This article appeared now not because someone suddenly remembered the Israeli strike on Syria nineteen years ago. In September 2026, events occurred almost simultaneously that linked the current war over Iran’s nuclear program with the old, still not fully understood nuclear legacy of Bashar Assad — and with Russia’s “position” in both cases.
On September 1, 2026, the IAEA Board of Governors decided for the first time in about twenty years to once again refer the Iranian nuclear issue to the UN Security Council. The agency pointed to the lack of convincing explanations for uranium found at undeclared sites, access problems following American and Israeli strikes, and uncertainty surrounding part of Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile. Russia and China opposed this course.
Six days later, IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi announced another result — a “historic breakthrough” in Syria. The agency finally confirmed that the site destroyed by Israel in 2007 near Deir ez-Zor was a nearly completed nuclear reactor, Syria was producing its own fuel for it, and the investigation led inspectors to approximately 73 tons of natural metallic uranium. The reactor’s design allowed for the efficient production of fissile material, which could be used in weapons after further processing. However, the IAEA does not claim that Assad had already decided to create an atomic bomb.
On September 9, 2026, the Board of Governors closed the previous case of Syrian non-compliance with safeguards, which had been ongoing since 2011. It was closed not because the suspicions were unfounded: the new Syrian authorities provided information and access that allowed the remaining questions to be resolved and the found material to be physically placed under IAEA control.
And on September 17, 2026, Russia and China already blocked the extension of independent monitoring of restored sanctions against Iran in the UN Security Council. Moscow stated that Western countries were “politicizing” the nuclear issue and that it should be resolved “diplomatically.” All this is happening in the seventh month of the war between the US and Israel with Iran, which began on February 28.
Therefore, the Syrian story suddenly stopped being archival. Fifteen years ago, Moscow was already arguing with international structures over the unresolved nuclear case of its Middle Eastern partner: in 2011, Russia opposed referring the Syrian violation to the Security Council, and in 2014, it attempted to remove the Syrian dossier from the IAEA’s permanent agenda.
Now we know significantly more about what inspectors did not yet know at the time.
And to understand what Russia has to do with it and how appropriate it is to compare Syria with today’s Iran, one must first go through the entire history of Deir ez-Zor — roughly in the sequence in which it was revealed by Israel and the IAEA.
Author — Alexander Khmelnitsky.
At first, Israel only saw signs
Suspicions arose long before the strike. The IDF later disclosed a military intelligence document from 2002: the Syrian Atomic Energy Commission was engaged in secret projects, the purpose of which Israel could not precisely determine at the time. By the end of 2004, Israeli intelligence received information about foreign specialists assisting a certain Syrian nuclear project; in January 2006, a specific suspicion about the construction of a nuclear facility first arose, and by April, intelligence had already identified a suspicious structure.
The facility was not located on the Golan Heights. Al-Kibar was built in eastern Syria, in the Deir ez-Zor area near the Euphrates — deep inside the country. For Israel, the threat was determined not by the distance to the border but by the nature of the structure and what was happening inside.
The turning point came in early March 2007. Mossad obtained photographs taken inside the structure. They showed reactor elements and North Korean representatives. These images became the evidence that was lacking: after them, Israeli intelligence was already writing about the construction of a reactor capable of producing plutonium with the help of North Korea.
How exactly the photographs reached Israel is surrounded by numerous versions. The story of agents infiltrating the computer of the head of the Syrian Atomic Commission became widespread, but Israel officially confirmed primarily the fact of obtaining the images, not all the details of the intelligence operation.
What the Syrians were building and what North Korea had to do with it
A later technical assessment by the IAEA showed: by size, internal configuration, water supply, and other features, the structure corresponded to a gas-cooled reactor with a graphite moderator. The agency received information that the project was being implemented with foreign assistance; American official assessments directly named North Korea.
The similarity with the Yongbyon reactor technology had an understandable reason. A reactor of this type can operate on natural uranium. During operation, plutonium is formed in the fuel, which can then be chemically separated from the irradiated material. The reactor itself does not yet mean a ready bomb: reprocessing, a further technological chain, and a political decision to go for weapons are necessary.
But Syria, as it turned out later, was building not just one building.
And here is a detail that makes the story of Al-Kibar particularly inconvenient for the previous Syrian version: Damascus knew perfectly well how the IAEA system works.
Near Damascus, another Syrian reactor operated for decades — a small Chinese SRR-1/MNSR with a capacity of 30 kW. It was officially declared, regularly inspected, and initially used highly enriched fuel with about 90% U-235 content. The mere presence of such fuel did not turn the facility into a secret weapons program precisely because the material was accounted for and under international safeguards.
Syria had other completely official projects — uranium research, uranium extraction from phosphoric acid, laboratory programs, technical cooperation with the IAEA.
So Al-Kibar was not the result of ignorance of procedures. One reactor the Assad regime declared and showed to inspectors. The other — no.
Israel struck before the launch, and Syria cleared the site
On the night of September 5-6, 2007, Israeli F-15I and F-16I destroyed Al-Kibar. Israel publicly acknowledged the operation only in 2018. According to assessments disclosed by the IDF, construction was rapidly nearing completion, so the decision was made before the reactor’s launch, while the strike did not pose a risk of spreading radioactive materials.
After the attack, the Syrians quickly changed the site. The remains of the structure were removed, the area leveled, and later another building appeared there. When the IAEA began a full investigation, the original facility effectively no longer existed. The agency had to compare satellite images, intelligence data, equipment purchases, and future sample results.
On June 23, 2008, something happened that is often lost in retellings: the Assad regime did indeed allow inspectors directly to Deir ez-Zor. On the site itself, they were given wide access, they inspected the buildings, and took environmental samples. Syria claimed that Israel destroyed an ordinary military facility unrelated to atomic activities.
But Damascus did not provide documents that could confirm this version.
And then came the results of the samples.
The first uranium particles
In samples from Deir ez-Zor, particles of anthropogenic natural uranium were found — that is, natural uranium that had undergone technological processing by humans. Graphite and types of stainless steel compatible, though not exclusively, with nuclear applications were also found.
Syria explained the particles with Israeli munitions. The IAEA checked this version and considered the likelihood of such an origin low; the agency also assessed the likelihood of accidental airborne uranium contamination as low.
After this, inspectors requested documents on construction, pump purchases, graphite and barite, information on the water supply system, and details on where the building debris and equipment were taken. Besides Deir ez-Zor itself, the agency wanted to check three more sites that, according to received information, could be functionally related to the project.
And here the investigation essentially hit a wall.
Syria claimed that these sites were military and non-nuclear. The IAEA responded that military status itself does not exempt a country from its obligations under safeguards and offered a limited access regime that would allow concealing unrelated classified information. But after the 2008 visit, the agency did not receive the full volume of documents, explanations, and access it deemed necessary for years.
This is significant. Inspectors did not “check everything and just not believe Assad.” They found the first physical trace, and then could not verify the entire related chain.
In 2011, Russia appears
By May 2011, the IAEA had pieced together the building’s configuration, cooling system, satellite images, purchases, sample analysis, and information on possible foreign assistance. The agency’s conclusion was harsh: the destroyed facility was very likely a reactor and should have been declared by Syria.
The Board of Governors recognized the violation of the safeguards agreement and decided to report it to the UN Security Council. Russia and China voted against.
At the same time, there is no evidence of Russia’s involvement in the construction of Al-Kibar. There are no published documents allowing one to assert that Moscow knew the full scale of the Syrian program. The confirmed Russian role begins precisely here — in the international “diplomacy” around the already discovered violation.
In September 2014, the story repeated in a more illustrative form. The IAEA was still talking about unresolved issues and demanding Syrian cooperation, while Russia proposed to remove the case of past Syrian nuclear activities from the agenda of future Board of Governors meetings. The initiative did not pass: 17 members voted against it, China and Venezuela supported Moscow.
At that time, no one yet knew the full scale of the fuel infrastructure, the volume of manufactured fuel, and the places of its storage.
And Iran?
Iran was one of Assad’s main regional allies, so its possible role was discussed almost from the moment Al-Kibar was revealed. Versions appeared about financing North Korean assistance, Tehran’s interest in future plutonium, or broader trilateral cooperation.
But here the boundary of the proven is quite clear. The IAEA did not establish that Iran built or financed Al-Kibar or was supposed to receive the material produced there. Therefore, a proven “Iran — Syria — DPRK — Russia” project does not emerge from the available documents.
The roles are different. North Korean technological assistance is much better confirmed. Syria was the host of the undeclared program. Iran was a strategic ally, around whose possible role there were versions. Russia politically opposed strengthening international consideration of the Syrian case.
NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency makes this distinction specifically: today’s relevance of the story does not require turning it into a theory of a general conspiracy.
The investigation revived even under Assad — and after him, it went significantly further
It would be wrong to write that Assad did not allow anyone until the end of his rule, and the new authorities opened everything from the first day. In March 2024, Grossi visited Damascus, after which Syria resumed interaction on the old dossier. During 2024, inspectors gained access to three related sites and took new environmental samples.
In June 2025, the analysis of these samples provided the next physical trace: a significant number of particles of anthropogenic natural uranium were found at one of the sites, some of which corresponded to processes of converting uranium concentrate into uranium oxide. The new Syrian authorities stated that they did not know the origin of the material and allowed a repeat sampling.
By this time, Assad was already in Russia. On December 8, 2024, he reached the Russian airbase Khmeimim, from where he was evacuated to Russia by Moscow’s decision; Putin granted him asylum. This detail later becomes especially noticeable against the backdrop of negotiations by the new Syria about the future of the Khmeimim base itself.
Who informed the IAEA about the 73 tons — and where they were found
On July 17, 2026, the post-Assad Syrian authorities themselves sent a letter to the IAEA. They reported the existence of another site that Syria had never declared before and offered the agency to check the facility and any nuclear material that might be there.
This was not the destroyed reactor in Deir ez-Zor itself and not one of the three sites that the IAEA had been trying to check since 2008. The exact location of the new site is not publicly disclosed. Its previous official designation and coordinates are also not published.
In August, Grossi and inspectors went there. To reach the material, they had to dismantle walls and pass through narrow, hard-to-reach areas. Inside were boxes with nuclear material. Thus, inspectors physically reached approximately 73 tons of natural metallic uranium.
Most of the stock was already in the form of fuel elements. According to a confidential IAEA report, the content of which was retold by the media and profile analysts, it was about 55 tons of metallic uranium in thousands of fuel rods; the rest consisted of scrap and fuel manufacturing waste.
This fundamentally changes the picture. Not bags of ore and not a randomly found piece of metal, but a stock of material related to reactor fuel production.
Open materials do not allow confidently naming the discovered site itself as a fuel manufacturing plant. More correctly — a previously undeclared nuclear material storage. The production infrastructure was restored at other sites.
The IAEA installed cameras and placed the material under safeguards. Grossi formulated the task simply: the agency must know the location of this uranium “to the last gram.”
And meanwhile, they began to dig at Deir ez-Zor itself
On August 29, 2026, inspectors returned to the site of the destroyed reactor. Excavations revealed part of the underground cooling system, and its design corresponded to reactor infrastructure. Simultaneously, the agency was able to clarify the functions of the three sites that had been featured in the investigation for so many years.
One site was related to uranium conversion and/or fuel manufacturing. Another was used for temporary storage of construction materials. The third was associated with the movement and storage of Deir ez-Zor materials, as well as with planned reprocessing.
The picture of “one suspicious building in the desert” finally turned into another: a nearly completed reactor, Syrian fuel manufacturing, related sites, tens of tons of metallic uranium, and plans for further reprocessing.
This is a serious path to obtaining fissile material. But it still does not allow saying that Assad had already ordered the creation of nuclear weapons. Grossi separately emphasizes: the technical configuration can be established, the intention — no.
And only then did they close the old violation
On September 9, the IAEA Board of Governors terminated the previous resolution on Syrian non-compliance with safeguards. This does not mean the completion of all inspections in Syria: the safeguards agreement remains in effect, 73 tons remain under observation, and further verification of materials continues.
But the old sequence is now fully visible.
In 2008, the first uranium particles were found. In 2011, the IAEA recognized the facility as an undeclared reactor — Russia opposed referring the case to the Security Council. In 2014, related sites had not yet been properly checked — Moscow proposed removing the issue from the agenda. In 2024–2025, new samples again led inspectors to processed uranium. In 2026, a huge fuel stock was discovered, and the functions of related infrastructure were restored.
And only after this verification was the previous case indeed closed.
Therefore, today’s Iran is not quite a separate story
The Syrian example does not automatically prove anything about Iran. Fordow, Natanz, and Al-Kibar are different programs, different technical conditions, and different obligations to the IAEA.
But one can compare Moscow’s diplomatic behavior.
In June 2025, Russia voted against the IAEA decision on Iran’s violations. On September 1, 2026, Moscow and Beijing opposed referring the Iranian issue to the Security Council, and on September 17, they blocked the continuation of independent control over compliance with restored sanctions.
This does not prove a unified Russian plan to cover up the nuclear programs of “partners.” But the Syrian story provides a specific criterion: what happens when Moscow considers international pressure excessive before inspectors have received all the answers?
In the Syrian case, the answers years later turned out to be quite material — samples, reactor cooling system, fuel infrastructure, and tens of tons of uranium.
Simultaneously, Syria is revising another legacy of Assad — Russian bases
On August 9, 2026, Damascus and Moscow, after 18 months of negotiations, agreed on a new regime for Tartus and Khmeimim. Civilian infrastructure should come under Syrian control, and military facilities should operate as joint training centers. Russian forces, however, remain.
NANews has already analyzed the change in the status of Tartus and Khmeimim and the consequences of weakening the previous Russian “Syrian lever” for Israel.
On September 7, a Russian convoy of four supply ships arrived at Tartus and Khmeimim. Reuters confirmed the arrival of the ships through satellite data and testimonies; sources mentioned ammunition, although the exact composition was not independently confirmed by the agency.
Here is an almost symbolic detail. Khmeimim is the very Russian base through which Assad left Syria in December 2024 and ended up under Russian asylum. Now Moscow is forced to coordinate the future of this base with the authorities after Assad.
Therefore, one should not look at the name “joint center,” but at the powers: who allows Russian ships to enter, who checks supplies, coordinates flights, determines permissible weapons, and can change the conditions of use of the facility. This will show the real degree of returning Syrian control.
What this means for Israel
For Israel, the 2007 story now stands on a much denser factual basis. Then the decision to strike was made based on intelligence data and the assessment of future risk; today there are IAEA conclusions, physical samples, fuel elements, confirmation of the cooling system, and related infrastructure.
But the exact formula remains this: Israel destroyed a nearly completed undeclared nuclear reactor with serious proliferation potential, not a “ready Syrian atomic bomb.”
Further, Israel needs to look at three things. First — whether the IAEA’s full access to the 73 tons of uranium, material accounting, its safe storage, and control of any movements will be maintained. Second — what will really remain of the Russian military presence and how will incident prevention channels work if the IDF operates over Syria. Third — whether the new Damascus can prevent the restoration of weapon routes from Iran to Hezbollah and other groups threatening Israel.
Explanation for readers: why 73 tons are not 73 tons for bombs
Natural uranium cannot simply be placed in a nuclear warhead. The Syrian project was dangerous because of the chain: natural uranium is turned into reactor fuel, the reactor irradiates it, plutonium forms inside, and then it must be chemically separated from the spent fuel.
Therefore, data on planned reprocessing are of particular importance. They show the possible next stage of the fuel cycle. But the technical ability to go such a path and a proven political decision to make weapons are not the same; the latter was not established by the IAEA.
Ukraine here is a different story, but the criterion is the same
It is impossible to draw a direct analogy with the Zaporizhzhia NPP. In Ukraine, it is about a large operating nuclear power plant in conditions of war and Russian occupation, not a secret undeclared reactor.
The only common question is: how much does the state support independent international access when the result of the inspection may be politically inconvenient for it or its partner.
The Syrian story now allows evaluating Russian statements about “excessive international control” not only by words. In 2014, Moscow proposed removing the case from the permanent agenda. Years later, it turned out that inspectors had not yet seen a significant part of the infrastructure and did not know about the later found stock of nuclear material.
After Assad, two stories converged
Russia remains in Syria but is already renegotiating Tartus and Khmeimim with a state trying to regain control over its own infrastructure. Meanwhile, Assad himself is under Russian asylum.
Simultaneously, another legacy of his regime is being revealed. International inspectors gained access to what had remained under-checked for decades and were able to restore a much more complete picture of the secret nuclear project.
There is no basis to assert that Russia built Al-Kibar or knew everything that was happening around it. There is also no evidence of Iran’s direct involvement in the reactor’s construction.
But another sequence is documented: Moscow opposed strengthening international consideration when the investigation was not yet completed. The old Syrian case could only be closed after inspectors received access, documents, samples, and the nuclear material itself.
Today, Russia again claims that international pressure around the nuclear program of its other Middle Eastern “partner” — Iran — is “politicized” and “should give way to diplomacy.”
The Syrian experience does not provide a ready answer as to whether Moscow is right or not in the case of Iran. It provides a more useful thing — a way to verify such statements.
A nuclear dossier is closed not when allies consider the questions sufficient.
It closes when the inspectors receive answers.
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