Beijing between Trump and Putin: Why China did not become the main arbiter of the war
In the past two weeks, Beijing has become one of the key diplomatic venues in world politics. First, Donald Trump arrived there, then Putin. Both visits were presented as major events, but in the end, it became clear: neither Washington nor Moscow received everything they expected from Xi Jinping.
For Ukraine, this is an important signal. China continues to talk about a ‘political settlement’ and a ‘constructive role,’ but does not call Russia’s war against Ukraine a war. In official Chinese rhetoric, it remains a ‘crisis,’ and in the joint formulations of Beijing and Moscow, the thesis about the need to eliminate ‘root causes’ is heard again.
This phrase is particularly important. The Kremlin uses it as a diplomatic cover for old demands: recognition of spheres of influence, pressure on Ukraine, limitation of its sovereignty, and the actual consolidation of the results of aggression. China does not repeat all Russian theses verbatim, but it also does not create real pressure on Moscow.
Macron warns Europe
French President Emmanuel Macron, during his visit to Greece at the end of April, said that Europe is experiencing a moment when the US president, the Russian ruler, and the Chinese leader are effectively acting against European interests. According to him, this is a time when Europe needs to finally wake up.
Paris, meanwhile, continues to maintain a dialogue channel with Beijing, hoping that China can send signals to Moscow about the need to end the war. But the problem is that Beijing does not seem interested in really forcing Putin to peace.
For Israel, this plot is not distant. If China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea are acting more closely, then the consequences of such a connection are felt not only in Kyiv or Brussels but also in the Middle East.
Doubts in US guarantees: Taiwan, NATO, and a worrying signal to allies
One of the main topics of Xi’s talks with Trump was Taiwan. For Beijing, this is a fundamental issue, especially against the backdrop of the American arms package for Taipei worth $14 billion, agreed upon in December 2025.
After visiting China, Trump effectively questioned not only the already approved defense support for Taiwan but also the US’s willingness to defend the island in case of an attack from mainland China. His words that America would have to ‘overcome 9500 miles’ to fight for Taiwan sounded like a signal to several capitals.
In Beijing, such statements are heard very attentively. In Moscow — too.
If Washington pauses aid to Taiwan, it hits the very idea of the reliability of American guarantees. For Europe, Ukraine, and Israel, the question is no longer just about Taiwan. The question is how firm the US commitments to allies remain at a time when the world is entering a new phase of power pressure.
Europe must defend itself
Meanwhile, the US continues to change its approach to European security. Even statements about additional American troops in Poland do not cancel the general line: conventional defense of Europe is increasingly seen as a task for Europe itself, and the US is ready to leave mainly nuclear deterrence.
This logic was previously voiced by Deputy Secretary of Defense Elbridge Colby, effectively questioning the traditional reading of NATO’s Article 5 on collective defense.
Against this backdrop, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte calls for preparing for further reductions in the American military presence in Europe. At the same time, the idea of buying more weapons from American companies is being discussed to keep Washington within the alliance. But many European countries want something else: to develop their own defense industry and reduce dependence on the US.
For the Ukrainian front, this means one thing: Europe must quickly move from statements to production, logistics, and long-term military solutions.
The Iranian factor, US weakness, and benefits for Moscow and Beijing
A separate line is the war in the Middle East and the role of Iran. According to American experts, US arms stocks were already under serious pressure even before the new escalation around Iran. The production of JASSM missiles, Tomahawks, and interceptors for Patriot can take years.
This creates a strategic problem. It is difficult for the US to simultaneously maintain tension in the Indo-Pacific region, support Europe, help Ukraine, and conduct a long campaign against Iran. Moscow and Beijing understand this.
Russia and China are helping Iran restore its military potential, and Iran itself remains a direct threat to both Israel and regional stability. Cheap strike drones, massive attacks, pressure on energy routes, and blocking the Strait of Hormuz show how expensive Western defense has become and how dangerous the cooperation of authoritarian regimes is.
That is why NANews — Israel News Nikk.Agency considers this story not only as a Ukrainian-European plot. For the Israeli audience, the entire chain is important: the Russian war against Ukraine, Chinese support for Moscow, the Iranian threat in the Middle East, and US fluctuations in ally security issues.
Putin did not get the pipeline, but kept the main thing
Putin’s visit to China also did not bring him complete success. Beijing again did not agree to the construction of the ‘Power of Siberia-2’ pipeline, which could help Russia compensate for the loss of the European gas market.
The design capacity of the pipe is estimated at about 50 billion cubic meters of gas per year. For Moscow, this would be a strategic lifeline. But China is in no hurry to pay for Russian desires and demands prices close to domestic Russian ones.
However, this visit cannot be called a failure. Putin maintained the status quo.
China remains Russia’s main economic rear, helps bypass Western sanctions, and maintains channels for the supply of dual-use goods. These channels are especially important for the Russian defense industry.
The main thing is that Beijing does not intend to pressure Moscow to ceasefire. If China really wanted to sharply change the situation, it could limit the export of critically important components and technologies. But there is no such decision.
Why Xi will not save Ukraine at the expense of pressuring Moscow
In the Trump administration, according to analysts, the idea remains that the US should be more of a mediator than a party that harshly pressures Russia. In this logic, Ukraine should make concessions, and Moscow can supposedly be torn away from China.
But this scheme looks weak. Russia is already deeply integrated into the anti-Western bloc, where China, Iran, and North Korea are next to it. The attempt to ‘tear’ Moscow away from Beijing at the cost of Ukrainian territorial concessions may turn out to be not a diplomatic maneuver, but a strategic mistake.
Especially since global energy instability works in Russia’s favor. If the Strait of Hormuz remains under pressure, if US allies pay the price for the crisis, if Washington is forced to soften certain sanction approaches to Russian oil, the Kremlin receives additional resources to continue the war.
Xi Jinping sees this. And therefore, he has no obvious incentive to force Putin to stop.
What remains for Europe
Europe has levers of influence on China, but they will have to be used more harshly. France is already warning Beijing that the destruction of European industry through unfair competition will ultimately hit China’s own access to the European market.
The European Commission is promoting ‘Made in Europe’ rules to protect jobs and reduce dependence on cheap Chinese imports. China, in response, threatens retaliatory measures, not offering a compromise.
This is the new reality. China is not going to voluntarily become a guarantor of a fair world for Ukraine. The US under Trump demonstrates unpredictability. Russia continues the war. Iran increases regional pressure. Europe is forced to grow up faster than it wanted.
For Israel, the conclusion is also obvious: in a world where allied guarantees become less automatic, security cannot be built only on promises. It is necessary to look at chains of interests, at the real actions of states, and at who, at a critical moment, helps the aggressor not with words, but with technologies, money, and time.
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