Month: June 2026

A small fish that argues with biology textbooks

In the rivers of Mexico and southern Texas lives a small silvery fish that many biologists long considered an almost impossible mistake of nature. It doesn’t look dangerous, doesn’t impress with its size, and doesn’t resemble a sensation.

But it is the Amazon molly that has become one of the strangest mysteries of evolutionary biology.

This species has no males. At all.

Schools of Amazon mollies consist only of females, but they still need a male for reproduction — just not of their own species, but a closely related one. The female chooses a partner, uses his sperm as a biological ‘starter key,’ after which the male DNA does not enter the offspring.

As a result, only females are born again.

Genetically, they are almost copies of their mother. This form of reproduction is called gynogenesis: the sperm triggers the development of the embryo but does not become part of the hereditary material of the new generation.

At first glance, this looks like a perfect scheme. No need to look for ‘your’ male, no need to mix genes, no need to pass on only half of your genetic set to the offspring. But this is where the main problem begins.

From the point of view of classical evolutionary logic, such a species should not exist for long.

Why life without males was considered a dead end

Sexual reproduction seems inconvenient and costly to nature. You need to find a partner, compete, expend energy, take risks, and pass on not the entire set of genes to the offspring, but only part of it.

Asexual reproduction looks simpler and more efficient: one individual itself gives offspring, passing on almost all of its genetic material.

But in biology, simplicity does not always mean an advantage.

Sex is needed by nature not for romance, but for genetic diversity. When the genes of the mother and father mix, each generation receives a new combination of traits. This helps the species adapt to diseases, climate, parasites, environmental changes, and random threats.

Even more important is that sexual reproduction helps cleanse the genome of harmful mutations.

When copying DNA, errors are inevitable. In species with sexual reproduction, some of these errors are eliminated by natural selection. In clones, the situation is more dangerous: if a harmful mutation appears, it can be passed on further and further, accumulating in generations.

This process is called Muller’s ratchet.

The meaning is simple: genetic degradation moves like a mechanism that cannot turn back. Errors accumulate, it becomes harder to fix them, and at some point, the species should find itself on the path to extinction.

That’s why the Amazon molly so irritates the usual schemes.

It has existed for about 100,000 years. For a species that reproduces clonally and does not receive normal gene exchange through males, this is a huge period.

How the Amazon molly defied the evolutionary verdict

The story of this fish began about 100,000 years ago when a female Atlantic molly crossed with a male sailfin molly. In a normal situation, such a hybrid could have been a dead-end branch — beautiful, strange, but unable to create a sustainable line.

However, a rare evolutionary glitch occurred.

A new species appeared that learned to use males of other closely related species only to trigger reproduction. Their DNA almost does not enter the offspring, but the very fact of contact with sperm is needed for the embryo’s development to begin.

Thus, the Amazon molly emerged — a female species that lives off a foreign biological ‘starter’ but does not pass male genes to its daughters.

On the level of the plot, this sounds like a natural provocation. On the level of science — as a challenge to the basic question: how has its genome not yet collapsed under the weight of mutations?

The answer seems to be related to a mechanism that scientists describe as gene conversion.

To explain without complex terminology, it’s like an internal ‘copy-paste’ system. When one copy of a gene is damaged, the cell can use another copy as a template for repair. This process also exists in humans, but in the Amazon molly, according to new data, it plays a special role.

This fish doesn’t just copy itself generation after generation.

It constantly ‘cleans up’ dangerous sections of DNA.

Genetic repair instead of regular sex

A new study published in Nature showed an important detail: although the Amazon molly indeed accumulates mutations faster than its parent species with sexual reproduction, this has not led to the functional destruction of the genome.

In other words, mutations exist, but they have not destroyed the species.

The reason may be that gene conversion helps natural selection more effectively eliminate the most dangerous errors. Damaged sections of DNA can be rewritten from more successful copies, and harmful mutations do not have time to quickly turn into a deadly burden.

It’s important not to exaggerate here. The Amazon molly has not proven that sexual reproduction is ‘unnecessary.’ It has shown something else: nature sometimes finds workarounds where theory expected a dead end.

For science, this is fundamental.

If clonal species were often considered a temporary anomaly doomed to extinction, it is now clear: some organisms may have their own mechanisms of genetic protection.

In this sense, the small fish from the warm waters of Mexico and Texas has become not a curiosity, but an important clue.

For the Israeli audience, this story is also interesting because Israel has long lived in a culture of science, medicine, biotechnology, and precise data analysis. When Nikk.Agency — Israel News | Nikk.Agency discusses such topics, it’s not just about an unusual fish, but about how fundamental biology can one day influence the understanding of mutations, hereditary risks, and oncological processes.

Why this fish is important not only for biologists

The Amazon molly shows that evolution does not always follow a neat school scheme. It can work through exceptions, glitches, hybrids, random successes, and unexpected self-repair mechanisms.

Scientists have long known that there are other species in nature that break the usual rules. For example, rotifers — microscopic creatures from freshwater bodies — have also lived without males for millions of years. They were even called an ‘evolutionary scandal’ because, according to classical calculations, they should have disappeared long ago.

Rotifers took a different path: they can use foreign genetic material from the environment. Some of these ‘borrowed’ genes help them survive drying, diseases, and extreme conditions.

The Amazon molly chose a different scenario.

It doesn’t so much steal foreign genes as use its own hybrid baggage. Its genome retains the legacy of two different parental species, giving it more options for internal DNA repair.

Simply put, it started with an unusually rich genetic set and then learned to maintain it in working condition.

Connection with medicine: cautious but important

The main practical interest of this story is mutations.

Mutations are at the core of many diseases, including cancer. Of course, the Amazon molly does not provide a ready-made cure and does not turn a biological discovery into a medical instruction. But it shows that nature can build genome protection systems differently than previously thought.

For researchers, this can be a valuable model.

If we understand how exactly this fish recognizes, rewrites, and eliminates harmful mutations, we can delve deeper into the logic of genetic repair itself. In medicine, such knowledge is never superfluous, especially where DNA damage, hereditary failures, and tumor processes are concerned.

No one knows yet whether the Amazon molly will live for hundreds of thousands or millions more years.

But it is already clear: it has not just survived against expectations. It has made scientists more cautious about saying what is ‘impossible’ in nature.

This fish has not canceled the laws of evolution.

It has reminded us that the laws of life are more complex than convenient formulas. Sometimes a small creature from a quiet river can pose a big question to all of biology: what if nature has more ways to survive than we are used to thinking?

…
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A lecture in Lviv about the Jewish world in the life and work of Ivan Franko became an occasion to take a broader look at one of the complex topics of Ukrainian-Jewish history. Franko lived in Galicia, where Ukrainians, Jews, and Poles not only coexisted but also influenced each other daily — through cities, markets, literature, politics, religion, poverty, conflicts, and memory.

A lecture in Lviv as an occasion to talk about more

On June 13, 2026, in Lviv – a cultural and educational meeting-lecture “The Jewish World in the Work and Life of Ivan Franko“.

It is organized by the Jewish Religious Community of Progressive Judaism “Teiva“. The venue is the Honorary Consulate of the State of Israel in the Western region of Ukraine, Lviv, Hazova Street, 36/3. The speaker is Bohdan Tykholoz — a well-known Franko scholar, literary critic, and director of the Franko House, the Lviv National Literary-Memorial Museum of Ivan Franko.

But the meeting itself is important here not only as a cultural poster.

It provides a good reason to return to a topic that is often either smoothed over or simplified: Ivan Franko and the Jewish World of Galicia.

For the Ukrainian reader, Ivan Franko is one of the main classics of national culture. For many Israelis, his name may be almost unfamiliar. Meanwhile, through Franko, one can see not only Ukrainian literature but also a whole layer of shared Ukrainian-Jewish history.

He was called “Kamenyar” (Ukr.) (Stonecutter — a worker who cuts stones) — in the image of a person who breaks a rock and opens the road ahead. In Ukrainian culture, this image became a symbol of labor, struggle, perseverance, and the movement towards freedom.

This is the history of Lviv, Drohobych, Boryslav, Nahuievychi, Galician towns and villages.

This is the history of a region where Ukrainians, Jews, and Poles lived side by side for centuries. Not in a simple postcard about “friendship of peoples,” but in real life — with mutual influence, trade, poverty, competition, religious distance, political disputes, stereotypes, and cultural exchange.

Such a conversation is important for the section “History and Facts“. Not a festive legend. Not an accusatory slogan. But an attempt to understand how everything was actually arranged.

Fact one: Franko did not grow up in a mono-national world

Ivan Franko was born in 1856 in the village of Nahuievychi, near Drohobych. This was Galicia — then part of the Austrian, and later Austro-Hungarian Empire.

Today it is Western Ukraine.

But to understand Franko, it is important to remember: Galicia of his time was not homogeneous. In towns and villages, Ukrainians, Poles, Jews, Germans, Austrian officials, craftsmen, peasants, traders, priests, rabbis, teachers, lawyers, journalists, and political activists lived side by side.

Drohobych, where Franko studied, was not just a Ukrainian city.

It was a city with a strong Jewish presence, with trade, crafts, religious life, urban poverty, and social contrasts. Lviv, where Franko worked, wrote, argued, and died, was an even more complex space — Ukrainian, Polish, Jewish, Austrian, multilingual, and politically tense.

Therefore, when we talk about the “Jewish world” in Franko’s life, it is not a separate side topic.

Jewish life was part of the environment in which he was formed.

He saw it in cities, markets, schools, everyday life, politics, in conversations about money, poverty, labor, justice, and the future of the peoples of Galicia.

And this immediately changes the approach to the topic.

Franko did not “add Jews” to his texts for color. He wrote about a world where Jews were a real and noticeable part of society.

Why this is important for Israel

For the Israeli audience, such a topic may sound especially close.

Many families in Israel have roots in Eastern European cities. For some, Lviv, Drohobych, Boryslav, Sambir, Stryi, Kolomyia, or Ternopil are not just names on a map, but places of family memory.

Sometimes this memory is associated with pre-war Jewish life.

Sometimes — with the Holocaust.

Sometimes — with Soviet times, emigration, repatriation, and a break with the past.

Franko helps to see an earlier layer of this history. Before the catastrophes of the 20th century. Before the Soviet erasure of memory. Before today’s war of Russia against Ukraine.

He shows Galicia as a space where Ukrainian and Jewish histories were intertwined long before the emergence of modern states of Ukraine and Israel.

Fact two: Jewish characters in Franko’s works are a mirror of Galician society

Jewish characters in Franko’s works do not appear by chance.

They are connected with the social issues that concerned the writer: poverty, money, exploitation, power, labor, dependence, city, trade, education, national awakening, and justice.

Boryslav is especially important.

In the second half of the 19th century, Boryslav became one of the centers of oil production in Galicia. It was a world of sharp social contrasts. Workers, entrepreneurs, small intermediaries, landless people, people without protection, people with hope to get rich quickly, and people who had only their labor to sell came here.

Franko saw Boryslav as a symbol of the new capitalist order.

And in this world, Jewish characters often occupy the roles of traders, tenants, intermediaries, entrepreneurs, small dealers, city dwellers. But to read this only as a “depiction of Jews” would be a mistake.

Franko describes not an isolated Jewish community.

He describes a system of relationships.

Who owns the money.

Who works.

Who depends.

Who bargains.

Who survives.

Who takes advantage of another’s weakness.

Who remains a prisoner of their own position.

In such a picture, Jewish images become part of a broader social critique. But it is here that the complexity arises, which cannot be bypassed.

Stereotypes of the era: an uncomfortable but necessary part of the conversation

Franko was a great writer and thinker.

But he was not a person outside his time.

In his texts, one can find sympathy for the poor, interest in human fate, attention to social injustice. But one can also find sharp formulations, stereotypical images, generalizations that today sound heavy and require critical reading.

This is an important point.

If we write that Franko simply “loved the Jewish world,” it would be untrue.

If we write that Franko was only a bearer of anti-Jewish stereotypes, it would also be untrue.

His position is more complex.

He lived in a society where national movements fought for a place under the sun. Ukrainians of Galicia sought cultural and political rights. The Polish elite maintained influence. Jewish communities sought different paths — from traditional religious life to assimilation, socialist ideas, and Zionism.

In this environment, conflicts easily arose.

Economic.

Religious.

Everyday.

Political.

National.

Franko did not stand above all this as a cold observer. He was a participant in the disputes of his era. Therefore, his Jewish theme cannot be sterile.

NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency considers it important to talk about this without embellishments. Ukrainian-Jewish history does not become weaker from an honest conversation. On the contrary, it becomes more mature when it retains both light and shadow.

Fact three: Franko turned to the Jewish biblical tradition as a language of the people’s destiny

There is another level that is especially important for the Israeli reader.

This is the poem “Moses”.

For Ukrainian culture, “Moses” by Ivan Franko is one of the key texts. But it is not a work about the Jewish community of Galicia in the everyday sense. Here Franko reaches another level — biblical, symbolic, national.

Moses in Franko’s work is not just a hero of ancient history.

It is the image of a leader who leads the people through the desert.

The people are tired.

The people doubt.

The people do not always understand their prophet.

The people want results but are not always ready for the cost of the journey.

For Franko, this plot became a way to talk about the Ukrainian fate. About a people who have language, culture, memory, inner strength, but do not yet have their own state. About a people who need to go through a long desert of historical expectation.

Here the Jewish biblical image turns into a Ukrainian political and spiritual language.

For Israelis, this may be especially interesting.

The Ukrainian classic turns to the image of Moses not as a foreign decorative plot, but as a universal symbol of the people’s path, responsibility, freedom, and faith in the future.

Franko and Zionism: why the Ukrainian classic looked closely at the Jewish national movement

A separate topic, important for the Israeli reader, is Ivan Franko’s attitude towards Zionism.

At the end of the 19th century, Jewish politics in Europe was changing. The old question “how should Jews live among other peoples” no longer had one answer. Some chose assimilation. Others remained in the traditional religious environment. Some joined the socialist movement. And part of the Jewish intellectuals and activists increasingly spoke about national revival and the right of the Jewish people to their own political future.

Franko observed this not as a random newspaper reader.

He lived in Galicia, where the Jewish community was a noticeable part of society, economy, urban culture, and political life. Therefore, Zionism for him was not a distant theory, but one of the answers to the real problems of Jews in Eastern and Central Europe.

Researchers directly note: Franko’s attitude towards Jews was ambiguous, from sympathy and interest to harsh assessments and stereotypes, but after the fall of Soviet censorship, texts became more known in which his benevolent attitude towards Jews and Zionism is visible.

For Franko, Zionism was important primarily as an expression of national self-awareness.

He himself belonged to the Ukrainian movement, which sought cultural, social, and political rights for Ukrainians of Galicia. Therefore, he could perceive the Jewish national movement not as a strangeness, but as a parallel historical process: a people facing discrimination and pressure seeks a language of self-organization, dignity, and future.

In 1893, Franko was in Vienna and, according to researchers, met with Theodor Herzl — one of the main future ideologists of political Zionism. Later, Franko wrote a preface to the Lviv publication of Herzl’s work “The Jewish State”. At the same time, it is important not to simplify: Franko did not accept the idea of a Jewish state unconditionally and considered it difficult to implement, but he recognized the need for Jewish solidarity in the face of anti-Semitism.

This is a very important facet.

Franko could sharply criticize wealthy Jewish entrepreneurs, especially in texts about Boryslav and oil capitalism. But this criticism did not cancel the other: he saw the right of Jews to national self-organization and understood that anti-Semitism is a real threat, not an invented problem.

In this sense, Franko differed from many contemporaries.

In the Ukrainian, Polish, and pan-European environment of the late 19th century, anti-Semitic sentiments were strong. The Jewish population was often turned into a convenient object of accusations — for the poverty of peasants, for economic crises, for political failures, for fear of modernization. Against this background, Franko’s very readiness to discuss the Jewish question not only in the language of accusation but also in the language of rights, solidarity, and national future was important.

But again — without embellishment.

Franko was not a modern liberal author of the 21st century. In his legacy, there are texts and formulations that today require critical reading. Researchers therefore speak of the complexity of his attitude towards Jews: it combined support for Jewish emancipation, interest in Zionism, social criticism of Jewish capital, and stereotypes of the era.

For an article in the “History and Facts” section, this is especially valuable.

Franko shows that Ukrainian-Jewish history is not divided into black and white. There were conflicts in it, but there were also points of understanding. There was social criticism, but there was also the defense of the right of Jews to participate in public life. There were stereotypes, but there was also interest in the Jewish national movement.

Zionism in this history is also important because it connects Franko with a topic understandable to today’s Israel: the right of a people not to dissolve, not to disappear, not to be an eternal object of foreign policy, but to speak of itself as a subject of history.

It is here that Franko unexpectedly becomes interesting not only to the Ukrainian but also to the Israeli reader.

He looked at the Jewish question from Galicia — a region where Ukrainians themselves fought for voice, language, and recognition. Therefore, the Jewish aspiration for self-organization could not be an empty sound for him. It entered the same great historical conversation about peoples without full political power, about the rights of minorities, about the future of Eastern Europe, and about how to maintain dignity in a world of empires and national conflicts.

Fact four: Lviv in this topic is not just a place on the poster

Lviv in the history of Franko and the Jewish world is not a backdrop.

It is one of the main characters.

Here Franko lived, worked, wrote, argued, and died. Here Ukrainian political and literary thought was formed. Here, until World War II, there was a powerful Jewish life—religious, cultural, educational, commercial, political.

Lviv was a city of several memories.

Ukrainian.

Jewish.

Polish.

Austrian.

Later—Soviet.

And each of these memories left a mark, but not always preserved equally.

After the Holocaust, Jewish life in Lviv was almost destroyed. After Soviet rule, much was renamed, erased, silenced, or reduced to official formulations. After the restoration of Ukraine’s independence, a complex process of memory return began—not always quick, not always complete, but important.

Therefore, a lecture on Franko’s Jewish world in Lviv sounds different than it would in any other city.

In Lviv, this topic is literally underfoot.

In the streets.

In the houses.

In the archives.

In the museum collections.

In family stories.

In the vanished synagogues.

In Ukrainian texts.

In Jewish memory.

In the modern dialogue between Ukraine and Israel.

And if such a meeting takes place at the Honorary Consulate of the State of Israel in the Western region of Ukraine, it adds another meaning. It is not only about the past but also about today’s readiness to speak about shared history in the language of respect and accuracy.

Who is Ivan Franko: an explanation for the Israeli reader

Many Israelis may know the name Taras Shevchenko, but not always understand who Ivan Franko is.

And without this, it is difficult to understand why a lecture on his Jewish world is important at all.

Ivan Franko is one of the main Ukrainian writers, thinkers, and public figures of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. For Ukrainian culture, he stands alongside Taras Shevchenko and Lesya Ukrainka.

If Shevchenko became a symbol of the Ukrainian national awakening of the 19th century, then Franko became a figure of another type—an intellectual of European scale, who combined literature, science, politics, journalism, translation, social criticism, and work with folk culture.

He was not only a poet.

Franko was a prose writer, playwright, translator, literary critic, publicist, scientist, political activist, folklore researcher, and a person of immense intellectual energy.

He wrote about poverty, labor, love, humiliation, dignity, social injustice, national awakening, human weakness, and the responsibility of the intelligentsia to the people.

Ivan Franko (August 27, 1856, Nahuievychi, Drohobych County, Sambir District, Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria, Austrian Empire – May 28, 1916, Lviv, Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria, Austria-Hungary) was an outstanding Ukrainian poet, publicist, translator, scientist, public and political figure. Doctor of Philosophy (1893), habilitated doctor (1895), full member of the Shevchenko Scientific Society (1899), honorary doctor of Kharkiv University (1906). Member of the “Prosvita” Society.

During his more than 40-year creative activity, Franko worked extremely productively as an original writer (poet, prose writer, playwright) and translator, literary critic and publicist, multifaceted scientist—literary, linguistic, translation, and art critic, ethnologist and folklorist, historian. His creative legacy is estimated to include several thousand works totaling more than 100 volumes. In total, during his lifetime, more than 220 editions were published as separate books and brochures, including more than 60 collections of his original and translated works of various genres. He was one of the first professional Ukrainian writers, meaning he earned a living through literary work.

Franko wrote primarily in Ukrainian—more precisely, in the literary Ukrainian of his time with a strong Galician linguistic layer.

But he was a multilingual author and intellectual.

He also wrote and published:

• in Polish—especially in the press and publicism;
• in German—for the Austrian and European scientific and publicistic space;
• used and knew Russian, Old Church Slavonic, Latin, Greek, translated from various languages;
• worked with texts in Hebrew/Jewish biblical tradition through biblical plots, primarily in the poem “Moses”, but wrote the poem itself in Ukrainian.

But the scale of Franko is best seen through his works.

One of the early and very important works is “Boa constrictor”, written in 1878. It is prose about Boryslav, oil capital, greed, dependence, and a world where money gradually begins to govern human relationships. For the theme of Galicia, this is especially important: Boryslav in Franko’s work becomes not just a city, but a symbol of new harsh capitalism.

In 1881–1882, Franko wrote the social novel “Boryslav Laughs”. In it, he showed the hard life of workers and the emergence of worker protest in oil Boryslav. It is not a novel “about industry” in the dry sense, but a text about people whom the new economy grinds between poverty, exploitation, and hope for justice.

In 1883, the historical novel “Zakhar Berkut” appeared. Its action is connected with the 13th century and the resistance of the Carpathian community to the Mongol invasion. For Ukrainian culture, this is one of the important texts about freedom, communal solidarity, dignity, and the ability of the people to defend their land. Through the past, Franko spoke about the present: that the people can withstand if they have internal organization, memory, and will.

In 1893, the drama “Stolen Happiness” was written. This is another side of Franko—not only a social thinker but also a subtle psychologist. At the center of the play is personal tragedy, ruined love, the pressure of circumstances, and the question of whether a person can preserve themselves when life is already broken by others’ decisions.

In 1895, Franko wrote the novel “The Foundations of Society”, where he again addressed the theme of social morality, power, money, and hypocrisy. He was interested not only in poverty as a fact but in how society is structured, where some people gain power, and others become dependent.

In 1896, the poetic cycle “Withered Leaves” was published. It is lyrics about love, pain, loneliness, internal fracture, and human vulnerability. This text is important because it shows that Franko was not only a “stonecutter”, not only a public fighter, but also an author of very personal, dramatic, emotional poetry.

In 1900, the novel “Crossroads” appeared. The very title is well-suited to the conversation about Franko and Galicia. It is a work about provincial society, politics, law, corruption, national work, personal choices, and the complex paths that people and entire communities take.

In 1905, Franko wrote the poem “Moses”—one of the key texts of Ukrainian literature. In it, the biblical image of Moses becomes the language of conversation about the fate of the people, leadership, doubts, desert, freedom, and the path to the future. For Ukrainians, it was not just a retelling of the biblical plot, but a reflection on their own national path.

That is why Franko is especially interesting for the Israeli reader.

He addressed the Jewish biblical tradition not as a distant folklore, but as a universal language of history. Through Moses, Franko spoke about a people seeking a path, tiring, doubting, arguing with the prophet, but still facing the question of freedom.

There is also another well-known work, important for understanding Franko’s image—the poem “The Stonecutters”, written in 1878. It is with this that his image of the Stonecutter is associated. In Ukrainian culture, The Stonecutter is a person who breaks the rock and paves the way forward. This image became a symbol of labor, perseverance, resistance, and movement towards freedom.

Therefore, Franko in Ukraine is not just the author of several school texts.

He is one of those who helped Ukrainian culture transition from a folkloric and romantic tradition to a modern intellectual nation. He wrote about peasants and workers, about the city and industry, about love and politics, about the past and the future, about the people and the individual, about weakness and dignity.

His place in Ukrainian literature is special.

Taras Shevchenko gave Ukrainians a powerful poetic and national voice. Lesya Ukrainka brought Ukrainian literature to the level of European philosophical drama and intellectual poetry. Ivan Franko stood between them and alongside them as a universal figure: writer, scientist, publicist, critic, translator, political thinker, and builder of modern Ukrainian culture.

Franko was born and formed in Galicia, where Ukrainian history constantly intersected with Jewish, Polish, Austrian, and pan-European. Therefore, his texts help to understand not only Ukraine but also the Eastern European world from which millions of Jewish families emerged.

Through Franko, one can see the map of Galicia not as a dry historical region, but as a living space.

Nahuievychi—the birthplace.

Drohobych—the city of youth.

Boryslav—a symbol of oil capitalism and social pain.

Lviv—the center of culture, politics, journalism, and memory.

And alongside this—Jewish communities, markets, religious life, poverty, wealth, socialism, Zionism, stereotypes, fears, dialogue, and conflicts.

There is also another important fact that helps to understand the scale of memory about Franko.

In Ukraine, there is a city named after him—Ivano-Frankivsk. Historically, this city was called Stanislaviv, later Stanislav. In 1962, it was renamed Ivano-Frankivsk in honor of Ivan Franko. This happened in Soviet times, for the 300th anniversary of the city, but the logic of renaming was connected with the fact that Franko was perceived as one of the largest figures of Ukrainian culture and as a symbol of Galicia.

Why his name?

Because Franko is not a local author of one region. He became a national symbol. His name is associated with Western Ukraine, Lviv, Galicia, the Ukrainian language, literature, enlightenment, social thought, and the idea of cultural dignity. Therefore, the city of Ivano-Frankivsk on the map of Ukraine is not just an administrative name, but a sign of the place Franko occupies in Ukrainian memory.

For the Israeli reader, this can be explained simply: Franko for Ukraine is not only a writer but one of the people through whom Ukrainians learned to speak about themselves as a modern nation.

Therefore, the conversation about Franko and the Jewish world is not a narrow literary topic.

It is a way to understand how Ukrainian culture saw Jewish life.

How Jewish presence shaped Galicia.

How the biblical Moses became one of the images of the Ukrainian national path.

How national movements of the late 19th century sought the language of the future.

And why today, after all the catastrophes of the 20th century and against the backdrop of Russia’s war against Ukraine, it is important to talk about this without false sweetness and without destructive simplification.

Franko does not give us a convenient legend.

He gives complex material.

That is why he is important.

The history of Ukrainians and Jews in Galicia was not only a history of neighborhood but also a history of tension. Not only a history of pain but also a history of influence. Not only a history of rupture but also a history of shared cultural fabric.

The lecture in Lviv was just an occasion to reopen this topic.

And the topic itself is much broader than one meeting.

It is about the fact that Ukraine and the Jewish world have a long shared history—with cities, names, texts, conflicts, biblical images, and memory that cannot be given to either propaganda or oblivion.

Therefore, the conversation about Franko today is important not only for philologists.

It is important for everyone who wants to understand why Ukrainian-Jewish history is not an appendix to the great European history, but one of its central lines.

…
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On June 7, 2026, Armenia held parliamentary elections, which have long ceased to be just an internal Armenian vote. It was a test of whether Yerevan remains in Moscow’s shadow or finally solidifies a course towards more independent policies, rapprochement with Europe, and seeking peace in the region.

The outcome was painful for the Kremlin.

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s party, ‘Civil Contract,’ received 49.81% of the votes and, according to the Central Election Commission of Armenia, retained the ability to independently form the government. The main pro-Russian competitor, the ‘Strong Armenia’ alliance of Samvel Karapetyan, garnered 23.29%. Another major opposition bloc, ‘Armenia’ led by Robert Kocharyan, entered the parliament with a result of about 9.94%.

The Armenian choice that Moscow did not want to hear

Pashinyan called the result a ‘historic victory.’ And in this statement, the percentage is not the only important thing.

Armenia voted after difficult years, after the war, after the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh, after a painful reassessment of relations with Russia and the CSTO. For Moscow, this was a convenient pressure point: to play on fear, pain, fatigue, distrust, and return Yerevan to the familiar orbit.

But the calculation did not work.

The more actively the Kremlin tried to portray Pashinyan as a weak link, the more noticeable it became that a significant part of Armenian society no longer wants to return to the old political cage. For years, Moscow demanded gratitude, loyalty, and silence, but at a critical moment, many in Armenia saw that Russian security guarantees are worth less than the Kremlin’s propaganda about them.

Why this is important for Israel

For the Israeli audience, the Armenian elections are not distant Caucasian news. The South Caucasus is connected with security, energy, logistics, relations with Turkey, Iran, Azerbaijan, and Russia.

When Armenia seeks a more independent route, it changes the balance around the entire region. For Israel, which lives within a dense system of regional risks, such shifts cannot be read as a mere change in parliamentary percentages.

That is why NANews — News of Israel | Nikk.Agency considers this story not only as the victory of one party but as part of a broader process: countries that have depended on Moscow for decades are beginning to test whether they can live without Russian permission.

The Kremlin model cracked again

Russia once again pretends not to understand the main question: why do they leave at the first opportunity?

The answer is obvious.

Because Moscow offers not an alliance, but subjugation. Not respect, but control. Not security, but dependency, where any attempt to speak with one’s own voice is declared treason, foreign influence, or a ‘Western project.’

Armenia is not the first country to face this language of pressure. Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, the Baltic states, parts of Central Asian societies — all have their own experiences, traumas, and pace of moving away from the Russian shadow. But the direction of the process is the same: the rougher Moscow demands love, the faster former partners begin to seek an exit.

In this sense, Pashinyan’s result was not only an Armenian victory. It was a defeat for Russian political inertia.

Pashinyan won, but there is no simple future

At the same time, it is important not to turn the elections into a fairy tale. The victory of ‘Civil Contract’ does not mean that Armenia’s problems have disappeared.

The country remains facing a complex peace process with Azerbaijan, internal polarization, security issues, and the heavy memory of Karabakh. According to AP and Reuters, the result gives Pashinyan the opportunity to govern, but does not give him a constitutional supermajority that might be needed for the largest political decisions.

This means that the new mandate is strong, but not unlimited.

Pashinyan will have to prove that the course towards peace and greater distance from Moscow can provide not only symbolic independence but also practical security: working agreements, economy, borders, transport routes, international guarantees, and a more stable state system.

Defeat not only for Kiriyenko but for the entire imperial habit

In Moscow, judging by the reaction of Russian political circles, the result of the Armenian elections will be explained by anything: the West, the diaspora, technologies, ‘betrayal,’ mistakes of individual curators. But the real reason is deeper.

The Russian system does not know how to recognize that nations are not obliged to live under its political supervision.

It can pressure, buy, blackmail, threaten, use church rhetoric, pull out imperial maps, and scare with chaos. But all this works less and less. Especially where people have already seen the price of Russian ‘protection.’

Armenia made a gesture to Moscow that the Kremlin does not like to notice: it showed that even a small country can stop being an appendage of a foreign center of power.

And this is perhaps just the beginning.

If other post-Soviet countries feel the window of opportunity, Moscow will face not a single loss, but a chain reaction. Kazakhstan, Georgia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan — each will have its moment, its calculation, its caution. But the Russian dust no longer looks eternal.

For the Kremlin, this is the most unpleasant part of the Armenian elections.

Not that Pashinyan won.

But that the idea won: it is possible to leave Russia.

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“Not About the War”: The book of Jewish defender of Ukraine Maksym Shvartsman was presented in Chernivtsi on the 3rd anniversary of his death at the front - July 21, 2026 - Новости Израиля

Did Azerbaijan stop Israel’s vote on recognizing the Armenian genocide? - July 20, 2026 - Новости Израиля

June 2026 was the hardest for Ukrainian civilians since April 2022 — UN data - July 20, 2026 - Новости Израиля

The British The Telegraph published a report from a Kyiv school about the Defence of Ukraine classes — a school course where teenagers are taught survival in wartime conditions. The most striking phrase in the material was the words of 12-year-old Ukrainian schoolgirl Valeria: she couldn’t kill an animal, but wouldn’t hesitate if she had to shoot a Russian soldier.

This quote sounds heavy. Very heavy.

But even heavier is the question behind it: what must happen to childhood for a child to start speaking the language of war, threat, and survival?

A phrase that cannot be taken out of the context of war

Valeria was 12 years old when Russia began its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. After more than four years of war, she no longer speaks like a child from a peaceful city, but like a teenager from a country where sirens, shelters, news of the dead, and talks about the front have long become part of everyday life.

That is why her words cannot be read separately from February 24, 2022.

You cannot take one phrase from a schoolgirl, put it in a headline, and pretend it’s about “the hatred of Ukrainian children.” This is too convenient for Russian propaganda and too unfair to the children who did not choose this war.

Valeria does not reason from a safe distance. She grew up in a country that was attacked. For her, a Russian soldier is not an abstract person from an ethics textbook, but a representative of an army that came to Ukrainian land, brought occupation, destruction, funerals, missiles, and fear.

This is the terrifying meaning of her phrase.

It does not show that Ukrainian children have become cruel. It shows that the circumstances in which they have to grow up have become cruel.

An animal is innocent, a soldier of the invading army is a threat

The contrast in Valeria’s words is jarring precisely because it is built on a child’s moral logic. An animal is defenseless and innocent. It is pitiful. Killing it is unimaginable.

But a Russian soldier in her mind is no longer just a “person.” It’s a threat.

A child should not have to draw such a line. In normal life, a teenager should think about school, friends, music, exams, first career choices, trips, the future. Not about whether they could shoot if the war comes very close.

But Ukraine does not live in normal life.

And this is the main nerve of The Telegraph’s story: a school lesson in Kyiv looks like a military training session, but in essence, it is a lesson on how to survive in a country against which Russia is waging war.

What is happening in Ukrainian schools

The Telegraph describes a school in central Kyiv where teenagers undergo an eight-hour session of Defence of Ukraine. The lesson is held once a month. The program includes basic weapon handling skills, first aid, drones, behavior in threat conditions, and countering Russian information warfare.

Teachers in the material emphasize an important point: children are not being prepared to go to war. They are being prepared to survive.

For a country living under attack, this is a painful but understandable logic. If missiles, drones, mines, shelling, and funerals have become part of reality, the school can no longer pretend that the world around remains the same.

In Israel, this is especially understandable. A society that knows what alarms, shelters, terrorist attacks, mobilization, and constant security system work are, understands well the difference between militarism and forced preparation for danger.

That is why NAnovosti — News of Israel | Nikk.Agency views this story not as a sensation about “children with weapons,” but as a painful symptom of the war that Russia has brought into Ukrainian schools.

Not the romance of weapons, but fear of the future

There is an important detail in the report that prevents the material from turning into a flat slogan. Another student, Nikita, says he has known how to handle weapons since childhood because his father took him hunting even before the war.

But then he says the main thing: psychologically, he is not ready to shoot a person. According to him, people cannot truly be ready to shoot other people.

This contrast is very important.

In the same school, in the same shelter, in the same class, two different reactions of teenagers are heard. Valeria talks about being ready to shoot an enemy soldier. Nikita admits that he is not internally ready to shoot a person. Both reactions are human. Both were born from war.

And both show how deeply the Russian invasion has entered the lives of Ukrainian children.

This is not a generation that is “taught to hate.” This is a generation that is forced to understand too early what an enemy, a front, loss, protection, danger, and the cost of a mistake are.

The line between protection and trauma

Here begins the most difficult conversation.

Ukraine is obliged to protect children. And if reality requires teaching teenagers first aid, safety rules, threat recognition, working with drones, and understanding information warfare, the state cannot turn a blind eye to this.

But at the same time, society is already facing another problem: how to later return children to a normal language of life?

Because war changes not only the map, economy, and army. It changes the inner world of a person. Especially a child.

A child growing up under sirens hears the word “safety” differently. A child who sees memorial walls of graduates who died at the front understands the word “future” differently. A child who learns to assemble a weapon in a school shelter no longer lives in the childhood that adults usually promise to protect.

And this is not the fault of Ukrainian children.

This is the price of Russian aggression.

Why you cannot equate Ukraine and Russia

Russian propaganda will surely try to use such quotes as “proof” that Ukraine allegedly raises children in hatred. This is a familiar technique: first come with war, and then accuse the victim of learning to defend itself.

But there is no equality between Ukraine and Russia here.

The Ukrainian school operates in a country that was attacked. Its task is to prepare the child for a real threat, to give them survival skills, to teach them to help the wounded, not to panic, and to understand how enemy information attacks work.

The Russian system, on the contrary, is increasingly drawing children into justifying war, the cult of the army, imperial symbols, and supporting aggression. These are fundamentally different things.

One teenager learns to survive because a foreign army came to his country.

Another teenager is taught to be proud of the army that came to this country.

This difference cannot be erased.

The Israeli view on Ukrainian pain

For the Israeli audience, Valeria’s story does not sound foreign. Israel knows well how quickly children grow up under threat conditions. When alarms, shelters, talks about service, funerals, terrorist attacks, and constant anticipation of a new attack appear in life, childhood becomes different.

But the Ukrainian experience has its scale and its wound. It is about a full-scale war, about cities under attack, about the front, occupation, refugees, missing, dead, and children who have lived inside a historical catastrophe since the age of 12.

Therefore, the question is not whether it is good or bad that Ukrainian schoolchildren study the basics of defense.

The question is why in the 21st century a Ukrainian child should even have to take such lessons.

The answer is known.

Because Russia started the war. Because the Russian army came to Ukraine. Because Ukrainian children had to learn to live where adults could not keep the peace.

Valeria’s phrase should not become a reason for moralizing. She does not need a lecture on humanism from a safe office. Humanism begins not with demanding a child “not to say scary words,” but with demanding the aggressor’s army to leave another country.

When a Ukrainian schoolgirl says she couldn’t kill an animal but is ready to shoot a Russian soldier, it is not an accusation against Ukrainian children.

It is an accusation against war.

And above all — against those who brought this war to Ukrainian cities, schools, families, and children’s minds.

For children to see a soldier not as a threat again, the foreign army must first leave their land.

And then another, longer work will begin — to return to the generation that grew up under sirens a normal sense of life. To return childhood, where a school shelter will once again be just a room in a building, not a place where teenagers learn to hold weapons and talk about the enemy.

…
“Not About the War”: The book of Jewish defender of Ukraine Maksym Shvartsman was presented in Chernivtsi on the 3rd anniversary of his death at the front - July 21, 2026 - Новости Израиля

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Hanna Andriienko shares the story of transforming a karaoke club into the restaurant “SHO?”, the wave of challenges she faced, and how her project brings together the Ukrainian and Jewish communities in Tel Aviv and Israel.

On July 9, 2025, the second episode of the “Balachky” podcast was released on the UDM Israel channel, in which Hanna Andriienko, owner of the “SHO?” restaurant, spoke about her journey from economist to the hostess of one of the most heartfelt Ukrainian establishments in Tel Aviv.

Below we will reveal the main topics of the conversation and recommend watching the full video to hear all the details firsthand:

Main Topics of the Conversation

• The story of turning a karaoke club into the “SHO?” restaurant
• Adapting “SHO?” to wartime restrictions and switching to takeout and delivery
• Cultural mission: gastronomic evenings, “Territory Show” and “Odessa Courtyard”
• The role of “SHO?” in the life of the Ukrainian community in Israel: support, gatherings, and traditions
• Challenges and achievements of Ukrainians in Tel Aviv: how the community unites and develops

The “SHO?” Restaurant – A Home for the Ukrainian Soul in Israel

• Origin story: a sudden call from the former owner of a karaoke club and Hanna’s bold decision to create a “place of strength.”
• Atmosphere and menu: interior with Ukrainian rushnyky, family recipes for borscht, varenyky, deruny, and six types of signature nalivky.
• Supporting guests: the switch to takeout and delivery during the crisis when it was important to keep warmth in the community.

Subscribe to the “SHO?” Restaurant on Facebook: facebook.com/shoukrainianfood

3 Karlibach Street, Tel Aviv, Israel

The Ukrainian Community in Israel: Challenges and Achievements

Community Challenges

Emotional burnout after intense months, lack of coordination among initiatives, adaptation of new arrivals, and the need to preserve traditions.

Main Achievements

Regular “Zdybanka” gatherings with hundreds of participants, cultural projects “Territory Show” and “Odessa Courtyard,” volunteer campaigns, and the growth of the UDM Israel channel, confirming keen interest in the topic.

UDM Israel and the “Balachky” Podcast

UDM Israel https://www.youtube.com/@udmIsrael is the first Ukrainian-language channel from Israel where activists and entrepreneurs share stories of resilience and support in the “Balachky” format.

The high production quality and live format make this project a true bridge between cultures.

On the NAnews — Israel News website, we continue to tell stories of resilience and mutual aid. The stories of “SHO?” and UDM Israel inspire and show: together we are stronger.

…
“Not About the War”: The book of Jewish defender of Ukraine Maksym Shvartsman was presented in Chernivtsi on the 3rd anniversary of his death at the front - July 21, 2026 - Новости Израиля

Did Azerbaijan stop Israel’s vote on recognizing the Armenian genocide? - July 20, 2026 - Новости Израиля

June 2026 was the hardest for Ukrainian civilians since April 2022 — UN data - July 20, 2026 - Новости Израиля

«We are saving the last. We are saving at least through digitization, to preserve the possibility of restoration in the future after the war in Ukraine», notes Prof. Kotlyar in an interview with the UJE portal.

On the platform “Ukrainian-Jewish Encounter” (UJE – Ukrainian Jewish Encounter), an article by Israeli journalist Shimon Briman was published about a project that sounds almost like a verdict and simultaneously as a rescue plan: “Saving Treasures from Perishing“. It’s not about another “cultural news” and not just about one exhibition.

It’s about an attempt to document what may not survive the war and simple neglect: unique wall paintings and architectural details of Bukovinian synagogues, created before the Holocaust, and preserved only in a few cities in Ukraine.

Why the project appeared now, and what Israel has to do with it

Professor Yevhen Kotlyar (Kharkiv National Academy of Design and Arts) speaks directly: German colleagues launched an exhibition-research project against the backdrop of Russian aggression against Ukraine — and especially after the tragedy of October 7, 2023, in Israel. This connection is important: for some European institutions, the Jewish theme after 7/10 became not an abstraction but a personal moral challenge, and the Ukrainian context is read differently in it.

Kotlyar formulates the task harshly and without romance: “we are saving the last”, at least through digitization, to leave a chance for restoration after the war.

Who and how is doing this: UAAC, an international team, and Ukrainian Skeiron

The initiator and sponsor of the project was The Ukraine Art Aid Center (UAAC) — a German non-profit organization created in the spring of 2022 as a network of specialists and cultural institutions (Germany, Switzerland, Austria, Ukraine) to support Ukrainian cultural institutions during the full-scale invasion.

The working group on the topic of Bukovinian synagogues included Kilian Heck, Jörg Gaspel, Stefan Hoppe, Yevhen Kotlyar, and Mykola Kushnir. The curator is listed as Professor Oleksandra Lipinska (University of Cologne).

The key practical part is not words and not posters.

The technical work on digitizing three synagogues in Bukovina was carried out by the Ukrainian company Skeiron: laser 3D scanning, detailed documentation of architectural and artistic details. Skeiron, as emphasized, has been engaged in digitizing monuments at risk of disappearing due to the Russian war since the beginning of 2022.

And then another layer of international cooperation kicks in: based on Skeiron’s scans, specialists from the Institute of Architecture of Mainz University of Applied Sciences created an animated 3D model of the synagogue in Novoselytsia — and this is called a “special highlight” because it shows how digital technologies can work both as documentation and as a presentation of heritage.

What exactly is being saved in Bukovina: three buildings and three different fates

The project documents specific objects in Chernivtsi and Novoselytsia — with biographies where architecture constantly encounters politics, war, and indifference.

1) Synagogue “Groyse Shil” (Chernivtsi).

Construction lasted from 1799 to 1854. Until 1877, it was considered the main synagogue of the city. In the fall of 1941 — winter of 1942, the building was part of the Jewish ghetto. Since 1959, the premises were transferred to the city council for a cinema — and since then, in essence, it has been used not for its intended purpose.

2) Synagogue “House of Prayer of Benjamin” (Chernivtsi).

Built in 1923. Around 1938, the interior walls were repainted. In 1941–1942 — again a ghetto. After 1945, it became one of the three synagogues in the city whose operation was allowed by the Soviet authorities; in the 1960s–80s, as noted, — the only one. It opened for the community in 1994.

3) Novoselytsia Synagogue (Novoselytsia).

Built in 1919, when about 5000 Jews lived in the city. After the Holocaust, religious life declined. The vacant premises were repurposed as a Pioneer House — it existed until the early 1990s. Then the building has been vacant ever since. In 2009, Kyiv restorers discovered wall paintings inside.

For the reader in Israel, one thought is especially important here: the question is not only about restoration “someday”. The question is whether future restoration will have any original material left at all — a line, a layer of plaster, a fragment of ornament, the exact geometry of the vaults.

Why these paintings are not like “ordinary” synagogue paintings

Kotlyar explains the phenomenon of Bukovina through the history of the region: a long stay “at the crossroads of different states” made the local culture open to influences, and in the decoration of synagogues, this is especially evident — the Jewish religious theme is combined with the traditions of European palace paintings.

But the most valuable in the text is not the general formula, but the details that sound like evidence.

In Bukovinian synagogues, sacred plots were “translated” into the local visual language. The walls of Jericho were painted as Khotyn Fortress. The symbol of the tribe of Issachar (“bony donkey” in the Torah) turns into a pack donkey pulling a typical Bukovinian cart with books. The symbol of the tribe of Zebulun — a ship — is depicted as a mid-19th-century paddle steamer.

There is an even more telling scene: a fresco with a quote from Psalm 137 about the “rivers of Babylon” shows not abstract harps, but instruments characteristic of a Bukovinian klezmer ensemble.

And “Jerusalem” in Chernivtsi, Kotlyar describes almost as a joke: the artist, who clearly had not seen Jerusalem, copied a city view from a postcard brought by pilgrims from the Holy Land. In the center is a domed structure resembling the Temple, but in essence, it is the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, on the dome of which the artist added the Star of David.

At the same time, even at the beginning of the 20th century, as emphasized, in these paintings there are no images of people — a sign of preserving the old tradition. Therefore, if the fresco shows the exodus and the parting of the Red Sea, the viewer sees only Moses’ hand directing the staff to the water.

This is not “about an exhibition” — this is about insuring history

Yes, the material mentions the opening in the city library of Cologne, and there they indeed showed the results — fragments of paintings, digital models, a presentation of laser scanning capabilities. But the exhibition here is more of a showcase.

The essence is different: digitization becomes insurance. When a building is destroyed, when walls “crumble” from time or alterations, when an object stands empty for decades — the digital layer may remain the only accurate testimony of what existed at all. And for reconstruction, scientific description, legal documentation of damage, community archives — this is sometimes more important than loud ceremonies.

And another nuance that is often overlooked: such projects create a network of trust between countries. Germany provides infrastructure and expertise, Ukraine — the subject of preservation and technical work on site, and the Israeli experience of tragedy and memory (especially after October 7, 2023) becomes a moral context that helps Europe hear the topic differently. In the news about Ukraine, we more often see the front and strikes, but cultural heritage disappears quietly — without sirens.

The end of this story is still open. Kotlyar speaks of “the remnants of these artistic treasures perishing before our eyes.” And this is not a metaphor, but a description of the pace: war accelerates everything — destruction, looting, repurposing, “fatigue” towards memory.

For the Israeli reader, this is also a reminder: the heritage of Jewish life in Ukraine is part of a common history, not a “foreign museum.” And if today it is possible to save at least a digital copy — then tomorrow there will be a chance to return not only the walls but also the language of symbols that connected Chernivtsi, Novoselytsia, and Jerusalem in one painting. NANews — News of Israel | Nikk.Agency

Source (Ukr.) December 18, 2025 – https://ukrainianjewishencounter.org/uk/vryatuvati-skarbi-vid-zagibeli/

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“Not About the War”: The book of Jewish defender of Ukraine Maksym Shvartsman was presented in Chernivtsi on the 3rd anniversary of his death at the front - July 21, 2026 - Новости Израиля

Did Azerbaijan stop Israel’s vote on recognizing the Armenian genocide? - July 20, 2026 - Новости Израиля

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Turkey changes the balance: why it matters not only for Ukraine

Turkey is increasingly moving away from its previous complex game with Moscow and is helping Ukraine establish itself where Russia recently felt almost unchallenged. This is not only about diplomacy but also about the Middle East — a region directly important for Israel, the security of the Eastern Mediterranean, and the entire system of regional alliances.

The occasion for a new discussion was a publication in The New York Times, where researcher Gönül Tol described the breakdown of the previous Turkish-Russian connection and the growth of Ukraine’s role with Ankara’s support.

The essence of this story is simple but painful for the Kremlin: Erdogan no longer looks like Putin’s junior partner.

Now it is Turkey that is helping Volodymyr Zelensky open doors in a region where Moscow has long built influence through Syria, weapons, energy, and personal agreements with authoritarian regimes.

From Syria to Ukraine: how the Ankara-Moscow alliance began to crack

About ten years ago, the war in Syria created a strange, almost paradoxical partnership between Turkey and Russia. Moscow was saving Bashar al-Assad’s regime, supporting it with aviation, military advisors, and political cover.

Ankara, on the contrary, bet on Assad’s opponents.

On paper, this should have led to a direct confrontation. But Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdogan found a formula: to compete, to pressure each other, but not to break relations completely. For Moscow, this was convenient because Turkey opened up space for maneuver near NATO. For Erdogan, it also worked — especially against the backdrop of strained relations with the West.

But Russia’s war against Ukraine changed this construction.

After February 24, 2022, Putin found himself much more dependent on those countries that did not join Western sanctions. Turkey refused to completely close economic and diplomatic channels for Moscow but at the same time did not refuse Ukraine.

This is where a new Turkish logic appeared: to talk with Russia but to strengthen Kyiv.

Why the fall of Russia’s influence in Syria became a turning point

The real blow to Russia’s position in the Middle East, according to this logic, occurred after the fall of Assad’s regime at the end of 2024. For Moscow, this was not just a Syrian crisis but a symbolic defeat of its entire Middle Eastern strategy.

For years, Russia showcased Syria as proof of its strength: unlike the West, Moscow does not abandon allies.

But when the Kremlin’s resources were drawn into the war against Ukraine, the ability to protect old regimes sharply weakened. Syria became for Russia not a stronghold of power but a reminder that the war in Ukraine is consuming its foreign policy capabilities.

Turkey, on the contrary, emerged from this crisis significantly more confident.

For Israel, this turn has a separate significance. The Middle East remembers well who can maintain influence and who only imitates global power. When Russian presence weakens, other players come to the fore — Turkey, Ukraine, Gulf countries, as well as new temporary coalitions on security, energy, and military technologies.

And here Ukraine no longer looks like just a country asking for help.

It increasingly acts as a state that has accumulated real combat experience against the Russian army, and this experience becomes a valuable export resource.

Zelensky in Syria: a gesture Moscow could not ignore

Particularly indicative was Volodymyr Zelensky’s visit to Syria, which, according to a retelling of the publication, took place on a Turkish government plane.

This is not just a transportation detail.

When the President of Ukraine arrives in the region with Turkish logistical support, it means that Ankara is effectively helping Kyiv to enter the political scene where Russia used to consider itself one of the main forces.

Zelensky met with Syrian transitional leader Ahmed al-Sharaa and discussed cooperation in security and energy. For Kyiv, this is a chance to establish itself in the region not only through requests for support but by offering specific expertise.

Ukraine offers what it has gained at a very high cost: experience in drone warfare, countering the Russian army, air defense work, and adapting military production under constant strikes.

This is why for Moscow, this story looks like a double humiliation.

First, Russia could not maintain the previous order in Syria. Then Ukraine, against which the Kremlin launched a full-scale war, began to occupy diplomatic and military-technological space in the Middle Eastern direction.

Ukraine, Iran, and Gulf countries: a new security line

A separate layer of this story is connected with Iran.

For Israel, this is a particularly sensitive topic because Iranian drones, missiles, and proxy networks have long been part of the regional threat. For Ukraine, Iran is also not an abstract player: it is Iranian strike drones that have become one of the tools of Russia’s war against Ukrainian cities, energy, and civilian infrastructure.

When Iran attacks neighbors with kamikaze drones, Gulf countries see not just a regional conflict.

They see weapons and tactics that Ukraine has already studied in combat conditions.

Therefore, sending Ukrainian teams and air defense specialists to Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE looks not like a gesture of symbolic solidarity but as a practical security deal. Kyiv can provide what the region’s countries need now: experience in countering threats emanating from the Iranian military school and its technological connections.

In this context, Nikk.Agency — Israel News | Nikk.Agency views the Ukrainian-Turkish rapprochement not as a separate diplomatic episode but as part of a broader restructuring of the Middle East. For the Israeli audience, the conflict between Kyiv and Moscow is not the only important aspect, but also how the war in Ukraine changes the balance around Iran, Syria, Turkey, and the Gulf countries.

What Putin loses

The main problem for Putin in this story is not one visit by Zelensky and not one publication in The New York Times.

The problem is deeper: Russia is gradually losing the status of a power that can simultaneously pressure Europe, hold positions in Syria, bargain with Turkey, intimidate NATO, and remain the main mediator in the Middle East.

This model is breaking.

The war against Ukraine has demanded too many resources, political attention, and military equipment from Moscow. The longer it continues, the fewer opportunities the Kremlin has to maintain its previous global stance.

Erdogan sees this.

This is why Turkish policy is becoming tougher and more pragmatic. Ankara is not necessarily turning into a direct ally of Kyiv in the Western sense. But it is increasingly using the Ukrainian factor against Russian weakness.

For Ukraine, this is a window of opportunity.

For Russia, it is yet another proof of strategic failure.

And for Israel — a signal that the Middle East is entering a new phase, where Ukrainian experience in the war against Russia can become part of regional security, especially against the backdrop of threats from Iran and its allies.

Why this is a blow specifically to the Kremlin’s myth

For years, Putin built the image of a leader who supposedly knows how to return Russia to the ranks of the world’s centers of power. Syria was part of this image. Connections with Iran, Turkey, and authoritarian regimes were also part of this construction.

But now it is clear that this construction is not monolithic.

Turkey does not break all bridges with Moscow, but it no longer plays by the old scheme where the Kremlin dictated the pace. Ukraine, which Putin wanted to deprive of subjectivity, is entering new platforms and offering regions not slogans but military experience, technologies, and political resilience.

This is the main symbolic blow.

Erdogan is not just helping Zelensky. He shows that Russian influence can be bypassed, displaced, and replaced with other connections. For the Kremlin, this indeed resembles a poke in the eye — not emotionally, but strategically.

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“… The UN is a major problem. It was created to maintain world peace and engage in peacekeeping when needed. Unfortunately, they did not create armed forces to support all nations. Moreover, Russia is part of it, and I understand that all members want to change the charter and remove it. Ultimately, we want them (Russia – ed.) not to appear on the UN map at all because they set a bad example for the world…

In our regular column “Jews from Ukraine” — Philip Kotler, by blood, is a Ukrainian Jew whose family roots go deep into Ukrainian soil, from which his parents were forced to emigrate to the United States in the early 20th century.

Who is Philip Kotler

Philip Kotler is an American economist and professor at Northwestern University (Kellogg School of Management), known as the “father of modern marketing”. He developed the concepts of the marketing mix (4P), social marketing, demarketing, and Marketing 3.0, which emphasizes values and humanism.

By combining marketing with psychology and economics, he laid the scientific foundations for modern marketing practice.

One of his most famous works, Marketing Management, is used worldwide as a key university textbook. His theories help companies build customer-oriented strategies and gain competitive advantages in global markets.

He has written over 80 books, and his flagship work Marketing Management is used in over 60 countries and translated into dozens of languages, including Ukrainian and Hebrew. Throughout his career, he received 22 honorary doctorates, including from Ukrainian institutions.

Family and Jewish roots

Kotler was born in 1931 in Chicago, in a family of Jewish immigrants from Ukraine. His father, Maurice Kotler (original surname Kotliarevsky), was born in Nizhyn in 1905, and his mother, Betty Bubar, was born in Berdychiv or Chernivtsi in 1910. They emigrated to the U.S. in 1917.

“I grew up in an environment where everyone knew you had to be not only successful but also useful.” — Philip Kotler

Nizhyn: Jewish pain and strength

Nizhyn is one of Ukraine’s oldest Jewish centers. In the early 20th century, Jews made up about 30% of the population. The city had 10 synagogues, schools, doctors, and craftsmen. The pogroms of 1905 and 1919 led to mass Jewish emigration.

Chernivtsi: Capital of Jewish intelligentsia

Chernivtsi was the cultural capital of Bukovina. It was home to Zionists, poets, and scholars. On the eve of World War I, Jews made up up to 40% of the city’s population. Famous Jewish natives include Paul Celan, Joseph Schmidt, Eliezer Steinbarg. Kotler’s mother was raised in this unique cultural atmosphere.

The path to success

Philip studied at the University of Chicago and MIT. He was the first to apply an economic-mathematical approach to marketing. His ideas became the foundation of strategic management and humane business thinking.

Philip Kotler: I was deeply disappointed by India’s and China’s neutrality on Ukraine

Philip Kotler in 2022:

“I’m very interested in peacemaking and marketing peace. We must identify areas and zones of war, like Syria and others. The truth is that the UN is a major problem. It was created to maintain world peace and intervene when needed, but it failed to create armed forces to defend nations. Moreover, Russia is part of it, and I understand that members want to change the charter and remove them. Ultimately, we want them to disappear from the UN map because they are a bad example for the world. We also must demand compensation for the destruction they’ve caused. Yes, there are people in Russia who don’t want war, but they too bear responsibility.

When the war against your country started, I hoped that all great powers, like India and China, would support Ukraine. I was deeply disappointed when they chose neutrality. The U.S. and other allies should be more active in addressing those countries publicly about what Russia is doing.”

Kotler and Ukraine

• 2006 — Honorary doctorate from Kyiv-Mohyla Academy
• 2009 — Visits to Kyiv and Odesa with lectures
• 2022 — Online lecture in support of Ukraine
• 2023 — His genealogy published by Ukrainian researchers
• 2025 — Featured in article “The Father of Marketing with Ukrainian Roots” on Shotam.info

“When the war against your country began, I hoped all leading nations would support Ukraine. I was disappointed when that didn’t happen. But that’s no reason to give up.” — Kotler, 2022

NAnews – Israel News

On the website NAnews – Israel News, we highlight individuals who connect Ukraine and Israel. Kotler is one of these symbols. His name is known in every business school, and his voice speaks for Ukraine.

Kotler and Israel

• 1997 — Lectures at Tel Aviv University as part of the Kellogg-Recanati MBA program
• 2002 — Marketing Management published in Hebrew
• Collaboration with Professor Yaakov Hornik
• Cited in Israeli media and business forums

“If business can sell Coca-Cola to every village, why can’t we sell the idea of peace?” — Kotler on peace marketing

Conclusion: Jews from Ukraine — a global legacy

Philip Kotler is one of the most influential intellectuals of the 20th and 21st centuries. His roots are in Nizhyn and Chernivtsi, his ideas have reached the entire world, and his voice speaks for justice and enlightenment.

Read more in our ongoing series “Jews from Ukraine” on NAnews – Israel News.

…
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Son from Ukraine, fighter of Israel

Staff Sergeant Michael Tyukin / מיכאל טיוקין, a 21-year-old fighter of the reconnaissance unit of the Givati Brigade from Ashkelon, died in southern Lebanon on May 30, 2026. According to the IDF and Israeli media, he was killed by a Hezbollah explosive drone strike on a position where Givati fighters were operating; four other soldiers were lightly wounded.

For Israel, this is yet another name in the long and heavy list of the fallen.

For the Ukrainian community in Israel, this is a story where too much sounds personal: Ukraine, aliyah, Ashkelon, the army, the northern front, a mother who lost her only son.

Michael Tyukin repatriated to Israel from Ukraine with his mother in 2020. He was her only son. Israeli media report that the family lived in Ashkelon, and Michael himself served in Sayeret Givati — the reconnaissance unit of the Givati Brigade.

This is not a dry biography of a ‘repatriate soldier.’

This is the path of a young man who came to Israel, became part of the country, and chose not a passive role, but combat service. He could have remained just a new citizen building his life after aliyah. But he went further — to where the decision to serve becomes not a formality, but a personal responsibility.

What is known about the death of Michael Tyukin

According to reports from the Times of Israel, ynet, and other Israeli media, the strike occurred on the evening of May 30, 2026, around 22:30, in southern Lebanon. A Hezbollah drone hit the point where the fighters of the Givati reconnaissance unit were located. Michael Tyukin was killed, and four other soldiers were lightly wounded and taken for medical assistance.

Southern Lebanon reminds Israel again that the northern front is not an abstract line on the map.

It is a territory where every day intelligence, infantry, drones, ambushes, threats from Hezbollah, and the constant readiness of the IDF to act where danger can come in seconds are combined.

Michael Tyukin did not die in a past conflict and not in a story that will be studied later. He died in the current Israeli reality, where the war after October 7 changed the life of the country from south to north.

For many repatriates from Ukraine, this death sounds especially acute.

He came from a country that itself lives in a great war after Russia’s invasion in 2022. But his personal fate ended not in Ukraine, but in Lebanon — in the IDF uniform, on the Israeli front, defending his home here.

Ashkelon came to say goodbye

The funeral of Michael Tyukin took place on June 1, 2026, at 17:00 at the military cemetery in Ashkelon. These data are indicated on the page of the fallen on the IDF website; Reuters also recorded the farewell ceremony in Ashkelon on this day.

Initially, there was a painful anxiety around the funeral: Michael had a small family in Israel, he was his mother’s only son. Friends and relatives appealed to the community with a request to come and see the fighter off on his last journey. Israeli media wrote that the public appeal was especially important precisely because the family needed support at a time when a person should not be left alone.

And people came.

According to ynet, thousands of people participated in the funeral of the Sayeret Givati fighter in Ashkelon. Many did not know Michael personally. They were not his relatives, did not study with him, did not serve with him in the same unit. But they came because in Israel there are moments when there is no such thing as a stranger soldier.

On the way to the cemetery, residents stood with Israeli flags. It was not just a military ritual, but a civic response to the loneliness of a family that lost a son.

Mother, city, and the last duty

The hardest part of this story is Michael’s mother.

She came with him from Ukraine, built a new life in Israel, raised her only son. Now she is left without him in the country for which he went to serve.

In the farewell words quoted by ynet, relatives spoke of 21-year-old Michael as a person with a life ahead, with dreams, with strength and a big heart. There was a simple and terrible thought: how to live on when the son around whom life was built will not return.

For Ashkelon, this is also a personal story.

The city knows well the price of war: rockets, alarms, strikes, life on the southern front, the constant feeling that security is never free. But this time Ashkelon was saying goodbye not only to its resident. It was saying goodbye to a young repatriate from Ukraine who became an Israeli soldier and died on the northern front.

In such stories, Israel is seen without decorations.

Not through slogans and not through political disputes, but through people who leave their homes, take a flag, come to the cemetery, and stand next to a mother they did not know yesterday.

Why this story is important for NANews

For NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency, the story of Michael Tyukin is not just a military report. It is one of those cases where Israel, Ukraine, aliyah, the army, and Jewish responsibility are combined in one fate.

Michael was not a public figure.

He did not make loud statements and did not build a symbol around himself. He simply lived, served, loved, was a son, a fighter, a resident of Ashkelon. But after his death, it became clear: his story speaks of many things at once.

It speaks of repatriates from Ukraine for whom Israel became a home not on paper, but in the most direct sense.

It speaks of mothers who bring their children to Israel for the future, and then see how these children put on the IDF uniform.

It speaks of the fact that the connection between Ukraine and Israel today goes not only through diplomacy, humanitarian projects, or news about the war. Sometimes it goes through a soldier’s biography.

Michael Tyukin came from Ukraine in 2020. A few years later, Ukraine was already living under full-scale Russian aggression, and Israel — after October 7 — entered its heavy war on several fronts. In this new reality, he found himself not as an observer, but as a participant in the defense of Israel.

Ukraine and Israel in one human fate

For the Ukrainian community in Israel, this story is especially painful.

Michael was one of those young people whose life could have gone completely differently. Ukraine, Israel, the army, Ashkelon, southern Lebanon — each point of this map became part of his fate. He was not ‘between countries.’ He made a choice and became part of Israel completely.

Therefore, his death cannot be reduced only to the formula ‘an IDF soldier died.’

A young man from Ukraine who became an Israeli fighter died.

The only son died.

A resident of Ashkelon died.

A Sayeret Givati soldier died.

A person whom thousands of unfamiliar Israelis came to see off on his last journey died.

And in this, there is an important truth about Israel: the country can argue, get tired, get angry, split along political lines, but at the moment of saying goodbye to a fallen soldier, it is still capable of coming together as one human whole.

What remains after the name

After such news, usually short lines remain: name, age, unit, place of death, date of the funeral.

But behind each such line stands a whole life.

Michael Tyukin was 21 years old.

He repatriated from Ukraine.

He lived in Ashkelon.

He served in the reconnaissance unit of the Givati Brigade.

He died on May 30, 2026, in southern Lebanon.

He was buried on June 1, 2026, at the military cemetery in Ashkelon.

And thousands of people came so that his mother would not stand at the grave alone.

For Israel, this is not just an episode of war.

For repatriates from Ukraine, this is pain, pride, and a reminder of the price of belonging to the country.

For the Jewish people, it is another name that cannot be lost in the news feed.

Blessed memory of Staff Sergeant Michael Tyukin.

יהי זכרו ברוך.

…
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“The Secret Visit” of Israel’s Heritage Minister Amichai Eliyahu to Moscow raised questions not because of the idea of the USSR Jewish Heritage Center itself, but because of the political context of the trip. The project has long been promoted in Israel, so the Russian scene in this story seems unnecessary, dangerous, and requiring public explanations.

Secret trip to Moscow: what is known as of June 4–7, 2026

Amichai Eliyahu’s visit to Russia is called “secret” primarily because that is the wording used by Channel 7 / Arutz 7, which first reported on the minister’s trip on June 4, 2026. It is not about a proven secret deal or a confirmed closed mission, but about the fact that the trip was not previously presented to the public as a regular official visit with an open agenda, a list of meetings, and a clear diplomatic framework.

For a democratic state, this is an important difference. If a minister goes to a country that is waging an aggressive war against a neighboring democratic state and maintaining close ties with Iran, such a trip requires maximum transparency. When society learns about it from a media report where the visit itself is called “secret,” the question becomes not technical but political: why was the discussion of the Israeli USSR Jewish Heritage Center conducted in this manner?

The subheading of the publication directly states: “Heritage Minister Amichai Eliyahu secretly flew to Russia today amid the war in the country and diplomatic sensitivity in relations with Israel — to promote the creation of the Heritage Center for immigrants from the Soviet Union in Rishon LeZion“. 

According to an Israeli source, the trip was supposed to last the weekend. The minister’s return was expected on Sunday, June 7, 2026.

At first glance, the official goal seems almost harmless: discussing the Heritage Center for Jews of the former USSR. For Israel, this topic is indeed important. It is not about a decorative museum, but about the memory of a massive aliyah, about people who lived for decades under Soviet anti-Semitism, fought for the right to leave, preserved Jewish identity, learned Hebrew underground, went through refusals, interrogations, dismissals, and systemic pressure.

But that is precisely why the trip to Moscow raises not fewer, but more questions.

USSR Jewish Heritage Center is an Israeli story. It is the story of Rishon LeZion, Haifa, Ashdod, Bat Yam, Netanya, Be’er Sheva, Jerusalem, Karmiel, Ariel, and dozens of other cities where immigrants from the former USSR, their children, and grandchildren live. It is the story of people who became doctors, engineers, scientists, musicians, military personnel, entrepreneurs, teachers, politicians, journalists, and part of Israeli society.

And if all this has long been in Israel, a simple question arises: why did the Israeli minister need Moscow specifically?

Who is the Heritage Minister and why is this position important

Amichai Eliyahu holds the position of Israel’s Heritage Minister. In Hebrew, it is שר המורשת. Formally, the ministry is associated with state projects of historical memory, archaeology, monuments, museums, Jewish heritage, and community heritage.

So on paper, Eliyahu’s participation in the USSR Jewish Heritage Center project is understandable. His department can allocate budgets, promote museum, educational, and memorial initiatives, and support memory projects of various Jewish communities.

But this is where the political sensitivity of the situation lies.

Historical memory is not a neutral zone. Especially when it comes to Russia. Moscow has been using the memory of World War II, the Soviet past, “compatriots,” diasporas, and “historical truth” as a tool of influence abroad for decades. Through cultural centers, archival projects, veteran organizations, community ties, and commemorative events, Russia knows how to enter where a direct political channel would look too toxic.

Therefore, the visit of Israel’s Heritage Minister to Russia cannot be considered a regular cultural trip.

Especially if the visit itself is called “secret.”

The USSR Jewish Heritage Center did not appear in Moscow

The main thing to note immediately: the USSR Jewish Heritage Center is not a new idea by Amichai Eliyahu and is not a project that was born from his trip to Moscow.

This initiative appeared and developed in Israel.

As early as March 8, 2021, Vesty wrote about the creation of the “Maalot” association — here is its website –  https://maalot.org/, which aimed to open the USSR Jewish Heritage Center in Israel. The board included well-known representatives of Russian-speaking Israel: writer David Markish, musician Vyacheslav Ganelin, actress Natasha Manor, journalist Victoria Dolinskaya, professor of Slavic studies at the Hebrew University Wolf Moskovich. The board was headed by former refusenik, writer, and journalist David Shechter, formerly the press secretary of the Russian-speaking immigrants’ party “Israel BaAliyah.”

This is a crucial starting point.

The project was initially not connected with the Kremlin’s agenda, but with the experience of Russian-speaking Jews in Israel, with the history of refuseniks, with the memory of aliyah, with academic and public circles within the country.

In the same Vesty publication, it was explained why such a center is needed. Despite their enormous contribution to the creation and development of Israel, immigrants from the USSR did not have a full-fledged center, museum, or even a small permanent platform where the history of this community would be presented.

This is a strong and fair argument.

In Israel, there are heritage centers for Jews from Babylon, Yemen, Ethiopia, North Africa, and other communities. But the million-strong aliyah from the former Soviet Union long remained without its own state memory platform. For a country where Russian-speaking immigrants have changed medicine, science, technology, culture, the army, the economy, and politics, this indeed seemed strange.

Such a center is needed.

The question is not about that.

The question is why a project that has been created in Israel for years suddenly received a Moscow shadow in June 2026.

What the Center was supposed to include

According to the original plan of “Maalot,” the USSR Jewish Heritage Center was not just supposed to be a museum with stands and photographs. It was supposed to tell about the achievements of Soviet Jews in science, art, and sports, about survival under harsh state anti-Semitism, about the Zionist movement, Yiddish culture, Chabad, and other Jewish religious movements that operated underground in the USSR despite NKVD-KGB persecutions.

A separate section was to be dedicated to the contribution of immigrants from the USSR to the creation and development of Israel. It was also planned to present Jewish communities in the post-Soviet space.

This is not a Moscow story.

This is the story of people who often broke free from the Soviet system. The story of those who wanted to live as Jews, speak Hebrew, move to Israel, and build their lives outside Soviet control.

Therefore, it is symbolically very important who exactly becomes the custodian of this memory.

If the USSR Jewish Heritage Center is built in Israel, its logic is clear: the state of Israel finally recognizes that the large aliyah and Jews of the former USSR are one of the key parts of national history.

However, if a secret trip by a minister to Moscow appears around this project, another nuance arises: as if the country from which many left due to anti-Semitism, repression, and lack of freedom is once again gaining the right to be present in the packaging of this memory.

And that is already dangerous.

“Maalot” worked for years, not waiting for a signal from Russia

On June 7, 2024, Madan published material stating that the NGO “Maalot” had been working on creating the USSR Jewish Heritage Center for eight years. Over these years, as stated in the publication, documents, testimonies, and artifacts were collected, exhibitions, lectures, meetings, and seminars were held.

The same material indicated that in 2016 an initiative group was formed, which included figures from science, culture, and public activists. They created the “Maalot” board of trustees. The initiative was supported by Natan Sharansky, Yuli Edelstein, and other politicians.

This destroys the possible explanation that Eliyahu’s trip to Moscow was needed to “launch” the project.

The project did not need a launch from Moscow.

It already existed.

It had people.

It had an idea.

It had documents, testimonies, artifacts, exhibitions, lectures, public support, political allies, and an Israeli base.

Moreover, Vesty wrote back in 2021 that the association received support from Yuli Edelstein, Natan Sharansky, the leadership of the Tel Aviv Museum of the Diaspora, and also concluded an agreement with the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, which created a group of professors responsible for the museum’s content.

So even the expert base was Israeli.

That is why the question about the visit on June 4, 2026, becomes tougher: what exactly needed to be sought in Moscow if historians, public figures, scientists, former refuseniks, documents, family archives, and the target audience are already in Israel?

Funds were already allocated: why then the trip now?

Another important fact: in June 2024, the Israeli government already allocated 25 million shekels for the creation of the USSR Jewish Heritage Center.

From this amount:

• 12 million shekels were to come from the Ministry of Heritage, headed by Amichai Eliyahu;
• 4.5 million from the Ministry of Culture and Sports;
• 3 million from the Ministry of Aliyah and Integration;
• 3 million from the Ministry of Construction;
• another 3 million from the Ministry of Development of the Negev and Galilee.

This is a key point.

If the budget was allocated as early as June 7, 2024, then Eliyahu’s trip to Moscow on June 4, 2026, cannot look like a regular initial stage of the project. Almost exactly two years have passed.

During this time, it would be logical to expect an Israeli state procedure: a commission, a concept, site selection, work with archives, involvement of researchers, an architectural program, an educational strategy, participation of “Maalot,” the Hebrew University, museums, municipalities, and immigrant organizations.

This is exactly how it was described in the Madan publication: after the government’s decision, a regular state procedure was supposed to begin, within which a commission would develop a program — what the Center would be like, where it would be created, and what would be included in it.

But two years later, there is no public report on the project’s progress, no presentation of the concept in Rishon LeZion, no discussion with the Russian-speaking community of Israel, but a secret visit by the minister to Russia.

This is the political problem.

Not the Center itself.

Not the memory.

Not “Maalot.”

Not the large aliyah.

But specifically the Moscow scene.

The Center is needed by Israel — but without the Kremlin’s tint

It is important to say directly: criticism of Eliyahu’s trip should not turn into criticism of the very idea of the USSR Jewish Heritage Center.

On the contrary.

Such a center has long been needed. It should tell about Soviet state anti-Semitism, the ban on Jewish religious life, the underground study of Hebrew, the struggle of refuseniks, families who waited for years for permission to leave, those who went through prisons, dismissals, surveillance, KGB pressure, and social isolation.

It should also tell about something else: how people who came from the former USSR changed Israel.

These are doctors who strengthened Israeli medicine.

Engineers who entered the technology sector.

Scientists, musicians, teachers, entrepreneurs, athletes, journalists, officers, soldiers, social workers, municipal activists.

These are the children of immigrants who already speak Hebrew as their native language, serve in the army, work in startups, teach, heal, build businesses, create Israeli culture, and often know too little about their family’s Soviet past.

That is why the USSR Jewish Heritage Center should be in Israel not only physically but also in meaning.

It should be Israeli memory, not a platform for Russian soft power.

NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency views this story not as a dispute over the right of Soviet Jews to memory. This right is obvious. The question is different: why a project that grew out of the Israeli Russian-speaking community, from the experience of refuseniks, large aliyah, and years of work by the NGO “Maalot,” suddenly receives a Moscow shadow right now — June 4, 2026, at the moment of Russia’s war against Ukraine, Moscow’s close ties with Iran, and growing political tension within Israel.

Russian context: why Moscow is not neutral for Israel

Russia today is not just a “country of the former USSR,” not an archival territory, and not a neutral cultural partner.

Since February 24, 2022, Russia has been waging a full-scale war against Ukraine. For many Israelis of Ukrainian origin, for immigrants from Ukraine, for families whose relatives live in Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odessa, Dnipro, Mykolaiv, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, or Lviv, this is not abstract geopolitics.

This is a war in which Russian missiles hit cities where their parents, grandparents, friends, classmates, neighbors lived.

At the same time, Russia is increasingly connected with Iran — a state that has become a direct threat to Israel. According to published UNITED24 Media materials, based on leaks of Russian documents, Moscow supplies Iran with aviation missiles and weapons related to the Su-35, including air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles.

Another UNITED24 Media publication claimed that Russian documents show the continuation of contracts related to Yak-130 and Su-35 for Iran.

For Israel, this is not a secondary detail.

Iran has attacked Israel with missiles and drones. Tehran arms and supports forces hostile to Israel. And Russia, which simultaneously wages war against Ukraine, remains an important military partner of Iran.

Therefore, the Israeli minister’s trip to Moscow cannot be detached from this background.

A country that helps Iran strengthen its military potential suddenly becomes the place of the first visit in years by an Israeli minister on the topic of the historical heritage of Soviet Jews.

This looks at least politically irresponsible.

Memory as a tool of influence

Russia knows how to work through topics that seem soft.

It is not always a direct slogan “support Russia.” More often, it is subtler: memory of the war, respect for veterans, culture, language, “historical truth,” fighting “rewriting history,” protecting “compatriots,” ties with communities, conferences, funds, trips, monuments, archives.

In this sense, the USSR Jewish Heritage Center is a very sensitive topic.

Because here several layers intersect at once: the Soviet past, Russian-speaking aliyah, Jewish identity, family memory, the trauma of anti-Semitism, gratitude to Israel, nostalgia for language and culture, the politics of the Russian-speaking electorate.

For Israeli society, this is important.

For the Russian propaganda machine — this can also be interesting.

That is why any connection of such a project with Moscow must be extremely transparent. Who invited? Who coordinated? Who were the meetings with? Were only cultural issues discussed? Were there any Russian state structures? Were there any funds associated with the Kremlin? Were money, archives, organizational support, political contacts offered?

There are no public answers yet.

There is only the fact of a secret trip.

And that is not enough.

Pre-election context and Russian-speaking audience

The visit takes place in June 2026, when Israel is already living in a tense political atmosphere. The Russian-speaking audience remains a significant electoral group, and the theme of respect for the great aliyah, Soviet Jewry, and the memory of immigrants from the former USSR can be used in political mobilization.

There is no need to invent a conspiracy here.

It is enough to see the coincidence of factors.

Minister from the ‘Jewish Power’ party.

Secret visit to Moscow.

The theme of the Center for the Heritage of Soviet Jews.

A project that has been developing in Israel for many years.

The budget allocated back in June 2024.

Russia, which is waging war against Ukraine.

Russia associated with Iran.

Russian-speaking audience of Israel.

Pre-election period.

Each point individually can be attempted to be explained. Together they create a picture that cannot be dismissed as a regular working trip.

What questions should be asked publicly

The main question now is not whether the Center for the Heritage of Soviet Jews is needed. It is needed.

The main question is who and why is drawing this project into the Moscow context.

The Israeli public has the right to get answers.

Who initiated Amichai Eliyahu’s trip to Russia on June 4, 2026?

Why was the visit secret?

Why did the trip fall on the weekend and Shabbat period?

Why was Moscow specifically needed to discuss the Israeli memory center?

Who exactly did the minister meet with?

Were there representatives of Russian state structures among the meeting participants?

Were only issues of the Heritage Center discussed or also political topics?

Was Russian financial, archival, organizational, or media support offered?

Why did a project promoted in Israel by ‘Maalot’, David Shechter, Marina Ben-Arie, Natan Sharansky, Yuli Edelstein, scholars, museums, and public activists suddenly require a minister’s trip to a country waging war against Ukraine?

What changed between June 7, 2024, when the Israeli government allocated 25 million shekels, and June 4, 2026, when the heritage minister flew to Russia?

This is not rhetoric for the sake of scandal.

These are normal questions for a democratic state.

Where the memory of Soviet Jews should be

The memory of Soviet Jews should be in Israel.

Not only in terms of geography. In terms of control, meaning, language, values, and political independence.

The Heritage Center should tell about the Jews of Kyiv, Odessa, Kharkiv, Moscow, Leningrad, Minsk, Chisinau, Tbilisi, Baku, Riga, Vilnius, Tashkent, Chernivtsi, Dnipro, Lviv, Bukhara, Samarkand, Kutaisi, and dozens of other cities of the former USSR.

But this story needs to be told from an Israeli perspective.

This is the story of people who were not part of the ‘Russian world’. They were Jews, often deprived of the right to be openly Jewish.

Many of them fought not to preserve Soviet identity, but to return to Jewish identity and move to Israel.

That is why it is dangerous when Moscow tries to appear next to such memory as a natural partner.

Moscow does not have a moral monopoly on the memory of Soviet Jews.

Moreover, the Soviet system was one of the sources of the trauma that this Center should explain to future generations.

Conclusion: center — yes, Moscow shadow — no

The Center for the Heritage of Soviet Jews is needed in Israel.

The work of the NGO ‘Maalot’ is important.

The history of refuseniks, underground Hebrew, Soviet anti-Semitism, the great aliyah, and the contribution of immigrants from the former USSR to Israel should have a worthy place in national memory.

But the secret visit of Heritage Minister Amichai Eliyahu to Moscow on June 4, 2026, does not look like a necessary stage in the creation of the Center, but as a politically dangerous gesture.

Especially because the project has been developing in Israel for many years, had a public base, support from well-known figures, contacts with academic and museum structures, and state funding was allocated back on June 7, 2024.

If the goal was only heritage, it could have been discussed in Rishon LeZion, Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Haifa, Ashdod, or any other Israeli city.

If archives are needed — there are researchers, international digital databases, universities, family collections, funds, communities, and professional channels.

If testimonies are needed — they live here, in Israel.

If schoolchildren, soldiers, participants of ‘Masa’, ‘Taglit’, NA’LE, and new immigrants are needed — they are here too.

Then what was needed in Moscow?

This is the question that should remain at the center of the article.

Because the Center for the Heritage of Soviet Jews should tell an Israeli story — the story of people who broke free from the Soviet system and built a new life in Israel. This memory should not become an entry point for a state that today uses history as a weapon, wages war against Ukraine, and strengthens ties with Israel’s enemies.

…
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US President Donald Trump is once again talking about the imminent end of the conflict with Iran. According to him, the agreement is almost ready, negotiations are ongoing, and Washington hopes to reach an agreement that should extend the ceasefire and restore movement through the Strait of Hormuz.

But in this story, there is a major gap between the political picture and reality. There is a deadline. There are mediators. There are statements about an ‘almost ready deal.’ The only thing missing is Tehran’s confirmed consent to the terms that the White House wants.

What exactly is Trump promising

At the end of May and the beginning of June 2026, Trump said several times that the US is close to an agreement with Iran. This is not about a simple declaration, but an attempt to secure an extension of the ceasefire regime, open the Strait of Hormuz, and postpone the most complex issues—primarily the Iranian nuclear program—to the next stage of negotiations.

According to Western media, Pakistan plays a significant role in the negotiations. It is through the Pakistani channel that Washington and Tehran have tried to advance contact, although there is still no direct full-fledged dialogue between the US and Iran. This is an important detail: the parties, which are allegedly one step away from an agreement, continue to act through intermediaries.

For Israel, this is not an external diplomatic chronicle. Iran remains a hostile center of power that supports Hezbollah and other anti-Western, anti-Israeli structures. Therefore, any US deal with Tehran will be assessed in Jerusalem not by beautiful words about peace, but by one question: does it reduce the real threat or just give the regime more time?

Why Switzerland sounds nice but doesn’t solve the problem

In the White House’s political presentation, everything looks almost complete: the deadline, the final document, a possible ceremony, the diplomatic scene. Switzerland also appears in the information field as a convenient place for the public formalization of agreements.

But the main thing is still missing—open and verifiable consent from Iran to the key conditions. Reuters reported on June 5 that Tehran continues to link a broader peace package with the issue of Lebanon and demands Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon; Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has effectively made this part of the political framework.

This is where Trump’s optimism clashes with Middle Eastern reality. Iran is bargaining not only over the Strait of Hormuz or sanctions. It is trying to tie Lebanon, Hezbollah, Israel, and the regional balance of power to the overall deal.

Why the war seems to be ending but isn’t

Formally, it is about the US-Iran conflict, which has been living in a strange mode for several months: there are statements about a ceasefire, but strikes, blockades, threats, and military readiness remain. The Guardian wrote that the ceasefire has been in effect since April 8, 2026, but the situation remains unstable, and the parties continue to perceive the truce as a pause, not a completed peace.

For Trump, it is politically important to show quick results. Ahead is the summer of 2026, the anniversary events for the 250th anniversary of the US, an internal campaign, economic pressure, and criticism due to rising fuel prices. Reuters noted that Trump enters the summer season amid a rare series of political resistances and symbolic defeats.

Hence the feeling that the White House is rushing to a beautiful finale. But the Middle East does not easily conform to the calendar of celebrations. If Tehran is not ready to concede in essence, the ceremony may turn into a television frame without real content.

Congress has already begun to limit Trump

Inside the US, things are not calm for Trump either. On June 3, 2026, the House of Representatives passed a resolution on military powers, which should limit the president’s ability to continue actions against Iran without Congress’s approval. The vote passed with a minimal margin—215 to 208; four Republicans joined the Democrats.

The decision is still more political than a final legal one. The question now depends on the Senate and a possible presidential veto. But the signal is clear: even part of the Republicans do not want to give the White House an unlimited mandate for new escalation.

Trump reacted sharply. According to American media, he called the vote ‘meaningless’ and attacked the Republicans who supported the limitation of military powers, calling them lovers of loud headlines.

What this means for Israel

For the Israeli audience, the main question is simple: will the deal with Iran stop the threat or freeze it again until the next round?

Iran does not appear to be a party ready to abandon regional pressure. On the contrary, Tehran’s latest statements show that it continues to support Hezbollah and is trying to integrate the Lebanese front into negotiations with the US. For Israel, this means that even an agreement between Washington and Tehran will not necessarily bring calm to the northern border.

That is why NANews — News of Israel | Nikk.Agency views this story not as an American domestic political game, but as part of a broader picture of Israel’s security. If the US agrees to a temporary solution, Israel will have to closely watch what exactly Iran receives: a respite, money, relief from pressure, or real restrictions.

There is a deadline. Agreement is not yet visible

The picture at the beginning of June looks extremely contradictory. Trump talks about an imminent agreement. Pakistan remains a channel of contact. In Washington, there is debate about the president’s right to continue military actions. In Tehran, they are linking the deal with Lebanon and Israel.

This is not the end of the war, but a struggle over how to name the pause.

If Iran makes a symbolic step, the White House will be able to declare a diplomatic victory. If Tehran continues to stall and expand the list of demands, the US will once again face a choice: extend negotiations or return to a forceful scenario.

For Israel, the danger is that both options carry risks. Military escalation could hit the region immediately. But a weak deal with Iran could be no less dangerous—just with a delayed effect.

…
“Not About the War”: The book of Jewish defender of Ukraine Maksym Shvartsman was presented in Chernivtsi on the 3rd anniversary of his death at the front - July 21, 2026 - Новости Израиля

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Ukraine is facing a labor shortage that can no longer be addressed with piecemeal solutions. According to data provided to the Interfax-Ukraine agency by a government source, in 2025, the country issued 9,582 work permits for foreigners and stateless persons, with 3,310 permits being revoked.

By the end of the year, there were actually 6,272 labor migrants in Ukraine.

Against the backdrop of a labor market need for approximately 4.5 million workers, this figure looks almost symbolic. Foreign workers cover only about 0.14% of the Ukrainian economy’s needs. In other words, labor migration is not yet a real answer to the staffing failure that has intensified after Russia’s full-scale invasion.

Why foreign workers have little impact on Ukraine’s labor market

Before 2022, Ukrainian employers annually received about 21,000 permits for the employment of foreigners. After the start of the full-scale war, the figure sharply decreased and has not returned to pre-war levels.

According to the State Employment Service of Ukraine, 4,720 such permits were issued in 2024, and 7,483 in 2025. This is more than the previous year, but still more than twice less than before the big war.

The difference in statistics between agencies is explained by different accounting methods. The State Migration Service reports that as of December 31, 2025, there were 47,684 foreigners and stateless persons on temporary registration in Ukraine. In 2025, 8,440 temporary residence permits were issued for the first time.

But even these figures do not change the overall picture. There are foreigners in Ukraine, there are separate permits, there are work projects, but there is still no systematic flow of labor migrants.

The main barrier is not only the war

The issue is not limited to security. For a foreign worker, Ukraine today is a complex bureaucratic and legal trajectory: employer, permit, visa, checks, residence permit, security issues, and further control.

Therefore, only part of the potential workers reach the Ukrainian market. Even if businesses are ready to hire people, the process remains long and unstable.

For the economy, this is a problem. The labor shortage affects production, construction, logistics, services, the agricultural sector, and infrastructure recovery. The longer the war and the more Ukrainians are abroad, the more acute the question becomes: who will work inside the country?

Why Canada, Australia, and Israel are mentioned in this discussion

A source from the agency suggests that Ukraine update its migration policy and look at the experience of countries that know how to attract people to meet economic needs. Examples include Canada, Australia, and Israel.

For the Israeli audience, this is a particularly understandable topic. Israel has built its economy, demography, and labor market over decades through a combination of repatriation, labor migration, targeted attraction of specialists, and strict state control. This model is not perfect and is not mechanically copied, but it shows the main thing: migration policy should not be spontaneous but managed.

NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency considers the Ukrainian staffing crisis in this context: it is important for Ukraine not just to ‘let in more foreigners,’ but to understand which sectors need people, what rules employers should receive, and how the state will control the legality of employment.

The Israeli lesson for Ukraine

Israel’s experience is important not because it can be transferred to Ukraine one-to-one. Israel is in a different demographic, military, and economic situation. But there is a common principle: the labor market does not recover on its own if the state does not create clear rules.

Ukraine will have to find a balance between two tasks. The first is to preserve its own labor potential so that Ukrainians return from the EU and do not leave further. The second is to attract foreign workers precisely where business and the country’s recovery will stall without them.

It is especially important not to turn the topic of migration into political speculation. When the state prescribes rules for employers in advance, control by the State Labor Service, migration procedures, and company responsibility, society is less afraid of chaos.

What will happen if the policy is not changed

Today, labor migrants cover only a small fraction of the needs of the Ukrainian market. Even if you take broader statistics of temporarily residing foreigners, it is still not comparable to the deficit of millions of workers.

Ukrainian business needs people. The state needs taxpayers. Regions need specialists for recovery. And the longer the staffing issue is postponed, the higher the risk that some projects simply will not be able to develop due to a lack of workforce.

But the main priority should still remain within Ukraine. The return of Ukrainians from Europe, retaining youth, supporting veterans, retraining, normal working conditions, and salaries are the foundation. Without this, any migration policy will only be a temporary support.

And only after this can Ukraine build a clear system for attracting foreigners to specific projects. Not massively, not chaotically, not through gray schemes, but according to rules that take into account security, the economy, and the interests of society.

For now, the numbers speak plainly: with a need for 4.5 million workers, a few thousand work permits are not a solution but a statistical error. Ukraine has already entered a period where the labor market becomes part of national security.

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The three-day pogrom of Kishinev’s Jews exactly 120 years ago (April 6 (19)–7 (20), 1903) left an indelible impression not only on the local Jewish population but also on the entire Jewish world.

To this day, the memory of the pogrom does not fade, according to Moldovan Ambassador to Israel Alex Roitman, for whom the day of remembrance is an opportunity for his country to build and develop friendly relations with the Jewish state.

“The imperial Russian authorities, including the anti-Semitic Minister of Internal Affairs Vyacheslav Konstantinovich von Plehve, wanted to see a pogrom in the city, without their sanction, the Jews of Kishinev would not have experienced such a devastating tragedy”.

“Russia is still trying to destabilize Moldova to hinder its choice to become part of the free world and its desire to join the European Union“, Roitman decisively states.

“They are waging war against us and spreading propaganda aimed at sowing hatred and discord between ethnic groups, and this is reminiscent of the anti-Semitic propaganda of 120 years ago“.

This is reported by Israel Hayom.

Incitement in the press

“There were two main factors that caused the unrest — the poisonous incitement of anti-Semites and the silence of the Russian authorities and their representatives in the city“, Roitman explains, donning the historian’s cap.

The newspapers of those days were filled with propaganda and disinformation about Jews, and this influenced the course of events. The worst offender was the Russian-language anti-Semitic newspaper “Bessarabets”, edited by Pavel Krushevan, a particularly fervent anti-Semite. The pages of “Bessarabets” were filled with fabricated stories about “Jewish crimes” and calls to “avenge them”.

Roitman notes that overall, relations between Jews and non-Jews in Moldova, then known as the Bessarabian province within the Russian Empire, were good.

Jews made up almost 50 percent of the population in major cities, and in Jewish settlements, people from other ethnic groups even understood Yiddish. But the poisonous combination of anti-Semitic propaganda, some of which came from the church, and the authorities’ desire to direct popular anger over their poor living conditions against the Jews led to disaster.

“There was an order from above not to prevent the unrest“, says Roitman. His conclusion is based on research and archival documents and testimonies about the events during and after the pogrom.

The Russian army and police did nothing to stop the unrest, intervening only after three days of killings and brutality. There were even reports that a bishop saw the rioters and blessed them.

Hands untied to harm Jews

“The memoirs of Prince Urosov, appointed after the pogrom as governor of Bessarabia, undoubtedly show that his predecessors and subordinates sat idly by and did nothing to stop the violence, and that the anti-Semitic mob received a clear signal from them that for three days they had free rein to attack Jews.

The imperial authorities, including the anti-Semitic Minister of Internal Affairs Vyacheslav Konstantinovich von Plehve, wanted to see a pogrom in the city, without their sanction, the Jews of Kishinev would not have experienced such a devastating tragedy.

“I researched another wave of anti-Jewish riots that swept through the Pale of Settlement in 1882-1884. At that time, too, the atmosphere could have led to pogroms, but the army and police did not allow the anti-Semitic hatred that was boiling in the area. In contrast, in 1903, the central authorities in Russia wanted Jewish blood to be shed, and that is exactly what happened“.

Respect for Moldova’s Jewish heritage

This year, Moldova will commemorate the 120th anniversary of the tragic events in Kishinev with a ceremony attended by state leaders.

Moldovan authorities honor the memory of the Jews killed during the pogroms of 1903, just as they honor the memory of the tens of thousands of Moldovan Jews who perished during the Holocaust. Anti-Semitism in Moldova has almost completely disappeared, and it has been replaced by a respectful attitude towards Jews and the state of Israel. If anything spoils this idyll, the Moldovan ambassador hints, it is incitement from Russia.

“Russia is now trying to destabilize Moldova to hinder its choice to become part of the free world and its desire to join the European Union“, Roitman decisively states.

“They are waging war against us and spreading propaganda aimed at sowing hatred and discord between ethnic groups, and this is reminiscent of the anti-Semitic propaganda of 120 years ago“.

“In Moldova, we remember and recognize the legacy of the large Jewish communities that once existed here,” said Ambassador Roitman.

“Now this legacy is also expressed in the strong ties between Moldova and Israel, and this legacy is a bridge that connects us and contributes to further strengthening ties. Moldova was one of the first countries to adopt the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) definition of anti-Semitism. It supports Israel in international organizations and works to strengthen friendship with the Jewish people”.

Blood libel leading to the Kishinev pogrom

As has happened many times in Jewish history, it was a blood libel that served as a convenient trigger for incitement to violence. After the death of two local children, a boy and a girl, false rumors spread that they were “killed by Jews to use their blood for making matzah for Passover”.

Of course, these accusations were unfounded (the boy was killed by members of his own family, and the girl committed suicide), but facts never stopped anti-Semites from fanning the flames of hatred. After the Passover prayers, an angry mob turned against their Jewish neighbors.

The Kishinev pogrom was not the first pogrom in the Russian Empire, but it became infamous for the brutality of the pogromists, who nailed victims’ heads, gouged out their eyes, threw babies out of windows, castrated men, and raped women and girls.

When the unrest ended, a grim tally was taken: 49 Jews were killed, about six hundred were injured (92 seriously), and the attackers caused terrible destruction to Jewish homes and businesses in the city.

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Kishinev pogrom: In 1903, the central authorities in Russia wanted Jewish blood to be shed, and that is exactly what happened.

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Mark Holenkov from Maccabi Haifa was included in the Ukraine U-18 youth national team’s squad for an international friendly tournament in Croatia. For the Israeli audience, this is not just a line in the lineup: the Ukrainian team is once again reaching the European youth level with a player representing an Israeli club.

The head coach of the Ukraine U-18 team, Dmytro Mykhaylenko, announced a list of 24 players for the tournament, which takes place in Croatia from June 3 to 9, 2026. The squad includes three goalkeepers, one of whom is Mark Holenkov, representing Maccabi Haifa, Israel. This was reported by the Ukrainian Football Association on June 3, 2026.

Ukraine U-18 in Croatia: dates, opponents, and schedule

The Ukraine U-18 team is holding a June friendly tournament in Croatia as part of the preparation for a new generation of players. Such tournaments rarely become big news outside the football community, but it is here that coaches test the nearest reserve, look at players from Ukrainian and foreign academies, and assemble the team before more serious international challenges.

Ukraine is set to play three matches: against Finland on June 3 at 18:30, against Norway on June 6 at 13:00, and against Turkey on June 9 at 13:00. This schedule is confirmed in publications about Mykhaylenko’s team lineup.

For the youth team, this is an important segment. Matches against Scandinavian teams and Turkey offer different levels of resistance: Finland and Norway are traditionally strong in organization and physicality, while Turkey is known for speed, combativeness, and individual actions.

Why Holenkov’s call-up is important for Israel

Mark Holenkov is listed in the squad as a goalkeeper for Maccabi Haifa. For Israeli football, this is a noticeable detail: the club from Haifa gains direct presence in the Ukrainian youth national team, and the story itself becomes another example of the connection between Ukrainian and Israeli football.

In Israel, such episodes are read more broadly than an ordinary sports news. Haifa, the Ukrainian national team, youth football, an international tournament in Croatia—all of this forms a living map of contacts between the two countries.

Against the backdrop of Russia’s war against Ukraine, sports remain one of the channels where Ukrainian presence in Europe continues to be visible. And if a player from an Israeli club appears in the national team, it enhances the attention of the Israeli audience.

Who Dmytro Mykhaylenko called up

Dmytro Mykhaylenko included 24 players in the squad. The goalkeeper line-up looks like this: Rostyslav Baglay from Shakhtar Donetsk, Mark Holenkov from Maccabi Haifa, and Yehor Klymenko from Rukh Lviv.

In defense, there are Nikita Melnyk from Napoli, Zakhar Onyshchuk from Bologna, Yehor Kostiuk and Nikita Kalyuzhny from Shakhtar, Yehor Sherstiuk from Metalist Kharkiv, Dmytro Maksymenko from Rebel Kyiv, and Arsen Zalipka from Rukh.

The midfield is assembled from players of Ukrainian and foreign clubs. The list includes Oleksandr Balakai and Artem Zubrii from Shakhtar, Illia Kutia from Hajduk Split, Vitalii Hliut from Chicago Fire, Dmytro Sukhonos from Kolos, Mykola Petrovskiy from Stuttgart, Illia Hryshchenko from Metalist, Mukhammad Dzhurabaev from Rukh, Vasyl Hustei from Puskas Academy, and Ivan Bahrii from Metalist 1925.

In attack, Mykhaylenko relies on Dmytro Zudin from Hajduk Split, Illia Menshikov from Austria Vienna, Matvii Bodnar from Kryvbas, and Oleksandr Dedov from Karpaty Lviv.

The lineup shows the geography of Ukrainian football

In this squad, it is clearly visible how the map of Ukrainian youth football has changed. The team includes players from Ukrainian clubs, but there is also a noticeable group of footballers from Italy, Germany, Austria, the USA, Hungary, Croatia, and Israel.

This is no longer a local story of one football school. Ukrainian youths are developing in different systems, playing in different championships, and returning to the national team with different experiences.

For the coaching staff, this is both an advantage and a challenge. The team receives players with international practice, but they need to be quickly assembled into a single game model. In a short tournament in Croatia, there is little time for adaptation, so discipline, interaction, and reliability in each line are important.

It is here that the role of goalkeepers is especially sensitive. At the youth level, a goalkeeper’s mistake often changes not only the score but also the psychology of the entire team. Therefore, the inclusion of Mark Holenkov from Maccabi Haifa in the trio of goalkeepers is not a formality but a real opportunity to make a statement in the Ukrainian national team system.

Ukraine, Israel, and football: where is the meaning for the reader

NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency views this story not only as sports news. For Israelis of Ukrainian origin, for the Ukrainian community in Israel, and for everyone following the connections between the two countries, the call-up of a player from Maccabi Haifa to the Ukraine U-18 team is a small but indicative fact.

In such cases, football works as a language of connection. It does not replace politics, diplomacy, or military support, but it shows that contacts between Ukraine and Israel exist on different levels: through families, clubs, academies, coaches, youth national teams, and personal player careers.

Mark Holenkov is not yet a hero of a major tournament or a star of the senior national team. But the call-up itself is already important: the Ukrainian U-18 is going to Croatia with a representative of an Israeli club.

For Haifa, this is an occasion to pay attention to a young footballer. For Ukraine, it is another signal that its football reserve is being formed not only within the country. For Israel, it is a reminder that the Ukrainian sports map has long not ended at Ukrainian borders.

What’s next

The tournament in Croatia will take place from June 3 to 9. Ukraine will play against Finland, Norway, and Turkey. For Dmytro Mykhaylenko’s team, this is a test of the lineup, and for individual players, a chance to strengthen their position in the Ukrainian youth national teams.

If Holenkov gets playing time, the match will become an important episode not only for him but also for Maccabi Haifa. In such a case, the Israeli club will be represented on the field as part of the Ukrainian U-18 national team.

In big football, such stories often start quietly: with a short line in the squad, with a friendly tournament, with a few matches in June. But it is from such details that careers, routes, and connections between countries are later formed.

…
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Young Israelis still feel the pain of losing a Ukrainian comrade with whom they created a Zionist project — an organic farm at the foot of Mount Carmel. In memory of their friend, who heroically died repelling Russian aggression against Ukraine, they named a new wine made from the vineyards he planted.

On March 12, 2022, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky awarded Kostyantyn Mrochko the title of Hero of Ukraine — the country’s highest military honor for courage and heroism.

His body was not buried as it burned along with the tank.

“In Israel, Kostya was spiritually reborn and restored. He was not Jewish, but we held a memorial ceremony for him in March 2023. We remember his quick reactions, his work ethic, courage, all his human qualities.”

Kostya, known as Kostyantyn Mrochko, was a tank operator, builder, and craftsman with golden hands. He was a nature and agriculture enthusiast, as well as a joker and inventor with a kind heart. After participating in tank battles in Donbas, he moved to Israel, where he worked in construction and joined the “Lev Adam” organic farm. Kostya was a respected and beloved comrade, leaving a deep impression on everyone who knew him. He was interested in Jewish customs, and his friends remember his courage, quick reactions, and work ethic.

When Kostya’s visa to stay in Israel expired, he returned to Ukraine in August 2021.

“It was clear to him that he would stay to defend Ukraine. And it was clear to us that even if he had stayed in Israel, he would have flown to fight for his country in 2022,” says Elia Aaron.

Israeli friends continue to communicate with his family — Kostya left behind a mother and a teenage son, Vasyl, from a previous marriage in Ukraine. Elia shared plans to build a small pool in memory of Kostya Mrochko.

This is reported by Ukrainian-Jewish Encounter.

Yoav Sason, the creator of the “Lev Adam” farm, talks about Kostya, who was a special person. Kostya quickly learned Hebrew and had extensive experience in agriculture. He was a patriot of Ukraine and planned to return there after his time in Israel. He had a military spirit that inspired him to return to Ukraine for its defense. Yoav recalls how Kostya gently held his newborn daughter and how he loved children.

Israeli friends from the “Lev Adam” farm harvested red and white grapes in the summer and fall of 2022 — just months after Kostya Mrochko’s death defending Kyiv from Putin’s aggression in March 2022.

These friends decided to combine red and white wine — just as Kostya symbolically combined Ukraine and Israel, Ukrainian and Jewish.

Thus, the new rosé wine “Kostya” of the 2022 harvest was born. Friends from “Lev Adam” made a limited edition — only 650 bottles, each with its own number. Each bottle features a story about Kostya, his wonderful human qualities, and his heroism.

The Last Battle

Kostyantyn Mrochko was born on April 9, 1984, and lived in the village of Blahodatne, Volodymyr district, Volyn region of Ukraine. He served in the tank troops and later enrolled in distance learning at the Kyiv University of Food Technologies. In 2014, he went to defend the country in eastern Ukraine and participated in various military operations. His feat in Debaltseve became known and recognized as significant in Ukraine’s history. In February 2022, after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, he once again stood to defend his country. During a battle on March 8, 2022, he died when his tank was hit by a missile.

But Kostya did not disappear without a trace.

“The rosé wine “Kostya” is dedicated to the memory of our dear friend Kostya Mrochko. He was the backbone of our organic farm “Lev Adam,” a strong man with a big heart and unmatched skill. Unfortunately, Kostya will never have the privilege to enjoy it. The memory of his strong hands and gentle heart lives in this wine, in its unique refreshing taste,” reads the label of the Israeli wine.

In the fall, new bottles will be filled with the young rosé wine “Kostya” of the 2023 harvest.

Hero of Ukraine Kostyantyn Mrochko remains not only in the memory of Ukrainian and Jewish friends but has become wine in Israel.

Read other News of Israel and the world on the channels “NiKK”

…
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In Israel, an investigation is underway into the brutal attack on 40-year-old Ukrainian Oleksandr Koval, a refugee from Kharkiv, who came to the country after the start of the Russian war against Ukraine, received temporary protected status, and worked as a cleaner at a confectionery factory in Nof HaGalil.

As it became known on June 4, 2026, the prosecutor’s office filed charges against three suspects — residents of Haifa, Kiryat Yam, and Kiryat Bialik aged 30, 31, and 34. They are accused of robbery with aggravating circumstances. According to the police, the criminals deliberately chose Oleksandr as a target because they knew he was a refugee from Ukraine, lived modestly, saved money for his family, and, as they hoped, might not dare to contact Israeli law enforcement.

Attack on a Ukrainian in Nof HaGalil: what is known

Oleksandr Koval came to Israel from Kharkiv — a city that has been regularly subjected to missile strikes, shelling, and destruction since the first days of the full-scale Russian aggression. In Israel, he got a job in Nof HaGalil, near Nazareth, and every month he set aside part of his earnings to send money to his relatives who remained in Ukraine.

According to the investigation, this was one of the reasons for the attack. One of the suspects previously worked with Oleksandr at the same factory and knew that he might have cash.

According to the victim, an acquaintance offered him a job in the Krayot area and said he would come to his home. But instead of one person, three came.

Oleksandr opened the door — and immediately received a strong blow to the head. Then the attackers beat him, put handcuffs on him, tied him up, strangled him, and continued to beat him until he lost consciousness. He regained consciousness only the next day — covered in blood, shackled, and with injuries all over his body.

“They stole everything I was saving for my family”

According to Oleksandr, the criminals took about 3,000 shekels — money he was saving for his family in Ukraine. In addition to cash, documents and several mobile phones were stolen. In the apartment, the police later found traces of blood, signs of a struggle, handcuffs, and adhesive tape.

This was not a spontaneous fight or a domestic conflict.

According to the investigation, the suspects had been on duty near the victim’s house for several hours. When the light came on in the apartment window, they realized that Oleksandr was home. In the correspondence found by the investigators, there were messages like: “He’s home, the light is on” and “Don’t leave, I’m at the door.” These details show that the attack was planned in advance.

After Oleksandr regained consciousness, he managed to get out of the apartment and reach the police station. In the hospital, he was diagnosed with several broken ribs and multiple injuries.

Why this case became more than just a regular crime chronicle

In this story, not only the brutality of the attack is terrifying. The calculation is terrifying.

According to the police, the suspects assumed that a Ukrainian refugee might be more vulnerable than an ordinary citizen: he is not fully confident in his rights, fears bureaucracy, does not want extra attention, thinks about his family in Ukraine, and is simply trying to survive in a new country.

It is this logic that makes the case especially painful for Russian-speaking Israel.

Thousands of people live in the country who came from Ukraine after February 24, 2022. Some lost their homes in Kharkiv, Mariupol, Dnipro, Mykolaiv, or Zaporizhzhia. Some left parents, children, spouses in Ukraine. Many work in hard and low-paid jobs because they need to pay for housing in Israel and at the same time help those who remained under the blows of the Russian army.

Oleksandr was just such a person. He did not seek conflict, was not part of the criminal environment, did not keep large sums. He simply worked and sent money to his family.

Police position: “In my long service, I don’t remember such brutality”

The head of the Nof HaGalil police department, Kobi Biton, stated that Oleksandr came to the station on May 11. According to the officer, the man was covered in bruises and showed signs of severe violence. Biton emphasized that in his long service, he does not remember such brutality during a robbery, especially considering the small amount of money stolen.

The police quickly identified the suspects. All three were detained, and then charges were brought against them.

For Israeli society, this is an important moment. The state must show that a person who came from a war zone is not easy prey. His status, language, weak knowledge of the system, or fear of bureaucracy should not become an invitation for criminals.

Ukrainian refugees in Israel: safety begins with trust in the law

This story should be heard not only as a crime news from Nof HaGalil. It concerns a broader question: how protected do people who fled the Russian war and are trying to rebuild their lives feel in Israel.

Israel knows well what war trauma is. Here they understand the price of anxiety, losing a home, moving, fear for loved ones, and the need to start from scratch. Therefore, the attack on a Ukrainian refugee should not remain at the level of a short police report.

For Nikk.Agency — Israel News | Nikk.Agency, this case is important as an example that vulnerable people need not pity, but effective protection: police, court, public attention, understandable information in Russian and Ukrainian, as well as a clear signal to criminals — refugee status does not make a person defenseless.

Nof HaGalil, Krayot, Haifa: geography of the case and human meaning

The place of this story is also important. Nof HaGalil is a city in northern Israel, near Nazareth, where many Russian-speaking Israelis and new immigrants live. Krayot and Haifa are large northern regions where Ukrainian refugees and immigrants from the former USSR often seek work, housing, and temporary support.

Therefore, Oleksandr Koval’s case quickly became not only a matter of one attack.

It speaks of trust between a person and the state. If a refugee, after torture, beatings, and robbery, finds the strength to reach the police, the system must work quickly and harshly. In this case, it worked: the suspects were found, detained, and the materials reached the court.

But another question remains — how many people in a similar situation may remain silent because they are afraid, do not know the language, or think that no one will help them.

What is important for Ukrainians in Israel to remember

After such a case, it is important for Ukrainians, temporary residents, new immigrants, and everyone who found themselves in Israel because of the war to remember the main thing: you can and should contact the police. If there is a threat, attack, extortion, violence, theft of documents, or pressure from acquaintances, this is not a “personal problem,” but a reason for immediate contact with law enforcement.

Criminals often choose those who seem lonely to them.

But loneliness disappears where a person receives support: from the police, from the community, from neighbors, from journalists, from social services, and from those who are ready not to pass by. Oleksandr Koval’s story is precisely about this. The attackers counted on fear. Instead, the case went to court.

And this is the right signal.

In a country that itself lives under threats and wars, it is not permissible to turn a refugee into prey. Especially a person who fled from Russian aggression, worked in Israel, and tried to help his family remaining in Ukraine.

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On June 4, Ukraine once again speaks a number that is impossible to look away from: since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, Russia has killed at least 707 Ukrainian children. This is not dry war statistics, not a line in a report, and not just another item in the news feed.

These are children who were deprived of their morning, home, drawings, school, parents, games in the yard, and the very right to grow up.

According to the state platform Children of War as of June 4, 2026, since February 24, 2022, 707 children have died in Ukraine, 2,548 have been injured, 2,317 are considered missing, and 20,570 children have been deported or forcibly displaced. 2,212 children have been returned home, but thousands remain in the Russian system of pressure, isolation, and ‘re-education.’

June 4: the day when Ukraine names the children

In Ukraine, June 4 is observed as the Day of Remembrance for Children Who Died as a Result of Armed Aggression by the Russian Federation. This date was established by the Verkhovna Rada on June 1, 2021 — even before the full-scale invasion, when the country was already living with the pain of the war that began in 2014. At that time, the resolution mentioned at least 240 children killed since the beginning of Russian aggression.

After February 24, 2022, this date became even heavier. The scale of the crimes has grown so much that behind each new report stands not only the tragedy of a specific family but also a question to the whole world: how much more evidence is needed for children’s deaths to stop being perceived as ‘collateral damage’ of war?

President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky on June 4, 2026, reported that Russia has killed at least 707 Ukrainian children, and emphasized: each such death is a child whose future was taken away. United24 also reminded the stories of the deceased children so that the numbers do not turn into impersonal noise.

Why this topic is important for the Israeli audience

For Israel, the topic of killed and kidnapped children is not distant. Israeli society knows all too well what terror against civilians is, what families waiting for the kidnapped are like, and what life looks like after a strike on a home, street, school, or bus stop.

That is why the conversation about Ukrainian children is not only a Ukrainian agenda. It is a topic for everyone who understands the cost of war against peaceful people.

In the midst of this pain, it is especially important that NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency continues to speak about Ukraine not in the language of indifferent statistics, but in the language of human memory. Because behind the formula ‘707 dead children’ are names, photographs, toys, unfinished drawings, and families that will never be the same.

Stories that cannot be reduced to numbers

United24 reminded several stories of Ukrainian children who died from Russian strikes. Among them is eight-year-old Bohdan from Cherkasy. He was simply playing on the playground when a Russian drone struck nearby.

This is what Russia’s war against Ukraine looks like in its most honest form: not ‘geopolitics,’ not ‘conflict of interests,’ not a ‘complex situation,’ but a drone that arrives where a child should have been laughing, running, and returning home to family.

Four-year-old Khrystynka died at night in her own home. Her father built this house for the family with his own hands, as a place of safety, warmth, and normal life. But the Russian strike came when everyone was asleep.

12-year-old Lyubava and her 17-year-old sister Vera died at home after a Russian missile strike. Their bodies were pulled from the rubble by rescuers. The girls loved art, drawing, beauty — all that is usually associated with the future, development, dreams. Their father, a defender of Ukraine, also died in the war.

There is also the story of three little children — Ivan, Vladislav, and Miroslava, who died along with their veteran father. The family moved from the border area, trying to get away from Russian attacks. It was their first night in a new place.

It became the last.

Why the real number might be higher

Official data almost always lags behind the reality of war. Some territories remain occupied, some crime scenes are inaccessible to Ukrainian investigators, some families are separated, and the fate of many children is still unknown.

That is why the number 707 is not the final line. It is the confirmed minimum.

The state platform Children of War separately notes that the exact number of affected children cannot be established due to active hostilities and the temporary occupation of part of Ukraine’s territory.

For the reader in Israel, this is an important detail. In wars of this scale, the truth often comes later: after the liberation of cities, after exhumations, after the return of documents, after the testimonies of those who survived.

Deportation of children: another side of the same crime

Russia kills Ukrainian children not only with missiles and drones. Thousands of children have been taken to Russia or occupied territories, separated from their families, passed through filtration procedures, placed in foreign environments, and subjected to pressure aimed at erasing Ukrainian identity.

According to Children of War, 20,570 Ukrainian children are considered deported or forcibly displaced, and 2,212 have already been returned.

This is not just a humanitarian issue. It is a legal, political, and moral topic directly related to the question of Russia’s responsibility. The International Criminal Court has previously issued arrest warrants for Putin and Russian official Maria Lvova-Belova in the case of the illegal deportation of Ukrainian children.

What happens to kidnapped children

The Russian system tries to break the child’s connection with Ukraine. This can happen through changing documents, imposing Russian citizenship, transferring to foster families, education under Russian programs, propaganda, and closing access to real information about relatives.

Returning such children is a complex and dangerous process. It involves routes through third countries, negotiations, document verification, psychological assistance, and a long path to recovery after the ordeal.

Ukraine and international partners continue to work on returning children, but each such operation is a separate story of risk. And every child who returns home returns not just from another country. They return from a system built on coercion.

Memory as a form of resistance

The Day of Remembrance for Children Who Died Due to Russian Aggression is needed not only for mourning. It is needed so that the world does not get used to the words ‘children died.’

Getting used to it is a dangerous thing. First, a person stops reading the news to the end. Then the numbers seem repetitive. Then the tragedy turns into a background. This is exactly what aggressors count on: for fatigue to become an ally of impunity.

But Ukraine has no right to forget. Israel, which understands the price of memory well, also has no reason to turn away from such stories.

Russia’s war against Ukraine has long gone beyond the military map. It has become a test of whether the world can protect children not only with declarations but with actions: sanctions, courts, investigations, support for Ukraine, the return of the kidnapped, and the preservation of the names of the deceased.

707 children — this is not just a number on June 4, 2026.

It is an indictment against Russia.

And it is a reminder: the future begins with the world refusing to be silent when children’s lives are taken away.

…
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At 11:00 on July 9, on Pushkinska Street in Odesa, a memorial plaque to Henrikh Romanovych Ostashevskyi will be unveiled – an actor, People’s Artist of the Ukrainian SSR, and Righteous Among the Nations. The event is organized by the Odesa Regional Association of Jews, the V. Vasylko Theatre, and the Odesa Holocaust Museum as a symbol of the unbreakable friendship between Israel and Ukraine.

Odesa’s Memorial to the Righteous: How Henrikh Ostashevskyi Saved Jewish Families and Earned Eternal Remembrance

Date and Time: July 9, 2025, 11:00

Location: opposite the Odesa Academic Ukrainian Theatre named after V. Vasylko (Italian Street, Odesa) (Pushkinska Street in Odesa no longer exists. As part of decommunization and derussification, it was renamed Italian Street in July 2024).

Organizers

• Odesa Regional Association of Jews — former ghetto and concentration camp prisoners
• Theatre named after V. Vasylko
• Odesa Holocaust Museum

Biography of Henrikh Romanovych Ostashevskyi

Henrikh Romanovych Ostashevskyi (June 1, 1921, Odesa — February 3, 2004, Odesa) was a Ukrainian theatre and film actor, People’s Artist of the Ukrainian SSR.

From his life path:

• Studied at the Odesa Theatre School (1938–1941).
• After Odesa was liberated from Romanian occupation in 1944, he became an actor at the Odesa Young Spectator’s Theatre and worked there for 14 years.
• Since 1958, he performed at the Odesa Ukrainian Music and Drama Theatre named after the October Revolution.

Awards:

• Order of the Badge of Honor
• Title of People’s Artist of the Ukrainian SSR (1976)

Recognition and Commemoration

• For rescuing the Jewish population during World War II, he was recognized as a Righteous Among the Nations.
• His name is inscribed on the Wall of Honor in the Garden of the Righteous Among the Nations at the Yad Vashem memorial complex (Jerusalem, Israel).
• In 2001, the Alley of the Righteous Among the Nations was opened in Prokhorivsky Square in Odesa, where a birch tree was planted in his honor.
• His name is featured in the exhibition of the Odesa Holocaust Museum.

Timeline of Key Events

Filmography (15 Works)

“My Daughter” (1957), “A Tale of First Love” (1957), “The Blue Arrow” (1958), “Storm over the Fields” (1958), “If Stones Could Speak…” (1958), “The Return” (1960), “Human Blood Is Not Water” (1960), “Dmytro Horytsvit” (1961), “Keys to Heaven” (1964), “People Do Not Know Everything” (1964), “They Knew Them Only by Sight” (1966), “Rainbow Formula” (1966), “Dr. Absta’s Experiment” (1968), “Between the Tall Grains” (1970), “Fiery Roads” (1977–1984)

Organization and Preparation for the Ceremony

1. Historical Segment:
   • Outdoor photo gallery of rescued families
   • Exhibition of archival documents and photographs at the Odesa Holocaust Museum
2. Artistic Accompaniment:
   • Musical-poetic prologue by the Theatre named after V. Vasylko
   • Reading of letters and recollections from contemporaries
3. Official Part:
   • Speeches by the mayor, the rabbi, and organizers on the significance of July 9, 1944
   • Flower laying at the memorial and the birch tree
4. Final Screening:
   • Excerpt from the documentary film about Ostashevskyi
   • Chamber concert by young Odesa musicians

Righteous Among the Nations from Ukraine

To date, 2,707 citizens of Ukraine have been awarded the title of Righteous Among the Nations for their selfless rescue of Jews during the Holocaust — providing shelter, food assistance, and organizing safe passage under mortal threat.

The Importance of Preserving Memory

The installation of the memorial plaque to Henrikh Ostashevskyi is a token of eternal gratitude for humanity and heroism. The editorial board of NAnews – News of Israel calls to preserve the memory of the Righteous as a guarantee of peaceful relations between peoples.

#NAseo

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On June 2, 2026, the topic of emigration from Israel once again went beyond dry statistics. New data, published on June 3 by Vesti/Ynet, shows: it is not only “fresh” immigrants who arrived after the start of the big war in Ukraine leaving the country, but primarily Israelis themselves — young, educated, working, and already integrated into the life of the country.

This picture sharply contrasts with the explanation given by Benjamin Netanyahu in January at a Knesset session. At that time, the Prime Minister, speaking about yerida, claimed that it was supposedly mainly about citizens from Ukraine, who recently arrived in Israel due to the war. However, a study prepared by Dr. Ila Eliyahu for discussion in the Knesset Committee on Aliyah and Integration shows a more alarming reality: the negative migration balance affects not the periphery of society, but its central layers.

Not Ukrainians as a “convenient explanation,” but an Israeli crisis of trust

According to data provided by Ynet, since 2022, about half of those who left Israel are people aged 20 to 44. This is not pension migration, not a story about random tourists, and not only a problem of new immigrants who found it difficult to adapt.

This is the age of work, army, family, startups, medicine, science, universities, and the future tax core of the country.

That is why the attempt to reduce the departure to “Ukrainians who did not settle” seems too simplistic. In 2022, 20,124 new immigrants who had lived in the country for less than two years left Israel. But those who did not fall under this definition were almost twice as many — 39,241 people. In 2023, the picture repeated: 27,973 “fresh” immigrants versus 54,791 people from other categories.

Why this is important for the Israeli audience

For Israel, this is not just statistics from Ben Gurion Airport.

When a person who recently arrived through aliyah leaves, it may be a problem of absorption, language, housing, work, or expectations. But when native Israelis, graduates of local universities, specialists, and families who have already put down roots here leave en masse, the question becomes much deeper.

Here it is no longer about who “could not withstand Israel.”

It is about the fact that some Israelis have stopped seeing a reliable personal horizon in the country.

Young and educated: the most painful part of the statistics

One of the harshest conclusions of the report concerns education. Among those leaving Israel, the share of people with academic degrees is noticeably higher than their share in the country’s population. According to data for 2022, 33.2% of those who left had a first academic degree, while their share in the population was 21.5%. A second degree was held by 23.5% of those who left — almost twice as much as in the overall population structure.

Even more alarming are the figures for holders of a third academic degree. Among those leaving, they were 3.7%, while in the population — only 0.8%.

This is no longer everyday emigration, but a brain drain.

According to the publication, about 25% of people who defended a doctoral degree in mathematics in Israel today live abroad for at least three years. In computer sciences, this figure is 22%, in genetics — 19%, in physics — 17%.

For a country that builds its strength on the army, technology, universities, medicine, and innovation, this sounds like a warning.

NANews — News of Israel | Nikk.Agency draws attention to this part of the story: the problem is not only in the number of those who left, but in who exactly is leaving. If the country is losing future scientists, engineers, doctors, entrepreneurs, and teachers, the consequences will not be immediate, but will hit Israel in years — in the economy, security, universities, high-tech, and the quality of state systems.

Gilad Kariv: the state cannot pretend that nothing is happening

Knesset member Gilad Kariv, who heads the Knesset Committee on Aliyah and Integration, stated that alarming data continues to arrive, but, according to him, there is no single body in the government that coordinates work on the emigration problem, nor a strategic plan to change the trend.

Kariv also directly challenged Netanyahu’s version that the main flow of those leaving are new immigrants from Ukraine. According to him, the statistics do not confirm such proportions.

In 2023, the number of those who left among native Israelis or immigrants who had lived in the country for at least five years reached 51,000 people. This is 53% more than in 2021. And in 2024, according to published data, 53% of those who left the country were sabras — native Israelis, while 48% were born abroad.

The numbers leave no convenient political exit.

One can argue about the reasons, one can assess the responsibility of the government, wars, cost of living, judicial reform, social division, and the sense of personal security differently. But it is already difficult to claim that this is a “foreign” problem brought to Israel by the last wave of aliyah.

Yerida after 2022: from personal decisions to a strategic threat

Until 2021, about 40,500 people left Israel on average per year. In 2022, 59,400 left. In 2023, there was a sharp jump — 82,800 people. In 2024, the figure decreased to 69,500, but still remained significantly above the pre-COVID level.

The number of returning Israelis also decreased. If the average annual figure for the period from 2009 to 2024 was 24,450 people, then in 2024 it fell to 18,800. According to the CBS, the migration balance of Israelis in 2022–2024 was negative: the gap was about 140,000 people in favor of those who left.

A personal story from Tel Aviv and Prague

The Ynet publication includes the story of 45-year-old Dudu Zakai, who moved to Prague. He said he had been working there for many years and had long thought about moving, but the final decision in the family matured after a rocket strike on their neighborhood in Tel Aviv in June last year.

This is an important detail.

For Israelis, war has long ceased to be something abstract. Rockets, alarms, mobilization, hostages, north, south, economic uncertainty, political fatigue — all this adds up to a personal sense of the future. For some, it holds. For others, it breaks.

That is why the conversation about emigration cannot be reduced to accusations of weakness or disloyalty.

People leave not only because it is easier abroad. Often they leave because it has become too difficult at home to plan life five, ten, or twenty years ahead.

Israel, Ukraine, and new aliyah: where the honest line lies

For immigrants from Ukraine, this topic is especially sensitive. After Russia’s invasion in 2022, many came to Israel not out of tourist interest and not for comfort, but because the war destroyed their previous lives. Some managed to integrate, some faced language, bureaucracy, expensive rent, difficulties in diploma recognition, and heavy psychological burdens.

But the new data is important precisely because it removes the role of a convenient explanation from Ukrainian immigrants.

The problem is broader.

NANews — News of Israel | Nikk.Agency views this story as a signal for the entire Israeli society: if the country wants to retain people, it is not enough to talk about Zionism, aliyah, and historical ties with the Jewish people. It is necessary for the citizen to see security, respect for institutions, a clear economy, honest absorption, functioning state services, and a future for children.

What lies behind the numbers

Yerida has always been a painful word in the Israeli language. It carries not only geography but also a moral burden: as if a person not only left but “descended.” However, modern emigration is more complex.

One person leaves for a postdoc.

Another — for work in high-tech.

A third — because of housing prices.

A fourth — because they no longer believe that the state can maintain a balance between security, democracy, economy, and normal life.

A fifth simply wants their children to sleep without sirens.

When such decisions number in the tens of thousands per year, it is no longer a sum of private stories. It is a national symptom.

The main question now is not who is to blame for the specific figure for 2024. The main question is whether the state is ready to recognize that it is not only the “unsettled” who are leaving, but people without whom it will be harder for Israel to remain a strong, smart, and resilient country.

The ending here is still open.

If the Knesset limits itself to another discussion without a plan, the statistics will remain statistics — until the next jump. But if Israel sees in these data not a political threat, but a warning about the future, the conversation about yerida may become the beginning of serious work: with security, absorption, economy, education, science, and trust between citizens and the state.

…
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Israeli midfielder Tomer Yosefi has officially completed the Ukrainian stage of his career and has become a player for Beitar Jerusalem. On June 2, 2026, the Jerusalem club announced the signing of the 27-year-old footballer for the next three seasons — until the summer of 2029.

For the Ukrainian club Polissya, this is not just another summer departure of a foreign player. Yosefi was a notable figure in the team from Zhytomyr, and his return to Israel coincided with an important moment for both sides: Beitar is preparing for European competition qualification, and Polissya is also entering the European stage after the 2025/26 season.

Yosefi returns to Israel: what is known about the transfer

Beitar Jerusalem announced the signing of Yosefi on June 2, 2026. The club’s publication stated that the midfielder will play in the yellow-black uniform for the next three seasons and will also become one of the team’s newcomers ahead of the 2026/27 campaign.

The transfer took place after the player’s departure from Polissya. According to Sport Arena and Football24, Yosefi joined Beitar as a free agent.

This is an important detail.

For Beitar, such a transfer looks economically prudent: the club gets an Israeli player with experience in the Ukrainian Premier League and international adaptation without a full transfer fee. For Yosefi himself, this is a return home, but not a step back. After his experience in Ukraine, he joins a team that will play in the Conference League qualification.

Who is Tomer Yosefi

Tomer Yosefi is an attacking midfielder born in Israel. Before the Ukrainian period, he played for Hapoel Be’er Sheva and Hapoel Haifa, and then moved to Zhytomyr’s Polissya. On Beitar’s website, his experience, intensity, attacking qualities, and ability to add depth to the squad were specifically highlighted.

In Jerusalem, he will not be waiting for a leisurely stroll, but the pressure of a big club.

Beitar is not just a league table. It’s Teddy Stadium, a demanding audience, emotional football, and constant attention from Israeli sports media. For a player who has already gone through the Ukrainian championship, this can be a good test of maturity.

What Yosefi gave to Polissya and why his departure is noticeable

Yosefi joined Polissya at the beginning of 2025 after leaving Hapoel Be’er Sheva. Ukrainian sources indicate that he played 26 matches for the Zhytomyr club in all competitions, scored 3 goals, and provided 2 assists.

In the 2025/26 season, his contribution was more compact but still noticeable: 15 matches, 2 goals, and 2 assists.

The numbers don’t look fantastic if you only look at the statistics.

But football is not always read by goals and assists. For Polissya, Yosefi was a player who added a different rhythm to the team: the Israeli school of movement between the lines, the ability to play in the attacking zone, the experience of the Israeli championship, and the habit of taking the ball in difficult episodes.

The Ukrainian club on the European stage

In recent years, Polissya has been building an ambitious project where not only local results are important, but also the club’s recognition outside of Ukraine. The invitation of the Israeli midfielder fit precisely into this logic: the team from Zhytomyr was trying to assemble a squad capable of competing above the usual level.

Now the club will have to fill this part of the squad without Yosefi.

And this is happening against the backdrop of preparation for the 2026/27 Conference League qualification. According to Ukrainian sports media, Polissya will also represent Ukraine in the main stage of the tournament.

NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency considers this transfer broader than a usual transfer line: the Israeli footballer leaves the Ukrainian club at a time when both Ukraine and Israel remain in the European football field not only through sports but also through political, social, and human context.

Why the transfer to Beitar is important for Israeli football

Beitar finished the 2025/26 season in second place in the Israeli championship and earned the right to play in the Conference League qualification.

This makes Yosefi’s transfer not just a return from a foreign assignment.

The Jerusalem club needs a squad that can withstand several levels of pressure: the Israeli championship, internal pressure, fan expectations, and European matches. In such a situation, a player with experience in another championship can be especially useful — not as a star for the poster, but as a footballer who has already stepped out of his usual environment and knows how to adapt.

Jerusalem, Zhytomyr, and the football connection between Israel and Ukraine

For the Israeli audience, there is a separate layer here.

Yosefi went to play in Ukraine after the start of Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine. It was an unusual route for an Israeli footballer: not to Belgium, Cyprus, Greece, or MLS, but to a country living under constant threat of attacks, alarms, and disrupted sports logistics.

And yet the Ukrainian championship continues to operate.

Clubs play, develop, sell and sign players, enter European competitions, and foreign players gain experience there. This is an important signal: Ukrainian football has not disappeared from the European map despite the war and pressure from Russia.

For Israel, which itself lives under conditions of war, threats, and constant security as part of everyday life, the Ukrainian sports context is especially acutely understood. Football in such conditions becomes not only a game but also proof of normal life where the enemy tries to destroy this normalcy.

NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency sees in Yosefi’s story precisely such an intersecting plot: the Israeli player gained Ukrainian experience, returned to Jerusalem, and can now enter Europe with Beitar. It’s a small sports story, but behind it lies a large geography — Israel, Ukraine, Jerusalem, Zhytomyr, and a common European football route.

What’s next

For Yosefi, the next season will be a test of his new status.

In Polissya, he was a foreign player from Israel who had to prove he could be useful in the Ukrainian Premier League. In Beitar, he returns not as a young player with potential, but as a footballer from whom a specific contribution will be expected immediately.

Beitar has European qualification ahead, and there the depth of the squad can be decisive. One match, one mistake, one quick goal — in the Conference League, such details change the season.

Polissya has its own task: to maintain the pace of development after the departure of foreign players and not lose quality before European matches. It is important for the Ukrainian club to show that it is capable not only of inviting interesting players but also of calmly enduring their departure.

For fans in Israel, this transfer looks especially lively. There is a familiar name, a big club from Jerusalem, a Ukrainian trace, and a European perspective. This means Yosefi’s story did not end with the news of signing a contract — it just moved from the Ukrainian field to the Israeli stage.

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