanation for Israeli readers

The Ukrainian RUN 7.10 is not a state day of remembrance in Ukraine and does not replace official Israeli ceremonies. It is a public initiative of “Maccabi-Ukraine”, which invites people in different Ukrainian cities to simultaneously join the memorial action.

At the same time, the organizers appeal not only to members of Jewish communities and not only to athletes. The original announcement mentions everyone interested, and the format itself provides the opportunity not only to run but also to walk.

This is significant: a person does not need a sports rank, club affiliation, or participation in a Jewish organization. The meaning is in the very presence.

At the time of publication, the full list of Ukrainian cities, starting points, and local schedules have not yet been listed in the public announcement. Those wishing to join are invited by the organizers to fill out the RUN 7.10 registration form.

Ukraine and Israel — one date, different cities

On October 7, people in Israel will once again take to the memorial routes. Now a similar gesture is being prepared in Ukraine — a country that itself lives within a great war, with casualties, destroyed cities, air raids, and its own experience of loss.

There is no need to compare the two wars here, and the organizers do not do so. The meaning of RUN 7.10 is much simpler: on a day that for Israel is associated with killings, abductions, and destroyed families, there will also be people in Ukrainian cities who will take to the streets.

And the formula “Maccabi-Ukraine” in this case explains the event better than any long slogan: “We run and walk together with Israel”.

…
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On Thursday, September 24, at 18:00, at the Ukrainian Cultural Center in Tel Aviv, the Ukrainian-Jewish youth community PROSTIR will unusually open the new season: participants will build a sukkah themselves, decorate it, prepare treats, and then hold a festive l’chaim in the finished hut. The organizers named the meeting “Sukkah Party and Opening of the PROSTIR Season”.

Author: Victoria Katsman

The event is called “Sukkah Party and Opening of the PROSTIR Season” and will take place at Yirmeyahu St 22, Tel Aviv-Yafo. Participation costs 50 shekels, pre-registration is mandatory.

The organizers warn: registration continues until September 23 or until all spots are filled. So those planning to attend should not delay registration any longer.

First build — then celebrate

This will not be an ordinary party where guests arrive at a set table. PROSTIR decided to link the opening of the season with the upcoming Sukkot and make the process of building the sukkah part of the meeting.

At the beginning, participants will get to know each other and the renewed community team, talk about the meanings of the holiday. After that, they will build the first PROSTIR community sukkah in Israel, decorate it, and prepare snacks together.

In the built hut, there will be a festive treat and l’chaim. Then — music, dancing, and informal communication.

This format was chosen here for a reason. Sukkot is associated with ideas of hospitality, a temporary common home, and being together. The organizers of PROSTIR formulated it even more simply: if you are opening a new season of the community, why not literally build the space where this community will gather first.

What is PROSTIR and what does Ukraine have to do with it

PROSTIR is a Ukrainian-speaking Jewish youth community in Israel for people approximately 18 to 40 years old. The Ukrainian word простір translates to “space”.

The project brings together people who want to maintain a connection with Ukrainian culture, learn more about Jewish tradition, and find their place in Israeli life.

The community has been active since the fall of 2024. More about how it appeared, who joins it, and why a separate Ukrainian-speaking space was needed in Israel, was told by NAnovosti in an interview with the founder of PROSTIR Olga Brodskaya.

The project remains volunteer-based. The organizers emphasize that its events are non-commercial, and the main goal is to create an environment where Ukrainian, Jewish, and Israeli parts of identity do not have to be opposed to each other.

NAnovosti — News of Israel | Nikk.Agency has already reported on such initiatives of the Ukrainian community in Israel: the Ukrainian Cultural Center in Tel Aviv, where the current meeting will take place, has turned into a permanent venue for exhibitions, lectures, public meetings, and events of the Ukrainian community over the past years.

In August, for example, a large “Zdibanka Nezalezhnih” for the 35th anniversary of Ukraine’s independence was held here. Now the same venue will host the opening of the new PROSTIR season.

Newcomers are also welcome

The organizers specifically address people who have not attended PROSTIR meetings before.

You can come alone. A significant part of the program is specifically built around joint work in small teams: some are involved in construction, some in decoration, some in preparing treats.

According to the organizers’ plan, acquaintance should therefore occur not at an awkward moment near the table when everyone has already broken into groups, but directly during the joint work.

As promised by PROSTIR, even a person who comes completely alone will quickly find themselves inside a small team.

Why they are building a sukkah

For those who have recently moved to Israel or have not yet encountered this tradition: sukkah — סוכה — is a temporary hut built for the Jewish holiday of Sukkot.

In Israel, such structures appear literally everywhere before the holiday — near houses, on balconies, in yards, at restaurants, public centers, and synagogues. It is customary to eat, host guests, and spend time in the sukkah during the holiday days.

In 2026, Sukkot begins on the evening of Friday, September 25, and the first festive day falls on September 26. Therefore, the PROSTIR meeting will take place the day before the holiday begins.

For the community, there is also a second meaning here. PROSTIR is building its own sukkah for the first time, and the project itself is built around people who, in a certain sense, continue to build a new home for themselves — already in Israel.

Without unnecessary pathos, this parallel is self-evident.

Where, when, and how much it costs

Date: Thursday, September 24, 2026
Start: 18:00
Place: Ukrainian Cultural Center
Address: Yirmeyahu St 22, Tel Aviv-Yafo
Participation cost: 50 shekels
Community age: approximately 18–40 years

To participate, you need to fill out the registration form.

After filling out the form, a payment link appears on the screen. The organizers also provided a separate link for the payment of 50 shekels.

After registration closes, participants are promised to receive a final confirmation and reminder with details via email.

If there are problems with registration, you can contact the organizers by phone at 055-976-3069.

Participants are also asked to familiarize themselves in advance with the PROSTIR Code of Conduct and Safe Space. Adherence to these rules is a condition for participating in community events.

What an Israeli reader needs to understand

PROSTIR is not a political organization or another official Ukrainian center. It is a youth community that tries to connect three environments — Ukrainian, Jewish, and Israeli.

Sukkah — סוכה — a temporary hut built specifically for Sukkot.

L’chaim — לחיים — a traditional Jewish wish and toast, literally “to life”.

And the Ukrainian Cultural Center at Yirmeyahu 22 is already an active public and cultural venue in Tel Aviv, not a space rented just for this party.

Therefore, the name “Sukkah Party” quite accurately describes what is happening. On September 24, guests are invited not to look at a ready-made sukkah, but to come, get acquainted, build it together, and only after that celebrate the beginning of the new season under the roof they just made with their own hands.

To participate, you need to fill out the registration form

…
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From September 3 to 10, 2026, an international youth music exchange took place in Berlin, where teenagers from four cities and four countries met simultaneously: Rivne in Ukraine, Ashkelon in Israel, Kołobrzeg in Poland, and Berlin’s Pankow. The Ukrainian side reported on the trip on September 20, after the delegation had returned home. The German administration of Pankow announced the project on August 28 and detailed the program for the entire week.

Author: Victoria Katsman

For the Israeli reader, there is a detail that is easy to miss in the Ukrainian news: it was not just a foreign trip for students from Rivne. Israel was represented by the Ashkelon Municipal Conservatory, and the exchange is a continuation of a project in which the youth of Ashkelon and Rivne first met simultaneously in Berlin back in September 2024. In 2026, Polish Kołobrzeg joined them.

Who came from Ukraine

Rivne was represented by teachers and high school students from the city’s children’s music school No. 2. The Ukrainian delegation brought two folk ensembles.

The folk music ensemble “Perepilonka” included Mykola Holubenko, Nazariy Zhitkovsky, Roman Lesko, Oleksiy Polyukhovych, and Orest Pastushenko. The ensemble’s leader is Svitlana Pekarska. In the exemplary folk ensemble “Ulyanochka”, Eva Novak, Vladyslava Pekarska, Anastasia Dubrovik, and Inna Plisyuk performed, led by Iryna Tataryn.

The Rivne participants focused on the culture of Polissya, traditional melodies, and works by Ukrainian composers. But the program was not limited to a scheme where each country came, performed its number, and left. Participants rehearsed together, attended master classes, and, according to the Ukrainian side, united in a large international music ensemble with peers from Germany, Poland, and Israel.

This continues a familiar line for NAnews readers, where Ukrainian music becomes a language of contact with the Israeli environment. Recently, we talked about the Kyiv ensemble “Bou Nashir”, whose members perform songs in Hebrew and Yiddish, thus building a completely different but similarly meaningful musical bridge between the two countries. “Kyiv students sing in Yiddish and Hebrew” — NAnews material

What musicians from Ashkelon, Rivne, Poland, and Germany did

The host was the municipal music school Béla Bartók in Pankow. The week included not only music activities. The program featured joint rehearsals and discussions, intercultural evenings, joint cooking, walks, and excursions around Berlin. The German organizers explicitly explained the project’s concept as follows: the city union exists on paper until people from partner cities start meeting in person.

The first public performance took place on September 4 in Einsteinpark. The program was called BÉLA TANZT, and the audience was presented with music from four countries.

The next day, September 5, Rivne musicians participated in the opening of the Pankow museum exhibition “Pankows Partnerstadt Riwne – Persönliche Berichte vom Alltag im Krieg” — “Pankow’s Partner City Rivne: Personal Accounts of Everyday Life During the War.” The exhibition emerged after a trip by Museum Pankow staff to Rivne and specifically told about the life of the Ukrainian city under war conditions.

The main musical event of the week was the “Concert of Friendship” on September 7 in the large hall of the educational and cultural center Peter Edel in Berlin’s Weißensee. On one stage, the Béla Bartók music school, school No. 2 from Rivne, the Ashkelon Municipal Conservatory, and the state music school of Kołobrzeg met. Organizers described the program as an evening of musical traditions from Germany, Ukraine, Israel, and Poland.

What is known about the Israeli side — and what is still unknown

Ashkelon Municipal Conservatory is a specific city institution, not a private group invited by the organizers. According to its official page in Hebrew, the conservatory has existed since 2004 and was established after the merger of two music centers. Today it operates in the Gan Ha-Vradim area as a division of the city’s culture, youth, sports, and leisure company. They teach playing, singing, and performing skills on about 15 types of instruments.

The conservatory has several ensembles. The representative ensemble — הרכב ייצוגי — is led by Yevgeny Razikov and Ella Galfgat; there is a representative choir, keyboard and guitar ensembles, and wind ensembles. The director of the conservatory in Israeli municipal reference data is listed as Gil-Ad Bardo.

But there is a boundary between what is found and what is assumed. In the open project documents, there is no list of Ashkelon children who traveled to Berlin, and no confirmation that Razikov, Galfgat, or Bardo were part of the delegation. Therefore, attributing leadership of this specific trip to them is not possible.

The full concert booklet for September 7 with the titles of the pieces performed by the Israeli side has not yet been found. The German program speaks of music from four countries, the Ukrainian one about joint rehearsals and an international ensemble. This is enough to understand the format but not to speculate on Ashkelon’s repertoire.

These are the details NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency tries to separate from the beautiful overall picture: where organizers provided a specific fact, we use it; where there is a gap in open sources, it remains a gap, not filled with assumptions.

Israel helped finance the project

There is a fact that is almost invisible in the Ukrainian publication. The Pankow administration separately thanked the Israeli Embassy in Berlin, which “again this year” supported the music exchange with a substantial donation. This wording indicates that it is a continuation of support, not a one-time contribution.

The Verband deutscher Musikschulen, the GESOBAU foundation, KulturMarktHalle, and public associations supporting Pankow’s partnerships with Ashkelon, Rivne, and Kołobrzeg also participated in the financing and organization.

Thus, Israel’s presence here was at several levels: children from Ashkelon, a municipal music structure, a long-standing city connection Pankow—Ashkelon, and support from the Israeli diplomatic mission in Germany.

This did not start in 2026

The history of Ashkelon and Pankow is much older than the current concert. The official partnership with the Israeli city appeared on July 7, 1994 and became the first city connection of its kind between a municipality of the former East Germany and an Israeli city. Now the interaction includes youth, sports, culture, and education.

Rivne joined this structure much later. At the end of 2022, Pankow and Rivne formalized a solidarity partnership after the start of the full-scale Russian war, and on July 12, 2024, the relationship received official partner city status.

And it was in September 2024 that the Ukrainian and Israeli lines first crossed within a music project. Youth from Rivne and Pankow then played together in an orchestra, and participants from Ashkelon and Pankow created a joint jazz group. The final concert took place on September 17 at the same Peter Edel. Official photos from Pankow show the mayor of Ashkelon Tomer Glam, the leadership of Rivne, and the head of Pankow Cordelia Koch with the youth ensembles.

After that meeting, participants of the multilateral city seminar separately agreed to expand precisely the musical youth contacts. Two years later, this decision no longer looks like a protocol after a meeting: in 2026, the music exchange took place for the second time and grew to four cities.

There is now even an Ashkelon-Platz in Berlin

The connection between Ashkelon and Pankow is so noticeable that there is now an Ashkelon-Platz in Berlin. Israeli local media described its opening as a symbol of more than 30 years of city partnership and specifically mentioned sports youth exchanges and music meetings.

In May 2026, an information stand was installed on the square, telling about the partnership with the Israeli city. The German administration again emphasized that the relationship covers youth, educational, sports, and cultural projects.

Back in September 2024, the Israeli publication כאן דרום — אשקלון reported on ten young athletes from Ashkelon who went to Pankow for an eight-day exchange. They not only engaged in sports but also discussed anti-Semitism, the Holocaust, and current events with their German peers. The publication noted that such trips are held regularly.

Thus, music did not arise separately from other contacts. It became another channel of the same relationships.

Why this is almost unheard of in Israel itself

There is a strange detail. In openly indexed Hebrew-language materials that could be checked, a separate publication about Ashkelon’s music trip September 3–10, 2026 could not be found. Meanwhile, Israeli local media regularly write about the partnership with Pankow, Ashkelon-Platz, and other youth exchanges.

This does not mean that the municipality or conservatory definitely did not publish anything: a post could remain on Facebook or Instagram and not be indexed by search engines. But as of today, the most detailed confirmed information about Ashkelon’s participation is provided by official German documents, while the Ukrainian side detailed its delegation.

For NAnews, this is precisely the case when a Ukrainian regional news story reveals an almost unnoticed Israeli plot within Israel.

We have already reported on other situations where children and youth from Ukraine and Israel find themselves within one international project. For example, in the spring, Israeli Nahariya represented the country at a youth football tournament in Berlin along with teams from Ukraine and other European countries. “Ukraine and Israel on the same field” — NAnews material

And within Israel itself, Ukrainian cultural infrastructure is becoming increasingly noticeable — from events and exhibitions to the permanently operating Ukrainian Cultural Center in Tel Aviv. What is happening at the Ukrainian Cultural Center in Tel Aviv

Explanation for Israeli readers

Pankow is one of the administrative districts of Berlin. It is the district administration, not the federal government of Germany, that manages the system of city partnerships with Ashkelon, Rivne, and Kołobrzeg.

Rivne is a regional center in western Ukraine. The city is far from the front line, but like other Ukrainian cities, it lives under war conditions, air raids, and Russian strikes. The partnership with Pankow began as a form of solidarity after the Russian invasion and became official in 2024.

Polissya, whose music was represented by the Rivne children, is a historical and ethnographic region of Ukraine, Belarus, and part of Poland with its own musical, song, and folklore tradition.

Peter Edel is a cultural and educational center in Berlin’s Weißensee district. It is here that the youth music exchange concerts took place in both 2024 and 2026.

Ashkelon Municipal Conservatory is a city music school operating since 2004. Its participation means that Israel was represented by an official cultural and educational structure of Ashkelon, not a randomly assembled group of musicians.

What was achieved in the end

If you only look at the message from Rivne, the story looks like a successful foreign trip for two Ukrainian folk ensembles. If you add German and Israeli sources, the picture changes.

We have a project that for the second time brings together children from Ukraine and Israel in one Berlin, not abstract “delegations of two countries,” but specific cities — Rivne and Ashkelon. Their own relations with each other are not yet formalized as a city partnership. The connecting link is Pankow.

In 2024, these were the first parallel music meetings. In 2026, it was already a week-long international program with four cities, rehearsals, concerts, conversations, an exhibition about the war in Ukraine, and support from the Israeli embassy.

And this project does not seem to be ending. The Pankow administration has already stated that it wants to further connect schools, music institutions, and public organizations with its partner cities. Therefore, the meeting in September 2026 looks not like a finale, but another link in a program that gradually turns formal lines on the map — Berlin—Ashkelon, Berlin—Rivne, Berlin—Kołobrzeg — into connections between specific teenagers, teachers, and families.

…
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This article appeared now not because someone suddenly remembered the Israeli strike on Syria nineteen years ago. In September 2026, events occurred almost simultaneously that linked the current war over Iran’s nuclear program with the old, still not fully understood nuclear legacy of Bashar Assad — and with Russia’s “position” in both cases.

On September 1, 2026, the IAEA Board of Governors decided for the first time in about twenty years to once again refer the Iranian nuclear issue to the UN Security Council. The agency pointed to the lack of convincing explanations for uranium found at undeclared sites, access problems following American and Israeli strikes, and uncertainty surrounding part of Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile. Russia and China opposed this course.

Six days later, IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi announced another result — a “historic breakthrough” in Syria. The agency finally confirmed that the site destroyed by Israel in 2007 near Deir ez-Zor was a nearly completed nuclear reactor, Syria was producing its own fuel for it, and the investigation led inspectors to approximately 73 tons of natural metallic uranium. The reactor’s design allowed for the efficient production of fissile material, which could be used in weapons after further processing. However, the IAEA does not claim that Assad had already decided to create an atomic bomb.

On September 9, 2026, the Board of Governors closed the previous case of Syrian non-compliance with safeguards, which had been ongoing since 2011. It was closed not because the suspicions were unfounded: the new Syrian authorities provided information and access that allowed the remaining questions to be resolved and the found material to be physically placed under IAEA control.

And on September 17, 2026, Russia and China already blocked the extension of independent monitoring of restored sanctions against Iran in the UN Security Council. Moscow stated that Western countries were “politicizing” the nuclear issue and that it should be resolved “diplomatically.” All this is happening in the seventh month of the war between the US and Israel with Iran, which began on February 28.

Therefore, the Syrian story suddenly stopped being archival. Fifteen years ago, Moscow was already arguing with international structures over the unresolved nuclear case of its Middle Eastern partner: in 2011, Russia opposed referring the Syrian violation to the Security Council, and in 2014, it attempted to remove the Syrian dossier from the IAEA’s permanent agenda.

Now we know significantly more about what inspectors did not yet know at the time.

And to understand what Russia has to do with it and how appropriate it is to compare Syria with today’s Iran, one must first go through the entire history of Deir ez-Zor — roughly in the sequence in which it was revealed by Israel and the IAEA.

Author — Alexander Khmelnitsky.

At first, Israel only saw signs

Suspicions arose long before the strike. The IDF later disclosed a military intelligence document from 2002: the Syrian Atomic Energy Commission was engaged in secret projects, the purpose of which Israel could not precisely determine at the time. By the end of 2004, Israeli intelligence received information about foreign specialists assisting a certain Syrian nuclear project; in January 2006, a specific suspicion about the construction of a nuclear facility first arose, and by April, intelligence had already identified a suspicious structure.

The facility was not located on the Golan Heights. Al-Kibar was built in eastern Syria, in the Deir ez-Zor area near the Euphrates — deep inside the country. For Israel, the threat was determined not by the distance to the border but by the nature of the structure and what was happening inside.

The turning point came in early March 2007. Mossad obtained photographs taken inside the structure. They showed reactor elements and North Korean representatives. These images became the evidence that was lacking: after them, Israeli intelligence was already writing about the construction of a reactor capable of producing plutonium with the help of North Korea.

How exactly the photographs reached Israel is surrounded by numerous versions. The story of agents infiltrating the computer of the head of the Syrian Atomic Commission became widespread, but Israel officially confirmed primarily the fact of obtaining the images, not all the details of the intelligence operation.

What the Syrians were building and what North Korea had to do with it

A later technical assessment by the IAEA showed: by size, internal configuration, water supply, and other features, the structure corresponded to a gas-cooled reactor with a graphite moderator. The agency received information that the project was being implemented with foreign assistance; American official assessments directly named North Korea.

The similarity with the Yongbyon reactor technology had an understandable reason. A reactor of this type can operate on natural uranium. During operation, plutonium is formed in the fuel, which can then be chemically separated from the irradiated material. The reactor itself does not yet mean a ready bomb: reprocessing, a further technological chain, and a political decision to go for weapons are necessary.

But Syria, as it turned out later, was building not just one building.

And here is a detail that makes the story of Al-Kibar particularly inconvenient for the previous Syrian version: Damascus knew perfectly well how the IAEA system works.

Near Damascus, another Syrian reactor operated for decades — a small Chinese SRR-1/MNSR with a capacity of 30 kW. It was officially declared, regularly inspected, and initially used highly enriched fuel with about 90% U-235 content. The mere presence of such fuel did not turn the facility into a secret weapons program precisely because the material was accounted for and under international safeguards.

Syria had other completely official projects — uranium research, uranium extraction from phosphoric acid, laboratory programs, technical cooperation with the IAEA.

So Al-Kibar was not the result of ignorance of procedures. One reactor the Assad regime declared and showed to inspectors. The other — no.

Israel struck before the launch, and Syria cleared the site

On the night of September 5-6, 2007, Israeli F-15I and F-16I destroyed Al-Kibar. Israel publicly acknowledged the operation only in 2018. According to assessments disclosed by the IDF, construction was rapidly nearing completion, so the decision was made before the reactor’s launch, while the strike did not pose a risk of spreading radioactive materials.

After the attack, the Syrians quickly changed the site. The remains of the structure were removed, the area leveled, and later another building appeared there. When the IAEA began a full investigation, the original facility effectively no longer existed. The agency had to compare satellite images, intelligence data, equipment purchases, and future sample results.

On June 23, 2008, something happened that is often lost in retellings: the Assad regime did indeed allow inspectors directly to Deir ez-Zor. On the site itself, they were given wide access, they inspected the buildings, and took environmental samples. Syria claimed that Israel destroyed an ordinary military facility unrelated to atomic activities.

But Damascus did not provide documents that could confirm this version.

And then came the results of the samples.

The first uranium particles

In samples from Deir ez-Zor, particles of anthropogenic natural uranium were found — that is, natural uranium that had undergone technological processing by humans. Graphite and types of stainless steel compatible, though not exclusively, with nuclear applications were also found.

Syria explained the particles with Israeli munitions. The IAEA checked this version and considered the likelihood of such an origin low; the agency also assessed the likelihood of accidental airborne uranium contamination as low.

After this, inspectors requested documents on construction, pump purchases, graphite and barite, information on the water supply system, and details on where the building debris and equipment were taken. Besides Deir ez-Zor itself, the agency wanted to check three more sites that, according to received information, could be functionally related to the project.

And here the investigation essentially hit a wall.

Syria claimed that these sites were military and non-nuclear. The IAEA responded that military status itself does not exempt a country from its obligations under safeguards and offered a limited access regime that would allow concealing unrelated classified information. But after the 2008 visit, the agency did not receive the full volume of documents, explanations, and access it deemed necessary for years.

This is significant. Inspectors did not “check everything and just not believe Assad.” They found the first physical trace, and then could not verify the entire related chain.

In 2011, Russia appears

By May 2011, the IAEA had pieced together the building’s configuration, cooling system, satellite images, purchases, sample analysis, and information on possible foreign assistance. The agency’s conclusion was harsh: the destroyed facility was very likely a reactor and should have been declared by Syria.

The Board of Governors recognized the violation of the safeguards agreement and decided to report it to the UN Security Council. Russia and China voted against.

At the same time, there is no evidence of Russia’s involvement in the construction of Al-Kibar. There are no published documents allowing one to assert that Moscow knew the full scale of the Syrian program. The confirmed Russian role begins precisely here — in the international “diplomacy” around the already discovered violation.

In September 2014, the story repeated in a more illustrative form. The IAEA was still talking about unresolved issues and demanding Syrian cooperation, while Russia proposed to remove the case of past Syrian nuclear activities from the agenda of future Board of Governors meetings. The initiative did not pass: 17 members voted against it, China and Venezuela supported Moscow.

At that time, no one yet knew the full scale of the fuel infrastructure, the volume of manufactured fuel, and the places of its storage.

And Iran?

Iran was one of Assad’s main regional allies, so its possible role was discussed almost from the moment Al-Kibar was revealed. Versions appeared about financing North Korean assistance, Tehran’s interest in future plutonium, or broader trilateral cooperation.

But here the boundary of the proven is quite clear. The IAEA did not establish that Iran built or financed Al-Kibar or was supposed to receive the material produced there. Therefore, a proven “Iran — Syria — DPRK — Russia” project does not emerge from the available documents.

The roles are different. North Korean technological assistance is much better confirmed. Syria was the host of the undeclared program. Iran was a strategic ally, around whose possible role there were versions. Russia politically opposed strengthening international consideration of the Syrian case.

NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency makes this distinction specifically: today’s relevance of the story does not require turning it into a theory of a general conspiracy.

The investigation revived even under Assad — and after him, it went significantly further

It would be wrong to write that Assad did not allow anyone until the end of his rule, and the new authorities opened everything from the first day. In March 2024, Grossi visited Damascus, after which Syria resumed interaction on the old dossier. During 2024, inspectors gained access to three related sites and took new environmental samples.

In June 2025, the analysis of these samples provided the next physical trace: a significant number of particles of anthropogenic natural uranium were found at one of the sites, some of which corresponded to processes of converting uranium concentrate into uranium oxide. The new Syrian authorities stated that they did not know the origin of the material and allowed a repeat sampling.

By this time, Assad was already in Russia. On December 8, 2024, he reached the Russian airbase Khmeimim, from where he was evacuated to Russia by Moscow’s decision; Putin granted him asylum. This detail later becomes especially noticeable against the backdrop of negotiations by the new Syria about the future of the Khmeimim base itself.

Who informed the IAEA about the 73 tons — and where they were found

On July 17, 2026, the post-Assad Syrian authorities themselves sent a letter to the IAEA. They reported the existence of another site that Syria had never declared before and offered the agency to check the facility and any nuclear material that might be there.

This was not the destroyed reactor in Deir ez-Zor itself and not one of the three sites that the IAEA had been trying to check since 2008. The exact location of the new site is not publicly disclosed. Its previous official designation and coordinates are also not published.

In August, Grossi and inspectors went there. To reach the material, they had to dismantle walls and pass through narrow, hard-to-reach areas. Inside were boxes with nuclear material. Thus, inspectors physically reached approximately 73 tons of natural metallic uranium.

Most of the stock was already in the form of fuel elements. According to a confidential IAEA report, the content of which was retold by the media and profile analysts, it was about 55 tons of metallic uranium in thousands of fuel rods; the rest consisted of scrap and fuel manufacturing waste.

This fundamentally changes the picture. Not bags of ore and not a randomly found piece of metal, but a stock of material related to reactor fuel production.

Open materials do not allow confidently naming the discovered site itself as a fuel manufacturing plant. More correctly — a previously undeclared nuclear material storage. The production infrastructure was restored at other sites.

The IAEA installed cameras and placed the material under safeguards. Grossi formulated the task simply: the agency must know the location of this uranium “to the last gram.”

And meanwhile, they began to dig at Deir ez-Zor itself

On August 29, 2026, inspectors returned to the site of the destroyed reactor. Excavations revealed part of the underground cooling system, and its design corresponded to reactor infrastructure. Simultaneously, the agency was able to clarify the functions of the three sites that had been featured in the investigation for so many years.

One site was related to uranium conversion and/or fuel manufacturing. Another was used for temporary storage of construction materials. The third was associated with the movement and storage of Deir ez-Zor materials, as well as with planned reprocessing.

The picture of “one suspicious building in the desert” finally turned into another: a nearly completed reactor, Syrian fuel manufacturing, related sites, tens of tons of metallic uranium, and plans for further reprocessing.

This is a serious path to obtaining fissile material. But it still does not allow saying that Assad had already ordered the creation of nuclear weapons. Grossi separately emphasizes: the technical configuration can be established, the intention — no.

And only then did they close the old violation

On September 9, the IAEA Board of Governors terminated the previous resolution on Syrian non-compliance with safeguards. This does not mean the completion of all inspections in Syria: the safeguards agreement remains in effect, 73 tons remain under observation, and further verification of materials continues.

But the old sequence is now fully visible.

In 2008, the first uranium particles were found. In 2011, the IAEA recognized the facility as an undeclared reactor — Russia opposed referring the case to the Security Council. In 2014, related sites had not yet been properly checked — Moscow proposed removing the issue from the agenda. In 2024–2025, new samples again led inspectors to processed uranium. In 2026, a huge fuel stock was discovered, and the functions of related infrastructure were restored.

And only after this verification was the previous case indeed closed.

Therefore, today’s Iran is not quite a separate story

The Syrian example does not automatically prove anything about Iran. Fordow, Natanz, and Al-Kibar are different programs, different technical conditions, and different obligations to the IAEA.

But one can compare Moscow’s diplomatic behavior.

In June 2025, Russia voted against the IAEA decision on Iran’s violations. On September 1, 2026, Moscow and Beijing opposed referring the Iranian issue to the Security Council, and on September 17, they blocked the continuation of independent control over compliance with restored sanctions.

This does not prove a unified Russian plan to cover up the nuclear programs of “partners.” But the Syrian story provides a specific criterion: what happens when Moscow considers international pressure excessive before inspectors have received all the answers?

In the Syrian case, the answers years later turned out to be quite material — samples, reactor cooling system, fuel infrastructure, and tens of tons of uranium.

Simultaneously, Syria is revising another legacy of Assad — Russian bases

On August 9, 2026, Damascus and Moscow, after 18 months of negotiations, agreed on a new regime for Tartus and Khmeimim. Civilian infrastructure should come under Syrian control, and military facilities should operate as joint training centers. Russian forces, however, remain.

NANews has already analyzed the change in the status of Tartus and Khmeimim and the consequences of weakening the previous Russian “Syrian lever” for Israel.

On September 7, a Russian convoy of four supply ships arrived at Tartus and Khmeimim. Reuters confirmed the arrival of the ships through satellite data and testimonies; sources mentioned ammunition, although the exact composition was not independently confirmed by the agency.

Here is an almost symbolic detail. Khmeimim is the very Russian base through which Assad left Syria in December 2024 and ended up under Russian asylum. Now Moscow is forced to coordinate the future of this base with the authorities after Assad.

Therefore, one should not look at the name “joint center,” but at the powers: who allows Russian ships to enter, who checks supplies, coordinates flights, determines permissible weapons, and can change the conditions of use of the facility. This will show the real degree of returning Syrian control.

What this means for Israel

For Israel, the 2007 story now stands on a much denser factual basis. Then the decision to strike was made based on intelligence data and the assessment of future risk; today there are IAEA conclusions, physical samples, fuel elements, confirmation of the cooling system, and related infrastructure.

But the exact formula remains this: Israel destroyed a nearly completed undeclared nuclear reactor with serious proliferation potential, not a “ready Syrian atomic bomb.”

Further, Israel needs to look at three things. First — whether the IAEA’s full access to the 73 tons of uranium, material accounting, its safe storage, and control of any movements will be maintained. Second — what will really remain of the Russian military presence and how will incident prevention channels work if the IDF operates over Syria. Third — whether the new Damascus can prevent the restoration of weapon routes from Iran to Hezbollah and other groups threatening Israel.

Explanation for readers: why 73 tons are not 73 tons for bombs

Natural uranium cannot simply be placed in a nuclear warhead. The Syrian project was dangerous because of the chain: natural uranium is turned into reactor fuel, the reactor irradiates it, plutonium forms inside, and then it must be chemically separated from the spent fuel.

Therefore, data on planned reprocessing are of particular importance. They show the possible next stage of the fuel cycle. But the technical ability to go such a path and a proven political decision to make weapons are not the same; the latter was not established by the IAEA.

Ukraine here is a different story, but the criterion is the same

It is impossible to draw a direct analogy with the Zaporizhzhia NPP. In Ukraine, it is about a large operating nuclear power plant in conditions of war and Russian occupation, not a secret undeclared reactor.

The only common question is: how much does the state support independent international access when the result of the inspection may be politically inconvenient for it or its partner.

The Syrian story now allows evaluating Russian statements about “excessive international control” not only by words. In 2014, Moscow proposed removing the case from the permanent agenda. Years later, it turned out that inspectors had not yet seen a significant part of the infrastructure and did not know about the later found stock of nuclear material.

After Assad, two stories converged

Russia remains in Syria but is already renegotiating Tartus and Khmeimim with a state trying to regain control over its own infrastructure. Meanwhile, Assad himself is under Russian asylum.

Simultaneously, another legacy of his regime is being revealed. International inspectors gained access to what had remained under-checked for decades and were able to restore a much more complete picture of the secret nuclear project.

There is no basis to assert that Russia built Al-Kibar or knew everything that was happening around it. There is also no evidence of Iran’s direct involvement in the reactor’s construction.

But another sequence is documented: Moscow opposed strengthening international consideration when the investigation was not yet completed. The old Syrian case could only be closed after inspectors received access, documents, samples, and the nuclear material itself.

Today, Russia again claims that international pressure around the nuclear program of its other Middle Eastern “partner” — Iran — is “politicized” and “should give way to diplomacy.”

The Syrian experience does not provide a ready answer as to whether Moscow is right or not in the case of Iran. It provides a more useful thing — a way to verify such statements.

A nuclear dossier is closed not when allies consider the questions sufficient.

It closes when the inspectors receive answers.

…
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Ukrainian goalkeeper Georgiy Ermakov, who was defending the goal for Maccabi Haifa in the summer, married Oleksandra Mikolyuk, a participant in the Ukrainian ‘Bachelor-11’. They officially became husband and wife on September 18, 2026. The wedding was announced by the footballer’s current club, FC Kharkiv, congratulating Ermakov and Oleksandra on starting a family.

Author: Victoria Katsman

For Israel, the story here is a bit broader than the usual sports social news. Ermakov spent a season as the goalkeeper for one of the country’s largest clubs, holds Israeli citizenship, and his family lives in Israel. His wife also studied here — at Reichman University in Herzliya. So the phrase ‘former Maccabi goalkeeper married a Bachelor participant’ is correct but significantly cuts the plot.

And there has already been confusion with the biographies of the newlyweds after the first publications.

The wedding was on September 18. But the ‘nine-year difference’ doesn’t add up.

FC Kharkiv announced the marriage on the evening of September 18: ‘goalkeeper of Kharkiv Georgiy Ermakov and his beloved Oleksandra officially became husband and wife’. The club did not disclose any additional details of the ceremony.

Ukrainian entertainment publications quickly picked up the news. Along with it, another figure spread: Oleksandra is allegedly nine years older than Georgiy. Several publications repeated it on September 19.

Only the dates contradict this.

Georgiy Ermakov was born on March 28, 2002 — the date is in the official database of the Ukrainian Premier League and on the FC Kharkiv footballer’s page. Oleksandra Mikolyuk was born on May 5, 1998. These same data agree with the 2021 publications when she was 22 at the time of participating in ‘The Bachelor’.

So Oleksandra is about four years older than her husband, not nine.

For NANews, there is not much choice here: mass reprinting of the number does not make it correct. Therefore, we will not use ‘nine years difference’ further.

Georgiy proposed to Oleksandra in January 2026. By that time, the couple had been dating for more than a year. About eight months later, they registered their marriage.

Who is Oleksandra Mikolyuk — and what does Israel have to do with it

The Ukrainian television audience knows Oleksandra from the 11th season of the show ‘The Bachelor’, which aired in 2021. The main character of the season was businessman Mykhailo Zalivako, and Mikolyuk left the project in the fifth episode.

For the Israeli reader, a small explanation: the Ukrainian ‘Bachelor’ is the local version of the international television format The Bachelor. The project’s participants meet one man, and he gradually chooses with whom to continue the relationship. Of course, that television romance has nothing to do with Oleksandra’s marriage to Ermakov today — the show ended five years ago.

But after television, Mikolyuk had a completely different biography.

She studied in Prague and then came to Israel and in 2024 received a master’s degree at Reichman University in Diplomacy & Conflict Studies.

Israelis usually do not need an explanation of Reichman University, but other readers may remember this institution under its old name — IDC Herzliya, Interdisciplinary Center in Herzliya. In 2021, it received university status and the name Reichman University.

It turns out quite amusing: when Ermakov later came to play for Maccabi Haifa, Israel was no longer an unknown country for his future wife. She studied here herself, and not for a couple of weeks.

Now Mikolyuk is also engaged in public activities. In Ukraine, the NGO ‘Soft Power’ is registered, with Oleksandra Mikolyuk listed as the director. The organization was registered in October 2025.

So the usual newspaper headline ‘married a Bachelor star’ works as a headline. For a biography — it’s already weak.

Ermakov’s connection with Israel began before Maccabi

With Georgiy, it’s a similar story. His Israeli part of life does not start with a contract in Haifa.

As early as July 6, 2025, NANews reported that Ermakov studied at a Jewish school in Kyiv, maintained relations with the family of Kyiv rabbi Yonatan Markovets, and his parents moved to Israel after the start of the full-scale war. Georgiy himself visited here to see his family before joining Maccabi and already understood a little Hebrew.

Moreover, that material for NANews was also prepared by Victoria Katsman: ‘In Kyiv, I studied at a Jewish school’: Ermakov’s first interview after joining Maccabi Haifa.

Ermakov said that his parents live in Holon, and he himself managed to get acquainted with Israeli life before a full-fledged move. Then there were training sessions in Haifa, the Maccabi locker room, Hebrew around him every day, and matches at Sammy Ofer.

So now there are indeed two separate Israeli lines in the family. He has family and football. She has university and studies.

NANews — News of Israel | Nikk.Agency

From ‘Oleksandriya’ to the goal of ‘Maccabi’

Ermakov’s football career took off sharply before coming to Haifa.

Maccabi acquired the rights to the Ukrainian goalkeeper in the summer of 2024 for about €100,000, but left him on loan for a season in ‘Oleksandriya’. And this season changed everything.

In the 2024/25 Ukrainian Championship, Ermakov played all 30 matches, 15 of which ended without conceding a goal, and ‘Oleksandriya’ became second. At the end of the season, the clubs of the Ukrainian Premier League recognized Georgiy as the best goalkeeper of the championship.

In the summer of 2025, he already came to Haifa as a ready first number, not as a young goalkeeper ‘for the future’.

NANews followed this story quite closely throughout the next year. By spring, it became clear that Ukrainian clubs wanted to bring Ermakov back, but now it was about completely different money.

In May, we wrote about an offer from the Kharkiv club for about €3.5 million: €3.5 million for Maccabi Haifa goalkeeper: Ukrainian club prepares a major offer. In June, negotiations were still ongoing, and the goalkeeper himself did not promise to stay in Israel: Ukrainian goalkeeper between Israel and Kharkiv: Maccabi Haifa prepares a raise, but Ermakov does not promise to stay.

In other words, the wedding takes place literally a couple of months after another big chapter in Ermakov’s life ended.

Maccabi bought him for about €100,000. Two years later, the price became different

By July, it became clear that the parties were indeed moving towards a deal.

NANews then thoroughly analyzed the economics of the transfer: ‘Maccabi’ turns €100,000 into €3.2 million: Georgiy Ermakov prepares to return to Ukraine. At that time, Israeli sources named amounts in the range of €3–3.2 million.

Finally, Ermakov became a player of FC Kharkiv on July 29, 2026. The club’s official website records this transfer, and profile databases estimate the transfer at about €2.8 million.

Even if we take this lower final estimate, the difference is impressive: Maccabi acquired the rights to the footballer for about €100,000, got the main goalkeeper for a season, and then sold him for about 28 times more.

Not every Israeli club can afford such deals. And they don’t happen every year.

Why ‘Kharkiv’ if it was recently ‘Metalist 1925’

Here’s another explanation specifically for the Israeli reader.

In our old publications about negotiations with Maccabi, the name ‘Metalist 1925’ appears. Now everywhere it says FC Kharkiv. It may seem that one club wanted to buy Ermakov, but he ended up in a completely different one.

No.

In June 2026, ‘Metalist 1925’ underwent rebranding and continued to perform under the name football club ‘Kharkiv’. Therefore, the January, May, and June negotiations of ‘Metalist 1925’ with Haifa and the July transfer of Ermakov to FC Kharkiv are parts of the same story.

The second detail, which may be unclear without the Ukrainian football context: UPL, which often appears next to Ermakov’s name, is the Ukrainian Premier League, the top division of the Ukrainian championship.

Now he plays there again every week.

Wedding is a wedding, but the next day — 90 minutes and another ‘zero’

After the club’s announcement of the wedding, Ermakov did not have any prolonged pause.

Already on September 19, that is, the day after the official congratulations to the newlyweds, Georgiy played in the goal of ‘Kharkiv’ against ‘Bukovyna’. He played all 90 minutes, the Kharkiv team won 2:0, and Ermakov did not concede again.

As of September 20, he has six matches in the current Ukrainian championship. The games with ‘Veres’ — 1:0, ‘Zorya’ — 3:0, ‘Obolon’ — 5:0, and ‘Bukovyna’ — 2:0 ended ‘dry’. There were also two matches with goals conceded: 1:3 against ‘Polissya’ and 0:1 against ‘Shakhtar’.

Plus, on September 16, Ermakov played in the Ukrainian Cup against ‘Prykarpattya’: ‘Kharkiv’ won 2:0.

In total, by the morning of September 20 — seven official matches for the new club and five games without conceding goals.

This is already more relevant than the initially spread statistics of ‘six matches, four clean sheets’. It was correct until the cup game and the meeting with ‘Bukovyna’, but football sometimes becomes outdated faster than an article can be published.

They left Haifa, but Israel has not disappeared from this story

In short, it turns out to be not the most ordinary Ukrainian-Israeli couple.

Ermakov grew up in Ukrainian football, studied at a Jewish school in Kyiv, visited his family in Israel, became the main goalkeeper of Maccabi Haifa, received his first call-up to the adult Ukrainian national team from here, and then returned to the Ukrainian championship as a footballer of a completely different value and status.

Oleksandra Mikolyuk is known to the public thanks to ‘The Bachelor’, although after the show her route went through Prague, the Israeli Reichman University, a diploma in diplomacy and conflicts, and her own public work.

Now they are a family.

With Haifa, Georgiy has put a period — at least a football one. But we hope to see both of them in Israel again. For this couple, returning here will not be a tourist trip: each has a place to return to in their own story.

…
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On October 1, 2026, the open online course “The Short 20th Century. Jewish Life in Ukraine, 1917–1991” (The Short 20th Century. Jewish Life in Ukraine, 1917–1991) will start — 10 lectures on the history of Jews in Ukraine throughout almost the entire Soviet period. From the revolution and the vibrant Yiddish culture of the 1920s — to the Holocaust, Stalinist persecutions, the “Doctors’ Plot,” and the late USSR.

Author: Alexander Khmelnitsky

The course is taught by Professor Anna Shternshis from the University of Toronto, one of the researchers of Soviet Jewry and Yiddish culture.

Participation is free, registration is required.

Register for Anna Shternshis’s open course

Organizers also promise a certificate to those who complete the test assignments.

And for the Israeli reader, there is one not-so-small detail. Despite the fact that the program is conducted by Ukrainian academic and Jewish institutions, the lectures will be delivered in Russian — this is explicitly stated in the official registration form. It turns out to be a course that a fairly large part of Russian-speaking Israel can join without a language barrier.

Not only the Holocaust: how Jews lived between 1917 and 1991

Soviet-Jewish history has a perception problem. For many, it breaks down into several familiar points: revolution, Holocaust, Stalin’s anti-Semitism, refuseniks, aliyah. Between these points, almost three generations of ordinary life remain — school, theater, profession, family, songs, books, childhood memories, attempts to preserve one’s culture or, conversely, to dissolve into the Soviet environment.

This is precisely the period that Shternshis’s program targets. In the course description, organizers specifically emphasize that history will be examined not only through state decisions and political campaigns but also through literature, memoirs, folklore, cinema, personal stories, and music. The question is posed quite simply: not only what the Soviet state did to the Jews, but also how the Jews themselves lived within this state.

This is already noticeable in the schedule:

• October 1 — revolution: Isaac Babel, S. An-sky, Peretz Markish, David Bergelson;
• October 8 — creation of a new Jewish culture and the ‘Kultur-Lige’;
• October 15 — ‘Jewish in form, Soviet in content’: ‘Red Haggadah’, banquet on Yom Kippur, and everyday life;
• October 27 — Jewish schools and childhood;
• October 29 — Jewish theater, Kyiv GOSET, and amateur theaters;
• November 12 — family, profession, and ordinary life;
• November 23 — Holocaust in Ukraine and Yiddish music in Transnistria;
• December 7 — Jews in evacuation in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan;
• December 10 — late Stalinism, arrests of Yiddish writers, struggle against ‘cosmopolitanism’ and the ‘Doctors’ Plot’;
• December 17 — Jewish and non-Jewish experience in Ukraine in the 1960s–1980s: what was common and what remained different.

By the way, there was a small discrepancy in the announcements. The initial announcement states that lectures take place on Thursdays at 20:00, but the detailed registration form also schedules classes for Tuesday, October 27, and Mondays, November 23 and December 7. Therefore, before joining, it is better to focus on the specific date sent to registered listeners, rather than just remembering ‘every Thursday’.

What is the ‘Kultur-Lige’ and why Kyiv

The name ‘Kultur-Lige’ may sound like another Soviet organization to the Israeli reader. But it emerged even before the final establishment of the Soviet system — in Kyiv in early 1918, during the period of the Ukrainian Central Rada.

It was a large Jewish cultural organization primarily focused on secular Yiddish culture. In Ukraine, it created schools, kindergartens, libraries, theater studios, music circles, and trained teachers. According to the YIVO Encyclopedia, by the summer of 1918, branches of the ‘Kultur-Lige’ existed in almost a hundred Ukrainian cities and towns.

And then begins a story quite characteristic of the USSR. The new government first uses and finances part of the cultural infrastructure, later the autonomous space becomes increasingly subordinate to ideology and state control.

Therefore, the lecture on the ‘Kultur-Lige’ is not only a story about books or theater. Through it, one can see the moment when Kyiv was one of the notable centers of modern Yiddish culture in Eastern Europe, a culture that was not museum-like but lively and very urban.

This line has already appeared from another angle in NAnews. In the material about the connection between Ukrainian, Yiddish, and Hebrew, we explained why Yiddish in Ukrainian cities was not some ‘foreign language of the diaspora’, but an everyday language of a huge number of people, which lived alongside Ukrainian for centuries. ‘Ukrainian is not “almost Russian”: why its history leads to Yiddish and Hebrew’

Then this world almost disappeared

By the 1930s, Soviet policy significantly changed the conditions of Jewish life. Religious institutions were closed, independent public organizations disappeared, cultural institutions came under state control. In Odessa, for example, synagogues, religious schools, independent libraries, theaters, and publishing houses were closed; similar processes occurred in other cities of the USSR.

But this does not mean that people stopped being Jews overnight. Some continued to speak Yiddish at home, some abandoned it. Some knew Jewish holidays only from family memory, while others had religious relatives. A special Soviet-Jewish identity emerged — often secular, sometimes almost entirely Russian-speaking, but still passed down within the family.

And this story is already very close to Israel. Not abstractly: families from Kyiv, Odessa, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Zhytomyr, Chernivtsi, and hundreds of other cities of the former USSR brought it with them.

Explanation for Israeli readers: Transnistria here is not today’s Transnistria

One of the lectures is titled ‘Holocaust in Ukraine: Yiddish Music in Transnistria’. Here, without explanation, it is easy to get confused.

Transnistria during the Holocaust period is not just the current unrecognized Transnistria. From 1941 to 1944, it was the name of a large territory between the Dniester and Southern Bug, occupied and administered by Nazi Germany’s ally Romania. A significant part of it was located on the territory of modern Ukraine, and the administrative center was Odessa.

According to the US Holocaust Memorial Museum, Romanian authorities and local auxiliary formations killed approximately 280,000–380,000 Jews in this zone — through mass shootings, deportations, starvation, disease, and inhumane conditions created by the occupation regime.

Therefore, the topic of Yiddish songs there sounds almost strange — until you understand that such songs became testimonies of people who knew what was happening around them.

Anna Shternshis and the songs that were considered lost

The course is taught by Anna Shternshis — a professor at the University of Toronto, holding the J. Richard and Dorothy Shiff Chair of Jewish Studies and directing the Anne Tanenbaum Centre for Jewish Studies. Her main research topics are the history and culture of Soviet Jews, Jewish-Slavic cultural connections, Yiddish popular culture, music, and theater. Shternshis received her doctorate from Oxford University in 2001.

Among her books are Soviet and Kosher: Jewish Popular Culture in the Soviet Union, 1923–1939, dedicated to Jewish folk and popular culture in the USSR, and When Sonia Met Boris: An Oral History of Jewish Life under Stalin — a study of Jewish everyday life during the Stalinist period, based in part on oral testimonies.

But Shternshis’s connection to Ukraine is not only through a general interest in Soviet Jewry. While working with Ukrainian archival materials, she turned to a unique corpus of Yiddish songs from World War II, collected by folklorist Moisey Beregovsky. For a long time, a significant part of these texts remained unknown to the general public.

Based on the found materials, Shternshis, together with Psoy Korolenko, created the project Yiddish Glory: The Lost Songs of World War II, reviving songs written and recorded by Jews during the war. The project was nominated for a Grammy, and in 2020 Shternshis herself received a Guggenheim Fellowship.

She continues to research Yiddish music created during the Nazi occupation of Ukraine. Therefore, the separate lecture on the Holocaust and Yiddish songs in Transnistria does not appear as a random addition to the program but as one of the topics Shternshis has been professionally working on for many years.

And this changes the way of talking about the Holocaust. On November 23, the discussion will not only be about the decisions of the occupation administrations, deportations, or the number of victims. Through songs, the voice of a specific person emerges: they remember home, fear, anger, sometimes joke, record what is happening around — and thus leave a testimony that survives the war along with the text.

The ‘Doctors’ Plot’: what is meant

Another term in the program that may mean nothing to a young Israeli reader is the Soviet ‘Doctors’ Plot’.

In 1952–1953, a group of prominent Soviet doctors, a significant part of whom were Jews, was accused of conspiring to kill Soviet leaders. The campaign was accompanied by anti-Semitic propaganda, arrests, and torture. After Stalin’s death, the case was closed, charges were dropped, arrested doctors were released and rehabilitated.

For the course, this is not a logical point in itself. It is preceded by the destruction of a significant part of the independent Jewish cultural environment, the struggle against so-called ‘rootless cosmopolitanism’, and the persecution of Jewish intellectuals and writers.

And then Stalin dies — but Jewish life does not instantly reappear. That is why the tenth lecture ends the story not in 1953 but extends it to the last decades of the USSR.

Ukraine today is once again gathering its Jewish history

The course is conducted by the International Interdisciplinary Certification Program in Judaic Studies under the auspices of the A. Krymsky Institute of Oriental Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, in cooperation with the Zionist Federation of Ukraine and with the support of the Jewish Theological Seminary in New York. In September, 23 new students were admitted to the main program this year after 32 interviews.

And this is not a separate story. On September 22–23, Ukraine is also hosting an international conference of the Ukrainian Association for Jewish Studies, where researchers from Ukraine, Israel, the USA, and Hungary discuss another question — who and how over the past two centuries has formed knowledge about Jews in encyclopedias. NAnews detailed this program and the opportunity to connect online. ‘The Ukrainian Association for Jewish Studies gathers researchers’

It turns out to be two events less than two weeks apart. Some researchers are analyzing how Jewish history was recorded. Another course — how this history was lived by people.

For NAnews — News of Israel | Nikk.Agency, this is where one of the direct lines Ukraine — Israel passes. Jewish history in Ukraine today is returning not only through monuments and mourning dates but through language, family documents, songs, university research, and attempts to restore ordinary life around the catastrophe.

We recently told, for example, how in 1966 several dozen people first independently came out to commemorate the murdered Jews of Babyn Yar — at that time, the Soviet system called such gatherings ‘Jewish nationalism’, and participants had to hide the filmed footage from the authorities. ‘In 1966, the first rally in Babyn Yar took place’

Shternshis’s course allows us to see what happened on both sides of this date — and why by 1966, the simple public articulation of Jewish memory was already becoming an act.

How to join from Israel

The course starts on October 1, 2026 and consists of ten online lectures. Participation is free, but registration is mandatory; the organizers send the connection link to the participant’s email. To receive a certificate, it is necessary to complete test assignments.

The registration form specifically states that Anna Shternshis is a Canadian citizen, has never lived in Ukraine, and delivers lectures in Russian. The participant must confirm that they understand and accept this condition.

Register for Anna Shternshis’s open course

For a Russian-speaking listener from Israel, the format is therefore quite simple: Zoom, ten meetings, and a topic that for many families actually begins not in a textbook. It begins with the grandmother’s surname, the grandfather’s city of birth, a couple of incomprehensible words in Yiddish, or that very Soviet answer: ‘We didn’t really talk about it at home.’

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An exhibition about Golda Meir was held at the Kyiv Art Gallery, including images of Golda in Ukrainian embroidered shirts with her most famous quotes. - October 7, 2026 - Новости Израиля

Ukraine to Israel on October 7: “We stand together in memory and pain” - October 7, 2026 - Новости Израиля

In Tel Aviv, ‘Theater Therapy’ will take place: how Ukrainian theater sought freedom after decades of bans – October 8, 2026 - October 6, 2026 - Новости Израиля

In the current election campaign in Israel, Ukraine has so far hardly been mentioned as an independent point of future policy. According to open pre-election materials that NAnews managed to verify, Yair Lapid became the first of the major Israeli politicians of the 2026 campaign not only to express support for Ukraine but also to directly link the attitude towards it with what his political camp intends to do after returning to power.

Author: Elena Gunko

In a large interview with the Russian-language project “Ulpan Politika“ (released on YouTube on September 16, 2026), he formulated this without diplomatic fog:

“If we return to power, we will do much more than we did then.”

By “then,” Lapid means 2022 — the period of the government of Naftali Bennett and Lapid himself, when Israel helped Ukraine humanitarianly, opened a field hospital, provided protective equipment, but refused to supply Kyiv with Israeli weapons and air defense systems. Now one of the two leaders of the united list “Beyahad” tells voters that such a level of participation is no longer sufficient.

And immediately after this, Lapid names a reason that for the Israeli audience is perhaps even more significant than the promise to increase aid to Ukraine itself.

Moreover, the wording itself deserves separate attention. According to open speeches and pre-election materials that NAnews managed to verify, this is the first case we found in the 2026 campaign where an Israeli politician of such a level — a former prime minister and current opposition leader — so directly publicly calls Russia an ally of Iran and immediately links this with the need to change Israel’s relations with Ukraine.

Lapid says:

“Now Russia is an ally of Iran. They act together in various military spheres.”

For Israeli politics, this wording is much harsher than the usual talks about “Moscow and Tehran rapprochement,” “military cooperation,” or “strategic partnership.” Lapid does not leave this connection at the level of diplomatic terminology: in his argumentation, Russia turns out to be an ally of a state that Israel considers its main regional adversary.

And Ukraine here appears not separately from Israeli security.

Lapid directly links the Russian war against Ukraine with the fact that Moscow and Tehran have deepened cooperation in the military sphere over the past years. From this, he derives a change in Israel’s own interest:

“And this, of course, strengthens our connection with the Ukrainians”.

It turns out to be quite a consistent construction. Russia is increasingly interacting with Iran; Iran poses a direct threat to Israel; Ukraine is fighting Russia and at the same time has accumulated technologies and combat experience that can be useful to Israel itself. Therefore, according to Lapid’s logic, relations with Ukraine cease to be only a matter of supporting a country attacked by Russia — they become part of Israel’s own security calculation.

That is why his next phrase about Ukraine already sounds completely different than it might have sounded in 2022.

This is already a different conversation than the one Israel had in the first months after the Russian invasion.

In 2022, one of the reasons for Jerusalem’s caution was the Russian military presence in Syria and the need to maintain the freedom of action of Israeli aviation against Iranian forces. At that time, the Bennett-Lapid government tried to help Ukraine while not bringing relations with Moscow to an open confrontation. Now Lapid himself claims that the balance of power has changed, and Russia has effectively ended up on the other side of the same strategic line on which Israel opposes Iran.

And further, the interview becomes even more interesting: Lapid talks not only about how much Israel can give Ukraine but also about what Ukraine can give Israel today.

He calls it:

“a two-way street.”

According to Lapid, Ukrainians have developed technologies and capabilities over the years of war that interest Israel, primarily in the field of combating drones. His next conclusion is also extremely direct: “the space for military cooperation has expanded”.

And then he returns once again to the pre-election promise:

“if we return to power, our policy will be bolder than in 2022”.

To a direct question from journalists about whether this includes military aid to Ukraine, Lapid did not promise specific weapons systems but replied:

“we must do everything possible to help Ukraine”.

This is where an important boundary lies. Lapid did not promise Ukraine Iron Dome, Arrow, David’s Sling, or any other specific Israeli weapons. He did not name any system, timeline, or volume of possible supplies. But politically, his wording still goes noticeably further than the position of the 2022 government: aid to Ukraine and possible military cooperation with it are marked for the first time in this campaign as part of the course that one of the leaders of a major Israeli bloc proposes to pursue after the elections.

What has changed since 2022

To understand how far Lapid is now departing from the previous line, it is necessary to restore not only political statements but also the factual picture of the first months of the full-scale war.

Israel indeed helped Ukraine. In March 2022, the government approved the creation of the “Kohav Meir” field hospital in the western part of the country. The official decision was presented by Prime Minister Naftali Bennett, Foreign Minister Yair Lapid, and Health Minister Nitzan Horowitz. About 21 million shekels were allocated for the launch of the hospital, with Israeli medics and specialists from Sheba Medical Center participating in the project.

Later, the Israeli Foreign Ministry reported that about seven thousand patients passed through “Kohav Meir.” Israel supplied Ukraine with medicines, medical equipment, generators, water purification systems, and other humanitarian aid.

But weapons were a different story.

This is where the red line of the Bennett-Lapid government lay. Kyiv wanted to receive Israeli air defense systems and repeatedly raised this issue publicly. Jerusalem, meanwhile, agreed to humanitarian aid, protective equipment, and later — assistance in creating an early warning system, but did not move to direct supplies of Israeli combat systems.

Therefore, Lapid’s current words cannot be reduced to the usual: “we have always supported Ukraine and will continue to support it.” He is talking about revising the scale of the previous policy.

Moreover, he repeats this thought twice. First — “we will do much more,” then — “our policy will be bolder.”

These are two formulations in one answer. Not a random slip.

Why Russia and Iran are mentioned in the same line here

During the first months of the full-scale war, the Russian factor for Israel looked completely different than for most European countries.

Russian troops were in Syria. Israel regularly struck targets there related to the Iranian presence and the transfer of weapons to Hezbollah. A mechanism to prevent unintended clashes between forces operated between Israel and Russia.

Therefore, any sharp deterioration in relations with Moscow was considered in Jerusalem not only as a diplomatic conflict around Ukraine. It could affect Israel’s freedom of action on its northern borders.

In the new interview, Lapid returns to this argument. But he says that the previous construction has effectively ceased to be what it was then. At the same time, Russia appears as a military partner of Iran — a state that Israel considers one of the main threats to its security.

And this is no longer just Lapid’s pre-election formula.

On July 23, 2025, during the visit of Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar to Kyiv, Israel and Ukraine officially agreed to start a strategic dialogue on the Iranian threat. The Ukrainian Foreign Ministry then separately stated the potential for cooperation between the two states in defense technologies and the intention to seek joint projects in the defense industry.

That is, the link Ukraine — Russia — Iran — Israel’s security, which Lapid is now using, no longer exists only in journalism or pre-election speeches. A separate official channel of negotiations on the common Iranian threat between Kyiv and Jerusalem has already been created.

Lapid goes further: he proposes to make this the basis for closer military cooperation.

What Ukraine can give Israel

Here his “two-way street” becomes especially substantial.

In the first months of the war, the conversation almost always revolved around the question: what can Israel give Ukraine?

Iron Dome? Detection systems? Interceptor missiles? Electronic equipment? Intelligence technologies?

Four and a half years later, the reverse question has appeared.

What can Ukraine give Israel?

Ukraine today has enormous practical experience in drone warfare. Not polygonal and not theoretical. Russian strikes forced Ukrainian defense to almost continuously change ways of detecting and destroying drones, reduce interception costs, integrate radars, electronic warfare means, mobile groups, aviation, software, and its own interceptor drones into one system.

This is happening right now. On September 15, 2026, Reuters reported on the testing of a new Ukrainian drone interception tool: according to Volodymyr Zelensky, the Ukrainian development has already managed to destroy a Shahed, although technical refinement is still ongoing. Reuters also noted that Ukraine is actively developing cheaper interceptor drones and is already offering accumulated experience to other countries, including Middle Eastern countries.

This is exactly what Lapid seems to be talking about when he highlights drone combat technologies.

For Israel, this is not an exotic experience of a distant war.

Iran and its allies have made drones a permanent part of the Middle Eastern war. Israel has faced both single UAVs and massive combined attacks where drones are used simultaneously with ballistic and cruise missiles.

At the same time, Israeli air defense itself is built in several echelons. Iron Dome is primarily intended for shorter-range threats; David’s Sling and Arrow solve other tasks. The mass use of cheap drones creates a separate economy of war: it is not reasonable to shoot down every cheap target with an expensive missile.

And Ukrainians have been trying to solve this problem for several years in conditions where the cost of interception is as important as the probability of interception itself.

NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency has already analyzed Ukrainian anti-drone experience and why it may be of interest to Israel. Therefore, today’s phrase by Lapid did not arise from nowhere: military-technological mutual interest between the two countries is gradually becoming a quite separate topic of relations between Kyiv and Jerusalem.

Is this already military aid?

Journalists of “Ulpan Politika” did not leave room for diplomatic evasion here and asked a direct clarifying question: does the new policy include military aid?

And received:

“we must do everything possible to help Ukraine.”

But this phrase cannot be turned into the headline “Lapid promised weapons to Ukraine” — there is no such promise in the interview.

He leaves himself very broad space.

“Doing everything possible” can mean defensive technologies, joint developments, detection systems, exchange of combat experience, company cooperation, specialist training, intelligence interaction, and may, with the appropriate decision of the future government, include weapons.

But the latter is already a possible scenario, not a commitment made by Lapid.

However, another part of his answer is spoken literally: “the space for military cooperation has expanded”.

And this is significant. It is no longer just about humanitarian cargoes and political solidarity.

The Ukrainian Foreign Ministry in July 2025 already spoke after negotiations with Israel about “significant potential in the field of defense technologies” and prospects for joint projects.

Now one of the leaders of a major Israeli pre-election bloc is effectively transferring this idea into his future state policy.

Another part of the conversation: Lapid on his own mistake before the invasion

Immediately after the Ukrainian block, “Ulpan Politika” asks Lapid a rather uncomfortable question.

In early February 2022, as foreign minister, he did not expect an imminent full-scale clash between Russia and Ukraine. A few weeks later, Russian troops began the invasion.

Lapid did not deny that he was wrong.

His explanation boils down to the fact that many Western politicians tried to analyze Moscow’s actions from the position of rational logic, whereas the decision for a full-scale invasion, in his opinion, was not rational. He links this mistake to the attempt of rational politicians to predict the actions of authoritarian leaders based on their own ideas about the benefits and costs of war.

This fragment is significant for the current interview for another reason.

Lapid simultaneously defends Israel’s caution in 2022 — and says that in 2026 he would act differently.

That is, he does not renounce his previous policy in hindsight. His argument is different: the war, Russia, Moscow’s relations with Iran, and Ukraine itself have changed.

Hence — “we will do much more.”

And what about the Jewish communities of Russia and Ukraine

There is another layer that is easy to lose in Israel if the whole dispute is reduced to air defense and Russian troops in Syria.

Lapid talks about large Jewish communities in both countries.

According to him, Israel must take their situation into account regardless of whom it conducts a political dialogue with — Moscow or Kyiv. For him, Israel is not only the state of its citizens but also the center of the Jewish world, and therefore bears responsibility for Jews outside the country.

This explains another part of Israel’s caution regarding Russia.

But at the same time, he says that there are situations where one still has to take a moral position. As an example, he cites February 2022, when he publicly put Israel on Ukraine’s side, despite warnings about possible problems with Moscow and risks for Russian Jews.

So Lapid’s current position is not that the Russian factor has completely disappeared.

He says something else: the balance has changed.

Explanation for Israeli readers: Ukraine is no longer just a request for Iron Dome

In the Israeli discussion, Ukrainian requests were often reduced to one well-known brand — “Iron Dome.”

This greatly simplifies the real picture.

Iron Dome was primarily created to intercept shorter-range missiles and is only one layer of Israel’s multi-tiered air and missile defense system. Different means are used against ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, various drones, and other types of targets.

The Ukrainian problem has become even more complex over the years of war.

Russia can launch a large number of drones in one attack, use false targets, change routes, altitudes, and configurations of devices, and simultaneously use cruise and ballistic missiles.

Shooting everything down with expensive interceptors is simply impossible.

Hence Ukraine’s search for cheaper solutions: its own interceptor UAVs, mobile groups, electronic warfare, new detection means, and constantly changing tactics. In September 2026, Ukraine continues to test new developments precisely in this area.

Therefore, Lapid speaks of two-way traffic.

In 2022, Ukraine mainly asked: what can Israel give us?

In 2026, a second question arises: what from the Ukrainian experience will be useful to Israel?

For the Israeli reader, this is perhaps the main shift in the entire Ukrainian fragment of the interview.

Not charity. Not a gesture of solidarity.

Coincidence of certain threats and mutual military interest.

What else was in the big interview — in theses

Ukraine occupies only one part of Yair Lapid’s conversation with ‘Ulpan Politica’. We deliberately do not retell the other answers in detail — it is better to read them in full in the original.

Lapid spoke about the events before October 7, 2023, and claimed that he received information about the growing threat. He stated that, being in power at that time, he would have strengthened the southern border and called up reservists if necessary. This is Lapid’s own position and his assessment of what decisions should have been made, not our established conclusion about the causes of the October 7 catastrophe.

He explains in detail the alliance with Naftali Bennett and the logic of the united list. According to Lapid, the alliance of the political center and liberal right may become a more sustainable governance model than the previous division of camps. This is his political concept and one of the central themes of the current campaign.

A separate conversation concerns the Russian-speaking electorate. After the question of why there is no Russian-speaking candidate in the first fifteen places of the ‘Beyahad’ list, Lapid essentially suggests that this audience consider him their representative. It is from here that the phrase ‘I am your candidate’ is taken for the title of the original interview. In the same answer, he reminds of his position in support of Ukraine after the start of the full-scale invasion.

Lapid also talks about the problems of new immigrants: the cost of living, education, bullying of Russian-speaking teenagers, and bureaucracy in recognizing foreign diplomas. As a characteristic example, he cites a person who received medical education in Kyiv and was forced to wait several years for an Israeli license.

On the Palestinian issue, Lapid says that after October 7, he does not see the possibility of implementing the two-state model in the foreseeable future, although he maintains the idea of a future separation of Israel from the Palestinians. This is his current political position, which significantly differs in terms and practical conclusions from what he said at the UN General Assembly in 2022.

The call for the Haredim is discussed separately. Lapid proposes financially ceasing state support for those who do not serve, as well as educational institutions that do not teach basic general education subjects. Again, this is about the program of his political camp, not the current norm.

The interview is better read in full.

For NANews, there was a separate Ukrainian plot in this conversation, so we deliberately analyzed it in detail.

But the interview itself is much broader.

There are things that cannot be properly retold in two paragraphs: Lapid’s own version of the events before October 7, relations with Netanyahu, explanation of the alliance with Bennett, the structure of the united list, conversation about Russian-speaking Israelis and new immigrants, Haredim, the Palestinian issue, and what kind of Israel Lapid proposes to build after the elections.

Therefore, the full conversation is worth reading directly on our colleagues’ website ‘Ulpan Politica’: ‘I am your candidate’: a big interview with Yair Lapid.

And if you leave only the Ukrainian part from almost the entire interview, it turns out to be a rather specific set of statements.

Lapid tells the Israeli voter that the policy of 2022 is already insufficient for the situation of 2026.

Russia, in his wording, has become an ally of Iran. Ukraine has accumulated drone combat technologies that are of interest to Israel. Military cooperation between Kyiv and Jerusalem can be broader than before. And if his political camp returns to power, Israel, Lapid promises, will do ‘much more’ for Ukraine, and the policy itself will be ‘bolder than in 2022’.

What exactly will be behind these words — joint technologies, exchange of experience, defense projects, or already direct arms supplies — Lapid has not yet determined.

But for the first time in this election campaign, the issue of relations with Ukraine sounded not as a recollection of the war that began four years ago, and not as a routine foreign policy remark.

It sounded as part of a proposal about what Israel’s policy will be after the elections.

…
An exhibition about Golda Meir was held at the Kyiv Art Gallery, including images of Golda in Ukrainian embroidered shirts with her most famous quotes. - October 7, 2026 - Новости Израиля

Ukraine to Israel on October 7: “We stand together in memory and pain” - October 7, 2026 - Новости Израиля

In Tel Aviv, ‘Theater Therapy’ will take place: how Ukrainian theater sought freedom after decades of bans – October 8, 2026 - October 6, 2026 - Новости Израиля