105 ships in eight days: Ukrainian drones hunt Russian ‘shadow fleet’ in the Sea of Azov

On the night of July 13, 2026, Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces claimed to have hit another 15 Russian vessels in the Sea of Azov. Simultaneously, the ‘Crimean Switch’ operation continued: energy nodes of occupied Crimea, the Russian S-400 system, Tor air defense systems, and radar complexes were targeted.

Over eight days — from July 6 to July 13, 2026 — Ukrainian drone operators, according to the commander of the Armed Forces of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces, Robert Brovdi, with the call sign ‘Madyar’, hit 105 Russian vessels.

These include tankers, bulk carriers, ferries, tugs, and special vessels involved in supplying occupied Crimea and operating Russian port infrastructure in the Sea of Azov.

On the night of July 12 to 13 alone, Ukrainian drones attacked 15 vessels:

  • seven tankers;
  • five bulk carriers;
  • one ferry;
  • two tugs.

Brovdi stated that Ukrainian units continue the ‘battle for fuel for Crimea’, gradually depriving the Russian group of stable maritime logistics.

What happened on the night of July 13

According to the commander of the Unmanned Systems Forces, strikes were carried out on Russian vessels in the Sea of Azov.

Their exact location at the time of the attack, names, and registration details of most targets were not publicly disclosed. However, it is known that these are vessels used for transporting fuel, cargo, and servicing ports that supply Russian troops in occupied Crimea and southern Ukraine.

After the night attack, the total result of the operation, according to Brovdi’s calculations, increased from 90 to 105 hit vessels.

The commander of the Unmanned Systems Forces also stated that the intensity of the strikes has already affected movement through the Kerch Strait, unloading of vessels, and the operation of transshipment infrastructure in occupied Crimea.

There is no independent confirmation of a complete halt to shipping through the Kerch Strait yet. However, earlier, Reuters, citing sources, reported a suspension of movement through the Azov-Don Canal after a series of attacks on vessels.

How Ukraine counted 105 hit vessels

The arithmetic declared by the Unmanned Systems Forces consists of several consecutive night operations.

July 6–10: the first 48 targets

The main phase of the strikes began on July 6.

In the following days, the Ukrainian side reported daily on new hits on Russian tankers and auxiliary vessels.

On the night of July 7, Unmanned Systems Forces units claimed an attack on tankers, a bulk carrier, and a ferry. On the night of July 8, nine more tankers were hit, and on July 9, 14 vessels, including 12 tankers, a bulk carrier, and a tug.

On the night of July 10, the list was supplemented by another 13 vessels:

  • ten tankers;
  • one bulk carrier;
  • one ferry;
  • one sea tug.

After this, Brovdi reported 48 hit vessels in the first five days of the operation.

July 11: immediately 28 vessels

The largest night attack in terms of the number of targets occurred on July 11.

According to Brovdi, Ukrainian drones hit 28 Russian vessels:

  • 21 tankers;
  • four tugs;
  • two bulk carriers;
  • one dredger or special vessel.

After this operation, the total number of hit vessels increased to 76 units.

The Ukrainian side claimed that the vessels were used for military logistics, cargo transportation, and supporting the activities of Russian port infrastructure.

July 12: another 14 targets

On the night of July 12, the Unmanned Systems Forces claimed to have hit:

  • ten tankers;
  • four ferries.

The total result for the period from July 6 to July 12 reached 90 vessels. Information about the attacks on vessels was also mentioned by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

July 13: the result increased to 105

After the attack on seven tankers, five bulk carriers, a ferry, and two tugs, the number of declared hits reached 105.

Thus, the sequence published by the Ukrainian side looks like this:

Date Declared hit vessels Total result
July 6–10 48 48
July 11 28 76
July 12 14 90
July 13 15 105

Why these vessels are called the ‘shadow fleet’

The term ‘shadow fleet’ is usually applied to tankers used by Russia to export oil and petroleum products bypassing sanctions, insurance restrictions, and the price cap set by Western countries.

However, in Brovdi’s statements, this concept is used more broadly.

He includes not only large oil tankers in the ‘shadow fleet’ but also bulk carriers, tugs, ferries, dredgers, and other auxiliary vessels involved in Russian logistics in the Sea of Azov.

These vessels can perform several tasks:

  • deliver gasoline and diesel fuel to occupied Crimea;
  • transport cargo for Russian troops;
  • service ports and piers;
  • ensure ferry communication;
  • support movement in sea channels;
  • participate in the transshipment of fuel and other cargo.

Therefore, the goal of the Ukrainian campaign is not only an individual tanker but the entire transport system connecting Russian ports with the occupied peninsula.

NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency notes that strikes on maritime logistics have significance far beyond the Sea of Azov. Russia is forced to spend additional resources on guarding vessels, seeking new supply routes, strengthening port air defenses, and redistributing cargo to the Crimean Bridge and the land corridor through the occupied south of Ukraine.

‘Crimean Switch’: strikes on the peninsula’s energy

Simultaneously with the hunt for Russian vessels, the Unmanned Systems Forces continue an operation called ‘Crimean Switch off’.

On the night of July 13, according to Brovdi, Ukrainian drones hit nine energy nodes and substations of various capacities in the occupied territories.

A strategic electricity transfer point of the Kuban-Crimea energy bridge, designated as the ‘Crimea’ node, was also hit.

Brovdi claims that this object was attacked for the second time in 48 hours.

The energy bridge from the Krasnodar region was built after the Russian occupation of Crimea and became one of the key sources of electricity supply to the peninsula.

Strikes on substations and electricity distribution nodes can create problems not only for civilian infrastructure but also for Russian military facilities, airfields, radar stations, ports, warehouses, and repair enterprises.

Earlier, on July 3, the Unmanned Systems Forces reported hitting ten energy facilities in occupied Crimea. At that time, the Ukrainian side claimed that in just one night, drones attacked 48 different targets.

S-400, ‘Tor’, and two radar stations

In addition to energy facilities, on the night of July 13, Ukrainian units claimed to have hit four elements of the Russian air defense system.

According to Brovdi, the following were destroyed:

  • a launcher of the S-400 ‘Triumph’ air defense missile system;
  • a ‘Tor’ air defense missile system;
  • two radar complexes.

The S-400 is one of the main long-range systems of the Russian air defense. The complex is designed to detect and hit aircraft, cruise missiles, and other aerial targets.

The ‘Tor’ air defense system is used at shorter distances and is supposed to cover military facilities and units from drones, guided bombs, and missiles.

The loss of radar stations creates an additional problem: even the remaining launchers become less effective if the Russian system cannot timely detect a target and transmit data for its destruction.

Earlier in July, the Unmanned Systems Forces also claimed strikes on two S-400 launchers and a ‘Nebo-U’ radar station. According to Ukrainian data, one of the launchers was located near Glazovka in occupied Crimea, and the other in the Kosyonki area of the Bryansk region of Russia.

The battle for fuel for occupied Crimea

Brovdi calls the disruption of fuel supplies the key task of the series of strikes.

Crimea depends on several supply routes:

  • sea transportation through the Sea of Azov;
  • movement through the Kerch Strait;
  • rail and road communication via the Crimean Bridge;
  • a land corridor through the occupied areas of Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson regions;
  • an energy bridge from the Krasnodar region.

If tankers and ferries stop going to sea or are forced to undergo repairs, the load shifts to land routes.

This increases transportation costs, creates queues, and makes logistics more vulnerable to subsequent strikes.

Even damage to a vessel without its complete destruction can take it out of operation for weeks or months. The shipowner needs to find a safe port, inspect the hull and equipment, replace damaged elements, and obtain permission for further operation.

Moreover, regular attacks increase risks for crews, insurers, and companies that agree to work on routes associated with occupied Crimea.

What the stoppage of the Kerch Strait means

The Kerch Strait is the only maritime route connecting the Azov and Black Seas.

Through it pass vessels heading to the Russian ports of Azov, Rostov-on-Don, Taganrog, Yeysk, and Temryuk, as well as to the ports of occupied Crimea.

Even a temporary halt in movement creates a chain reaction:

  • vessels accumulate waiting for permission to pass;
  • the schedule for fuel delivery is disrupted;
  • freight costs are rising;
  • ports are not receiving cargo on time;
  • there are delays in the removal of products;
  • Russian military are forced to seek alternative routes.

Brovdi suggested that movement through the strait could have been stopped after the large-scale attacks on July 11.

The Russian side has not officially confirmed a complete and prolonged blockade of the strait. Therefore, it is premature to assert that shipping has completely ceased.

However, reports of temporary movement restrictions and the suspension of the Azov-Don Canal indicate that the strikes have already begun to affect Russian maritime logistics.

Affected does not mean sunk

The figure 105 must be interpreted correctly.

The Ukrainian side claims 105 affected vessels, but this does not mean that all of them were sunk or completely destroyed.

The military term ‘affected’ can mean:

  • direct hit;
  • hull damage;
  • fire;
  • engine failure;
  • damage to navigation equipment;
  • loss of ability to move independently;
  • need for long-term repair;
  • temporary suspension of operation.

The full list of names of the 105 vessels, detailed photographs of the damage, and an independent assessment of the condition of each vessel have not yet been published.

There is also no independent confirmation of the destruction of all the declared air defense systems and energy facilities.

Therefore, the most accurate wording is: The Ukrainian drone forces claimed to have affected 105 Russian vessels from July 6 to 13, 2026.

Why this operation is important

In eight days, Ukrainian drones, according to the statements of the SBS command, moved from individual strikes to a systematic campaign against Russian maritime, energy, and military infrastructure.

Simultaneously, ships, ports, substations, energy bridges, air defense systems, and radar stations are being attacked.

This approach forces Russia to defend several types of objects at once and stretch limited air defense resources over a large area.

While Russian complexes try to cover energy nodes, ports and ships become more vulnerable. If air defense is transferred to the coast, the risk to airfields, warehouses, and other objects deep in the occupied peninsula increases.

This is the logic of the ‘Crimean Switch’: not a one-time strike, but a gradual destruction of the system that ensures the Russian military presence in Crimea.

The declared 105 affected vessels in eight days still require full independent confirmation. But even if some targets received relatively minor damage, the intensity of the attacks itself shows that the Sea of Azov has ceased to be a safe internal water area for the Russian fleet and transport companies.

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Digital Business Map: How Profiles, Hubs, and Communities Work for Promotion in Israel. Part 7

In the seventh part, we will analyze another layer of digital presence: landing pages, bookmark profiles, CRM platforms, professional networks, federated social networks, communities, messenger groups, and alternative platforms. For small businesses in Israel, such tools may seem secondary, but they often create the “trust trail” that a client sees before the first contact.

Today, a person rarely makes a decision after one post. They might see a business in search, open LinkedIn, check the page on HubSpot, enter a Discord community, see a profile on Mastodon, find a collection of links on Diigo, and then go to the main site. If everything is neatly arranged and leads to one logic, the brand looks alive and professional.

The example of NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News shows how such platforms can work together. The project itself is related to Israeli news, Ukrainian topics, Jewish communities, regional security, culture, international politics, and historical memory. But the same scheme is suitable for small businesses: each external platform should explain who you are, how you are useful, where the main site is, and how to contact you.

How to use social networks and blogs to promote small businesses in Israel. Part 7
How to use social networks and blogs to promote small businesses in Israel. Part 7

Protopage: landing page, RSS, and convenient link hub

Protopage is a personal start page, RSS reader, and web portal. The platform has been operating since 2005 and was originally built around the idea of gathering news, RSS feeds, bookmarks, notes, widgets, and useful links in one place. It is not a social network in the classic sense, but rather an informational desktop.

In terms of market share, Protopage cannot be compared to Facebook, LinkedIn, or Telegram. Its niche is personal panels, RSS aggregation, informational hubs, internal portals, and pages with structured links. It is used by people and small teams who need to see different sources and materials on one page.

For small businesses in Israel, Protopage can be useful as a public or working link center: site, social networks, RSS, blog, video, contact pages, maps, partner materials, and important publications. This is especially convenient when a company has many channels and needs to gather them into a clear map.

The page Protopage — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can work as an additional hub for the project. For businesses, this is an example of how not just to open another profile, but to gather different digital points into one understandable system.

Diigo Profile: bookmarks, sources, and research base

Diigo is a service for saving bookmarks, annotations, tags, notes, and research materials. It appeared in 2005 as a social bookmarking tool and later became a useful platform for those working with a large number of sources: journalists, teachers, students, marketers, analysts, editors, and teams.

In terms of market share, Diigo does not compete with large social networks. Its role is different: not coverage at any cost, but saving, structuring, and explaining links. It is a tool for those who want to show that the project is backed by normal work with materials and sources, not random publications.

For small businesses in Israel, Diigo can be unexpectedly useful. An agency can collect cases, research, useful articles, and links on promotion. A lawyer can gather materials on legal topics. An educational project can collect sources for students. Media can gather publications on countries, topics, events, and historical memory.

The profile Diigo Profile — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can work as a library of important links for the project. For small businesses, this is an example of how even bookmarks can enhance brand trust.

HubSpot: CRM, marketing, and landing pages

HubSpot is a large platform for CRM, marketing, sales, service support, content, and automation. The company was founded in 2006 in Boston and grew from marketing software into a full-fledged customer platform. It is used by small and medium businesses, B2B teams, SaaS companies, agencies, sales, marketing, and customer service departments.

In the market, HubSpot is not related to ordinary social networks but to the class of business platforms. It is compared with CRM and marketing automation solutions: Salesforce, Zoho, Pipedrive, Mailchimp, ActiveCampaign, and other tools for working with clients and leads. HubSpot’s strength is the connection of the site, forms, email, CRM, content, analytics, and marketing processes.

For small businesses in Israel, HubSpot can be useful if you need not just to publish posts but to manage inquiries: who wrote, where they came from, what they asked, at what stage the deal is, what emails were sent, which pages work better. This is especially important for services where the client does not buy immediately but goes through several touches.

The page HubSpot — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can work as an additional landing page for the project. For businesses, this is an example of how an external landing can be connected not only with publication but also with marketing logic and applications.

LinkedIn: professional network and B2B trust

LinkedIn is a professional social network launched in 2003. Its main role is business connections, companies, vacancies, expert publications, corporate pages, B2B communication, recruiting, and professional reputation. Unlike entertainment social networks, LinkedIn is perceived as a place where business shows its competence.

In terms of scale, LinkedIn remains one of the main professional networks in the world. International companies, startups, universities, media, funds, technology brands, agencies, executives, HR specialists, journalists, consultants, and experts are present there. For the B2B segment, it is one of the key channels of trust.

For small businesses in Israel, LinkedIn is especially important if the company works with corporate clients, international audiences, technology, marketing, legal services, consulting, education, real estate, investments, or expert services. There you can show not only services but also a professional position.

The page LinkedIn — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can work as a professional representation of the project. For small businesses, this is an example of how a brand becomes visible not only to clients but also to partners, journalists, specialists, and organizations.

Mastodon: federated network and independent presence

Mastodon is a federated social network that publicly appeared in 2016. Its feature is that it is not built around one central site. There are different servers, or instances, that are connected through the Fediverse. A user of one server can read and discuss publications of users from other servers.

In terms of market share, Mastodon is much smaller than X, Facebook, or Threads. But its value is not in mass coverage, but in an independent environment, open code, the absence of a single corporate center, and an audience often consisting of IT specialists, journalists, researchers, authors, activists, and people interested in privacy.

For small businesses, Mastodon can be useful if the company works with an international audience, technology, media, education, analytics, culture, or independent communities. It is not a channel for quick sales but a good signal of modern digital literacy.

The profile Mastodon — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can be used as an additional point for publishing materials and links. For small businesses, this is an example of presence not only on large centralized platforms but also in a freer federated environment.

Discord: communities, discussions, and closed audience

Discord is a platform for voice, video, and text communication, launched in 2015. Initially, it became known among gamers, but later expanded significantly: now it is used by educational projects, crypto and Web3 communities, music groups, startups, authors, fan clubs, IT teams, courses, and closed communities.

In the market, Discord holds a strong place in the niche of community platforms and real-time communication. It is not a classic social network with an open feed but a space of servers, channels, roles, chats, voice rooms, and constant communication. Therefore, its value is in retaining the audience, not just attracting new people.

For small businesses in Israel, Discord can be useful if a community can be created around the company: a training course, a client club, technical support, a creative group, a project for youth, a gaming or IT direction, an educational program, closed discussions, or events.

The server Discord — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can work as an additional communication space around the project. For businesses, this is an example of how you can not only publish but also gather people into a separate community.

MeWe: privacy and an alternative to large social networks

MeWe is a social network that grew out of the Sgrouples project, founded in 2012. The platform positions itself as a more private alternative to large social networks. It is often described with an emphasis on personal data, groups, communities, the absence of the usual advertising model, and an attempt to create a more controlled communication environment.

In terms of market share, MeWe is much smaller than Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, or X. But it has its niche: users who value privacy, alternative communities, interest groups, and less dependence on the largest platforms. Open data on its audience has changed, but the platform claimed tens of millions of users worldwide.

For small businesses, MeWe can be useful if the company works with interest groups, communities, author projects, culture, family audiences, educational topics, or international connections. It is not the main sales channel but an additional layer of presence.

The profile MeWe — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can be used as another social point of the project. For businesses, this is an example of working with an audience that is not always found in ordinary mass networks.

Plurk: microblogging, short thoughts, and niche communities

Plurk is a microblogging platform launched in 2008. It is known for its horizontal timeline, short messages, and culture of quick publications. Over the years, Plurk has been particularly noticeable in some Asian internet communities, as well as among users who liked the alternative format of microblogging.

In terms of market share, Plurk does not compete with X, Facebook, or Telegram. It is a niche platform where the value is not in a huge audience but in an additional digital footprint, short publications, and presence in non-standard environments. For some brands, such platforms help expand recognition beyond familiar networks.

For small businesses, Plurk can be an additional channel for short updates, thoughts, links, announcements, and quick notes. Do not expect it to be the main flow of applications, but as part of the overall presence system, it can work.

The page Plurk — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can be such a short microblogging channel for the project.

Societas: federated social environment and additional profile

Societas is one of the niche federated social platforms associated with the idea of independent profiles and alternative social networks. Such platforms usually do not have a large market share, but they are important as part of the broader Fediverse environment and independent web.

Unlike Facebook or LinkedIn, such platforms do not provide instant coverage. Their role is to show that the project is present not only in commercial social networks but also in distributed, independent, or alternative digital spaces. This is especially interesting for media, authors, IT projects, cultural initiatives, and people who value digital autonomy.

For small businesses in Israel, Societas can be useful as an additional point of presence if the brand works with technological, international, independent, or media audiences. It is not a mandatory platform for everyone, but a good element of a wide link map.

The profile Societas — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can be used as another federated profile of the project.

Diaspora Psyco: distributed social network and data control

Diaspora is a distributed social network that appeared in 2010 as an alternative to centralized platforms. Its idea is not one main site but a network of independent servers called pods. The user chooses a pod, and the network itself does not belong to one corporate center.

In terms of the mass market, Diaspora did not become a competitor to Facebook, but it is important historically and ideologically: as one of the early projects that raised the question of user control over data, distributed architecture, independence from large platforms, and open code.

For small businesses, such a platform is not suitable for everyone. But for media, technological projects, public initiatives, cultural organizations, and authors, it can be an additional signal: the project is present in an environment where independence, privacy, and distributed communication are important.

The profile Diaspora Psyco — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can work as another point of presence for the project in the distributed social network.

How to use these platforms without chaos

The main mistake of small businesses is to perceive external platforms as a random set of links.

If a company has Protopage, Diigo, HubSpot, LinkedIn, Mastodon, Discord, MeWe, Plurk, Societas, and Diaspora, but nowhere is it explained who they are and where to contact, there will be little benefit.

Each platform should have its role. Protopage — link hub and RSS. Diigo — bookmark and source base. HubSpot — landing pages and CRM logic. LinkedIn — professional reputation. Mastodon, Societas, and Diaspora — federated presence. Discord — community and communication. MeWe — alternative social network. Plurk — short messages and additional microblog.

For small businesses in Israel, it is important that all these pages lead to one center: the main site, a clear description of services, contacts, and a clear action. The client should not guess what the company does. They should quickly understand: who you are, where you work, how you are useful, and how to contact you.

Why this is important for promotion in Israel

The Israeli market is fast and multilingual. One client searches in Hebrew, another in Russian, a third in English or Ukrainian. One checks Google, another looks at LinkedIn, a third opens Telegram or Discord, a fourth just looks for additional confirmations that the business is real.

Therefore, promotion should not depend on one platform. The main site remains the center, but around it should work social networks, blogs, profiles, communities, maps, RSS hubs, professional pages, and additional publication platforms.

The example of NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News shows that digital presence can be built as a system. A reader can find the project through Protopage, Diigo, HubSpot, LinkedIn, Mastodon, Discord, MeWe, Plurk, Societas, or Diaspora, but everywhere they should see the same logic: this is a project about Israel, Ukraine, Jewish communities, regional security, culture, and historical memory.

Who can help with such promotion in Israel

Such services in Israel are provided by the partner agency of the project NAnews and sTDe | NAnews — event poster of Israel.

Nikk.Agency is engaged in website promotion, lead generation, and internet marketing in Israel. The agency works with Google Ads, Google Maps, local promotion, websites, content, landing pages, and business visibility in AI assistants.

For small businesses, this is especially important because not just views are needed, but real inquiries: calls, applications, WhatsApp messages, site visits, and clients from the desired city or region. The agency’s website is available in Hebrew, Ukrainian, and Russian: Nikk.Agency — website promotion, lead generation, and internet marketing in Israel.

Conclusion of the seventh part: Protopage, Diigo, HubSpot, LinkedIn, Mastodon, Discord, MeWe, Plurk, Societas, and Diaspora do not replace the main site but enhance it. They help small businesses in Israel look more professional, create more trust points, work with different audiences, and lead the client to a clear inquiry.


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The Alibi Sisters in Israel: the Zaval’ski sisters bring Ukrainian-Jewish music, Yiddish and klezmer – October 2026

In October 2026, Israel will once again hear The Alibi Sisters — the duo of Anna and Angelina Zavalsky, Ukrainian sisters from Kyiv, who have journeyed from the popular group “Алібі” to a project where the Ukrainian scene, Jewish memory, Yiddish, klezmer, and retro aesthetics sound like one story.

The tour will take place from October 10 to 18, 2026, covering several cities in Israel: Nof HaGalil, Ashdod, Netanya, Ashkelon, Rishon LeZion, Petah Tikva, Be’er Sheva, and Haifa. All concerts are scheduled for 20:00, and tickets, according to the organizers Showman, range from 174 to 265 shekels in different cities.

Tickets are already available on the Showman website

This is not just a tour of a Ukrainian duo.

For many Israelis, especially those whose family histories are connected with Kyiv, Podolia, Odessa, Chernivtsi, Zhytomyr, Berdychiv, or Uman, this concert may be a meeting with that cultural world that cannot always be explained in words. It lives in songs, intonations, old records, family recipes, Yiddish words, grandmother’s memories, and that special music where joy and sadness almost never exist separately.

Who are The Alibi Sisters

Anna and Angelina Zavalsky have been known to the Ukrainian public since the early 2000s as the group “Алібі”. The project appeared on April 6, 2001, and since 2021, the sisters have been performing as The Alibi Sisters. The group’s profile lists pop and klezmer genres, and among the languages of performance are Ukrainian, Russian, and Yiddish.

There is an important detail in the duo’s biography: the sisters were soloists of the folk ensemble “Strumochok” from the age of five, graduated from music school in 1997 with a focus on violin, and later moved on to the professional stage, television, albums, and a large Ukrainian audience. In 2012, “Алібі” ceased artistic activity, but in 2021 the project returned in a new form — with a different musical perspective, sound, and a deeper appeal to Ukrainian-Jewish heritage.

It is this transition that makes the current Israeli tour particularly interesting.

The Alibi Sisters are no longer just nostalgia for the Ukrainian pop scene of the 2000s. It is an attempt to hear anew that cultural layer where Ukrainian folk songs, Yiddish, klezmer, Jewish hits, theatricality, family memory, and the retro image of the 1950s–1960s merge into a cohesive stage form.

Why this concert is important specifically for Israel

The Alibi Sisters in Israel: the Zavalsky sisters bring Ukrainian-Jewish music, Yiddish, and klezmer - October 2026 - Israel news
The Alibi Sisters in Israel: the Zavalsky sisters bring Ukrainian-Jewish music, Yiddish, and klezmer – October 2026 – Israel news

In an interview with Ukrainian Jewish Encounter, published on May 15, 2025, Anna Zavalsky explained in detail that the Ukrainian-Jewish theme for the sisters is not a random stylization. She said that even on a household level in Ukraine, many people partially remain carriers of Jewish culture — through songs, dish names, words, family habits, and memory, which was not always openly passed on but often very deeply.

In the same interview, Anna recalled challah, stuffed fish, Yiddish words in family speech, and the song “Vi iz dos gesele,” which their grandmother sang to them in childhood. Such details are important because they show: for The Alibi Sisters, Yiddish and Jewish musical tradition are not museum exhibits but part of living memory that returns through voice, stage, and personal history.

For Israel, this resonates particularly accurately.

Here live people for whom Yiddish is the language of childhood, the language of parents or grandparents, the language of old songs, jokes, prayers, family conversations, and the Eastern European Jewish world. And even if someone no longer speaks Yiddish, music is often recognized faster than words.

Tour organizers describe the program as a concert with a live band, retro aesthetics, dance drive, klezmer spirit, and songs where Jewish hits, Ukrainian folk songs, well-known Ukrainian pop compositions, and world hits sound together. Among the announced Jewish songs are Bublitchki, Main Yiddishe Mamme, Papirossen, Ich Hob Dich Zifeel Lieb, and others.

You can listen on https://www.youtube.com/@TheAlibiSisters

NAnews — Israel News and sTDe | NAnews — event listings in Israel note: in this format, the concert becomes not only a musical event but also a cultural meeting. Here, not only the stage is important, but also who sits in the audience, what family associations arise for the viewers, and why the Ukrainian-Jewish theme sounds so attentively today.

The Berry Sisters, Kyiv, and a return to the Yiddish world

The Showman poster states that Anna and Angelina Zavalsky are inspired by the work of the legendary Berry Sisters. Organizers emphasize the retro atmosphere, live band, and the sense of a time when Yiddish was heard in apartments and on the streets, and Ukrainian and Jewish melodies could alternate at weddings and family celebrations.

In an interview with UJE, Anna Zavalsky also spoke about the connection with the Berry Sisters but clarified an important point: The Alibi Sisters do not try to be a copy of the legendary duo. They use the power of “sisterly thirds,” retro aesthetics, and recognizable vocal kinship while remaining an independent Ukrainian project.

This distinction is fundamental.

When Ukrainian artists sing in Yiddish in Israel, they do not just reproduce old melodies. They reconnect Kyiv, Podolia, the Ukrainian stage, Jewish musical memory, and the modern experience of war, emigration, loss, and return to roots.

In the same interview, Anna Zavalsky said that returning to the Yiddish world is impossible physically, but possible as memory, respect, and a form of cultural return. In her view, it is important to remember not only the tragedy but also life: laughter, food, conversations, love, Sholem Aleichem’s books, and the human warmth of a vanished world.

That is why the Israeli tour of The Alibi Sisters does not look like an ordinary poster for a week in October.

This is a concert for those who want to hear Ukraine not only through war news but through music, culture, voices, and those connections that have existed for centuries between Ukrainians and Jews.

Where and when The Alibi Sisters concerts will take place in Israel

According to Showman, The Alibi Sisters concert tour has been rescheduled to new dates and will take place in Israel from October 10 to 18, 2026.

Nof HaGalil — October 10, 2026

The concert in Nof HaGalil will take place on October 10, 2026, at 20:00.

Venue: Berkovich Cultural Center.

Address: Derech HaChativot 4.

Ticket prices: 175–235 ₪.

Ashdod — October 11, 2026

In Ashdod, The Alibi Sisters will perform on October 11, 2026, at 20:00.

Venue: Matnas Duna-Yud.

Address: Keren Kayemet LeIsrael St. 90.

Ticket prices: 195–255 ₪.

Netanya — October 12, 2026

The concert in Netanya will take place on October 12, 2026, at 20:00.

Venue: Arik Einstein Auditorium.

Address: Beni Berman St. 6.

Ticket prices: 225–255 ₪.

Ashkelon — October 13, 2026

In Ashkelon, the concert is scheduled for October 13, 2026, at 20:00.

Venue: Matnas “Woldenberg”.

Address: Gruper St. 15.

Ticket prices: 174–225 ₪.

Rishon LeZion — October 14, 2026

In Rishon LeZion, The Alibi Sisters will perform on October 14, 2026, at 20:00.

Venue: “Mofet” Hall.

Address: Rothschild St. 60.

Ticket prices: 195–255 ₪.

Petah Tikva — October 15, 2026

The concert in Petah Tikva will take place on October 15, 2026, at 20:00.

Venue: “Sharet” Hall.

Address: HaAliya HaShniya St. 1.

Ticket prices: 195–255 ₪.

Be’er Sheva — October 17, 2026

In Be’er Sheva, the concert will take place on October 17, 2026, at 20:00.

Venue: Tamuz — House of Music.

Address: Herzl St. 12.

Ticket prices: 235–265 ₪.

Haifa — October 18, 2026

The final concert of the Israeli tour is announced in Haifa on October 18, 2026, at 20:00.

Venue: “Rappaport” Hall.

Address: HaNasi Ave. 138.

Ticket prices: 195–255 ₪.

Tickets are already available on the Showman website

What will be featured in the program

A program with a live band is expected, where Jewish hits in Yiddish, Ukrainian folk songs, well-known Ukrainian compositions, and world retro classics will sound not as separate numbers but as one musical route. The organizers’ description highlights the klezmer spirit, dance energy, nostalgia, and stage theatricality.

For the Israeli audience, this may be particularly relatable: here, Ukrainian motifs do not conflict with Jewish ones but become part of a shared memory. And perhaps that is why The Alibi Sisters in Israel are perceived not as foreign performers but as artists who bring a familiar code — only in a new, bright, and stage-assembled form.

NAnews — Israel News will follow cultural events that connect Israel, Ukraine, and Jewish communities through music, history, and living human memory.

Tickets and tour schedule:

Tickets are already available on the Showman website

 


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Lindsey Graham died after returning from Kyiv: Israel and Ukraine lost an influential ally in Washington

American Republican Senator Lindsey Graham, who remained one of the most prominent figures in US foreign policy for decades, died on the evening of July 11, 2026, after a brief and unexpected illness. He was 71 years old.

His team officially announced the politician’s death. The cause of the illness has not yet been disclosed, and the senator’s family has asked for privacy during this difficult time.

The news was particularly unexpected because on July 10, Graham was still in Kyiv, meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and discussing the strengthening of Ukraine’s air defense, the production of Patriot systems, and new sanctions against Russia. He maintained an extremely busy work schedule and participated in shaping American policy towards Ukraine, Israel, Iran, and the Kremlin until his last days.

Lindsey Graham’s last visit to Ukraine

The tenth trip to the country that continues to resist Russia

The meeting with Volodymyr Zelensky was part of Lindsey Graham’s tenth visit to Ukraine. The parties discussed not only the current needs of the Ukrainian army but also long-term military cooperation, including the implementation of agreements on the licensed production of Patriot complexes directly in Ukraine.

The senator also visited the Ukrainian defense company SkyFall, which produces heavy strike drones Vampire, FPV drones Shrike, and interceptor drones P1-SUN. For Graham, the development of Ukrainian military technologies was not a secondary topic but one of the proofs that aid to Ukraine yields practical results.

During a conversation with journalists, he stated that Donald Trump began to perceive Ukraine differently because he saw its ability to withstand a significantly stronger opponent and exert serious pressure on Russia. According to the senator, the American president was particularly impressed by the successes of Ukrainian forces and the level of development of defense technologies.

Graham believed that Trump respects winners and is gradually beginning to see Ukraine in that light. This statement was made just a few days before the senator’s death and effectively became one of his last public political messages.

Sanction blow to Russian oil

One of Lindsey Graham’s main initiatives in recent years was a bill to increase pressure on countries that continue to buy Russian oil, gas, and other strategic resources.

The document provides for the possibility of imposing extremely high tariffs on goods from countries that effectively help the Kremlin finance the war. The initiative received support from more than 80 American senators, but its advancement was delayed for some time due to the Trump administration’s desire to leave room for negotiations with Moscow.

After Graham’s last visit to Kyiv, the situation began to change. The senator reported that the White House was ready to support the advancement of a sanctions package capable of seriously hitting Russia’s revenue from energy sales. For Ukraine, this meant the emergence of a new tool to pressure not only the Kremlin but also its largest trading partners.

Israel lost one of its most consistent allies

A politician who visited the country during crises

For Israel, Lindsey Graham was much more than just another influential Republican in Congress. He consistently supported the country’s right to self-defense, advocated for strengthening US-Israeli military cooperation, and took a tough stance against the Iranian regime.

Just in the last year, the senator visited Israel at least three times: in February and December 2025, and then in January-February 2026. During one of the visits, he said he was ready to fly every two weeks to support the Israelis and strengthen defense cooperation amid growing tensions around Iran.

Graham often took an even tougher stance on Iran than Donald Trump. He did not believe that diplomatic promises alone were enough to deter Tehran and insisted on maintaining a real military threat in case of further development of the Iranian nuclear program.

At the same time, the senator had to balance between personal loyalty to the president and his own views. These contradictions were especially noticeable on the issue of Ukraine: Trump repeatedly criticized the scale of American aid to Kyiv and focused on a quick end to the war, while Graham demanded strengthening Ukraine and economic pressure on Russia.

It is this connection between Israeli security, Ukraine’s resistance, and American politics that makes the senator’s death significant for the audience in Israel. NAnews —Israel News | Nikk.Agency views such events not in isolation but in the context of the overall struggle to preserve Western alliances in the face of Russia and Iran.

Reaction of Isaac Herzog and Israel Katz

Israeli President Isaac Herzog stated that he was shocked by the sudden death of Lindsey Graham. He called the senator a great American patriot, a dear friend, and a true leader of the strategic partnership between the United States and Israel.

According to Herzog, Israelis will never forget that Graham stood by them in the most difficult moments. The president emphasized his commitment to truth, sense of justice, and moral clarity.

Defense Minister Israel Katz also noted the senator’s contribution to strengthening the alliance between the two countries. He recalled that Graham consistently defended Israel’s security and its right to respond to threats.

These statements reflect the real weight of the American politician in Israel’s system of international relations. Graham did not limit himself to formal words of support: he visited Israel during crises, advocated for arms supplies, and sought to maintain the country’s support in Congress.

What Graham’s death means for Ukraine and Israel

Lindsey Graham represented that part of the American political class that viewed support for Israel and Ukraine as interconnected elements of US security. In his view, Russia and Iran were not separate regional problems but participants in a broader confrontation aimed against Western democracies and American allies.

His death occurred at a time when the struggle over further aid to Ukraine, sanctions against Russia, policy towards Iran, and the future of US-Israeli cooperation continues in Washington.

The senator had a rare ability to unite representatives of both parties around foreign policy initiatives. The sanctions bill against buyers of Russian oil, developed with his participation, became one of the most notable examples of such cooperation. Now the question is whether there will be a politician in the Senate with comparable influence capable of bringing this initiative to fruition.

For Ukraine, Graham’s departure means the loss of a person who publicly and consistently proved to Republican voters the need to support Kyiv. For Israel, it means the loss of a politician who considered the security of the Jewish state a strategic interest of the United States, not a subject of short-term partisan bargaining.

His last visit to Kyiv turned into a symbolic conclusion of his political biography. Lindsey Graham spoke until his last days about Patriot, Ukrainian drones, sanctions against the Russian economy, and the need to stop the aggressor through pressure, not empty promises.

If you want to see the Israeli-Ukrainian agenda without a Russian lens — add NAnews to Google.

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Are you 60+ in Israel and still working? Perhaps the pension fund can already pay you money

Many residents of Israel approach the age of 60 with the feeling that retirement is something distant, complicated, and almost inevitably bureaucratic. As long as there is work, a salary, and a familiar rhythm of life, it seems that dealing with pension funds can be postponed: closer to 67 years, after dismissal, or already when Bituach Leumi sends some documents.

But in reality, this approach often becomes the most costly mistake.

In Israel, the pension system is arranged so that a person can have several different sources of future income: state old-age benefits, a pension fund, Bituach Menahalim, Kupat Gemel, Keren Hishtalmut, severance pay, old savings from previous employers, and additional insurance or pension programs. Some of this money people remember, some they have long forgotten, and some programs they only learn about after a professional review.

And here arises the main question for those who have already turned 60 or are approaching this age: can one already start receiving a pension from the pension fund and continue working?

The answer may be unexpected. In some cases — yes, this possibility is indeed worth checking. But this does not mean that everyone over 60 should urgently start receiving payments. For one person, such a step may increase family income today, while for another — decrease future pension, affect taxes, or create problems for the family in the future.

Therefore, the right question is not “am I entitled to a pension?” but rather: what is beneficial in my specific situation?

Pension in Israel is not a single button and not a single payment

You are 60+ in Israel and continue to work? Perhaps the pension fund can already pay you money
You are 60+ in Israel and continue to work? Perhaps the pension fund can already pay you money

For many Russian-speaking Israelis, the word “pension” sounds like something singular: reached the age, submitted documents, started receiving money. But in Israel, everything is more complicated, and because of this, people often get confused.

There is an old-age benefit from Bituach Leumi. This is a state payment that depends on age, insurance record, income, and other conditions.

There is a pension fund — money that has been accumulated over the years from employee and employer contributions. These funds are not the same as the Bituach Leumi benefit and operate under different rules.

There is severance pay — a compensatory part that may be related to dismissal, job change, and pension savings. Sometimes a person perceives this money as a “free amount” that can simply be taken, but such a decision can affect the future monthly pension.

There is Keren Hishtalmut, Kupat Gemel, old pension programs, additional insurances, and savings that may have remained from previous workplaces. This is especially common for people who have changed employers several times in their lives, worked part-time, were self-employed, or moved between cities and fields of employment.

That is why before retiring, it is important not just to ask an acquaintance “how was it for you?” but to gather a complete picture.

  • How many pension programs do you have?
  • Where are the savings located?
  • What amount is already there?
  • What commissions do you pay?
  • What is the forecast for the monthly pension?
  • What will happen if you start receiving payments now?
  • What will change if you wait a few more years?
  • How is all this related to taxes, spouse, heirs, and future living standards?

Until these questions are answered, any decision will be more of a guess than planning.

Why the age of 60+ requires a separate check

In Israel, there is the concept of early retirement age. For many pension issues, the age of 60 becomes an important point because it is after this age that in some cases, one can consider starting to receive payments from the pension fund.

But this is not an automatic right “for everyone” and not a universal advice.

Imagine a typical family in Israel. The husband is 63 years old, the wife is 59. The husband continues to work, receives a salary, and the family is used to planning expenses around the current income. They know that there will be a pension someday, but are not sure when exactly to start the process, what documents are needed, and whether it makes sense to check something in advance.

After a professional review, it may turn out that the pension fund already allows considering a monthly payment, even if the person continues to work. For the family, this may mean additional income now: money for current expenses, helping children, treatment, rent, mortgage, trips, or just a more peaceful life.

But for another family with a similar age and similar salary, the calculation may show the opposite. If you start receiving money too early, the future pension may become lower. If you incorrectly handle severance pay, you can worsen the long-term picture. If you do not consider the tax, the amount “on paper” will not be the same amount that actually comes to the account.

That’s why the topic of 60+ is so sensitive: you can’t work by template here.

The same question — “receive now or wait?” — can have two different correct answers for two people.

The pension fund is not Bituach Leumi

One of the most common confusions arises between Bituach Leumi and the pension fund. People say “pension,” but mean completely different things.

Bituach Leumi is the national insurance system. The old-age benefit is related to state rules, age of entitlement, income checks in certain periods, and insurance record.

The pension fund is savings that were formed through work. Money was transferred there from the salary and employer contributions. These funds may be related to pension payments, severance pay, insurance part, and the chosen pension route.

If a person mixes these two topics, they may incorrectly assess their situation. For example, they may think: “I am not yet receiving Bituach Leumi, so there can be no pension yet.” Or vice versa: “Since I am soon entitled to an old-age benefit, the pension fund will do everything itself.”

In practice, it doesn’t work that way.

Bituach Leumi benefits and payments from the pension fund need to be considered separately, and then look at the overall picture of family income. Only then can you understand how much money a person can actually receive per month, what amounts will be gross, what net, what will happen with the tax, and how income will change after stopping work.

NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency regularly raises such topics precisely because for Russian-speaking families in Israel, this is not an abstract financial theory, but a question of everyday life: paying for housing, maintaining income levels, not losing rights, and not signing documents whose consequences will be difficult to correct later.

Where people most often lose money

The most common mistake is not checking pension savings at all. A person sees deductions in the payslip, knows that “something is there,” but does not understand in which fund the money is, what investment route is chosen, how much maintenance costs, and what the forecast for the future pension is.

The second mistake is waiting for dismissal or official retirement age to open documents for the first time. By this time, some decisions may already be less flexible, and there is much less time left for calm preparation.

The third mistake is withdrawing severance pay without calculation. At first glance, this seems logical: the money is accumulated, so it can be used now. But in Israel’s pension system, the compensatory part is often linked to the future pension, and its withdrawal can significantly reduce the monthly payment in old age. Sometimes a person receives a lump sum today but loses much more in the future.

The fourth mistake is looking only at the “gross” amount. The pension payment may look attractive in calculation, but after taxes and other conditions, the real amount will be different. Therefore, it is important to understand not only the size of the possible pension but also how much a person will actually see in the bank account.

The fifth mistake is not considering the spouse. When starting to receive a pension, a person can choose conditions that will affect what their spouse will receive after their death. This is not a technical detail, but one of the most important family decisions in pension planning.

There is another serious problem: many people rely on someone else’s experience.

Someone says: “I started receiving — and everything is great.” Another says: “Don’t touch anything until 67.” A third advises withdrawing severance pay because “money should be in hand.” But someone else’s story does not replace calculation because each person has different savings, record, income, spouse’s age, health, tax situation, and work plans.

What you need to know before making a decision

If you are already 60 years old or this age is approaching, the first thing to do is not to urgently submit documents and not withdraw money, but to check the whole picture.

You need to understand how many pension programs are open in your name.

Sometimes a person has an active fund from the last employer and one or more old funds that they have long forgotten about. It happens that money is in different places, and without checking, it is impossible to see the full amount.

It is important to find out what monthly payment can be received now and what the forecast will be if you wait a few years. The difference can be significant, especially if the person continues to work and contributions to the pension fund continue to be made.

Separately, you need to check severance pay. This is one of the most sensitive blocks because the decision on compensations can affect future pension, tax benefits, and the overall structure of payments.

The tax issue is no less important. Pension in Israel can have tax consequences, and before starting payments, it is worth understanding what exemptions or benefits may be available, what documents need to be prepared, and how not to create unnecessary tax burden.

It is also necessary to discuss the family part in advance. What will the spouse receive? What guaranteed payments can be chosen? What will happen to the money if the person starts receiving a pension and then passes away in a few years or even earlier? These questions are unpleasant to discuss, but they protect the family from severe financial surprises.

A good pension review should give a person not a beautiful advertising phrase, but a clear answer: what options are there, what are the advantages, what are the risks, and what is more beneficial right now.

Can you work and receive a pension at the same time

In some situations, a person can indeed continue to work and simultaneously receive payments from the pension fund. For Russian-speaking Israelis, this often becomes a revelation because many are sure: the pension starts only after dismissal.

However, it is important not to confuse possibility with recommendation.

If the pension fund allows starting the payment, this does not mean that the decision is automatically beneficial. You need to look at how much money is accumulated, what the size of the monthly payment will be, whether pension contributions from the current work will continue, how the future pension will change, what will happen with taxes, and how it will affect the family.

Sometimes it may indeed be beneficial for a person to start receiving part of the pension income now. For example, if the family needs additional monthly income, if there are large expenses, or if the calculation shows that waiting does not give a significant advantage.

But sometimes it is better to wait. Especially if the person earns well, continues to actively save, does not need additional payments now, or can get a stronger pension picture in a few years.

The main thing is not to make a decision based on emotions.

Pension after 60 in Israel is not a question of “can or cannot.” It is a question of balance between today’s money and future stability.

Why an article on this topic is important specifically for Russian-speaking Israelis

The Russian-speaking audience in Israel often faces several barriers at once.

One barrier is language. Even if a person speaks Hebrew, pension documents, tax forms, and fund explanations can be written in such a way that it is difficult to understand the meaning without a specialist.

The second barrier is the habit of comparing the Israeli system with the country from which the person came. But the Israeli pension system works differently, and old ideas can hinder here.

The third barrier is distrust. People are afraid that they will be “sold something,” so sometimes they do not check anything at all. As a result, instead of caution, there is inaction, and inaction in the pension topic can also cost money.

The fourth barrier is a late start. Many begin to deal with the pension only when they are tired of working, have fallen ill, lost their job, or faced a sharp drop in income. But pension decisions are better made not under pressure, but in advance, calmly, and with calculation.

Therefore, the goal of such a review is not to force a person to urgently sign something. The goal is different: to see the facts.

Where is the money?

How much is there?

What rights are there?

What risks are there?

What actions are better not to take without calculation?

And what option might be reasonable for this family?

When a check is especially needed

It is worth checking pension savings if you are already 60 years old, continue to work, and do not know if you can receive payments from the fund alongside your salary.

This is also important if you have changed jobs several times, are not sure where old pension programs are located, do not know if you have severance pay, or have never looked at a pension forecast.

It is worth checking the situation separately if you are thinking of quitting, retiring early, withdrawing compensation payments, helping children with a large sum, or paying off debts with pension money.

Such decisions may be understandable on a human level, but financially they require calculation. Money that seems “free” today may turn out to be part of future monthly income.

A check is also needed for those who help parents. Very often, it is the children who seek information for mom or dad because parents do not want to deal with personal accounts, are afraid of Hebrew, or do not understand what documents are needed.

If parents are 60+, they work or have recently worked, they may have pension rights that the family simply does not know about.

What to do now

If you are already 60 years old or this age is approaching, do not wait until the situation becomes urgent. It is much more reasonable to find out in advance what pension savings you have, whether you can already consider a monthly payment, how it will affect the future pension, and what tax issues need to be checked before signing documents.

It is important to emphasize: it is not about everyone immediately starting to receive a pension. It is about not living blindly.

Sometimes a check shows that a person can increase monthly income now.

Sometimes it shows that it is better to wait.

Sometimes it helps find old savings.

Sometimes it warns of a mistake with severance pay.

Sometimes it just gives the family peace of mind: now it is clear what is there, what is not, and what to prepare for.

In detail about retirement in Israel, pension funds, Bituach Leumi, severance pay, and important checks before making a decision can be read here: https://nikk.agency/vam-60-v-izraile/

For a person 60+, such information may not just be a useful article, but the beginning of a normal financial review before an important life stage.

Pension in Israel is not just about age. It is about documents, savings, taxes, family, work, and decisions that can affect income for many years.

Therefore, the most reasonable first step is not to guess, but to check.

 


“Not About the War”: The book of Jewish defender of Ukraine Maksym Shvartsman was presented in Chernivtsi on the 3rd anniversary of his death at the front - July 21, 2026 - Новости Израиля

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Jews from Ukraine: How Natives of Ukraine Shaped “Mossad” – Ukrainian Trace in Israeli Intelligence

Israeli intelligence has long become part of a global political myth. Mossad is spoken of as an almost abstract force — without faces, without biographies, without a past. However, any institution has a human dimension. If you look closely at the history of Mossad’s leadership, especially in the second half of the 20th — early 21st century, it becomes clear: the key stages of the formation and strengthening of Israeli intelligence are connected with people whose roots go back to Ukraine.

This is not about the influence of states or external control. It’s about people shaped by the experience of Jewish life in Odessa, Kharkiv, Kherson — cities where security was never guaranteed, and the ability to survive became part of everyday culture. This experience was in demand at a time when the young state of Israel needed not just intelligence, but a survival system. This was noted by Valery Boyanju in “Odessa Life”.

Ukrainian Jewish Reality as a Factor of Thinking

Jews from Ukraine: how immigrants from Ukraine shaped 'Mossad' - the Ukrainian trace in Israeli intelligence
Jews from Ukraine: how immigrants from Ukraine shaped “Mossad” – the Ukrainian trace in Israeli intelligence

Jewish Ukraine at the end of the 19th and the first half of the 20th century was a space of constant risk. Pogroms, revolutions, changes of empires, the Civil War, Stalinist repressions, Nazi occupation — all these are not abstract chapters of textbooks, but personal memories of thousands of families. For these people, the state was rarely a source of protection. More often — a source of threat or, at best, indifference.

It was in such an environment that a type of thinking was formed, based on three principles: not trusting declarations, verifying reality, and acting in advance. This approach later became one of the unspoken foundations of the Israeli security system.

Mossad as a Product Not Only of the State but Also of the Diaspora

Officially, Mossad was created in 1949, after the declaration of Israel’s independence. At an early stage, it was a compact structure with limited resources. However, it quickly began to rely on people with experience in underground struggle, military intelligence, and living under constant threat.

Immigrants from Eastern Europe, including Ukraine, fit organically into this logic. They did not perceive security as something given. For them, it was always a process, not a state.

Meir Amit (1963–1968): Kharkiv Roots and Systemic Transformation

Meir Amit (Hebrew: מאיר עמית, born Meir Haimovich Slutsky) led Mossad from 1963–1968, during a period when Israeli intelligence was transitioning from the stage of formation to the stage of institutional maturity. Although Amit was born in Israel, his parents came from Kharkiv — one of the largest Jewish intellectual centers in Eastern Europe.

Article in the Ukrainian Wikipedia – Meir Amit.

In English biographies, it is consistently mentioned that he was a cousin of the poet Boris Slutsky, and Slutsky himself grew up/was formed in Kharkiv (this is about the poet).

This background was reflected in his management style. Amit was opposed to improvisation for the sake of heroism. He insisted on analytics, data structuring, and strategic planning. It was under him that Mossad became not just a set of operations, but part of a unified architecture of national security.

During his leadership, intelligence played a key role in preparing for the Six-Day War. After leaving his post, Amit did not disappear from public life: he became a member of the Knesset, participated in economic and technological projects, including telecommunications and the defense industry. This highlights an important detail: for this generation, intelligence was not an isolated profession, but part of the general state thinking.

Yitzhak Hofi (1974–1982): Odessa Pragmatism in an Era of Crisis

Yitzhak Hofi (Hebrew: יצחק חופי, born Yitzhak Poberesky) led Mossad from 1974–1982 — one of the most challenging periods in Israel’s history. His leadership came after the Yom Kippur War, the rise of international terrorism, and the strengthening of threats beyond the Middle East.

Article in the Ukrainian Wikipedia – Іцхак Хофі.

Hofi was born in Mandatory Palestine, but his parents emigrated from Odessa. The Odessa Jewish environment always combined irony, caution, and harsh realism. This cultural code was reflected in his management style.

Hofi avoided publicity and believed that the best operation is the one that neither journalists nor politicians know about. Under him, Mossad significantly expanded its international agent networks and strengthened its ability to operate beyond the region, including in Europe and other continents.

Meir Dagan (2002–2011): Kherson, the Holocaust, and the Rejection of Illusions

The most famous figure with Ukrainian roots was Meir Dagan (born Huberman, in another transcription Huberman), who led Mossad from 2002–2011. He was born in Kherson in 1945 to a family that survived the Nazi occupation. (in some sources, 1947 is indicated; Odessa is also named as Dagan’s place of birth).

His grandfather was killed during the Holocaust, and this family tragedy became part of his worldview.

Article in the Ukrainian Wikipedia – Meir Dagan.

Dagan came to intelligence from the army, went through key Israeli wars, and formed a reputation as a person who does not believe in the “goodwill” of the enemy. In his office, a photograph of a deceased relative was kept for many years — not as a symbol of revenge, but as a reminder of the price of strategic mistakes.

Under Dagan, Mossad focused on preventive actions against strategic threats, including the nuclear programs of Israel’s adversaries. He consistently opposed the illusions of diplomatic appeasement and believed that intelligence must prevent threats before they become the subject of public discussions.

Behind the tough image was a person with unexpected interests. Dagan was fond of painting and sculpture, was a vegetarian, and valued unconventional thinking. This combination of internal reflection and strategic toughness made him one of the most controversial figures in the history of Israeli intelligence.

Common Denominator: Experience of Instability

What unites these people is not geography per se, but the experience of living in conditions of instability, characteristic of Jewish Ukraine. This experience formed several key principles that later became the foundation of Israeli intelligence culture:

absolute distrust of declarations without confirmation;
willingness to act in conditions of uncertainty;
understanding that the weakness of the state is always perceived as an invitation to aggression;
orientation towards long-term survival, not short-term political comfort.

Myths Around the “Ukrainian Trace”

In recent years, the topic of the Ukrainian roots of Mossad leaders is often used for propaganda purposes. This is a distortion of reality. Mossad has always been and remains an instrument of the Israeli state, subject to its laws and political leadership.

The Ukrainian roots of its leaders are part of the history of the Jewish diaspora, just like the Polish, Lithuanian, German, or Iraqi. Attempts to turn this fact into a political sensation only simplify the complex and tragic history of the 20th century.

Why This Matters Today

Against the backdrop of the ongoing war in Ukraine and the protracted conflict around Israel, the historical context takes on new significance. Ukrainian Jews are not a “bridge of influence” or a political tool. They are part of the common historical fabric, in which the destinies of Ukraine, Israel, and the Jewish people are intertwined.

Understanding this allows for a better view of the logic of Israeli security — a logic formed not by abstract doctrines, but by real experiences of loss, flight, and survival.

Instead of a Final Point

The history of Mossad is the history of specific people who brought not only professional skills but also personal memories of what happens when security is underestimated. The Ukrainian Jewish trace in this history is not a sensation and not an argument in political disputes.

It is a reminder that from Odessa, Kharkiv, and Kherson, the path sometimes led not only to emigration but also to the very heart of the system responsible for the survival of the state.

Category: “Jews from Ukraine” | NANews – news of Israel


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We will find life in the Universe — the question is whether we will live to see it: warning from Nobel laureate Didier Queloz

Humanity has already proven that planets beyond the Solar System exist by the thousands. Now science faces a more complex task: to understand if there is life on them and whether our civilization will have enough time to discover it.

The question of the existence of planets around other stars was recently almost in the realm of science fiction. Today, this debate is practically over: planets are widespread throughout our galaxy, and the Solar System no longer appears to be the only known island of worlds in the Universe.

According to NASA’s exoplanet archive, by July 2026, scientists have confirmed the existence of more than 6,300 planets beyond the Solar System. Most of them were discovered not through direct photographs, but through indirect signs — for example, by the dimming of a star’s brightness during a planet’s transit in front of it or by barely noticeable wobbles of the star itself under the influence of the planet’s gravity.

This scientific revolution is partly due to the work of Swiss astrophysicist Didier Queloz. In 1995, he, along with Michel Mayor, announced the discovery of 51 Pegasi b — the first confirmed planet orbiting a sun-like star. The discovery changed astronomers’ understanding of planetary system formation and in 2019 earned Queloz and Mayor the Nobel Prize in Physics.

In an interview with TSN, recorded during the 75th meeting of Nobel laureates in Lindau, Germany, Queloz suggested looking at the problem of extraterrestrial life more broadly. He is no longer worried about whether science will be able to create the necessary tools.

The scientist is almost certain that such technologies will appear.

The real question is much more worrying: will human society be able to last long enough to use them.

Planets have been found. Now science is looking not for worlds, but for life.

The discovery of 51 Pegasi b was groundbreaking not because this planet is similar to Earth. On the contrary, it turned out to be a huge gas world located extremely close to its star. Such objects have been called “hot Jupiters.”

Before the discovery by Queloz and Mayor, many models suggested that large gas planets should be far from their stars, like Jupiter and Saturn in the Solar System. 51 Pegasi b showed that the arrangement of planetary systems can be much more diverse than previously thought.

Today, researchers face a different question. Planets exist — this is proven. But how often among them are worlds where water, complex chemistry, and living organisms could have appeared?

Finding a planet in the so-called habitable zone is not enough. This is just the area around a star where the temperature theoretically allows for the existence of liquid water. The real habitability of a world also depends on its mass, atmosphere, magnetic field, star activity, surface composition, and internal geology.

A planet may be at the perfect distance from its star but lack an atmosphere. Or have such a dense gas envelope that a destructive greenhouse effect arises on the surface. Stellar flares can gradually destroy the atmosphere, and the absence of geological activity can disrupt the long-term cycle of substances.

That is why modern astronomy is gradually moving from simply counting planets to studying their atmospheres and climates.

Queloz reminds us how limited human knowledge is even about the nearest celestial bodies. We have been exploring Mars for decades, sending orbiters and rovers there, but we still know almost nothing about what lies at a shallow depth beneath its surface.

The scientist proposes a thought experiment: if an alien probe landed in the Sahara or the Atacama Desert, its creators might mistakenly conclude that the entire Earth is a lifeless desert. A few landing points do not provide a complete picture of an entire planet.

Therefore, the absence of detected life on Mars does not yet prove that it never existed there or that simple organisms have not survived beneath the surface.

NANews — Israel News notes: the search for extraterrestrial life has already ceased to be a hunt for sensation or an attempt to catch an artificial radio signal. It is systematic work at the intersection of astronomy, chemistry, geology, climatology, and biology.

Queloz heads the Center for Life in the Universe at Cambridge, where researchers from different specialties try to understand not only where to look for life but also what exactly should be considered life. Scientists still find it difficult to formulate a universal definition that would suit both terrestrial organisms and potentially other biological systems.

Why extraterrestrial life may turn out to be very different from what we expect

Human imagination usually depicts either intelligent beings or a planet similar to Earth. But the first discovery of extraterrestrial life is most likely to look much more modest.

It could be an unusual combination of gases in the atmosphere of a distant planet, which is difficult to explain without biological processes. Another possible option is organic compounds, traces of ancient microbial activity, or surface changes that repeat seasonally.

However, even a potential biosignature will not become instant proof. Methane, oxygen, and other substances can arise both as a result of organism activity and due to non-biological chemical and geological processes.

Every loud discovery will have to be repeatedly verified by different telescopes and methods. It may take years between the first suspicion and the recognition of the existence of extraterrestrial life.

Artificial intelligence will not replace the scientist

Modern telescopes produce huge arrays of information. The volume of data is already so large that a researcher is physically unable to independently review every signal, spectrum, or change in star brightness.

Artificial intelligence helps find patterns, sort observations, identify anomalies, and select the most interesting objects. But Didier Queloz does not believe that an algorithm can replace scientific thinking.

According to him, a good researcher should not automatically trust the telescope, measuring instrument, or computer model. It is especially necessary to be cautious when the system shows something unusual.

In the history of astronomy, there have already been cases where technical defects were mistaken for planets.

An instrument could create a spike in the data, and a researcher expecting a certain result saw it as confirmation of their hypothesis.

Therefore, the task of the scientist is not to accept a beautiful result but to try to disprove it. The observation is checked with another instrument, repeated under different conditions, and alternative explanations are considered.

Queloz calls artificial intelligence a wonderful tool and compares its emergence to the spread of computers, phones, and photography. Each of these technologies changed the usual way of life but did not destroy human creativity.

Photography did not lead to the disappearance of painting. Computers did not stop people from writing. Similarly, artificial intelligence can free researchers from administrative routine and mechanical data processing but cannot independently decide which question is truly important.

It is the person who determines the direction of research, doubts the result, and understands its significance.

The main threat is not in space

The strongest thought in Queloz’s interview is not related to distant planets or even artificial intelligence.

The scientist believes that the technologies necessary for the search for extraterrestrial life will be created sooner or later. But creating a telescope, spacecraft, or new algorithm can take decades. Scientific results require stable universities, long-term funding, international cooperation, and the training of new generations of researchers.

Politicians live by electoral cycles, companies by quarterly reports, and fundamental science is forced to plan work decades ahead.

Queloz sharply criticizes the reduction of research funding in the USA. In his opinion, by limiting support for science, the American authorities primarily reduce America’s influence. He characterizes such a policy as an attempt to “shoot oneself in the foot,” especially when political pressure affects climate and global warming research.

Science will not stop because of this. If one country reduces investments, the center of attraction for researchers and technologies gradually shifts to where funding is growing. Queloz expects the strengthening of scientific positions in China, India, and Southeast Asian countries.

Nobel Prizes usually reflect research conducted many years or even decades ago. Therefore, today’s reduction in university programs may not be immediately noticeable. Its consequences will manifest later — in a decrease in the number of discoveries, specialists, and new technologies.

Why this is important for Israel

For Israel, Queloz’s conversation has direct significance. The country has strong universities, technology companies, and a developed system of defense and space developments, but its scientific advantage also depends on continuous funding and international connections.

The Israel Space Agency supports exoplanet research, planetology, the development of scientific equipment, and deep space observations. The agency collaborates with NASA, the European Space Agency, and other international organizations.

At the Weizmann Institute, new telescopes and methods for processing astronomical data are being developed. The complex located in the Negev is used, among other things, for the search for exoplanets and the study of their atmospheres.

Researchers at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem study the climate of distant worlds. One of the works was dedicated to the impact of ozone on the atmosphere of Proxima Centauri b — a planet near the closest star to the Sun. Modeling showed that the chemical composition of the atmosphere can significantly affect the distribution of temperature and winds, and therefore the potential habitability of the planet.

Such projects show that the search for life in the Universe is not an abstract topic for a few major space powers. Israeli scientists are already participating in the creation of knowledge and technologies on which the future answer may depend.

For NANews — Israel News, Queloz’s words are especially important for the connection between scientific freedom and societal stability. A state may have talented researchers and advanced technologies but lose its advantage if universities are constantly struggling for survival and long-term programs become hostages of political crises.

Humanity has approached one of the most important discoveries in its history. We already know that Earth is not the only planet. We have learned to determine the sizes of distant worlds, measure their mass, and obtain the first information about their atmospheres.

But the final answer will require patience.

Perhaps signs of life will be found in a few years. Perhaps it will take decades. And it is likely that the discovery will not be an impressive message from an intelligent civilization but a faint chemical signal that will need to be verified for a long time.

Didier Queloz is confident in science’s ability to create the necessary tools. His doubt relates to humanity itself.

“The question is only whether we will have time.”

This is no longer just a question of astronomy. It is a question of whether modern societies can protect education, science, and the freedom of research long enough to one day find out: are we alone in the Universe.


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Israel warned the US about a new Iranian plan to assassinate Trump: what is known about the threat to the president

Israel has provided the United States with new intelligence data, which, according to the Israeli side, indicates Iran’s preparation of another plan to assassinate US President Donald Trump. This was reported by The Wall Street Journal on July 9, 2026, citing people familiar with the contents of the warning.

Public evidence of the existence of a new conspiracy has not yet been presented. The names of the alleged organizers, the possible location of the assassination, the method of its execution, and the readiness of the perpetrators have not been disclosed. However, the message cannot be considered an isolated rumor: in recent years, American law enforcement agencies have indeed uncovered several Iran-related plans to assassinate Trump, former US officials, American citizens, and Israelis.

The new information emerged amid a sharp escalation between Washington and Tehran, the resumption of American strikes on Iran, and the Iranian regime’s longstanding promises to avenge Trump for the elimination of Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani.

What Israel reported to the United States

According to The Wall Street Journal, Israel recently shared intelligence information with the American side about a new Iranian plan to physically eliminate Donald Trump.

Sources of the publication claim that this information was not previously in the field of view of American intelligence services in this form and is now being verified by US authorities. The White House did not comment in detail on the content of the intelligence and referred journalists to recent public statements by the president himself. The Israeli embassy and the Iranian mission to the UN also did not provide substantive comments.

It is fundamentally important that WSJ reports specifically on the assessment provided by Israel. It is currently impossible to independently confirm whether it is a developed operational plan, preliminary discussions within Iranian structures, or an intelligence signal that still requires additional verification.

There is also no report of the detention of alleged participants in the new conspiracy.

Nevertheless, Washington has reasons to take the warning seriously. The US Department of Justice previously published materials of criminal cases in which representatives or individuals associated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps attempted to organize political assassinations on US soil.

Trump spoke about the threat on July 8 in Ankara

A day before the WSJ publication, on July 8, 2026, Donald Trump raised the issue of threats to his life during a conversation with journalists at the NATO summit in Ankara.

The US president stated that he is the top target of the Iranian leadership:

“They want to eliminate the leader of the United States — me. I am on all their lists. This morning I saw that I am literally on every one of them. So far, I think I’ve been a bit lucky, but this may not last very long.”

The fact of Trump’s speech in Ankara and his statement that he is Iran’s main target is confirmed by materials from American media and photographs from the Associated Press at the president’s press conference on July 8.

Publicly, Trump did not specify which lists he was shown in the morning and whether his words were directly related to the new intelligence information received from Israel.

It was also reported that during the return from Turkey, additional security measures were taken, including changing the plane used by the president. However, the White House did not publish an official detailed explanation of these decisions.

Why Iran considers Trump a personal target

The main reason for the longstanding threats remains the American operation against General Qasem Soleimani.

On the night of January 3, 2020, an American drone strike in the area of Baghdad International Airport killed Soleimani, who led the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and the deputy head of the Iraqi Shiite militia Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis.

The operation was carried out on the orders of Donald Trump during his first presidential term.

The Pentagon stated that Soleimani was developing plans for attacks on American diplomats and military personnel in Iraq and other countries in the region. The US Department of Defense called the strike’s goal the prevention of future Iranian attacks.

Tehran, for its part, declared Soleimani’s elimination a crime and promised to punish those involved in the decision. After that, threats were made not only against Trump but also against former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, former National Security Advisor John Bolton, and other representatives of Trump’s first administration.

Thus, it is not just political rhetoric that arose during a new round of war. The Iranian campaign of revenge has been ongoing since January 2020 and has already become the subject of specific criminal investigations in the US.

The Trump assassination plan revealed in 2024

One of the most serious episodes was made public by the US Department of Justice on November 8, 2024.

American authorities charged Iranian citizen Farhad Shakeri and two New York residents — Carlisle Rivera and Jonathan Loadholt.

According to the case materials, Shakeri informed law enforcement officers that on October 7, 2024, an IRGC representative instructed him to develop a plan to assassinate Donald Trump.

The US Department of Justice claimed that Shakeri was supposed to present the corresponding plan within a set timeframe. The accused himself told investigators that he did not intend to fulfill the assignment within the given deadlines. He remained in Iran and was not arrested.

American investigators also stated that Shakeri received assignments to surveil two American Jews in New York. Allegedly, $500,000 was offered for the murder of one of them. Additionally, the case materials mentioned a possible attack on Israeli tourists in Sri Lanka.

However, the charge does not automatically mean proven guilt of all the defendants, and part of the information was based on Shakeri’s own testimony. But the case confirms that American authorities officially considered the Iranian plan to assassinate Trump as a concrete threat back in 2024, not just a propaganda statement.

Iranian operative and plan for political assassinations in the US

Another case is related to Pakistani Asif Merchant, whom American authorities called a trained operative working in the interests of the IRGC.

In April 2024, Merchant arrived in the United States, and in June, he met with people he believed to be hired killers. In reality, they were cooperating with American law enforcement agencies.

According to the indictment, Merchant discussed political assassinations on US soil. He was arrested in July 2024 before leaving the country, and on March 6, 2026, a federal jury in Brooklyn found him guilty of organizing murder for hire and attempting to commit a transnational terrorist act.

The case materials initially did not name a single specific target. American media reported that Donald Trump and Joe Biden were among the possible targets.

This case demonstrates a scheme that American intelligence services consider characteristic of Iranian operations: a middleman arrives in the US, seeks executors among local criminal circles, discusses surveillance of the target, and transfers money without revealing the role of Iranian state structures to all participants.

Attempt on John Bolton for $300,000

Long before the Shakeri and Merchant cases, American authorities uncovered a plan to assassinate former Trump National Security Advisor John Bolton.

On August 10, 2022, the US Department of Justice announced charges against Iranian Shahram Poursafi, whom they called a member of the IRGC.

According to the investigation, since October 2021, Poursafi attempted to hire someone to kill Bolton in Washington or Maryland. The proposed reward increased from $250,000 to $300,000.

American authorities believed that the alleged murder was intended as revenge for Soleimani’s elimination. Poursafi also mentioned another assignment worth one million dollars.

The investigation established that the organizer provided the alleged executor with the address of Bolton’s office, information about his schedule, and demanded to expedite the preparation of the attack. Poursafi remained in Iran.

This episode is particularly important for understanding the current warning from Israel: American agencies have already documented attempts by individuals associated with the IRGC to translate threats of revenge for Soleimani into a practical operation on US soil.

The threat concerns not only American politicians

Materials from the US Department of Justice show that Iran’s potential targets are not limited to Trump and members of his administration.

In recent years’ investigations, the following were mentioned:

  • American officials;
  • Iranian opposition members in exile;
  • journalists;
  • American citizens of Jewish descent;
  • Israeli tourists abroad.

In January 2026, a US court sentenced Carlisle Rivera to 15 years in prison for participating in a plan to kill Iranian-American journalist and activist Masih Alinejad. According to the Department of Justice, group members conducted surveillance, discussed weapons, and attempted to determine a convenient time for the attack.

Therefore, the new information from Israel may be part of a broader picture: Tehran is accused of using agents, intermediaries, and criminal executors to attack regime opponents in different countries.

Why Israel’s warning appeared now

The WSJ report was published during a new military escalation between the US and Iran.

On July 7–8, 2026, Washington and Tehran exchanged strikes again after attacks on commercial ships in the Strait of Hormuz area and the de facto cessation of a brief truce.

Trump stated in Ankara that agreements with Iran are no longer in effect and warned of new American strikes. The American command reported attacks on Iranian military infrastructure, after which Iran launched retaliatory strikes on targets in Bahrain and Kuwait, where American troops are stationed.

In this situation, a possible assassination plan for the US president becomes not only a matter of Trump’s personal safety. It can influence Washington’s decision on the duration of the military operation, the scale of strikes, and the conditions of any future negotiations with Tehran.

For Israel, providing intelligence also has strategic significance. Jerusalem seeks to convince Washington that the Iranian threat does not end with missiles, the nuclear program, or attacks by regional proxies. It can be directed directly against the top leadership of the United States.

What remains unknown

As of July 10, 2026, it is impossible to establish from open sources:

  • who exactly developed the alleged new plan;
  • whether it was sanctioned by Iran’s top leadership;
  • whether the alleged executors were in the US;
  • whether a date or location for the attack was chosen;
  • whether American services discovered independent confirmations;
  • whether the plan is related to current US strikes on Iran or was developed earlier;
  • whether specific attempts were made to approach the president.

The WSJ publication also does not mention new charges or arrests. Therefore, it is premature to assert that the assassination was already at the stage of direct execution.

Israel’s intelligence may change Washington’s decisions

The new warning appears at a time when relations between the US, Israel, and Iran are simultaneously defined by military strikes, negotiations, and mutual threats.

For Trump, the situation is personal. He sanctioned Soleimani’s elimination on January 3, 2020, and the Iranian regime has repeatedly named him as one of the main targets for retribution.

For Israel, this is an opportunity to once again show the American administration that Iran acts not only through the regular army, missiles, and controlled groups. There are also secret networks, intermediaries, and plans for political assassinations outside the Middle East.

NAnews — Israel News notes: so far, the public is only aware of the assessment of Israeli intelligence provided to the American side. The details of the new plan remain classified, and independent confirmation of its preparation stage is absent.

But previous US Department of Justice cases show that the threat is not purely rhetorical. Iranian agents and associated individuals have already been accused of attempting to organize assassinations of American officials, regime opponents, Jews, and Israelis.

The new signal from Israel could lead to increased security for the president, expanded cooperation between American and Israeli intelligence services, and a tougher stance by Washington towards Tehran.

The main question now is not only whether there was another plan to assassinate Trump, but also how far its alleged organizers managed to advance before Washington received the information.

 


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Patriot for Ukraine: why US permission to produce missiles will not close the sky immediately

American consent for the licensed production of Patriot missiles could become one of the most important decisions for Ukraine’s defense independence. However, between the political promise and the first missile rolling off the Ukrainian production line lie years of negotiations, technology transfer, factory construction, and the creation of a secure supply chain.

U.S. President Donald Trump, during a meeting with Volodymyr Zelensky at the NATO summit in Ankara, announced his readiness to grant Ukraine a license to produce ammunition for Patriot anti-aircraft missile systems.

For Ukraine, this statement has enormous strategic significance.

Patriot remains one of the few Western systems capable of effectively countering Russian ballistic missiles, including the Iskander-M, as well as aeroballistic missiles like the Kinzhal. This is why the shortage of interceptors has turned into not just a military problem but a matter of survival for Ukrainian cities.

But the German publication WELT points out the main drawback of the American proposal: a license does not mean that Ukraine will be able to start mass production of missiles in a few months.

According to experts, creating a full-fledged production line could take several years. In the initial stage, Ukraine will still have to rely on ready-made missiles stored in the U.S. and European allies’ warehouses.

What exactly did Trump promise

The meeting between Volodymyr Zelensky and Donald Trump took place in Ankara on July 8, 2026.

The Office of the President of Ukraine reported that the parties discussed strengthening Ukraine’s air defense, further military support, and decisions that could enhance Ukraine’s positions.

As early as July 6, Volodymyr Zelensky publicly stated that Ukraine is ready to produce Patriot missiles independently if the U.S. provides the necessary licenses. According to him, Ukrainian enterprises are capable of creating volumes sufficient not only for Ukraine’s defense but also to assist other partners.

However, Trump’s statement remains a political promise rather than a ready industrial contract.

The American president acknowledged that the issue has not yet been agreed upon with the companies involved in the production of various types of missiles for Patriot, primarily Lockheed Martin and RTX, which includes Raytheon.

This is fundamentally important.

The U.S. government can authorize the transfer of technology and export of the license, but the organization of production, transfer of documentation, certification of parts, and quality control must be carried out by the manufacturing companies.

Without their participation, the political decision will not turn into a working production line.

Patriot is not just one missile

When politicians talk about ‘Patriot missiles,’ it may create the impression that it is a single standard munition.

In reality, the system can employ several types of interceptors with different tasks.

PAC-2 GEM-T, produced by Raytheon, is primarily intended for destroying aircraft, cruise missiles, and some tactical ballistic threats.

PAC-3 MSE, manufactured by Lockheed Martin, is a more modern and significantly more complex interceptor. It is primarily used against ballistic missiles and destroys the target through direct kinetic impact.

For Ukraine, the PAC-3 MSE is of particular importance, as the Russian army regularly uses ballistic missiles, against which the capabilities of most other air defense systems are limited.

Washington has not yet specified which interceptor license Ukraine might receive.

This issue could completely change the significance of the future agreement.

Production of PAC-2 GEM-T would allow Ukraine to increase its stockpile of missiles to combat cruise missiles and other aerial targets. Obtaining PAC-3 MSE technology would represent a qualitatively different level of cooperation — the transfer of one of the most sensitive American missile defense technologies.

Why the plant cannot be launched in a few months

Ukraine has proven capable of extremely quickly developing and scaling the production of drones, long-range missiles, and other weapons.

However, Patriot belongs to a different category of weapons.

It’s not about simply assembling a missile from several imported blocks.

To start production, it will be necessary to:

  • conclude a licensing agreement;
  • determine the list of technologies allowed for transfer;
  • create a certified enterprise;
  • install specialized American equipment;
  • train personnel;
  • organize the production or import of components;
  • create a quality control system;
  • ensure the physical protection of the enterprise;
  • conduct tests and certification of finished missiles.

An interceptor missile must detect, calculate the trajectory, and destroy another missile in the air at tremendous speed. An error in software, electronics, engine, or guidance system could mean not just the loss of an expensive munition but the destruction of the city it was supposed to protect.

Therefore, production processes in this industry are strictly controlled, and each component undergoes multi-stage verification.

German missile analyst Markus Schiller emphasized in a comment to WELT that creating such production is significantly more complex than it might seem after political statements.

Even countries with developed industries and decades of cooperation with the U.S. have launched licensed lines over the years.

Experience of Japan and Germany

Japan is cited as one example.

The country has a powerful high-tech industry, a close military-political alliance with the U.S., and extensive experience in licensed production of American weapons. However, deploying Patriot missile production there took about five years.

Germany also could not instantly launch a new European line.

Back in 2024, Germany, the Netherlands, Romania, and Spain agreed to purchase up to 1,000 GEM-T missiles. For their production, a joint company COMLOG, owned by Raytheon and MBDA Deutschland, is being established.

Production at the German site is expected to begin at the end of 2026, but serial deliveries are expected later. Previously, the main delivery period was named as 2027–2033.

Even in Germany, the plant is being built on NATO territory, far from the immediate combat zone.

The Ukrainian enterprise will have to be created under the constant threat of Russian missile and drone attacks.

Russia will try to destroy the production

The location of the Patriot plant will become one of Ukraine’s most closely guarded state secrets.

Russia is likely to use satellite reconnaissance, espionage, cyberattacks, and airstrikes to detect and destroy the enterprise even before the start of serial production.

Therefore, the most realistic option may be not one large plant but a distributed production model.

Separate components may be produced at several enterprises in different regions of Ukraine or beyond its borders. Final assembly may also be divided among several sites.

Another option is the creation of a Ukrainian-American production in one of the NATO countries with subsequent transfer of finished missiles to Ukraine.

This model is already used in the Ukrainian defense industry. Some types of Ukrainian weapons are produced jointly with European partners at enterprises protected by NATO territory.

However, in this case, Ukraine will not receive a fully independent production chain on its territory.

Global shortage of Patriot

The main problem is not only the absence of a Ukrainian plant.

There is a physical shortage of Patriot missiles for everyone.

Demand sharply increased after the start of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, the escalation of threats in the Middle East, and the massive use of ballistic missiles by Iran and its allies.

In 2025, Lockheed Martin delivered over 600 PAC-3 MSE missiles. This was a record figure and approximately 20% higher than the previous year’s production.

In January 2026, the Pentagon and Lockheed Martin agreed on a long-term program to increase annual production capacity from approximately 600 to 2,000 missiles.

But achieving this figure will take several years. The company must build new lines, expand its supplier network, and increase production of engines, electronics, and other critical components.

Even with a threefold increase in production, the U.S. will have to distribute missiles between its own army and numerous allies.

Patriot is used by Germany, Poland, Japan, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Israel, and other countries.

At the same time, the decision on who and when will receive the produced missiles is made by the American government, not Lockheed Martin itself.

In June 2026, the company acknowledged that it could not guarantee allies specific delivery times for PAC-3 MSE due to the global shortage and Washington’s decisions on distribution priorities.

Why Ukraine needs missiles now

Creating its own production can solve the strategic problem in a few years.

But Russian missiles are flying over Ukrainian cities today.

Therefore, a license cannot replace immediate deliveries of ready interceptors.

Until the Ukrainian line is launched, Kyiv will have to continue seeking the transfer of missiles from U.S. and European warehouses, as well as asking allies to temporarily give up their places in the production queue for Ukraine.

This is where the main political question arises.

Western states recognize that Ukraine is defending not only itself but the entire European security system. However, many governments simultaneously fear reducing their own missile defense stocks.

After new wars and crises in the Middle East, this competition has become even tougher.

NAnews — Israel News notes that the shortage of interceptors affects not only Ukraine.

Israel’s experience shows how quickly air and missile defense missiles can be expended during massive combined attacks.

Even a high-tech air defense system depends not only on radars and launchers but also on a constant flow of expensive munitions.

Therefore, the Ukrainian idea of producing Patriot is part of a broader process: Western states are beginning to realize that existing factories and pre-war production volumes do not match the reality of modern missile wars.

What Ukraine can get in the first stage

Most likely, cooperation will develop gradually.

First, a center for the repair and maintenance of Patriot missiles may appear in Ukraine or one of the neighboring countries.

The U.S. is already discussing the creation of a European PAC-3 service center with Germany, Poland, the Netherlands, and Sweden. Such a site should reduce the time needed to send missiles for repair to the United States.

The next step could be the production of individual components.

Ukrainian enterprises are capable of producing casings, mechanical parts, ground equipment elements, and some electronic systems under the control of the American manufacturer.

Then local assembly of missiles from kits produced in the U.S. and Europe is possible.

And only after that can deep localization begin, including the manufacture of key elements directly by Ukrainian enterprises.

This sequence looks slower than loud political promises, but this is how complex defense productions are usually created.

Why the license is still a breakthrough

Long terms do not mean that the decision is insignificant.

Until now, Ukraine was almost entirely dependent on the political will of partners. Each batch of missiles required separate negotiations, funding, and decisions by American authorities.

Own or joint production will gradually change this model.

Ukraine will be able to plan stocks for years ahead, train specialists, repair missiles closer to their place of use, and integrate into the Western defense industry not only as a recipient of aid but also as a manufacturer.

Moreover, Ukrainian enterprises have unique experience in operating air defense systems in conditions of constant war.

No NATO country faces such a number of combined attacks with ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones.

This experience can be used to upgrade missiles, improve software, and create new air defense systems.

Volodymyr Zelensky claims that Ukrainian enterprises, after receiving licenses, are capable of meeting not only their own needs but also helping partners.

Today, this statement looks ambitious. But the Ukrainian industry has already shown how quickly it can transition from small experimental batches of drones to mass production of millions of devices.

A solution for the future does not cancel responsibility today

An American license could become the foundation of Ukrainian missile defense in the next decade.

However, it will not protect Kyiv, Kharkiv, Dnipro, or Odesa tonight.

Between the promise and the first serial missile, there remains a dangerous time gap.

This can only be filled by transferring existing interceptors to Ukraine, increasing production in the US and Europe, joint purchases by allies, and creating a transparent system of priorities.

Ukraine has the necessary enterprises, engineers, and military experience.

The United States controls the technologies.

Europe has the funding and territories where part of the production can be more safely located.

Combining these capabilities can transform Ukraine from a dependent recipient of missiles into one of the centers of European missile defense.

But for this, Donald Trump’s political statement must turn into signed contracts, a specific list of transferred technologies, funding, and an approved construction schedule.

NAnews — News of Israel emphasizes: the Patriot license is not a ready-made missile and not an immediately closed Ukrainian sky.

It is a chance to build a system where, in a few years, the security of Ukrainian cities will depend not on the next political decision across the ocean, but on a constantly operating production line.

That is why Ukraine simultaneously needs two solutions: ready-made missiles — today and its own production — for the future.


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Independence Day of Ukraine in Tel Aviv: “NEZALEZHNA 2026” invites you to celebrate the 35th anniversary together, support Ukrainian refugees in Israel and IDF soldiers – August 21, 2026

“When purchasing a ticket, you can add 20 shekels. These funds will go towards funding discounted tickets for Ukrainian refugees in Israel due to the war. Ukrainian refugees wishing to receive a discounted ticket can contact the organizers. The initiative is in cooperation with ASSAF, an organization helping refugees and asylum seekers in Israel.

If you are serving mandatory service in Israel or have served in the reserves for more than 10 days this year, you are entitled to a free ticket. Contact the organizers for details. Part of the evening’s proceeds will be donated to support volunteer initiatives in Ukraine and the Ukrainian community in Israel”.

Organizer – “Nezalezhna – Ukrainian Party“.

On August 24, 2026, Ukraine will celebrate the 35th anniversary of the restoration of its state independence.

In 1991, on this day, the Verkhovna Rada adopted the Act of Declaration of Independence of Ukraine. The document declared Ukraine an independent democratic state, and its territory indivisible and inviolable. The historic decision was a response not only to the collapse of the Soviet system but also to the long-standing aspiration of Ukrainians to regain their statehood.

35 years later, Ukraine’s Independence Day can no longer be perceived solely as a festive date on the calendar.

Today, Ukraine continues to defend that decision with arms in hand — against Russian aggression, attempts to destroy Ukrainian statehood, culture, language, and the right of Ukrainians to determine their own future.

For millions of Ukrainians inside the country and abroad, August 24 has become simultaneously a day of pride, memory, resistance, and hope.

In Israel, the 35th anniversary of Ukraine’s Independence will be celebrated with a large “Ukrainian” party “NEZALEZHNA 2026”, which will take place on August 21, 2026, in Tel Aviv.

What happened on August 24, 1991

The decision on independence was made after the failure of the coup in Moscow, whose participants tried to preserve the Soviet Union and restore strict control of the communist center over the union republics.

On the evening of August 24, 1991, the Ukrainian parliament supported the Act of Declaration of Independence. It explicitly stated that henceforth only the Constitution and laws of Ukraine have force on the territory of Ukraine.

However, the final word had to be said by the citizens.

On December 1, 1991, a nationwide referendum was held, in which more than 90% of participants voted for independence. Importantly, the majority spoke in favor of an independent Ukrainian state in all regions of the country, including Donetsk and Luhansk regions, Crimea, and Sevastopol.

Thus, Ukraine’s independence was not a “gift from Moscow,” a “random consequence of the USSR’s collapse,” or a “decision of a narrow group of politicians.”

It was confirmed by the will of the Ukrainian people.

Ukrainian statehood did not begin in 1991. Modern Ukraine is a continuation of a much longer struggle — from the Ukrainian People’s Republic and the declaration of independence in 1918 to the dissident movement, resistance to Soviet repressions, and preservation of language and national memory.

Independence that has to be defended every day

Since 2014, and especially after February 24, 2022, the words “Independence Day” have taken on an even more literal meaning for Ukraine.

Independence today is not only the state flag, anthem, and festive events.

It is Ukrainian soldiers on the front line, air defense units, medics, volunteers, rescuers, energy workers, and ordinary citizens who continue to live and work under the threat of Russian missile and drone attacks.

It is cities that restore power supply after strikes.

It is families waiting for the return of soldiers and prisoners.

It is people who have lost their homes but have not given up on Ukraine.

In 2026, the war continues for the fifth year after the start of the full-scale Russian invasion. Russia retains the ability to launch massive strikes on Ukrainian cities, while Ukraine develops its own weapons production and conducts long-range operations against military and energy facilities on the territory of the aggressor state.

Therefore, the 35th anniversary of independence is not just an anniversary.

It is a reminder of the price Ukraine pays for the right to exist.

NAnovosti — News of Israel considers this date an important part of the life of the “Ukrainian community” in Israel. For people who are far from Kyiv, Lviv, Kharkiv, Odesa, Dnipro, or Zaporizhzhia, “Ukrainian” events become a way to maintain a connection with their country, support each other, and show that Ukraine remains a part of their lives.

“NEZALEZHNA 2026” in the center of Tel Aviv

The main festive event of the “Ukrainian” community will take place on Friday, August 21, 2026, three days before the official Independence Day.

The organizers invite Ukrainians and friends of Ukraine, as well as everyone interested, to a large party “NEZALEZHNA 2026”, dedicated to the 35th anniversary of the country’s independence.

This year, the event moves to a new venue in the very center of Tel Aviv:

CALLAS TLV
Menachem Begin Road 37, Tel Aviv-Yafo

The organizers promise a program for the entire evening and all night — until the very morning.

We don’t promise a quiet sit-down“,” says the event announcement.

According to organizer Daniel Lutin, the event is created with the participation of many representatives of the “Ukrainian community” in Israel. It is not only a club party but also a large gathering of people united by Ukraine, Ukrainian culture, and the desire to celebrate an important date for Ukraine together.

Who will perform at “NEZALEZHNA 2026”

Joining the celebration are:

Anya and the restaurant “SHO?!”, representing modern Ukrainian cuisine in Israel;

Olya Yaros, who will be the host of the evening;

Anton Shevchenko — a comedian and artist, participating in the event for the first time;

DJs Sasha RAZME, Den DOMINIC, and Daniel LOUTIQUE.

The special guest of the evening will be DJ LUMARE from Lviv.

Her arrival creates a direct cultural connection between the modern Ukrainian music scene and the “Ukrainian community” in Israel. The party will unite Ukrainian music, electronic sound, humor, gastronomy, and the atmosphere of Tel Aviv’s nightlife.

Also during “NEZALEZHNA 2026”, the premiere of a new remix by Daniel LOUTIQUE on a song by Iryna Bilyk is expected.

The organizer wants to pass the composition to the singer herself and has reached out to representatives of the “Ukrainian community” to help establish contact so that the remix definitely reaches the artist.

The door opens at 19:00.
The program starts at 20:00.

Dress code: festive, cocktail, or Ukrainian.

From the organizers:

“The best is to combine an elegant look with a Ukrainian accent. Until midnight, you will have a festive program with MC OLYA Y (Olya Yaros), and comedian and artist Anton Shevchenko.
It will be loud, fun, festive, with contests and cool prizes 🎁 And most importantly: this time “NEZALEZHNA 2026” continues until the very morning.
This is an event for the entire evening and all night. This year we heard you.
On the dance floor, there will be Ukrainian music, modern world hits, legendary favorite songs, new remixes, and premieres from our DJs, which will be heard for the first time at “NEZALEZHNA 2026″”.

“One ticket for the entire evening and all night. The ticket price includes:
• entry to the main festive part of “NEZALEZHNA 2026”;
• entry to the night disco after midnight;
• welcome drink at the beginning of the evening;
• buffet snacks, vegetables, and fruits from SHO;
• a large Ukrainian atmosphere that we create together. There will be a bar with special prices on location, where you can purchase drinks throughout the evening and night 🍸
Tickets can be purchased at the entrance, but pre-purchase is cheaper and helps us better prepare for the event.”

Why the Motherland Monument appeared against the backdrop of the Azrieli Towers

On August 24, 2026, Ukraine celebrates 35 years of independence: in Tel Aviv, the celebration will start with
On August 24, 2026, Ukraine celebrates 35 years of independence: in Tel Aviv, the celebration will start with “NEZALEZHNA 2026”

The event poster sparked separate discussions.

It depicts the Ukrainian Motherland Monument against the backdrop of one of Tel Aviv’s most recognizable landscapes — the Azrieli Towers.

One user asked the organizers what connection the Ukrainian monument has to Tel Aviv.

Daniel Lutin, who acted as the event organizer and poster designer, explained that it is a conscious artistic composition.

According to him, the authors did not try to present Kyiv and Tel Aviv as one place. They combined Ukrainian symbols with the city where the “Ukrainian community” will celebrate Ukraine’s Independence Day.

“For me, it is a symbol that Ukraine lives in the hearts of people, wherever they are,” explained the organizer.

People can work in Tel Aviv, Haifa, Jerusalem, Ashdod, or Be’er Sheva, speak Hebrew, and build their lives in Israel, but at the same time maintain their Ukrainian identity, follow events in Ukraine, help the army, volunteers, and those affected by the war.

A celebration far from home, but together with Ukraine

Ukrainian events abroad during the war inevitably have a dual meaning.

People come to listen to music, dance, and meet friends. But behind the festive atmosphere remains the understanding that in Ukraine itself, air raids, shelling, and heavy fighting continue.

This does not negate the right to celebrate.

On the contrary, the ability to preserve culture, music, humor, and a sense of community becomes one of the forms of resistance to Russia’s attempt to portray Ukraine as a country without an independent history and identity.

NAnovosti — News of Israel continues to report on the events of the “Ukrainian community” in Israel, as such initiatives show: Ukraine is present in Israel not only in political statements and news about the war.

It is present in language, music, cuisine, charity, public projects, and the personal stories of thousands of people.

Date, address, and tickets

Event: “NEZALEZHNA 2026”
Occasion: 35th anniversary of Ukraine’s Independence
Date: August 21, 2026
Place: CALLAS TLV
Address: Menachem Begin Road 37, Tel Aviv-Yafo
Format: Ukrainian party for the entire evening and until morning
Special guest: DJ LUMARE, Lviv

When purchasing a ticket, you can add 20 shekels. These funds will go towards funding discounted tickets for Ukrainian refugees in Israel due to the war. Ukrainian refugees wishing to receive a discounted ticket can contact the organizers. The initiative is in cooperation with ASSAF, an organization helping refugees and asylum seekers in Israel.

If you are serving mandatory service in Israel or have served in the reserves for more than 10 days this year, you are entitled to a free ticket. Contact the organizers for details. Part of the evening’s proceeds will be donated to support volunteer initiatives in Ukraine and the Ukrainian community in Israel.

Organizer – “Nezalezhna – Ukrainian Party“.

Organizers advise purchasing tickets in advance, as the number of places at the new venue is limited.

Tickets: https://selector.org.il/e/jK4ZMvUNqa-

On August 24, 2026, Ukraine will celebrate 35 years of independence…

 


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American Jewish volunteer in shock: on the front lines in Ukraine – solidarity and support for Jews, in New York – hatred and anti-Israel hysteria. NY Post report

American Jewish drone operator Sam Nahins, who volunteered in Ukraine, told the NY Post why he felt safer on the front lines than among antisemitic slogans in New York. The article features his perspective on Ukrainian-American brotherhood and the unique role of Help is on WayUA.

New York Post: An American Jew Found Respect in Ukraine and Faced Hatred in the US

New York Post is one of the largest American newspapers, founded back in 1801. Today, its circulation exceeds 625,000 copies on weekdays and 386,000 on Sundays. Since 1993, the publication has belonged to News Corporation of the famous media mogul Rupert Murdoch.
It was for this newspaper that on July 26, 2025, 32-year-old Jew and US Air Force veteran Sam Nahins shared his experience volunteering in Ukraine and his impressions upon returning to the campus of Columbia University in New York.

From the Front in Ukraine to Protests in New York: A Personal Story

Sam Nahins is a Columbia University graduate student and former US Air Force drone operator. In May 2025, he volunteered on the front lines in Ukraine, working with the humanitarian organization Help is on WayUA. As part of the 25th Ukrainian battalion, Sam spent three weeks under shelling and drone attacks. However, according to him, in Ukraine, he felt much calmer and more confident than in America.

“In Ukraine, I always knew who my enemy was. Here, in New York, it feels like people hate each other,” says Nahins.

Upon returning to New York, he found himself literally trapped — in Butler Library, he was blocked by protesters from the radical group Unity of Fields, known for its anti-Israel and anti-American slogans. On campus, Nahins was insulted and called a “colonizer” and “child-killer” — just for serving America and helping Ukraine.

“My reason for going to Ukraine was simple: I piloted US Air Force drones, flying remotely in the Middle East, fighting ISIS and Al-Qaeda. I served in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. But I had never been in a combat zone.
I was shelled and attacked by drones when I was with the 25th Ukrainian battalion. But I was in safe hands. No one tried to stab me in the back — at least I knew who my enemy was.

It turned out that in Ukraine I felt calmer than in New York.”

Contrast: Attitudes Toward Jews and Americans in Ukraine and the US

In an interview with the New York Post, Sam admits:
— In Ukraine, people wave American flags, respect volunteers, and value the contribution of Israel and Jews.
— Among students in New York, on the contrary, antisemitism has become commonplace, and support for Israel is called a “crime.”

“On the front, even under fire, I felt unity and support. In New York, I no longer feel needed by my hometown,” he notes.

Among other things, Sam recalled: on Veterans Day at the university, they celebrated “Martyrs’ Day” — for him, this was a shock, as a Jew and a patriot.
Statistics: According to surveys, over the past two years, the number of antisemitic incidents on US campuses has nearly doubled. At the same time, 70% of Ukrainians, according to various sociological services, have a positive attitude towards Jews and Americans.

Who Are Help is on WayUA and Why Is This Important

Help is on WayUA is a non-profit organization founded by US veterans to provide rapid humanitarian support to those affected by the war in Ukraine. The fund operates on the principle of maximum transparency: all donations go directly to aid, and bureaucracy and overhead are kept to a minimum.
The team consists of experienced military personnel who personally handle the delivery of humanitarian cargo and organize aid both in Ukraine and for refugees abroad. Special attention is paid to creating support centers for displaced persons and the long-term recovery of families who have lost everything due to the war.

Help is on WayUA actively cooperates with volunteers, administrative staff, and specialists to quickly respond to real needs on the ground. Their mission is to help without delay and unnecessary words, setting an example of honesty and efficiency.

More information is available on the official website.


NAnews — News of Israel: How Jews and Ukrainians Become Brothers

This story of Sam Nahins is yet another confirmation: the respect and support given to Jews in Ukraine is not uncommon. For the NAnews — News of Israel website, such examples are important: they show that Israel and Ukraine can be true allies in difficult times.
In the midst of war, as Europe and the US face growing xenophobia, Ukraine sets an example of solidarity and true unity, where nationality and religion take a back seat.


Conclusions for the Jewish and Israeli audience:

  • American Jews and Israelis in Ukraine feel support and respect.
  • Antisemitism in Western universities is an alarming challenge for all Jewry.
  • The experience of the Ukrainian front is an example for Israel and the diaspora of how to value solidarity even in times of crisis.

Read more analytics, stories, and news on NAnews — News of Israel.


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Israeli trace on the Ukrainian front: what is known about Gaia Thunder, AMIR, and the mysterious supply route

Israeli-origin equipment was once again spotted on the Ukrainian front. This refers to the Gaia Thunder 4×4 armored vehicle, which, according to military observers, was used to deliver ammunition to the crew of the 155-mm M777 howitzer.

Such an episode could have remained a technical detail: a camouflaged artillery position, crew work, shells, supply transport. But the attention was drawn specifically to the vehicle. Gaia Thunder is produced by the Israeli company Gaia Automotive, and the question of how equipment of such origin ended up in Ukraine still has no public official answer.

The reason for the new discussion was a post by Israeli analyst Yigal Levin from May 19, 2026. He reminded that Israeli ‘Amirs’ — GAIA AMIR armored vehicles from the same manufacturer Gaia Automotive as Thunder — were spotted in Ukraine back in 2022 and were likely supplied through third countries.

This is what makes the story broader than a single frontline frame. Thunder did not appear in an information vacuum. Before it, there was AMIR — another Israeli armored platform Gaia, which was associated with the Ukrainian theater of operations during the events in southern Ukraine in 2022.

Israeli trace on the Ukrainian front: what is known about Gaia Thunder, AMIR and the mysterious route through third countries - Israel news
Israeli trace on the Ukrainian front: what is known about Gaia Thunder, AMIR and the mysterious route through third countries – Israel news

Gaia Thunder at M777: what the frontline episode showed

According to Ukrainian sources, it is about the work of the 155-mm M777 howitzer crew from a camouflaged artillery position of the ‘Kraken’ active action unit of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine. The frame showed not only the howitzer itself but also the logistics around it: ammunition delivery, preparation for firing, the work of people and equipment near the position.

For ammunition delivery, according to observers, the Gaia Thunder 4×4 armored vehicle of Israeli origin was used. How and when this vehicle ended up in Ukraine was not openly reported.

From a military point of view, its appearance next to the M777 seems logical. An artillery crew cannot work without constant supply. Shells need to be delivered to the position, people need to be covered, and transport needs to be brought as close as possible to the danger zone. In such a role, a protected vehicle is as important as the artillery system itself: it reduces the risk for the crew and allows for faster servicing of the firing point.

The frame also mentioned a wide range of 155-mm ammunition: high-explosive M795 with IMX-101 explosive, cluster M864 with a base bleed unit, and high-explosive M107 of various countries’ origin. For the Israeli reader, this is an important detail: Ukrainian artillery today operates as a complex international system where weapons, ammunition, transport, and repair infrastructure are assembled from different sources.

But the main question did not arise because of the shells. The main question is because of Gaia Thunder. If an armored vehicle of Israeli manufacturer appears on the Ukrainian front, it is logical to ask: is this an isolated case, an old indirect supply, re-export through a third country, or part of a broader story that is not officially spoken about?

Why the story does not start with Thunder

Yigal Levin in his post reminded an important detail: Gaia equipment has already appeared in the Ukrainian context. This refers to GAIA AMIR — armored vehicles of the same Israeli company, which were spotted in Ukraine back in November 2022.

At that time, reports about AMIR were associated with the Kherson region — precisely with the period when Ukrainian forces were advancing in the south, and the Russian army was retreating from the Kherson area. Against this background, the appearance of the Israeli armored vehicle looked especially noticeable: it was not about a press release, not about a public transfer ceremony, and not about a declared military aid package, but about a trace in open sources.

Therefore, the current episode with Thunder is better viewed not as a separate sensation, but as a continuation of an old undisclosed line. First, AMIR was noticed in Ukraine. Now Thunder appears in the frame. Both vehicles are linked to one manufacturer, but their route to Ukraine is not publicly explained.

What is Gaia Automotive, Thunder, and AMIR

Gaia Thunder and GAIA AMIR are not the same vehicle, but two different armored platforms from the Israeli manufacturer Gaia Behri Ltd, better known in open sources as Gaia Automotive. The company is registered in Israel and positions itself as a developer and manufacturer of armored and special vehicles for armies, police, and government structures.

Gaia’s headquarters is listed in Kiryat Tivon, Israel. The company’s lineup includes armored vehicles, special task vehicles, platforms for internal security forces, fire and refueling vehicles, heavy trailers, and engineering solutions.

Gaia describes its work as comprehensive armored solutions: design, production, marketing, service support, CKD kits, and assistance in creating production lines abroad. This is an important detail for understanding the whole story. It is not about a company that works only within Israel, but about a manufacturer oriented towards export markets and foreign customers.

Gaia Thunder: protected transport for people, cargo, and supply

Gaia Thunder is a multipurpose armored vehicle of the 4×4 APC class, that is, an armored personnel carrier or armored vehicle for transporting personnel. According to the manufacturer, Thunder is designed to carry up to 12 people and a payload of up to 1.8 tons.

That is why its appearance next to the M777 crew looks practical. Such a vehicle can be used not only for transporting fighters but also for delivering ammunition, equipment, property, evacuation, or escort. In the Ukrainian episode, Thunder is important not as a symbol, but as a working tool of frontline logistics.

This is not a ‘parade’ vehicle. In wartime conditions, protected transport solves a simple but critically important task: to deliver people and cargo to where an ordinary vehicle may become too easy a target.

GAIA AMIR: a heavier platform with an MRAP profile

GAIA AMIR is another vehicle from the same manufacturer. Unlike Thunder, AMIR is positioned as a mine-protected armored vehicle, that is, an armored vehicle with an emphasis on mine protection. In public descriptions, it is more often perceived as a heavier MRAP/APC class platform designed to work in conditions of mine threats, ambushes, and a more dangerous frontline environment.

It was AMIR, according to open sources and OSINT observers, that was spotted in Ukraine back in 2022. This is fundamental: when today Gaia Thunder is discussed, it is not about the first appearance of Gaia equipment in the Ukrainian war.

AMIR and Thunder share the same manufacturer and Israeli origin, but in terms of purpose and application, they are different vehicles. Thunder is a lighter and more versatile transport for carrying people, cargo, and escort. AMIR is a heavier protected platform where the survivability of the hull, mine protection, and work in high-threat conditions play a key role.

For the Ukrainian context, this distinction is important. AMIR in 2022 looked like a rare and mysterious trace of Israeli armored vehicles on the front. Thunder in the frame with the M777 crew shows another side of the same story: not only crew protection but also everyday frontline logistics — delivering shells, supporting the artillery position, reducing risk for people in a dangerous area.

Third countries, Israeli caution, and the Ukrainian war

The main question remains the same: if Israeli-origin equipment was indeed used in Ukraine, was it a direct supply from Israel or re-export through a third country?

This is where the story becomes politically sensitive. In the fall of 2022, amid Ukrainian requests for air defense systems, the Israeli position remained extremely cautious. Israel spoke of humanitarian aid, protective equipment, and early warning systems, but not of direct arms transfers to Ukraine.

Therefore, the version of a direct official supply of GAIA AMIR to Ukraine in 2022 looks weak. It is much more careful to formulate it this way: armored vehicles of Israeli production could have ended up in Ukraine through third countries, intermediaries, or another indirect channel. This is not proven by public documents, but this version better aligns with the then Israeli policy and the absence of an official announcement about the transfer of AMIR.

Publicly, Gaia declares work in foreign markets, including Eastern Europe, but there are no open confirmations of a specific buyer of Thunder or AMIR in a NATO country yet. Therefore, the version of the ‘third country’ remains general: it could have been a former foreign customer, a government structure, an intermediary, or another indirect channel, but it is not possible to name a specific European or NATO country based on open data.

A vehicle on the front is not only a supply but also maintenance

In the story with Gaia Thunder and GAIA AMIR, there is another important question that often remains behind the scenes. It is not enough to deliver an armored vehicle to Ukraine once. If it is really used on the front, it needs to be maintained, repaired, and supplied with spare parts.

This is especially important for equipment that is not mass-produced for the Ukrainian army. A conditional pickup, a Soviet truck, or a common Western armored vehicle is easier to integrate into the repair system. And Gaia Thunder and GAIA AMIR are rarer vehicles. This means that along with the equipment itself, at least a minimal channel of technical support must have appeared.

It does not necessarily mean official service from Israel. Such a conclusion would be too strong without documents. But any armored vehicle requires basic things: tires, filters, batteries, suspension parts, brake system, electrics, armored glass, door mechanisms, mounts, tools, and technical documentation. If the vehicle remains operational, then someone is addressing these issues.

How it could work without direct official assistance

The simplest option is that the vehicle could have arrived in Ukraine already with a set of ZIP, that is, spare parts, tools, and accessories. For a small batch of equipment, such a set may include spare wheels, filters, repair kits, consumables, part of the chassis elements, and instructions for mechanics.

Moreover, not all parts of such vehicles are unique. An armored vehicle has a special part — the armored hull, doors, armored glass, hatches, mounts, protection elements. But there are also more common units: tires, batteries, part of the electrics, filters, brake elements, suspension or engine components. If the vehicle is built using serial commercial units, part of the maintenance can be covered through regular auto parts markets or through analogs.

Another possible scenario is related to the previous owner. If the equipment came through a third country or another foreign customer, then along with the vehicle, Ukraine could have received not only the armored vehicle itself but also part of the documentation, consumables, spare parts, or contacts for purchasing components. This does not prove a specific route but explains how rare equipment could continue to operate without a public service program.

Why a small number of vehicles is easier to hide in logistics

If it were about dozens or hundreds of Gaia Thunder or AMIR, without a noticeable service chain, it would be hard to imagine. Regular spare parts supplies, mechanic training, separate repair procedures, a stock of consumables, and understandable logistics would be needed.

But if there are few vehicles, the situation is different. A few armored vehicles can be supported by the initial set of spare parts, local workshops, selection of analogs, donor parts, and one-time purchases through indirect channels. Ukraine has learned to maintain an extremely diverse fleet of equipment over the years of war: Western, Soviet, trophy Russian, commercial, and small-series.

Therefore, the appearance of Gaia Thunder next to the M777 crew or the earlier trace of GAIA AMIR does not necessarily indicate a large official program. But it almost certainly means that there is at least minimal technical logistics behind the scenes. Otherwise, such equipment would quickly turn into an immobile museum exhibit.

The main conclusion here is cautious: the supply route remains non-public, but the very fact of operation speaks not only of the delivery of the vehicle but also of the ability to maintain it in working condition. Who exactly provides this minimum — the previous owner, intermediary, Ukrainian repair units, commercial purchases, or a combination of these options — is not openly confirmed.

For NAnovosti — Israel News | Nikk.Agency in this story, the Israeli-Ukrainian context is important. Ukraine is at war with Russia, which relies on Iranian drones, missiles, technologies, and political support from Tehran. For Israel, Iran is a strategic enemy. Therefore, every episode where the Ukrainian front intersects with Israeli technologies becomes more than just a military detail.

What can be asserted, and what remains a version

Today, the careful picture looks like this: the appearance of Gaia equipment in Ukraine cannot be reduced only to the latest episode with Thunder. The story began earlier, at least with public reports about GAIA AMIR in 2022.

The direct official route Israel — Ukraine for AMIR or Thunder is not publicly confirmed. This is a key caveat. Without it, the material turns from analysis into speculation.

The version of third countries seems the most logical, but not definitively proven. It explains why Israeli-origin equipment could have ended up on the Ukrainian front in the absence of a public Israeli campaign to supply armored vehicles to Kyiv.

The very fact of using Thunder next to the M777 also shows something else: the Ukrainian army continues to assemble working solutions from different sources. In war, not only large systems like Patriot, HIMARS, or M777 are important, but also protected transport that delivers shells, evacuates people, closes logistics, and allows crews to live longer.

Why this is important for Israel

For the Israeli audience, this story is sensitive for several reasons.

On the one hand, Israel has long tried to balance: helping Ukraine, considering the threat of Iranian-Russian military rapprochement, but not publicly moving to direct arms supplies. On the other hand, the war itself has changed. Iranian drones in Ukraine have become not only a Ukrainian problem but also an Israeli warning: what Russia receives from Tehran may be refined against Israel tomorrow.

In this sense, Ukraine is not only fighting the Russian army. It faces part of the same hostile axis that threatens Israel through Iran and its allies. Therefore, the appearance of Israeli equipment on the Ukrainian front, even if it came through third countries, looks like a symptom of a deeper reality: the security interests of Ukraine and Israel are gradually converging, even if politics often lags behind the war.

The story of Gaia Thunder and GAIA AMIR does not prove that Israel officially supplied Ukraine with armored vehicles. But it shows something else: Israeli-origin equipment has already appeared more than once in the Ukrainian theater of war, and its route remains not fully transparent.

Yigal Levin’s post is important for this very reminder. Thunder did not arise from nothing. Before it was AMIR. Before the new frame with the M777 crew, there was the old Kherson story of 2022. Before the current questions, there was the Israeli political balance between caution, the Russian factor, and the growing threat from Iran.

And therefore, the main question is not only: ‘How did Gaia Thunder end up in Ukraine?’

The main question is broader: how long can Israel consider the Ukrainian war as an external story if Russian aggression, Iranian technologies, Western artillery, and Israeli-origin equipment already intersect on this front.


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Jews from Ukraine: Steven Spielberg

Steven Spielberg is one of the most famous directors in human history! Category 🔯 — Jews from Ukraine 🇺🇦 #jewsukraine

📍 Born: 12/18/1946, Cincinnati 🇺🇸

💙💛 Spielberg’s grandparents were Jews from Kamenets-Podolsky and Sudilkov, Khmelnitsky region. Ukraine

🔯 His mother ran a kosher halawi (dairy) restaurant. All of his immediate family were religious Jews. Stephen attended Hebrew school and also celebrated his bar mitzvah. His family was involved in the synagogue and had many Jewish friends.

🤔Spielberg had a hard time accepting his heritage

“I hate to admit it… but as a child, God forgive me, I was ashamed because we were Orthodox Jews. I was ashamed of the external perception.”

At school, anti-Semites broke his nose twice. “It was terrible.”

💍Spielberg met actress Kate Capshaw when he filmed her in the film Indiana Jones. They married in 1991, and the bride converted to Judaism at the time of their marriage.

Stephen said:

“Kate is a Protestant and she insisted on converting to Judaism. She spent a year studying, doing the mikveh, all of this. She decided to convert completely before our marriage. This, more than anything else, brought me back to Judaism. This shiksa (non-Jewish in Yiddish) made me a better Jew than my parents.”

🕯About the Holocaust, he said that his parents “talked about it all the time, and so it was always in my mind.”. His father lost at least 16 relatives in the Holocaust. In 1993, Spielberg directed Schindler’s List about a businessman who helped save 1,100 Jews from the Holocaust. The film was included in all major ratings of the best films in history.

🇮🇱 Spielberg’s Munich (2005) tells the story of the Israeli government’s retaliation against Arab terrorists after 11 Israeli Olympians were kidnapped and killed during the 1972 Olympics.

📝 The Steven Spielberg Jewish Film Archive is dedicated to the preservation and research of Jewish documentaries. The archive is run by the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the World Zionist Organization. The archive contains more than 16,000 pieces of content.

🕎 Together with Victor Pinchuk (Ukraine), he produced the documentary film “Say Your Name”. The film tells about the survivors of Babi Yar, and was filmed based on the testimony of the Holocaust Survivors Foundation. The fund contains 55,000 video testimonies in 43 languages ​​from 65 countries, making it the largest archive of its kind in the world.

🇺🇦In 2006, Spielberg visited Ukraine for the first time in his life at the premiere of this film. The film had a significant impact on Ukrainian-Jewish relations and changed the understanding of the Holocaust in Ukraine.

👾In Spielberg’s film “War of the Worlds” the events of the alien attack begin with anomalies in Ukraine.

🤝 In addition to cultural influence, Spielberg has repeatedly supported Israel and Ukraine:
❤️Donated $1 million to help Israel during the 2006 Lebanon War
❤️His sister Nancy is the founder and director of the Children of Chernobyl charity organization. Stephen also supports this company.
❤️In 2022, in connection with the Russian invasion of Ukraine, he and his wife donated $1 million to Ukrainian refugees.
❤️ In 2023, following the Hamas attack on Israel, the Shoah Foundation, founded by Spielberg, collected more than 100 video testimonies from survivors of the October 7 attacks to add to the Holocaust Survivors collection. He said: “I never thought I would see such unspeakable barbarity against the Jews in my lifetime.”

🏆 Spielberg is one of the most awarded cinema figures and officially the most commercially successful director in history. He alone has received a Best Director nomination for six consecutive decades:

  • Oscar: 3 awards / 23 nominations
  • Emmy: 12 / 27
  • Golden Globe: 9/24
  • BAFTA: 2 / 14
  • And hundreds more.
  • He also received a special medal from the President of Israel 🥇

🎬 Featured films:

  • Jaws;
  • Alien;
  • Indiana Jones film series;
  • Jurassic Park;
  • Schindler’s List;
  • Saving Private Ryan;
  • Catch me if you can;
  • Terminal;
  • Munich.

This article was prepared specifically for the site NAnews — Israel News, where you will find even more interesting stories about prominent Jews from Ukraine, such as Steven Spielberg.

Veda section @davidkrutonog — Jew from Ukraine and founder of a marketing agency tlv.agency

#jewsukraine

Leave a comment on Telegram – channel NAnews ↓ — Israel News


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Chornitsa at Sho: Ukrainian rock from Haifa will be heard in Tel Aviv on August 7, 2026

On Friday, August 7, 2026, at 8:00 PM, a concert Chornitsa at Sho will take place at the restaurant Sho? in Tel Aviv — an evening of live Ukrainian rock, powerful vocals, new songs, and the atmosphere for which people come not just to “listen to music” but to become part of an event.

For the band Chornitsa, this will be the first performance on the stage of the restaurant Sho?. The musicians are preparing a powerful program for the audience: songs from the album “Na Ves Golos” (Ukr.), the latest singles, as well as new, yet unreleased tracks.

The evening promises to be especially interesting for those who already follow the band and for those who are just discovering the Ukrainian rock scene in Israel.

Special guest of the concert — Igor Ageenko.

Chornitsa: Ukrainian rock created in Israel

Chornitsa is a Ukrainian-language rock band from Haifa. It is one of those musical projects that are important not only as a concert story but also as a cultural symbol: Ukrainian music in Israel continues to sound, develop, and find its audience.

Chornitsa at Sho: Ukrainian rock from Haifa will sound in Tel Aviv on August 7, 2026
Chornitsa at Sho: Ukrainian rock from Haifa will sound in Tel Aviv on August 7, 2026

In the material NANovosti about the band Chornitsa, it was noted that the group was founded by immigrants from Ukraine and presents original songs in Ukrainian, as well as cover versions of famous Ukrainian performers. The band’s repertoire mentioned Ukrainian hits “Odin v Kanoe”, “Vopli Vidoplyasova”, Okean Elzy, and other compositions close to people who grew up with Ukrainian music or discovered it already in Israel.

But Chornitsa is not just covers.

An important part of the band’s story is their own songs. Currently, the concert program includes compositions from the album “Na Ves Golos”, the latest singles, and new tracks that have not yet been officially released.

So the concert on August 7, 2026 is not just a repeat of already familiar material. It’s an opportunity to hear the band in development: with what has already become part of their musical history and with what is only preparing to reach a wide audience.

The musicians themselves described themselves very accurately: “We are all from Ukraine, but now we live in Israel. And it is here that we create Ukrainian music”. This phrase well explains why Chornitsa is important for the Israeli scene: the band does not try to be a “museum of memories” but makes live Ukrainian music here, in Israel, in the present time.

You can listen to the band here:

YouTube – https://www.youtube.com/@chornitsa4512

Instagram –  https://www.instagram.com/chornitsa/

Facebook – https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100068335582124

Why this concert should be noted in the Israel poster

In Israel, there are many musical events, but Ukrainian-language rock is a separate story. Here, language, memory, emigration, new life, personal experience, and the desire to communicate with the audience not only through words but also through sound meet.

Chornitsa at Sho is an event for Ukrainians in Israel, for Israelis with Ukrainian roots, for friends of Ukraine, and for everyone interested in live music without artificial distance between the stage and the hall.

Songs from the album “Na Ves Golos” themselves set the mood for the evening. This is music not “half-tone” and not “for the background”. This is a story about voice, energy, emotions, and presence.

And new, yet unreleased tracks make the concert especially valuable: evening guests will be able to hear material that is not yet available in regular public access.

Sho: Ukrainian cuisine, Tel Aviv, and the right atmosphere for live music

The concert venue is also important. Sho? / SHO Ukrainian Traditional Food https://www.facebook.com/shotelaviv — a Ukrainian restaurant in Tel Aviv located at Carlebach Street 3, Tel Aviv-Yafo. An authentic Ukrainian place in the center of Tel Aviv with Ukrainian cuisine, service, and Ukrainian character.

For the concert Chornitsa, such a venue looks very organic. It is not a faceless hall and not a random stage. It is a place where Ukrainian culture is present not only in music but also in cuisine, in the atmosphere, in conversations at the tables, in the feeling of meeting.

Guests will be able to come not just to a concert, but to an evening of Ukrainian mood in the center of Tel Aviv: with live music, food, company, and the opportunity to hear the band very closely.

What will be in the program

At the concert Chornitsa at Sho will feature:

songs from the album “Na Ves Golos”;

the band’s latest singles;

new, yet unreleased tracks;

a live performance by a Ukrainian-language rock band from Haifa;

special participation of Igor Ageenko.

Such a format is especially good for a chamber stage: the music sounds closer, the audience’s reaction is felt stronger, and new songs are perceived not as a “release” but as a personal meeting with the band.

For whom this evening

This concert should be noted by those who are looking for a poster of Ukrainian events in Israel, are interested in live music in Tel Aviv, follow Ukrainian culture outside of Ukraine, or just want to spend an evening in a place with a special atmosphere.

Chornitsa at Sho is not only about rock. It’s about the Ukrainian language, which sounds on the Israeli stage. About Haifa and Tel Aviv, between which cultural connections are born. About music that has not remained in the past but continues to live in a new country.

And most importantly, it’s an evening where you can hear Ukrainian music at full voice.

Event information

Event: Chornitsa at Sho
Date: Friday, August 7, 2026
Time: 8:00 PM
Venue: Sho restaurant, Tel Aviv
Band: Chornitsa
From where: Haifa
Program: songs from the album “Na Ves Golos”, latest singles, and new unreleased tracks
Special guest: Igor Ageenko

Details:
https://www.facebook.com/events/2251054468973169/


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The Year of Shmuel Yosef Agnon in Ukraine: Five Major Events Connecting History and Modernity

Ukraine dedicated the years 2025–2026 to Shmuel Yosef Agnon. Exhibitions, conferences, and expeditions will revive memory and strengthen cultural ties with Israel.

Agnon and His Ukrainian Roots

Shmuel Yosef Agnon, born in Buchach, became the first Israeli writer to be awarded the Nobel Prize in Literature. His books are filled with the atmosphere of Ukrainian shtetls, Jewish traditions, and personal memories of childhood. For Ukraine and Israel, his legacy is more than literature. It is a link between two cultures, two peoples, two histories.

The organizers of the “Year of Agnon” emphasize that now, during times of war and trials, it is important to remember those who built bridges between peoples.

“Agnon was the voice of memory. His words connect the broken and give birth to hope,” note the project curators.

His work is a combination of Jewish tradition, biblical and Talmudic motifs with images of Eastern European shtetls and contemporary Israel.

Main Works of Agnon

  • “The Inn” (“הָאִשָּׁה וְהַבֵּית”) — an early story about life in a Jewish shtetl.
  • “The Unfaithful Husband” (“עִם הָאִשָּׁה”) — a novel about the crisis of family and traditions.
  • “She Just Stood There” (“עִם פְּנֵי הַשֶּׁמֶשׁ”) — a poignant story about faith and suffering.
  • “Only Yesterday” (“תְּמוֹל שִׁלְשׁוֹם”) — one of Agnon’s most famous novels: about a young immigrant from Galicia who came to build a new life in Eretz Israel.
  • “The City and Its Fullness” (“עִיר וּמְלוֹאָה”) — a monumental chronicle of Buchach, with its joys, tragedies, and vanishing Jewish culture.
  • “The Mandate” — a novel about the clash of personal fate and historical events.

Themes and Style

  • Memories of childhood in Buchach and the atmosphere of Jewish shtetls.
  • Combining Jewish religious texts and folklore with modern prose.
  • The theme of exile and return, the search for home.
  • Images of loss, destroyed homes, and memory.
  • Existential questions: faith, doubt, the meaning of life.

Agnon wrote in Hebrew, but many of his works are based on the experience and memory of life in Ukraine. Therefore, his work is perceived as part of the common Jewish-Ukrainian cultural heritage.

Five Major Projects

1. Art Exhibition “Strange Homes”

In September 2025, an exhibition by Matvey Weisberg opened in Kyiv. The artist, through images of empty interiors and ruined facades, shows what the loss of home and break with the past meant for Agnon. The paintings raise questions: what do we lose along with homes, and can we regain what was lost?

2. Scientific Conference in Fall 2025

In November, a conference with Ukrainian and Israeli researchers will take place in Kyiv. Scholars will discuss how cultural heritage can influence identity formation and how Jewish and Ukrainian traditions have intersected over the centuries.

3. Project “Jerusalem — Kyiv from A to Z”

This is an exhibition built as a kind of alphabet: each letter symbolizes a concept, place, or image associated with the two capitals. The exhibition will first open in Kyiv and then move to Odesa, Lviv, and Chernivtsi, making the project both national and international.

4. Ethnographic Student Expedition

In spring 2026, students will travel to Buchach and Sataniv. There they will collect materials, study old archives, and listen to stories from local residents. Such an expedition is not just an educational process but a return of memory, a revival of what seemed lost forever.

5. Final Conference and Work Competition

In summer 2026, the project will conclude with a major conference. A student essay competition is planned, where young researchers will present their vision of the dialogue between Agnon and Ukrainian philosophical tradition. A separate block — “Israeli Readings,” dedicated to parallels between Agnon and Hryhorii Skovoroda.

Geography of the “Year of Agnon”

  • Kyiv — the center of scientific and artistic initiatives.
  • Odesa, Lviv, Chernivtsi — cities where local exhibitions will take place.
  • Buchach and Sataniv — expedition sites where Agnon’s legacy can be felt literally at every step.

These cities symbolically connect the East and West of Ukraine, large cultural centers, and small towns.

What It Gives to Ukraine

  • Restoration of memory about Jewish history in the Ukrainian context.
  • Strengthening cultural dialogue with Israel and the global Jewish community.
  • Development of youth initiatives and student involvement in exploring the past.
  • Potential for cultural tourism and international contacts.

The Effect Is Broader Than It Seems

The project helps Ukraine assert itself as a country capable not only of defending itself in wartime but also of building new cultural bridges. It is a signal to Europe and Israel: Ukrainian identity is open, alive, and based on respect for diversity.

Short Biography of Shmuel Yosef Agnon

Shmuel Yosef Czaczkes, better known as Agnon, was born in 1888 in the city of Buchach (now Ternopil region, Ukraine) in the family of a rabbi and a fur trader. From an early age, he absorbed the atmosphere of Jewish tradition, listened to the stories of elders about shtetl life, and studied texts in Hebrew.

In 1908, he moved to Jaffa, in Eretz Israel, where he began publishing stories. He lived in Germany for some time, got married, wrote extensively, and participated in the literary life of Europe. In 1924, he returned to Jerusalem, where he lived until the end of his life. He wrote exclusively in Hebrew, creating a unique style — a combination of biblical language, Talmudic expressions, and vivid observations. His works are a bridge between the Jewish past of Eastern Europe and modern Israel.

In 1966, he became a laureate of the Nobel Prize in Literature, the first among Israeli writers. He died in Jerusalem in 1970, leaving a rich literary legacy.

Israeli Context

For Israelis of Ukrainian origin, the “Year of Agnon” is not just a cultural project. It is a reminder of roots, of the cities where their ancestors lived, and of the values that connect Ukrainians and Jews.

NANews — News of Israel emphasizes: such projects are important for the entire diaspora. They strengthen the sense of unity and give Israelis the opportunity to better understand what Ukraine lived and lives by.

Conclusions

The “Year of Agnon” is more than exhibitions and conferences. It is an attempt to revive memory, make the past part of the present, and offer a new future for cultural dialogue.

Ukraine and Israel have the chance to show that literature and history can connect even where walls have existed for decades.


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Trump praised Erdogan and pushed aside Netanyahu’s warnings: Turkey is once again entering the big game around Israel

Donald Trump once again did something that was heard particularly painfully in Israel: he publicly praised Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, called him a strong leader, and essentially presented himself as the person who prevented Ankara from entering the war on the side of Israel’s opponents.

These words did not sound in a vacuum.

They appeared against the backdrop of the NATO summit in Ankara, taking place on July 7–8, 2026, in Turkey. According to NATO, the meeting of heads of state and government of alliance countries and key partners is being held in Ankara, and the summit’s symbolism is associated with the Beştepe presidential complex, where the main venue is organized. For Turkey, this is not just a diplomatic event but a demonstration of status: Ankara is hosting NATO leaders while simultaneously trying to regain access to American F-35 fighters.

For Israel, this story became a worrying signal.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had tried in advance to convince Washington not to return Turkey to the F-35 program and not to transfer technologies to Ankara that could change the military balance in the Middle East. But Trump in Ankara spoke a completely different language.

“He didn’t go because of me”: what exactly Trump said

At a meeting with Erdogan in Ankara, Trump stated that Turkey could have chosen “the other side” in the war but did not. According to him, Ankara knows Iran well and understands the problems associated with it.

“Turkey could have chosen the other side. They know Iran very well. And they know the problems associated with Iran. They could have entered the fight. You hear people talking about their relations with Israel. They could have entered the fight. This is a country with a very large military force. And they didn’t. Maybe they didn’t because of me. But they certainly could have joined the other side,” Trump said.

In another part of his speech, he turned to Erdogan personally.

“I like President Erdogan. He gave me a ceremonial reception. He’s amazing,” Trump said.

Then he directly linked the Turkish leader’s position with Israel and Netanyahu.

“I said he could have gone to war because he doesn’t really like Israel and doesn’t really like Bibi,” Trump said.

According to Trump, Erdogan “didn’t go” to war precisely because of him.

“He didn’t go because of me. He would have gone if it weren’t for me. He would have gone, and it would have been on the other side,” the US president stated.

This is an important formulation. Trump not only praised Erdogan. He publicly said that the Turkish president could potentially have ended up on the side opposite to Israel but was allegedly stopped by the personal influence of the US president.

In the Israeli context, such a phrase sounds like a warning: if Israel’s security depends not on a clear ally strategy but on Trump’s personal relations with Erdogan, then the room for error increases sharply.

June episode: Trump had already spoken about Erdogan and Iran

The current story did not begin on July 7.

As early as June 24, 2026, at the White House, Trump had already told journalists that Erdogan was “the main candidate” for entering the war with Iran, “possibly on Iran’s side,” because “he’s not a big fan of Israel.”

“I asked him to stay out. He stayed out,” Trump said then in the Oval Office.

At the same time, he added: “Erdogan is a great leader, a very strong man. Everything I ever asked him to do, he did.”

These words were said even before the NATO summit in Ankara, but it was in Ankara that they received continuation. Now Trump was already speaking next to the Turkish leader, against the backdrop of talks about lifting sanctions from Turkey and possibly returning Ankara to the F-35 program.

So this is not a solitary phrase.

This is a line.

Trump portrays Erdogan as a strong ally who can be held by personal agreements. Netanyahu, on the contrary, tries to portray Erdogan as a threat to Israel and the region.

What Netanyahu said and why he opposed F-35 for Turkey

On July 6, 2026, a day before the NATO summit in Ankara, Benjamin Netanyahu spoke on Fox News and publicly warned: Turkey should not receive F-35s or engines for its fighters.

The Israeli Prime Minister stated that the transfer of such systems to Turkey could “disrupt the balance of power in the Middle East.” According to him, this balance largely relies on Israeli air superiority and the American military position in the region.

Netanyahu used extremely harsh formulations. He said that Turkey is governed by a person who “openly calls for the destruction of Israel,” threatens Greece, talks about conquering Jerusalem, and Turkish officials allow themselves statements questioning the very existence of the Jewish state.

In the interview, Netanyahu also called Erdogan’s regime “infected with the Muslim Brotherhood” and reminded of Ankara’s support for Hamas.

This position of Israel is understandable.

The F-35 is not an ordinary aircraft. It is a technology that changes the quality of the air force of the country gaining access to the platform. If Turkey returns to the F-35 program, Israel gets not just a new competitor in the air but potentially a hostile regional force with American stealth technology.

Sanctions, S-400, and the question to the US Congress

The F-35 problem for Turkey did not arise yesterday.

In 2019, Turkey received Russian S-400 air defense systems. After that, Washington excluded Ankara from the F-35 program, and in 2020 imposed sanctions under the CAATSA law — Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act.

The American logic was simple: a country that possesses the Russian S-400 system cannot simultaneously receive the F-35 because it creates a risk for the aircraft’s secret technologies and could give Russia access to critically important data.

But on July 7, 2026, in Ankara, Trump said that the US would lift sanctions from Turkey.

“We are going to lift the sanctions,” he told journalists.

Answering a question about the possible sale of F-35s to Turkey, Trump said: “This is a decision we will make.” He also called the F-35 “a great plane” and “the best plane to date.”

Erdogan, for his part, expressed hope for a “favorable decision” on the F-35 and reminded that Turkey had previously been promised five planes.

American officials are also involved in the discussion. Trump said that Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, and Pentagon chief Pete Hegseth are working on the issue. Earlier, Vice President J.D. Vance said that there are requirements of American law and the role of Congress in this matter.

It is Congress that can now become the main obstacle to the deal.

On July 8, 2026, American lawmakers began publicly arguing about Trump’s plans. Republican Mike Lawler stated that the sale of one of the most advanced American planes to Turkey “does not meet US interests,” risks compromising critical technologies, and sends the wrong signal to allies in Europe and the Middle East.

Democrat Brad Sherman called the possible lifting of sanctions “a deep mistake” and stated that Turkey’s return to the F-35 program would effectively mean handing over the “blueprints” of American technology to Vladimir Putin.

At the same time, not everyone in Washington is categorically against it. Senator Jeanne Shaheen said that if an acceptable way to solve the S-400 problem is found, Turkey’s return to the F-35 program could be a positive development for Ankara and Washington. Senator Mike Rounds also said that Turkey is a major contributor to NATO and could be important for deterring Russia in Europe.

So within the US, there is already a struggle not only for the planes but also for who determines American strategy: the White House, Congress, or Trump’s personal diplomacy.

Why this is important for Israel

For Israel, this story is dangerous not only because of the F-35.

Much more important is the political signal.

Trump publicly placed personal relations with Erdogan at the center of regional security discussions. He did not say that Turkey is reliable because its policy aligns with Israel’s interests. He said something else: Erdogan could have entered the war because “he doesn’t really like Israel” and “doesn’t really like Bibi,” but didn’t do so because of Trump.

This is a completely different level of risk.

NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency draws attention to this very point: Israel in such a scheme becomes not an independent strategic ally but part of a personal bargain between Washington, Ankara, and regional players. Today Trump says he held Erdogan back. Tomorrow the question will be what price the US is willing to pay to keep Turkey “on the right side.”

Turkey, meanwhile, has a strong negotiating position.

NATO emphasized back in 2024 that Turkey has the second-largest army in the alliance and spends more than 2% of GDP on defense. In 2026, the NATO summit is being held in Ankara. Turkey presents itself as an indispensable flank of the alliance, as a military power, as a mediator, and as a country without which it is difficult to solve issues of Ukraine, the Black Sea, Syria, Iran, and the eastern Mediterranean.

Trump acknowledges this role.

He directly said that Turkey is a “military power” with “millions of soldiers,” that it is “very strong” and has “a lot of our best equipment.”

Even if the words about “millions of soldiers” sound like political exaggeration, the meaning is clear: Trump sees Turkey as a heavyweight player that is more advantageous to keep close than to push away.

What is happening with Israeli influence in Washington

Israel is used to its arguments on regional security issues being perceived as a priority in Washington. But the episode with Turkey shows that this is no longer guaranteed.

Netanyahu warns about Hamas, Jerusalem, Greece, Cyprus, the “Muslim Brotherhood,” and the balance of power. Trump responds with praise for Erdogan, talks about the “red carpet,” about a strong leader, about lifting sanctions, and about Turkey being “more loyal” than some other countries.

This gap is where the main news lies.

It’s not just about planes.

It’s about Washington potentially starting to view Turkey not through the Israeli lens but through its own interests: NATO, Iran, Syria, the Black Sea, Russia, the defense industry, and Trump’s personal agreements.

For Israel, this means the need to revise its diplomatic strategy. It’s not enough to just say in Washington that Erdogan is dangerous. It is necessary to prove what specific consequences the region will face if Turkey returns to the F-35, retains the S-400, continues to support Hamas, and simultaneously becomes a “special partner” for the US within NATO.

Main conclusion

Trump’s words about Erdogan have become one of the most candid signals in recent months.

The US president essentially acknowledged: the Turkish leader does not like Israel, does not like Netanyahu, and could have ended up “on the other side” of the war. But instead of calling it a threat, Trump presented the situation as his own diplomatic victory.

For Israel, this is a troubling logic.

If Erdogan was indeed so close to entering the conflict, as Trump claims, then the question should be not “what a strong leader he is,” but “why was a NATO ally even considered as a potential side against Israel.”

If Turkey was not actually preparing to enter the war, then Trump is simply using the image of a dangerous Erdogan to justify a future deal: I held him back, so now we can talk about F-35s and sanctions.

In both cases, Israel has reason to worry.

Ankara received the NATO summit, the red carpet for Trump, talks about lifting sanctions, and a chance to return to the F-35 program.

Netanyahu received a public reminder that even Israel’s closest ally might consider Erdogan not a threat but a partner for a deal.

This is what makes the story around Ankara on July 7–8, 2026, much broader than a usual dispute about planes.

It’s a dispute about who today sets the rules of the game around Israel.


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Agents of Russia and Iran are ‘working on’ Israelis on social networks, and the state does nothing about it – new report by the State Comptroller of Israel

The primary source is a special report by the State Comptroller of Israel, Matanyahu Engelman, titled “ההתמודדות הלאומית עם השפעה זרה במרחב הדיגיטלי” (“National Counteraction to Foreign Influence in the Digital Space”), published on July 7, 2026 in the official publication library of the Office of the State Comptroller and Ombudsman of Israel.

This document is important not only for intelligence agencies, lawyers, or cybersecurity specialists.

It is important for every Israeli who reads news on their phone, receives messages on WhatsApp, argues on Facebook, watches short videos, forwards “urgent warnings” to relatives, or sees an account on X that looks like an ordinary Israeli resident.

The report shows: the digital space has become a full-fledged front.

Iran is identified as a direct and specific source of threat through influence campaigns, false messages, attempts to incite panic, and affect the perception of war.

Russia in this article should be considered differently: not as a separate detailed case of the report, but as part of the same category of foreign state actors from which Israel must build protection. The main conclusion of the State Comptroller is precisely this: Israel has seen the threat of foreign influence in the digital space for almost nine years but has not created a national system capable of countering such operations as a class of threats.

Foreign influence is no longer just “fakes,” but a threat to the state.

The State Comptroller’s report does not talk about random mistakes on social networks or everyday rumors.

It is about covert and organized activities of foreign players who use digital platforms to harm Israel’s national interests.

This may include disinformation, fake accounts, bots, fake identities, manipulative campaigns, artificial promotion of topics, spreading panic, and increasingly active use of artificial intelligence.

The goal of such actions is not just to spread lies.

The goal is to influence public opinion, deepen internal divisions, reduce trust in state institutions, and affect democratic processes, especially during war, crisis, and elections.

For Israel, this is especially dangerous.

The country simultaneously lives in a state of war, debates about hostages, the army, responsibility for October 7, relations with the USA, political future, the 2026 elections, Ukraine, Russia, and Iran.

A foreign player does not need to create a split from scratch.

It is enough to take an existing pain and amplify it.

Fear turns into panic.

Political debate turns into hatred.

Distrust of a single official turns into distrust of the entire state.

War fatigue turns into demoralization.

And a foreign policy issue becomes a convenient tool for those who want to weaken Israel’s ties with allies and confuse society with foreign narratives.

NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency points out: the State Comptroller’s report is important precisely because it translates the topic of social networks from the category of “internet noise” to the category of national security.

Iran is named directly: SMS panic, “Hezbollah,” and the war for perception.

The Iranian direction in the report is revealed most specifically.

One of the most illustrative episodes is the mass sending of false SMS to Israelis.

In September 2024, about 5 million messages were sent to Israeli citizens. They urged people to immediately enter a protected space. Some messages looked as if they were sent on behalf of official structures, including the Home Front Command. Following an investigation by the National Cyber Directorate, it was stated that Iran and “Hezbollah” were behind the distribution.

This is not just disinformation.

This is a psychological attack.

A person receives an “urgent warning,” gets scared, wakes up the children, calls relatives, forwards the message further. Even if it turns out a few minutes later that the alarm is false, the effect has already been achieved: fear is spread, trust is undermined, society becomes even more tense.

This is what a modern influence attack looks like.

It may not physically destroy a house.

But it hits the nervous system of society.

The report also mentions campaigns related to the “Iron Swords” war. Already in the first days after October 7, an Iranian campaign was identified, trying to establish an accusatory narrative against Israel in the digital space, including the topic of “genocide in Gaza.”

This is an important detail.

The war is not only for territory and not only for military results.

The war is for the language with which the world describes events.

If an external player imposes words, emotions, and explanations of what is happening on society, they are already beginning to control the perception of reality.

The “Isnad” network: thousands of messages and hundreds of fake profiles.

One of the central cases of the report is the foreign influence network “Isnad”.

According to the data presented in the report materials, this network operated in 2024 and tried to influence Israeli public opinion by promoting the cessation of the war in Gaza on terms favorable to Hamas.

From December 2023 to August 2024, thousands of messages were prepared as part of this campaign.

Between 300 to 1000 fake profiles operated on X.

This is no longer one propagandist and not one Telegram channel.

This is a network.

It creates the artificial impression that a certain position is massively coming from within Israeli society itself.

One account writes.

Others pick it up.

Thirds argue.

Fourths spread it further.

Then real people, journalists, activists, families of hostages, politicians, and protest participants see it.

At some point, a foreign operation begins to look like “public sentiment.”

This is where the danger lies.

An Israeli thinks they are arguing with a neighbor.

But they may be arguing with part of a foreign campaign.

Where is Russia here?

To be factually accurate, it is important to say directly: the State Comptroller’s report does not build a separate large chapter on the Russian operation against Israel.

But that does not mean the Russian direction should be excluded.

On the contrary.

The main conclusion of the report is that Israel has not built protection against foreign influence as a phenomenon. It is not just about one enemy and not just about one campaign. It is about the ability of foreign states and external structures to use social networks, bots, fake identities, artificial intelligence, and digital platforms to pressure Israeli society.

Iran, Russia, and other external players fall into this framework.

Iran is shown in the report through specific cases: SMS, “Hezbollah,” campaigns around the war, “Isnad,” pressure on the perception of events.

Russia should be named as part of the same external threat because for Israel, the problem is not limited to one Iranian campaign. The state must have a system capable of responding to any foreign digital operation — Iranian, Russian, Islamist, or otherwise.

This is especially important for the Russian-speaking audience in Israel.

The Russian propaganda environment has been working for years with topics of Ukraine, the West, the USA, democracy, war, and trust in institutions. In Israel, these topics intersect with internal politics, security, and the issue of foreign alliances.

This is how Russia and Iran should stand side by side — not as equally detailed cases of the report, but as two external directions against which the state needs unified protection.

The state knew about the threat since 2017.

The most alarming part of the report is not the fake campaigns themselves.

They are expected.

Iran will try to pressure Israel.

Hamas will try to influence the war agenda.

“Hezbollah” will use citizens’ fear.

Russia and other external players will look for weak spots in Israeli society.

The most alarming is something else: the state knew about the threat for a long time but did not create a full-fledged response system.

According to the report, since 2017 various Israeli structures have already pointed to the threat of foreign influence in the digital space and the need for an interagency response. Among them are the Shin Bet, the National Security Council, the National Cyber Directorate, and other structures. However, initiatives that were supposed to turn into national policy were not brought to a working system.

By March 2026, almost nine years after the threat was identified, Israel still does not have:

  • a unified national policy against foreign influence;
  • a state body that conducts interagency work;
  • an approved permanent mechanism;
  • sufficient coordination between structures;
  • a clear system of interaction with digital platforms;
  • a clear channel for messages from civil society;
  • full preparation of the population to recognize fakes, bots, and manipulations.

The State Comptroller essentially describes a recurring pattern: the threat is raised on the agenda, structures begin discussions, initiatives appear, but then the work does not turn into mandatory national policy.

For Israel, this sounds especially strange.

The country knows how to intercept missiles.

The country knows how to build cyber defense.

The country knows how to work in the most complex intelligence environment.

But in the sphere of foreign influence on social networks, the state system turned out to be fragmented and delayed.

There was an action plan, but it was not advanced.

After the start of the “Iron Swords” war, the National Cyber Directorate indicated that the Israeli audience is the target of influence and disinformation efforts.

In August 2024, the head of the Cyber Directorate presented the threat of foreign influence in the digital space to the Prime Minister.

In September 2024, an action program was submitted.

But, according to the report, this program was not considered for a long time. Only after the appeal of the State Comptroller’s office was it submitted for consideration by the National Security Council. At the same time, the necessary resources and practical implementation remained a problem.

That is, the state had a threat.

Had understanding.

Had a prepared program.

But did not turn it into a working mechanism.

And this happened not in a calm time, but after October 7, during the war, when digital influence operations became part of the overall picture of pressure on Israel.

The 2026 elections — the most sensitive point.

A separate block of the report concerns the elections.

Israel is approaching the 2026 elections in a state of severe internal tension.

Society is debating war, hostages, the responsibility of politicians and security forces, relations with allies, the judicial system, the economy, security, and the future of the country.

Such periods are most convenient for foreign influence campaigns.

The State Comptroller warns that the election period could become a “fertile ground” for attempts to influence the agenda, perception of reality, and decision-making. The potential damage could reach the point of undermining public trust in election results and the democratic process.

The Central Election Commission has identified several risk scenarios.

The first is a blow to public trust in the electoral system, for example, through reports of alleged fraud.

The second is creating chaos on election day, for example, through false publications that elections are canceled or a specific polling station is closed.

The third is deceiving voters through fake information about candidates, including deepfakes and reports that a candidate has allegedly withdrawn from the elections.

This is no longer fiction.

These are scenarios that state structures consider real.

That is why the issue of foreign influence before elections is not a technical topic.

It is a matter of sovereignty.

If a citizen stops trusting elections, the voting result, the commission, the vote count, and the democratic process itself, an external player has already achieved a strategic effect.

Even if not a single ballot was changed.

Artificial intelligence accelerates the threat.

The report separately warns about the role of artificial intelligence.

AI allows for the rapid creation of convincing texts, images, audio, video, and fake personalities.

It helps overcome language and cultural barriers, imitate real people, scale campaigns, and complicate the detection of foreign networks.

Previously, a foreign operation needed people, editors, translators, time, and money.

Now you can quickly create an “Israeli” with good Hebrew, a photo, a history, political views, and emotional posts.

You can make a fake video.

You can launch a fake news story.

You can imitate a local discussion.

You can create a sense of mass outrage.

And then social media algorithms themselves help spread conflict content because fear, hatred, scandal, and anxiety get more attention.

For Iran, this is an opportunity to attack Israelis not only with missiles and proxies but also through the phone.

For Russia and other foreign players, this is an opportunity to work with the Israeli agenda through distrust, polarization, foreign policy fears, and manipulations around Ukraine, the USA, Europe, and security.

There is no single responsible party — which means there is no full protection.

The report shows: in Israel, there is no single “owner” of this topic.

There is the Shin Bet.

There is the National Cyber Directorate.

There is the National Security Council.

There is the Ministry of Justice.

There is the Central Election Commission.

There is the Prime Minister’s Office.

There are structures that work with digital platforms.

But there is no single body that holds the whole picture, is responsible for strategy, coordinates departments, works with civil society, interacts with platforms, and has an approved budget.

The State Comptroller’s audit was conducted from July 2024 to January 2026 and covered, among other things, the National Security Council, the Prime Minister’s Office, the Shin Bet, the National Cyber Directorate, the Central Election Commission, and the cyber division of the prosecutor’s office. Some findings were classified for security reasons.

This is an important detail.

The problem is not in one weak department.

The problem is systemic.

The state sees the threat, but the response remains fragmented.

A citizen sees a suspicious account but does not always understand where to report it.

A public organization may identify a network, but there is no transparent channel through which the state systematically receives and processes such information.

Platforms remove some content, but the state does not always have a sufficient picture to assess the effectiveness of this work.

As a result, the Israeli is left alone with a digital influence operation.

He receives a message.

He sees a post.

He forwards an alarming “news”.

He argues with a fake account.

He gets angry, afraid, loses trust.

And the state system is still deciding who should be in charge.

What needs to change

The State Comptroller’s report essentially demands that Israel move from random reaction to a permanent system.

A unified national policy against foreign influence is needed.

A central body is needed to coordinate the fight against this threat.

An approved budget is needed.

Constant work with digital platforms is needed.

A channel is needed for reports from citizens, journalists, researchers, and civil society organizations.

More data on content removal requests needs to be published so that society understands the scale of the problem.

Educational work is needed — not only for adults but also for schoolchildren.

Because digital literacy today is not an additional skill.

It is part of civil security.

An Israeli must understand that a fake account can look like a real neighbor.

That a false SMS can be part of an enemy campaign.

That a video can be generated.

That “mass public opinion” is sometimes created by hundreds of artificial profiles.

That a foreign operation does not always speak a foreign language.

Sometimes it speaks good Hebrew.

Sometimes in Russian.

Sometimes in Arabic.

Sometimes in English.

Sometimes in exactly the language a person trusts the most.

Conclusion

The State Comptroller’s report shows: Israel is not facing a future threat, but an already active front.

On this front, Iran acts directly and aggressively — through influence campaigns, false SMS, “Hezbollah”, fake narratives, and attempts to sow panic.

Russia should be considered part of a broader category of foreign players against which Israel must build defense: states using digital space to pressure democratic societies, divide alliances, undermine trust, and promote a favorable worldview.

The main problem is not that Israel’s enemies are trying to influence Israelis.

This is expected.

The main problem is that Israel has known about the threat for almost nine years but still has not created a full-fledged protection system.

A missile is visible on the radar.

A fake account is more difficult.

But sometimes it is the first to launch panic, discord, and distrust.

And if the state does not learn to protect citizens in the digital space, the next attack may start not with a siren, but with a message that someone forwarded in a family WhatsApp.

 


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Trump prepares a ‘gift’ for Erdogan: Turkey may be returned to the F-35, and this is important for Israel

Donald Trump is expected to inform Recep Tayyip Erdogan that the US is ready to return Turkey to the F-35 program.

This concerns the lifting of the ban that Trump himself imposed seven years ago for national security reasons. This is reported by The New York Times.

For Ankara, this could be a major diplomatic victory.

For Israel, it is a signal to be watched very closely.

Why Turkey was excluded from the F-35 program

In 2019, during Donald Trump’s first term, Turkey was removed from the F-35 program after purchasing Russian S-400 missile systems.

In Washington, the concern was not the deal with Moscow itself, but its consequences for NATO security and American technologies.

The US believed that Turkey could use the S-400 to study the characteristics of the latest F-35s, and that Russia could gain access to information about the aircraft’s stealth and missile evasion capabilities through these systems.

What is being discussed now

According to NYT, Trump may announce the policy change at the NATO summit in Ankara this week.

Earlier, he said he would bring Erdogan a gift that would make him “very happy.” It is now becoming clear that this gift could be Turkey’s return to the F-35.

But the decision will not be automatic.

Resistance may already arise in the US Congress, and some lawmakers may try to block a move that seems too risky given previous grievances with Ankara.

What will happen with the Russian S-400s

The main question remains: what to do with the Russian S-400 systems, which led to Turkey’s exclusion from the program.

According to one administration official actively involved in the negotiations, the option of transferring the S-400 to a third party is being discussed.

Another scenario is to render the systems inoperable, for example, by dismantling key components.

Many of these systems, it is noted, are still in shipping containers.

This is an important detail. It allows Washington and Ankara to seek a formula in which Turkey formally renounces the threat to the F-35, but Erdogan does not appear to have capitulated under US pressure.

Why Ankara is so eager for the F-35

Turkey has been trying to return to the F-35 program for many years.

For Erdogan, it is not only a matter of aviation but also a matter of status: Turkey wants to remain a major NATO military power capable of playing an independent game between the US, Russia, the Middle East, and Europe.

At the same time, Ankara has so far been unwilling to give up the air defense systems purchased from Russia, despite being a NATO member and hosting an American base on its territory where nuclear weapons are stored in case of a possible NATO conflict with Moscow.

The Israeli angle: F-35, Turkey, and Netanyahu’s words

For Israel, Turkey’s possible return to the F-35 is not a technical news but a strategic issue.

Turkey remains a NATO member, an important regional power, and a state with serious military ambitions. However, relations between Ankara and Jerusalem remain tense, and Erdogan’s rhetoric towards Israel has long gone beyond ordinary diplomatic criticism.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu previously stated in an interview with Fox & Friends: “Turkey is a great country, but it is led by a man who openly calls for the destruction of Israel… and openly talks about conquering Jerusalem.”

That is why the Israeli audience needs to look at this story more broadly than just an aircraft deal.

At the center of the issue is not only the F-35 but the balance of power in the region, US relations with NATO allies, and the price Washington is willing to pay for rapprochement with Ankara.

In this context, NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency views the situation not as a separate US-Turkish episode but as part of a larger regional picture where the interests of Israel, Ukraine, NATO, and Russia intersect at one point again.

What is important to understand now

If Trump indeed returns Turkey to the F-35 program, it will be a strong political gesture towards Erdogan.

But for Israel, the main question will not be the gesture itself but its consequences: what guarantees will Washington receive that the Russian S-400s will not be used against NATO technologies, and how will the military balance in the Middle East change.

Ankara has long been playing on several fronts simultaneously.

That is why any concession to Turkey from the US will be closely scrutinized not only in Congress but also in Jerusalem.

If you want to see the Israeli-Ukrainian agenda without the Russian lens — add NANews to Google.
https://www.google.com/preferences/source?q=news.nikk.co.il


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Kyiv after the night attack: 19 dead, child under the rubble, and a question to Ukraine’s allies

On the night of July 6, 2026, Russian terrorists launched another massive combined strike on Ukraine.

The main target was once again Kyiv.

According to the Ukrainian Air Force, the attack began on the evening of July 5 and included 419 aerial attack assets: 68 missiles of various types and 351 drones.

Among them were “Zircon”/”Onyx” missiles, ballistic “Iskander-M”/S-400, cruise Kh-101, “Kalibr”, as well as drones of types Shahed, Gerbera, Italmas and decoy drones Parody. Ukrainian air defense destroyed or suppressed 363 aerial targets, but hits were recorded from 29 ballistic missiles and 18 strike drones at 34 locations.

For the Israeli reader, this is not abstract military statistics.

This is a familiar logic of war against cities: first overload the air defense system with the number of targets, then break through the defense with ballistics, and then explain to the world that the targets were supposedly “military objects.”

But in Kyiv, residential buildings were once again under attack.

Podil and Darnytskyi districts: rescuers completed the search

According to the State Emergency Service, search and rescue operations in Kyiv have been completed at both locations — in the Podil and Darnytskyi districts.

19 people became victims of the Russian attack, among them — 1 child.

Another 61 people were injured, among them 7 children.

Later, Kyiv Mayor Vitali Klitschko reported that the number of injured in the capital had risen to 76 people. According to him, 24 people were in hospital wards, among them — two children. Klitschko also reported that at night rescuers retrieved the bodies of a 12-year-old boy and his mother from the rubble in the Darnytskyi district.

In the Darnytskyi district, according to rescuers, search and rescue operations were completed on July 7. 11 people died there. At this location, 300 cubic meters of construction debris and waste were dismantled and removed, 183 rescuers and 99 units of SES equipment were involved in the work. SES psychologists provided assistance to 77 people.

8 people died in the Podil district.

This district, according to Kyiv authorities and rescuers, suffered some of the most severe damage. As a result of the strike on a nine-story residential building, floors of the building were destroyed, and rescuers worked under the risk of further collapses. Damage was also recorded in the Darnytskyi, Holosiivskyi, and Obolonskyi districts, fires in residential and non-residential buildings, damage to vehicles, and falling debris.

NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency follows this topic not as a distant war on the map.

For Israel, this is a story about how terrorist states and their allies test the limits of Western aid, the resilience of air defense, and the readiness of democracies to protect civilian populations.

Day of mourning and the Patriot question

On July 7, 2026, a day of mourning was declared in Kyiv and the Kyiv region for the victims.

According to Radio Liberty, Ukraine also initiated a meeting of the UN Security Council due to the attack. The strike occurred just before the NATO summit in Ankara, which starts on July 7, where Volodymyr Zelensky was supposed to meet with US President Donald Trump.

The main question after this attack is not only the number of destroyed houses.

The main question is why Ukraine still lacks interceptor missiles for the Patriot systems, which are critically important against ballistic missiles.

After the attack, Zelensky directly stated that Ukrainian military showed good results in destroying drones and cruise missiles, but the problem with Russian ballistics remains due to insufficient interceptor supplies. According to him, as long as the Patriot missiles remain in the allies’ warehouses, it effectively encourages Russia to continue “defeating” residential buildings.

Israeli media wrote about this as well. The Times of Israel noted that this was already the second attack in a week in which Russia actively used hard-to-intercept ballistic missiles, and Zelensky again appealed to allies for additional air defense capabilities.

For Israel, this detail is especially important.

Ukraine and Israel live in different military realities, but both countries understand well the value of missile defense. When missiles fly over residential areas, diplomatic formulas cease to be theory. Then the question is simpler: if there are interceptors, people have a chance to survive; if there are no interceptors, rescuers retrieve bodies from the rubble.

Why this attack is important for the Israeli audience

Russia once again showed that its war against Ukraine is not just the front.

It is a systemic war against cities, homes, children, hospitals, energy, transport, and normal life.

Kyiv on the night of July 6 was not a military base.

It was a city where people slept in apartments, where children were with their parents, where rescuers spent hours clearing concrete, metal, glass, and remnants of human lives after explosions.

That is why it is important for the Israeli audience to see the Ukrainian agenda without the Russian lens.

Today, Ukraine is asking not for abstract “support,” but for specific means to protect the sky. And after each such attack, it becomes clearer: the delay of allies is measured not by statements, but by the people who died.

Search and rescue operations in Kyiv have been completed.

But for the families of the victims, this night will never end.


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