Month: April 2026

On April 19, 2026, the Prime Minister of Slovakia Robert Fico released a video address on Facebook, in which he stated that the actions of the US, Israel, and Volodymyr Zelensky would allegedly eventually force the European Union to “sober up” and get rid of “ideological blinders” regarding Russia. In the same speech, he said that Slovakia is filing a lawsuit against the EU due to the cessation of Russian gas supplies and will not support a new sanctions package until the operation of the Druzhba oil pipeline is restored.

For the Israeli audience, it is important not only that Fico once again opposed the hard line towards Moscow.

More significant is the fact that Israel, in his logic, is integrated into the same line with American policy, the Ukrainian war, and European sanctions pressure. This is no longer a random slip and not a secondary background, but a direct inclusion of the Israeli theme in the debate about whether Europe should soften its stance towards Russia.

For Ukraine, the meaning of this story is also obvious.

Fico is once again using the energy conflict as a tool to pressure Kyiv and simultaneously as an argument against further support for Ukraine from the European Union. As a result, the same political formula hits in two directions at once: against European solidarity with Ukraine and against the perception of Israel as a separate regional player that can be used in someone else’s geopolitical rhetoric.

What exactly did Fico say and why is it important for Israel

The Slovak Prime Minister did not limit himself to criticizing Brussels.

He deliberately linked Middle Eastern tensions, Israel’s actions, Washington’s policy, and Zelensky’s position with the need for the EU to reconsider its attitude towards Russia. In such a formula, Israel becomes a convenient element of someone else’s argumentation: not as an independent country with its own threats and interests, but as part of a construct that explains why Europe supposedly should look at the Kremlin more leniently.

For Israel, this is a signal.

When the name of the country begins to be used in European discussions about sanctions, gas, and the war against Ukraine, it means that the Israeli agenda ceases to exist separately. It is being tried to be integrated into a broader scheme where Moscow no longer appears as the main source of threat, and attention is shifted to the “mistakes” of the US, Israel, and Kyiv. This is how political substitution works: Russia’s responsibility is blurred, and the focus shifts to those who oppose it.

Israel is important in this plot also because it itself lives in a regime of constant threat and knows firsthand the value of security, alliances, and strategic autonomy. Therefore, any attempts to use the Israeli name as an argument in favor of softening the course towards Russia inevitably go beyond Slovak domestic politics. It is already a question of how European leaders are trying to repackage the very meaning of war, sanctions, and international pressure.

Why the mention of Israel is not accidental

Fico made this statement precisely now, when the Middle East remains in a state of high tension, and the European energy system still reacts painfully to any external crisis.

In such an environment, the Israeli theme is used as an emotional amplifier. The logic is simple: if the region is hot again, if the US is involved, if Israel acts harshly, then, according to Fico, it is time for the European Union to reconsider its attitude towards Russia. This is a politically convenient but dangerous scheme because it mixes different crises into one common plot in the interests of those forces that want to weaken the European line against Moscow.

Why Ukraine is again at the center of the energy conflict

In the same address, Fico again linked the EU’s sanctions policy with the operation of the Druzhba oil pipeline.

He stated that he would not support a new sanctions package until Volodymyr Zelensky restores the pipeline. This is a continuation of a conflict that has been dragging on for several months: Hungary and Slovakia accuse Kyiv of delaying the restoration of supplies, while Ukraine talks about damage after a Russian strike and the technical complexity of repairs. Reuters reported that Zelensky in March spoke about the possibility of restoring Druzhba in about six weeks, and in April clarified that the repair should be completed in the spring.

For Ukraine, this is not just a dispute about a pipeline and oil. It is an example of how Russia, even attacking Ukrainian infrastructure, then gains a political effect in Europe. After the damage to Druzhba, Kyiv found itself under pressure not only because of the war but also because of the demands of those European countries that maintain dependence on Russian energy resources. As a result, Ukraine itself is put in a position where it is required to simultaneously repel aggression, repair the damaged system, and also not interfere with European states maintaining the usual channels of receiving Russian oil.

Against this background, Fico’s words about a lawsuit against the EU due to the ban on Russian gas show that this is not about one emotional speech, but about a consistent line.

Reuters reported on April 17 that Slovakia is going to file a lawsuit against the European Union’s decision to abandon Russian gas and seek interim measures, and the final ban on pipeline gas should come into force in the fall of 2027. That is, Bratislava is actually simultaneously arguing with Brussels, pressuring Kyiv, and building rhetoric in which Russia again appears not as a source of the problem, but as a beneficial energy argument.

What this means for Israel and Europe

Looking more broadly, Fico’s statement is not just words about gas, Ukraine, and sanctions.

It is an attempt to build a new political framework in which Europe should supposedly tire of its own principles and recognize that a hard line against Russia hinders itself. For Ukraine, such logic is dangerous because it undermines support in the EU. For Israel, it is dangerous because its actions and its very involvement in the Middle Eastern agenda begin to be used as an argument in the European discussion about whether to soften the attitude towards the Kremlin.

It is in this context that NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency draws attention to a key detail: Israel and Ukraine in Fico’s speech were not accidentally placed in the same construct. Both topics are used as a tool to pressure the European Union, but in different roles. Ukraine — as an object of blackmail through energy and sanctions. Israel — as an additional political argument that should help sell the audience the idea of European “sobering up” regarding Russia.

For the Israeli reader, the main conclusion here is simple.

When a European politician begins to place Israel, Zelensky, the US, Russian gas, and sanctions side by side, it is no longer just an eccentric statement.

It is a sign that the struggle for Europe’s attitude towards Russia goes far beyond the Ukrainian front and already affects the entire broader belt of crises — from Eastern Europe to the Middle East. And this means that Israel will increasingly have to monitor not only military threats in the region but also how its name is used in someone else’s game around Moscow, Brussels, and the future of European politics.

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In Moscow, at least three scenarios for the further development of the war against Ukraine are being considered, and only one of them allows for the freezing of the front line. This was stated against the backdrop of ongoing hostilities by the head of the Center for Countering Disinformation of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, Andriy Kovalenko. The very framing of the question is important because it shows that the Kremlin is not thinking about genuine peace, but about various forms of continued pressure — military, political, and informational.

For the Israeli audience, this is not an abstract Eastern European discussion. If one of the Russian scenarios indeed involves a transition from the war against Ukraine to hybrid pressure on NATO countries closer to 2028, then it is already about a broader architecture of threats.

And when the aggressor simultaneously tests the front, propaganda, drones, sabotage groups, and the theme of ‘protecting Russians,’ it begins to resemble a familiar logic of gradual escalation, which in the Middle East they also know how to read without unnecessary illusions.

What three scenarios, according to Kovalenko, is the Kremlin considering

According to Andriy Kovalenko, the Kremlin is currently calculating at least three options for the development of the war. The first scenario is the continuation of hostilities against Ukraine at least until 2028. The bet in it is on the success of the spring-summer offensive campaign, but even in this model, as noted, it will be difficult for Russia to manage without additional mobilization.

This is an important detail.

It shows that even with all the military rhetoric, Moscow has structural limitations. A long war requires not only weapons and propaganda but also a constant replenishment of human resources. This means that the talk of war until 2028 is not just a fantasy of endless offensives, but a scenario that hinges on the internal resilience of Russia itself.

The second option is a gradual drift towards a ceasefire and freezing of the war. But even here, judging by the description, it is not about rethinking aggression, but about trying to formalize a pause in a form convenient for Moscow. That is why Russian propaganda, it is claimed, is already partially preparing the audience for such a turn, spreading theses that Putin is allegedly poorly informed about the real situation on the front, and the stalemate arose due to the generals’ lies.

Such an informational technique is well recognizable.

When a regime wants to save face, it often begins to shift responsibility down the vertical — to the entourage, the military, the executors, ‘incorrect reports.’ This allows not to completely deny the problem but also not to acknowledge one’s own strategic guilt.

Why the third scenario looks especially dangerous

The third scenario, voiced by Kovalenko, involves the continuation of the war against Ukraine with a subsequent transition to hybrid confrontation with NATO closer to 2028. Among the potential targets in this case are the Baltic countries, and the format of actions may include drone attacks and the penetration of small sabotage-reconnaissance groups.

It is here that the Ukrainian assessment goes far beyond the Ukrainian front itself.

If this scenario at least partially corresponds to real reflections in Moscow, then the Kremlin sees the war not as a separate campaign against Ukraine, but as a long arc of pressure on the entire eastern flank of Europe. And then the Ukrainian front becomes only the first and largest stage of a broader plan.

For Israel, this has a separate meaning. Israeli society knows too well that hybrid aggression rarely begins with a full-scale invasion. More often, it goes differently: first, informational agitation, then provocations, then limited strikes, then testing reactions, and only then — an attempt to move the crisis to a new phase.

How Russia may be preparing the ground for new escalation

According to Kovalenko, Russia is already preparing informational pretexts that in the future may be used as justification for expanding pressure. Among such topics are mentioned ‘military factories’ in NATO countries, as well as stories about the use of the airspace of the Baltic countries for attacks by Ukrainian drones.

This looks like typical narrative preparation.

First, an idea is thrown in, then it is repeatedly repeated through loyal platforms, then it is overgrown with details, and after that, it begins to be perceived as an allegedly natural reason for retaliatory actions. This is how a political smokescreen is built before the next round of aggression.

The topic of Narva draws particular attention. The mention of this Estonian city in such a context is not accidental: Moscow traditionally likes to look for zones where it can speculate on the theme of the Russian-speaking population, historical memory, and ‘protection of compatriots.’ It is through such plots that the Kremlin has tried for many years to legitimize interference in the affairs of neighboring states.

In addition, Russia is expanding formal powers for the use of the army abroad under the pretext of protecting those who are declared ‘persecuted Russians’ there. This is a dangerous legal-propagandistic link. First, an image of a threat is created, then a pseudo-legal basis is brought under it, and only after that does the opportunity for a ‘gray operation’ appear, which can be presented as forced.

NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency in this context may consider Kovalenko’s warning not as an emotional statement, but as an important signal: Russia continues to think in terms of a protracted war, where informational preparation and military pressure go hand in hand, and Ukraine remains only the central, but not necessarily the last direction of attack.

Is true peace possible in such logic

Against this backdrop, the question of peace sounds especially heavy. Formally, one of the scenarios indeed involves a ceasefire and freezing of the front. But in essence, even this option does not mean the Kremlin’s abandonment of the very idea of war as a tool of politics.

This is perhaps the main conclusion.

Moscow can change the pace, form, intensity, and public rhetoric. It can pretend to seek a pause, blame the generals, complain about circumstances, or test diplomatic formulas. But if scenarios of a protracted war and hybrid aggression against NATO are maintained in parallel, then talking about genuine peace is premature.

In such a picture, Ukraine remains not just a victim of the current invasion, but a barrier that prevents Russia from moving to the next stage of pressure. That is why the initial assessment contains the idea that only the Armed Forces of Ukraine now prevent the Kremlin from realizing broader plans.

Why this topic is important for Israel

For the Israeli reader, all this matters not only because of Ukraine as such. Here, the universal logic of a revisionist power is visible, which does not stop at one crisis but constantly seeks new opportunities to expand instability, test the weak points of opponents, and use pauses only to prepare the next step.

Israel knows too well the price of complacency.

When an aggressor begins to simultaneously work through the army, special services, sabotage groups, psychological pressure, and informational constructs, it is naive to hope that one tactical pause will automatically turn into strategic peace. Therefore, Ukrainian assessments of the three Kremlin scenarios are of interest to Israel not only as news from the European front but also as a textbook on how modern authoritarian regimes plan long-term confrontation.

Based on the described logic, the most realistic question today is not ‘does the Kremlin want peace,’ but ‘what form of war does it consider beneficial for itself at the next stage.’ And it is precisely the answer to this question that largely determines not only the future of Ukraine but also the level of risk for all of Europe in the coming years.

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In March 2026, Ukraine saw Israel not as a country leading in sympathies and not as an unconditional outsider, but as a state with a controversial, unstable, and noticeably weakened image. This conclusion follows from a joint study by Active Group and Experts Club, where sociologists examined Ukrainians’ attitudes towards 50 countries among Ukraine’s largest trading partners. The survey was conducted using a self-completion questionnaire in an online panel, with 800 respondents participating, and the declared margin of error does not exceed 3.5%. The study was presented in early April 2026 at a press conference at “Interfax-Ukraine“.

For Israel, this result is unpleasant primarily because it ended up in the middle zone of perception. It is no longer the status of a country to which Ukrainian society automatically feels warmth. But it is also not a failure at the level of China or Hungary, which received much harsher assessments in the study. Israel in Ukrainian perception today is more of a country with limited sympathy, a high level of doubt, and a growing share of irritation.

What is this survey and why is it important

The study was presented in April 2026 at a press conference at “Interfax-Ukraine”. Its authors attempted to connect two planes: Ukraine’s real foreign trade and the emotional attitude of society towards partner countries. The founder of Experts Club, Maksym Urakin, directly formulated the framework of the study: modern international economics is no longer just about import and export figures, but also about trust, reputation, political proximity, humanitarian presence, and a sense of partnership at the societal level.

This is especially important during wartime.

Sociologists particularly emphasize that Ukrainian public opinion today is sensitive to the foreign policy context, the informational background, personal experience of interaction with citizens of other countries, and the perception of whether a particular state helps Ukraine achieve peace, stability, and recovery. That is why a country’s trade weight and sympathy towards it can diverge significantly.

Israel is almost perfectly indicative for such an analysis.

It is not among Ukraine’s top trading giants in the top ten of this study, but it remains a noticeable and recognizable country, whose attitude is shaped not only by economics but also by politics, war, media background, and the expectations of Ukrainian society. According to the study based on statistics from the State Customs Service of Ukraine, Israel ranks 29th in total trade turnover with Ukraine, amounting to $714.7 million; imports from Israel slightly exceed Ukrainian exports, so the bilateral balance is moderately negative for Ukraine.

Where exactly is Israel in the sympathy ranking

In March 2026, positive attitudes towards Israel amounted to 38.7%. Of these, 12.6% of respondents chose the option “completely positive,” and another 26.1% “mostly positive.” A neutral position was taken by 38.2% of respondents, which is a lot. Negative attitudes totaled 19.8%, including 14.7% “mostly negative” and 5.1% “completely negative.” Another 3.3% found it difficult to answer.

The most alarming part for Israel is not only the numbers themselves but their dynamics. In August 2025, positive attitudes towards Israel were noticeably higher at 44.7%, and negative attitudes were lower, only 13.7%. By March 2026, positivity decreased by 6 percentage points, and negativity increased by 6.1 points. This is no longer statistical noise but a tangible deterioration in the country’s reputational position in Ukrainian society.

When comparing Israel with the leaders of sympathies, the gap looks very large.

In the study, the highest levels of positive attitudes were received by Germany — 77.4%, Lithuania — 75%, France — 74%, the United Kingdom — 74%, Sweden — 72.5%, Japan — 71.8%, Italy — 70%, and the Czech Republic — 67%. Even without additional interpretations, it is clear that Israel, with its 38.7%, is not just below the leaders but almost twice as low as the first group of countries that Ukrainians perceive as the closest and most reliable.

Even countries in the so-called “medium-positive” circle look better.

The article separately mentions Poland and Turkey: 56% of respondents have a positive attitude towards Poland with 14.7% negative ratings, and 55% towards Turkey with 5.6% negative. This means that Israel lags not only behind Germany or the UK but also behind those countries around which there are also complex discussions, contradictions, and pragmatic approaches.

At the same time, Israel is indeed not in the camp of countries with an openly bad reputation.

China received only 23% positive ratings against 42% negative, Hungary — 18.6% positive against 52% negative. The USA, although still above Israel, also shows not a brilliant result: 44.1% positive against 24.7% negative. Against this background, Israel is not an anti-record but rather a middle, shaky zone where there is neither stable love nor complete rejection.

Who leads in positivity and who falls into the negative

The leaders of trust in the study are mainly countries that in Ukrainian perception are associated with clear support, political proximity, and European solidarity.

Germany, Lithuania, France, the UK, Sweden, Japan, Italy, and the Czech Republic make up the top part of the ranking. At the bottom are those whose policies cause irritation, distrust, or a sense of cynicism: China and Hungary are named by the authors as the most striking examples of poor emotional perception despite their significant role in Ukraine’s international relations.

Israel in this construct does not fall down, but it does not rise up either. This is its current problem: the country is too noticeable to dissolve into neutrality, but not clear enough to Ukrainian society to enter the circle of emotionally close partners. It is appropriate to say directly here: for the audience closely monitored by NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency, this is one of the most unpleasant signals of the study. It’s not about hostility towards Israel, but about losing a clear positive image.

Why Israel has declined and what it should reconsider

The authors of the study do not provide a separate long list of reasons specifically for Israel, but they give a general framework from which the conclusion is quite clear. Sociologists and participants in the presentation emphasize that attitudes towards countries are formed through political context, social media, cultural stereotypes, personal experience, and a sense of strategic partnership.

A large share of neutral responses, according to sociologists, usually indicates a lack of personal experience or a lack of a clear public image of the country.

In relation to Israel, it looks like this: almost 38.2% neutral ratings mean that a huge part of Ukrainians does not have a stable, clearly formed position.

But at the same time, the negative segment is growing.

And this already indicates that the informational background around Israel in Ukrainian society has become more contradictory, less unambiguous, and less favorable than before. This is exactly what Open4Business writes about, noting that Israel is shifting into a group of countries with a more polarized image.

There is also another important logic that Urakin directly points to.

If society sees a powerful flow of imports from a particular country but does not see a symmetrical flow of investments, technologies, localization of production, humanitarian participation, educational programs, or real involvement in recovery, a sense of imbalance arises. This is no longer just economics, but emotional politics of perception. And although this thought is formulated in the study in general terms, it is almost literally applicable to Israel.

What Israel should reconsider if it does not want to be entrenched in the Ukrainian consciousness as a “middle” country without a reserve of trust?

Firstly, the language of presence. The authors of the study directly say that foreign representations should speak to Ukrainian society not with abstract diplomatic language, but with the language of concrete benefits: jobs, investments, humanitarian projects, logistics, medicine, education, recovery. For Israel, this means that general words about friendship are not enough. Clear, visible, measurable stories of presence are needed.

Secondly, regional visibility. The study separately states that diplomatic missions should work more actively not only in Kyiv but also in the regions. This is an important signal. If a country wants a real reputational effect, it must be noticeable not only in capital offices and at the level of statements but also in universities, hospitals, energy, processing, technological clusters, and local humanitarian initiatives.

Thirdly, the link “trade plus participation.” The turnover of $714.7 million does not automatically turn into sympathy. Moreover, the small negative balance for Ukraine makes the question especially important: what does Ukrainian society get from these relations besides trade. Israel should think not only about bilateral trade exchange but also about how its participation looks in Ukrainian everyday reality — in recovery, technological partnership, medical programs, educational opportunities, and local investments.

And finally, Israel should reconsider its public image strategy in Ukraine.

Because now the numbers speak not of hatred, but of the blurring of sympathy.

And this is more dangerous than it seems.

A country perceived sharply negatively is at least understandable. A country that ends up in the middle zone risks falling out of the circle of emotionally significant partners. For a state that claims special relations with Ukraine and relies on long-term trust, this is already a serious signal.

The result of the study for Israel sounds harsh but accurate: it has not become a “bad country” for Ukrainians, but it has also ceased to be obviously “its own.”

The March 2026 survey shows Israel as a state in the middle — far from the leaders of trust, below most countries with a consistently positive image, but still outside the camp of outright negativity. And if this dynamic is not reversed, the next wave of measurements may be even less comfortable for Israel.

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Tickets are already on sale! Part of the proceeds will be donated to support the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the Israel Defense Forces.

NAnovosti continues to follow important events in the world of music, and for all fans of Ukrainian culture in Israel, a unique offer is ready. On May 6, 2026, Tel Aviv will become the center of a musical event that many have been waiting for — a concert by Ukrainian singer YAKTAK.

YAKTAK

After a successful European tour that gathered thousands of spectators, YAKTAK will bring his music to the heart of Israel — Havana Music Club.

YAKTAK is a name that is known in many countries today. Young, but already one of the most sought-after artists of the generation, he continues to gain popularity actively. His songs “Endorphin”, “Sky”, “Gaze”, and “At Night” have already become soundtracks for thousands of stories around the world, and now Israelis will be able to hear them live.

“Silent” (soundtrack to the project “Mavka”), “C’est la vie”, “Ultramarine” and other new tracks actively playing in 2025–2026.

Listen – https://www.youtube.com/@YAKTAK_OFFICIAL

The influence of Ukrainian music on the world stage is undeniable, and it is no coincidence that YAKTAK is in the spotlight. This concert in Israel promises to be unforgettable.

The success story of YAKTAK

Yaroslav Mykolayovych Karpuk, better known by the pseudonym YAKTAK, began his career as a participant in the 5th season of the Ukrainian show “Voice. Children”, where he not only reached the super-final but also took second place. Since 2021, he has been actively developing his solo project, creating unique musical compositions and collaborating with well-known artists such as Jerry Heil, MamaRika, SOBOL, and many others.

Since February 2022, YAKTAK officially launched his solo project, and his popularity quickly gained momentum. His songs in the pop and hip-hop genres resonated with a young audience, as well as more mature listeners who appreciate sincerity and talent. In 2024, YAKTAK even participated in the national selection for the Eurovision 2024 contest, demonstrating his versatility as an artist.

This will not be just a concert. An atmosphere that cannot be conveyed in words, hits sung by the entire hall, emotions that remain for a long time — this is how the organizers describe the upcoming event. The entrance ticket will provide a unique opportunity to become part of this musical journey and support not only culture but also the military who are at the center of the struggle for the independence and security of Ukraine and Israel.

Part of the proceeds will be donated to support the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the Israel Defense Forces

Special attention should be paid to the social component of this concert. Part of the proceeds from ticket sales will be donated to support the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the Israel Defense Forces, emphasizing the mutual support and solidarity of the two peoples, including the Jewish people, who have deep ties with Ukraine. This event goes beyond music and becomes a symbol of unity in difficult times.

Why should you attend the YAKTAK concert in Tel Aviv?

• The musical event of the year — YAKTAK — is one of the brightest representatives of Ukrainian music on the international stage.
• Extraordinary atmosphere — YAKTAK concerts are always filled with emotions and energy that are hard to forget.
• Support for the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the Israel Defense Forces — you can not only enjoy the concert but also contribute to an important cause.
• A unique opportunity for Israelis of Ukrainian descent — support for Ukrainian culture in Israel.

NAnovosti – news of Israel reminds all fans of Ukrainian music that the YAKTAK concert in Tel Aviv on May 6, 2026, is not just a concert, it is support for two nations, a meeting of cultures, and a symbol of solidarity. Tickets for the event are already on sale, and this is a chance to become part of something important, feel unity, and hear music that captures the soul.

Don’t miss this event — come, support, and enjoy beautiful music!

Tickets

YAKTAK concert in Tel Aviv: what to expect?

Date: May 6, 2026
Time: 20:00
Venue: Havana Music Club, Tel Aviv, Yigal Alon St 126
Tickets:

Link to purchase tickets

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Although they are Muslims and are often grouped with the Druze, the Circassians are neither ethnically Arabs nor even from the historical Levantine region — they are… Circassians and originate from the Black Sea region of the Caucasus.

In many ways, their history is similar to that of the Jews, with exile and genocide, preserving their culture and traditions while longing for their homeland, writes the Jerusalem Post.

Kfar Kama, one of the two Circassian villages in Israel, is located in the Lower Galilee near Kfar Tavor. This year, the UN World Tourism Organization selected it for inclusion in the list of tourist villages recommended for visiting in 2022, making it one of the 32 UNWTO-recognized “tourist villages” in the world. Last year, when this title was first given, 44 villages were chosen.

The smaller sister village of Kfar Kama, Rehaniya, is located on the border with Lebanon near Safed.

The UNWTO award ceremony will take place in Saudi Arabia on February 26, with representatives from Israel’s Ministry of Tourism and Kfar Kama attending.

The details of the actual logistics of the Israeli delegation’s visit to a country with which Israel has no official diplomatic relations have yet to be clarified, according to Nira Fisher, director of the ministry’s international relations, who accompanied Kfar Kama in the application process.

Refugee Village

“Kfar-Kama is not just another village in Israel,” stated Zakaria Napso, head of the Kfar-Kama local council.

“It is a settlement of refugees who came here a century and a half ago by force, after we were expelled… by the Russian Empire from our homeland in the Caucasus.

But despite the years that have passed, we have managed to preserve our language, culture, and cuisine. We are the largest authentic [Circassian] village. This is what sets us apart from other exiles; we make a lot of effort to preserve our traditions.”

According to him, the fact that they are so often grouped with the Druze in budgetary matters is largely due to being granted minority status by the government, serving in the army. But they work hard to make the distinctions between them known, he said.

Both Circassian villages in Israel were founded about 150 years ago — four years before Rosh Pina, the first Jewish agricultural settlement in the Galilee — survivors of the Circassian genocide and the expulsion of Circassians from their native land in the Caucasus at the end of the 101-year Russo-Circassian War.

Jewish newcomers to the Yishuv and Circassian refugees found common ground in their history of persecution by the Russians and knowledge of the Russian language, as well as cooperation in agriculture and security.

Located in an area of strategic importance to various empires, the Caucasus and its peoples found themselves caught in the crossfire of various political interests after the Russian Empire sought to impose its influence in the region between the Black and Caspian Seas (some things don’t seem to change) and rid it of predominantly Muslim ethnic tribes, including Chechens and Circassians.

The Tsarist Russian Empire and the weakening Ottoman Empire fought for control of the territory from 1763 to 1864, resulting in the death of about 2 million Circassians, with 90% of the remaining population being expelled.

The last part of the Circassian army was defeated in a bloody massacre of soldiers and civilians on May 21, 1864, in Sochi, which many Circassians considered their traditional capital. Known to Circassians as the Red Hill, it was here in 2014 that skiing and snowboarding competitions were held during the Sochi Winter Olympics. Circassians claim that the Olympic Village was built on the mass graves of their slain ancestors.

“It is very difficult for us to talk about Sochi,” said Aibek Napso, director of the Kfar Kama Circassian Heritage Center, who calls himself a third-generation Israeli. Napso is a common Circassian surname, and Aibek and Zakaria are not related.

“For Circassians, saying ‘Sochi’ is like saying ‘Auschwitz’. It is a huge cemetery under the entire Olympic [construction]. More than 230,000 bodies from my tribe are buried in Sochi… We ask every country to recognize the Circassian Genocide and the need for our own state.”

He quickly added: “We are asking for land not in Israel — there are enough conflicts here — but in the Caucasus, in a place called Circassia.”

While Georgia recognizes the Circassian genocide, Russia does not.

Despite this, Napso emphasized: “If I were born 10 times, I would choose to be born in Kfar-Kama again and again. It is like a piece of paradise.”

Arrival in the Promised Land

Survivors of the 1864 genocide sought refuge with the Ottoman Empire, which saw them as a group of experienced fighters.

“The sick man of Europe” — as the Ottoman Empire was called by Tsar Nicholas I — sent them across the sea on arduous journeys, many of which did not survive, mainly to the Middle East to protect territories under Ottoman control from nomadic Bedouin tribes in what are now Jordan, Syria, and Israel.

There are also exiled Circassian communities in Europe, the USA, and Turkey, where the majority of the community resides, but only a small Circassian community remains on the historical lands of Circassia, which are now controlled by Russia.

But in the quiet and extraordinarily clean village of Kfar-Kama, home to about 3,300 residents, the memory of the homeland is visible everywhere, in the names of streets — named after Circassian cultural traditions, regions, and 12 Circassian tribes, which are written on street signs in Hebrew, Arabic, and Circassian — and businesses with traditional Circassian names. Mount Elbrus, after which the Thakoo cheese factory is named, is the highest peak in the Caucasus Mountains in the western part of the Caucasus, on the territory that is now the Russian-Georgian border.

“Israel is the only place where you have Circassian street names,” said Aibek Napso.

Preserving Ancestral Memory

The connection to the community’s ancestral homeland, which was divided by Russia into separate southern republics of Adygea, Karachay-Cherkessia, and Kabardino-Balkaria, is also preserved in the form of traditional dishes, dances, and language, which it resolutely maintains.

Thanks to its educational system, which it has managed separately from the Arab sector since 1976, the community ensures the transmission of its culture to the younger generation.

Along with Circassian history and traditions, schoolchildren are taught the Adyghe Circassian language, as well as Hebrew, Arabic, and English. Due to its complexity, the language has been preserved mainly in spoken form.

The village has two elementary schools where boys and girls study together, and several kindergartens. Circassian youth attend the local council’s high school together with Jewish students.

“90% of the Circassian population in 50 different countries no longer speaks this language,” noted Aibek Napso. “I believe that by the end of the century, there will not be a single Circassian left on this planet.”

Since there are fewer than 5,000 Circassians in Israel, he is used to explaining to Israelis who his people are and where they come from.

“After all the time we’ve lived here, we still need to explain who we are,” he said.

Sometimes there are minor verbal skirmishes with co-religionists because, on the one hand, Circassians are Muslims. But on the other hand, they are not Arabs, he said. But overall, Circassians have good relations with everyone.

Indeed, Circassians also maintain a connection with their distant pagan past by celebrating their New Year on March 22, the day after the vernal equinox.

Many Israeli football fans know about the Circassian community thanks to Bibras Natcho, who plays as a midfielder for the Serbian club Partizan and is the captain of the Israeli national team.

In every country where they reside, Circassian communities have assimilated with the majority society, and these days, although young people from the Circassian community serve in the IDF, the community prefers to maintain neutrality regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Easy Does It

According to him, Aibek Napso hopes that inclusion in the UN list will attract more attention to the unique cultural and historical heritage of his community. At the same time, however, he said he intends to help implement a careful and measured process of attracting tourists to his village in a way that is sustainable and manageable, so as not to disrupt its unique way of life.

Since the village is already of interest to a certain segment of Israelis, such as local school groups and retirees, residents want to ensure that it does not turn into Daliyat al-Karmel of souvenir shops and grilled meat restaurants. According to Aibek Napso, parking will need to be organized outside the village, sufficient public toilets provided, and strict waste disposal rules enforced.

“Last week, in addition to our residents, there were 1,000 tourists in Kfar-Kama in their cars,” he said. According to him, the quiet streets of the village, where some people move around in golf carts, are not suitable for such a number of traffic jams, and a solution will need to be found.

“It’s a lot, a lot. We have some concerns; not all tourists may be educated, and if there are 1,000 people, 500 are enough to throw their cigarette butts or water bottles on the street instead of in the trash can to [pollute the village]. We want to do it step by step and educate them. We are also learning. This is something new for us.”

In the Heritage Center he manages, visitors will be able to arrange a visit to watch a short video presentation about the history of the Circassians and see the center’s small but interesting exhibition dedicated to items from the daily life of the Circassians.

People will be able to walk through the narrow streets of the old town, see old houses built of basalt stones, and notice small details of bygone times, such as a tiny metal window latch in the shape of a person on a house, sometimes used by a young lady being courted to let her suitor know by tilting the latch whether it was safe for him to visit the house, whether her parents were home or not.

The uniquely shaped village mosque embodies the three different stages the community has gone through: the square bottom represents the shape of traditional Circassian houses; the middle octagonal part symbolizes the transition the Circassians underwent; and the minaret denotes the Ottoman Empire, explained Aibek Napso.

“Rural tourism can introduce people to other cultures and provide economic [growth] in small places,” said Fisher. “We want to start communicating [with other villages] to learn how to do tourism properly and find solutions to problems.”

Currently, the village has four bed-and-breakfast hotels, as well as other accommodation options in the surrounding area, including in Kfar Tavor and hotels in Tiberias, which is a 20-minute drive away.

“We don’t want the impact of this designation to remain only in this area but also in the surrounding circles. We want to preserve the uniqueness of the village. We don’t want tourists walking around the neighborhood 24 hours a day.”

Connections with the International Circassian Diaspora

Young Circassians in Israel attend annual summer camps, and there is an international exchange with other Circassian communities abroad, allowing for the maintenance of cultural and national ties, as well as helping young Circassians get to know each other, encouraging marriages within the community, while being exposed to the “brotherhood of Circassians,” said Aibek Napso.

The community does not approve of mixed marriages to preserve its cultural identity, but there are about 20 mixed marriages in the village, including with Russians, Ukrainians, and Israeli Jews. He noted that there are few mixed marriages with Arab Muslims due to cultural differences.

Most young people from the village return to Kfar-Kama after studying and traveling, added Aibek Napso.

“We have our unique goal, and everyone lives with one goal: to be Circassian,” he said.

Sixty-eight percent of young Circassian women pursue higher academic education in various disciplines such as high technology, nursing, accounting, law, and business management, while only 38 percent of young men do so after military service.

“Military service has its consequences,” said Zakaria Napso, noting that men usually work in local industries and businesses.

The birth rate among the Circassian community in Israel is low, averaging 1.6 children per couple, and this is a concern, says Zakaria Napso, who has four children, all with professional education.

“This is a problem now because young couples are busy with their lives and careers, and this affects the number of children they have,” he said. “For our community to survive, there should be an average of two children.”

Being a Bridge

He said that over the past 10 years, the local council has tried to fill the gaps in infrastructure and planning that existed between Kfar-Kama and its neighbors, partly due to government neglect and partly due to poor local governance and a lack of knowledge about how the planning system works at the village level. He said there is a master plan for the village.

“We have invested a lot in [closing the gaps],” he said. “Now we have all the permits for the master plan.”

According to him, living in the Lower Galilee, they have good relations with all their neighbors and cooperate with local councils.

“There is no racism in our area,” he added. “We cooperate with Arabs and Jews. We have managed to build a bridge between them.”

In addition to the Circassian cheeses of the Elbrus Dairy, visitors to Kfar Kama are attracted by traditional Circassian food. Entrepreneur Suzie Ashmuz opened Suzie’s Kitchen, a home-cooked restaurant where visitors can pre-order traditional Circassian dishes such as matza, cheese-filled pastries; haluz, fried bread; khajagas-pasta, a dish similar to polenta with a fried vegetable filling khajagas-nataf; and round date cookies called halgujhan. Just don’t expect to find hummus on the table.

Romantic and Bold Traditional Dance

Marriages with Circassians from abroad have also brought new initiatives to the village. A German Circassian who married a local opened a German waffle shop.

Rustam Apsha, a Russian Circassian who married a local woman, became a football coach and teaches dance in a traditional Circassian dance troupe, which provides a very colorful spectacle.

Traditionally, the dance gave young people the opportunity to connect with each other, as a young woman used her subtle movements to give subtle hints to her potential suitors whether courting attempts were welcome or not.

“I know that there are Circassians in Syria and Turkey, but I wanted to see what it’s like here. It’s better than Turkey; there’s democracy here,” said 40-year-old Apsha, a father of two. “I just want to live. It’s more comfortable here. There [in Russia] it’s not so free. Here we can commemorate May 21, the day of our genocide. Every year we walk from our village to the Knesset.”

As in other communities, many unique traditions are disappearing as young people are drawn into the pop culture of mobile phones and social media apps, but food and beautiful traditional dances have retained their significance for much of the Circassian community at weddings and public events.

The traditional dance troupe led by Apsha is a popular ensemble in the village. With men in fur hats, long coats with belts studded with [fake] bullets and daggers, and women dressed in long, flowing, intricately embroidered dresses and tall characteristic headpieces, the performances are both romantic and bold. With their graceful movements, the women seem to float above the ground, while the men fiercely jump and spin in steps stemming from their warrior past.

“For us as a community, it is very important to maintain our culture,” said 19-year-old Nafna Napso, a dancer in the Kfar Kama dance troupe. “Not all Circassians in other parts of the world speak Circassian, but wherever we are, what unites us is what we do together — our traditional dances.”

She noted that in everyday life she usually speaks Hebrew with her friends, but when she sends texts, she uses Hebrew letters to write in Circassian.

“We are very welcome here, even though we are not Middle Easterners and live here [in Kfar-Kama] very differently,” she said. “This is our home, and Circassia is our homeland.”

Discuss:

Who are the Circassians of northern Israel?

Who are the Circassians of northern Israel? – source Jerusalem Post.

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Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar publicly thanked Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on April 16, 2026, for legislative changes introducing criminal liability for manifestations of anti-Semitism. For Israel and Jewish communities outside the country, such a step by Kyiv has not only legal but also symbolic significance: it is a state confirmation that anti-Semitism is considered not as a private incident but as a dangerous phenomenon requiring a separate and tough response at the level of law.

This statement was made against the backdrop of the ongoing war, political turbulence, and Ukraine’s constant struggle for international support. That is why, in the Israeli perception, the news seems particularly significant: even in wartime conditions, the Ukrainian authorities demonstrate that the issue of protecting the Jewish community and countering hate crimes remains part of state policy.

Why Sa’ar’s statement is important for Israel

According to the head of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, the amendments to the Ukrainian Criminal Code have become an important step in the fight against hate crimes, primarily anti-Semitism. In Israeli political and public discourse, such signals are always considered carefully because they directly concern the security of Jewish communities, historical memory, and the state’s attitude towards one of the most painful topics in Jewish history.

For the Israeli audience, the diplomatic context is also important here. The gratitude expressed at the level of the foreign minister means that in Jerusalem, this step by Kyiv was noticed and considered worthy of a separate public assessment. In the current conditions, this is not formal politeness but a political signal that such legislative decisions can strengthen trust between countries.

What exactly the head of the Israeli Foreign Ministry said

Gideon Sa’ar stated that he expresses gratitude to President Zelensky and Ukraine for amending the Criminal Code, which introduces criminal liability for manifestations of anti-Semitism. He emphasized that these changes are an important step in the fight against hate crimes, especially anti-Semitism.

Such an emphasis is not accidental. For Israel, it is fundamentally important when a foreign state does not limit itself to declarations of tolerance but enshrines responsibility in criminal legislation. This moves the topic from the realm of moral statements to the realm of concrete law and practical enforcement.

How Ukraine approached this decision

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signed the corresponding law on April 14, 2026. The bill itself was adopted by the Verkhovna Rada back in February 2022, but it was the signing of the document that completed the legislative procedure and opened the way for its full implementation.

This time gap between adoption and finalization also deserves attention. It shows that even in the conditions of a major war, Ukraine returns to issues of internal legal architecture and brings to completion decisions that are significant for national memory policy, interethnic relations, and the country’s international image.

Why this is important not only for Ukraine

Anti-Semitism for the Jewish world is never exclusively an internal issue of one country. Any law that strengthens responsibility for such manifestations becomes a marker of a broader trend: whether the state is ready to protect minorities, call the problem by its name, and act not in words but through legal mechanisms.

That is why this news goes beyond Ukrainian domestic politics. It concerns both Israel and the Jewish diaspora, and indeed the entire European discussion on how states should respond to the rise of hatred, radicalization, and xenophobia.

NAnews — News of Israel | Nikk.Agency in this context also draws attention to the symbolic side of the decision. When Ukraine, under the heaviest military pressure, formally strengthens the punishment for anti-Semitism, it is perceived as an attempt to establish a clear value line: the Jewish community, like other groups of citizens, must be protected not declaratively but by law.

What this changes for Israel-Ukraine relations

For bilateral relations between Israel and Ukraine, such steps can have a long-term effect. They create an additional basis for political dialogue, especially on sensitive issues of historical memory, community security, and public assessment of manifestations of hatred.

Israel, as a state, is extremely attentive to any forms of anti-Semitism abroad. Therefore, Sa’ar’s positive reaction seems logical: Jerusalem demonstrates that it is ready to publicly support those decisions that strengthen the legal protection of Jews and fix the inadmissibility of anti-Semitic actions at the level of criminal law.

The broader meaning of this step

For the Israeli reader, it is important to see not only a diplomatic remark in this story but also a broader process. Ukraine shows that it seeks to build a modern legal model in which anti-Semitism is directly recognized as a criminal act, not dissolved in general formulations about hatred.

Against the backdrop of European debates on the boundaries of freedom of speech, political radicalization, and growing tensions around national and religious identity, such a step by Kyiv looks like a clear and legally formalized statement. And that is why the gratitude expressed by the Israeli minister carries much more weight than an ordinary diplomatic comment.

In the end, it is not just about an amendment to the criminal code and not only about a formal exchange of courtesies between politicians. This is a story about how a legislative decision within Ukraine became an important signal for Israel, the Jewish world, and the entire discussion about whether a state is truly capable of protecting its citizens from hatred. In the current international atmosphere, such signals become especially noticeable and politically significant.

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Ukraine is getting closer to the moment when the conversation about robots stops being futurology and turns into a question of economic survival. Against the backdrop of war, labor shortages, pressure on the labor market, and severe demographic dynamics, automation no longer looks like an expensive whim but as one of the few real answers to the crisis. It’s not just about factories, warehouses, and logistics, but also about the front, where technology has long ceased to be an addition and has become part of the very structure of war.

For the Israeli audience, this topic is especially understandable. Israel also lives in the logic of constant technological adaptation, where security, labor shortages, high labor costs, and competition for efficiency push businesses and the state towards automation faster than in more peaceful countries. That is why the Ukrainian conversation about robotization is interesting not as an exotic, but as an example of how the pressure of war and the economy together launch a new industrial model.

The material underlying this article raises the main question: are robots — including humanoid platforms — capable of at least partially compensating for Ukraine’s shortage of people, reducing the burden on the labor market, and supporting the economy in conditions of prolonged war and demographic decline. The answer is not simple, but quite indicative: yes, robots can help, but not as an instant replacement for humans, but as part of a deep restructuring of the entire labor system.

Why Ukraine finds it increasingly difficult to do without robotization

The labor shortage in Ukraine is felt on several fronts today. People are needed in the army, people are needed in production, people are needed in logistics, trade, repair, agriculture, and many everyday processes. Against this backdrop, the very idea that part of the physical, repetitive, dangerous, or routine work can be transferred to machines stops being a theoretical discussion. It becomes a matter of practical management of the country in a state of war.

At the same time, the Ukrainian robot market cannot yet be called mature. Rather, it is an early stage of the industry, where standards, formats, and the most viable models are being sought. The text emphasizes that the global humanoid robot industry has already moved beyond laboratory demonstrations and is moving towards the first commercial cases, but it is still far from mass household use. This means that Ukraine is entering this race at a time when the rules of the game are not yet fully established.

A robot is not always better than a human, but increasingly more useful in a specific task

One of the key conclusions of the material is that a humanoid robot is not a universal winner over humans in all areas. On the contrary, today such machines are often more complex, more expensive, and less energy-efficient than specialized solutions: drones, robotic arms, mobile platforms, and other systems created for a specific function.

But humanoids have another advantage. They are potentially capable of working in an environment already built for humans: using stairs, interacting with shelves, carts, warehouses, premises, and familiar infrastructure without a complete restructuring of the space. And this is what makes them especially interesting for those industries where a complete replacement of infrastructure is too expensive or almost impossible.

Another important thought is that it’s not so much about displacing people as it is about changing the structure of employment. Robots can cover heavy, monotonous, and physically exhausting work areas, but at the same time create demand for operators, integration engineers, maintenance specialists, management, and training of robotic systems. In other words, jobs do not automatically disappear — they change.

American, Chinese, and Ukrainian models: where is Kyiv’s place in the new industry

On the global market, two forces are particularly noticeable now — the USA and China. American companies set the technological vector through software, artificial intelligence, versatility, and long-term integration of robots into the economy. China focuses on scaling speed, production control, and cost reduction, turning robotics into a more accessible and faster replicable product.

In this structure, Ukraine is assigned not the role of a factory, but the role of an intellectual center. And this is perhaps one of the strongest theses of the entire text. Ukrainian companies and specialists, according to industry interlocutors, are capable of occupying a niche in the software layer: in AI, management systems, computer vision, integration of solutions for real business scenarios, navigation, simulation, and configuration of complex robotic ecosystems.

Why Ukraine’s bet is not on ‘hardware’ but on ‘brains’

Producing humanoid robots on an industrial scale will be difficult for Ukraine. The reasons are obvious: limited production base, capital shortage, strong competition from Chinese and American players, and dependence on components. But this does not mean a strategic defeat. On the contrary, the material repeatedly emphasizes that the maximum added value in the future will be concentrated precisely in the intellectual part of robotics.

For the Israeli reader, this logic is very familiar. The country does not have to win in production volume to be a leader in meaning, solution architecture, and the applied value of technologies. In this sense, the Ukrainian model looks quite viable: Chinese ‘hardware’, American AI, and Ukrainian system integration can become a working formula for a new industry in the future.

NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency sees another important strategic nerve in this story: in the 21st century, not only those who can produce win, but also those who can connect technologies, adapt them to reality, and quickly test them in extreme conditions. This is where Ukraine is already gaining experience that takes years to accumulate in peaceful economies.

War as an accelerator, not just a destroyer

The harshest and at the same time the most truthful conclusion of the material is that the war has become the main accelerator of Ukrainian robotization. Where in other countries technologies are long tested in comfortable conditions, in Ukraine they are immediately tested to the limit: under fire, in conditions of people shortage, with logistical disruptions, against the backdrop of constant pressure on infrastructure.

That is why the Ukrainian experience in drones, ground robotic complexes, exoskeletons, and automated logistics does not look like a side effect of war, but as a foundation for a future civilian technological ecosystem. Technologies first survive on the front, and then get a chance to become part of the regular economy.

Front, logistics, and production: where robots are needed in Ukraine right now

The text shows in detail that Ukraine is developing robotization in two key directions today — in the military sphere and in civilian logistics. Large companies are already testing exoskeletons and automated solutions for warehouses and cargo movement. It is openly acknowledged that humanoid robots are not yet ready for full-fledged complex operations at the human level, but business is already closely watching this evolution.

That is, at the current stage, a robot is not an independent universal employee, but a tool that enhances a human. It can consistently repeat given actions, work according to a clear scenario, take on physically heavy and monotonous operations, help where repeatability and predictability are critical. This is not a replacement for a live worker in everything, but it is no longer an experiment for the sake of a beautiful presentation.

Why humanoids are still losing to specialized systems

On the front, the attitude towards humanoid robots remains cautious. They are considered a promising but not yet mature concept. The main problems are complex mechanics, high cost, energy consumption, vulnerability in combat conditions, issues of autonomy, communication, and navigation. Therefore, in the coming years, more practical remain ground robotic complexes and other specialized platforms that have already proven their usefulness in real war.

However, the history of recent years in Ukraine shows that technologies should not be treated too condescendingly. What seemed like an expensive toy yesterday is becoming the norm on the front or in business today. This has already happened with FPV drones, with a number of ground platforms, and with other solutions that were initially perceived as niche experiments. In this sense, humanoids are at an early stage today, but their path already looks inevitable.

Will robots save Ukraine from economic collapse

If answering strictly, then no — robots themselves will not save Ukraine. They will not fix demographics, will not completely replace the labor of millions of people, and will not cancel the structural problems of war. But they can become an important bridge between the shortage of personnel and maintaining productivity, between the lack of people and the need to keep the economy, between dangerous physical work and technological compensation for human losses.

And this is the main meaning of the entire discussion. The future of Ukraine in robotics, in essence, does not boil down to the question of whether it will catch up with the USA or China. Much more important is whether the country can create its own practical contour of robotization, where the experience of war, a strong engineering school, an IT ecosystem, and real demand for automation will form a new economic support. Judging by the assessments given in the text, Ukraine indeed has such a chance.

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As is known, in 2022 The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine recognized the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria as “temporarily occupied” and condemned the genocide of the Chechen people — an important symbolic bridge between Ukrainians and the Chechen resistance.

In the photo — Jewish volunteers and representatives of the Chechen battalion hold the flag of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria — the official symbol of the unrecognized Chechen state, which in 1991–2000 actually existed on the territory of Chechnya and declared independence from Russia. Today it is mainly used in the diaspora and among supporters of Chechen independence, including Chechen volunteers in Ukraine.

The suppression of the Chechen resistance by Russia in the 1990s–2000s was accompanied by mass civilian casualties and large-scale destruction.

In the First Chechen War (1994–1996), Russian troops used carpet bombing, especially in Grozny, which was practically wiped off the face of the earth; thousands of civilians were killed, tens of thousands were wounded.

In the Second Chechen War (since 1999) the scale of violence increased even more: extrajudicial executions, “cleansing” operations with disappearances of people, torture and deportations took place. According to human rights activists, the total number of dead in the two wars ranges from 80 to 150 thousand people, including women and children, and hundreds of thousands became refugees.

These events made the flag of Ichkeria not only a symbol of independence, but also a reminder of the tragedy of a people who experienced ethnic extermination.

How are the Chechen volunteer battalions of the AFU connected to the Jewish communities of Ukraine?

The Jewish community of Shostka handed over humanitarian aid to the Chechen battalion of the AFU

In Shostka, the Jewish community handed over another batch of humanitarian aid to Ukrainian servicemen, including the Chechen battalion, which is heading to one of the most dangerous sections of the front.

This was reported by the Shostka Jewish Community on its account on August 12, 2025.

“The Shostka Jewish Community continues to support our defenders by providing tactical stretchers made using Israeli technology. These stretchers are in great demand among the military, as they are reliable, comfortable, and help save lives.

This time, the aid went to the Sheikh Mansur Chechen Battalion, which will head to the hottest direction to defend our indestructible Ukraine. Along with the stretchers, paracord bracelets, protective gloves, neck pillows, fire starters, and, of course, amulets were handed over to protect our warriors in the hottest spots.

We believe that every contribution brings us closer to victory. Victory is not far away — Ukraine will definitely win!”

Volunteer work of the Shostka Jewish Community

The Shostka Jewish Community is known for producing tactical stretchers using Israeli technology.

The production is organized by volunteers at the community base. Modern materials are used to ensure reliability and convenience. Such stretchers can withstand significant loads and allow transportation of the wounded even in difficult conditions. They can be used not only to evacuate soldiers from the battlefield but also in rescue operations — they can hold up to 200 kg.

In addition to stretchers, the community purchases and sends to the front protective gloves, warm clothing, neck pillows, fire starters, and small amulets.

Sergey Katsman, head of the Jewish community, said that the Shostka Jewish Community is the only one in Ukraine producing such stretchers, but they are ready to share the sewing technology with other cities because all Ukrainians now have one common goal — Victory.

Since February 24, 2022, Shostka, a city in the Sumy region 25 kilometers from the Russian border, has been regularly shelled. Already in the first days of the invasion, the city found itself in the zone of direct threat. In March 2022, as a result of artillery strikes, residential buildings and infrastructure were damaged.

The Shostka Jewish Community, numbering several dozen active members, from the beginning of the war organized volunteer aid together with other residents. They coordinate the collection of food, clothing, medicines, and hygiene products for those affected.

In the summer of 2025, Shostka, Sumy region, was the focus of massive attacks by Russia. Aviation, guided bombs, and Shahed drones were used, with strikes on residential neighborhoods and infrastructure.
Chronology of shelling:

Against the backdrop of constant threat, the Shostka Jewish Community continues to act: organizing collections of food, medicines, and essential items for those affected, and providing assistance to the wounded and to families who have lost their homes.

On July 28, 2025, the Shostka Jewish Community (Sumy region) appealed to city residents to support community members — Serhii and Iryna Starostenko, whose house was completely destroyed as a result of shelling, and all property was destroyed.

Chechen volunteer battalions in the Armed Forces of Ukraine

For more than ten years, Chechen volunteer formations, created from natives of Chechnya who emigrated after the First and Second Chechen Wars, have been fighting as part of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Their main goal is to continue the struggle against Russia, which they consider their historical enemy. For them, the war in Ukraine is not only support for the Ukrainian people but also part of their own national liberation struggle for the independence of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria.

Sheikh Mansur Battalion

It was to this battalion that the Shostka Jewish Community has now provided assistance.

Formed in 2014, mainly from Chechens who left Chechnya after the Second Chechen War. Initially part of the Volunteer Ukrainian Corps “Right Sector,” later — of the Ukrainian Volunteer Army. Named after the late 18th-century Caucasian leader Sheikh Mansur, who led the highlanders’ uprising against the Russian Empire. This is one of the largest volunteer battalions in Ukraine, which took part in battles in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, and after 2022 — also in the southern directions.

Dzhokhar Dudayev Battalion

Also created in 2014. Composed mainly of Chechen emigrants who left their homeland after the Second Chechen War. Named after the first president of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, Dzhokhar Dudayev, who was killed by Russian troops in 1996. The battalion’s motto is “Freedom or Death!”. The unit is actively fighting on the fronts, seeing Ukraine’s victory as an important step towards the possible liberation of Chechnya.

Khamzat Gelayev Battalion

A formation created in 2022, named after Chechen field commander Ruslan (Khamzat) Gelayev, one of the symbols of resistance to Russia. The battalion quickly became part of the AFU’s combat operations, participating in assault actions and reconnaissance.

Other Chechen formations

In addition to these three main battalions, the following fight on Ukraine’s side:

• Separate Special Purpose Battalion of the Armed Forces of the ChRI;
• Special Operations Group “SOG”;
• Assault Battalion “Shalena Zgraya” (“Mad Pack”);
• Volunteer Battalion “Crimea”;
• Muslim Corps “Caucasus”.

Why Chechen battalions fight for Ukraine

For the fighters of these units, the war in Ukraine is a chance to continue the struggle they began on their native land against Russian occupation. They believe that Russia’s defeat in Ukraine will also bring the liberation of Chechnya closer. Many fighters have combat experience gained in the Caucasus mountains and use it to help Ukrainian troops with reconnaissance, sabotage operations, and urban combat.

As of the end of 2022, the number of Chechen volunteers in the AFU was estimated at about 2,000 people, but there are no exact and up-to-date figures for 2025 — many formations do not disclose their numbers for security reasons.

Historical connection between Mountain Jews and Chechens

The ancestors of the Mountain Jews (Juhuri) arrived in the Caucasus presumably in the 5th century CE from Persia, where their forebears had settled in the 8th century BCE from ancient Israel. Their language — Mountain Jewish (Juhuri) — belongs to the southwestern group of Judeo-Iranian languages. The Mountain Jews practiced Judaism according to the Sephardic rite and had their own writing, literature, and religious books, including the prayer book “Rabbi Yechiel Sevi.”

From the 19th century, during the Caucasian War and the annexation of the region by the Russian Empire, Mountain Jews lived in Chechnya, Dagestan, and neighboring areas, including Grozny, Vedeno, Itum-Kali, and mountain auls. Their neighbors were Chechens — Sunni Muslims — with whom relations of mutual respect and trust were established. Trade routes, crafts, and common enemies (first the tsarist, then the Soviet repressive authorities) brought the two peoples closer.

Chechens valued Jewish blacksmiths, gunsmiths, jewelers, and winemakers, and Mountain Jews used the services of Chechen craftsmen and farmers. In bazaars, the trading rows stood side by side, and deals were often sealed by a spoken word. In case of an external threat, Chechens protected Jewish families, and Jews helped their neighbors with food and craft products.

During the Second World War, the Mountain Jews of Chechnya and Dagestan avoided the mass extermination that befell their communities in Crimea and the Kuban, largely thanks to the resistance of the local population, including the Chechens. In 1944, when the Soviet authorities deported the Chechens to Central Asia, some Mountain Jews of Grozny and the surrounding areas looked after their homes. After the return, the Chechens helped their Jewish neighbors amid the postwar devastation.

The cultural life of the Mountain Jews suffered greatly from Soviet policy: in 1948–1953, schools teaching in the Judeo-Tat language were closed, literature in Juhuri ceased, and communities were pressured. Nevertheless, until the end of the 20th century, several thousand Mountain Jews continued to live in Chechnya.

Cultural revival began only after 1991; however, new problems arose due to instability and religious pressure from the Muslim environment. The period of the Chechen wars of the 1990s–2000s was especially difficult, when almost all Mountain Jews left Grozny and Nalchik.

Today the number of Mountain Jews is estimated at approximately 110,000 people. The largest communities live in Israel (50–70 thousand), Azerbaijan (12–37 thousand), as well as in the USA, Germany, and Austria. In Russia, they remain in Dagestan (3–18 thousand) and partly in other regions. Traditional centers of residence include Derbent, Makhachkala, Buynaksk (Dagestan), Baku and Kuba (Azerbaijan). In Chechnya now only a few elderly representatives of this community remain, and most descendants of the Mountain Jews from Chechnya live in Israel, the USA, and Europe.

Despite the loss of former neighborhood, the memory of peaceful coexistence is preserved. Chechens and Mountain Jews who met in Israel or in the diaspora often recall the times when they were connected by shared courtyards, markets, mutual assistance, and respect — that which allowed two different peoples to live side by side for more than a century.

Relations between Jews and Chechens in Ukraine from 2014 to the present

Since the beginning of Russian aggression in 2014, the interaction between the Jewish community of Ukraine and Chechen volunteers has acquired practical and symbolic significance.

In the autumn of 2014, a volunteer battalion named after Beni Krik was created in Odesa — a Jewish-Chechen humanitarian formation. Commander Dmytro Nudel stated that Odesa Jews would collect aid for fighters in the ATO zone and for the wounded, and that volunteers would be trained with the help of fighters from the Chechen battalion named after Dzhokhar Dudayev. The battalion had a symbolic character and did not participate in battles, but demonstrated the alliance of the two communities: the Chechens shared military experience, and the Jews — resources and a volunteer network. The unit was supported by Amina Okuyeva, the wife of the commander of the Dudayev battalion.

In 2014–2015, a significant part of the assistance to Chechen volunteers was coordinated through the Dnipropetrovsk region, where, with the participation of Governor Ihor Kolomoyskyi and the Jewish community, a powerful volunteer center was created. Private patrons provided fighters with uniforms, transport, and equipment.

In February 2016, commander Adam Osmayev and Amina Okuyeva, at the invitation of city council deputy Asher Cherkassky, visited the central synagogue “Golden Rose” and the “Menorah” center in Dnipro. The guests toured the Museum “Memory of the Jewish People and the Holocaust in Ukraine,” where special attention was paid to the deportation of Chechens in 1944. Cherkassky emphasized the spiritual kinship of peoples united by a common struggle against imperial aggression.

At the state level, Jewish support was also noticeable. In the Verkhovna Rada of the 8th convocation (2014–2019), deputy Heorhii Lohvynskyi, deputy chairman of the Human Rights Committee, repeatedly raised the issue of the deportation of Chechens by the Stalinist regime, drawing parallels with the Holocaust. He welcomed the recognition of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and supported pro-Ukrainian Chechen formations. These actions strengthened the moral and political legitimacy of the Chechen presence in Ukraine.

In September 2022, the words of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, addressed to the peoples of the Caucasus with an appeal not to fight for Russia, received a wide response in the Jewish diaspora and strengthened informational support for Chechen allies.

The Chechen volunteers themselves note the respect and assistance from the Jewish community. Osmayev and Okuyeva emphasized that Ukraine became a home for people of different nationalities united by the desire for freedom. After 2022, the symbols of Ichkeria began to appear at Jewish public events, and some Chechen fighters wear a six-pointed star on their uniforms along with the flag of their republic.

From NAnews

The story of assistance from the Shostka Jewish community to the Sheikh Mansur Chechen Battalion is not a one-off gesture, but part of a long line of mutual support stretching from the days of peaceful neighborhood between Mountain Jews and Chechens in the Caucasus to today’s joint struggle in Ukraine.

Since 2014, Jewish communities across the country — from Odesa to Dnipro — have not only shared resources with Chechen volunteers, but have also publicly recognized them as allies in resisting Russian aggression. The Chechens reciprocate, seeing Ukrainian Jews as partners in arms and fate.

Today, when the flag of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria is raised alongside the Ukrainian and Israeli flags, it symbolizes not only resistance to a single aggressor, but also the historical solidarity of peoples who survived genocide and refused to give up the right to freedom. For us at NAnews — News of Israel, this is a reminder that brotherhood, forged through blood and mutual aid, can outlast centuries and borders.

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Chernikhovsky was born in Mikhailovka (Taurida Governorate), now the urban-type settlement of Mikhailovka in Zaporizhzhia Oblast. On August 20, 2020, a commemorative plaque for Chernikhovsky was unveiled on the building of the Mikhailovka Local History Museum (Zaporizhzhia Oblast, Ukraine). On March 1, 2022, Mikhailovka was occupied by Russian aggressors.

Do you know who adorns the 50-shekel bill? Yes, yes, it is him — Shaul Chernikhovsky, whose name is immortalized not only on banknotes but also on the streets of Israeli cities.

He is often called “second after Bialik” among Israeli poets. But isn’t that a compliment?

Shaul Gutmanovich Chernikhovsky was an outstanding Jewish poet, translator, and doctor, whose creations in Hebrew had a significant impact on Jewish culture.

Born in Mikhailovka (Zaporizhzhia, Ukraine), he knew several languages and began translating Pushkin’s works into Hebrew in his youth.

At the age of 15, he continued his education in Odessa. With the support of Yosef Klausner, he began publishing poems. He then went to Heidelberg and Lausanne, where he studied medicine. Upon returning from abroad, he worked as a doctor in Melitopol and in Kharkiv Governorate.

During the First World War, he was also a doctor in a hospital (Serafimovsky Lazaret in Minsk). He was awarded the Order of St. Stanislaus, third class, and the Order of St. Anna, third class.

After the war, he returned to Odessa and engaged in private medical practice. In 1922, he emigrated from Russia and settled in Berlin.

His poems and translations brought him wide recognition. He wrote poems in Hebrew (at that time, Hebrew was not yet fully restored as a spoken language and was often called the “ancient Hebrew language”). His poetry celebrates inner revival through Zionism, the liberation of the Jewish soul.

For modern Hebrew speakers, however, Chernikhovsky’s metrics are often difficult to perceive because the stresses in modern Hebrew differ from the language in which the poet wrote; the language itself has significantly changed, becoming a living means of communication.

In 1931, Chernikhovsky made a move that changed his life: he moved to Eretz-Israel. Here he not only contributed to medicine by compiling a dictionary of terms (Latin — Hebrew — English) but also continued to heal with words, working as a doctor in a school.

His pen was no less powerful than a scalpel, as he translated the epic poems “Iliad” and “Odyssey” into Hebrew, as well as “The Tale of Igor’s Campaign.” For translating the Finnish “Kalevala,” he was awarded the Knight’s Cross of the Order of the White Rose of Finland in 1934. From 1936, Chernikhovsky represented Hebrew literature in the international PEN club and was nominated for the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1935 and 1937. He twice became a laureate of the Bialik Prize for Literature.

Twice (in 1935 and 1937) he was nominated for the Nobel Prize in Literature.

He passed away in 1943 in Jerusalem, leaving behind a rich literary legacy.

Shaul Chernikhovsky is not just a name, it is a symbol. A symbol of love for his people, language, and culture. A symbol of tireless pursuit of knowledge and creativity.

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Ankara’s rhetoric towards Israel has once again sharply intensified, and this time it’s not just about the usual accusations against Jerusalem. According to The Jerusalem Post, on April 12, 2026, Recep Tayyip Erdogan accused Israel of ‘atrocities’ against Palestinians and Lebanon during a speech in Istanbul, and then suggested the possibility of a military scenario, comparing it to Turkey’s actions in Karabakh and Libya. For the Israeli audience, this does not sound like an ordinary emotional outburst, but as another signal: relations between the two countries are rapidly approaching a new dangerous point.

It is also important that Erdogan’s words did not occur in a vacuum. They coincided with a new round of the Turkish-Israeli conflict around the ‘Gaza flotilla’, Turkish accusations against Israeli leaders, and mutual public insults at the highest level. As a result, the crisis between Jerusalem and Ankara today looks not just like a diplomatic quarrel, but as a struggle for regional role, in which Turkey is increasingly trying to speak the language of force.

What exactly did Erdogan say and why did it sound so alarming

The Jerusalem Post writes that the Turkish president first accused Israel of continuing a ‘genocidal network’ and claimed that 1.2 million Lebanese were forced to leave their homes due to Israeli strikes. At the same time, the publication separately notes: Israel and the US reject the assertion that Lebanon is part of the current ceasefire agreements with Iran. Later, responding to journalists, Erdogan went even further and said that Turkey must be strong to prevent Israel from doing this to Palestine, and then made a direct comparison with Karabakh and Libya.

The most sensitive part of his words is precisely the formula about the possible repetition of past Turkish interventions. Back in July 2024, Reuters recorded almost the same logic: at that time, Erdogan already said that Turkey must be strong enough so that Israel could not do ‘these ridiculous things’ with Palestine, and added that Ankara could act the same as in Karabakh and Libya. In other words, the current statement is not an accidental slip, but a continuation of an already established line of pressure.

Karabakh and Libya are no longer a metaphor, but a political signal

For Israel, the level of hostility is not the only important factor, but also the chosen images. When the Turkish leader refers to Karabakh and Libya, he shifts the dispute from the realm of slogans to the plane of precedents. This is a way to show internal audiences strength, and external ones Ankara’s readiness to see itself not just as a participant in the Middle Eastern discussion, but as an independent power center. Even if a direct military confrontation between Turkey and Israel does not currently seem like a likely scenario, the normalization of such rhetoric itself is already dangerous.

In this situation, Israel hears not just another anti-Israel speech, but Erdogan’s attempt to occupy the niche of the main defender of the Palestinian issue in the Muslim world. And the weaker the traditional Arab mechanisms of influence appear, the louder Ankara tries to speak on behalf of the region. In this sense, Turkey’s threats are both a foreign policy challenge to Israel and an element of internal Turkish political theater.

How Israel responded and why the conflict quickly moved to a personal phase

The Israeli side’s response was not long in coming. According to The Jerusalem Post, Heritage Minister Amichai Eliyahu accused Erdogan of hypocrisy, reminded of Northern Cyprus, the treatment of Kurds and the Armenian issue, and also called the Turkish president a ‘megalomaniac dictator’ with imperial ambitions. Moreover, he hinted that it was time to close ‘this sad chapter of relations’ and raise the question of a complete severance of diplomatic ties with Turkey.

Against this backdrop, the conflict became even harsher due to the Turkish case against Israeli officials over the ‘Sumud’ episode. The Jerusalem Post reported that the Turkish prosecutor’s office filed charges against Benjamin Netanyahu and 35 other Israeli officials over the interception of the ‘Gaza flotilla’ in October 2025. Anadolu also confirmed that it was an indictment against Netanyahu and 34 others in the case of the attack on a humanitarian aid ship. It is this legal front that has made the current verbal skirmish even more explosive.

This is where Nikk.Agency — Israel News | Nikk.Agency sees the main shift. Ankara is no longer limited to harsh statements about Gaza and Palestine. Turkey is simultaneously trying to play the court, the moral accuser, and the regional power that allows the language of military threat against Israel. For the Israeli reader, this is no longer a private news about Erdogan’s harsh words, but a sign of a much deeper cooling, where public hatred is gradually forming into a systemic state line.

From the flotilla to ‘the Hitler of our time’

Further escalation was almost instantaneous. The Jerusalem Post reported that Netanyahu, Israel Katz, and Itamar Ben-Gvir responded to Turkish accusations with separate harsh posts, and Ben-Gvir published an openly offensive message towards Erdogan. After this, the Turkish Foreign Ministry issued an official reaction, stating that Netanyahu is called ‘the Hitler of our time’ due to the crimes he committed. This formula is also recorded on the official website of the Turkish foreign policy department.

When a diplomatic dispute reaches such language, the space for normal dialogue almost disappears. For Israel, this means that Turkey is no longer just arguing with Israeli policy, but is consciously building one of the most aggressive anti-Israel narratives in the region. And when such rhetoric comes from a NATO member country with serious military potential, it is inevitably perceived differently in Jerusalem than the usual statements from the Iranian proxy camp.

What this means for Israel right now

The main problem for Israel is that the Turkish line is no longer just noisy. It consists of three elements simultaneously: threats of a forceful nature, legal pressure on Israeli leaders, and an ideological campaign where Israel is described in the language of ‘genocide’, ‘barbarism’, and international crime. In such a configuration, Erdogan is trying to make Turkey not just a critic of Israel, but a political center of attraction for the entire anti-Israel agenda in the region.

For Israeli society, this means that Turkey is already difficult to perceive as a complex, but still pragmatic partner of previous years. Even if a direct military scenario remains unlikely, the logic of relations has changed. Ankara is increasingly trying on the role of a state that simultaneously pressures Israel through moral accusations, international legal constructions, and the threat of force. And that is why Erdogan’s current words should be read not as a single outburst, but as part of a new, tougher Turkish strategy against Israel.

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In Israel, the dispute between the left and the right has long gone beyond the usual disagreement between parties, programs, and election slogans. On the surface, it looks like a conflict over war, security, Arab-Israeli relations, the role of the court, the state, and religion. But if you look deeper, it becomes clear: often it’s not just about different views on the same events, but about two different ways of understanding the world, justice, and human loyalty.

That is why the same fact in Israeli society provokes not just different assessments, but almost incompatible moral reactions.

For some, the main thing is not to betray their own. For others, it is not to abandon a universal principle, even if it is inconvenient and painful.

And as long as this internal conflict is not called by its names, the country will continue to argue as if it were about numbers, although in reality, the dispute is about what to consider good, what is duty, and what is betrayal.

Not just two platforms, but two coordinate systems

It is customary to say that the left and the right are people with different political programs.

Some advocate for tougher security and national cohesion, others for human rights, limiting state power, and more universal moral rules. But in the Israeli reality, this explanation is no longer sufficient.

The right-wing worldview in its mass form is most often built around belonging.

In such logic, the world is divided into ‘us’ and ‘them,’ and morality does not exist separately from this division. It begins to work differently depending on who is being discussed. Our own can make mistakes, behave rudely, be unjust, but they still remain our own. The outsider is initially perceived as someone who cannot be trusted, who should be feared, and whose suffering does not have to evoke the same reaction as the suffering of our own.

In Israeli political culture, this manifests itself especially sharply because the country lives under real threat, memories of wars, terrorist attacks, and a constant sense of siege. In such an atmosphere, the division into ‘us’ and ‘them’ becomes not only an emotional reaction but also a way of self-description. Moreover, outsiders can be not only Arabs or Iran. Within Israel itself, ‘leftists,’ judges, officials, the Ashkenazi elite, secular liberals, Russian speakers, ultra-Orthodox, migrants, human rights activists easily fall into this category — the set changes, but the mechanism remains.

A common enemy in such a system is often more important than a common positive goal. It is not an idea that unites the camp, but an object of irritation. Not an image of the future, but an image of danger.

Why in a warring society justice seems like a threat

That is why in times of war or acute crisis, the attempt to talk about equal moral standards for everyone is perceived not as honesty, but as hostility.

When a person says that compassion, law, and measure should also be applied to outsiders, their words are easily perceived as undermining collective defense. It seems as if they are not just arguing, but breaking the internal psychological shield on which communal solidarity rests.

This is one of the main features of the Israeli political dispute.

For many people, morality is primarily loyalty to their own. If our children are killed, it is absolute evil. If our actions lead to the death of other people’s children, it is explained by war, necessity, collateral damage, the enemy’s guilt, or the inevitability of conflict. Symmetry here seems not like humanism, but almost like sacrilege.

For another part of society, morality is arranged differently.

There, the center is not loyalty, but justice. Not the tribe, but the principle.

This approach requires that the same rules work against both the enemy and our own. If it is unacceptable to kill civilians, it should be unacceptable always. If there is a right, it should not become a privilege only for one’s own camp. If there is compassion, it cannot end at the border of identity.

On this line, the main Israeli rift is born. Some believe that universal morality in a real war is a luxury that a society under threat cannot afford. Others are convinced that it is the refusal of universal morality that destroys the country from within because it turns it from a community of citizens into a camp living by the rules of emotional mobilization.

NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency has repeatedly shown through examples from Israeli public life that this crack runs not only between parties in the Knesset but also through families, work collectives, universities, the military environment, and even ordinary conversations in bomb shelters, where fear, anger, and a sense of common destiny often prove stronger than any rational arguments.

Why this dispute is almost impossible to end

In the Israeli discussion, it is often mistakenly thought that the issue can be resolved with the right facts.

That if you explain better, provide numbers, remind of chronology, show cause-and-effect relationships, the opponent will definitely change their position. But this does not always work precisely because the dispute is not about facts as such.

When one person perceives the discussion as a search for truth, and another as a test of loyalty, an almost insurmountable chasm arises between them. For the first, admitting one’s own mistake is part of honest thinking. For the second, it is a risk of weakening their own and giving an argument to outsiders.

And in conditions of conflict, it is often the second type of behavior that proves to be socially more advantageous: it gives a sense of belonging, security, and emotional warmth within the group.

Therefore, a leftist in Israel often seems not just naive to a rightist, but dangerous.

And a rightist to a leftist looks not just harsh, but morally deaf.

Each sees in the other not only a political opponent but a bearer of a different human structure.

This does not mean that all rightists are the same or that all leftists truly live by high universal standards. Reality is always more complex than any scheme. Among the right, there are people for whom moral constraints and the human dignity of outsiders are important. Among the left, there is enough cynicism, arrogance, and double standards. But the general difference in priorities still exists, and it explains a lot in today’s Israel.

The dispute between the left and the right here increasingly turns out to be a dispute not about how to better govern the country, but about what makes a person moral at all.

For one side, it is moral to be for one’s own, even when it requires turning a blind eye to inconvenient questions. For the other, it is moral to ask these questions even when it makes you an outsider among your own.

And as long as Israel remains a society living under the pressure of war, memory, trauma, and constant fear, this conflict will not disappear. Because it concerns not only elections, not only Netanyahu, not only judicial reform or the war in Gaza. It concerns the very foundation of the social contract: is the nation built on common justice or on common loyalty.

The answer to this question determines not only the language of political polemics. It also determines what Israel wants to see itself as in the future — a state that knows how to protect its own without abandoning moral constraints, or a society where the very idea of justice will increasingly seem like a weakness.

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