Month: July 2026

The Ukrainian-German documentary film “Silent Flood” by director Dmytro Sukholytkyy-Sobchuk became one of the winners of the 43rd Jerusalem Film Festival.

The film received the Chantal Akerman Award in the category of experimental documentary cinema.

The names of the winners were announced on July 16, 2026 during a ceremony at the Jerusalem Cinematheque. The total value of the awards presented at the festival amounted to about one million shekels.

The victory of “Silent Flood” became one of the most notable results of Ukrainian participation in the festival, which took place in Jerusalem from July 9 to 19, 2026.

“Silent Flood”: the Ukrainian war beyond the battlefield

Dmytro Sukholytkyy-Sobchuk’s film tells the story of a secluded religious community living near a picturesque river canyon in western Ukraine.

The community members adhere to pacifist beliefs and strive to maintain a traditional way of life. However, their usual order is constantly disrupted by floods, and after the start of the full-scale Russian invasion, by war as well.

“Silent Flood” was created as a co-production between Ukraine and Germany. The film’s duration is 90 minutes. In Jerusalem, it was shown in Ukrainian with subtitles in Hebrew and English.

The director does not build the narrative around battles, military equipment, or destroyed cities.

He observes the everyday life of people who would like to exist outside modern politics and conflicts but gradually discover that staying completely aside is no longer possible.

Natural floods and war become two forces in the film capable of destroying the usual way of life. The first comes with water, the second with anxiety, mobilization, losses, and the need to redefine one’s relationship with the surrounding world.

The competition jury noted this particular approach.

The official decision states that Silent Flood directs the gaze to what remains beyond the battlefield and discovers a deep movement of history there.

According to the jury, the film creates a cinematic language that remains poetic, political, and deeply human at the same time. In the conditions of war, attentiveness, compassion, and contemplation turn into a form of resistance in the film.

The award received in Jerusalem is named after the Belgian director Chantal Akerman, one of the most influential figures in European auteur and experimental cinema.

In 2026, the winner of this competition was determined by Israeli artist and director Nevet Yitzhak. She considered films whose creators use documentary material but go beyond the usual reportage form.

Before Jerusalem, “Silent Flood” had already received international recognition.

At the IDFA documentary film festival in Amsterdam, the film was noted for the best cinematography. The visual work was done by Ivan Morarash, Oleksandr Korotun, Vyacheslav Tsvetkov, and Dmytro Sukholytkyy-Sobchuk himself. Despite the participation of four cinematographers, the film maintained a unified visual language.

Then the film received an award at the Krakow International Film Festival.

Thus, Jerusalem became another important point in the international journey of the film, which tells about Ukraine not through direct depiction of the front but through the lives of people whom the war gradually reaches.

Earlier, NAnews — Israel News reported that two Ukrainian films were presented at the 43rd Jerusalem Film Festival.

Besides “Silent Flood,” the main international competition included the film “To the Victory!” by Valentyn Vasyanovych. Its action unfolds in an imaginary post-war Ukraine, which many residents, including the main character’s family, are leaving.

Ukrainian director Serhiy Loznitsa was an honorary guest of the festival and the chairman of the jury for the feature-length Israeli cinema competition. Together with him, the winners were chosen by Alissa Simon and Jorge Stamadianos.

However, it is important to note that the decision to award “Silent Flood” was made separately: Loznitsa was not part of the jury for the Chantal Akerman competition.

The Ukrainian film was part of a large list of winners, which included films from Germany, North Macedonia, Israel, China, and other countries.

The main international winners of the festival

The main award of the international competition — The Nechama Rivlin Award for Best International Film — was won by the film “The Dreamed Adventure” by German director Valeska Grisebach.

This is a joint production of Germany, France, Bulgaria, and Austria with a duration of 167 minutes.

The main character agrees to help an old acquaintance and embarks on a dangerous journey with him. Gradually, the foreign adventure forces her to confront her own desires and inner contradictions.

The jury noted Valeska Grisebach’s directorial skill and how the film connects several major themes: European identities, state borders, and personal relationships between people.

The award for best acting went to Karlis Arnolds Avots, who starred in the film by Latvian director Viesturs Kairish “Ulya”.

The jury noted how the actor creates an image using movements, gaze, body plasticity, and facial expressions. His performance was described as serious, restrained, and visually expressive.

The best international debut was recognized as the film “17” by director Kosara Mitic, created in collaboration with North Macedonia, Serbia, and Slovenia.

The main character, 17-year-old Sara, hides her own secret during a school trip. The situation spirals out of control after she witnesses sexual violence against her friend Lina. The girls try to break the cycle of violence, and a special bond develops between them.

The jury called the film a harsh and uncompromising statement about violence, which had long been preferred to remain silent about.

A special mention in the debut competition was awarded to the film “Panda” by director Zhang Xinyang, representing Singapore, Hong Kong, and China.

The jury described it as a poetic and philosophical journey along the Yangtze River, reflecting on madness, acceptance of life, and the human ability not only to fear water but also to enter it.

The winner of the “In the Spirit of Freedom” competition, dedicated to solidarity, humanity, freedom, and justice, was the film “Skateboarding Is Not for Girls” by director Dina Duma.

The film tells the story of two sisters from the Roma community — Adela and Zara. After their father’s disappearance, the family finds itself in an even more difficult situation, and a relative offers to take the older girl to the Bulgarian bride market and marry her off for a reward.

The jury noted that the author addresses heavy themes but maintains room for humor, compassion, vitality, and the complexity of human characters in the film.

Winners of Israeli competitions

The main winner of the feature-length Israeli cinema competition was the film “Where To?” by director Assaf Machnes.

The film received three awards:

for best Israeli feature-length film;

for best screenplay;

for best acting by Ihab Salami.

The action takes place in Berlin.

55-year-old Palestinian taxi driver Hassan transports club and party-goers at night. He has become estranged from his eldest daughter and has been unable to free himself from memories of the past for many years.

One day, his passenger is a 25-year-old Israeli named Amir. A few months later, their paths cross again. Gradually, the night rides through Berlin turn into a story about pain, memory, exile, loneliness, and an attempt to understand another person.

The jury, chaired by Serhiy Loznitsa, noted the film’s ability to show the human above political beliefs and cultural conflicts.

The best Israeli feature-length documentary film was recognized as “I Am Neo” by director Yael Abecassis.

Neo was three and a half years old when a severe car accident led to brainstem damage. After five days between life and death, the child awoke, unable to breathe, speak, walk, or eat independently.

The parents began filming the events on camera. From hundreds of hours of family recordings, a film emerged about the child and his loved ones trying to practically rebuild their lives.

The jury called the film a patient, humane, and touching struggle for life.

The award for best Israeli debut went to the documentary film “Find Me, Okay?” by director Yula Gidron.

Its heroine is Eden Yerushalmi, kidnapped by Hamas terrorists from the Nova festival on October 7, 2023.

The film shows the struggle of Eden’s mother, sisters, and friend for her return, the collapse of hope after news of the hostage’s death, and the family’s attempt to continue living after the tragedy.

The award for best cinematography went to Meidan Arama for the film I Can’t Say No to Myself, for best editing to Gal Rosenbluth for the film Amal, and the prize for original music went to Asaf Talmudi, who worked on the film The Wedding Entertainer.

Among Israeli short films, the winner was Another Body by Orit Fuchs Rotem. Second place went to the film Fireworks, the best animated work was recognized as Saba, and the acting award went to Dar Zuzovsky for her role in the film Peppa the Great.

In the Israeli experimental cinema and video art competition, the main award went to the film A Pleasant Sail on Land by Gadi Yampel. The film Krav Maga by Tal Elkayam received a separate award for experimental cinema, and a special mention was given to the work Dragon by Natalia Riss.

The 43rd Jerusalem Film Festival showcased a very wide range of contemporary cinema: from stories about war, violence, and abductions to films about European identity, family trauma, coming of age, and the search for connection between people.

For NAnews — Israel News, the victory of the Ukrainian “Silent Flood” remains an especially important result.

However, it would be wrong to consider it separately from other laureates. Dmytro Sukholytkyy-Sobchuk’s film was part of a festival program where the main themes were human dignity, memory, freedom, resistance to violence, and the attempt to maintain the ability to see another person even during war.

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“Maccabi” Haifa indeed took concrete steps to sign the 28-year-old Ukrainian national team midfielder Oleksiy Hutsulyak. However, as of July 19, 2026, the player remains a free agent, with no official agreement announced with any Israeli, Turkish, or Arab club.

The story developed over several weeks: first, Hutsulyak ended his cooperation with Zhytomyr’s “Polissya”, then information about “Maccabi’s” interest appeared in Israel, and on July 16, the player’s agent first detailed the negotiations with clubs from Israel, Turkey, Belgium, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.

Summer 2024: Hutsulyak moves to “Polissya”

Oleksiy Hutsulyak joined Zhytomyr’s “Polissya” in the summer of 2024 after leaving “Dnipro-1”. The contract was for two years — until the end of June 2026.

During this time, the Ukrainian winger became one of the key players of the team.

Together with Hutsulyak, “Polissya” won the first bronze medals in the club’s history in the Ukrainian Premier League in the 2024/25 season. According to “Suspilne Sport”, he played 65 matches for the Zhytomyr team over two years, scored 20 goals, and made 10 assists. Some other sports sources account for 21 goals and 11 assists, so the differences are likely due to the methodology of counting tournaments and assists.

In the 2025/26 season, Hutsulyak played 25 matches in the Ukrainian Premier League and scored eight goals. His last championship game for “Polissya” took place on May 12, 2026, against “Epicenter”.

January 2026: conflict over transfer to U-19

On January 13, 2026, it became known that “Polissya” transferred Hutsulyak from the main team to the youth squad U-19.

Publicly, the club did not link this decision to contract negotiations, but Ukrainian media speculated that this might have been a way to pressure the player due to his reluctance to sign a new agreement.

Already on January 18, 2026, Hutsulyak was returned to training with the first team.

The management of “Polissya” explained this by the interests of the Ukrainian national team: in March, the national team had decisive playoff matches for the 2026 World Cup qualification, and Hutsulyak was one of its most productive players.

Later, the player’s agent, Oleh Avdysh, refused to directly answer whether the transfer to U-19 was an attempt at pressure. He stated that “Polissya” and Hutsulyak gave a lot to each other and that the player’s representatives do not want to return to negative moments.

End of June — July 1, 2026: contract completed

Hutsulyak’s contract with “Polissya” expired at the end of June 2026.

On July 1, 2026, the player officially bid farewell to the Zhytomyr club on social media. He emphasized that he spent exactly two years with the team and became part of the historic achievement — “Polissya’s” first bronze medals in the Ukrainian Premier League.

After the contract ended, Hutsulyak gained free agent status.

This means that a new club does not need to pay “Polissya” a transfer fee. However, the player himself may demand a higher salary, signing bonuses, and more favorable personal terms.

Later, Oleh Avdysh explained that Hutsulyak refused a new agreement not because of a desire to move to another Ukrainian club. According to the agent, the player had long planned to continue his career abroad and try his hand in a new championship.

July 4, 2026: interest from “Maccabi” first reported in Israel

On July 4, 2026, at 19:04, the Israeli publication Walla Sport reported that “Maccabi” Haifa was considering signing Hutsulyak.

At that time, it was about the club’s interest, not an agreed contract or official offer. Israeli journalists noted that teams from Belgium, Turkey, and the Gulf countries were also interested in the Ukrainian.

The publication from July 4 stated that Hutsulyak was not in a hurry to make a final decision and hoped to receive new offers after the 2026 World Cup.

At the same time, Israeli media cited his statistics for the Ukrainian national team: 16 matches and six goals. For “Polissya” in all tournaments of the 2025/26 season, he recorded nine goals and seven assists.

Thus, “Maccabi’s” interest arose or, at least, became public after Hutsulyak gained free agent status.

July 16, 2026: agent confirmed Israel’s concrete step

The main source of this story appeared on July 16, 2026, at 08:18.

It was then that the publication “Ukrainian Football” published a large interview with Hutsulyak’s agent, Oleh Avdysh. The player’s representative first detailed the teams and championships with which negotiations were conducted.

Avdysh confirmed serious interest from the Turkish “Kocaelispor”. According to him, this club was actively working on the possible transfer of Hutsulyak.

Besides “Kocaelispor”, three other Turkish teams were interested in the Ukrainian at that time. The agent named “Konyaspor” and “Chorum” but refused to disclose the name of the fourth club. Another team, which was in the top five of the Turkish championship at that time, also joined the negotiations.

To a direct question about “Anderlecht” and “Maccabi” Haifa, Avdysh replied:

“It’s ‘Anderlecht’. The Brussels team indeed showed serious interest, but their financial capabilities do not meet Oleksiy’s demands. The Israeli side also took a concrete step.”

Therefore, on July 16, the agent confirmed that there was not only preliminary interest from Israel but also a concrete action. However, he did not disclose the amount or specify whether it was a written offer, salary agreement, or the start of official negotiations.

Avdysh added that the most likely scenario is a move to Turkey or one of the Arab championships.

How much Hutsulyak wanted to earn

In the interview from July 16, the agent was directly asked about reports that Hutsulyak’s financial demands range from one to two million dollars a year.

Oleh Avdysh confirmed that this amount is close to reality. According to him, there are clubs on the market capable of meeting such demands.

For “Maccabi” Haifa, such a contract would mean turning the Ukrainian into one of the highest-paid players on the team.

However, the exact amount offered by the Israeli club was not publicly disclosed. Therefore, claims of specific 700, 800 thousand, or one million euros do not have sufficient official confirmation.

The agent also emphasized that salary is not the only criterion. For Hutsulyak, it is fundamentally important to choose a club whose performances will allow him to remain in the field of view of the Ukrainian national team’s coaching staff.

July 18, 2026: Israeli media announced that “Maccabi” lost the financial battle

On July 18, 2026, at 09:57, Walla Sport returned to Hutsulyak’s story and published an article with the headline: “Hutsulyak’s agent: ‘Maccabi’ Haifa did not match the received offers”.

This version was also spread by other Israeli sports publications, including Sport1.

The Israeli publication claimed that “Maccabi” could not offer financial conditions comparable to the offers from clubs in Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE.

However, there is an important nuance here.

In the original interview from July 16, the agent directly mentioned the mismatch of financial capabilities only concerning “Anderlecht”. Regarding “Maccabi” Haifa, he only stated that the Israeli side took a “concrete step”.

Therefore, the phrase that “Maccabi” could not match the competitors’ offers is logical but still an Israeli interpretation of the agent’s words, not his verbatim statement in the Ukrainian source.

Nevertheless, the overall conclusion seems obvious: if the conditions of the Israeli club suited the player, “Maccabi” would remain among the main contenders. By July 18, Turkey and the Gulf countries had already gained the advantage.

July 18: offer from “Al-Wasl” appeared

Also on July 18, 2026, Ukrainian media reported an offer from the “Al-Wasl” club from the United Arab Emirates.

According to Football24, citing the “TaToTake” project, the club was ready to offer Hutsulyak about 1.5 million euros per season. Officially, “Al-Wasl” did not confirm this information.

This amount corresponds to the range of one to two million dollars, which the player’s agent confirmed on July 16.

It is the clubs from the UAE and Saudi Arabia that have the ability to offer conditions that are difficult for not only “Maccabi” Haifa but also many European teams to compete with.

July 19: “Konyaspor” dropped out of the race

On the morning of July 19, 2026, new information about the Turkish direction appeared.

Sport.ua reported that “Konyaspor” is not actually working on signing Hutsulyak and that the Ukrainian’s name is not on the team’s transfer list.

This message contradicts the agent’s words from July 16, who confirmed “Konyaspor’s” interest.

There are two possible explanations: either the situation changed within three days, or the initial interest did not turn into real negotiations. In any case, as of July 19, the option with “Konyaspor” was no longer considered relevant.

At the same time, the information about the interest of “Kocaelispor”, “Chorum”, an unnamed Turkish club, and a team from the top five of the Turkish championship was not officially refuted.

Who is Oleksiy Hutsulyak

Oleksiy Hutsulyak was born on December 25, 1997 in Krasyliv, Khmelnytskyi region.

He is 187 centimeters tall. His main position is a flank midfielder or winger. He can play on the right, left, and closer to the center of the attack.

During his career, Hutsulyak played for Lviv’s “Karpaty”, Chernihiv’s “Desna”, “Dnipro-1”, and Zhytomyr’s “Polissya”. He also had a period in the structure of the Spanish “Villarreal”, but he did not play for the main team of the Spanish club.

The player has 16 matches and six goals for the Ukrainian national team. In 2025, he became the top scorer of the Ukrainian national team, scoring five goals.

Main conclusion

The interest of “Maccabi” Haifa in Oleksiy Hutsulyak was real.

It was not just a name on the list of potential newcomers: the player’s agent confirmed that the Israeli side took a concrete step.

However, by mid-July 2026, the financial bar had risen to a level where “Maccabi” had to compete with Turkish clubs and teams from Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

For NAnews — Israel News, this story shows that Israeli clubs continue to closely monitor the Ukrainian market. One of the most productive players of the Ukrainian national team could indeed have ended up in Haifa, but the economic capabilities of the Gulf clubs and the Turkish championship pushed the Israeli option to the background.

As of July 19, 2026, Hutsulyak remains a free agent. “Maccabi” Haifa has effectively dropped out of the main contenders, but the player’s final decision and his new club have not yet been officially announced.

…
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The United States is preparing a large-scale reinforcement of its air group in the Middle East. Dozens of additional tanker aircraft are being sent to Israel, and F-35 fighters and specialized F-16s designed to suppress air defense systems are being transferred from American airbases in the UK and Germany.

This is not just a show of force.

The infrastructure being created allows American aviation to stay over Iran longer, increase the number of combat sorties, support operations against radars and anti-aircraft complexes, and, with a political decision from Washington, significantly expand the list of targets.

About 60 tankers were already in Israel

The American publication Axios reported on July 17, 2026, that President Donald Trump’s administration notified Israel of the decision to send several dozen additional military tanker aircraft to the country.

According to the publication, at that time about 30 American tankers were at Ben Gurion International Airport, and approximately the same number were at Ramon Airport in southern Israel.

Thus, even before the new transfer, the American group numbered about 60 tanker aircraft. After the arrival of additional machines, its number could indeed approach one hundred, although the Pentagon has not officially announced the exact number of aircraft.

Axios links the decision to discussions in the White House Situation Room about new options for a military campaign against Iran.

Among the scenarios presented to Donald Trump were strikes on Iranian infrastructure, new attacks on nuclear program facilities, and a possible operation against the alleged underground site Pickaxe Mountain. A final decision to move to such a large-scale campaign had not been made at the time of publication.

However, the transfer of dozens of tankers itself shows that the US is creating opportunities to expand the war in advance.

A large number of such aircraft is necessary not for a single attack, but for a prolonged air operation in which fighters, reconnaissance aircraft, and other aviation must remain at a significant distance from their bases for hours.

The war has already transitioned to a mode of daily American strikes

The United States Central Command reported that on the night of July 18, 2026, American forces conducted the eighth consecutive night of strikes on Iran.

According to an official CENTCOM statement, the targets were coastal surveillance facilities, air defense systems, naval forces, as well as missile and drone storage sites. The American military stated that they continue to reduce Iran’s ability to conduct attacks and control the Persian Gulf region.

This makes the transfer of tanker aircraft especially important.

American strikes are no longer a one-time operation. They have turned into a consistent campaign that requires constant aviation presence, regular aircraft rotation, and continuous in-air refueling.

NANews — Israel News notes: the concentration of dozens of American tankers at Israeli airfields indicates preparation not only for the continuation of current strikes but also for the possibility of their rapid expansion.

Why tankers determine the scale of the air war

The KC-135 Stratotanker remains the main aerial refueling aircraft of the US Air Force. According to official information from the US Air Force, these machines provide fuel for Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and allied aviation.

The newer KC-46A Pegasus has expanded refueling, cargo transport, and medical evacuation capabilities. They were created as a replacement for the aging KC-135 fleet and can be used simultaneously in several types of operations.

The presence of dozens of such machines allows:

keeping fighters in the air longer;

increasing the flight range of combat aviation;

conducting repeated target approaches;

supporting round-the-clock air patrols;

refueling aircraft operating against Iranian air defenses;

reducing dependence on airfields located close to Iran.

In fact, each additional tanker increases not only the range but also the intensity of the entire air campaign.

F-35s are being sent from the UK, F-16 Wild Weasel from Germany

The American specialized publication Air & Space Forces Magazine reported on July 17, 2026, that the Pentagon is simultaneously transferring additional combat aircraft to the Middle East.

F-35A Lightning II fighters from the 48th Fighter Wing, based at RAF Lakenheath, are being sent from the UK.

F-16 Fighting Falcon from the 480th Fighter Squadron are being transferred from Spangdahlem Air Base in Germany.

This is an important clarification: some reports mentioned F-15s supposedly being transferred from Germany. American sources indicate that it is specifically about specialized F-16s.

The official website of Spangdahlem Air Base confirms that the 480th Squadron is capable of performing Wild Weasel missions — suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses.

Its F-16s are designed to detect and engage active radars, anti-aircraft missile systems, and other elements of the air defense system.

The task of such aircraft is to clear the way for the main strike aviation.

First, F-16 Wild Weasel detects radar activity and forces the enemy to activate detection systems. Then radar and anti-aircraft missile positions can be suppressed by electronic warfare means or destroyed by munitions.

After this, F-35s, bombers, and other strike aircraft can operate with less risk.

In March 2026, Air & Space Forces Magazine already reported that F-16 Wild Weasel from Germany participated in operations against Iranian air defenses. Simultaneously, F-35s and F-15Es, based in the UK or transferred from there to the region, were used in the campaign.

The figure ’14 aircraft’ requires caution

In foreign publications, the number 14 American tanker aircraft does indeed appear, but it does not refer to the last July weekend.

The American publication The War Zone reported that just before the start of hostilities on February 28, 2026, nine KC-46A Pegasus and five KC-135 Stratotanker — a total of 14 machines — arrived at Ben Gurion. After the start of the war, the American presence at the airport increased significantly.

There is no independent confirmation that another 14 tankers arrived specifically on July 17–18 in available American and international sources.

Therefore, in publications, it is safer to talk about the confirmed transfer of several dozen additional aircraft, rather than asserting as an established fact the arrival of specifically 14 machines on the last weekend.

At the same time, the overall trend is undeniable: the American air group in Israel is expanding.

Ben Gurion was overwhelmed with military aviation

The presence of dozens of American aircraft has already affected the operation of Israel’s main international airport.

Reuters reported on May 28, 2026, that due to the deployment of American military aviation, Ben Gurion was operating at about a third of its normal capacity.

According to the head of the Airports Authority, up to 70% of the airport’s space and infrastructure capabilities were restricted for military needs. This posed a threat of mass flight cancellations during the summer vacation period.

Reuters had already published materials on May 19 confirming the presence of a large number of American tankers at the airport’s parking areas. Thus, the American group began forming long before the current July reinforcement.

Placing some aircraft in Ramon helps reduce the load on Ben Gurion, but the arrival of several dozen more machines again raises questions about available parking, technical maintenance, security, and the organization of military flights alongside civilian aviation.

What the transfer of nearly a hundred tankers means

Tanker aircraft themselves do not strike Iranian targets.

But they make a large-scale and prolonged air war possible.

Without refueling, a fighter is limited by its fuel supply and must quickly return to base. With the support of KC-135 or KC-46, it can remain in the operation zone much longer, await strike orders, escort other aircraft, or re-attack a target.

The simultaneous arrival of F-35s and F-16 Wild Weasel shows the intended structure of the American operation.

Specialized F-16s are to suppress radars and anti-aircraft complexes. Stealthy F-35s can penetrate areas with remaining air defenses, gather intelligence, and deliver precise strikes. Tankers provide the necessary range and flight duration for both groups.

NANews — Israel News notes that this is about creating an entire air system: tankers ensure the duration of the operation, F-16s clear the airspace, and F-35s and other strike aircraft can operate over Iran with less risk.

Main conclusion

American and international sources confirm that the US is sending several dozen additional tanker aircraft to Israel.

About 60 such machines were already at Ben Gurion and Ramon by July 17, 2026, so after the transfer is completed, the total number of the group could approach one hundred aircraft.

Simultaneously, the Pentagon is transferring F-35s from the UK and specialized F-16 Wild Weasel from Germany. The latter are intended to suppress and destroy Iranian radars and air defense systems.

Against the backdrop of eight consecutive nights of American strikes on Iran, this does not look like a symbolic gesture, but rather as preparation of infrastructure for a prolonged and potentially more extensive air war.

…
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The resignation of Ukraine’s Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov brought to light a conflict that had been developing within the Ukrainian military-political leadership for a long time. At the center of the confrontation were Fedorov’s relations with the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Oleksandr Syrskyi, differing views on conducting the war, defense procurement, and control over the distribution of the enormous military budget.

Published on July 18, 2026, by The New York Times.

According to the American publication, one of the main reasons for the conflict was Fedorov’s attempt to redirect more resources to drones and robotic systems. Oleksandr Syrskyi, on the contrary, insisted on continuing large purchases of artillery ammunition necessary for the Ukrainian army for heavy positional battles in the east of the country.

However, the story turned out to be significantly more complex than a usual dispute over whether it is better to fight with drones or artillery.

Behind Volodymyr Zelensky’s personnel decision was a protracted conflict between two centers of Ukraine’s defense management, which by mid-July had practically ceased to interact normally.

Six months at the head of the Ministry of Defense

Mykhailo Fedorov headed Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense on January 14, 2026.

Before that, he led the Ministry of Digital Transformation, participated in the creation of the state application “Diia”, the launch of the “Army of Drones” project, the expansion of Starlink usage, and the development of the Ukrainian market for unmanned systems, electronic warfare means, ground robots, and missiles.

Fedorov came to the defense department with a reputation as a technological reformer.

He intended to restructure the cumbersome military procurement system, accelerate the delivery of weapons to combat units, and use battlefield data to determine which drones and other systems truly show results.

Reuters notes that Fedorov tried to apply an approach to the army based on technology, measurable efficiency, and quick decision-making. This inevitably led him to clash with the existing military bureaucracy and high command.

But just six months after his appointment, he lost his position.

During a government reshuffle, Fedorov’s candidacy was not included in the new Cabinet of Ministers. Yevhen Khmara, who previously served as acting head of the Security Service of Ukraine, was appointed as acting Minister of Defense.

The conflict between Fedorov and Syrskyi came to the surface

After the decision on his resignation, Fedorov publicly accused Oleksandr Syrskyi of blocking the Ministry of Defense’s initiatives, backstage intrigues, and deliberate sabotage of reforms.

According to the former minister, at the beginning of his work, he proposed to Zelensky to replace the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and the Chief of the General Staff.

The president then refused.

Fedorov claims that after this, he agreed to try to establish joint work with the military leadership, but the initiatives proposed by the Ministry of Defense were systematically blocked. He also stated that Syrskyi avoided direct and open discussions about the accumulated problems.

Fedorov, however, did not deny the military merits of the Commander-in-Chief. In particular, he acknowledged Syrskyi’s role in the defense of Kyiv in 2022.

His complaints primarily related to the existing culture of army management, attitude towards servicemen, inability to quickly implement new solutions, and resistance to changes.

Volodymyr Zelensky himself also acknowledged that the conflict existed and reached a level where the Minister of Defense and the Commander-in-Chief could not interact normally without the president’s mediation.

According to sources in Ukrainian media, Zelensky considered it unacceptable for the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff to effectively fight each other during the war.

Drones versus artillery shells

The most high-profile part of the story is related to defense procurement.

The New York Times claims that Fedorov blocked some purchases of artillery ammunition, seeking to redirect the freed-up funds to drones.

Syrskyi, according to this version, considered such a decision dangerous. Despite the rapid development of drones, Ukrainian troops continue to engage in heavy ground battles where artillery remains one of the main means of fire support.

Fedorov acknowledged that he canceled or revised some tenders for the purchase of 155-millimeter NATO-standard artillery shells. He also suspended contracts for certain types of short-range ammunition.

According to the former minister, the review of these purchases saved about 100 million dollars. At the same time, he claimed that Ukraine continued to purchase long-range artillery ammunition and did not intend to completely abandon artillery.

A representative of one of the Ukrainian defense enterprises reported that military contractors received letters about the cessation of some shell purchases. It was assumed that the army could temporarily use existing stocks while expanding the use of drones.

This is where the main question arose.

The General Staff determines the army’s needs for weapons based on the situation at the front. The Ministry of Defense is responsible for financing, contracts, and the actual acquisition of weapons.

If the ministry begins to review the military command’s requests, it effectively gains the ability to influence not only contract prices but also the very strategy of the war.

Fedorov did not propose to completely abandon artillery

The public description of the conflict as a choice between artillery and drones simplifies the situation.

As early as June 24, 2026, Fedorov named among Ukraine’s main needs air defense, the expansion of drone and missile production, as well as long-range strike capabilities.

Thus, it was probably not about a complete abandonment of traditional weapons, but about the redistribution of the defense budget.

Fedorov wanted to direct more money to drones, robotic systems, digital management, and units capable of proving their effectiveness.

Syrskyi and his supporters feared that an excessively rapid transition to such a model could leave frontline units without the necessary amount of shells, equipment, and personnel.

In essence, the parties argued about the pace and scale of the army’s technological restructuring.

What results did Fedorov present

Before leaving office, Fedorov named 22 achievements of the Ministry of Defense during his leadership.

Among them are the expansion of purchases of FPV drones, fiber-optic drones, interceptor drones, ground robotic complexes, and long-range strike systems. The ministry also developed a support program for modern drone-assault units.

According to the department, Ukrainian units from the beginning of 2026 to June 22 confirmed more than 800,000 hits on Russian targets using drones.

Already on July 17, the Ministry of Defense reported that the number of Russian targets hit by drones exceeded one million. On the same day, the department announced the signing of contracts for drones worth more than 333 billion hryvnias in the first half of the year.

These figures are published by the Ministry of Defense itself and reflect the official assessment of the results of Fedorov’s team’s work.

There is no complete independent audit of the effectiveness of all programs yet. However, even critics of the former minister recognize his role in scaling up Ukrainian drone production and turning drones into one of the main elements of modern warfare.

Political version of the resignation

The TSN material also presents a political version of what happened.

A deputy from the “Holos” party, Mykola Davyduk, suggested that Fedorov’s growing popularity and the well-known drone program could have caused concerns in Volodymyr Zelensky’s political circle.

According to this version, presidential advisers could have portrayed Fedorov as a potentially independent and overly popular political figure.

The New York Times also recalled that Zelensky had previously dismissed the popular Commander-in-Chief Valeriy Zaluzhnyi, who was considered a possible competitor to the president in future elections.

Later, the head of military intelligence Kyrylo Budanov received a position in the presidential administration. Some analysts interpreted this as an attempt to keep a popular security official within the current political team.

However, there is no evidence that Fedorov was preparing his own political project or intended to participate in the presidential elections.

Therefore, political jealousy remains a version, not a confirmed reason for the resignation.

Why Zelensky retained Syrskyi

Volodymyr Zelensky was effectively faced with a choice between a reformist minister and the commander-in-chief of the active army.

Replacing Syrskyi during ongoing heavy fighting could have caused temporary disorganization of the entire military vertical.

Fedorov’s resignation also created serious risks but did not directly affect the system of operational command of the troops.

As a result, Zelensky retained Syrskyi and sacrificed the Minister of Defense.

This does not necessarily mean that the president fully supported the methods of the Commander-in-Chief. Rather, in the conditions of war, he chose to maintain the existing system of army management.

At the same time, Zelensky appointed Yevhen Khmara as acting Minister of Defense and stated the need to continue technological operations, develop unmanned systems, and maintain direct funding for combat units.

Thus, official Kyiv is trying to show that Fedorov’s resignation does not mean abandoning his technological course.

The resignation caused rare military protests

The decision to leave Fedorov led to protests, unusual for wartime Ukraine.

For two consecutive days, thousands of people gathered near the President’s Office in Kyiv. Participants demanded the resignation of Oleksandr Syrskyi and the return of Fedorov to the leadership of the defense system.

Among the protesters were veterans, relatives of servicemen, and supporters of the army’s technological modernization. Similar actions took place in other Ukrainian cities.

After Fedorov’s resignation, Deputy Commander of the Air Forces Pavlo Yelizarov, associated with the development of drone operations, submitted a resignation report.

Several high-ranking military officials also publicly supported the continuation of reforms.

The scale of the reaction showed that Ukrainian society perceived what happened not as an ordinary government reshuffle.

For many, the resignation became a symbol of the struggle between the new technological model of the army and the old military system, which is accused of excessive centralization, large losses, and resistance to change.

What really cost Fedorov his position

It cannot be asserted that Mykhailo Fedorov lost his post solely because of one canceled contract or a dispute over 155-millimeter shells.

A combination of factors led to the resignation.

First and foremost, it was a personal and managerial conflict with Oleksandr Syrskyi, which made normal interaction between the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff practically impossible.

The second factor was a different understanding of the future of the war. Fedorov tried to accelerate the transition to drones, robots, digital systems, and resource distribution based on proven effectiveness.

The military command continued to insist on the need for artillery, infantry, mobilization, and a traditional vertical of management.

Finally, Fedorov’s reforms affected the interests of major arms suppliers and the existing system of military budget distribution. The former minister himself stated that the review of procurements threatened the business interests of individual companies, but there is no independent evidence of organized pressure from the defense industry yet.

NANews — Israel News notes: Fedorov’s resignation was not the end of the conflict, but its public beginning.

Zelensky retained Syrskyi but simultaneously promised to continue the technological reforms associated with the name of the dismissed minister.

Now the main indicator will be not personnel statements, but the real decisions of the new leadership: whether the review of procurements will continue, whether support for effective drone units will be maintained, and whether the General Staff will gain full control over the distribution of defense funds.

The high-profile resignation showed that Ukraine faced not just a dispute between two leaders. The country must decide whether it can combine the traditional military system with a technological army — or whether the struggle for control over the war will continue under a new Minister of Defense.

…
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How did four Ukrainian Jews — Jan Koum, Leonid Radvinsky, Michael Polsky and Max Levchin — go from childhood in Kyiv, Odesa and the Kharkiv region to a combined net worth of over $25 billion in the United States?

Each of them founded or led a world‑class company: Jan Koum was one of the creators of WhatsApp, Leonid Radvinsky turned OnlyFans into a global phenomenon, Michael Polsky founded Invenergy LLC in the “green” energy sector, and Max Levchin co‑founded PayPal and now runs Affirm.

This is reported in a publication by Forbes. By the number of billionaire immigrants, Ukraine ranked 9th among 41 countries.

From Kyiv’s Courtyards to Global Heights

How Their Stories Began in Ukraine

• Jan Koum was born in February 1976 on the outskirts of Kyiv. In the family of an electronics engineer there were no trendy computers, but there were radios that the boy would take apart and reassemble. In a school BASIC club he wrote his first programs to send text messages over a local network.
• Leonid Radvinsky was born in the early 1970s in Odesa, near the famous Privoz Market. Together with his mother he sold souvenirs to tourists, calculating profit and bargaining for every dollar. These lessons in commerce and the ability to connect with people laid the foundation for his entrepreneurial drive.
• Michael Polsky was born in 1947 in a rural area of the Kharkiv region. In his free time he built wind turbine models from bicycle spokes and tin cans, dreaming of an energy future. After technical college he worked at a power plant, where he first encountered the ideas of alternative energy.
• Max Levchin was born in July 1975 in Kyiv into a family of historians. At school he became passionate about chess and the Pascal programming language. By organizing a “Young Programmer” club, Max not only deepened his algorithmic knowledge but also learned to share expertise and build teamwork.

In the Emigration Lab — A Step West

Each of them took the risk to leave their homeland and go to the United States with minimal resources:

1. Jan Koum arrived in 1992 with his mother and grandmother under a repatriation program. For the first years he worked as a cleaner and barista to pay for his studies at San Jose State University.
2. Leonid Radvinsky settled in Chicago on a humanitarian visa, graduated from Northwestern University, and began working in internet marketing.
3. Michael Polsky was invited as an energy specialist in 1976. With $500 in his pocket, he got a job as an electrician, and twenty years later founded his own company, Invenergy.
4. Max Levchin obtained political asylum in 1991, moved to Memphis, and by the end of the decade had co‑founded PayPal.

Breakthroughs and Achievements

• WhatsApp by Jan Koum and Brian Acton amassed over 2 billion users in a few years, and its sale to Meta netted Koum over $16.9 billion.
• OnlyFans by Leonid Radvinsky became a platform generating over $1.3 billion in annual revenue and awarded him personal dividends of over $1 billion.
• Invenergy by Michael Polsky executed projects worth more than $7 billion, including wind and solar farms across America.
• Affirm Holdings under Max Levchin’s leadership became a key player in fintech, and Levchin’s net worth is estimated at approximately $2.1 billion.

How They Stay Connected to Ukraine Today

• Jan Koum supports several educational programs and grants for IT camps in Kyiv, aiming to inspire a new generation of programmers.
• Leonid Radvinsky donated $5 million in 2022 to humanitarian aid for Ukraine, affected by military conflict.
• Michael Polsky speaks at European energy conferences promoting green economy practices in Eastern Europe.
• Max Levchin organizes student exchanges between Kyiv Polytechnic Institute and American universities, supporting young engineers.

On the NAnews – Israel News website, we share how mutual support and knowledge exchange strengthen bridges between Israel and Ukraine.

Conclusions and Significance

• Childhood interests — whether radio electronics or chess — can lead to global discoveries.
• Emigration tests resilience: courage and adaptability turn challenges into opportunities.
• Maintaining cultural roots and caring for one’s homeland create synergy between innovation and tradition.

These stories from NAnews inspire Israeli startups and show that by combining diaspora experience and technology, we can reach new heights.

…
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In 12 days of the ‘MoLoChKa’ operation, Ukrainian drones, according to the command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces, hit 159 vessels of the Russian ‘shadow fleet’ in the Azov and Black Seas. The campaign’s goal is not the mass sinking of tankers, but the paralysis of Russia’s maritime logistics, the supply of occupied Crimea, and the transportation of oil, fuel, and goods circumventing sanctions.

On July 17, 2026, the commander of the Armed Forces of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces, Robert Brovdi, known by the call sign ‘Madyar’, summarized the interim results of the ‘MoLoChKa’ operation.

According to him, from July 6 to 17, Ukrainian units hit 159 vessels used in Russian maritime logistics:

• 117 vessels — in the Azov Sea;
• 42 vessels — in the Black Sea.

On the night of July 17 alone, 12 more vessels were attacked in the Black Sea: nine dry cargo ships, one tanker, one gas tanker, and one tugboat.

These figures are already being called one of the largest episodes of drone use against Russian maritime logistics. However, it is important to understand: 159 affected vessels do not mean 159 sunken ships.

What does the name of the operation ‘MoLoChKa’ mean

The name of the operation turned out to be an abbreviation.

On July 15, Robert Brovdi deciphered it as follows:

MLChK — ‘Moscow Will Lie Through Crimea’, meaning ‘Moscow will lie through Crimea’.

According to the Ukrainian command’s plan, it is not about a single series of strikes, but a systematic campaign against the infrastructure that allows Russia to hold the occupied peninsula and use it as a military base.

It includes attacks on maritime transport, oil depots, energy facilities, railway hubs, bridges, substations, and other elements of supplying Russian troops in southern Ukraine.

The strategy’s meaning is to gradually turn Crimea from a convenient military foothold into a territory whose maintenance requires more and more fuel, equipment, ships, air defense systems, and repair resources from Moscow.

Crimea holds not only military but also symbolic significance for the Kremlin. Its capture has been portrayed by Russian propaganda for many years as one of Putin’s main achievements. Therefore, the destruction of the peninsula’s logistical connections can simultaneously inflict military, economic, and political damage.

159 affected vessels — not 159 sunken ships

Headlines about ‘knocked out’ or ‘destroyed’ vessels can create the false impression that Ukrainian forces sent almost one and a half hundred ships to the bottom in 12 days.

The SBS command describes the operation’s goal differently.

Ukrainian drones are supposed to deprive the vessel of the ability to move normally, navigate, and maintain communication. Robert Brovdi stated that the task is to turn a self-propelled vessel into a drifting ‘blind and deaf’ barge.

At the same time, according to him, operators try not to pierce the hulls of tankers to prevent large-scale oil spills and pollution of the Azov and Black Seas.

Drones can hit:

• the captain’s bridge;
• radar equipment;
• satellite communication antennas;
• navigation systems;
• control elements;
• engine and steering mechanisms;
• equipment necessary for safe passage through straits and ports.

After such a strike, the vessel may not sink but lose the ability to continue the voyage independently. It has to be towed, repaired, have its crew changed, or be taken out of service for a long time.

That is why Ukrainian targets include not only tankers and dry cargo ships but also tugboats. Russia uses them for rescuing and evacuating already damaged vessels.

How the operation developed

The operation began on July 6 with attacks on vessels in the Azov Sea, after which Ukrainian units quickly increased the number of strikes.

By July 14, the Ukrainian command reported 116 affected vessels in the Azov Sea. Reuters confirmed that maritime movement in the region was seriously disrupted, although the agency could not independently verify the condition of each vessel from the Ukrainian list.

After that, the operation moved to the Black Sea. In a few days there, according to SBS data, tankers, gas carriers, dry cargo ships, and tugboats were attacked, increasing the total to 159.

Why the Azov Sea is so important for Russia

The Azov Sea is one of the key links in Russia’s system for transporting oil, oil products, grain, and other goods.

Through the Don River and the Volga-Don Canal, it is connected to Russia’s internal waterways. Small ‘river-sea’ class tankers can pick up cargo in internal Russian ports, pass through the Don, and enter the Azov Sea.

Further, oil can be transshipped onto larger tankers waiting in the Black Sea.

Large sea vessels cannot always enter Azov ports due to limited depth and large draft. Therefore, Russia needs an intermediate feeder fleet — relatively small tankers, dry cargo ships, and auxiliary vessels.

Strikes on this fleet disrupt several logistical chains at once:

• fuel delivery to occupied Crimea;
• supply of Russian troops in southern Ukraine;
• transportation of oil and oil products;
• export of Russian goods through the Azov Sea;
• operation of ports and transshipment points;
• movement through the Kerch Strait;
• schemes to bypass international sanctions.

In NAnews — Israel News they note: the operation against vessels is not an isolated maritime campaign. It is connected with a broader Ukrainian strategy of strikes on oil refineries, oil depots, energy, and transport infrastructure of Russia.

If maritime delivery becomes too dangerous, Moscow is forced to transfer cargo to road and rail. But these routes are closer to the range of Ukrainian missiles and drones.

What happened to shipping

The consequences of the operation are recorded not only in reports from the Ukrainian command.

Reuters reported that after the start of the strikes, Russia temporarily stopped or seriously restricted movement through the Don-Azov Canal. This route connects the Don with the Azov Sea and is used for transporting oil, grain, and other goods.

Satellite images also showed a sharp decrease in the number of vessels near the Kerch Strait.

According to Reuters, in early June, more than 40 vessels were waiting to pass in the strait area. After a series of Ukrainian attacks, satellite images showed only a few noticeable vessels in the same zone.

Ukrainian Navy representative Dmytro Pletenchuk stated that for Russian logistics, the Azov Sea is effectively turning into a closed water area. According to him, Russian vessels began moving to the Taman area and looking for safer anchorage spots.

But the concentration of dozens of vessels in a limited area creates new problems: they are easier to detect, harder to disperse, and more difficult to protect simultaneously with air defense and electronic warfare means.

Impact on oil, Crimea supply, and the Russian budget

Russian oil exports remain one of the most important sources of revenue for the budget, which finances the war against Ukraine.

Some vessels are used directly for delivering fuel to Crimea and occupied territories. Others are involved in transporting oil, oil products, and goods between Russian ports and external markets.

Ukrainian Navy representative Dmytro Pletenchuk called oil the ‘blood of war’ and the Russian economy. According to him, small Azov tankers delivered oil to large ships in the Black Sea, but now this scheme has been disrupted.

At the same time, the term ‘shadow fleet’ should be used cautiously.

The Ukrainian side applies it to vessels involved in Russian oil, sanction, and military logistics. However, not every affected vessel is necessarily under personal sanctions by the EU, USA, or UK.

Reuters previously checked part of the first attacked tankers and found that not all of them were officially listed in international sanctions lists. Therefore, it is more accurate to speak of vessels that Ukraine refers to as the Russian ‘shadow fleet’ or the system supporting the Russian economy and military logistics.

Why the strikes affected the grain market

The Azov Sea is used not only for oil transportation.

A significant portion of Russian grain exports passes through this region. According to Reuters, routes through the Azov Sea and the Don-Azov Canal may be linked to up to a quarter of Russian wheat exports.

After shipping restrictions, European wheat futures rose by about 4% and reached their highest level in several weeks.

This shows that the Ukrainian operation can have consequences far beyond the combat zone.

Increased risks affect:

• freight costs;
• marine insurance;
• delivery times;
• global grain prices;
• the willingness of foreign companies to send ships to Russian ports;
• Russia’s ability to fulfill export contracts.

Russian authorities began considering redirecting part of the grain cargo to other ports in the Black and Baltic Seas. However, this increases distances, transportation costs, and the load on railway infrastructure.

Legality of strikes and Ukraine’s position

Russia called Ukrainian attacks ‘terrorism’ and ‘piracy’.

Ukraine rejects these accusations and states that the vessels are used to support the Russian army, supply occupied Crimea, and finance the war.

Dmytro Pletenchuk reminded that Crimea, according to international law, remains the territory of Ukraine. Therefore, vessels entering the ports of the occupied peninsula without Kyiv’s permission are considered violators by the Ukrainian side.

At the same time, there is no independent international legal assessment of each of the 159 episodes yet. Nor has a complete list of all vessels with their names, owners, flags, cargo nature, and damage degree been published.

What is confirmed, and what remains Ukraine’s statement

As of July 17, several levels of confirmation can be confidently stated.

The Ukrainian command stated:

• 159 ships affected;
• 117 targets were in the Sea of Azov;
• 42 — in the Black Sea;
• the task is to paralyze Russian logistics;
• ships are predominantly disabled, not sunk.

Independent sources confirm:

• a sharp reduction in ship movement;
• restrictions in the Kerch Strait and the Don-Azov Canal;
• concentration of ships in safer areas;
• disruption of Russian export routes;
• the impact of events on grain prices;
• the need to redirect cargo through other ports.

It is currently impossible to independently confirm:

• the exact damage to each of the 159 ships;
• the number of ships completely decommissioned;
• the number of ships that have already been towed and repaired;
• the affiliation of each ship to the internationally recognized ‘shadow fleet’;
• the full composition of the cargo they carry.

A new stage of the war at sea

Over several years, Ukraine, with virtually no classic large military fleet, managed to change the balance of power in the Black Sea with the help of sea and air drones.

Now this tactic is spreading to the Sea of Azov and the internal Russian transport system.

Operation ‘MoLoChKa’ shows a transition from single strikes on individual ships to the systematic destruction of the entire logistics chain: tanker, tugboat, port, oil depot, canal, railway, substation.

For Russia, the problem is not only the cost of damaged ships. Each new strike forces route changes, increased security, dispatch of tugs, equipment repairs, higher insurance costs, and delivery delays.

NAnews — News of Israel notes: even if most of the 159 ships remain afloat, the strategic effect of the operation is measured not by the number of sunken hulls. It is measured by how many Russian routes have ceased to function normally and how many additional resources Moscow is forced to spend on ensuring occupied Crimea.

The main result of the operation at the moment is not ‘159 sunken ships’, but the actual transformation of the Sea of Azov and the adjacent part of the Black Sea into a zone of constant risk for Russian logistics.

This is what lies behind Robert Brovdi’s formula: ‘Moscow will lie through Crimea’.

…
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Boombox starts “Dronotour ’26” from Israel: Tel Aviv and Haifa are the first in the big 2026 route. The Ukrainian band Boombox announced a big concert route “Dronotour ’26” for November–December 2026.

For the Israeli audience, there is a particularly important detail in this poster: the tour starts from Israel.

The first concert is scheduled for November 10, 2026 in Tel Aviv, at the Reading 3 club.

The next day, November 11, 2026, the band will perform in Haifa, at the Theatron Hatzafon hall.

Details and tickets are published on the tour page on UNOW: https://unow.com.ua/tour/boombox-eu/

Why this tour starts with special meaning

Boombox is one of the most recognizable Ukrainian musical phenomena of the last two decades.

The band was founded in 2004 and became known for its combination of rock, hip-hop, soul, and live stage energy.

But after February 2022, Boombox’s story gained another dimension.

The band’s leader, Andriy Khlyvnyuk, became one of the voices of Ukrainian resistance.

His a cappella performance of “Oh, the Red Viburnum in the Meadow” on Sophia Square in Kyiv became a symbol of Ukraine’s struggle and gained viral popularity far beyond the country’s borders.

This song was picked up by musicians, volunteers, artists, and ordinary people in different countries.

Thus, the Ukrainian melody turned into an international flash mob supporting Ukraine.

Therefore, “Dronotour ’26” is not just a concert route.

It’s a meeting with a band for whom music, stage, donations, merch, and public voice have become part of one big story — a story of help, memory, resistance, and connection with Ukraine.

Boombox concerts in Israel

Tel Aviv — November 10, 2026

The first concert of “Dronotour ’26” will take place in Tel Aviv.

Venue — Reading 3.

The UNOW page for this date lists the starting ticket price — from 249 ILS.

For Israel, this is the main start of the tour: it is from Tel Aviv that the entire Boombox route through European countries begins.

Haifa — November 11, 2026

The second Israeli concert will take place in Haifa.

Venue — Theatron Hatzafon.

The tour page lists the starting ticket price — from 219 ILS.

For northern Israel, this is a separate important date because Haifa traditionally gathers a large audience connected with Ukraine, Ukrainian culture, and the Russian-speaking scene without political slogans, but through music, memory, and personal experience.

Details and tickets are published on the tour page on UNOW: https://unow.com.ua/tour/boombox-eu/

Route of “Dronotour ’26” by cities

Bratislava — November 19, 2026

After the Israeli concerts, the tour will continue in Bratislava.

Venue — MMC.

This date opens the European part of the route after the start in Israel.

Frankfurt — November 21, 2026

The next stop is Frankfurt.

The concert will take place at Haus Sindlingen.

Germany occupies a prominent place in the tour route: several German cities are included in the Boombox poster.

Stuttgart — November 22, 2026

In Stuttgart, the band will perform at LKA Longhorn.

This date follows immediately after Frankfurt and continues the German block of the tour.

Düsseldorf — November 24, 2026

The concert in Düsseldorf is scheduled at Stahlwerk.

In the tour poster, this city is listed as one of the key stops in Germany.

Bremen — November 26, 2026

In Bremen, Boombox will perform at Aladin Music-Hall.

The route in Germany continues almost throughout the second half of November, showing the scale of the band’s audience outside Ukraine.

Dresden — November 27, 2026

The next date is Dresden.

Venue — Club Tante JU.

For Ukrainian listeners in Germany, such concerts often become not only a musical evening but also a meeting of the community, friends, and people with a shared memory of home.

Hanover — November 29, 2026

In Hanover, the concert will take place at Kulturzentrum FaUST.

This date closes another stage of the German part of the route before Hamburg.

Hamburg — November 30, 2026

The last November concert of the tour is announced in Hamburg.

Venue — Grosse Freiheit 36.

After Hamburg, “Dronotour ’26” will move to the December part of the route.

Dublin — December 2, 2026

Boombox will start December in Dublin.

Venue — Opium.

The band’s message separately emphasized that the route goes “from Israel to Germany, from England to Poland, from Ireland to Slovakia and the Czech Republic.”

Dublin just becomes the Irish point of this big tour.

London — December 3, 2026

In London, Boombox will perform at Electric Brixton.

The British date follows immediately after Dublin and is part of the December block of the tour.

Prague — December 5, 2026

In Prague, the concert will take place at SaSaZu.

The Czech Republic became one of the countries on the route where the Ukrainian audience has been particularly noticeable since 2022.

Krakow — December 7, 2026

The Polish part of the tour will start in Krakow.

Venue — Klub Studio.

The UNOW page for this date lists the starting ticket price — from 179 PLN.

Warsaw — December 9, 2026

The final date of the poster is Warsaw.

The concert will take place at Progresja.

The tour page lists the starting price — from 199 PLN.

It is Warsaw that concludes the announced route of “Dronotour ’26”.

What Boombox is bringing to this tour

The tour description states that Boombox will present the maxi-single “Zhiviy“.

The program will also include songs from various albums of the band.

Boombox formulated this very precisely: they will bring a new maxi-single on tour, enhanced by compositions under which listeners grew up, and under which their children are now growing.

This is an important detail.

Boombox has long ceased to be a band of one generation.

For some listeners, this is the music of student years and first concerts.

For others, it is the voice of wartime, a symbol of support for Ukraine, and a reminder that culture can also be a form of resistance.

The band separately addressed listeners with a request to buy tickets in advance, as well as to prepare money for donations and merch.

Therefore, the name “Dronotour” in this poster sounds not like an ordinary marketing move, but as a continuation of the line in which concerts help gather support for Ukraine.

Where to see details and buy tickets

Tickets, prices, cities, and venues are published on the UNOW tour page.

Before purchasing, it is worth carefully checking the city, date, venue, and ticket category.

For Israel, two dates are currently listed in the poster:

November 10, 2026 — Tel Aviv, Reading 3

November 11, 2026 — Haifa, Theatron Hatzafon

Details and tickets are published on the tour page on UNOW: https://unow.com.ua/tour/boombox-eu/

For NAnews readers — Israel News this is one of the main Ukrainian music posters of autumn 2026 in Israel.

Because “Dronotour ’26” starts here — from Tel Aviv and Haifa.

…
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A series of Ukrainian attacks on Russian ships in the Azov and Black Seas has escalated from isolated sabotage operations into a large-scale campaign against Russia’s military and economic logistics. The restriction of navigation, the destruction of an FSB ship, rising wheat prices, and the search for new routes for grain export have even led pro-Kremlin military bloggers to publicly question why Russian ports and the fleet have been left virtually defenseless.

There has been no literal uprising in Russia yet. There are no protesting sailors on the streets, and the Black Sea Fleet command has not turned against the Kremlin.

However, something unusual has happened in the Russian information system: pro-military Telegram channels, which for years justified the war against Ukraine, have begun openly accusing officials and military leadership of failing to protect their own fleet.

The trigger was a series of Ukrainian strikes conducted from July 6 to 15, 2026. Over nine days, Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces claimed to have hit 116 ships in the Azov Sea, after which the operation moved to the Black Sea, where on the night of July 14-15, another 20 Russian ships were struck.

Nine days that changed the situation in the Azov Sea

Commander of the Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces Robert Brovdi, known by the call sign ‘Madyar,’ reported that Ukrainian units consistently attacked Russian tankers, bulk carriers, tugs, ferries, and other vessels involved in transportation between the Azov Sea, the Volga-Don Canal, the Kerch Strait, and the Black Sea.

The goal was not necessarily to sink every vessel. The Ukrainian side aimed to disable ships, force crews to abandon them, and leave damaged vessels adrift without the ability to continue operations.

Special attention was paid to the so-called feeder fleet — small and medium tankers that deliver petroleum products from Russian river and Azov ports to larger tankers waiting in the Black Sea.

Strikes on such a system can disrupt several logistics chains at once:

• fuel delivery to occupied Crimea;
• supply of Russian military facilities;
• export of petroleum products;
• transportation of grain and other agricultural cargo;
• movement of ships between the Don, Azov, and Black Seas.

Reuters notes that the exact location and timing of each strike shown by the Ukrainian military could not be independently verified. The number 116 is also based on Ukrainian command data and does not mean that all these ships were sunk. However, subsequent navigation restrictions, satellite images, and admissions by Russian regional authorities confirm that the operation had real consequences.

Russia itself closed key maritime routes

On July 10, 2026, Russian border services effectively halted passage through the Azov-Don Canal — a shipping route connecting the Don River with the Azov Sea.

Simultaneously, shipping companies received notification that applications for passage through the Kerch Strait from 18:10 local time would not be accepted. The Russian side did not specify the duration of the restrictions.

The Kerch Strait is the only maritime exit from the Azov Sea to the Black Sea. The Azov-Don Canal, in turn, connects the Azov Sea with Russia’s internal waterways system.

As a result, commercial vessels could move within the Azov Sea but could not normally leave it through the Kerch Strait or go through the canal towards the Don and Volga. Russian authorities did not officially announce a complete closure of the area, but industry sources confirmed the presence of restrictions.

Satellite images show a sharp change in maritime traffic. On June 6, 2026, more than 40 ships were waiting to pass near the Kerch Strait. In images from July 11, only a few ships remained in the same area.

Reuters examined more than 30 satellite images and noted that before the start of the Ukrainian campaign, ship clusters near the strait were regularly observed. After the restrictions were introduced, the usual picture disappeared.

According to the Institute for the Study of War, the number of Russian ships in the Azov Sea decreased from 267 on June 30 to approximately 120 by July 11 — about 55%. Some ships left before the routes were closed, some may have turned off their transponders, and damaged ships were sent for repair or remained in the area.

Russian grain exports were hit

The Azov Sea is important for Russia not only from a military standpoint.

Up to a quarter of Russia’s wheat exports pass through the ports and routes of this region. The Rostov region and Krasnodar Krai are among Russia’s main grain-producing regions, and nearby ports are used for exporting grain, sunflower oil, and other goods.

After information about navigation restrictions emerged, Euronext wheat prices rose by almost 4%, reaching a six-week high.

On July 14, 2026, the Minister of Agriculture and Food of the Rostov region, Anna Kasyanenko, acknowledged that the region, along with exporters, began working on alternative routes for grain export due to ‘temporary difficulties’ with navigation in the Azov Sea.

The Russian Federal Ministry of Agriculture simultaneously claimed that the events would supposedly not affect the domestic market and the country’s export capabilities. But the very fact of urgently seeking bypass routes shows that the problem has gone far beyond military reports.

Redirecting cargo to rail or distant ports means additional costs, a shortage of wagons, overloading of transport infrastructure, and increased delivery times. Even if Russia can partially restore exports, its cost inevitably rises.

The destruction of the ‘Izumrud’ and questions to Russian command

A separate symbol of this campaign was the destruction of the Russian border patrol ship of the second rank ‘Izumrud’, belonging to the Coast Guard of the FSB Border Service.

The Ukrainian Navy reported that the ship was attacked near Novorossiysk by a marine drone Sargan-3000. According to Ukrainian data, there were casualties and injuries among the crew.

On July 14, 2026, the Ukrainian Navy published a satellite image of the damaged ship near the quay wall. The Ukrainian side stated that the image confirms the destruction of the ‘Izumrud.’ Russia did not provide detailed official information about the ship’s condition.

This ship was already known in Ukraine.

On November 25, 2018, the ‘Izumrud’ participated in a Russian operation in the Kerch Strait when Russian forces attacked Ukrainian military boats ‘Berdyansk’ and ‘Nikopol,’ as well as the tug ‘Yany Kapu.’ At that time, 24 Ukrainian sailors were captured.

Almost eight years later, the ship that participated in that operation itself became the target of a Ukrainian marine drone.

Even Kremlin supporters began asking questions

It was the strike on the FSB ship that caused an especially sharp reaction in the Russian pro-military community.

A military blogger associated with the Kremlin publicly asked why the entrance to the port was not blocked by protective nets and why Russian forces could not detect Ukrainian drones in advance.

He also accused officials of insufficient attention to protecting Russian ports from marine and aerial drones.

Another Russian milblogger posed an even more unpleasant question for the command: how did Ukrainian devices manage to approach the FSB ship unnoticed and strike near one of the most important basing areas of the Russian fleet.

The Institute for the Study of War notes that such criticism does not come from the Russian opposition but from people who support the war and demand that the Kremlin conduct it even more harshly. Therefore, their outrage cannot be considered an anti-war protest.

This is a different type of conflict — a clash between Russian propaganda, which for years told of the country’s complete security, and the reality in which Ukrainian drones reach ships, ports, and logistics facilities far from the front line.

The Black Sea became the next stage

After the active phase of the operation in the Azov Sea was completed, the Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces shifted strikes to the Black Sea.

On the night of July 14-15, 2026, according to Robert Brovdi, another 20 Russian ships were attacked:

• 17 oil tankers;
• two gas carriers;
• one tug.

Brovdi stated that the previous phase with 116 targets in the Azov Sea was completed, and the new phase will focus mainly on the Black Sea.

Thus, Russia faced not isolated attacks but a consistent campaign covering the entire connected maritime system: internal waterways, the Azov Sea, the Kerch Strait, occupied Crimea, and the Black Sea.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov called the attacks ‘terrorism’ and stated that Ukraine’s actions allegedly go beyond piracy.

The Ukrainian side responds that the targets are ships and vessels that support the Russian military machine, ensuring the transportation of fuel, petroleum products, and other resources used to continue the war.

Robert Brovdi responded to Lavrov with the phrase:

‘No piracy, Lavrov — just business. Your bloody business.’

Reuters quotes a source in the Russian shipping industry who compared the ships in the Azov Sea to targets before a firing squad and suggested that soon there may be almost no undamaged ships left in the area. Several grain carriers attacked on July 13 and 14, according to industry sources, caught fire.

Why this story is important for Israel

For Israel, events in the Azov and Black Seas have not only military significance.

Russia remains one of the world’s largest exporters of grain and sunflower oil. Any prolonged restrictions on maritime trade can affect global prices, insurance rates, freight costs, and supply routes to the Mediterranean and the Middle East.

The first consequences have already manifested in the European wheat market, although it is too early to assert that the July campaign will lead to a long-term increase in food prices in Israel.

The strategic aspect is no less important.

Ukraine demonstrates that relatively inexpensive unmanned systems can paralyze ship movement, force the enemy to close straits and canals, and pose a threat to a larger fleet without classical sea superiority.

For Israel, which simultaneously faces threats from drones, missiles, attacks on maritime routes, and attempts to disrupt trade through the Red Sea, the Ukrainian experience is of particular interest.

NANews — Israel News views the events not as a story of a sudden ‘rebellion’ by Russian propagandists, but as a sign of a deeper crisis.

The Kremlin promised that the war would not approach Russian cities and ports. Now Russian ships are burning in the Azov Sea, an FSB ship is destroyed near a base, exporters are seeking bypass routes, and war supporters are asking where the protection they were told about four years ago has gone.

The Ukrainian operation has not yet completely destroyed Russian maritime logistics. There is no independent confirmation of the defeat of each of the claimed 136 ships.

But the main result is already clear: Russia is forced to change routes, restrict its own navigation, and spend more resources on protecting ports that were recently considered a safe rear.

And the public panic of pro-military Russian channels shows that marine drones hit not only ships.

They destroy one of the Kremlin’s main myths — the myth of a state capable of controlling the sea, protecting its own territory, and continuing the war against Ukraine with impunity.

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In his native Buchach, a monument was erected in his honor, one of the city’s streets is named after him, and a bas-relief of the writer is at the entrance to the local “ART-Court.”

Shmuel Agnon (born July 17, 1888, Buchach, Ukraine) is a famous Jewish writer whose life and work are closely connected with Ukraine. The events of his most famous novels, “The Bridal Canopy” and “A Guest for the Night,” for which he received the Nobel Prize in Literature, take place in his native Buchach and its surroundings.

In Ukrainian Buchach

To date, not many of Agnon’s works have been translated into Ukrainian, but interest in them is growing in Ukraine, which means that Ukrainian readers are in for an acquaintance with his books.

The Nobel Prize in Literature laureate of 1966 “For his profoundly original narrative art with motifs from Jewish folk tales.” He became the first laureate of one of the Nobel Prizes representing Israel. He wrote in Hebrew and Yiddish.

The influence of the Talmud on Shmuel Agnon’s work was significant. He was born as Shmuel Yosef Halevi Czaczkes in July 1887 in Buchach, now Chortkiv district of Ternopil region. His father, Shalom Mordechai Halevi Czaczkes, was a rabbi and fur trader, knowledgeable in the Torah and Talmud, and often explained them to the local Jewish community.

Shmuel’s mother, Esther Farb, and grandfather, Yehuda Farb, were also educated people. Shmuel attended a cheder and received a good home education, studying Yiddish, Hebrew, German, and Ukrainian languages, as well as the Talmud under his father’s guidance.

Starting to write early, at the age of 8, Shmuel published stories in local newspapers. At 19, he moved to Lviv and worked in a Jewish newspaper. In 1907, his first novella “Forsaken Wives” was published, which in Hebrew sounds like “Agnon,” becoming his pseudonym and official surname since 1924.

Palestine and Berlin

In the same year, Agnon went to Palestine, and then to Berlin, where he wrote, lectured, gave private Hebrew lessons, and published works in the newspaper Jude.

He was supported by patron Zalman Schocken, who provided a five-year scholarship for organizing an anthology of Jewish literature and writing new works. Agnon’s works were published in German at Schocken’s publishing house in Berlin.

Love Against All Odds

In Berlin, Shmuel Agnon found true love — Esther Marks, or “dear Esterlein,” as he called her. The girl’s father was against their marriage, but they married anyway, and the ceremony was conducted by Rabbi Yechiel Yaakov Weinberg.

They had a daughter, Emuna (“faith”), and a son, Shalom Mordechai, whom they called Hemdat (“soul’s desire”) at home.

Three Destroyed Homes

In 1924, the family moved to Jerusalem. The move was preceded by tragedy: the writer’s house in Hamburg burned down, destroying the library and manuscripts, including the novel “The Community of the Ever-Living.”

Agnon decided to return to the Promised Land. He moved to Jerusalem first, and a year later called for Esther and the children. In 1927, an earthquake occurred in Jerusalem.

“The disaster did not destroy our souls,” Agnon wrote, “only the house we lived in.”

Two years later, in 1929, the new Agnon home in Jerusalem was looted during Arab riots. “Esterlein,” he wrote to his wife, “we need to start everything anew: the house is ruined, things are stolen or broken. But… do not grieve and do not think about it.”

World Fame and the Nobel Prize

Agnon gained world fame in the late 1940s when his works began to be published in English. In 1966, Agnon became the first writer writing in Hebrew and Yiddish to receive the Nobel Prize for the novels “The Bridal Canopy” and “A Guest for the Night.”

In his speech, he noted that he draws inspiration from spiritual literature.

“Keep Quiet! Agnon is Working!”

Israel is proud of its Nobel laureate. When a construction site was opened in the Talpiot area, Mayor Teddy Kollek installed a sign saying: “Keep quiet! Agnon is working!” European critics compared him to Marcel Proust, James Joyce, and William Faulkner.

Agnon wrote in various genres but was wounded by the fact that many of his readers became victims of the Holocaust. His last novel, “Just Recently,” set in Palestine during the Second Aliyah, is dedicated to the catastrophe of European Jewry.

Memory of the Writer

Shmuel Agnon died of a heart attack on February 17, 1970, in Jerusalem at the age of 82. He was buried on the Mount of Olives, and his apartment became a memorial museum.

In his native Buchach, which he last visited in 1930, a monument was erected in his honor, a street is named after him, and a bas-relief of the writer adorns the entrance to the local “ART-Court.”

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On July 15, 2026, Israeli lawyer Alex Zernopolsky announced the conclusion of a case that his office had been handling for about three years: the Jerusalem District Court ordered the Population and Immigration Authority to grant permanent status to Liza K. and her mother Oksana K.

This decision comes after four years of struggle, numerous appeals, administrative procedures, and a court appeal. In 2022, Israeli authorities demanded that the mother and her minor daughter leave the country and return to Ukraine — at a time when their native Kherson was under Russian occupation.

Now the court has recognized that serious errors were made in the consideration of the case, and the family’s real connection to Israel was not properly assessed.

Deportation to Kherson during a full-scale war

Oksana K. first came to Israel in 2011. She later married an Israeli citizen, and in 2012 began the process of legalizing her status based on marriage. Her daughter Liza, who came to the country as a child, lived with her in Israel.

The family settled in Petah Tikva. Liza attended an Israeli school, spoke Hebrew fluently, and spent almost her entire conscious life in Israel.

Oksana’s husband died in August 2019. After his death, the usual procedure for obtaining status was halted, and the mother and daughter appealed to the Ministry of Interior to allow them to stay under special humanitarian circumstances.

The review was delayed.

On February 24, 2022, a few hours after the start of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, Oksana and Liza attended a scheduled meeting at the Population Authority. They waited about six months for a response to their appeal.

In early September 2022, the Ministry of Interior reported that it did not consider their situation sufficient humanitarian grounds. The women were ordered to leave Israel within 14 days and return to Kherson, which was then under Russian control. Oksana’s eldest son was serving in the Armed Forces of Ukraine and participating in combat at that time.

At the time of the decision, Liza was still a minor. She was born on December 6, 2004, so in September 2022 she was 17 years old, not 15, as stated in some later retellings of this story.

Why the Ministry of Interior denied the family

The Population Authority argued that long-term residence in Israel alone is not sufficient reason to grant status.

In its official response, the agency stated that Oksana, besides her daughter, had no close relatives in Israel, while her son and sister remained in Ukraine. The Ministry of Interior also cited Oksana’s trips to Ukraine and questioned whether Israel was truly the center of the family’s life.

Some officials’ doubts concerned Oksana’s relationship with her deceased Israeli husband. According to the Population Authority, the legalization process was stopped and resumed several times, and the circumstances presented were insufficient to grant humanitarian status.

However, the agency’s formal approach almost did not take into account the daughter’s life.

Liza grew up in Israel, graduated from school here, spoke mainly in Hebrew, had friends, a team, coaches, and a professional future in the country. Ukraine remained her country of birth, but practically all her social and sports life was connected to Israel.

Israeli team — without Israeli status

Liza began playing handball shortly after arriving in the country. In the second grade, she enrolled in the Maccabi Petah Tikva sports school and later joined the youth and reserve teams of Israel.

The Israeli Handball Federation publicly supported the athlete back in September 2022. The women’s team coach, Reuven Yosfolski, described her as a tall, strong, and athletic handball player with serious technical capabilities and prospects in Israeli sports.

An absurd situation arose: Liza trained in the Israeli team uniform and was supposed to represent Israel in competitions, but the state itself refused to recognize her as a permanent resident.

Due to the lack of regulated status, she could not work normally, serve in the IDF, use regular medical insurance, or freely travel to international tournaments. In 2023, the athlete said she missed the European Championship, although she remained on the team until the last moment: the lack of documents prevented her from traveling with the team.

Liza also could not fulfill another dream — to undergo military conversion. Her school friends received draft notices and began service, while the girl who wanted to voluntarily serve Israel remained without official status.

Meanwhile, her sports career continued. Liza played for the adult team Maccabi Petah Tikva, was recognized as one of the breakthrough athletes of the season, and during her loan to Bnot Herzliya, participated in the club’s championship playoff matches.

Three years of administrative struggle

Alex Zernopolsky’s office got involved in the case at the stage of appealing the deportation decision.

After filing the appeal, the initial decision was overturned, and the mother and daughter’s application was sent for consideration by the interdepartmental humanitarian commission. However, this did not mean immediate receipt of documents.

According to Zernopolsky, the Ministry of Interior continued to delay the process. Family representatives were told that the police’s position was awaited, then claimed that the decision was under review by the central office. The internal appeal remained unanswered for a long time.

On July 31, 2023, the humanitarian commission reviewed the case again, but by September, a final decision had still not been made. The mother and daughter continued to live in Israel without regulated status, medical insurance, or certainty about the future.

The case then went through the Appeals Tribunal for Entry and Stay in Israel and reached the Jerusalem District Court.

What the Jerusalem District Court recognized

The final turn occurred on July 5, 2026.

Judge Tamar Bar-Asher of the Jerusalem District Court granted the administrative appeal of Liza K. and Oksana K. The court ruled that the Appeals Tribunal incorrectly assessed their connection to Israel.

The judge noted that Oksana’s trips to Ukraine could not automatically be used as evidence that the center of the family’s life was outside Israel. These trips needed to be considered in the context of her marriage, family situation, and many years of living in the country.

One of the key violations was that the Population Authority staff did not conduct a separate full interview with Liza. Her individual story — childhood in Israel, education, language, sports career, social connections, and desire to serve in the IDF — was not properly studied.

The court also took into account the conclusion of the representative of the Ministry of Social Affairs, who recommended granting the mother and daughter’s request.

As a result, the court not only sent the case for another review but ordered the Population Authority to grant both women permanent resident status in Israel.

“As if I was released from prison”

After the decision, 21-year-old Liza told Israeli media that for the first time in many years, she felt solid ground under her feet.

She compared the years of uncertainty to being in detention and said she now finally feels part of the country. Obtaining permanent status allows her to voluntarily enlist in the IDF, begin the conversion process, and continue her professional sports career without previous restrictions.

Alex Zernopolsky called the decision the end of years of injustice against the widow of an Israeli citizen and her daughter — an athlete representing Israeli handball.

“I am glad that justice for the mother and daughter was achieved, even if delayed by several years,” the lawyer said after the court’s decision.

Why this decision is important for Israel

Liza K.’s story shows how serious the consequences of a formal approach to humanitarian cases can be.

A person can grow up in Israel, graduate from an Israeli school, speak Hebrew, represent the national team, aspire to serve in the IDF, and still remain a temporary foreigner to the state system for years.

The court’s position on minor children included in their parents’ immigration cases is especially important. Their circumstances cannot be considered only as an attachment to the mother’s or father’s documents. State bodies are obliged to separately assess where the child grew up, what language they speak, where they study, with which society they are connected, and which country they truly consider their home.

For Liza and Oksana K., the court decision ended almost four years of struggle against deportation.

For the Israeli system, this decision served as a reminder: humanitarian circumstances consist not only of passport stamps, entry and exit dates, or formal procedural stages. Behind each such case is a human life that cannot be put on hold for four years.

Page – Law Office of Alex Zernopolsky

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On the morning of July 15, 2026, Russian forces dropped six guided aerial bombs on the Sumy urban community. One of the bombs exploded near medical facilities where people were present and transport was moving. Three civilians were killed, and another 17 people were injured.

The Russian attack on Sumy continued practically all night and morning.

Initially, Russian forces used a cluster munition against a private housing area, then attacked city gas stations and residential buildings with drones, and around 09:00 began dropping guided aerial bombs on the regional center.

According to the head of the Sumy Regional Military Administration, Oleg Grigorov, Russian aviation carried out six strikes with guided bombs on the territory of the Sumy community.

One of the aerial bombs hit near medical facilities — in an area with heavy movement of people, cars, and public transport. The other five strikes, according to preliminary data, targeted infrastructure facilities.

Three dead, among the injured — a 16-year-old teenager

Initially, authorities reported three dead and seven injured. However, as people sought medical help, the number of injured increased to 17 people.

Among the injured is a 16-year-old boy.

He and two other seriously injured individuals underwent surgery. The remaining injured were examined by doctors, and some people were discharged from hospitals after receiving medical assistance.

Among the dead are confirmed a man and a woman.

The third deceased suffered such severe injuries that specialists could not even determine the person’s gender immediately after discovering the body. The identities of all the deceased are being clarified.

Oleg Grigorov called the incident another deliberate strike by Russian forces on the civilian population.

At the epicenter of one of the explosions were civilians and transport. This means that the Russian side could not have been unaware of the consequences of using a heavy aerial bomb in a busy urban area.

The bomb fell near the sidewalk

Journalists from the local publication ‘Kordon.Media’, who worked directly on the scene, reported that one of the Russian aerial bombs hit a flowerbed near the sidewalk.

In the nearby buildings, the blast wave shattered windows. Cars near the impact site were damaged.

After the first explosions, eyewitnesses reported a fire and burning cars. Medics, rescuers, police, and utility services were working on the scene.

The exact names of the medical facilities were not disclosed by the authorities for security reasons.

It has also not been officially reported which specific modification of guided aerial bombs was used by Russian aviation. In the regional administration’s reports, the munitions are referred to as guided bombs.

The air raid alert lasted from early morning

The air raid alert in the Sumy district was announced around 05:12.

The military warned of the threat of Russian drones and the possible use of guided aerial bombs.

The first powerful explosions, associated with a series of strikes with guided bombs, sounded around 09:00. For more than 30 minutes afterward, city residents continued to hear explosions.

The Ukrainian Air Force reported several times about the launches of aerial bombs towards Sumy, including repeated launches.

Thus, people were under the threat not of a single strike, but of a prolonged series of aerial attacks.

For the border regional center, this creates an especially dangerous situation: the distance to the launch site is small, and the time between the warning and the possible impact of the bomb can be extremely short.

Before the aerial bombs, the city was attacked by drones

The strikes with six guided bombs were a continuation of attacks that began at night.

Russian FPV drones and ‘Molniya’ type drones struck gas stations in the Kovpakovsky and Zarechny districts of Sumy.

As a result of one of the hits, a 63-year-old suburban minibus driver received severe multiple injuries. The man was hospitalized.

A fire broke out at one of the gas stations, which was extinguished.

Around 07:20, a Russian drone hit a residential building in the Kovpakovsky district.

A fire started in the house, the roof of the building and the garage were damaged. In the neighboring house, the blast wave shattered windows.

There was no one in the attacked house at the time of the hit. However, in the neighboring building, there was an elderly immobile woman. She was taken to the hospital with an acute stress reaction.

About an hour later, another Russian drone struck nearby, causing a new fire.

Cluster strike on the evening of July 14

In fact, the current attack on Sumy began on the evening of July 14, 2026.

According to preliminary conclusions of specialists, Russian forces shelled the outskirts of the city with a long-range multiple launch rocket system, using a cluster combat element.

The strike hit a private residential area.

At least ten households were damaged. Seven residents of Sumy were injured in the attack, including an 11-year-old boy.

Two adults — a 30-year-old man and a 59-year-old woman — received severe injuries.

Unexploded cluster elements were found in the affected area. Explosive technicians examined the area and neutralized the found munitions.

The use of cluster elements in a residential area poses a threat not only during the shelling itself.

Unexploded parts of munitions can remain on streets, in yards, near houses and cars, turning into delayed-action mines for residents and rescuers.

The third deadly airstrike in less than two weeks

The attack on July 15 was already the third heavy strike with guided aerial bombs on Sumy in less than two weeks.

Strike on July 11

On July 11, during the day, Russian aviation dropped three guided bombs on the Zarechny district of Sumy.

One of the strikes hit a road and a public transport stop. Another hit an infrastructure facility.

As a result of the attack, five people died immediately after the strike, including a 13-year-old girl. Later, a 48-year-old woman who received critical injuries died in the hospital.

Thus, the number of dead increased to six people.

A total of 44 injured required medical assistance. As of July 14, 17 injured remained in hospitals, including four children. Two adults were in serious condition.

The blast wave damaged residential high-rise buildings, hundreds of windows and balcony structures, cars, and civilian infrastructure facilities.

Strike on July 3

On the evening of July 3, Russian forces also attacked Sumy with guided aerial bombs and drones.

One of the bombs hit the central part of the city — in the area of a high-rise residential building, a store, and a road where many people were present.

Four civilians were killed: two men, a young woman, and her five-year-old daughter.

The deceased woman’s older daughter was injured and hospitalized.

According to updated data, 36 people were injured. Twenty high-rise residential buildings, three private houses, and three non-residential buildings were damaged.

Sumy is being turned into a constant zone of aerial terror

The strikes on July 3, 11, and 15 show that these are not isolated random hits.

Russian forces are consistently using guided aerial bombs, drones, multiple launch rocket systems, and cluster munitions against the regional center.

The targets and impact zones include roads, public transport stops, residential buildings, gas stations, medical facilities, and other civilian infrastructure.

In just the three mentioned guided bomb attacks in Sumy, at least 13 people have been killed, and dozens of civilians have been injured.

NAnews — Israel News highlights: what is happening in Sumy should be considered not only as another front-line report.

This is a systematic use of powerful aerial munitions against a large city where families continue to live, hospitals operate, public transport runs, and people are forced to go out on the streets daily.

The Israeli audience is well aware of how important early warning systems, protected spaces, and the time available to the civilian population after an alarm signal are.

However, in the case of guided aerial bombs, Sumy residents often have only a few minutes, sometimes even less, to find a safe place.

After the strikes on July 15, rescue and medical services continued to work at the impact sites. Authorities warned residents not to approach damaged areas due to the risk of new attacks and the possible presence of unexploded munitions.

NAnews — Israel News continues to monitor updates on the condition of the injured and the consequences of the Russian attack on Sumy.

The data on the number of dead and injured may be updated.

…
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Ukrainian center Dmitry Skapintsev completed his performances for the basketball club Hapoel Jerusalem after one season in Israel. The contract with the 28-year-old basketball player was not extended, and now the former New York Knicks player has gained free agent status.

Hapoel Jerusalem officially announced the departure of the Ukrainian on July 14, 2026.

“Dima, thank you very much for your dedication, commitment, and fight in every minute spent on the court. We wish you great success in the future,” reads the farewell message from the Jerusalem club. The Israeli sports channel Sport5 emphasizes that Skapintsev leaves the team after one season and that his departure is another element of a large-scale roster overhaul.

At the same time, this is not about a scandal, disciplinary conflict, or early termination of the agreement.

In August 2025, Skapintsev signed a one-season contract with an option to extend for another year. Hapoel decided not to use the option provided by the agreement, so the cooperation ended after the first season.

From the NBA and G League to Jerusalem

Dmitry Skapintsev was born on May 12, 1998, in Cherkasy. The height of the Ukrainian basketball player is about 216 centimeters. He plays as a center and is capable of covering the position of a power forward.

Before moving to Israel, Skapintsev went through an unusual path for a Ukrainian basketball player.

He played in Ukraine and Lithuania, after which he went to the USA. Skapintsev spent most of his American career in the NBA G League, where he played for the farm teams of the New York Knicks, Boston Celtics, and Portland Trail Blazers.

On December 23, 2023, the New York Knicks signed a two-way contract with Skapintsev. The Ukrainian played two games in the NBA regular season, getting a few minutes of playing time, and then returned to the G League.

In the 2024/25 season, Skapintsev averaged 9 points, 7.9 rebounds, and 2.7 assists in the G League. At the time of his transition to Israel, he was considered a physically powerful center with experience in training and games in the North American basketball system.

Hapoel’s head coach Yonatan Alon noted his toughness, rebounding ability, decision-making under the basket, and potential to strengthen the team in the paint after signing the Ukrainian.

However, Skapintsev failed to become a stable player in the main rotation in Jerusalem.

“I don’t fully understand my role”

Problems with playing time became noticeable during the season.

In February 2026, Skapintsev admitted that he did not fully understand his role in Hapoel. According to the Ukrainian, at the beginning of the season, he received more minutes, but later his participation in games decreased.

The center explained that he tries to do everything he can to return to a stable rotation. At the same time, he noted that the head coach preferred players he had worked with for more than a year.

These words help to better understand the club’s subsequent decision.

Skapintsev’s departure cannot be called a surprise solely because of his statistics. The Ukrainian was useful in rebounding and rim protection but did not secure a stable role in the team and rarely spent significant stretches on the court.

At the same time, Hapoel did not officially name the player’s professional performance as the reason for not extending the contract. In the farewell message, the club, on the contrary, emphasized his attitude to work, dedication, and fight.

What the official statistics show

Ukrainian sports media publications presented different figures regarding Skapintsev’s performances in Israel.

Football24 reported that in 14 Israeli championship games, the Ukrainian averaged 6.1 points, 2.1 rebounds, and 0.6 assists.

However, the official statistics of the Israeli Basketball Super League show different results for the regular season:

• 14 games;
• 8 starts;
• 16.9 minutes on the court;
• 5.4 points;
• 5.8 rebounds;
• 0.5 assists;
• 1 block;
• 0.6 steals per game on average.

Skapintsev made 66.7% of his two-point shots and 71.4% of his free throws. In total, he scored 75 points and grabbed 81 rebounds in the regular season.

Thus, the figure of 2.1 rebounds provided by the initial Ukrainian source does not match the data from the Israeli league. Rebounding was one of the most noticeable strengths of the Ukrainian center.

In the playoffs, Skapintsev participated in two more games. On average, he scored 5.5 points and grabbed 3.5 rebounds in 13.5 minutes.

In the EuroCup, the Ukrainian played 15 games. His stats were 4.4 points, 3.2 rebounds, and 0.3 assists in about ten minutes of playing time.

Considering the Israeli championship, playoffs, EuroCup, and Winner Cup, Skapintsev played about 34 official games for the Jerusalem club.

Not a failure, but not a breakthrough

Skapintsev’s first season in Israel is hard to call a failure.

When the Ukrainian received playing time, he regularly helped the team in rebounding, created physical pressure under the basket, and used his height advantage. The figure of 5.8 rebounds in 16.9 minutes in the regular season confirms that the center remained quite effective in a limited stretch.

But the modern Hapoel, aiming for leading positions in Israel and Europe, needed a player who could either consistently play in the starting lineup or become a key element of the second unit.

Skapintsev found himself between these roles.

He started in eight regular-season games but spent less than 17 minutes on the court. In the EuroCup, his playing time was even less — about ten minutes. This meant that the coaching staff did not consider the Ukrainian as the team’s main center.

As noted by NAnews — News of Israel, in this case, it is more accurate to talk not about the failure of the Ukrainian basketball player, but about the mismatch of his playing qualities with the role the coaching staff was ready to offer him.

Hapoel began a major overhaul

The decision not to extend the contract with Skapintsev was made against the backdrop of significant changes in the Jerusalem club.

In the Israeli regular season, Hapoel finished third, winning 18 out of 26 games. In the playoffs, the team reached the semifinals, where they lost to Hapoel Tel Aviv in a series with a score of 0:3.

In the EuroCup, the Jerusalemites took first place in their group but ended their performances in the quarterfinals. In the decisive match, Hapoel lost to the Turkish Turk Telekom with a score of 90:91.

After the end of the season, Yonatan Alon, who had led Hapoel for three years, left the team.

Experienced Serbian specialist Sasha Obradovic was appointed as the new head coach. The club’s management announced its intention to build a team capable of competing for all Israeli titles and potentially entering the EuroLeague.

Against this backdrop, Skapintsev’s departure looks like part of the overall restructuring of the roster to meet the new coach’s requirements.

The club has already started signing new basketball players, including front-line players. Therefore, the decision to forgo the option in the Ukrainian’s contract is likely not related to one specific game or episode but to the formation of a new team model.

Hapoel has not officially confirmed this, so it is a conclusion drawn from the sequence of the club’s personnel decisions.

The Ukrainian stayed in Israel during the escalation

Skapintsev’s behavior during the security escalation in Israel deserves special attention.

In June 2026, several foreign basketball players from Hapoel decided to leave the country. Skapintsev was among the legionnaires who stayed in Israel after the club’s management provided players with additional security guarantees.

For the Ukrainian basketball player, the topic of war and security holds special significance.

Back in February, Skapintsev said that he studied the situation in Israel before moving. He emphasized that what was happening in the country at that time could not be compared to the full-scale war in Ukraine.

The decision to stay with the team in a difficult moment partially explains why Hapoel specifically mentioned the Ukrainian’s dedication, commitment, and fight in the farewell address.

One of the best matches for Ukraine — before leaving the club

It is symbolic that the announcement of Skapintsev’s departure from Hapoel came shortly after one of the center’s best matches for the Ukrainian national team.

On July 2, 2026, Ukraine defeated Georgia with a score of 95:76 in a nominally home match of the 2027 World Cup qualification held in Riga.

Skapintsev started in the starting five, scored 17 points, and grabbed 14 rebounds, achieving a double-double. Thanks to this victory, the Ukrainian national team advanced to the second stage of the World Cup qualification ahead of schedule.

This match showed that the Ukrainian remains capable of being a noticeable and productive basketball player with sufficient playing time and a clear role on the court.

Therefore, leaving Hapoel should not be perceived as the end of his career at a high level.

Skapintsev is 28 years old — for a center, this is an age when basketball players often reach the peak of their physical capabilities and professional stability.

What will happen next

After Hapoel’s refusal to use the extension option, Dmitry Skapintsev became a free agent.

At the moment, the new club of the Ukrainian center has not been officially announced.

Considering his NBA and G League experience, performances in the EuroCup, playing for the Ukrainian national team, and rare physical attributes for European basketball, Skapintsev may interest teams from the championships of Israel, Turkey, Poland, Lithuania, Germany, or other European countries.

The main question for the Ukrainian will be not only the level of the next club but also the role they can offer him.

The season in Jerusalem showed that Skapintsev is capable of effectively rebounding and protecting the space under the basket, but he needs stable minutes and the trust of the coaching staff.

For NAnews — News of Israel, this story is important not only as another transfer news.

Dmitry Skapintsev became one of the few Ukrainian basketball players in recent years to play simultaneously in a leading Israeli club, a European tournament, and the Ukrainian national team.

He leaves Jerusalem without scandal and public mutual claims. Hapoel thanked the Ukrainian for his professionalism and fight, and Skapintsev himself gets the opportunity to find a team where his height, experience, and play under the basket will be used much more actively.

…
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Representatives of Ukraine were among the participants of the international educational seminar of Keren Kayemet Le-Israel, which brought together 209 educators, teachers, and leaders of Jewish schools from 26 countries in Israel.

Over eight days, participants familiarized themselves with modern life in Israel, visited historical and natural sites, met with Israeli educators, local authorities, security personnel, and community members who have experienced difficult events in recent years.

The international program took place in Israel from July 7 to 14, 2026 under the leadership of the educational division of KKL — Keren Kayemet Le-Israel, also known as the Jewish National Fund.

Ukraine among 26 countries — but the names of the participants have not yet been announced

The Israeli publication Yeshuvnik reported that representatives from the USA, Canada, Germany, France, Lithuania, Ukraine, Moldova, Romania, South Africa, Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, and other countries participated in the annual seminar.

Thus, the participation of the Ukrainian delegation is officially confirmed by the organizers.

However, KKL and Israeli media have not yet reported how many educators came from Ukraine, which cities and educational institutions they represented, nor have they published their names.

It is only known that among the 209 participants were teachers, directors, and leaders of Jewish schools, as well as specialists in formal and informal Jewish and Zionist education.

For Ukraine, participation in such a seminar is of particular importance.

Ukrainian Jewish schools and communities continue to operate under conditions of full-scale war, air raids, forced family migration, and partial transition to distance learning.

Therefore, the opportunity for direct communication with colleagues from Israel and other countries becomes not only a professional exchange but also a way to maintain the connection of Ukrainian Jewish youth with Israel, Jewish history, and international communities.

The very fact of the presence of representatives from Ukraine shows that Ukrainian Jewish education remains part of the global Jewish space even under the conditions of ongoing Russian aggression.

What was included in the educational program

The seminar was not an ordinary familiarization trip but a week-long educational program across different regions of Israel.

Participants visited natural, archaeological, and historical sites, learned about the work of KKL, met with educators, security personnel, municipal leaders, and local residents.

Special attention was paid to communities affected after the terrorist attack on October 7, 2023, and the subsequent war.

Educators were told not only about the consequences of the tragedy but also about the restoration of Israeli settlements, mutual assistance, the return of residents, and the work of educational institutions in crisis conditions.

The organizers aimed to show participants modern Israel not only through media reports and political debates but through direct meetings with people.

Educators were to see a country that simultaneously faces military, social, and educational challenges and continues to restore affected communities.

For many foreign teachers, such meetings become the basis for future lessons and conversations with students.

NANews — News of Israel notes that educators often become the main source of systematic knowledge about Israel for children in the diaspora.

The perception of Israel by the next generation of Jewish youth depends on the materials and personal stories they bring home.

Education after October 7

The official program of the American delegation allows for a more detailed understanding of the main directions of the international seminar.

Participants were offered lectures, discussions, and practical sessions dedicated to teaching Jewish history and Zionism after October 7.

The program also included familiarization with KKL educational materials, visits to Jewish National Fund sites, historical places of the Jewish people, and participation in volunteer work.

The issue of how to talk to children and teenagers about Israel in conditions of war, rising anti-Semitism, and harsh international debates was separately considered.

For educators, this is a challenging task.

They need to talk about the terrorist attack, hostages, casualties, and war, but at the same time not turn the study of Israel solely into a conversation about violence and tragedy.

That is why the organizers included topics of Israeli society’s resilience, mutual responsibility, community restoration, ecology, the country’s history, and modern educational work in the program.

KKL also provided educators with materials they could use after returning to their own schools.

American participants, for example, had previously committed to preparing educational projects for their educational institutions in collaboration with JNF-USA representatives.

They were expected to talk about the trip on social media, speak to their community, and incorporate the experience gained into school programs.

These conditions apply directly to the American delegation, but they show the general approach of the organizers: the seminar should continue in the form of lessons, events, and projects after the participants return home.

Educators are called ‘messengers of Israeli history’

KKL Chairman Eyal Ostrinsky stated that the decision of hundreds of Jewish educators to come to Israel during a difficult period is an expression of trust, responsibility, and shared destiny.

According to him, educators become a kind of ‘messengers of Israeli history’ in their communities.

Direct acquaintance with the country, its people, and the values of Zionism should provide them with tools for educating the next generation of the Jewish people.

KKL emphasizes that such educational programs help strengthen ties between Israel and Jewish communities in the diaspora.

The task is not only to transmit knowledge.

Participants from different countries get to know each other, discuss teaching methods, and have the opportunity to create joint educational programs.

After the seminar, they return to their countries with materials, personal impressions, and contacts of colleagues.

For representatives of Ukraine, this experience can be especially important, as Ukrainian Jewish schools are simultaneously part of Ukrainian society, the international Jewish space, and the system of relations between Ukraine and Israel.

Ukrainian educators participate in KKL programs not for the first time

The participation of the Ukrainian side in the KKL international seminar has a long history.

In July 2023, a similar program was attended by 250 educators from 22 countries and 27 educational institutions.

At that time, KKL separately reported that Ukraine was represented by 14 teachers.

One of the participants was Ukrainian educator Natala Androshenko.

She said that materials from previous KKL seminars were used in her school in geography, ecology, history, Jewish tradition lessons, and in the study of nature.

According to her, such classes helped students become closer to Israel and better understand Zionism.

Androshenko also noted the value of communication with directors and educators of Jewish schools from different countries.

There is no confirmation that she participated in the 2026 seminar.

However, her story shows how the knowledge gained by Ukrainian educators in Israel is subsequently used in working with children in Ukraine.

This practical result is one of the main meanings of the program.

Educators do not just visit Israel but return to their schools with ready-made methodological materials, new contacts, and personal stories.

For NANews — News of Israel, the participation of Ukrainian representatives in the seminar is also important as an example of the ongoing dialogue between Israel and Ukraine at the level of education and Jewish communities.

Such connections do not always receive noticeable attention in major media, but they are the ones that form long-term relationships between countries.

Political statements change, governments argue, but the work of teachers with children continues for years.

What remains unknown

KKL confirmed the presence of representatives from Ukraine but did not publish the composition of the delegation.

At the time of publication, the following are unknown:

— the exact number of participants from Ukraine;

— their names and positions;

— the cities they represented;

— the names of Jewish schools and organizations;

— the separate program of the Ukrainian group;

— the topics or projects that Ukrainian educators plan to implement after returning.

Therefore, it cannot yet be asserted that a certain number of Ukrainian teachers or representatives of specific organizations arrived in Israel.

But the very fact of Ukrainian participation is confirmed by both the Israeli publication and the KKL announcement.

From July 7 to 14, 2026, representatives of Ukraine, along with educators from 25 other countries, studied Israel’s experience, exchanged educational practices, and discussed how to preserve the Jewish identity of the next generation in a world that has become even more complex and divided after October 7.

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Ukraine Officially Returns to Haifa: after 11 years of absence, a consular representation will once again appear here. NAnews – Israel News reports on how the network of Ukrainian diplomatic missions in Israel has evolved from 1991 to the present day.

What we will cover in this article:

• Diplomatic relations between Ukraine and Israel were established on 26 December 1991, and by October 1992 the Embassy of Ukraine in Tel Aviv had already opened.
• In 1998, Aron Maiberg was granted the status of Honorary Consul of Ukraine in Haifa, marking the first step toward developing a consular network in the country; his mandate was extended several times by Ukraine’s MFA.
• From 2008–2014, Haifa hosted a General Consulate headed by Ihor Vitaliyovych Turchyn.
• Since 2013, Jerusalem has been home to an Honorary Consulate led by Ofer Kerzner.
• In 2025, the process began to open a new Honorary Consulate of Ukraine in Haifa, which is to be headed by Alex Zernopolski.

After Tel Aviv and Jerusalem — Ukraine Returns to Haifa

For the first time in over a decade, the north of Israel will once again have a Ukrainian consular representative. On 14 August 2025, Ukraine’s Ambassador to Israel Yevhen Korniychuk announced on “The Best Radio of Israel” that lawyer Alex Zernopolski will become the Honorary Consul of Ukraine in Haifa.

According to him, the candidate approval process lasted about ten months, and now it remains only to receive final confirmation from Israel’s MFA. The consular office will operate in Haifa — Israel’s third-largest city and the center of the northern region. The decision is driven both by the growing needs of the Ukrainian diaspora and the city’s strategic importance in the country’s economy.

From Diplomatic Relations to the First Consulates

Diplomatic relations between Ukraine and Israel were established on 26 December 1991. By October 1992, the Embassy of Ukraine opened in Tel Aviv. The first ambassador was Yurii Shcherbak, who served from 29 October 1992 to October 1994. Since the early 2000s, Ukraine has gradually expanded its network of diplomatic institutions to serve not only the capital region but also major centers where a significant portion of Ukrainians reside.

Embassy of Ukraine in Tel Aviv: Historical Overview, Functions, and Cultural Role

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There is no direct evidence of the murder of American Senator Lindsey Graham today. But it is too early to completely dismiss the version of poisoning.

Too many things coincided in time: the last visit to Kyiv, the agreement with the White House on a sanctions bill painful for the Kremlin, the return to Washington — and the sudden death of a politician who was officially declared wanted in Russia and portrayed for years as one of Moscow’s main enemies.

Preliminary examination indicates aortic dissection associated with atherosclerotic vascular disease. This is a real and often lightning-fast cause of death. However, the death certificate has not yet been finalized: forensic experts continue toxicological and microscopic studies. Therefore, the question of possible exposure to a foreign substance is technically still open.

The last 36 hours of Lindsey Graham

July 10, 2026 Lindsey Graham was in Kyiv. This was his tenth visit to Ukraine since the start of the full-scale Russian invasion.

The senator met with Volodymyr Zelensky, discussed Ukraine’s air defense needs, missile production for Patriot systems, and increasing economic pressure on Moscow. He also familiarized himself with Ukrainian production of Skyfall drones.

But the most dangerous result of this trip for the Kremlin was something else.

In Kyiv, Graham announced that he and other senators had reached an agreement with Donald Trump’s administration on an updated sanctions bill against Russia.

“We have reached an agreement with the White House on the version of the Russian sanctions bill that they will support. This means it will become law,” Graham told reporters.

The project provided for punishment not only for Russian structures but also for states, banks, and companies that continue to buy Russian oil and gas, thereby financing Putin’s war machine. In fact, it was an attempt to hit one of the Kremlin’s main sources of income.

In the evening of July 11, less than two days after this statement, the 71-year-old senator suddenly died in Washington.

Shortly before his condition worsened, he spoke with Donald Trump. The US president later said that Graham sounded a little tired, but otherwise spoke normally. Shortly thereafter, emergency services received a report of cardiac arrest at the senator’s home.

It was this sequence — Kyiv, Russian sanctions, return, and sudden death — that raised the question of possible poisoning not only among anonymous social media users.

Russia had an obvious motive

Lindsey Graham was not just one of Ukraine’s supporters in the Senate.

He belonged to a small group of American politicians who for years consistently demanded moving from words to real economic and military pressure on Moscow. At the same time, Graham remained a close ally of Trump and could persuade the US president on issues of Ukraine, Russia, Iran, and Israel.

For the Kremlin, this made him significantly more dangerous than an ordinary senator.

In March 2022, Graham publicly called for someone inside Russia to “remove” Putin. The Russian Foreign Ministry officially protested, and the White House was forced to separately state that the assassination of a foreign leader is not US policy.

In May 2023, the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs added the American senator to the official wanted list. The reason was his statements during a visit to Kyiv, which Russian propaganda presented as approval of the death of Russians. The full recording of the meeting showed that two of Graham’s phrases were edited together and were not one statement, but Moscow still began criminal prosecution against him.

Thus, at the time of his death, Lindsey Graham was simultaneously:

• one of the most consistent supporters of Ukraine;
• the author of a personal threat against Putin;
• a person declared wanted by the Russian authorities;
• the main driver of a new sanctions mechanism against buyers of Russian energy resources;
• an influential intermediary between Ukraine and Trump.

The presence of a motive in itself proves nothing. But to claim that the Kremlin was indifferent to whether Graham would continue his work is also impossible.

Poisoning is not fantasy, but part of the history of Russian special services

Host Greg Kelly, asking Trump about a possible Russian trace, put it very bluntly: “Russians have a habit of poisoning those they don’t like”.

The phrase sounds harsh, but it is based not only on political rhetoric.

In November 2006, former FSB officer Alexander Litvinenko was poisoned in London with radioactive polonium-210. A British public inquiry concluded that Andrei Lugovoy and Dmitry Kovtun likely acted under FSB direction, and the operation was likely approved by then-FSB head Nikolai Patrushev and personally by Putin.

In March 2018, Sergei and Yulia Skripal were poisoned with a nerve agent in Salisbury, UK. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons independently confirmed the findings of British laboratories on the use of a highly toxic nerve agent. The UK blamed the operation on the Russian state.

In August 2020, Alexei Navalny was poisoned. OPCW laboratories found biomarkers of a cholinesterase inhibitor in his blood and urine, structurally similar to substances in the same group as the Novichok family components.

These episodes do not prove Russia’s involvement in Graham’s death. But they prove something else: the use of poisons against political opponents, defectors, and people deemed enemies of the Kremlin cannot be considered impossible or uncharacteristic of the Russian system.

This has already happened. Moreover, it happened abroad, using rare substances and with the calculation of denying Moscow’s involvement.

For Russian special services, poison is not only a means of physical elimination. It is also a message: borders do not protect, and death can look like an illness, accident, or unexplained medical catastrophe.

What the official medical version says

The preliminary conclusion of the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner of the District of Columbia sounds specific: aortic dissection due to atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease.

Aortic dissection occurs when the inner lining of the body’s largest artery tears, allowing blood to penetrate between the layers of the vessel wall. The condition can develop very quickly and lead to massive internal bleeding, disruption of blood supply to organs, and cardiac arrest. Age, hypertension, and atherosclerosis are known risk factors.

Therefore, the natural cause of death looks medically plausible.

But the word “preliminary” in this story is of fundamental importance.

The official cause and manner of death will be recorded only after the completion of toxicological and microscopic analysis. At the moment, US authorities have not reported finding poison, stimulant, nerve agent, or other suspicious substances in Graham’s body.

At the same time, the detection of aortic rupture describes the immediate mechanism of death. By itself, it is not yet separate evidence that there was no external influence. Toxicology is supposed to check this.

For NAnews — Israel News it is crucial to separate two formulations: claiming that Russia killed Graham today is impossible; claiming that the Russian version has already been completely refuted is also premature.

Why Trump does not believe in poisoning

Donald Trump publicly rejected the version of Russian involvement.

Answering Greg Kelly’s question, the president said he would “gladly” support a conspiracy theory but believes the senator had serious health problems. Trump added that Graham’s father died at about the same age, and the senator’s own problems were deep and difficult to detect.

But the president’s words are a political and personal assessment, not an investigative conclusion.

Trump did not present toxicological results and did not report an intelligence check of the senator’s last route. His position, judging by the public explanation, is based primarily on medical information about Graham’s illness.

The FBI confirmed that it is assisting local authorities and has provided necessary resources. However, the agency has not announced the start of an investigation into a foreign operation, and law enforcement agencies have not publicly reported signs of violent death.

Why the issue still needs to be fully investigated

The version of the Russian trace is based not on evidence but on a combination of circumstances:

July 10 Graham announces in Kyiv the advancement of sanctions capable of hitting Russian oil and gas exports.

July 11 he returns to Washington, talks to Trump, and suddenly dies.

Russia had previously declared him wanted, and Russian propaganda had portrayed the senator as an enemy for years.

Russian special services have a documented history of using toxic substances against people the Kremlin considered a threat.

At the same time, the final toxicological conclusion has not yet been published.

American activist Laura Loomer demanded a full investigation and directly asked: “Did Russia just poison Lindsey Graham?” She also reminded of previous threats against the senator. Loomer herself is known for spreading conspiracy theories, so her words cannot be considered evidence. But the demand to wait for full toxicology in this situation seems reasonable.

A check of the entire chain of Graham’s last days is necessary: flights, food and drinks, meetings, hotels, transportation, contacts, surveillance camera recordings, and possible unusual medical visits. Even the discovery of a suspicious substance will not yet prove Russian involvement — data on the method of delivery, performers, and customers will be required.

However, closing the case before obtaining these results would be as irresponsible as declaring the senator’s death a proven murder today.

Russia could well have done it — but there is no evidence yet

As of July 14, 2026, the most confirmed version of Lindsey Graham’s death is sudden aortic dissection against the background of chronic vascular disease.

But the Russian version does not look absurd.

The Kremlin had a motive. Russian special services have the necessary capabilities. Poisoning opponents outside Russia is part of the documented history of the Putin regime. And Graham’s death occurred at a time when he was close to passing sanctions threatening Russian oil and gas revenues.

Therefore, the correct conclusion today should sound like this:

Russia could well have been interested in eliminating Lindsey Graham, and the use of poison fully corresponds to the known methods of Russian special services. However, this can be considered an established fact only after the appearance of toxicological, investigative, or intelligence evidence.

Until the completion of examinations, the version of natural death remains the main one. But calling any question about the Russian trace a “crazy conspiracy theory” before the publication of final results is too hasty.

Monitoring of the final toxicological conclusion and new FBI statements on this case can be set.

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Israel’s main airport faces the threat of a new transportation crisis. Due to the resumption of military escalation between the US and Iran, Washington has suspended the withdrawal of tanker aircraft from Ben Gurion. If the previously agreed schedule is not restored, the airport may run out of parking spaces for passenger liners as early as July 23.

The Israel Airports Authority warns: in such a case, about ten flights will have to be canceled daily. In terms of passengers, this means approximately 50,000 canceled airline tickets each month.

The situation is especially dangerous because the crisis is unfolding at the height of the summer season, when Ben Gurion is supposed to serve from 80,000 to 94,000 passengers a day.

Four planes returned, eight refused to withdraw

The new escalation became known on July 14, 2026.

The US was supposed to withdraw another eight tanker aircraft from Ben Gurion by the end of the week. This stage was part of an agreement reached after several months of pressure from the Israeli Ministry of Transport and the Airports Authority.

However, due to the resumption of hostilities against Iran, the American command suspended the withdrawal of aviation.

Moreover, four tankers that had previously left the airport returned to Ben Gurion.

The Israel Airports Authority stated that such a change of plans has “immediate and serious operational significance.” If American aviation does not start freeing up parking spaces, starting from July 23, there will be a significant shortage of spaces for civilian aircraft at the airport.

Israeli Transport Minister Miri Regev ordered not to allow the landing of additional American tankers without prior coordination.

Thus, the conflict between Israeli civilian agencies and the American military has reached a new level. Israel does not refuse strategic cooperation with the US but demands that military needs do not paralyze the country’s civil aviation.

The problem is not only in the number of aircraft.

Tankers are significantly larger than many passenger planes, require larger parking spaces, special ground services, security, fuel, and separate procedures for departure. Their landing or urgent takeoff during peak hours forces dispatchers to rearrange the civilian schedule.

In March or May, such an operation could delay other flights by about half an hour. In July and August, when planes take off and land almost continuously, one such disruption can cause a multi-hour chain of delays affecting hundreds of flights.

From the first tankers to an actual military base

American planes began arriving at Ben Gurion even before the start of the large-scale war with Iran.

On February 23, 2026, American tanker aircraft and C-17 military transport planes were spotted at Israel’s main civilian airport. By that time, military aviation observers had counted more than 85 tankers and over 170 transport aircraft sent by the US to the Middle East region since mid-February.

On the night of February 27, at least nine more American tankers arrived at Ben Gurion. Simultaneously, American F-22 fighters and accompanying aircraft were stationed at the Ovda airbase.

On February 28, 2026, the US and Israel launched a large-scale military operation against Iran.

Aerial tankers became one of the most important elements of the campaign. They allowed American and Israeli fighters and bombers to stay in the air longer and strike targets deep within Iranian territory.

After the start of the war, Israel’s airspace was closed. On March 2, Ben Gurion began gradually resuming operations, initially in a very limited format and mainly for Israeli airlines.

However, American tankers did not disappear from the airport.

According to satellite images studied by the Financial Times, there were about 36 military tanker aircraft at Ben Gurion in early March.

After the ceasefire, which came into effect on April 8, their number did not decrease but increased to about 47.

By mid-May, there were already at least 52 American military aircraft at the airport. The reasons for placing such a large group specifically at Israel’s main civilian airport, rather than at military bases, were not fully explained officially.

By this time, Ben Gurion had effectively ceased to cope simultaneously with civilian and military tasks.

The head of Israel’s Civil Aviation Authority, Shmuel Zakai, stated that Ben Gurion had turned into an American military airfield with limited civilian activity.

The Director General of the Airports Authority, Sharon Kedmi, reported on May 28 that the airport was using only about one-third of its operational capacity. According to him, approximately 70% of Ben Gurion’s activities were limited due to the space and resources occupied by American aviation.

In two months, the Airports Authority lost about 700 million shekels. If the situation continued as it was, losses could grow to several billion.

The passenger traffic forecast for 2026 had to be reduced from 18 million to 15 million people. Up to three million passengers risked facing cancellations or being unable to purchase tickets.

Many El Al, Arkia, and Israir planes had to be kept outside Israel. This meant additional expenses for parking, crews, and maintenance, as well as reducing the number of flights Israeli companies could perform daily.

NAnews — Israel News notes that it’s not just about inconveniences for tourists. For Israel, which effectively has one main international aviation hub, the overload of Ben Gurion quickly turns into a national economic and transportation problem.

Foreign carriers also received another reason not to return to Israel. The reduction in supply amid high demand created conditions for further increases in ticket prices.

June crisis: 2.4 million trips were at risk

By mid-June, the number of American planes reached maximum levels.

According to Miri Regev, there were about 72 American tankers and military transport aircraft at Ben Gurion. The Airports Authority cited the figure of 74 aircraft.

Another 26 American machines were stationed at Ramon Airport in southern Israel, occupying about 90% of the available parking spaces there. Meanwhile, according to Israeli officials, at that time, not a single American tanker was stationed at Israeli Air Force bases.

On June 10, Miri Regev publicly criticized the situation, stating that if US President Donald Trump does not intend to continue the war against Iran, American planes should vacate Ben Gurion.

On June 14, the minister sent an urgent letter to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

She demanded the relocation of at least 30 American aircraft to Israeli Air Force bases or outside the country. Otherwise, Regev warned, about 2.4 million tickets sold for the summer months and the period of the autumn Jewish holidays would be at risk of cancellation.

This figure included trips of Hasidim to Uman for Rosh Hashanah.

The critical date was announced as June 16, 2026.

It is in mid-June that the Airports Authority allocates summer slots to airlines — the time during which a carrier has the right to land or take off a plane.

If an airline does not receive the necessary slot, it is forced to cancel the flight. At the same time, Israeli law allows the carrier not to pay standard compensation if the passenger was warned of the cancellation at least 14 days in advance.

Therefore, on June 16, foreign companies could begin to massively cancel July flights without incurring additional compensation costs.

Miri Regev warned of direct damage in billions of shekels to airlines, the tourism industry, and Israel’s economy. She also noted that mass cancellations would harm the country’s reputation as an aviation destination and could deter carriers just beginning to return after the April ceasefire.

At the last moment, Israel and the US managed to find a temporary solution.

On June 16, Israeli media reported that in the coming days, 20 planes would be transferred to Israeli Air Force bases, and another 17 machines would leave Ben Gurion by the end of the month. At the time of publication, there was no official confirmation of the full schedule.

By June 24, about 20 American planes had indeed been withdrawn.

But this was still not enough. Of the 99 parking spaces intended for civilian passenger aircraft, only 65 remained free.

For normal operations in July, at least 80 parking spaces were required, and for the August peak — all 99.

Sharon Kedmi warned that without freeing up at least 15 more spaces, cancellations could affect about 100,000 passengers. In June, Ben Gurion served more than 65,000 people a day, while in August, between 70,000 and 100,000 passengers were expected daily.

By early July, the situation began to improve.

On July 1, Lufthansa and ITA Airways resumed flights to Israel. Austrian Airlines had previously returned, and Air Europa restored service to Madrid. The Ministry of Transport announced an agreement to accelerate the withdrawal of American aviation: about 30 planes were to be moved in the first stage and another 20 later.

However, the achieved normalization proved to be unstable.

On July 7, 2026, the US resumed strikes on Iran after attacks on merchant ships in the Strait of Hormuz. The American command announced the targeting of more than 80 targets, including ships and objects of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Iran responded with strikes on American targets in the Persian Gulf countries.

On July 13, Donald Trump officially notified the US Congress that hostilities had resumed on July 7.

Amid this escalation, the American military decided to keep the tankers in close proximity to the operations zone again. That is why the previously agreed withdrawal of eight planes was stopped, and four machines returned to Ben Gurion.

Now the consequences of the military decision may become noticeable as early as July 23.

By the end of the month, passenger traffic is expected to exceed 80,000 people almost every weekday.

On July 16, about 91,000 passengers were forecasted.

On July 26 — about 90,000.

The maximum load is expected on July 30: approximately 94,000 passengers and about 560 takeoffs, landings, and other aviation operations.

In total, about 2.3 million passengers are expected to pass through Ben Gurion in July, which is approximately 25% more than in July 2025.

Therefore, even the daily cancellation of ten flights will have a cumulative effect. Over the month, this is about 300 flights and 50,000 unrealized flights.

The main question now is whether Israel and the US can find alternative places for the tankers — at military bases or outside the country — without weakening American capabilities in the war against Iran.

NAnews — Israel News emphasizes: the history of American tankers has shown how closely Israel’s security is now linked to the daily lives of citizens.

The decision made by the American military command due to attacks in the Strait of Hormuz and strikes on Iran may determine in a few days whether tens of thousands of Israelis can go on vacation, return home, or meet with relatives.

Ben Gurion has simultaneously become an international airport, a logistics center for war, and one of the most vulnerable points of the Israeli economy. As long as American tankers remain on its parking spaces, each new turn of the conflict with Iran will directly affect passengers, airlines, the tourism industry, and ticket prices.

…
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On the night of July 13, 2026, Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces claimed to have hit another 15 Russian vessels in the Sea of Azov. Simultaneously, the ‘Crimean Switch’ operation continued: energy nodes of occupied Crimea, the Russian S-400 system, Tor air defense systems, and radar complexes were targeted.

Over eight days — from July 6 to July 13, 2026 — Ukrainian drone operators, according to the commander of the Armed Forces of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces, Robert Brovdi, with the call sign ‘Madyar’, hit 105 Russian vessels.

These include tankers, bulk carriers, ferries, tugs, and special vessels involved in supplying occupied Crimea and operating Russian port infrastructure in the Sea of Azov.

On the night of July 12 to 13 alone, Ukrainian drones attacked 15 vessels:

• seven tankers;
• five bulk carriers;
• one ferry;
• two tugs.

Brovdi stated that Ukrainian units continue the ‘battle for fuel for Crimea’, gradually depriving the Russian group of stable maritime logistics.

What happened on the night of July 13

According to the commander of the Unmanned Systems Forces, strikes were carried out on Russian vessels in the Sea of Azov.

Their exact location at the time of the attack, names, and registration details of most targets were not publicly disclosed. However, it is known that these are vessels used for transporting fuel, cargo, and servicing ports that supply Russian troops in occupied Crimea and southern Ukraine.

After the night attack, the total result of the operation, according to Brovdi’s calculations, increased from 90 to 105 hit vessels.

The commander of the Unmanned Systems Forces also stated that the intensity of the strikes has already affected movement through the Kerch Strait, unloading of vessels, and the operation of transshipment infrastructure in occupied Crimea.

There is no independent confirmation of a complete halt to shipping through the Kerch Strait yet. However, earlier, Reuters, citing sources, reported a suspension of movement through the Azov-Don Canal after a series of attacks on vessels.

How Ukraine counted 105 hit vessels

The arithmetic declared by the Unmanned Systems Forces consists of several consecutive night operations.

July 6–10: the first 48 targets

The main phase of the strikes began on July 6.

In the following days, the Ukrainian side reported daily on new hits on Russian tankers and auxiliary vessels.

On the night of July 7, Unmanned Systems Forces units claimed an attack on tankers, a bulk carrier, and a ferry. On the night of July 8, nine more tankers were hit, and on July 9, 14 vessels, including 12 tankers, a bulk carrier, and a tug.

On the night of July 10, the list was supplemented by another 13 vessels:

• ten tankers;
• one bulk carrier;
• one ferry;
• one sea tug.

After this, Brovdi reported 48 hit vessels in the first five days of the operation.

July 11: immediately 28 vessels

The largest night attack in terms of the number of targets occurred on July 11.

According to Brovdi, Ukrainian drones hit 28 Russian vessels:

• 21 tankers;
• four tugs;
• two bulk carriers;
• one dredger or special vessel.

After this operation, the total number of hit vessels increased to 76 units.

The Ukrainian side claimed that the vessels were used for military logistics, cargo transportation, and supporting the activities of Russian port infrastructure.

July 12: another 14 targets

On the night of July 12, the Unmanned Systems Forces claimed to have hit:

• ten tankers;
• four ferries.

The total result for the period from July 6 to July 12 reached 90 vessels. Information about the attacks on vessels was also mentioned by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

July 13: the result increased to 105

After the attack on seven tankers, five bulk carriers, a ferry, and two tugs, the number of declared hits reached 105.

Thus, the sequence published by the Ukrainian side looks like this:

Why these vessels are called the ‘shadow fleet’

The term ‘shadow fleet’ is usually applied to tankers used by Russia to export oil and petroleum products bypassing sanctions, insurance restrictions, and the price cap set by Western countries.

However, in Brovdi’s statements, this concept is used more broadly.

He includes not only large oil tankers in the ‘shadow fleet’ but also bulk carriers, tugs, ferries, dredgers, and other auxiliary vessels involved in Russian logistics in the Sea of Azov.

These vessels can perform several tasks:

• deliver gasoline and diesel fuel to occupied Crimea;
• transport cargo for Russian troops;
• service ports and piers;
• ensure ferry communication;
• support movement in sea channels;
• participate in the transshipment of fuel and other cargo.

Therefore, the goal of the Ukrainian campaign is not only an individual tanker but the entire transport system connecting Russian ports with the occupied peninsula.

NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency notes that strikes on maritime logistics have significance far beyond the Sea of Azov. Russia is forced to spend additional resources on guarding vessels, seeking new supply routes, strengthening port air defenses, and redistributing cargo to the Crimean Bridge and the land corridor through the occupied south of Ukraine.

‘Crimean Switch’: strikes on the peninsula’s energy

Simultaneously with the hunt for Russian vessels, the Unmanned Systems Forces continue an operation called ‘Crimean Switch off’.

On the night of July 13, according to Brovdi, Ukrainian drones hit nine energy nodes and substations of various capacities in the occupied territories.

A strategic electricity transfer point of the Kuban-Crimea energy bridge, designated as the ‘Crimea’ node, was also hit.

Brovdi claims that this object was attacked for the second time in 48 hours.

The energy bridge from the Krasnodar region was built after the Russian occupation of Crimea and became one of the key sources of electricity supply to the peninsula.

Strikes on substations and electricity distribution nodes can create problems not only for civilian infrastructure but also for Russian military facilities, airfields, radar stations, ports, warehouses, and repair enterprises.

Earlier, on July 3, the Unmanned Systems Forces reported hitting ten energy facilities in occupied Crimea. At that time, the Ukrainian side claimed that in just one night, drones attacked 48 different targets.

S-400, ‘Tor’, and two radar stations

In addition to energy facilities, on the night of July 13, Ukrainian units claimed to have hit four elements of the Russian air defense system.

According to Brovdi, the following were destroyed:

• a launcher of the S-400 ‘Triumph’ air defense missile system;
• a ‘Tor’ air defense missile system;
• two radar complexes.

The S-400 is one of the main long-range systems of the Russian air defense. The complex is designed to detect and hit aircraft, cruise missiles, and other aerial targets.

The ‘Tor’ air defense system is used at shorter distances and is supposed to cover military facilities and units from drones, guided bombs, and missiles.

The loss of radar stations creates an additional problem: even the remaining launchers become less effective if the Russian system cannot timely detect a target and transmit data for its destruction.

Earlier in July, the Unmanned Systems Forces also claimed strikes on two S-400 launchers and a ‘Nebo-U’ radar station. According to Ukrainian data, one of the launchers was located near Glazovka in occupied Crimea, and the other in the Kosyonki area of the Bryansk region of Russia.

The battle for fuel for occupied Crimea

Brovdi calls the disruption of fuel supplies the key task of the series of strikes.

Crimea depends on several supply routes:

• sea transportation through the Sea of Azov;
• movement through the Kerch Strait;
• rail and road communication via the Crimean Bridge;
• a land corridor through the occupied areas of Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson regions;
• an energy bridge from the Krasnodar region.

If tankers and ferries stop going to sea or are forced to undergo repairs, the load shifts to land routes.

This increases transportation costs, creates queues, and makes logistics more vulnerable to subsequent strikes.

Even damage to a vessel without its complete destruction can take it out of operation for weeks or months. The shipowner needs to find a safe port, inspect the hull and equipment, replace damaged elements, and obtain permission for further operation.

Moreover, regular attacks increase risks for crews, insurers, and companies that agree to work on routes associated with occupied Crimea.

What the stoppage of the Kerch Strait means

The Kerch Strait is the only maritime route connecting the Azov and Black Seas.

Through it pass vessels heading to the Russian ports of Azov, Rostov-on-Don, Taganrog, Yeysk, and Temryuk, as well as to the ports of occupied Crimea.

Even a temporary halt in movement creates a chain reaction:

• vessels accumulate waiting for permission to pass;
• the schedule for fuel delivery is disrupted;
• freight costs are rising;
• ports are not receiving cargo on time;
• there are delays in the removal of products;
• Russian military are forced to seek alternative routes.

Brovdi suggested that movement through the strait could have been stopped after the large-scale attacks on July 11.

The Russian side has not officially confirmed a complete and prolonged blockade of the strait. Therefore, it is premature to assert that shipping has completely ceased.

However, reports of temporary movement restrictions and the suspension of the Azov-Don Canal indicate that the strikes have already begun to affect Russian maritime logistics.

Affected does not mean sunk

The figure 105 must be interpreted correctly.

The Ukrainian side claims 105 affected vessels, but this does not mean that all of them were sunk or completely destroyed.

The military term ‘affected’ can mean:

• direct hit;
• hull damage;
• fire;
• engine failure;
• damage to navigation equipment;
• loss of ability to move independently;
• need for long-term repair;
• temporary suspension of operation.

The full list of names of the 105 vessels, detailed photographs of the damage, and an independent assessment of the condition of each vessel have not yet been published.

There is also no independent confirmation of the destruction of all the declared air defense systems and energy facilities.

Therefore, the most accurate wording is: The Ukrainian drone forces claimed to have affected 105 Russian vessels from July 6 to 13, 2026.

Why this operation is important

In eight days, Ukrainian drones, according to the statements of the SBS command, moved from individual strikes to a systematic campaign against Russian maritime, energy, and military infrastructure.

Simultaneously, ships, ports, substations, energy bridges, air defense systems, and radar stations are being attacked.

This approach forces Russia to defend several types of objects at once and stretch limited air defense resources over a large area.

While Russian complexes try to cover energy nodes, ports and ships become more vulnerable. If air defense is transferred to the coast, the risk to airfields, warehouses, and other objects deep in the occupied peninsula increases.

This is the logic of the ‘Crimean Switch’: not a one-time strike, but a gradual destruction of the system that ensures the Russian military presence in Crimea.

The declared 105 affected vessels in eight days still require full independent confirmation. But even if some targets received relatively minor damage, the intensity of the attacks itself shows that the Sea of Azov has ceased to be a safe internal water area for the Russian fleet and transport companies.

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…
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In the seventh part, we will analyze another layer of digital presence: landing pages, bookmark profiles, CRM platforms, professional networks, federated social networks, communities, messenger groups, and alternative platforms. For small businesses in Israel, such tools may seem secondary, but they often create the “trust trail” that a client sees before the first contact.

Today, a person rarely makes a decision after one post. They might see a business in search, open LinkedIn, check the page on HubSpot, enter a Discord community, see a profile on Mastodon, find a collection of links on Diigo, and then go to the main site. If everything is neatly arranged and leads to one logic, the brand looks alive and professional.

The example of NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News shows how such platforms can work together. The project itself is related to Israeli news, Ukrainian topics, Jewish communities, regional security, culture, international politics, and historical memory. But the same scheme is suitable for small businesses: each external platform should explain who you are, how you are useful, where the main site is, and how to contact you.

Protopage: landing page, RSS, and convenient link hub

Protopage is a personal start page, RSS reader, and web portal. The platform has been operating since 2005 and was originally built around the idea of gathering news, RSS feeds, bookmarks, notes, widgets, and useful links in one place. It is not a social network in the classic sense, but rather an informational desktop.

In terms of market share, Protopage cannot be compared to Facebook, LinkedIn, or Telegram. Its niche is personal panels, RSS aggregation, informational hubs, internal portals, and pages with structured links. It is used by people and small teams who need to see different sources and materials on one page.

For small businesses in Israel, Protopage can be useful as a public or working link center: site, social networks, RSS, blog, video, contact pages, maps, partner materials, and important publications. This is especially convenient when a company has many channels and needs to gather them into a clear map.

The page Protopage — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can work as an additional hub for the project. For businesses, this is an example of how not just to open another profile, but to gather different digital points into one understandable system.

Diigo Profile: bookmarks, sources, and research base

Diigo is a service for saving bookmarks, annotations, tags, notes, and research materials. It appeared in 2005 as a social bookmarking tool and later became a useful platform for those working with a large number of sources: journalists, teachers, students, marketers, analysts, editors, and teams.

In terms of market share, Diigo does not compete with large social networks. Its role is different: not coverage at any cost, but saving, structuring, and explaining links. It is a tool for those who want to show that the project is backed by normal work with materials and sources, not random publications.

For small businesses in Israel, Diigo can be unexpectedly useful. An agency can collect cases, research, useful articles, and links on promotion. A lawyer can gather materials on legal topics. An educational project can collect sources for students. Media can gather publications on countries, topics, events, and historical memory.

The profile Diigo Profile — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can work as a library of important links for the project. For small businesses, this is an example of how even bookmarks can enhance brand trust.

HubSpot: CRM, marketing, and landing pages

HubSpot is a large platform for CRM, marketing, sales, service support, content, and automation. The company was founded in 2006 in Boston and grew from marketing software into a full-fledged customer platform. It is used by small and medium businesses, B2B teams, SaaS companies, agencies, sales, marketing, and customer service departments.

In the market, HubSpot is not related to ordinary social networks but to the class of business platforms. It is compared with CRM and marketing automation solutions: Salesforce, Zoho, Pipedrive, Mailchimp, ActiveCampaign, and other tools for working with clients and leads. HubSpot’s strength is the connection of the site, forms, email, CRM, content, analytics, and marketing processes.

For small businesses in Israel, HubSpot can be useful if you need not just to publish posts but to manage inquiries: who wrote, where they came from, what they asked, at what stage the deal is, what emails were sent, which pages work better. This is especially important for services where the client does not buy immediately but goes through several touches.

The page HubSpot — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can work as an additional landing page for the project. For businesses, this is an example of how an external landing can be connected not only with publication but also with marketing logic and applications.

LinkedIn: professional network and B2B trust

LinkedIn is a professional social network launched in 2003. Its main role is business connections, companies, vacancies, expert publications, corporate pages, B2B communication, recruiting, and professional reputation. Unlike entertainment social networks, LinkedIn is perceived as a place where business shows its competence.

In terms of scale, LinkedIn remains one of the main professional networks in the world. International companies, startups, universities, media, funds, technology brands, agencies, executives, HR specialists, journalists, consultants, and experts are present there. For the B2B segment, it is one of the key channels of trust.

For small businesses in Israel, LinkedIn is especially important if the company works with corporate clients, international audiences, technology, marketing, legal services, consulting, education, real estate, investments, or expert services. There you can show not only services but also a professional position.

The page LinkedIn — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can work as a professional representation of the project. For small businesses, this is an example of how a brand becomes visible not only to clients but also to partners, journalists, specialists, and organizations.

Mastodon: federated network and independent presence

Mastodon is a federated social network that publicly appeared in 2016. Its feature is that it is not built around one central site. There are different servers, or instances, that are connected through the Fediverse. A user of one server can read and discuss publications of users from other servers.

In terms of market share, Mastodon is much smaller than X, Facebook, or Threads. But its value is not in mass coverage, but in an independent environment, open code, the absence of a single corporate center, and an audience often consisting of IT specialists, journalists, researchers, authors, activists, and people interested in privacy.

For small businesses, Mastodon can be useful if the company works with an international audience, technology, media, education, analytics, culture, or independent communities. It is not a channel for quick sales but a good signal of modern digital literacy.

The profile Mastodon — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can be used as an additional point for publishing materials and links. For small businesses, this is an example of presence not only on large centralized platforms but also in a freer federated environment.

Discord: communities, discussions, and closed audience

Discord is a platform for voice, video, and text communication, launched in 2015. Initially, it became known among gamers, but later expanded significantly: now it is used by educational projects, crypto and Web3 communities, music groups, startups, authors, fan clubs, IT teams, courses, and closed communities.

In the market, Discord holds a strong place in the niche of community platforms and real-time communication. It is not a classic social network with an open feed but a space of servers, channels, roles, chats, voice rooms, and constant communication. Therefore, its value is in retaining the audience, not just attracting new people.

For small businesses in Israel, Discord can be useful if a community can be created around the company: a training course, a client club, technical support, a creative group, a project for youth, a gaming or IT direction, an educational program, closed discussions, or events.

The server Discord — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can work as an additional communication space around the project. For businesses, this is an example of how you can not only publish but also gather people into a separate community.

MeWe: privacy and an alternative to large social networks

MeWe is a social network that grew out of the Sgrouples project, founded in 2012. The platform positions itself as a more private alternative to large social networks. It is often described with an emphasis on personal data, groups, communities, the absence of the usual advertising model, and an attempt to create a more controlled communication environment.

In terms of market share, MeWe is much smaller than Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, or X. But it has its niche: users who value privacy, alternative communities, interest groups, and less dependence on the largest platforms. Open data on its audience has changed, but the platform claimed tens of millions of users worldwide.

For small businesses, MeWe can be useful if the company works with interest groups, communities, author projects, culture, family audiences, educational topics, or international connections. It is not the main sales channel but an additional layer of presence.

The profile MeWe — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can be used as another social point of the project. For businesses, this is an example of working with an audience that is not always found in ordinary mass networks.

Plurk: microblogging, short thoughts, and niche communities

Plurk is a microblogging platform launched in 2008. It is known for its horizontal timeline, short messages, and culture of quick publications. Over the years, Plurk has been particularly noticeable in some Asian internet communities, as well as among users who liked the alternative format of microblogging.

In terms of market share, Plurk does not compete with X, Facebook, or Telegram. It is a niche platform where the value is not in a huge audience but in an additional digital footprint, short publications, and presence in non-standard environments. For some brands, such platforms help expand recognition beyond familiar networks.

For small businesses, Plurk can be an additional channel for short updates, thoughts, links, announcements, and quick notes. Do not expect it to be the main flow of applications, but as part of the overall presence system, it can work.

The page Plurk — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can be such a short microblogging channel for the project.

Societas: federated social environment and additional profile

Societas is one of the niche federated social platforms associated with the idea of independent profiles and alternative social networks. Such platforms usually do not have a large market share, but they are important as part of the broader Fediverse environment and independent web.

Unlike Facebook or LinkedIn, such platforms do not provide instant coverage. Their role is to show that the project is present not only in commercial social networks but also in distributed, independent, or alternative digital spaces. This is especially interesting for media, authors, IT projects, cultural initiatives, and people who value digital autonomy.

For small businesses in Israel, Societas can be useful as an additional point of presence if the brand works with technological, international, independent, or media audiences. It is not a mandatory platform for everyone, but a good element of a wide link map.

The profile Societas — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can be used as another federated profile of the project.

Diaspora Psyco: distributed social network and data control

Diaspora is a distributed social network that appeared in 2010 as an alternative to centralized platforms. Its idea is not one main site but a network of independent servers called pods. The user chooses a pod, and the network itself does not belong to one corporate center.

In terms of the mass market, Diaspora did not become a competitor to Facebook, but it is important historically and ideologically: as one of the early projects that raised the question of user control over data, distributed architecture, independence from large platforms, and open code.

For small businesses, such a platform is not suitable for everyone. But for media, technological projects, public initiatives, cultural organizations, and authors, it can be an additional signal: the project is present in an environment where independence, privacy, and distributed communication are important.

The profile Diaspora Psyco — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can work as another point of presence for the project in the distributed social network.

How to use these platforms without chaos

The main mistake of small businesses is to perceive external platforms as a random set of links.

If a company has Protopage, Diigo, HubSpot, LinkedIn, Mastodon, Discord, MeWe, Plurk, Societas, and Diaspora, but nowhere is it explained who they are and where to contact, there will be little benefit.

Each platform should have its role. Protopage — link hub and RSS. Diigo — bookmark and source base. HubSpot — landing pages and CRM logic. LinkedIn — professional reputation. Mastodon, Societas, and Diaspora — federated presence. Discord — community and communication. MeWe — alternative social network. Plurk — short messages and additional microblog.

For small businesses in Israel, it is important that all these pages lead to one center: the main site, a clear description of services, contacts, and a clear action. The client should not guess what the company does. They should quickly understand: who you are, where you work, how you are useful, and how to contact you.

Why this is important for promotion in Israel

The Israeli market is fast and multilingual. One client searches in Hebrew, another in Russian, a third in English or Ukrainian. One checks Google, another looks at LinkedIn, a third opens Telegram or Discord, a fourth just looks for additional confirmations that the business is real.

Therefore, promotion should not depend on one platform. The main site remains the center, but around it should work social networks, blogs, profiles, communities, maps, RSS hubs, professional pages, and additional publication platforms.

The example of NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News shows that digital presence can be built as a system. A reader can find the project through Protopage, Diigo, HubSpot, LinkedIn, Mastodon, Discord, MeWe, Plurk, Societas, or Diaspora, but everywhere they should see the same logic: this is a project about Israel, Ukraine, Jewish communities, regional security, culture, and historical memory.

Who can help with such promotion in Israel

Such services in Israel are provided by the partner agency of the project NAnews and sTDe | NAnews — event poster of Israel.

Nikk.Agency is engaged in website promotion, lead generation, and internet marketing in Israel. The agency works with Google Ads, Google Maps, local promotion, websites, content, landing pages, and business visibility in AI assistants.

For small businesses, this is especially important because not just views are needed, but real inquiries: calls, applications, WhatsApp messages, site visits, and clients from the desired city or region. The agency’s website is available in Hebrew, Ukrainian, and Russian: Nikk.Agency — website promotion, lead generation, and internet marketing in Israel.

Conclusion of the seventh part: Protopage, Diigo, HubSpot, LinkedIn, Mastodon, Discord, MeWe, Plurk, Societas, and Diaspora do not replace the main site but enhance it. They help small businesses in Israel look more professional, create more trust points, work with different audiences, and lead the client to a clear inquiry.

…
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In October 2026, Israel will once again hear The Alibi Sisters — the duo of Anna and Angelina Zavalsky, Ukrainian sisters from Kyiv, who have journeyed from the popular group “Алібі” to a project where the Ukrainian scene, Jewish memory, Yiddish, klezmer, and retro aesthetics sound like one story.

The tour will take place from October 10 to 18, 2026, covering several cities in Israel: Nof HaGalil, Ashdod, Netanya, Ashkelon, Rishon LeZion, Petah Tikva, Be’er Sheva, and Haifa. All concerts are scheduled for 20:00, and tickets, according to the organizers Showman, range from 174 to 265 shekels in different cities.

Tickets are already available on the Showman website. 

This is not just a tour of a Ukrainian duo.

For many Israelis, especially those whose family histories are connected with Kyiv, Podolia, Odessa, Chernivtsi, Zhytomyr, Berdychiv, or Uman, this concert may be a meeting with that cultural world that cannot always be explained in words. It lives in songs, intonations, old records, family recipes, Yiddish words, grandmother’s memories, and that special music where joy and sadness almost never exist separately.

Who are The Alibi Sisters

Anna and Angelina Zavalsky have been known to the Ukrainian public since the early 2000s as the group “Алібі”. The project appeared on April 6, 2001, and since 2021, the sisters have been performing as The Alibi Sisters. The group’s profile lists pop and klezmer genres, and among the languages of performance are Ukrainian, Russian, and Yiddish.

There is an important detail in the duo’s biography: the sisters were soloists of the folk ensemble “Strumochok” from the age of five, graduated from music school in 1997 with a focus on violin, and later moved on to the professional stage, television, albums, and a large Ukrainian audience. In 2012, “Алібі” ceased artistic activity, but in 2021 the project returned in a new form — with a different musical perspective, sound, and a deeper appeal to Ukrainian-Jewish heritage.

It is this transition that makes the current Israeli tour particularly interesting.

The Alibi Sisters are no longer just nostalgia for the Ukrainian pop scene of the 2000s. It is an attempt to hear anew that cultural layer where Ukrainian folk songs, Yiddish, klezmer, Jewish hits, theatricality, family memory, and the retro image of the 1950s–1960s merge into a cohesive stage form.

Why this concert is important specifically for Israel

In an interview with Ukrainian Jewish Encounter, published on May 15, 2025, Anna Zavalsky explained in detail that the Ukrainian-Jewish theme for the sisters is not a random stylization. She said that even on a household level in Ukraine, many people partially remain carriers of Jewish culture — through songs, dish names, words, family habits, and memory, which was not always openly passed on but often very deeply.

In the same interview, Anna recalled challah, stuffed fish, Yiddish words in family speech, and the song “Vi iz dos gesele,” which their grandmother sang to them in childhood. Such details are important because they show: for The Alibi Sisters, Yiddish and Jewish musical tradition are not museum exhibits but part of living memory that returns through voice, stage, and personal history.

For Israel, this resonates particularly accurately.

Here live people for whom Yiddish is the language of childhood, the language of parents or grandparents, the language of old songs, jokes, prayers, family conversations, and the Eastern European Jewish world. And even if someone no longer speaks Yiddish, music is often recognized faster than words.

Tour organizers describe the program as a concert with a live band, retro aesthetics, dance drive, klezmer spirit, and songs where Jewish hits, Ukrainian folk songs, well-known Ukrainian pop compositions, and world hits sound together. Among the announced Jewish songs are Bublitchki, Main Yiddishe Mamme, Papirossen, Ich Hob Dich Zifeel Lieb, and others.

You can listen on https://www.youtube.com/@TheAlibiSisters

NAnews — Israel News and sTDe | NAnews — event listings in Israel note: in this format, the concert becomes not only a musical event but also a cultural meeting. Here, not only the stage is important, but also who sits in the audience, what family associations arise for the viewers, and why the Ukrainian-Jewish theme sounds so attentively today.

The Berry Sisters, Kyiv, and a return to the Yiddish world

The Showman poster states that Anna and Angelina Zavalsky are inspired by the work of the legendary Berry Sisters. Organizers emphasize the retro atmosphere, live band, and the sense of a time when Yiddish was heard in apartments and on the streets, and Ukrainian and Jewish melodies could alternate at weddings and family celebrations.

In an interview with UJE, Anna Zavalsky also spoke about the connection with the Berry Sisters but clarified an important point: The Alibi Sisters do not try to be a copy of the legendary duo. They use the power of “sisterly thirds,” retro aesthetics, and recognizable vocal kinship while remaining an independent Ukrainian project.

This distinction is fundamental.

When Ukrainian artists sing in Yiddish in Israel, they do not just reproduce old melodies. They reconnect Kyiv, Podolia, the Ukrainian stage, Jewish musical memory, and the modern experience of war, emigration, loss, and return to roots.

In the same interview, Anna Zavalsky said that returning to the Yiddish world is impossible physically, but possible as memory, respect, and a form of cultural return. In her view, it is important to remember not only the tragedy but also life: laughter, food, conversations, love, Sholem Aleichem’s books, and the human warmth of a vanished world.

That is why the Israeli tour of The Alibi Sisters does not look like an ordinary poster for a week in October.

This is a concert for those who want to hear Ukraine not only through war news but through music, culture, voices, and those connections that have existed for centuries between Ukrainians and Jews.

Where and when The Alibi Sisters concerts will take place in Israel

According to Showman, The Alibi Sisters concert tour has been rescheduled to new dates and will take place in Israel from October 10 to 18, 2026.

Nof HaGalil — October 10, 2026

The concert in Nof HaGalil will take place on October 10, 2026, at 20:00.

Venue: Berkovich Cultural Center.

Address: Derech HaChativot 4.

Ticket prices: 175–235 ₪.

Ashdod — October 11, 2026

In Ashdod, The Alibi Sisters will perform on October 11, 2026, at 20:00.

Venue: Matnas Duna-Yud.

Address: Keren Kayemet LeIsrael St. 90.

Ticket prices: 195–255 ₪.

Netanya — October 12, 2026

The concert in Netanya will take place on October 12, 2026, at 20:00.

Venue: Arik Einstein Auditorium.

Address: Beni Berman St. 6.

Ticket prices: 225–255 ₪.

Ashkelon — October 13, 2026

In Ashkelon, the concert is scheduled for October 13, 2026, at 20:00.

Venue: Matnas “Woldenberg”.

Address: Gruper St. 15.

Ticket prices: 174–225 ₪.

Rishon LeZion — October 14, 2026

In Rishon LeZion, The Alibi Sisters will perform on October 14, 2026, at 20:00.

Venue: “Mofet” Hall.

Address: Rothschild St. 60.

Ticket prices: 195–255 ₪.

Petah Tikva — October 15, 2026

The concert in Petah Tikva will take place on October 15, 2026, at 20:00.

Venue: “Sharet” Hall.

Address: HaAliya HaShniya St. 1.

Ticket prices: 195–255 ₪.

Be’er Sheva — October 17, 2026

In Be’er Sheva, the concert will take place on October 17, 2026, at 20:00.

Venue: Tamuz — House of Music.

Address: Herzl St. 12.

Ticket prices: 235–265 ₪.

Haifa — October 18, 2026

The final concert of the Israeli tour is announced in Haifa on October 18, 2026, at 20:00.

Venue: “Rappaport” Hall.

Address: HaNasi Ave. 138.

Ticket prices: 195–255 ₪.

Tickets are already available on the Showman website. 

What will be featured in the program

A program with a live band is expected, where Jewish hits in Yiddish, Ukrainian folk songs, well-known Ukrainian compositions, and world retro classics will sound not as separate numbers but as one musical route. The organizers’ description highlights the klezmer spirit, dance energy, nostalgia, and stage theatricality.

For the Israeli audience, this may be particularly relatable: here, Ukrainian motifs do not conflict with Jewish ones but become part of a shared memory. And perhaps that is why The Alibi Sisters in Israel are perceived not as foreign performers but as artists who bring a familiar code — only in a new, bright, and stage-assembled form.

NAnews — Israel News will follow cultural events that connect Israel, Ukraine, and Jewish communities through music, history, and living human memory.

Tickets and tour schedule:

Tickets are already available on the Showman website. 

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